This article was downloaded by: [University of Sydney]

On: 01 May 2015, At: 13:08

Publisher: Routledge
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954
Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

Defence Economics
Publication details, including instructions for authors and
subscription information:
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/gdpe19

Nobody cites nobody else:

Mathematical models of domestic
political conflict
a
Mark I. Lichbach
a
Center for Comparative Politics, Department of Political
Science , University of Colorado , Campus Box 333, Boulder,
Colorado, 80309–0333, USA
Published online: 19 Oct 2007.

To cite this article: Mark I. Lichbach (1992) Nobody cites nobody else: Mathematical
models of domestic political conflict, Defence Economics, 3:4, 341-357, DOI:
10.1080/10430719208404742

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10430719208404742

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information
(the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor
& Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties
whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the
Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and
views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The
accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently
verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable
for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages,
and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in
connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes.
Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-
licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly
forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://
www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions
 Defence Economics, 1992, Vol. 3, pp. 341-357 © 1992 Harwood Academic Publishers GmbH
Reprints available directly from the publisher Printed in Great Britain
Photocopying permitted by license only

NOBODY CITES NOBODY ELSE: MATHEMATICAL

MODELS OF DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONFLICT*
MARK I. LICHBACH
Center for Comparative Politics, Department of Political Science,
University of Colorado, Campus Box 333, Boulder, Colorado 80309-0333, USA
(Received 26 February 1992; in final form 3 June 1992)

This paper surveys nearly two hundred scholarly works that use mathematical methods, which include
Downloaded by [University of Sydney] at 13:08 01 May 2015

stochastic models, difference and differential equation models, expected utility models, and various types
of game theoretic models, to study domestic political conflict (DPC), which includes terrorism, guerrilla
wars and insurrections. A citation count reveals that the DPC articles surveyed here cite less than three
quarters of an article from within their own DPC modelling tradition and cite less than two articles from
any DPC modelling tradition. The only exceptions to the rule that "nobody cites nobody else" are the
stochastic and expected utility modelers. I conclude that the "field" of formal models of DPC hardly
exists: few authors read other authors, few articles cite other articles, few models build on other models.
Several suggestions aimed at promoting greater accumulation in formal models of DPC are offered.

KEY WORDS: Mathematical models, conflict, violence, revolution.

INTRODUCTION

This article identifies nearly two hundred scholarly works that use mathematical
methods to study protest demonstrations, riots, military coups, terrorism, political
repression, human rights abuses, civil wars and revolutions. The defining feature of
this subject matter (Gurr and Lichbach, 1979; 1986), which I shall refer to as domestic
political confict (DPC), is that either the challenges by dissident groups to the
structures, incumbents, or policies of a state, or the responses by the state to those
challenges, involve the threat or actual use of physical coercion to exact concessions
or compliance from their targets. DPC is thus an ongoing struggle between state and
opposition involving more than such conventional democratic processes as lobbying
and elections.
Perhaps you are surprised by the number of scholarly efforts devoted to constructing
mathematical models of DPC. The authors themselves would certainly be surprised.
The game theorists, engineers, geographers, economists, political scientists and
sociologists who have built such models have published in journals, edited collections
and books scattered across academia. The result of this scatter of DPC articles is that
the authors do not seem to be aware of each others' efforts. The use of difference or
differential equations to model protest and repression, for example, has been the
antithesis of scholarship: stagnation and not progress, ad hocery and not accumu-
lation. The better executed difference and differential equation models make their
way through to a scholarly journal, somewhere, sometime, somehow. But they remain

* I would like to thank Steve Chan, Tom Mayer, Todd Sandier and Mike Ward for their very helpful
comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

341
 342 M. I. LICHBACH

uncited, presumably unknown and unread. After reading all these articles one
therefore gets the painful feeling that no real field of "mathematical models of
D P C " exists: few authors read other authors, few articles cite other articles, few
models build on other models.
Things could be different. Things are different for mathematical modelers of
international conflict. While over a dozen articles and books (e.g., Intriligator, 1982)
have reviewed, summarized and evaluated formal models of international crises, arms
races, nuclear proliferation, etc., no piece has provided an overview of formal models
of terrorism, guerrilla warfare, and insurrections. Evidently no one has ever bothered
to look at the domestic side of the formal conflict literature as a whole. The result
is that whereas formal modelers of international conflict think of themselves as
working within a field, formal modelers of DPC keep reinventing the wheel.
The purpose of this article is therefore to create a common awareness among
formal modelers of DPC that there is a budding field out there. I do this by pointing
Downloaded by [University of Sydney] at 13:08 01 May 2015

out where accumulation within and among formal modelling traditions has and has
not occurred.
The results of my survey will demonstrate that there are only two modelling
traditions in DPC studies that are cumulative: stochastic modelling and expected
utility modelling. Stochastic modelers have consistently depicted outbreaks of DPC
as random. Expected utility modelers have consistently depicted rational rebels as
choosing not to rebel. These traditions are not only internally cumulative; they also
turn out to be externally consistent. These observations, which could only have come
from looking at the field of mathematical models of DPC as a whole, will be elaborated
shortly.
The plan for my survey is quite simple. The next section outlines the methodology
I used to create a sample of mathematical models of DPC. The following section
advances a taxonomy of modelling approaches to DPC. The citation patterns of the
articles are then reviewed to demonstrate that most modelers do not acknowledge
previously published models of the same or a related genre. The final section evaluates
the accomplishments and failures of this budding field and suggests some future
avenues of inquiry. The paper includes a bibliography that is functionally divided
into the categories of models developed in the body of the text.

BOUNDARIES OF THE SURVEY

The boundaries of "mathematical models" and of "domestic political conflict" are

inherently difficult to erect. A manageable survey, however, must establish these
boundaries. A focus on any use of "mathematics" and on any type of "conflict"
would produce too broad an overview to be of direct use.
The use of a mathematical model is taken to be any attempt at formalizing an
argument such that specific deductions follow from explicit assumptions. This focus
does not exclude works based on the level of mathematics used. Some of the
mathematical models surveyed here are relatively intricate, involving extensive
manipulations of assumptions; other models are relatively simple, involving a single
diagram or equation. The focus adopted here does produce, however, two significant
exclusions from the survey. First, if the piece refers only to other works that formalize
a model, it is excluded. This criterion eliminates the scores of articles in the "resource
mobilization " tradition in sociology and political science. Such works typically adopt
 DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONFLICT MODELS 343

some form of rational choice reasoning, looking at dissidents, for example, as choosing
demonstrations over interest group activity when demonstrating is more profitable,
but do not themselves adopt any formalisms. Second, if the model is a purely statistical
one, designed to be more or less directly estimated, it is excluded. This criterion
eliminates the scores of articles that use statistical methods, both cross sectional and
time series, to test hypotheses about DPC, including hypotheses about the "economic
determinants" of collective dissent.
The definition of DPC adopted here and presented at the outset involves the threat
or actual use of physical coercion on political opponents. Its use produces four
significant exclusions from this survey.
Models of political interaction that lack the threat or use of force. Many modelling
traditions in political economy are designed to capture conventional democratic
processes. These include models of legitimacy or executive popularity, rent-seeking
competition among interest groups, electoral competition among political parties,
Downloaded by [University of Sydney] at 13:08 01 May 2015

