Formal Models in Political Science

Author(s): Morris P. Fiorina

Source: American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Feb., 1975), pp. 133-159
Published by: Midwest Political Science Association
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 TheWorkshop
MORRISP. FIORINA
CaliforniaInstituteof Technology

ModelsinPolitical
Formal *
Science
In recentyearsthejournalshave publishedan increasing numberof articleswhich
present or utilizeformalmodelsofpoliticalbehavior andpoliticalprocesses.
Atpresent,
however, thisresearch probablyreachesonlya smallaudience.In an effort to broaden
thataudiencethispaperattempts (1) to describe
andillustrate
theuseofformal models,
(2) to explainwhysomebelievethatthe construction of modelsis a usefulresearch
method,(3) to identify subfields
inwhichmodelsexistandsuggest otherswheremodels
shouldexist,(4) to discussvarioustypesof existing models,(5) to offersomebasic
criticalstandards to whichresearch
according whichinvolvesmodelscanbe judged.

Duringthe past decade politicalscientists havemadeincreasing use of a

newmethod,a methodin whichpoliticalbehaviorand politicalprocessesare
studiedby constructing formalmodels of such behaviorand processes.
Lookingback on thisdevelopment it is clearthatAnthonyDowns(1957)
precipitatedit, althoughsome earliereffortsat formalizing the studyof
politicsexist(Richardson,1939; Black, 1948; Shapleyand Shubik,1954).
Downs' workdiffered fromthen-prevailing studiesin thatit was neithera
descriptionof a particularreal-world democracynor a portraitof some
normatively ideal democracy.Nor did Downs compareand contrastthe
actualwiththe ideal,a commonpracticein the democratictheoryof the
period.Rather,Downs'book was an attemptto modelthecentralprocesses
ofanydemocratic politicalsystem.
Although Downstook painsto explainhisintent, theidea ofconstructing
and applyinga modelwas discomforting to manypoliticalscientists
(Rogers,
1959). In theyearssince,however, boththe use ofmodelsandtheapprecia-
tion of thatuse has increased.Manygraduateprograms includecoursesin
formaltheory,analyticaltheory,mathematical models,or the like, and
examplesof such workincreasingly win space in the pagesof ourjournals
(Polsby-Riker,1974). Still,thereexistsmuchless of a generalunderstanding
of theroleof formalmodelsin our discipline thanof therole,say,ofsurvey

*1wishto thankKen Shepsle,RobertBates,andthreeanonymous fortheir

referees
comments
onan earlier
version
ofthispaper.

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, XIX, 1, February1975 133

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134 MorrisP. Fiorina

methods.In thisWorkshop
researchor statistical articleI proposeto examine
the place of formalmodelsin politicalscience.My discussionwillbe con-
cernedless withabstractphilosophy of scienceconsiderationsthanwithan
attemptto conveythe perceptions, goals and standardsof thosewho con-
structoremployformalmodelsin theirresearch.

The Natureof Models

Puttingfirstthingsfirst,whatis a model?Fromgraduateschoolscopeand
methodscourseswe remember thatphilosophers of scienceadvancerather
precisedefinitions and invariablybemoanthe failureto differentiate models
fromtheories,analogies,and metaphors(Brodbeck,1959). But ratherthan
engagein a technicaldefinitional exerciseI willtakethecourseofdescribing
whatpoliticalsciencemodelbuildersmeanbythetermmodel.
All of our modelshave in commonat least threeelements.First,they
containa set of primitives or undefinedterms.Second,theycontainaddi-
tionalconceptsdefinedwiththeaid of primitives or otherpreviouslydefined
terms.Third,theycontainassumptions of varioustypes.Theseassumptions
include those underlying the particularlanguagein whichthe model is
formulated (e.g.,calculus,settheory,propositional logic,English)andusually
othersof a behavioral nature.'Some colleagueswouldalso
and institutional
includein themodelproperall statements logicallyimpliedbythebasicthree
elements.Otherswouldconsidersuchstatements thetheorygenerated by the
model. For ease of expositionI shalladopt the formerviewpointin this
paper.2
Perhapsan examination of a specificmodelwouldbe a usefulsupplement
in thepreceding
to theostensivedefinition Considerforexample
paragraph.
one of thesimplemodelsconstructed by DuncanBlack(1958, ch. 4) in The

II wishto emphasize thata formalmodelneed not be a mathematical structure,

although manyare.Fenno(1973) employsa veryspecific modeleventhough hisbookis
devoidof mathematical or logicalsymbols.Of course,a well-developedverbalmodel
shouldbe amenableto restatement inmoreabstract terms.
2A fewadditional comments on terminology.In contemporary politicalsciencethe
terms"formalmodel,""formaltheory,"and "analytical theory"are usedmoreor less
interchangeably. AlthoughI recognizethe ambiguity inherentin such a situation,
one-man attempts to enforce conformity
terminological fail.Therefore,
invariably inthis
articleI will toleratetheambiguity. In personalusageI tendto use theterm,model,
withoutmodifiers like "mathematical" and "formal,"and to reservetheterm,model,
fortheabstractlogicalstructure, thenswitchto theterm,theory, whenI interpretreal
politicswiththehelpofthemodel.

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 Formal Models in Political Science 135

Theoryof Committees and Elections,a modelwhichproducesBlack'swell-

known"mediandominance"theorem.
The primitives in Black'smodelincludetermssuchas committee member,
proposal,and preference. The definedconceptsincludecommittee, motion,
single-peaked curve,and optimum.The assumptions includean infinite (not
essential)numberof motions,ai, arranged alongsomedimension, X, sincere
voting(i.e., votingforthe motionwhichstandshighestin one's preference
ordering),single-peaked preference curves(i.e., a preference curvewhich
changesdirectionat mostonce as we traverse thedimension at issue),andno
abstention. Forease of expositionconsideronlythecaseof a committee with
an odd numberof members.Giventhebasicstructure outlined,a committee
preparing to make a decisioncan be represented as in Figure1, wherethe
particulararrangement and number(odd) of preference curvesis unim-
portant.
Now,it is immediately apparentthatBlack'ssimplemodelimpliesat least
one statement aboutthecommittee decisionprocess,namelythatthemotion
whichis theoptimumof themedianmember(a3 in thiscase) candefeatany
othermotionin pairwisevoting.To see thatthisis so, notethatanymotion
to the leftof the medianoptimum(say a,) can be defeatedby a motion
locatedbetweenit and themedianoptimum (saya2). Thisis truebecauseby
the assumptionsof single-peakedness and sincerevoting,the new motion
receivesat least the votes of the median memberand everyoneto his
right-bydefinition of themedian,a majority.A similarargument holdsfor
motionsto therightof themedian.Onlytheoptimumofthemedianmember

FIGURE 1
ofa Five-Man
Representation Committee
order of
preference

a/\\ a2 ,/A3 ,A4 A

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136 MorrisP. Fiorina

can defeateveryothermotion:it receivesthe votesof themedianmember

andeveryone on thesideoppositethechallengingmotion.
Thus,Black'smodelproducesan empiricallytestableproposition,
a theory
of committeedecisionmaking. Givena (majorityrule) collectivedecision
processin whichpairwisevotingoccurs,and in whichthemedianalternative
entersthevotingat somepoint,thentheoptimumofthemedianmemberis
the decisionof the committee.3Failureto confirmthatpropositioncasts
doubt on the assumptionof single-peaked preferences,unidimensionality,
sincerevoting,
universal or somecombination
voting, ofthese.

