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A Pragmatist Theory of Social Mechanisms

Neil Gross
American Sociological Review 2009 74: 358
DOI: 10.1177/000312240907400302
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A Pragmatist Theory of
Social Mechanisms
Neil Gross
University of British Columbia
Some sociologists have recently argued that a major aim of sociological inquiry is to
identify the mechanisms by which cause and effect relationships in the social world come
about. This article argues that existing accounts of social mechanisms are problematic
because they rest on either inadequately developed or questionable understandings of
social action. Building on an insight increasingly common among sociological
theorists—that action should be conceptualized in terms of social practices—I mobilize
ideas from the tradition of classical American pragmatism to develop a more adequate
theory of mechanisms. I identify three kinds of analytical problems the theory is
especially well poised to address and then lay out an agenda for future research.
n recent decades, sociological positivism—the Scholars also note that in more than a century
I view that sociology should aim to identify uni-
versal causal laws of social life—has been sub-
of sociological research, few universal laws
have been discovered.
ject to withering critique. Leaving aside the As criticisms mount, sociologists grasp for
claims of postmodernists, skeptical of every more adequate conceptions of the disciplinary
effort at universalization, and humanistic soci- enterprise. Moralistic and political understand-
ologists who worry that positivism objectifies ings have attained new popularity (e.g., Burawoy
human beings, positivism has been persuasive- 2005; Feagin and Vera 2008), but many
ly attacked on various philosophical and theo- researchers with more strictly explanatory aims
retical grounds (see Abbott 1988, 1990; have embraced the postpositivist position that
Alexander 1982–83, 1987; Seidman 1994; sociology should center on identifying more or
Steinmetz 2005; Zammito 2004). Critics point less general social mechanisms, or abstract
out its philosophical naiveté with regard to dis- causal processes, that may operate in particular
tinctions between facts and values, observation settings and that may help to account for
and theory, and proof and persuasion—a prob- observed outcomes. Where positivism has tra-
lem sociological positivism shares with posi- ditionally searched for laws of the form “if X
tivism as a more general philosophy of science. then universally Y ” or “if X then universally Y
becomes more likely,” social mechanisms are
generally understood as intermediary process-
Direct correspondence to Neil Gross at Department es by which, in certain irreducible contexts, the
of Sociology, 6303 NW Marine Drive, Vancouver BC probabilistic X→Y relationship obtains. The
V6T 1Z1, Canada (ngross@interchange.ubc.ca). For view that sociology should identify mechanisms
their very helpful comments on earlier drafts I thank underlies, for instance, Kandel and Massey’s
the ASR editors and reviewers as well as Gianpaolo (2002:983) attempt to discover the means
Baiocchi, Amy Binder, Matteo Bortolini, Craig “through which [the] migratory attitudes [of
Calhoun, Charles Camic, Scott Frickel, Julian Go, Mexican immigrants] spread through cultural
Hans Joas, Erkki Kilpinen, Michèle Lamont, John
channels to affect behavior”; Fernandez,
Levi Martin, Robert Sampson, Mitchell Stevens,
Castilla, and Moore’s (2000) effort to deter-
Sidney Tarrow, Stephen Turner, Josh Whitford,
Christopher Winship, Matt Wray, and Stephen Vaisey. mine how contemporary firms leverage bene-
I also thank participants in workshops held at the fits in hiring by reliance on employee referrals;
University of British Columbia, New York University, and Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls’s (1997)
the Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study, and the argument that the capacity of urban neighbor-
University of Trento. hood residents to collectively exert informal
AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW, 2009, VOL. 74 (June:358–379)
A PRAGMATIST THEORY OF SOCIAL MECHANISMS—–359
social control is a key mechanism mediating Bourdieu 1990; de Certeau 1984; Giddens 1984;
between structure and crime rates. Empirical Ortner 1984; Swidler 2001; see also Chaiklin
work in this vein is often distinguished not only and Lave 1996; Pickering 1992; Schatzki 1996,
from positivism sensu stricto, but also from the 2002; Schatzki, Knorr Cetina, and von Savigny
sociological tradition of “correlational analysis,” 2001).