government as a revenue-maximizing Leviathan, and the formation of political

coalitions. Other modelling traditions are designed to capture very general conflict
processes, and include models of the emergence of property rights, of law and order,
and of the state out of anarchy, perpetual theft and insecurity, as well as models of
power, interdependence, inequality, cleavage and relative deprivation among a set
of actors. A final set of modelling traditions are designed to capture revolution without
rebellion. These formal models depict institutional, organizational or constitutional
choice among a set of actors, modelling the origin of or changes in regime and state
that are not necessarily the result of violent clashes among the actors involved. All
such models from all these modelling traditions are excluded.
Models of crime. Many formal models of protest conclude that rebels must really
be criminals (see the expected utility tradition below). Many formal models of crime,
moreover, have been adapted to model protest. Protest and crime are different
substantive domains, however, and only protest is surveyed here.
Models of subnational conflict. Many formal models depict violent and/or non-
violent clashes among private actors in which the state is not a direct participant.
Models along these lines include models of conflict between workers and the firm,
economic classes, and ethnic groups. Though many such conflicts eventually engulf
the state, bringing such state actors as national politicians and the police into the
fray, these models are not considered unless the modeler brings in state actors.
Modelers of international conflict. Though formal models of conflict among nations
might be isomorphic in many ways to formal models of conflict within nations,
domestic and international conflict are different substantive domains. Only within-
nation conflict is surveyed.
These definitions were used to create a sample of published works that formally
model DPC. I tried to be as inclusive as possible and hence read widely.1 The sources
thus included, but were not limited to, the four or five major journals in political
science, economics and sociology, as well as alljournals devoted specifically to conflict
studies. The latter include Conflict, Defence Economics, Journal of Conflict Manage-
ment and Peace Science, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Journal of Peace Science,
Journal of Peace Studies, Papers, Peace Science Society (International), and Terrorism.

1
This survey is limited to the Anglo-Saxon literature, excluding many interesting and important
contributions in German, French, etc.
 344 M. I. LICHBACH

THE TAXONOMY

In order to classify each of the DPC articles surveyed, I developed a taxonomy of

DPC models. There are four points to note about this taxonomy. First, in order to
make the discussion easier to follow, I have underlined and numbered the specific
categories of models that subsequently appear in Table 1 and in the references.
Second, due to space limitations only the three or four most important types of
models are discussed in any detail. Third, there are numerous operational difficulties
in classifying DPC articles. Rational actor reasoning may lay behind difference and
differential equation models, simulation models, or even stochastic models (i.e., the
probability of an individual overcoming the free rider problem and successfully
initiating a riot). Difference and differential equation reasoning, moreover, may lay
behind simulation models and stochastic models. The result is that the categories
are not necessarily mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive. Fourth, in the
Downloaded by [University of Sydney] at 13:08 01 May 2015

interest of space, articles are classified only once, under the type of model principally
used.
Mathematical models of DPC are divided into two sets: those based on some
optimization framework are rational choice models (II), and those that do not involve
optimization are non-rational choice models (I). Several types of non-rational choice
models are found in DPC studies.

Non-rational choice models (/)

Stochastic models (I.A) are models of randomness. Suppose we assume that all cities
(countries) have an identical probability of experiencing a demonstration or riot
(coup or terrorism) at each point in time. Moreover, the outbreak of, say, a riot in
a city at one point of time does not change the probability that the same city or
neighbouring cities will also experience a riot. DPC is thus truly random, a series of
independent events. Such a theory of DPC may be modelled using a Poisson density
function. Let

There are i (0,1, 2,...) DPC events that may occur over a fixed time interval in any
city or country. p; is the probability of a particular city or country being in state i
and thus experiencing i DPC events, a is a measure of DPC proneness of cities or
countries, or the expected (mean) number of DPC events that a city or country will
experience. The observed frequency distribution of DPC events (e.g., the number of
cities experiencing 0,1,2,... riots per year) is then compared with a x2 test of
goodness-of-fit to the theoretical frequency distribution expected under Poisson
assumptions. If the test fails, one or more of the aforementioned assumptions, such
as the homogeneity of the units (i.e., all have the same probability of experiencing
a DPC event) or the independence of DPC events (i.e., there are no interconnections
among cities or states that can lead to the contagion of DPC), may be relaxed. Other
stochastic distributions (e.g., negative binomial) that capture heterogeneity and/or
diffusion might then be fit to the data.
Difference and differential equation models of opposition (I.B) depict the spread of
dissent among some contagious population:

^ = F(O,t) (2)
at
 DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONFLICT MODELS 345

O is the level of dissent by the regime's opponents. Specific functional forms are
used to represent various hypotheses about the temporal diffusion of dissent.
Richardson models of regime-opposition interaction (I.C) factor the regime into the
previous model. The assumption here is that DPC occurs between regimes and
oppositions and that such conflict unfolds over time in an action-reaction manner.
Such a theory of DPC has been modelled with a set of arms race type equations:

at

^ = G{O,R,t)
at
0 is still the level of dissent by the regime's opponents. R is now the level of repression
by the government. As in Richardson models of arms races, various assumptions are
Downloaded by [University of Sydney] at 13:08 01 May 2015

then made about how dissent and repression are both triggered or impeded by dissent
and/or repression. One might speculate, for example, that there is some threshold
of repression below which dissent is encouraged and above which dissent is
discouraged. One might also speculate about a fatigue factor in repression such that
high levels of repression discourage even higher levels. The qualitative dynamics
of regime-opposition conflict, the growth trajectories of the dispute, are then
investigated.
Three other categories complete the set of non-rational choice models considered
here. Suppose we assume that revolution and crises are major and abrupt political
upheavals. Catastrophe theory (I.D) is designed precisely to handle such discontinuous
shifts, sequences of shifts, and multiple equilibria. Catastrophe models thus typically
distinguish zones in which gradual political changes are likely to occur from those
in which rapid political change is predicted. Computer simulation models (I.E) of
DPC have been developed. Complicated computer algorithms have tried to capture,
for example, the role of DPC in economic and political "development". Finally, a
grab-bag of other models (I.F) in the non-rational choice tradition have specified a
variety of functional forms and equations thought to capture the causes, courses and
consequences of DPC.

Rational choice models (II)

1 now turn to the rational choice of tradition in DPC models. Several types of decision
theory (II.A) have appeared. Regimes and dissidents are often thought to be
deterministic utility maximizers (II.A.l), or actors who maximize a utility or
production function subject to constraints. Analysts typically derive indifference
curves and then study income and substitution effects.
A variation of this argument suggests that the dissident's decision calculus is based
on expected utility (II.A.2) calculations. Suppose dissidents seek a public good from
the government, for example, an anti-discrimination law. Consider the following
model of public goods provision:

Ut = bP(llkJ\-ckl (4)

Ut is the utility of dissident i. b is the benefits to i of any dissident's contribution of

one unit of resources toward the public good, c is the cost to i of his or her contribution.
 346 M. I. LICHBACH