WhyModels?
Givensome agreement on whata modelis, theobviousnextquestionis
why bother?Does the use of a formalmodel providescientificbenefits
greaterthantheevidentintellectual costsof thatuse?Do modelslikeBlack's
contributeto our knowledgeoverand above traditional wisdombased on
empirical observation of the compromise decisionsmadeby manyrealcom-
mittees? To methemainadvantages ofmodelbuilding lie in considerations
of
precisionof thinking and clarityof argument. Theseconsiderations enteron
severallevels.
First,formulating a modelforcesprecision inthetermsof one'sargument.
In everydaydiscoursewe use wordswithmultipleor ambiguousmeanings.
But to employa conceptlike"groupstrength" or "issuesalience"in a formal
model invariablynecessitatescarefulthinking about the precisesense in
whichwe wishto use it.Downs,forexample,adopteda veryspecific, though
restrictivedefinition
of a politicalparty.Riker(1962) refined theconceptof
coalition.Axelrod(1970) formulated a precisenotionofconflict ofinterest.
Clearly,one can toleratemoreconceptualambiguity in an informal argument
thanin a formal one.
A secondlevelon whichmodelbuildingcontributes to clarityofthought
is on the level of assumptions. The assumptions"drive"a model; they
determine thedeductionsone can make.As suchtheyobviouslyarecrucial.
Yet in casualarguments assumptionsnot onlymaybe statedratherloosely,
theyoftenare not statedat all. In workingthrougha formalargument,

3Experiments CharlesPlottand I haveconductedrevealthecrucialimportance of

insuringthatthe medianoptimum does enterthe voting,which,in turn,suggests
the
empirical of anyinstitutional
significance rulesand procedures
whichaffectcommittee
agenda.Similarly,experimentsshowthatif votingis notpairwise,themediancan be
eliminated
consistently fromconsiderationbychoiceofa suitableagenda.

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 FormalModels in PoliticalScience 137

however, imprecise or missingassumptions havea wayofbecoming painfully

obvious.The "way" is thatone cannotlogicallydrawtheconclusionsone
mighthave wished(or ifone does anyway,theillogicis clearlyapparentto
one's colleagues).For example,I doubtthattheimportance of theassump-
tion of single-peaked preferences would haveemergedas clearlyin a verbal
discussionof committeedecisionmaking as it did in Black'sgraphicalargu-
ments.Takeanothercase. In decadesofdiscussion of the"centrist" natureof
Americanelectoralpolitics,few imaginedthe restrictive assumptions that
mightbe necessary to assurethatconvergence takesplacein formalmodelsof
the Americanelectoralprocess(Rikerand Ordeshook,1973, chs. 11-12).
Numerousotherexamplescouldbe cited.In a carefully formalized modelall
thecardsare on the table.Scholarly disagreement can focusquicklywhereit
oftenbelongs:on thedifferent basicassumptions withwhichthecontending
sidesapproachthesubject.
A thirdway in whichformalmodelscontribute to clarityof thoughtis
closelyrelatedto the clarityand completeness of definitions and assump-
tions.A formalargument is by farthe easiestto checkforlogicalvalidity
(providedone understands whateverabstractreasoningwhichmay be in-
volved).We haveall had the experienceof readingandrereading a discursive
essayandremaining undecidedas to whether or nottheconclusions hold.Far
less oftenwill such uncertainty remainafter studying a formal argument.
Giventhedefinitions and assumptions, a conclusionis eithervalidor invalid.
Moreover,if an argumentis invalid,the location of the invalidityoften
suggests whatmodifications or additionsare necessaryin orderto produce
logicalvalidity.On occasionI havebelievedthata givenproposition would
hold ina modelwithwhichI wasworking, onlyto workit out and findthatI
was in error.Sometimesa morespecificassumption wasneeded,sometimes a
conceptwas imprecise, and sometimes mycommonsensesimplywaswrong.
Butin each case theshortcoming was one whichdid notbecomeapparentso
longas everyday Englishwasthelanguageoftheargument.
A further advantageof modelbuildingliesin thepenetration ofargument
whichmodelsallow. Fromthe assumptions one deducessomeconclusions.
From theseand the assumptionsone producesfurther conclusions.From
these. . . and so forth.Everyday languageis not wellsuitedto carrying out
thesesecondand higherorderarguments. The scholardoes not himselfsee
thefullestimplications ofhisargument, norcanhisaudiencefollowhimvery
far beforeconfusionarises. Formalmodels greatlyfacilitatecarrying an
argument to its logicalend-bleedinga set of assumptions dry,so to speak.
One's previousconclusionsare at hand in the formof compacttheorems,
equations,or thelike.Thesein turnsuggestnewdirections or stagesforthe

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138 MorrisP. Fiorina

argument. Sometimesone's results"linkup" withthosein anothermodelso

thata largetheoretical jump can occurveryquickly.Recastingthespatial
model in game-theoretic formis one exampleof such a link-up(Hinich,
Ledyard,Ordeshook,1973). The convergence of someaspectsof gametheory
withsocialchoicetheoryis another(Wilson,1971).
In sum,I wouldarguethatthemajoradvantageofusingformalmodelsis
the precisionand clarityof thoughtwhichthesemodelsrequire,and the
depthof argument whichtheyallow.Yet I recognize thatmanyareskeptical
of thepositionjust presented.Doubterswouldarguethatintellectual clarity
is purchasedat too dear a price,thatit involvessimplifying social reality
beyondall recognition,thatformalmodelsare "elegantmodelsofirrelevant
worlds."The chargeis not uncommon, noraltogetherunwarranted, so I will
attempt to answerit.
The contentionthatmathematical modelsare hopelesslyunrealistic is a
one to deal with,forit raisesa questionof degreeratherthanone of
difficult
kind.How unrealistic is hopelesslyunrealistic?By theirverynaturemodels
One ignoresmanyvariablesin an attemptto isolatea few
are abstractions.
importantones which largelyaccount for the patternsin our empirical
observations.Ashby(1970, pp. 94,96) makesthepointnicely:
I wouldlikethento startfromthebasicfactthateverymodelofa realsystemis inone
sensesecondrate.Nothingcan exceed,or evenequal,thetruthandaccuracyofthereal
systemitself.Everymodelis inferior, a lie....
a distortion,

No electronic modelofa cat'sbraincanpossibly be as trueas thatprovidedbythebrain

of anothercat;yetof whatuse is thelatteras a model?Itsverycloseness meansthatit
also presentsall the technicalfeaturesthatmakethe firstso difficult.Fromhereon,
virtue
then,I shalltakeas a basisthethesisthatthefirst ofa modelis to be useful.

areawarethatnumerous
Physicalscientists mathematicalfunctionsfitany
set of observeddata. Each of these,whensuitablyinterpreted, providesan
alternateexplanationof the data. Similarly, a modelerdoes notbelieve(at
leasthe is notjustifiedin believing)thathis modelis theexplanation,only
thatit is one of many.Giventhisrelatively modestviewof his intellectual
product,a modelertendsto brushoffcriticisms thathis modelsarehope-
lessly With
unrealistic. no real of
expectation findingtheone, trueexplana-
tion, he settlesfor one whichworks,i.e., predictsmore accuratelythan
anything elseavailable.
The precedingpoint of view has foundits mostpopularexpressionin
MiltonFriedman's (1953) "as if" argument.
Briefly,judgea modelnotby the
realismor plausibilityof its assumptions,but ratherby the accuracyof its
predictions.If the model works,say that people behaveas if the model
underliestheirbehavior.