which examines associations among variables In this article, I show how a sophisticated
but pursues explanation at a high level of gen- theory of social action, broadly in the practice
erality (see Bunge 1997; Mahoney 2001; Steel theory family—developed by the American
2004). Both approaches, it is argued, treat causal pragmatist philosophers Charles S. Peirce,
mechanisms as black boxes (Elster 1989; William James, George Herbert Mead, and John
Hedström and Swedberg 1998) and so fail to Dewey and elaborated most recently by Joas
provide comprehensive explanations. (1996)—can be extended into a robust theory
As more sociologists have adopted a mech- of social mechanisms. I do not argue directly for
anism-centered focus, theoretical formulations
the merits of a pragmatist theory of action;
of the mechanisms concept have proliferated
strong arguments to this effect have been
(e.g., Hedström and Swedberg 1998; Reskin
advanced by others (e.g., Joas 1993, 1996;
2003; Stinchcombe 2005; Tilly 2001). There
Whitford 2002). Nor do I demonstrate that my
is, however, something paradoxical about many
of these formulations: they owe their attrac- approach necessarily increases the explanatory
tiveness to a context in which sociological the- power of every account of the operation of par-
orists, applying and extending the ideas of ticular mechanisms, although I identify three
philosophers, have helped to undermine posi- common analytical problems with which the
tivism. Yet they often proceed from substantive theory could be especially helpful. Rather, I
assumptions that many in the heterogeneous make a prima facie case that a great many social
theory community do not consider viable. More mechanisms, regardless of the level of analysis
specif ically, many prominent theoretical at which they operate, can be understood as
accounts of social mechanisms are either resting on a more solid action-theoretical foun-
beholden to some version of rational choice dation than existing approaches recognize. In
theory or essentially agnostic about the nature doing so, I offer a way to connect important
of social action.1 strands of sociological theory with the research
However, a majority of theorists today doubt enterprise of “mainstream” sociology (see
that action typically takes the form of a ration- Calhoun and VanAntwerpen 2007) and—taking
al calculation of means to ends, and also insist a different tack from the symbolic interaction-
that action-theoretical assumptions necessarily ists—show how the tradition of American prag-
factor into every account of social order and matism can provide intellectual coherence to a
change and should therefore be fully specified. discipline looking to find its way in a postpos-
From a variety of viewpoints, contemporary itivist age.
theorists instead conceptualize social action as
a creative enactment over time of social prac-
WHAT IS A SOCIAL MECHANISM?
tices. Social practices are ways of doing and
thinking that are often tacit, acquire meaning Confusion abounds as to what exactly a mech-
from widely shared presuppositions and under- anism is. A clear definition is an essential first
lying semiotic codes, and are tied to particular step toward a sociological theory of mecha-
locations in the social structure and to the col- nisms. To distill such a definition, I consider five
lective history of groups. Collective enactment varied conceptualizations that have appeared
of such practices produces and reproduces those in recent years.2
structures and groups (e.g., Archer 2000;
2 For a more exhaustive review of the literature on

1 I discuss below an exception to this generaliza- mechanisms, see Hedström (2005); Hedström and
tion in Tilly’s work, which overlaps in certain respects Swedberg (1998); Johnson (2002); and Mahoney
with the perspective I develop here. (2001).

360—–AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW
MECHANISMS AS NOT NECESSARILY out an agenda for research on ascriptive

OBSERVABLE STRUCTURES OR PROCESSES inequality, she urges scholars to stop being
concerned with models that posit motives for
According to the first conceptualization— unequal allocations and focus instead on
advanced by Hedström and Swedberg (1998)— uncovering mechanisms by which “ascribed
a social mechanism is the structure or process characteristics” are linked “to outcomes of
S by which some event or variable I leads to or varying desirability” (p. 7). For Reskin, as for
causes a change in the state of variable or event Hedström and Swedberg, mechanisms are what
O. Where some sociologists would be content happen inside the black box of social causal-
to “blackbox” S, or significant components of ity—they are “processes that convert inputs (or
it, Hedström and Swedberg insist that true independent variables) into outputs (or depen-
explanation demands fuller specification of dent variables)” (p. 7). She glosses mecha-
its internal content. Such specification, in their nisms-based approaches to inequality as those
view, should have three features. First, it should concerned with the question of how inequali-
follow the principle of methodological indi- ties arise in allocation.4 Unlike Hedström and
vidualism, explaining meso- and macro-level Swedberg, however, Reskin argues that how
social phenomena by reference to the actions questions must be answerable in terms of
of the individuals involved. Second, it should observable processes; in her view, this feature
give primacy to analytical models to be judged commends them over why questions from the
by their explanatory utility and parsimony, as standpoint of realism, for the motives of indi-
much as by their realism.3 Third, the specifi- viduals and groups typically cannot be seen.
cation of S must not require that S be directly The only exception concerns mechanisms pos-
observable; many social mechanisms, they tulated to operate at the intrapsychic level;
argue, cannot be observed. Although Hedström interpersonal, societal, and organizational
and Swedberg point appreciatively to work mechanisms must meet the observability
done by Coleman, Granovetter, and others, requirement.