If i does (does not) contribute any resources towards the public good, kt = 1 (kt = 0).
P ( . ) is the probability of receiving the PG if n people cooperate. Hence, as the
number of cooperators increase, the benefits b from the public good is unaffected
but the probability of receiving the public good [ P ( . ) ] changes. For defection to
be a Nash equilibrium in this case the returns from defection if j others contribute
must be at least as great as the returns from contribution if j others contribute:
l)-c (5)
Or,
obiP(j + i)-pun (6)
In order for a dissident to contribute his or her benefits times the probability of making
a difference [ P ( j + 1) — P ( ; ) ] must be at least as great as his or her costs. Since in
large dissident groups the probability of making a difference is small, rational
Downloaded by [University of Sydney] at 13:08 01 May 2015

dissidents in such a situation will never contribute toward the public good.
A grab-bag of other models (II.A.3) in the decision theory tradition, including
models of risk, public goods and control systems, have appeared. The other type of
rational choice approach that has been used to model DPC is the multiperson game
(II.B).
Almost all types of game theory (II.B.l) models have been employed. Games may
be represented in their greatest detail in extensive form (H.B.l.a), or as a sequence
of moves. Terrorism, for example, has been modelled in extensive form. Some of the
complexity of extensive form games may be abstracted away by considering only the
set of strategies available to each actor. Such a game is said to be displayed in normal
form. If strategies are discrete and small in number, normal form games may be
displayed as a bimatrix model (II.B.l.b). The Prisoner's Dilemma, for example, has
been used to represent the dissidents' collective action problem. If strategies are
continuous, as in theories of duopoly, normal form games may be displayed as a
continuous model (II.B.l.c). Regime-opposition interaction, for example, has been
depicted using such models. Some of the complexity of normal form games may be
abstracted away by turning from noncooperative games, in which agreements to form
coalitions are not enforceable, to cooperative games, in which such agreements are
enforceable. In exploring cooperative coalitions, DPC modelers have considered both
the two-person bargaining (II.B.l.d) problem, for example the negotiations between
regimes and oppositions, and the multiperson coalition (II.B.l.e) problem, for example
the dissident group's attempts to build a winning coalition.
DPC modelers have also applied the multiperson decision perspective to various
types of market models (II.B.2). The zero-sum tradeoff along a contract curve may
produce conflict, for example, because the problems of recontracting and of blocking
coalitions produce gridlock and an inability to move towards Pareto optimality.
Models of the supply and demand of social movements, for another example, have
also appeared. Finally, some DPC modelers have integrated political demonstrations
and/or government coercion into macroeconomic or general equilibrium models.
DPC modelers have, in addition, applied the multiperson decision perspective to
various types of social choice models (11.B.3). Some DPC models are based on
Downs' spatial theory (II.BJ.a). These models of policy space use the preference
distribution of the population, or the ideological spectrum in collective dissent, to
derive implications about the number of people mobilized or politicized into protest
and rebellion. Other DPC models are based on the preference aggregation (II.BJ.b)
 DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONFLICT MODELS 347

problem. The various difficulties that arise from aggregating individual preferences
into collective decisions, such as instability, cycles, and manipulation, can lead to
repression and dissent.

RESULTS
The results of the citation study appear in Table 1. Several aspects of these results
merit discussion. First,. I note that 182 scholarly works that contain mathematical
models of DPC were uncovered. There are evidently many more formal models of
DPC than anyone has hitherto imagined. Even Mueller's (1989) and Eggertson's
(1990) fine surveys of the public choice tradition failed to recognize the extensive
contributions to that literature made by rational actor models of DPC.
Second, these 182 articles cited a mean of 0.73 articles within their categories, a
Downloaded by [University of Sydney] at 13:08 01 May 2015

mean of 1.04 articles outside of their categories, and thus a mean of 1.77 articles
overall. But even this finding that DPC modelers cite less than three-quarters of an
article from within their own DPC modelling tradition and cite less than two articles
from any DPC modelling tradition must be qualified. Many of these citations are to
a very small number of classic articles, such as Downs (1956), Gurr (1970) and
Hirschman (1970), which are referenced for reasons other than their relatively simple

Table 1 Citations to mathematical models of DPC

Category Number Mean number of

of citations

Within Other

I. Non-rational choice models

A. Stochastic models 23 1.57 0.09
B. Difference and differential equation models of opposition 10 0.70 1.00
C. Richardson models of regime-opposition interaction 13 0.38 1.23
D. Catastrophe theory 3 0.00 0.00
E. Computer simulation models 12 0.67 0.67
F. Other models 4 0.00 0.00
II. Rational choice models
A. Decision theory
1. Deterministic utility maximization 23 0.30 1.78
2. Expected utility models 28 1.57 1.25
3. Other models 6 1.00 2.00
B. Multiperson games
1. Game theory
a. Extensive form 4 0.00 1.50
b. Bimatrix models 10 0.30 1.30
c. Continuous models 3 0.00 2.00
d. Two-person bargaining 3 0.00 2.33
e. Multiperson coalitions 5 0.00 1.60
2. Market models 14 0.43 1.07
3. Social choice models
a. Spatial theory 13 0.54 0.62
b. Preference aggregation models 8 0.50 0.36
TOTALS: 182 0.73 1.04
 348 M. I. LICHBACH

DPC models. Many of the citations, moreover, are to a very small number of classic
DPC models in the stochastic (e.g., Spilerman, 1970) and expected utility (e.g.,
Tullock, 1972) traditions. I therefore conclude that little accumulation has occurred
in the field, of DPC modelling as a whole. The title of this article says it all: nobody
cites nobody else.
Third, I must note the two exceptions to this rule. The 23 stochastic articles cite
a mean of 1.57 articles from within their tradition, so that the authors are well aware
of each other's efforts. The consequence is that the use of the Poisson and related
stochastic distributions to model formally DPC is a truly cumulative research
approach. Stochastic modelers have, in addition, produced one of the two noteworthy
conclusions about DPC to emerge: outbreaks of protest and rebellion are largely
random events. Similarly, the 28 expected utility pieces also cite a mean of 1.57
articles within their tradition, so that the authors are also well aware of each others'
efforts. Hence, the use of variants of the expected utility model is the other truly
Downloaded by [University of Sydney] at 13:08 01 May 2015

cumulative modelling approach in DPC studies. Expected utility modelers, moreover,

have produced the other notable conclusion to emerge: unless the rebel's free rider
problem is overcome, for example by selective incentives, a rational rebel will
ordinarily not rebel.
Mathematical models of DPC have, accordingly, produced two astoundingly
counterintuitive results: expected utility models have shown that rational people will
usually not rebel and stochastic models have shown that instances of rebellion are
largely random events. The virtue of looking at all the formal models of DPC surveyed
here has therefore been to discover the obvious linkage between these two modelling
traditions: given that rational people usually do not rebel, and given that there are
very many possible ways to overcome the rebel's collective action problem (e.g.,
selective incentives, zealots, entrepreneurs, patrons, federal groups, Tit-for-Tat),
actual instances of rebellion will be largely the result of random successes at
overcoming what I have called the Rebel's Dilemma (Lichbach, 1992). Formal DPC
models of both rationality and of randomness are therefore not only internally
cumulative, but also reinforcing of one another. These two formal modelling traditions
have thus offered us a great insight into DPC that is currently being expanded in
many different directions. It is an insight, moreover that could not have come in any
other way but with the mathematical formalisms. Any critic of the formal modelling
tradition in conflict studies could be disarmed if he or she actually spent the time
pondering the implications of stochastic and expected utility models of DPC.
Other modelling traditions in DPC studies, however, have been notably less
successful. Consider, for example difference or differential equation models of the
growth of opposition, or what may be referred to as the "reproduction" theory of
DPC, and of regime-opposition interaction, or what might be referred to as the
"reaction" theory of DPC. The 10 pieces in the reproduction tradition only cite a
mean of 0.70 articles from within their approach. The 13 pieces in the reaction
tradition cite a mean of 0.38 articles from within their approach. Neither the
reproduction nor reaction modelers generally cite existing models of reproduction
and reaction, which could either be due to a lack of information about or a lack of
appreciation of existing models of DPC. Neither reason reflects well on the
approaches. Neither approach, moreover, has produced a notable result. No
consistent finding or theme bears mention. These two flaws are of course related: if
the models develop a consistent theme, modelers will read provious models; if
modelers read each others' models, themes develop. DPC models of reproduction
 DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONFLICT MODELS 349