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 FormalModels in PoliticalScience 139

The as if argumentcan be carriedtoo far,I think,especiallyby new

convertsto formalmodelingwho show a tendencyto elevateFriedman's
dictumto 11thCommandment status.In somecirclestheas ifargument is
knownunsympathetically as the "F-twist"(Samuelson,1963), and at least
one skeptichasdubbedit "Friedman's ofunreality"
principle (Simon,1963).
The difficulty that can arise stemsfromthe role of basic assumptions in
specifying theempiricalsituations to whichthemodelapplies.Iftheassump-
tionsare wildlyinaccurate, the model appliesnowhereand its implications
become nonfalsifiable. Nevertheless, because theoreticalassumptionsare
neverliterally true,theyall are inaccurateto somedegree,andwe tendback
to thepositionthattheprimary testof theadequacyoftheassumptions must
lie in the accuracyof thepredictions. Thus,if whatseemslike a hopelessly
simplified theorypredictsquitewell,we mayjudgethetheoryas sufficiently
accurateforour purposes,regardless of itsappearanceof unrealism. If it is
hopelesslyunrealistic, surelyit will not standthe testof time.If it does,
perhapsour initialnotionsof realismwerein factunrealistic. Otherthings
equal, I willopt formoreaccurateassumptions overless accurateones,but
otherthingsareseldomequal.
As a postscript to thissectionI venture theopinionthatmodelersmakeno
morehopelesslyunrealisticassumptionsabout realitythan do the practi-
tionersof othertechniques;they are just more explicitabout doingso.
Statisticallyinclinedpoliticalscientistsbeginarticleswithinnocentsounding
statements like "Factoranalysisis a technique. . . ," leavingtheunwaryin
the darkabout the numerousspecialassumptions whichunderliethetech-
nique.Yearsago Donald Stokes(1963) publishedan excellentcritiqueofthe
Downsianspatialmodel.He pointedout thatit was a seriousoversimplifica-
tion to assumethat an issue space remainedconstantovertime,to assume
that votersperceivethe space identically, and to assumethatvotersagree
upon the actualcandidatelocationsand vice versa.All verytrue.But how
manyof thoseoccasionallyengagedin multidimensional scaling(and how
manymore of those who read such research)are fullyawarethatthese
techniquestypicallymake corresponding assumptions about the mannerin
whichthedata are generated?4 The pointis simple.Eventhosewhosehands
are burieddeepestin thedatamakeverybigandquestionable assumptions in
theirresearch. Manywhothrowstonesat formalmodelsresideinglasshouses
themselves.

articleHerbert
in a recentWorkshop
4Happily, illuminates
(1974) brightly
Weisberg
andprocedures
thefoundations ofsuchtechniques.

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140 MorrisP. Fiorina

An Illustrative
Example

Havingassertedthatformalmodelsforceprecision in theuse ofconcepts,

candorabout analyticalassumptions, and clarityin one's arguments, I now
will tryto illustrate theseprocessesby showingthemat workin a specif'ic
model.5
Considerthe questionof constituency influenceon legislative roll call
votingbehavior.Fromempiricalstudieswe knowthatrepresentatives arenot
highlyvisible(Stokes and Miller,1962); they are not bombardedwith
instructionsfromhordesof issue-conscious constituents.Thus,letus assume
thatrepresentatives viewtheirdistricts inrathersimplegroupterms(e.g.,the
laborvote,theblackvote,the sportsmen's vote,etc.). Whatis it aboutsuch
groupsthat intereststhe representative? Plainly,theirvotes,money,and
otherresourceswhichmightaffecthis reelectionare foci of his attention.
Moreover, forany groupinfluenceto operate,the representative mustper-
ceivesome causal relationbetweenhis votingrecordand theapplicationof
grouppoliticalresources.
Can one formulate a measureof grouppoliticalresources? Let us assume
that representatives have subjectiveestimates,p, of theirprobability of
reelection,and thattheywouldliketheseestimates (whichreflect reality,we
presume)to be as highas possible.Giventhisassumption, it is naturalto
assumefurther that the representative translatesgainsor losses in group
supportinto increments and decrements in his subjectiveprobabilityof
reelection.Specifically, considera group,Gj. Definethestrength, Sjk, of Gj
on issuek as (Xjk + Zjk), whereXjk is theamountthegroupcouldincreasethe
representative's probabilityof reelectionin grateful responseto a favorable
vote on issue k, and Zjk is the amountthe groupcould decreasep in
antagonistic responseto an unfavorable vote.Thus,the strength of a group
reflectsits raw capabilityof affecting the representative'sprobabilityof
reelection.As mentioned,this capabilitymay reflectnumbers, money,or
otherresourcespossessedby the group.Groups whomSjk > 0 forissuek
for
are termed"significant" groups: they mustbe includedin the decision
problem for issuek. GroupsforwhomSjk = 0 aretermed"insignificant": the
representative ignorestheminmakinghisvotingdecision issueon k.
In additionto theirstrength, a second dimensionalongwhichdistrict

5The modelis presented at lengthin mybook (Fiorina,1974a) and extendedin a

laterpaper(Fiorina,1974b).Somewhatimmodestly, I mightobservethatthebookis a
goodbeginning forsomeoneinterested sincethelevelofanalysis
in formalmodeling, is
verysimpleand the styleis that of an essay ratherthan the Teutonicstyleof
axiom-theorem-proof.