their paradigm case of an adequately specified
social mechanism is Merton’s (1968) theory of
MECHANISMS AS LOWER-ORDER SOCIAL
the self-fulfilling prophesy, by which a false
PROCESSES
definition of a situation leads individuals to act
so as to bring that situation about, as when Stinchcombe (1998:267), building on
belief in the insolvency of a bank leads to a run Coleman, offers an alternative by suggesting
that causes insolvency. This theory meets their that mechanisms are “bits of ‘sometimes true
criteria because it postulates the existence of theory’ or ‘models’ that represent a causal
a “general belief-formation mechanism which process, that have some actual or possible
states that the number of individuals who per- empirical support separate from the larger the-
form a certain act signals to others the likely ory in which it is a mechanism, and that gen-
value or necessity of the act, and this signal will erate increased precision, power, or elegance
influence other individuals’ choice of action” in the large-scale theories.” Although not a
(p. 21, emphasis in original). methodological individualist, he argues that
all social mechanisms involve processes affect-
MECHANISMS AS OBSERVABLE PROCESSES ing lower-order units of analysis—processes
that in aggregate bring about the relationship
THAT DO NOT REQUIRE THE POSITING OF
X→Y for higher-order units under considera-
MOTIVES
tion. Stinchcombe, however, insists that we
For Reskin (2003), the specification of a social may be able to show that X causes Y without
mechanism need not have all the properties knowing much about the underlying, lower-
demanded by Hedström and Swedberg. Laying order mechanisms: only when such knowledge
3 As noted below, Hedström (2005) objects to 4 Much recent empirical work on mechanisms of
“instrumentalist” versions of rational choice theory inequality can be seen as carrying out Reskin’s pro-
that ignore realism altogether. gram (e.g., Rivera 2008; Stevens 2007).

gives us a better understanding of the higher- ant to movement in the direction of closure, not
order relationship—for example, of the con- least because of what they postulate to be the
texts in which the relationship is likely to intrinsic capacity of human beings to work at
obtain—will it be helpful to have a grasp of the transforming social relations. This resistance
relevant mechanisms. has methodological implications (see Ekström
1992). In the social sciences, explanation can
MECHANISMS AS TRIGGERABLE CAUSAL only take the form of breaking events down
POWERS into their component parts, identifying—by the
elaboration of analytic models—the mecha-
“Critical realism” provides a fourth approach to nisms that could have helped generate them,
mechanisms. For critical realists like Bhaskar and determining, through empirically ground-
and Collier, the search for mechanisms is the ed reflection on the conditions of historical pos-
sine qua non of science. In their view, the iden- sibility, whether and how those mechanisms,
tification of mechanisms involves analytic with others and given contingent circumstances,
movement across three ontological domains: actually brought about the events (see Steinmetz
from the empirical, where scientists access expe- 2004). Unlike methodological individualists,
rience; to the actual, where they identify the critical realists are also emergentists who argue
events that generate that experience; to the real, that higher-order strata of social reality emerge
wherein lie the causal mechanisms—usually out of lower-order ones, and that events within
unseen—by virtue of which one event causes those emergent strata are caused by mecha-
another. Key to critical realism’s understanding nisms unique to them and not reducible to lower-
of this process is the claim that movement from order mechanisms.5
the empirical to the real involves movement
along a continuum from an “open” toward a MECHANISMS AS TRANSFORMING EVENTS
“closed” system. A mechanism is “that aspect
of the structure of a thing by virtue of which it A final framework is outlined by Tilly (2001),
has a certain [causal] power” (Collier 1994:62). who, like most students of mechanisms, con-
Mechanisms, however, “operate [only] when trasts mechanisms-based accounts with those
suitably triggered” (p. 62), and outside the lab- centering on the search for covering laws. He
oratory mechanisms almost always coexist with also counterposes them with “propensity
a host of other mechanisms, processes, and fac- accounts” that “consider explanation to consist
tors that inhibit that triggering or otherwise of reconstructing a given actor’s state at the
interfere with the causal relationship. “Under threshold of action, with that state variously
non-experimental conditions,” in other words, stipulated as motivation, consciousness, need,
“we can see only what [a] mechanism in con- organization, or momentum” and to “systems
junction with other factors makes it do” (p. 33, explanations” that “consist of specifying the
emphasis in original)—that is, we can see it place of some event, structure, or process with-
operate only in an open system. Experi- in a larger .|.|. set of interdependent elements”
mentation, by contrast, creates a closed system (p. 569). Mechanisms-based approaches, by
“to isolate one mechanism of nature from the contrast, “select salient features of [historical]
effects of others, to see what that mechanism episodes .|.|. and explain them by identifying
does on its own” (p. 33). Science proceeds by robust mechanisms of relatively general scope”
generating such isolation and thus involves nei- (p. 569). Tilly has a distinct understanding, how-
ther a search for covering laws nor a simple ever, of what mechanisms consist of. They “are
accumulation of findings. Rather, science events that alter relations among some specified
searches for an increasingly comprehensive and set of elements,” and they come in three vari-
deep understanding of causal mechanisms, the eties: “cognitive mechanisms operate through
mechanisms that underlie mechanisms, and how alterations of individual and collective percep-
the configuration of particular open systems tion”; “relational mechanisms alter connections
affects the functioning of mechanisms.
Bhaskar and other critical realists devote par-
ticular attention to the social sciences, which 5 For a discussion of social emergence, see Sawyer
they see as studying systems especially resist- (2005).