and reaction, one must unfortunately conclude, follow each other without rhyme or
reason.
The contrast of DPC models of reproduction and reaction with DPC models of
rationality and randomness could therefore not be greater. While most expected
utility modellers and stochastic modelers are well aware that they work within a
formal modelling tradition, almost all the other modelers from all the other formal
modelling traditions surveyed here seem oblivious to the fact that they are reinventing
at least part of the wheel. Difference/differential equation models, spatial models,
game theoretic models, etc. follow each other, but also talk past each other. Many
of these models do offer some fascinating ideas and insights into DPC, and are worth
pursuing. Precious few are actually pursued. More accumulation, especially the
development of a few basic themes, is therefore definitely needed in models of DPC.
Unless new models build on the ideas of earlier models, we produce curiosities and
not a field.
Downloaded by [University of Sydney] at 13:08 01 May 2015

The contrast of DPC models of reproduction and reaction with the Richardson
arms race tradition in studies of international conflict also could not be greater. New
arms race models do explicitly build on existing arms race models, continually
exploring the theme of external threat vs. domestic fatigue as competing explanations
of an arms race. Themes exist, modelers read about the themes, and themes are then
revised and reworked. Now that is a field.

CONCLUSIONS
Skeptics of the formal modelling approach to DPC always raise one question: what
has really been accomplished by these formal models ? Are they mere mathematical
curiosities, interesting exercises in technical virtuosity, or will we really understand
DPC any better after we have read the nearly two hundred studies surveyed here?
One must conclude that a definite negative side to these formal models of DPC
does exist. The fact that few formal modelers accord other formal modelers the respect
of being cited implies that maybe the skeptics are right and the models really do not
deserve respect. Given that stochastic models and expected utility models have
developed ideas that have been pursued, there is, however, at least some indication
that at least two formal modelling traditions are worth pursuing.
It is towards the end of improving the successful modelling traditions and
reivigorating the unsuccessful ones that I offer some final suggestions for the future
development of formal models of DPC. It is apparent to anyone familiar with the
large substantive and theoretical literature on DPC that formal models of DPC have
addressed only a small subset of the interesting questions.2 Six gaps seem particularly
worthy and capable of redress.
First, if one reads all of these formal models of DPC, an interesting but unarticulated
theme emerges: how one type of structure or relationship among a set of people
leads to another type of structure or relationship, namely conflict, among the same

2
A citation count of the substantive and theoretical conflict literature, a literature written mostly by
political scientists and sociologists, would produce an equally distressing result. The consequences of most
DPC modelers' unfamiliarity with this literature is often a superficial understanding of DPC and a model
that offers few insights. DPC modelers, in short, need to read other models of DPC as well as the relevant
substantive and theoretical literature.
 350 M. I. LICHBACH

set of people. There are (Lichbach, 1989) non-rational actor models of how cleavage
and polarization; hierarchy, power and dependence; mobilization and assimilation;
contagion and diffusion; and inequality, class, relative deprivation, and rank
disequilibrium produce conflict. There are also rational actor models of how burden
shifting, the balance of power, contextual effects of the size of the group and/or the
number of other potential dissidents, segmentation-sorting-mixing-integration, and
exit produce conflict. The idea that conflict is often the unexpected, unwanted and
unavoidable outcome of political, social or economic structures is something which
can only be appreciated if models of such structures are integrated with models of
DPC. Such models of rich and complicated DPC processes are waiting to be
constructed.
Second, while economists have integrated models of DPC with models of economic
processes, such as a general equilibrium or macroeconomic framework, political
scientists have yet to integrate models of DPC with models of political institutions
Downloaded by [University of Sydney] at 13:08 01 May 2015

and processes. DPC has yet to be placed, for example, into a voting and election
framework, or a lobbying and interest group framework. The result is that while
economists have explored the economic consequences of DPC, political scientists
have yet to explore the political consequences of protest and repression. Since most
rational actor models look at participation in protest and rebellion as a choice made
in preference to participation in elections or to lobbying, this is a major gap. Many
formal models of the spatial competition of political parties could serve as a guide here.
Third, while the interaction of regimes and oppositions has been modelled in
difference, differential and game theoretic frameworks, most of the interesting strategic
aspects of regime-opposition interaction have yet to be examined. Signalling,
strategic preference revelation, threats, bluffs, promises, brinkmanship, unpredict-
ability, credibility, reputation, deterrence, etc., have yet to be explored in the DPC
context. Many formal models of international conflict could serve as a guide here.
Fourth, while the interaction of regimes and oppositions has been modelled by
treating both the regime and the opposition as single actors, both regime and
opposition are composed of many participants. Few models recognize that both the
regime and the opposition have their own collective action and collective choice
problems. How these competing teams are constructed and the implications of team
competition for DPC have yet to be systematically explored.
Fifth, while some DPC models confront data, most do not. Difference or differential
equation models, for example, typically do not subject their models to empirical
evaluation, and their models have not accumulated. But stochastic modelers typically
confront their models with aggregate data while expected utility modelers typically
confront their models with survey data, and both sets of models have accumulated.
Is it mere coincidence that successful DPC modelling traditions have ultimately
confronted their deductions with data, while unsuccessful DPC modelling traditions
have not ? Moreover, Sandier and his coauthors have demonstrated quite clearly the
value of developing a variety of interrelated models to explain a single data set -
(e.g., terrorism). The absence of a confrontation between theory and evidence, one
must conclude, is a principal reason why most DPC modelling traditions do not
accumulate. Better integration of the statistical and formal modelling of DPC is
definitely needed.
Sixth, while some forms of DPC, such as riots, terrorism and revolutions, have
received extensive attention, other forms of conflict have never been modelled. The
most prominent examples of unexplored territory include womens' movements, fascist
movements, prison riots, student demonstrations and decolonization struggles.
 DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONFLICT MODELS 351

In sum, while the formal modelling tradition on the domestic side of conflict studies
is not nearly as well developed as on the international side, formal models of DPC
have, at least in part, a rich past. They will have an even brighter future once
practitioners recognize the highlights and low points of that past and thereby move
in the direction of a truly cumulative social science.

References

Note: This bibliography is divided into the functional categories used to classify models of DPC. It also
contains a set of references that are cited in the body of the paper but do not appear under any modelling
category.