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 FormalModels in PoliticalScience 141

groupswilldiffer electoral
is whetheror not theyare in therepresentative's
coalition.Has he won withtheiraid, or in spiteof theiropposition?Define
twoadditionalconcepts:

Friendly
group: Zjk > Xik > 0

group:
Unfriendly Xjk > zjk > 0

If, on balance,a groupcurrently supportsa representative, he has moreto

lose by alienatingthemthan he has to gainby pleasingthemfurther. In
contrast, forunfriendly groupshe has less to lose by alienating themfurther
thanhe has to gainby winning theirsupport.I assumethatrepresentatives
viewthegroupsin theirdistricts in theseterms.
EarlierI notedthatwhenrepresentatives maketheirvotingdecisions, they
generally willbe uncertain abouttheconsequences of thosedecisions. Thatis,
whilea representative mayhave littledifficulty in calculating how mucha
groupcould help or hurthim in his reelection battleifit enteredthefray,
whatis the likelihood thatthe groupactuallywill do so? Here themodel
reliesheavilyon the mechanism of anticipatedreactions.Definecjk as the
probability thata voteon issuek willdrawGi intothenextcampaign.The
representative usescjk to discountSikin thevotingdecision.
The alternatives availableto a representative are simpleto enumerate. He
mayvoteaye,abstain,or votenay.For simplicity's sake orderthegroupsin
each votingdecisionaccordingto theirrespective strengths (i.e., S1 > S2 >
. . . > SO), thenidentify thevotingstrategies as al -vote withSI (and allies,
if any),a2-abstain,and a3-vote againstSI (and allies,if any).As yet no
payoffto the abstention strategy has been specified.Assumethatan absten-
tion on issuek arousesan unfavorable reaction,Yjk, fora significant group,
Gj, whereOS Yjk Zjk.< That is, an abstention on an issuetouching a group's
interests has thepotentialto costtherepresentative something, butcertainly
no morethanan unfavorable vote.
Notetheimplicitassumption thatrepresentatives havea verylimitedtime
I
horizon. wouldargue that representatives have only thevaguestidea of the
of on
numberand kinds billstheywillvote betweencampaignperiods.Thus,
theymakedecisionsone at a time,day by day.They do not takerisksnow
withthe intention of makingit up later.Essentially, then,themodelhas no
the in
future(of course, pastis reflected changing estimates of p, Sj andcj as
thelegislative sessionproceeds).
Puttingall of theforegoing together, one can construct andanalyzesimple
decisionproblems. Figure2 illustrates the decisionwhen onlyone grouphas a

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142 MorrisP. Fiorina

FIGURE 2
Case
VotingDecisionforConsensual

States
Si S2
Gl Enters G1 Does Not
Vote Campaign EnterCampaign

WithGI x0 O
Abstain -y 0
O
Against
GI -z1 0

nonzeroprobability of reacting to thevote.To elaborate, therepresentative's

votedrawsGI resources intothecampaign withprobability cl . Dependingon
how he voteshe receivesxl , -Y I, or-z I, in sucha case.Withprobability (1 -
cl) therepresentative'svotegoesunnoticedandhasno electoralimpact.
At thispointan implicitassumption becomessuddenlyexplicit.I have
assumedthattheprobability a groupreactsto an issueis independent ofhow
the representativevotes.In symbols,Pr(SI/with)= Pr(S /abstain)= Pr(S1/
against)= cl. Elsewhere(Fiorina,1974b), I havebuiltan "ungrateful elec-
torate"notioninto the modelby assumingthatgroupsare morelikelyto
entera campaignwhen a representative votesagainstthemthanwhenhe
abstainsor votes forthem. For present purposes, however, letus simplynote
theassumption and proceed.
Whatdoes the analysisof Figure2 reveal?The expectedreturnfrom
votingwiththe groupis c1(xI) > 0, fromabstaining (-c1y1) S0, andfrom
votingagainstthe group,(-clzl) < 0. Thus, to maximize his subjective
probabilityof reelection a representative facingsuch a decision alwaysvotes
withthe group.If a representative typicallyfacessuchdecisions, he willend
up witha veryhighprobability ofreelection and
stupidity mistakes).
(barring
Beforeproceeding, one mighttakenoteoftwofurther implications ofthe
analysis.First,votingwiththe district groupis therepresentative's optimal
strategywhethercl is largeor small.In thissimplemodeltherepresentative
votesin accordwiththegroup'swisheswhetherhe believestheyare certain
to react to his vote or onlybelievesthattheyare not certainnot to. Of
course,a morecomplexmodelmightchangethisconclusion.Second,the
representativevotesin accordwithgroupwisheswhether thegroupis friendly
or unfriendly.Ourdistinction as yetmakesno difference.
Admittedly, the politicalworldis seldomso simpleas thatpicturedin
Figure2. Real representatives findcleavageswithintheirdistricts: Republi-

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 FormalModels in PoliticalScience 143

can-Democratic, black-white, urban-rural, Whathappenswhen

business-labor.
we putconflict intothemodel?Figure3 illustrates thedecisionproblemfora
conflictsituation.Thus,ifa representative voteswiththestronger group,and
Si holds,he receives(xl - Z2). If S4 holds,thevotegoesunnoticedandhas
no electoralconsequences.
Immediately uponattempting to analyzeFigure3 we discovertheneedfor
an additionalassumption. Arethe probabilities cl, c2, thatgroupsenterthe
campaignindependent? If so, thenthe probabilities of SI, S2, S3, S4 are
(clc2), cl (1 - c2), (1 - cl)c2, (1 - cl )(1 - c2), respectively.
The indepen-
denceassumption wouldappearto requirethatthegroupsbe mutually exclu-
sive.But,ifnotindependence, what?Wehaveno theorywhichwouldspecify
howtheprobabilities of SI, S2, S3, S4 woulddependon cl, c2. So, letus
maketherestrictive assumption and proceed.We can takesomeconsolation
in the factthatwithoutconstructing themodelwe mightneverhaverealized
thequestionexisted.
FromFigure3 theexpectedvalueof votingwiththestronger groupis

C1 X1 - C2 Z2 whichmaybe > = < O.

Theexpectedvalueof abstaining
is

-c1y1 -c2y2which is <0.

Theexpectedvalueofvotingagainstthestronger
groupis

c2x2 - cl zI whichmaybe > = < 0.

FIGURE 3
VotingDecision forConflictualCase

States

Vote S1 S2 S3 S4

WithGI xi - Z2 xi -Z2 0
Abstain -Y l Y2 -Y 1 -Y2 0
AgainstG, -zI +x2 -z, x2 0

WhereS 1: Both groupsreact to the vote

S2: G1 reacts,but not G2
S3: G2 reacts,but not GI
S4: Neithergroupreacts

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144 MorrisP. Fiorina

Thus, comparingexpectedvalueswe see that a representative

favorsthe
groupratherthantheweakerif
stronger

cI(xI +z1)>c2(x2 +z2) (1)

and if(1) holds,he voteswiththestronger

group,G1, ratherthanabstainif

cI(xI + Y1) >-c2(z2-Y2) (2)

whileif (1) failsto hold,he voteswiththeweakergroup,G2, ratherthan

abstainif

c2(x2 + Y2) >-cl (Z1 -YI) (3)

Severalpointsof interestare evident.First,note thatabstentionnever

yieldsa positivepayoff.If a representative findsit in his best interestto
the difficulty
abstain,thisonlyillustrates of the situation:votingwouldbe
evenworse.In otherwords,in the conflictual case,representatives mayface
situationsin whichtheirprobabilityof reelectionfallsno matterwhatthey
do. Thus, the model clarifiesthe theoreticalrationalefor the empirical
correspondence betweenthehomogeneity-heterogeneity of a district
and its
electoralsafetyor marginality.
Homogeneousdistricts serveup consensual
decisionproblemswhicha representative can handleeasilyand profitably.
Heterogeneous districts
produceconflictual decisionproblems. And,depend-
ingon thevariablescontainedin (1) to (3), therepresentativemaybe unable
to make such decisionswithoutsuffering. Heterogeneity makesmarginality
morelikely.
In fullyanalyzingconditions(1) to (3), fourlogicalconfigurations are
relevant.