among people, groups, and interpersonal net- mechanism is rather the process or means by
works”; and “environmental mechanisms exert which X causes Y. This process must have a
external influences on the conditions affecting significant social component if the mechanism
[social] processes” (p. 572). is to be considered a social one. A volcanic
In Tilly’s view, consequently, social expla- eruption leveling a village and destroying a
nation should involve “pursu[ing] particular community is an environmental mechanism
mechanisms across different settings” and (not in Tilly’s sense), not a social one, although
examining the role of those mechanisms, includ- it might help establish the conditions under
ing how they “concatenate” into “social process- which social mechanisms could unfold.6 It
es,” in bringing about puzzling historical might also be connected with other social mech-
episodes. In describing mechanisms as events, anisms that incorporate and mediate environ-
Tilly refers first and foremost to the different mental factors, such as those that help explain
kinds of practices actors can enact together, the geographic positioning of the village or the
such as pursuing “certification” of their politi- nature of its housing stock.
cal identities, as numerous would-be states did 2. Social mechanisms unfold in time. Social
vis-à-vis the United Nations after World War II, mechanisms bring about causal effects through
or “brokerage” involving actors “establishing, a temporal sequence of events or processes
severing, or realigning connections among occurring in the social world at the micro-,
social sites” (p. 575), which Tilly describes as meso-, or macro-level or across levels. A social
a defining feature of social life in the Soviet fact or phenomenon that causes another social
Union. Tilly recognizes that mechanisms thus fact or phenomenon instantaneously, with no
understood, while relatively general in nature, intervening processes, is unimaginable; such
may be instantiated differently in different his- processes make up mechanisms and are always
torical periods. For example, he notes that mech- temporally embedded. The duration of the
anisms of competition, involving “striving sequences involved may vary greatly. The
among several actors within a reward-allocat- sequence may be short—a matter of a few inter-
ing arena” (p. 575), are key features of the con- actions and cognitive-affective processes—for
tentious politics waged by social movement example, when an individual in a small-group
activists, but that politics of this sort, with its judges another with low external status char-
unique phenomenology, emerged only in the acteristics more positively after that person
nineteenth century. Analysts of mechanisms demonstrates commitment to the group
must therefore be attentive to time and place— (Ridgeway 1982). The duration of a mecha-
in particular, to ways in which social mechanism may extend over years, as for individuals
nisms may “incor porate institutions, in occupations involving high levels of work-
understandings, and practices that have accu- place autonomy who come to value indepen-
mulated historically” (p. 570). Tilly’s dence and self-direction (Kohn et al. 1990). Or
(1995a:1602) program for social research thus the mechanism may unfold over centuries, as in
involves “the historically embedded search for the sequence of events by which the Protestant
deep causes operating in variable combinations, Reformation instilled social discipline in pop-
circumstances, and sequences with consequently ulations, laying the microfoundations for the
variable outcomes.” rise of strong nation-states (Gorski 2003).
3. Social mechanisms are general, although
in varying degrees. If a person grows up in a
TOWARD A DEFINITION neighborhood with a high degree of social dis-
To extract a working definition of social mech- organization, has no one exerting informal social
anisms from these conceptualizations, I consider control over her, and turns to a life of crime
the major points on which the authors agree (Wilson 1996), a social mechanism can be said
and disagree. First the points of explicit and to be at play only if the process is more or less
tacit agreement:
1. Social mechanisms are causal in that they
mediate between cause and effect. In the 6 For example, mechanisms relating to the result-
sequence X→Y, neither X nor Y nor the causal ing high levels of anomie, as in Erikson’s (1978)
relationship itself is a social mechanism. The classic study of Buffalo Creek, West Virginia.

typical of actors in similar circumstances. Every parsimony not only allows but requires “taking
such person need not be subject to the mecha- certain macro-level states as given and incor-
nism, or affected by it in the same way, but a porating them into the explanation” (p. 13).
social mechanism is a causal process with some Generally, however, Hedström and Swedberg
minimum level of generality. As Tilly’s analy- believe that the analysis of mechanisms should
sis makes clear, however, mechanisms may focus on processes centered on individual-level
sometimes be invoked to explain particular action. For critical realists, who are committed
events (e.g., historical ones). However much to a social ontologist position, by contrast, it is
the events typically studied by historical soci- acceptable—the point about analytic hierarchy
ologists involve dramatic breaks from estab- notwithstanding—to study social mechanisms
lished social routines (Sewell 1996), they are without much concern for the individual-level
explicable in terms of mechanisms to the extent phenomena by which they come about (e.g.,
that they are instances of a more general phe- Steinmetz 2005; see also Burris 2007).
nomenon, such as revolution (Skocpol 1979), or 2. Formal versus substantive mechanisms.