I. Non-rational choice models

I.A. Stochastic models
Downloaded by [University of Sydney] at 13:08 01 May 2015

Bienen, H. and Van de Walle, N. (1989) Time and power in Africa. American Political Science Review,
83 (1), 19-34.
Carter, G.L. (1990) Collective violence and the problem of group size in aggregate-level studies. Sociological
Focus, 23 (4), 287-300.
Dacey, M.F. (1974) A model of political integration and its use in the reconstruction of a historical
situation. In Locational Approaches to Power and Conflict, edited by K.R. Cox, D.R. Reynolds and
S. Rokkan, pp. 213-230. New York: Sage.
Diekmann, A. (1979) A dynamic stochastic version of the Pitcher-Hamblin-Miller model of "collective
violence". Journal of Mathematical Sociology, 6 (2), 277-282.
Goldstone, J.A. (1980) The weakness of organization: a new look at Gamson's The Strategy of Social
Protest. American Journal of Sociology, 85 (5), 1017-1042.
Huff, D.L. and Lutz, J.M. (1974) The contagion of political unrest in Black Africa. Economic Geography,
50 (4), 352-367.
Laemmle, P. (1977) Epidemiology of domestic military intervention: evaluation of contagion as an
explanatory concept. Behavioral Science, 22 (5), 327-333.
Li, R.P. and Thompson, W.R. (1975) The "coup contagion" hypothesis. Journal of Conflict Resolution,
19 (1), 63-88.
Lieberson, S. and Silverman, A.R. (1965) The precipitants and underlying conditions of race riots. American
Sociological Review, 30 (6), 887-898.
Mazur, A. (1972) The causes of Black riots. American Sociological Review, 37 (4), 490-493.
Midlarsky, M. (1970) Mathematical models of instability and a theory of diffusion. International Studies
Quarterly, 14 (1), 60-84.
Midlarsky, M. (1978) Analyzing diffusion and contagion effects: the urban disorders of the 1960s. American
Political Science Review, 72 (3), 996-1007.
Midlarsky, M. (1981) The revolutionary transformation of foreign policy: agrarianism and its international
impact. In The Political Economy of Foreign Policy Behavior, edited by C.W. Kegley and P. McGowan,
pp. 39-62. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
Midlarsky, M. (1982) Scarcity and inequality: prologue to the onset of mass revolution. Journal of Conflict
Resolution, 26 (1), 3-38.
Midlarsky, M. (1988) Rulers and the ruled: patterned inequality and the onset of mass political violence.
American Political Science Review, 82 (2), 491-509.
Midlarsky, M. (1989) A distribution of extreme inequality with applications to conflict behavior: a
geometric derivation of the Pareto distribution. Mathematical and Computer Modelling, 12 (4/5),
577-587.
Midlarsky, M., Crenshaw, M. and Yoshida, F. (1980) Why violence spreads: The contagion of international
terrorism. International Studies Quarterly, 24 (2), 262-298.
Midlarsky, M.I. and Roberts, K. (1985) Class, state, and revolution in Central America. Journal of Conflict
Resolution, 29 (2), 163-193.
Putnam, R.D. (1967) Toward explaining military intervention in Latin American politics. World Politics,
20 (1), 83-110.
Ritterband, P. and Silberstein, R. (1973) Group disorders in the public schools. American Sociological
Review, 38 (4), 461-467.
Spilerman, S. (1970) The causes of racial disturbances: a comparison of alternative explanations. American
Sociological Review, 35 (4), 627-649.
 352 M. I. LICHBACH

Spilerman, S. (1971) The causes of racial disturbances: tests of an explanation. American Sociological
Review, 36 (3), 427-442.
Spilerman, S. (1972) Strategic considerations in analyzing the distribution of racial disturbances. American
Sociological Review, 37 (4), 493-499.

I.B. Difference and differential equation models of opposition

Boulding, K.E. (1962) Conflict and Defense: A General Theory. New York: Harper Torchbooks. Chapter 7.
Burbeck, S.L., Raine, W.J. and Stark, M.J.A. (1978) The dynamics of riot growth: an epidemiological
approach. Journal of Mathematical Sociology, 6 (1), 1-22.
Deutsch, K.W. (1966) Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundation of
Nationality. Second Edn. Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press. Appendix V.
Doreian, P. and Hummon, N.P. (1973) Modeling Social Processes. New York: Elsevier.
Hamblin, R.L., Jacobsen, R.B. and Miller, J.L.L. (1973) A Mathematical Theory of Social Change. New
York: Wiley.
Hopkins, R.F. (1973) Mathematical modelling of mobilization and assimilation processes. In Mathematical
Approaches to Politics, edited by H.R. Alker, Jr., K.W. Deutsch and A.H. Stoetzel, pp. 375-415. San
Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
Downloaded by [University of Sydney] at 13:08 01 May 2015

Nielsen, F. (1980) The Flemish movement in Belgium after World War II: a dynamic analysis. American
Sociological Review, 45 (1), 76-94.
Pitcher, B.L. and Hamblin, R.L. (1982) Collective learning in ongoing political conflicts. International
Political Science Review, 3 ( 1 ) , 7 9 - 9 0 .
Pitcher, B.L., Hamblin, R.L. and Miller, J.L.L. (1978) The diffusion of collective violence. American
Sociological Review, 43 (1), 23-35.
Rapoport, A. (1983) Mathematical Models in the Social and Behavioral Sciences. New York: Wiley.

I.C. Richardson models of regime-opposition interaction

Chong, D. (1991) Collective Action and the Civil Rights Movement. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago
Press.
Huckfeldt, R. (1989) Noncompliance and the limits of coercion: the problematic enforcement of unpopular
laws. Mathematical and Computer Modelling, 12 (4/5), 533-545.
Intriligator, M.D. and Brito, D.L. (1988) A predator-prey model of guerrilla warfare. Synthese, 76 (2),
235-244.
Jackson, S., Russett, B., Snidal, D. and Sylvan, D. (1978) Conflict and coercion in dependent states.
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 22 (4), 627-657.
Karmeshu, Jain, V.P. and Mahajan, A.K. (1990) A dynamic model of domestic political conflict
process. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 34 (2), 252-269.
Katzner, D.W. (1979) The formal structure of argument in Professor Apter's Choice and the Politics of
Allocation. Political Methodology, 6 (2), 217-235.
Katzner, D.W. (1983) Analysis Without Measurement. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Likens, T.W. and Kohfeld, C.W. (1983) Models of mass compliance: contextual or economic approach?
Political Methodology, 9 (4), 377-406.
McCaughrin, C. (1983) Statics and dynamics of dissent. Comparative Political Studies, 15 (3), 405-423.
Salert, B. and Sprague, J. (1977) Police response to urban riots: an expository model. Papers of the Peace
Science Society (International) 27: 49-57.
Salert, B. and Sprague, J. (1980) The Dynamics of Riots. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-University Consortium
for Political and Social Research.
Stahel, A.A. (1985) Dynamic models of guerrilla warfare. In Dynamic Models of International Conflict,
edited by U. Luterbacher and M.D. Ward, pp. 354-369. Boulder, C O : Lynne Rienner.
Tsebelis, G. and Sprague, J. (1988) Coercion and revolution: variations on a predator-prey model.
Mathematical and Computer Modelling, 12 (4/5), 547-559.