a. andweakergroupsfriendly.
Stronger
b. Stronger
groupfriendly,
weakerunfriendly.
c. Stronger
groupunfriendly,
weakerfriendly.
d. andweakergroupsunfriendly.
Stronger

But space precludesmy carrying this exampleso far.I will concludeby

mentioning one conclusionwhich I could notfindin the model.WhenI
began thiswork I carried
alongnumerous suggestionsfromtheliterature.
One
of thesewas that from
representatives marginal districts
(i.e.,heterogeneous)
are moresubjectto constituency influencethanthosefromsafe(i.e.,homo-

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 FormalModels in PoliticalScience 145

geneous)districts. A secondwas thatrepresentatives frommarginal districts

adoptedcompromise, middle-of-the-road In the
roll call votingstrategies.
modelI constructed, however,suchconclusionsdid not follow.In fact,on a
theoreticallevelI was led to believetheoppositeof the second,an expecta-
tion sinceverified(Fiorina,1974, pp. 100-108). In otherwords,working
withthemodeldisabusedme of somenotionsthatbothcasualargument and
earlierstudiesseemedto support.
The preceding exampleillustrates,I hope,the pointsmadein responseto
the question,whymodels?Definition of concepts,choiceof initialassump-
tions,discoveryof additionalimplicitassumptions, reasoningaccordingto
fixed,objectiveprocedures-allof these are fosteredby the processof
formalizing an argument. Whether one choosesmathematics or precise,care-
ful Englishas the languageof one's model,would anyonereallyfindfault
withthelogicalrigorentailedbymodelconstruction?

WhenAreFormalModelsMostUseful?

As withanyothertechnique,the construction or applicationof a formal

model is sometimesmore appropriate fora givenresearcharea and other
timesless so. In thissectionI willoffersomeopinionsaboutresearchareas
ripe for modeling.First,considerthe descriptive or explanatoryuse of
models.
If our purposeis to explain observablepoliticalbehaviorin a given
context,thenit seemsto me thatmodelscan be used mostadvantageously
wherethereexistsa body of acceptedempiricalfindingsabout political
behaviorinthatcontext.Afterall,how doesone go aboutchoosingconcepts,
definingthemprecisely, andmakingappropriate assumptions ina substantive
vacuum?Considerfora momenttheempirical processof constructingexpla-
natorymodels,a processArthur Goldberg(1968) terms"retroduction."
Givensome empirical X, one posesthequestion,"How might
finding(s),
theworldbe structured suchthatX holds,occurs,oris true?"Theanswersto
thisquestionare models,all of whichhavein commonthattheyassumeor
implyX. To be worthyof consideration a modelmusthaveat leastthisone
tie (X) to the empiricalworld.For example,Downs appearsto have had
several"facts"in mindwhen he formulated his theory-thatpartiesin a
two-party systemare alike but in a multiparty systemdistinct;thatmany
citizensare ill-informedand voteon thebasisof shortcuts suchas partyID
and ideology;thatdemocraticgovernments do "too little;"and no doubt
severalothers.A secondexampleis JohnFerejohn's(1974, ch. 7) modelof
the congressional conferencecommittee bargainingprocess.Ferejohnrequires

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146 MorrisP. Fiorina

thathismodelbe consistent withtwoseemingly inconsistent findings: (1) that

interviewevidencesuggeststhat the House has a stronger position in the
conferencethan the Senate;(2) thatexamination of conference outcomes
suggests thattheSenateis moresuccessful in conference. Anotherexampleis
Shepsle's(1974) modelof theHouse committee assignment process.Rather
thanconstruct a highlyabstractgeneralmodelof how partyleadersand the
Committeeon Committees distribute committee posts,Shepsleincorporates
in the model the detailedrulescurrently prevailing in theHouse (e.g., only
one assignment ifto an exclusivecommittee, no morethanone assignment to
a semiexclusive committee, etc.),as wellas otherempirical findings aboutthe
committeeassignment process.In each of these examplesempiricalfacts
establish constraints on themodelsconstructed; one requiresa priorithatthe
modelbe consistent withthesefacts.
The value of "retroduction" is self-evident. Innumerable modelsare con-
ceivable; far fewer are interesting. The size of the interesting class will
partiallybe determined by what we know in a given area. Many, many models
willimplyX; somewhat fewer will imply both X and Y; fewer still
will imply
all of X, Y, andZ; and so forth.The morewe know,themorerestrictions we
can place on our models,and the less likelywill our modelsbe serious
misrepresentations oftheempirical world.
Withthepreceding comments in mind,I willsuggest variousareasripefor
the applicationof formalmodels.As one would expect,the firstis where
some modelinghas alreadyoccurred-theelectoralprocess.We have great
quantitiesof data,mostlyAmerican, butincreasingly foreignas well.Numer-
ous capable researchers are mining these data, and some generalizations are
to
beginning emerge. Such a situation is close to ideal.
Considerwhathas alreadyoccurred.Buildingon traditional wisdomand
earlyvotingstudies,Downs presenteda modelof partycompetition in a
democraticsystem.Authorssuch as Garvey(1966), Davis, Hinich, and
Ordeshook(1970), Shepsle (1972), and McKelvey(1972) refined various
aspects of the Downsian model. These effortsdirectlyinfluencedsome
empirical research(Shapiro,1969; Rabinowitz, 1973;PageandBrody,1972)
and perhapsindirectly providedsome of the impetusfor the upsurgeof
researchon issue voting(see Kessel, 1972, for citations).Aransonand
Ordeshook(1972), Coleman(1971), and Black(1975) extendedthe earlier
simplemodels to take into accountempiricalresearchon partyactivists.
Inconsistencies betweenthe Downsianvotermodeland empiricaltumout
levels motivatedRikerand Ordeshook(1968) and Ferejohnand Fiorina
(1974a) to trynewtheoretical avenues,whichin turnled to newhypotheses