result from combinations of more general mech- Beyond the requirement that social mechanisms
anisms (see Steinmetz 2005; Tilly 1995a). have a minimum level of generality, some schol-
4. Because a social mechanism is an inter- ars are concerned with causal relationships that
mediary process, it is necessarily composed of obtain because of the form of the sociological
elements analyzed at a lower order of com- case at hand, in roughly Simmel’s (1971) sense
plexity or aggregation than the phenomenon it of the term “formal.” What matters here is that
helps explain. The nature of this hierarchical an X→Y relationship comes about because of
relationship will vary by case, but Stinchcombe the formal, structural characteristics of the social
speaks for most writers on social mechanisms relations involved, as in Burt’s (2001) argument
when he argues that identifying them means that social capital advantages accrue to actors
peering into a layer of social reality that serves whose network ties span the “structural holes”
as a substratum for the phenomenon under other actors encounter. The content of the situ-
investigation. All work on social mechanisms ation in which actors accrue or fail to accrue
assumes that mechanisms are the gears in some such an advantage, where content is either the
social machinery and thus stand in a relation- actor’s subjective understanding of it or the ana-
ship of lesser to greater vis-à-vis the causal lyst’s categorization in terms of social domain
effect they bring about (see Johnson 2002:230). or manifest or latent function, matters only indi-
If we let theoretical consensus be our guide, rectly to Burt’s argument. By contrast, Reskin’s
these points of agreement should be incorpo- call for the study of mechanisms generative of
rated into any adequate definition of social ascriptive inequality aims to isolate mecha-
mechanisms. But such a definition should also nisms operative specifically in situations of
be sufficiently broad to accommodate points allocation. Those who take Reskin’s view that
of significant epistemological and method- the key mechanisms to study are substantive
ological disagreement: rather than formal typically focus on domains
1. Methodological individualism versus social rich with the relevant mechanisms, whereas
ontologism. Those like Hedström and Swedberg, advocates of more formal approaches seek to
who believe that individual persons must be identify mechanisms so abstract that they oper-
the point of departure for social analysis, take ate across virtually all domains. The closer to
a different approach to mechanisms than do the formal end of the continuum a conceptual-
critical realists, who recognize the nonreductive ization of mechanisms is, the less attentive it will
reality of emergent social entities. In fact, be to variation in the working of mechanisms
Hedström and Swedberg (1998:12) make a case across time and space. Nearly all approaches,
only for a “weak version” of methodological however, proceed from the recognition that in
individualism. In many instances, they argue, it social life contingent circumstances cannot be
may be impossible for explanation to trace all completely explained away.
the steps by which the actions of individuals 3. Analytical versus realist models. A final
aggregate to compose a supra-individual enti- point of contention among those who offer con-
ty—the demand of methodological individual- ceptualizations of social mechanisms is episte-
ism in its “strong version.” Insofar as this is so, mological: Is the goal to produce models that

allow for elegant and robust predictions, whether cation of mechanisms may be helpful, it does lit-
or not the postulated mechanisms can be shown tle to delimit the scope of possible mechanisms
to be present and operative in reality? Or should and provides no general account of their nature.
one seek to identify mechanisms that are empir- Reskin offers a categorization of the mecha-
ically observable? Hernes (1998:78), con- nisms relevant to the maintenance of inequali-
tributing to Hedström and Swedberg’s volume ty, but provides neither a reason to think her
on social mechanisms, takes the former view: typology exhaustive nor much detail as to the
“A mechanism is an intellectual construct that workings of the mechanisms said to fall with-
is part of a phantom world which may mimic in each class. These omissions might stem from
real life with abstract actors that impersonate skepticism about the explanatory gain from
humans and cast them in conceptual conditions general theories. They might also, however,
that emulate actual circumstances” (emphasis in stem from a hesitation on the part of scholars
original). Reskin takes the latter view—without to both make strong assumptions about social
giving up a concern for robustness—as she action of the kind that contemporary theorists
would reject postulated mechanisms that are insist on and to grapple with their implications
either unobservable or diverge from processes for the understanding of causal processes.
and sequences of events that can be observed. A different problem besets another strain of
Taken together, these considerations suggest work. Perhaps because the idea of opening up
the following definition: A social mechanism is the black box of causality to develop fully spec-
a more or less general sequence or set of social ified models appeals to sociologists who value
events or processes analyzed at a lower order a certain kind of analytical rigor, there is often
of complexity or aggregation by which—in cer- an affinity between work on mechanisms and
tain circumstances—some cause X tends to theorization proceeding from assumptions about
bring about some effect Y in the realm of human action thought to be highly rigorous—namely,
social relations. This sequence or set may or scholarship in the rational choice theory tradi-
may not be analytically reducible to the actions tion. Hedström’s work provides an example:
of individuals who enact it, may underwrite for-
formerly a champion of rational choice theory
mal or substantive causal processes, and may
proper, he now argues that social mechanisms
be observed, unobserved, or in principle unob-
should be understood through the lens of what
servable.
he calls “DBO theory.” In this theory, social
action results when intentional agents have
THE PROBLEM WITH CURRENT something they desire (D), have a belief (B)
FORMULATIONS about the world pertaining to that desire, and
Recent scholarship, although helpful in shed- confront opportunities (O) that give them
ding light on the term “social mechanism,” is options for action from which they must choose.