I.D. Catastrophe theory

Adelman, I. and Hihn, J.M. (1984) Crisis politics in developing countries. Economic Development and
Cultural Change, 33 (1), 1-22.
Adelman, I., and Hihn, J.M. (1984) An analysis of contemporary Latin American political history: an
application of the use of catastrophe theory. In The Modelling of Socio-Economic Planning Processes,
edited by S.I. Cohen, et al., pp. 221-249. Vermont: Gower.
Zeeman, E.C. (1986) On the psychology of a hijacker. In Analysing Conflict and Its Resolution: Some
Mathematical Contributions, edited by P.G. Bennett, pp. 71-91. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
 DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONFLICT MODELS 353

I.E. Computer simulation models

Alker, H.R., Jr. (1968) Decision-makers' environments in the Inter-Nation Simulation. In Simulation in
the Study of Politics, edited by W.D. Coplin, pp. 31-58. Chicago, IL: Markham.
Bremmer, S.A. (1977) Simulated Worlds: A Computer Model of National Decision Making. Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press.
Brunner, R.D. (1968) Some comments on simulating theories of political development. In Simulation in
the Study of Politics, edited by W.D. Coplin, pp. 392-342. Chicago, IL: Markham.
Brunner, R.D. and Brewer, G.D. (1971) Organized Complexity: Empirical Theories of Political Develop-
ment. New York: Free Press.
Elder, C.D. and Pendley, R.E. (1981) An economic model and government stability: reconstructing the
Inter-Nation Simulation. In Simulated International Processes: Theories and Research in Global
Modelling, edited by H. Guetzkow and J.J. Valdez, pp. 65-100. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
Feinberg, W.E. and Johnson, N.R. (1988) Outside agitators and crowds: results from a computer
simulation model. Social Forces, 67 (2), 398-423.
Johnson, N.R. and Feinberg, W.E. (1977) A computer simulation of the emergence of concensus in crowds.
American Sociological Review, 42 (3), 505-521.
Milstein, J.S. (1973) The Vietnam War from the 1968 Tet Offensive to the 1970 Cambodian Invasion: A
Downloaded by [University of Sydney] at 13:08 01 May 2015

Quantitative Analysis. In Mathematical Approaches to Politics, edited by H.R. Alker, K.W. Deutch and
A.H. Stoetzel, pp. 113-135. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
Milstein, J.S. (1974) Dynamics of the Vietnam War: A Quantitative Analysis and Predictive Computer
Simulation. Columbus, Ohio: Ohio University Press.
Moy, R.F. (1971) A Computer Simulation Model of Democratic Political Development: Tests of the
Lipset and Moore Models. Sage Professional Papers in Comparative Politics 01-019. Beverly Hills,
CA: Sage.
Opp, K. (1991) Processes of collective political action: a dynamic model and the results of a computer
simulation. Rationality and Society, 3 (2), 215-251.
Powers, C.H. and Hanneman, R.A. (1983) Pareto's theory of social and economic cycles: a formal model
and simulation. In Sociological Theory, 1983, edited by R. Collins, pp. 59-89. San Francisco, CA:
Jossey-Bass.

I.F. Other models

Galtung, J. and Hoivik, T. (1971) Structural and direct violence. Journal of Peace Research, 8 (1), 73-76.
Gurr, T.R. and Duvall, R.D. (1976) Introduction to a formal theory of political conflict. In The Uses of
Controversy in Sociology, edited by L.A. Coser and O.N. Larsen, pp. 139-154. New York: Free Press.
Ridker, R.G. (1962) Discontent and economic growth. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 11
(1), 1-15.
Roberts, B. and Holdren, B. (1972) Theory of Social Process: An Economic Analysis. Ames, Iowa: Iowa
State University Press.

II. Rational choice models

A. Decision theory
II.A.1. Deterministic utility maximization
Auster, R.D. and Silver, M. (1979) The State as a Firm: Economic Forces in Political Development. Boston,
Mass.: Martinus Nijhoff Publishing.
Boschlen, H.L. (1975) The logic of protest action. Western Political Quarterly, 28(1), 59-71.
Brough, W.T. and Kimenyi, M.S. (1986) On the inefficient extraction of rents by dictators. Public Choice,
48(1), 37-48.
Chung, P. (1974) The fate of Solzhenitsyn: an analytical note. Public Choice, 19, 117-120.
Cicchetti, C.J., Freeman, A.M., Haveman, R.H. and Knetsch, J.L. (1971) On the economics of mass
demonstrations: a case study of the November 1969 March on Washington. American Economic Review,
61 (4), 719-724.
Cuzan, A.G. (1980) Authority, scope and force: an analysis of five Central American Countries. Public
Choice, 35 (3), 363-369.
Enders, W., Sandier, T. and Cauley, J. (1990) Assessing the impact of terrorist-thwarting policies: an
intervention time series approach. Defence Economics, 2 (1), 1-18.
Engineer, M. (1989) Taxes, public goods and the ruling class: an exploration of the territory between
Brennan and Buchanan's Leviathan and conventional public finance. Public Finance, 44 (1), 19-30.
Hartle, D.G. and Bird, R.M. (1971) The demand for local political autonomy: an individualistic theory.
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 15 (4), 443-456.
Havrilesky, T. (1980) The discordance-inequality tradeoff. Public Choice, 35 (3), 371-377.
 354 M. I. LICHBACH

Heggen, R.J. and Cuzan, A.G. (1981) Legitimacy, coercion, and scope: an expansion path analysis applied
to five Central American countries and Cuba. Behavioral Science, 26 (2), 143-152.
Hirschman, A.O. (1970) Exit, Voice, and Loyally: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and
States. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Leites, N. and Wolf, C , Jr. (1970) Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts.
Chicago, IL: Markham Publishing Co.
Lichbach, M.I. (1984) An economic theory of governability: choosing policy and optimizing performance.
Public Choice, 44 (2), 307-337.
Lichbach, M.I. (1987) Deterrence or escalation? The puzzle of aggregate studies of repression and dissent.
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 31 (2), 266-297.
Race, J. (1972) War Comes to Long An: Revolutionary Conflict in a Vietnamese Province. Berkeley, CA:
University of California Press.
Roeder, P.G. (1982) Rational revolution: extensions of the "by-product" model of revolutionary
involvement. Western Political Quarterly, 35 (1), 5-23.
Wintrobe, R. (1990) The tinpot and the totalitarian: an economic theory of dictatorship. American Political
Science Review, 84 (3), 849-872.
Downloaded by [University of Sydney] at 13:08 01 May 2015