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 FormalModels in PoliticalScience 147

to be tested(1974b). And in a relatedarea of research, findingsaboutthe

correlatesof politicalparticipation led to additionaltheorizing about the
natureof theparticipation decision(Tollisonand Willett,1973). In thearea
of votingbehaviorandelectoralprocessI believeit fairto concludethatthere
has been considerableinterchange betweenempiricalresearchand formal
models,and thatbothhaveprofited fromit.
A secondarea in whichformalmodelsalmostcertainly willprovevaluable
is the legislativeprocess.Again,thereexistnumerousinformative empirical
studiesrangingfromdetailedinterview materialsto highlyquantitative roll
call studies.Aspectsofthelegislative processthathavebeenmodeledthusfar
include coalition formation(Koehler, 1974), roll call voting(Fiorina,
1974, 1975; Gilbert,1973) conference committee decisionmaking (Ferejohn.
1974), and committee assignments (Shepsle,1974). Thisfirstgeneration of
modelshasnotas yethad muchimpacton empirical research, however.
The studyofthejudicialprocesspresents virtually thesamepictureas that
of the legislative process.Again,thereare numerous highqualityempirical
studiesin whichto groundformalmodels.AlreadyRohde (1972a,b) has
applied Riker's(1962) and Axelrod's(1970, ch. 8) theoriesof coalition
formation to the studyof opinioncoalitionson theSupremeCourt.In the
futureI expectthatformalmodelswillappearquitefrequently in studiesof
thelegislative andjudicialprocesses.
By implication, formalmodelsare not so usefully appliedwherelittleis
knownaboutthebehaviorof interest. I willnotbe so foolishas to nameany
areasof the disciplinewhichfitthatcategory, butcertainly in somesubfields
thereis littleagreement evenon whatshouldbe studiedandhow,letaloneon
whatis known.Possibly,by adoptingthe categories and approachof one of
the contending sides,a researcher could build a model whichwould bring
orderoutof chaos,but I wouldnotbe optimistic aboutthepossibility.
ThusfarI havediscussedtheuse of modelsto explainpoliticalbehavior,
and the conditions underwhichthatuse is mostappropriate. Butthereexists
are
anothertypeof researchquestionforwhichformalmodels quiteappro-
priate.That questioninvolvesthe abstractpropertiesof alternative insti-
tutionalarrangements. Formalanalysisof politicalinstitutions and "rulesof
thegame"areveryrevealing.
Withno more than simplearithmetic Duncan Black (1958) suggested
effectsandproperties ofvariousvotingschemes, e.g.,pairwisevoting(exhaus-
tiveand not),rank-order voting,and extraordinary majorities.He also clari-
fiedand carriedforward the analysisof single-member multimember
district,
district,pluralitywinner,and proportionalrepresentation systems.Many

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148 Morris P. Fiorina

politicalscientistsare familiar withthe interesting institutional analysesin

Buchananand Tullock'sThe Calculusof Consent(1962). Butscoresofother
studiescan be cited.May(1954), Murikami (1968), Rae (1969), Plott(1967),
and numerousothershave ex-amined majorityrule. Ferejohnand Grether
(1974) haveprobedintotheruleofextraordinary majorities.Fishburn (1971),
Murikami, and Fine (1972) haveattempted to formalize andanalyzewhatit
meansto have a representative system.Institutional analysisvirtually de-
mandsa formalizedstudy;the effectsof rulesand procedurescan be ex-
tremelysubtle.Formalanalysesrevealpossibilities thatverbaldiscussions
anticipateonlyvaguely, ifat all (Fishburn,1974).
Frominstitutional analysisit is but a shortstepto politicalphilosophy.
Whyshouldmajorityrulebe adopted?Whichinstitutions are the fairestor
mostjust? Ironically, here,whereformalmodelshave had littleimpact,is
wherethey profitably could be applied.Broadlyconstrued,the abstract
analysesin modernsocialchoicetheoryfocuson thesamequestions(albeit
more narrowly)as does classicalpoliticaltheory(Shepsle, 1974b; Plott,
1972). I findit veryinteresting thatJohnRawls'(1971) prize-winning book,
A Theoryof Justice,containsample documentation of the influenceof
variousindividual and socialchoicemodels;moreover thebook recently has
been critiquedby formalizing its argument and examining its consequences
(Plott,1974). In 1968 Rikerand Shapleypointedto therelevance of formal
modelsfornormative analysis.I would reemphasize their observation here.
Perhapsan unforeseen byproduct of the development of formalmodelswill
be a renewedinterestin the studyof institutional and normative political
science,areaswhichhavefallenintorelative neglectduringthebehavioral era.
As the precedingpages make evident,I have no simpleanswerto the
questionwhichleadsoffthissection.Whenareformalmodelsmostuseful?If
I wereallowedonly one sentencein whichto providean answer,I would
probablyfocusless on theinappropriateness of a givensubjectthanon the
inappropriatenessof givenmodels.Tailorthemodelto theresearch question,
notviceversa.Modelsbecomeinappropriate whentheyceaseto be toolsand
becomeends.Justas thereare a fewindividuals who see the politicalworld
onlyas an arenafortheapplicationof somecherished method,so
statistical
thereare peoplewhosee theworldas something to be twistedandbentto fit
someparticular model.Wecan onlyhopethattheirtribedoesnotincrease.

KindsofModels

Existingformalmodels can be classifiedin variousways,but before

I willargueagainstone whichrears
severalpossiblecategorizations
suggesting

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 FormalModels in PoliticalScience 149

itshead fartoo often:normative vs. positive,ornormative vs.empirical.6In

my opinionthisdistinction servesno usefulpurpose.It has wastedfartoo
muchscholarlytimeand energyin the past,and unfortunately it showsa
recenttendencyto becomethe last refugeof formalmodelersreluctant to
confront therealworld.
Theoriesare theories.The structureof a normativetheorylooks no
different fromthatof a positivetheory.Sometimesit is claimedthatthe
premises of a normative theorycontainimperatives, whereasthepremises ofa
positivetheorycontainonlydeclaratives. But I suggestthatsuchdistinctions
do notlie in thetheoryormodelitself,butratherin themindof thetheorist,
inhisattitudetowardsthetheory.Let me elaborate.
The "normative theorist"regardscertainaxiomsof his theoryas true,as
nonfalsifiable, whetherthisstatusstemsfromrevelation, intuition, natural
law,or whatnot.Giventhisattitudeit is clearthattheimplications of these
axiomsare similarly theyare prescriptions,
nonfalsifiable; nothypotheses. If
the realworlddoes not conformto theseprescriptions, the responseof the
theoristis to censurethe behavior,to recommend thatthe worldshould
change.
In contrast,the positivetheoristregardsthe axioms of his theoryas
approximations to behaviorallawsand characteristicsof the situationbeing
modeled.Giventhisattitude,theimplications oftheaxiomsarepropositions
subjectto falsification,hypothesesabout whatis present in therealworld.If
the worlddoes not conformto the hypotheses, the hypothesesmustgive
way.The theoristgoesback to the drawingboardto reviseor abandonsome
of theaxioms.
For thepositivetheoristthemodelmustaccommodate theworld.For the
normative theoristthe worldmustconformto the model.To see thatthe
distinction is purelyone of attitude,considerhow the samemodelcan be
usedinbothways.
Take someeconomicmodelwhichpositsthatatomizedindividuals inter-
actunderperfectly competitiveconditions.Sucha modelcan illuminate some
spheresof economicactivityeventoday-ithas someexploratory power.Yet
notethatlibertarians takethatsamemodelas a norm.Ifthemodeldoesnot
describebehaviorin some sectorsof the economy(because of statistor