less satisfactory when it comes to offering soci- Where rational choice theory posits “an atom-
ological theories of mechanisms—that is, gen- ized actor equipped with unlimited cognitive
eral accounts, not of social causality as a abilities that allow ‘him’ to consistently choose
philosophical concept, but of causal processes the optimal course of action” (Hedström
in the realm of the social. How should such 2005:36), DBO theory assumes only that “the
processes be understood? What are their build- cause of an action is a constellation of desires,
ing blocks? How do they vary? beliefs and opportunities in light of which the
With respect to such questions, conceptual action appears reasonable” (p. 39). Moreover,
work on social mechanisms tends to take one of while at least some rational choice approaches
two forms. Some work seeks to identify rela- treat desires and beliefs as exogenous to the
tively abstract features of mechanisms but stops explanatory model, DBO theory takes serious-
short of laying out a fully developed theory of ly the notion that “individuals’ attitudes and
them. Stinchcombe’s and Reskin’s contribu- beliefs are molded in interactions with others”
tions fall into this camp. Although (p. 43). Such a molding is at the core of
Stinchcombe’s work clarifies that mechanisms Hedström’s conception of social mechanisms.
bridge levels of analysis, and offers suggestions In his view, three types of interactional mech-
about the circumstances in which the specifi- anisms—belief-, desire-, and opportunity-medi-

ated—are the building blocks for more complex they did something as post hoc rationalizations
social processes. that, beyond being restricted to a prescientific
The problem with this strain of work is that “vocabulary of motives” (Mills 1940), often
relatively few in the theory community agree obscure the fact that no real motivation or choice
that rational choice theory or variants such as was involved.7 Because these criticisms apply
DBO theory offer empirically or theoretically as much to DBO theory as to more conven-
adequate descriptions of social action. Several tional rational choice models, no sociologist
objections are widely shared among theorists who finds them convincing is likely to think
(see Archer and Tritter 2000; Green and Shapiro Hedström’s theory of social mechanisms—or
1994; Somers 1998). Rational choice theory cognate theories offered by Elster and others—
typically conceptualizes rationality as an innate promising.8
and more or less equally distributed cognitive In response to these concerns; in reaction to
capacity, whereas sociological theorists attend other developments in the human sciences such
to ways in which different forms of rationality as existentialism, structural Marxism, and
appear at different historical moments and come anthropological structuralism; and building on
to be differentially distributed across social other developments including phenomenology,
space. Rational choice approaches—especially ethnomethodology, and work on “rule follow-
outside the “bounded rationality” framework— ing” inspired by the later Wittgenstein, theorists
assume that, in most circumstances, individu- in recent decades have argued that social prac-
als act rationally or at least reasonably in the tices—not discrete actions—should be the focus
light of their clear and coherent beliefs and of social research at the level of the individual
desires. Leaving aside the question of whether or group. Practices are generally understood as
most people act rationally or reasonably most of forms of doing or ways of acting and interact-
the time, many sociological theorists would fol- ing that appear within particular communities
low Smelser (1998:4) in holding the “psycho- or groups; depend on shared presuppositions
logical postulate” of ambiguity to have “wide and assumptions; often have a significant cor-
applicability” in social life, and Swidler (2001) poreal or material dimension; and unfold in
in maintaining that the logical coherence of individuals’ lives as a result of active, creative,
individuals’ beliefs about the world is the excep- and less than fully conscious puttings into play
tion rather than the rule. Furthermore, the tem- of those presuppositions and assumptions in
poral phenomenology of much social action the context of various and intersecting sociobi-
departs from that implied by rational choice ographical and interactional exigencies.
approaches. While these approaches suggest an Conceptualized as such, practices are at the
individual armed with beliefs and desires who heart of Bourdieu’s (1990) theory of social
steps out of the flow of action to face and eval- fields, Butler’s (1990) analysis of the perfor-
uate a choice between competing means, theo- mativity of gender, Giddens’s (1984) theory of
rists note that such moments are empirically structuration, Knorr-Cetina’s (1999) investiga-
rare, tend to come about in a socially structured tions of the “epistemic cultures” of science and
fashion, and often involve an inverse temporal
modern society, Ortner’s (1984) efforts to
ordering in which goals emerge and are clari-
reground anthropological understandings of
fied only after individuals tentatively embark on
one means or another.
Finally, whereas rational choice approach-
7 Not all theorists in the rational choice tradition
es—like those emphasizing the norm-directed
nature of action—assume that most action is are subject to these criticisms. Macy’s (1993) “back-
motivated, many sociological theorists argue ward-looking model of social control” posits that
actors learn through experience about the general
that socially learned habit is a major proximate
conditions under which it makes sense to participate
cause of behavior (Camic 1986). While recog- in collective action, eliminating the need for infor-
nizing that lines of habitual activity might mation-intensive calculation in every instance.
accord with individuals’ strategic or expressive 8 However, a growing literature in the philosophy
interests, theorists view most separate acts com- of social science argues that “false models” may still
posing those lines as not directly motivated and be extremely useful in explanation (e.g., Hindriks
see individuals’ retrospective accounts of why 2008).