II.A.2. Expected utility models

Boudon, R. (1982) The Unintended Consequences of Social Action. London: Macmillan.
Braybrooke, D. (1979). Self-interest in times of revolution and repression: comment on Professor Tullock's
analysis. In Revolutions, Systems, and Theories, edited by H.J. Johnson, J.J. Leach and R.G. Muehlmann,
pp. 61-74. Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel.
Brennan, G. (1973) Pareto desirable redistribution: the non-altruistic dimension. Public Choice, 14, 43-67.
Chalmers, J.A. and Shelton, R.B. (1975) An economic analysis of riot participation. Economic Inquiry,
13 (3), 322-336.
Coleman, J.S. (1978) A theory of revolt within an authority structure. Papers of the Peace Science Society
(International), 28, 15-25.
Coleman, J.S. (1990) Foundations of Social Theory. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap.
Finkel, S.E., Muller, E.N. and Opp, K. (1989) Personal influence, collective rationality, and mass political
action. American Political Science Review, 83 (3), 885-903.
Fireman, B. and Gamson, W.A. (1979) Utilitarian logic in the resource mobilization perspective. In The
Dynamics of Social Movements: Resource Mobilization, Social Control and Tactics, edited by M.N. Zald
and J.D. McCarthy, pp. 8-44. Cambridge, Mass.: Winthrop.
Frohlich, N. and Oppenheimer, J.A. (1973) Government violence and tax revenue. In Violence as Politics:
A Series of Original Essays, edited by H. Hirsch and D.C. Perry, pp. 72-88. New York: Harper, Row.
Gunderson, G. (1974) The origins of the American Civil War. Journal of Economic History, 34 (4), 915 -950.
Gunning, J. Patrick (1972) An economic approach to riot analysis. Public Choice, 13, 31-46.
Gupta, D.K. (1990) The Economics of Political Violence: The Effect of Political Instability on Economic
Growth. New York: Praeger.
Ireland, T. (1967). The rationale of revolt. Papers on Nonmarket Decision Making, 3, 49-66.
Islam, M.Q. and Shahin, W.N. (1989) Economic methodology applied to political hostage-taking in light
of the Iran-Contra Affair. Southern Economic Journal, 55 (4), 1019-1024.
Landes, W.M. (1978) An economic study of U.S. aircraft hijacking, 1961-1976. Journal of Law and
Economics, 21 (1), 1-31.
Laver, M. (1976) "Exit, voice, and loyalty" revisited: the strategic production and consumption of public
and private goods. British Journal of Political Science, 6 (4), 463-482.
Markus, G.B. and Tanter, R. (1971) A conflict model for strategists and managers. American Behavioral
Scientist (6), 809-836.
Mason, T.D. (1984) Individual participation in collective racial violence: a rational choice synthesis.
American Political Science Review, 78 (4), 1040-1056.
Muller, E.N. (1982) An explanatory model for differing types of participation. European Journal of Political
Research, 10 (1), 1-16.
Muller, E.N., Dietz, H.A. and Finkel, S.E. (1991) Discontent and the expected utility of rebellion: the
case of Peru. American Political Science Review, 85 (4), 1261-1282.
Muller, E.N. and Opp, K. (1986) Rational choice and rebellious collective action. American Political
Science Review, 80 (2), 471-487.
Oberschall, A. (1979) Protracted conflict. In The Dynamics of Social Movements: Resource Mobilization,
Social Control and Tactics, edited by M.N. Zald and J.D. McCarthy, pp. 45-70. Cambridge, Mass:
Winthrop.
 DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONFLICT MODELS 355

Opp, K. (1986) Soft incentives and collective action: participation in the anti-nuclear movement. British
Journal of Political Science, 16 (1), 87-112.
Opp, K. (1989) The Rationality of Political Protest: A Comparative Analysis of Rational Choice Theory.
Boulder, C O : Westview.
Opp, K. (1990) Postmaterialism, collective action, and political protest. American Journal of Political
Science, 34 (1), 212-235.
Opp, K., Burrow-Auffarth, K. and Heinrichs, U. (1981) Conditions for conventional and unconventional
political participation: an empirical test of economic and sociological hypotheses. European Journal of
Political Research, 9 (2), 147-168.
Osayimwese, I. (1983) An economic analysis of international violence. In International Violence, edited by
T. Adeniran and Y. Alexander, pp. 182-197. New York: Praeger.
Scriven, M. (1979) The evaluation of revolutions. In Revolutions, Systems, and Theories, edited by
H.J. Johnson, J.J. Leach and R.G. Muehlmann, pp. 1-9. Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel.
Silver, M. (1974) Political revolution and repression: an economic approach. Public Choice, 17, 63-71.
Tullock, G. (1971) The paradox of revolution. Public Choice, 11, 89-99.
Tullock, G. (1974) The Social Dilemma: The Economics of War and Revolution. Virginia: Center for the
Study of Public Choice.
Downloaded by [University of Sydney] at 13:08 01 May 2015

Tullock, G. (1979) The economics of revolution. In Revolution, Systems, and Theories, edited by
H.J. Johnson, J.J. Leach and R.G. Muehlmann, pp. 47-60. Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel.
Wilson, E.M. (1973) The Rhodesian constitution and predictions for political stability. Public Choice, 16,
77-80.

II.A3. Other models

Buchanan, J.M. and Flowers, M. (1969) An analytic setting for a "taxpayers' revolution". Western
Economic Journal, 7 (4), 349-359.
Gallarotti, G.M. (1989) Legitimacy as a capital asset of the state. Public Choice, 63 (1), 43-61.
Jackson, R. (1971) A "taxpayers' revolution" and economic rationality. Public Choice, 10, 93-96.
Lee, D.R. and Sandier, T. (1989) On the optimal retaliation against terrorists: the paid-rider option.
Public Choice, 61 (2), 141-152.
Mueller, D.C. (1989) Public Choice II. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
O, M. (1975) Demand, capacity, and decay: a control systems formulation. Comparative Political Studies,
7 (4), 460-477.

II.B. Multiperson games

II.B.I. Game theory
II.B.1.a. Games in extensive form
Lapan, H.E. and Sandier, T. (1988) To bargain or not to bargain: that is the question. American Economic
Review, 78 (2), 16-21.
Przeworski, A. (1991) Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and
Latin America. Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press.
Sandier, T. and Lapan, H.E. (1988) The calculus of dissent: an analysis of terrorists' choice of targets.
Synthese, 76 (2), 245-261.
Selten, R. (1977) A simple game model of kidnapping. In Mathematical Economics and Game Theory,
edited by R. Henn and O. Moeschlin, pp. 139-155. Berlin: Springer-Verlag.

II.B.l.b. Bimatrix models

Buchanan, A. (1979) Revolutionary motivation and rationality. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 9 (4), 59-82.
Cauley, J. and Sandier, T. (1988) Fighting World War III: a suggested strategy. Terrorism, 11 (3), 181-195.
Davis, J.R. and Palomba, N.A. (1969) The National Farmers Organization and the Prisoner's Dilemma:
a game theory prediction of failure. Social Science Quarterly, 50 (4), 742-748.
Geddes, B. (1991) A game theoretic model of reform in Latin American democracies. American Political
Science Review, 85 (2), 371-392.
Granovetter, M. (1978) Threshold models of collective behavior. American Journal of Sociology, 83 (6),
1420-1443.
Lee, D.R. (1988) Free riding and paid riding in the fight against terrorism. American Economic Review,
78 (2), 22-26.
Levy, M.A. (1985) Mediation of Prisoners' Dilemma conflicts and the importance of cooperation threshold:
the case of Namibia. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 29 (4), 581-603.
Lichbach, M.I. (1990) Will rational people rebel against inequality? Samson's Choice. American Journal
of Political Science, 34 (4), 1049-1076.
 356 M. I. LICHBACH

Lumsden, M. (1973) The Cyprus conflict as a Prisoner's Dilemma game. Journal of Conflict Resolution,
17 (1), 7-32.
Oberschall, A. (1980) Loosely structured collective conflict: a theory and an application. Research in
Social Movements, Conflicts and Change, 3, 45-68.