6Sometimes one sees a trichotomous of theoriesinto normative-

classification
In myownusageI do notdifferenti-
ornormative-positive-empirical.
positive-descriptive,
is intended
theory;a positivetheory
ate betweena positiveand a descriptive to explain
anddescribebehavior.A pollofmycolleaguesin thefieldofeconomics elicitedthesame
pointofview.Thus,I consider dichotomy
onlytheproposed tointhetext.
referred

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150 MorrisP. Fiorina

do-gooderinterference withthemarket),thelibertarian doesnotswitchto a

new model (monopoly,oligopoly,centralplanning,etc.). Rather,he con-
demnstheconditions whichprevent themodelfrombeingdescriptive.
A secondexampleis perhapsmorecompelling. Take thetheoryofsubjec-
tiveexpectedutility(Savage,1954). HowardRaiffa(1968) andhisassociates
at the HarvardBusinessSchoolteachthistheoryto theirstudents, but they
teach it as a "normative"theory.Throughproof,paradox, and case study,
Raiffaattemptsto convincedecisionmakers thatto act in theirown best
interests,theyshouldact so as to maximizesubjectiveexpectedutility.But
notethatif a studentlearnswellandusesthetheoryinmakingdecisions, the
theorywill predict,explain,and describehis decisions.The sametheoryis
normative to Raiffa,positiveto-thescholarstudying thedecisionsof Raiffa's
students, andbothto thosemakingthedecisions.Enoughsaid.
Turningto the constructive side, I will suggestthreesomewhatuseful
of existingformalmodels.Thesearenotmeantto be mutually
classifications
exclusiveor exhaustive. Theysimplyconveysomegeneralinformation about
themodelunderconsideration.
One way of classifying modelsis accordingto the generaltheory(para-
digm?)of humanbehaviorwhichunderliesthem.That is, modelsused in
politicalscienceare examplesor applications of moregeneralmodels.These
generalmodelsin turnreflect certainbasicbeliefsaboutthenatureofhuman
behavior.
Most formalmodelsin politicalscienceare examplesof rational-choice
models,a classof modelswhichdominateseconomics.Suchmodelsreflect a
viewof manas a purposive being:individualbehavioris seenas an attemptto
maximizeindividually heldgoals.Decisiontheoreticmodels,gametheoretic
models,spatialmodels-allare examplesof thisbasicclassofmodels.Several
attemptsto analyzethe individualvotingdecision(Rikerand Ordeshook,
1968; Ferejohnand Fiorina,1974a) illustrate veryclearlythebasicelements
ofa rational-choicemodel.
Othermodelsof individualbehaviorhave been developedin psychology
and sociology.Thesemodelsgenerally emphasizethe responsive side ofman
ratherthan his purposiveside. There are variousmathematical learning
models(Estes, 1964) whichgrewout of thebasic stimulus-response-reward
paradigm.Butto thebestofmyknowledge thereareas yetno literalpolitical
applications ofsuchmodels.Theleadingmodelin sociology-therolemodel-
similarlyreflectsa viewofhumanbehavioras primarily responsive.Behavior

(1968,pp. 90-91) writes:

'Ralf Dahrendorf
Withthe existenceof thesefewcategories socialrole,sanc-
(e.g., expectations,
the proposition
tions-M.F.) ... we may formulate or explicitly
thatimplicitly

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 FormalModels in PoliticalScience 151

is seenas a responseto internalized normsandtheexpectations ofsignificant

others.Obviously,politicalscience has been stronglyinfluencedby the
sociologicalparadigm(e.g., social determinist model of votingbehavior,
rolestudies).Buttherearenotmany
politicalsocializationstudies,legislative
formalmodelswhichreflectthe sociologicalparadigm.8 One exceptionoc-
cursin theworkofWayneFrancis(1965). Also,inMcPheeand Glaser(1962)
thereare a numberof interesting politicalapplications of modelssetwithin
thesociologicaltradition.
A second dimensionalong whichto arraymodelsis micro-macro. Are
individuals thebasic unitof analysis,or are groups,classes,nations,etc. the
basic analyticunit?Thosewhoemployindividualistic modelsfrequently hold
the viewthatmacrophenome-na shouldbe completely explainablein micro
terms.For example,in macroeconomics the aggregate supplyand demand
relationships shouldbe builtup fromindividual demandand supplycurves
(easierto believethanto demonstrate, incidentally).Or in politicalscience,
someanalystsmaintain thatan electionis no morethanthesumof numerous
citizen,activist,and candidatedecisions.Others,however, woulddisputethis
position.Some arguethatmodelingmacroeventsis simplymucheasierif
individualbehavioris not consideredexplicitly.Others(Przeworski, 1973)
argue that individualbehavioris affectedby contextualinfluencesthat
individualisticmodelsdo not capture.At any rate,one canfindexamplesof
modelswhichcutintothemicro-macro continuum at variouspoints.Whether
one choosesto analyzethebehaviorofunifiedcollectiveactors(Richardson,
1960), atomizedindividuals, or something in betweendependsmostlyon
whatone wishesto explain,how soon one wishestheanswer,and whatone
wishesto do with it. Dependingon the answers,eitherindividualistic or
macromodels mightbe moreappropriate.
Finally,one mightdifferentiate amongmodelsaccording to theirstaticor
dynamicnature.9Our presentapplications of decision and gametheoretic

workin modernsociology.Man behavesin

all researchand theoretical
underlies
accordancewithhisroles.Thusmanbasicallyfigures analysesonly
in sociological
to theextentthathe complieswithall theexpectationsassociatedwithhis social
unitof sociology,maybe calledhomo
the scientific
positions.Thisabstraction,
sociologicus.
8Wilhiam Mitchell(1969) remarks reluctant
areparticularly
thatpoliticalsociologists
realismforanalytical
to sacrifice Suchan attitude
simplicity. is notconducive
obviously
to formalmodeling.Of course,the "to hell withrealism"attitudeshownby some
is notconducive
politicaleconomists tousefulformal modeling.
9Hereis an appropriatespotto makean observation aboutsimulationmodels(which
arenotautomatically dynamic as is sometimesbelieved-seePool,Abelson,andPopkin,
1964, forexample).In thenaturalsciences, if one's modelcontainsso manyvariables

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152 MorrisP. Fiorina

models are static. One seeks to find an optimalchoice or equilibrium

outcome,givenan unchanged set of initialparameters
(e.g., thestrategy
set,
payofffunctions, etc.). In contrastthereare modelswhosebasic concernis
representing
change.The collectionof articlesin McPheeand Glaser'sPublic
Opinionand Congressional Elections(1962) containsseveralsuch models.
Modelshavebeen constructed to predictattitudechange(Kreweras,1966),
thespreadof rumors, armsraces,and otherdynamicphenomena(Boulding,
1962,chs.2, 6, 7; Rapoport,1960,part1). Again,thetypeofmodelwhichis
appropriatedependson the questionsone is asking.A priorithereis no
reasonto prefermicroor macro,staticor dynamic,purposiveor responsive.
The important questionis whatmodelbestanswersthequestionsof concern.