culture, and Sewell’s (2005) contributions to and Mead and elaborated toward a sociological
historiography, among many other contribu- theory of action by Joas (1996).
tions (for review, see Schatzki 1996, 2002;
Schatzki et al. 2001). Nearly all specific theo- THE PRAGMATIST THEORY OF
retical programs advanced under the rubric of ACTION
practice theory have come in for criticism, as has
the notion of social practices itself (Turner The classical American pragmatists were
1994), but this has not deterred a significant philosophers, not sociological theorists per se.
amount of research into the practices seen as Yet as Joas shows, despite disagreement among
constitutive of social life in numerous domains them and significant interpretive disputes
and historical settings. among contemporary scholars as to the mean-
Students of social practices have by no means ing of pragmatism, the classical pragmatists
ignored causality. Indeed, as Ortner notes in a were for the most part united in their under-
seminal 1984 article, the turn toward practice standing of the basic nature of human activity
among contemporary theorists, while incorpo- vis-à-vis the social and natural worlds. Rejecting
rating notions of the active, knowledgeable, the Cartesian view that thought and action, mind
culturally interpretive agent that can be found and body, are ontologically distinct, the prag-
in earlier humanistic approaches such as sym- matists argued that in anthropological terms,
bolic interactionism, departs from the antide- humans are problem solvers and the function of
terminism that often characterizes such thought is to guide action in the service of solv-
approaches by seeing in patterned iterations of ing practical problems that arise in the course
of life. From this claim, wide ranging and con-
practice the basis for the reproduction of social
troversial epistemological implications followed.
structures, in particular, structures of inequali-
More important in the present context, howev-
ty. Faced with causal questions such as “Why is
er, is the corollary claim that action, as a
there not more intergenerational upward mobil-
response to problem situations, involves an
ity in contemporary capitalist societies?”
alternation between habit and creativity. The
researchers who take a practice approach do
main way humans solve problems, the prag-
not hesitate to point to practices and their causal
matists held, is by enacting habits—those
effects, as in Lareau’s (2003) claim that differ-
learned through social experience or from pre-
ences in childrearing between working- and
vious individual efforts at problem solving. By
middle-class parents instill distinctive disposi-
habits, the pragmatists meant not rote behavior,
tions in their offspring that are differentially but “acquired predisposition[s] to ways or
rewarded in school and on the labor market. modes of response” (Dewey 1922:42, empha-
Yet the direct production and reproduction of sis in original) of which actors are typically not
social structures of inequality by means of the conscious in the moment. Only when preexist-
iteration of practices is only one kind of causal ing habits fail to solve a problem at hand does
effect that may interest social scientists. To the an action-situation rise to the forefront of con-
extent that it remains unclear how a variety of sciousness as problematic. Then, the pragmatists
other causal processes build on and intersect argued, humankind’s innate capacity for cre-
with social practices—as it does, given that few ativity comes into play as actors dream up pos-
who take a practice approach address social sible solutions, later integrating some of these
mechanisms—much empirical research will into their stocks of habit for use on subsequent
find itself deprived of sophisticated action-the- occasions.9
oretical foundations.
I argue that a solution to this problem can be
found by developing a theory of social mecha- 9
nisms on the basis of an approach to social Space constraints prevent me from offering a
more nuanced account of pragmatism or considering
action that has affinities with other strains of the implications for sociology of a pragmatist epis-
practice theory but is less reductive at the level temology or philosophy of science. The one point I
of action than theories like Bourdieu’s. This make with regard to the latter is to reject the idea that
approach is the one taken by the classical for pragmatists any action model that “works” to
American pragmatists Peirce, James, Dewey, yield a robust explanation will suffice. As Joas shows,

Blumer (1969), formulating the program of nological diversity involved in the experiencing
symbolic interactionism, downplayed this alter- of problem situations. Second, to reiterate the
nation between habituality and creativity, but point about meaning, pragmatists insist that
correctly noted that meaning is also central to problem situations are always interpreted
a pragmatist view of action. Problem situations through cultural lenses. Even in situations of
present themselves to actors through the lens- instrumental rationality, actors are enmeshed
es of the cultural environments in which they are in webs of meaning that indicate the significa-
immersed. Such environments give meaning to tion of the ends they are trying to pursue, con-
and help provide the content of the goals, ori- strain the choices they make by setting limits on
entations, identities, vocabularies of motive, the thinkability of means, and sustain the social
and other understandings of the action situation relationships in which instrumentality must be
that actors come to have. They also provide the embedded. Rational choice theory makes little
basis for intersubjective judgments about the room for culture thus understood. Third, prag-
adequacy of problem solutions. All habits are matists argue—directly against most utilitari-
thus enacted on the basis of culturally mediat- ans—that much action is habitual and typically
ed interpretations of the situation one faces (see involves no conscious weighing of means and
Alexander 1988), not least interpretations of
ends. Fourth, pragmatists maintain that instru-
the intentions of interaction partners.
mental rationality itself, when it does appear, is
Why should sociologists take a pragmatist
a kind of habit, a way that some humans can
approach to action seriously? A full treatment
learn to respond to certain situations, and that
of this question goes beyond the scope of this
article, but I can outline some reasons why one we should be as interested in the historical
might prefer pragmatism to both rational choice processes by which the habit of rationality—in
theory and practice theory approaches such as its various forms—develops and is situational-
Bourdieu’s. ly deployed as we should be in its effects.