II.B.I.c. Continuous models

Hirshleifer, J. (1988) The analytics of continuing conflict. Synthese, 76 (2), 201-233.
Kirk, R.M. (1983) Political terrorism and the size of government: a positive institutional analysis of
violent political activity. Public Choice, 40 (1), 41-52.
Sandier, T., Tschirhart, J.T. and Cauley, J. (1983) A theoretical analysis of transnational terrorism.
American Political Science Review, 77 (1), 36-54.

U.B.I.d. Two person bargaining

Atkinson, S.E., Sandier, T. and Tschirhart, J. (1987) Terrorism in a bargaining framework. Journal of
Law and Economics, 30 (1), 1-21.
Fitzgerald, B.D. (1978) The analytical foundations of extortionate terrorism. Terrorism, 1(3-4), 347-362.
Sandier, T. and Scott, J.L. (1987) Terrorist success in hostage-taking incidents: an empirical study. Journal
Downloaded by [University of Sydney] at 13:08 01 May 2015

of Conflict Resolution, 31 (1), 35-53.

II.B.1.e. Multiperson coalitions

Almond, G.A., Flanagan, S.C. and Mundt, R.J. (1973) Crisis, Choice, and Change: Historical Studies of
Political Development. Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company.
Cao-Garciá, R. (1983) Explorations Towards an Economic Theory of Political Systems. Lanham, MD:
University Press of America.
Roemer, J.E. (1985) Rationalizing revolutionary ideology. Econometrica, 53 (1), 85-108.
Tullock, G. (1987). Autocracy. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Tullock, G. (1987) Autocracy. In Economic Imperialism: The Economic Approach Applied Outside of the
Field of Economics, edited by G. Radritzky and P. Bernholz, pp. 365-381. New York: Paragon House.

II.B.2. Market models

Bloch, P.C. (1986) The politico-behavior of authoritarian governments. Public Choice, 51 (2), 117-128.
Breton, A. and Breton, R. (1969) An economic theory of social movements. American Economic Review,
59 (2), 198-205.
Grossman, H.I. (1991) A general equilibrium model of insurrections. American Economic Review, 81 (4),
912-921.
Gupta, D.K. and Venieris, Y.P. (1981) Introducing new dimensions in macro models: the sociopolitical
and institutional environments. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 30 (1), 31-58.
Hirshleifer, J. (1978) Natural economy versus political economy. Journal of Social and Biological Structures,
1 (4), 319-337.
Hirshleifer, J. (1987) The economic approach to conflict. In Economic Imperialism: The Economic Approach
Applied Outside of the Field of Economics, edited by G. Radritzky and P. Bernholz, pp. 355-364. New
York: Paragon House.
Pettengill, J.S. (1981) Firearms and the distribution of income: a neo-classical model. Review of Radical
Political Economics, 13 (2), 1-10.
Przeworski, A. and Zechman, M. (1971) Politics and the initiation of economic development. Public
Choice, 10, 61-80.
Reid, J.D., Jr. (1987) Economic burden: spark to the American Revolution? Journal of Economic History,
37 (1), 81-100.
Usher, D. (1989) The dynastic cycle and the stationary state. American Economic Review, 79 (5),
1031-1044.
Usher, D. and Engineer, M. (1987) The distribution of income in a despotic society. Public Choice, 54
(3), 261-276.
Vanieris, Y.P. and Gupta, D.K. (1983) Sociopolitical and economic dimensions of development: a
cross-section model. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 31 (4), 727-756.
Venieris, Y.P. and Gupta, D.K. (1985) Macro interactions in a social system: a case study of Great
Britain. Southern Economic Journal, 51 (3), 681-696.
Wolf, C , Jr. (1960) Foreign Aid: Theory and Practice in Southern Asia. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press.
 DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONFLICT MODELS 357

II.B.3. Social choice models

II.B.3.a. Spatial theory
Bates, R.H. (1989) Beyond the Miracle of the Market: The Political Economy of Agrarian Development
in Kenya. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Dahl, R.A. (1956) A Preface to Democratic Theory. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Dahl, R.A. (1966) Some explanations. In Political Oppositions in Western Democracies, edited by R.A. Dahl,
pp. 348-386. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.
DeNardo, J. (1985) Power in Numbers: The Political Strategy of Protest and Rebellion. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
Downs, A. (1957) An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper and Row.
Dudley, L. (1991) Constitutions as the outcome of imperfect spatial competition. In The Competitive
State, edited by A. Breton et al., pp. 185-203. Netherlands: Kluwer Academic.
Gurr, T.R. (1970) Why Men Rebel. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Kuran, T. (1989) Sparks and prairie fires: a theory of unanticipated political revolution. Public Choice,
61 (1), 41-74.
Scott, A., et al. (1970) Insurgency. Chapel Hill, N C : University of North Carolina Press.
Stinchcombe, A.L. (1968) Constructing Social Theories. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc.
Downloaded by [University of Sydney] at 13:08 01 May 2015

Tullock, G. (1968) A note on censorship. American Political Science Review, 62 (4), 1265-1267.
Tullock, G. (1971) A model of social interaction. In Mathematical Applications in Political Science, V,
edited by J.F. Herndon and J.L. Bernd, pp. 4-28. Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia.
Wintrobe, R. (1991) Political competition and the rise of dictatorship. In The Competitive State, edited by
A. Breton et al., pp. 147-165. Netherlands: Kluwer Academic.

II.B.3.b. Preference aggregation models

Beck, D. and Bueno de Mesquita, B. (1985) Forecasting policy decisions: an expected utility approach.
In Corporate Crisis Management, edited by S.J. Andriole, pp. 103-122. NJ: Petrocelli Books.
Bueno de Mesquita, B. (1984) Forecasting policy decisions: an expected utility approach to Post-Khomeini
Iran. PS, 17 (2), 226-236.
Bueno de Mesquita, B., Newman, D. and Rabushka, A. (1985) Forecasting Political Events: The Future
of Hong Kong. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.
Meadwell, H. (1989) Ethnic nationalism and collective choice theory. Comparative Political Studies, 22
(2), 139-154.
Miller, N.R. (1983) Pluralism and social choice. American Political Science Review, 11 (3), 734-747.
Rabushka, A. and Shepsle, K.A. (1971) Political entrepreneurship and patterns of democratic instability
in plural societies. Race, 12 (4), 461-476.
Rabushka, A. and Shepsle, K.A. (1972) Politics in Plural Societies: A Theory of Democratic Stability.
Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co.
Rogowski, R. (1974) Rational Legitimacy: A Theory of Political Support. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.

III. Citations in the body of the text

Eggertson, T. (1990) Economic Behavior and Institutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gurr, T.R. and Lichbach, M.I. (1979) A forecasting model for political conflict within nations. In To
Augur Well: Forecasting in the Social Sciences, edited by J.D. Singer and M.D. Wallace, pp. 153-193.
Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
Gurr, T.R. and Lichbach, M.I. (1986) Forecasting internal conflict: a competitive evaluation of empirical
theories. Comparative Political Studies, 19 (1), 3-38.
Intriligator, M.D. (1982) Research on conflict theory: analytic approaches and areas of application.
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 26 (2), 307-327.
Lichbach, M.I. (1989) An evaluation of "does economic inequality breed political conflict" studies. World
Politics, 41 (4), 431-470.
Lichbach, M.I. (1992) The Rebel's Dilemma: Collective Action and Collective Dissent. Unpublished book
manuscript. University of Colorado.