of Models
CriticalJudgment
Whenreadingabouttheconstruction of a newmodelortheapplication of
an old one, what shouldone look for?Whatare somecriteria of judgment
thatone mightapply?
If the modelis intendedas an explanation of somepoliticalphenomenon,
then the criticalquestionis just what is the model intendedto explain?
Banal? Not at all. Identification
of theprimary researchquestion(s)enables
one to bringto bear one's criticalacumen(and personalbiases)on several
majorquestions:shouldthe modelbe microor macro?Staticor dynamic?
Rationalchoiceor sociological?Identification of theprimary researchques-
tionenablesone to makean initialjudgment abouttheappropriateness of the
model. For example,earlyspatialmodels(Davis,Hinich,and Ordeshook,
1970) are static,micro,rationalchoicemodels.10If one viewsthe electoral
processas quintessentiallya dynamic, macroprocess,one mightsimplyreject
out ofhandspatialmodelsoftheelectoralprocess.
Turning to morespecificmatters, one shouldcarefullystudytheassump-
tionsof themodel.Aretheyreasonableattemptsto approximate aspectsof
thesituationunderstudy,or are theymadein thespiritof "Thisassumption

andrelationshipsthata paperandpencilanalysisis impractical,one turnsitlooseon the

computer. evenverysimplemodelssometimes
In politicalscience,however, getputon
thecomputer becausetheyareusedto manipulate largeamounts of data(Pool,Abelson,
and Popkin,1964; Matthews andStimson,1974).Atanyrate,simulation modelsshould
be evaluatedin the same fashionas otherformalmodels,withthe exceptionthat
repeatedrunsandsensitivitytesting
typically
willreplacelogicalproofs.
"Later developments of themodel(McKelvey, 19'72)relaxtherationalchoicepart
by representingcitizenbehaviorby aggregate "supportfunctions"ratherthanindi-
rationaldecision
vidually rules.

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 FormalModels in PoliticalScience 153

is crazy,but I can't get any resultswithoutit"? If the latter,beware.AD

modelinginvolvesa trade-off betweensimplicityand realism.But one must
takecarenot to tradeawaythe problem in to getenoughsimplicity
order to
analyzeit. Considerthemodelproposed by Robert Barro (1973) to analyze
the electorate'scontrolof theirrepresentatives. Barrowhetsour interest
whenhe writes(1973, p. 19):
The modelfocuseson the divisionof interestbetweenthe publicand its political
The divisionof interest
representatives. is assumed
arisesbecausethepublicofflceholder
to act to advancehis own interests,and theseinterestsdo notcoincideautomatically
withthoseof his constituents.The electoralprocessand someelements ofthepolitical
structureare thenanalyzedas mechanisms whichcan be usedto movetheofflceholder
towarda positionwheretheadvancement approximates
ofself-interest theadvancement
oftheinterestsofhisconstituents.

Butuponreadingfurther
we learnthat:
theanalysisofpoliticalcontrol,
In orderto facilitate modelincorporates
thetheoretical
an extremely simplifiedversionof the underlying In sectionI an
"publicinterest."
assumption of commontasteson privategoods versusthe singletypeof publicgood
insuresunanimous agreementamongindividuals on theidealaggregatelevelofgovern-
mentalactivity.Giventhisunanimity, themodelabstracts fromdifferencesof opinion
amongthe publicand focuseson theproblemof thepublic'scontroloveritspolitical
(Emphasis
representatives. mine.)

Barroremarksthathis model complements otherworkwhichallowsdiver-

genttastes,but I remainskeptical.
Giventhattheassumptions of a modelcapturetheessentialaspectsofthe
situationunder study,one should ask an additionalquestion.Are some
assumptions so specificthatthemodellacksrobustness? If certainvariables
are assumedto followparticular probability or if variablesare
distributions,
assumedto be relatedvia specificfunctionalforms,then hard questions
shouldbe asked.Do we haveevidence(eitherempirical or as theconclusions
of otheracceptedmodels)thatthe specificdistributions or functional forms
arejustified?If not,we shouldbe skepticalof theconclusions ofthemodel,
fortheymay be totallydependenton the distributions or functional forms
assumed.Slightperturbations of theassumptions could altertheconclusions
drastically.
For example,the Brams-Davis (1974) modelof campaignresourcealloca-
tiondependscritically on theassumption thatcandidates expendexactlythe
sameamountof resourcesineachstate.The Gilbert(1973) modelofrollcall
votingassumesthatrepresentatives strivefor50% + 1 votes.If somerecalci-
trantrepresentative wishes55% of the vote,the conclusionsof the model
may not hold forhim.In mybook (Fiorina,1974) I assumethata rollcall

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154 MorrisP. Fiorina

vote againsta constituency groupalwayshurtsa representative morethana

voteforthemhelps.
I hastento emphasizethatsuchspecificassumptions byno meansmakea
modeluseless.Afterall, theymaybe exactlycorrect.Highlyspecificassump-
tionssimplyraisea cautionflag.The implications of themodelmayresult
directlyfromthespecificity assumed,so examineit carefully.
Even if the model is not intendedas explanatory, one stillmustpay
carefulattentionto the assumptions.In analysesof institutional arrange-
ments,one willcomeacrossabstractaxiomslabeled"anonymity," "positive
responsiveness,""liberalism,""nondictatorship," etc. Do such axiomscap-
ture the essenceof such concepts?If not, thereis uncertainty about the
meaningof themodel'simplications. An exampleis an impossibility theorem
provedby Sen (1970). Loosely speaking,Sen shows that undercertain
generalconditionsan additionalconditionhe callsliberalism is incompatible
withthe existenceof a collectivechoice rulewhichdesignates a bestalter-
nativefromeverysubsetof alternatives. The essenceof Sen's "liberalism" is
thatforeveryindividual thereis at leastone pairof alternatives forwhichhis
preference alone determines the socialchoice(e.g.,pinkwallsinhisbedroom
ratherthan white walls). As Sen recognizes,however,liberalismcan be
definedin variousways. An alternative formulation mightbe to designate
some subsetof alternatives as simplyoutsidethe domainof feasiblealter-
natives("Congressshallmakeno law....").
The essenceof the precedingdiscussionis simple.Do not skipoverthe
technicalportionof a formalmodel and go directlyto the conclusions.
Rather,examinecarefully thedeflnitions and assumptions ofthemodel.The
model'sconclusionsare implicitin the definitions and assumptions. Scruti-
nizethelatteras wellas theformer.
Finally,examinethecorrespondence betweentheconclusions of a formal
modelandtheresearcher's interpretations ofthem.Theoremssometimes may
be terriblyabstract.And (down deep) many formalmodelersare just as
concernedoverthe relevanceof theirworkas are moreempirically oriented
researchers.Thus, a littlewishful thinking sometimes can creep in between
theoremand interpretation. The consumerof suchworkshouldbe awareof
thepossibility.
Otherwise, judge work involving modelsas one wouldjudge any other
work.Is it careful,insightful,and does it advanceour understanding? In the
endeverystudymustbe judgedagainst those standards.

Manuscript May 13, 19 74.

submitted
receivedSeptember
Finalmanuscript 10, 19 74.

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 FormalModels in PoliticalScience 155

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