Pragmatism is often misunderstood as a form Finally, pragmatists suggest that means and
of utilitarianism, but there are at least five ways ends are not always given prior to action, as
in which it differs from—and is superior to— assumed in most rational choice models, but are
rational choice theory (for discussion, see often emergent from action, as lines of activity
Beckert 2002; Joas 1996; Whitford 2002). First, are initiated that lead actors to see themselves
pragmatism does not equate problem solving in new ways, to value different kinds of goods,
with the maximization of utility. To be sure, the and to become attached to problem solutions
situations humans experience as problems may they could not have imagined previously
involve utility maximization—for example, the (Whitford 2002).
need of businesses to generate revenue. But the Thus described, pragmatism, in its under-
kinds of problems of concern to pragmatists standing of social action, sounds similar to work
range much more widely and include all the in the practice theory tradition. A number of
difficulties humans or collective actors face in commentators point to commonalities at the
life, from the need to remain healthy to the need level of action theory between pragmatism and
to find meaning and purpose in existence. To the thought of Bourdieu (Aboulafia 1999;
reduce these to the desire to maximize on a Dalton 2004; Emirbayer and Goldberg 2005;
preference function is to ignore the phenome- Shusterman 1999). Bourdieu himself noted that
“the affinities and convergences are quite strik-
ing” and that his approach, like Dewey’s,
the epistemology of the classical pragmatists was “grant[s] a central role to the notion of habit,
premised on their anthropology. My view of the tra- understood as an active and creative relation to
dition draws from many texts, especially Dewey the world, and reject[s] all the conceptual
([1910] 1978, [1920] 1982, 1922), James ([1907] dualisms upon which nearly all post-Cartesian
1975), and Peirce (1992, 1998). Beside classic con-
tributions to symbolic interactionism, previous efforts
philosophies are based: subject and object, inter-
at bringing pragmatist insights into sociology include nal and external, material and spiritual, indi-
Lewis and Smith (1980), Maines, Sugrue, and vidual and social, and so on” (Bourdieu and
Katovich (1983), Mills (1966), Seidman (1996), and Wacquant 1992:122). If pragmatism and prac-
Shalin (1986). For discussion, see Gross (2007). tice theory, at least of the Bourdieusian variety,

are so similar, why should sociologists prefer the account for social reproduction—but also
former? because the habituality-creativity continuum,
Some might argue that they should not. for pragmatists, is meant to encompass rather
Similar though the two approaches may be in than substitute for other forms of action, while
certain respects, the claim could be made that giving pride of place to matters of identity and
there is one crucial difference. Practice theorists meaning—pragmatism is better able to accom-
like Bourdieu routinely tie their analyses of modate the diversity of action and practice.
practices to questions of social-structural pro- Although nothing in a pragmatist approach
duction and reproduction, which have not been would deny that some practices are closely
a major concern of scholars working in a prag- bound up with the reproduction of social
matist framework. The objection here is not inequality, the very thinness of the model at the
simply that the work has not yet been done to meso- and macro-levels gives it a flexibility
link pragmatist understandings of action with and range lacking in other approaches.
accounts of meso- and macro-level phenome-
na, sociology’s typical objects of explanation. As A PRAGMATIST THEORY OF
important, the lack of such linkage may lead MECHANISMS
pragmatists to ignore systematic and conse-
quential patterns in the distribution of habitu- The key claim to advance in constructing a the-
ality—by social class position, for example. To ory of social mechanisms on these foundations
my mind, however, this argument counts in favor is this: Pragmatists would view social mecha-
of pragmatism. Because approaches to prac- nisms as composed of chains or aggregations of
tice theory like Bourdieu’s aim primarily at actors confronting problem situations and mobi-
accounting for social reproduction, they end up lizing more or less habitual responses. I noted
placing far too much emphasis on the strategic above that alternation between habit and cre-
dimensions of action. Although Bourdieu does ativity is at the heart of pragmatism, and that
not see every individual act as motivated, he pragmatists see this alternation as underlying—
does view most lines of activity as connected to not substituting for—other action forms (Joas
actors’ interests in leveraging themselves into 1996). These characteristics of the approach,
favorable positions in multidimensional social combined with the focus on meaning, yield
hierarchies, and thus as tied to the maintenance unique leverage over the notion of mechanisms.
or transformation of those hierarchies. To see why, let us follow Hedström and
As critics of Bourdieu have pointed out (e.g., Swedberg at least part way and describe a social
Alexander 1995), however, this analytical reduc- mechanism as the structure or process S by
tion is as problematic in its own way as ration- which some input I leads to outcome O. A prag-
al choice theory is in its. In Bourdieu’s matist theory of mechanisms would hold that to
framework, practices tend not to be seen as sub- understand S, we must examine the individual
scribed to on the basis of relatively autonomous and collective actors A1–n involved in the I–O
identity commitments, or ultimate values dis- relationship. For each, our goal should be to
connected from broader social-structural posi- understand why and how, when confronted with
tionings, or by virtue of the sheer force of problem situation Pn and endowed with habits
tradition or institutionalization. Yet evidence of cognition and action Hn, along with other
from domains as diverse as religion (Smith resources, response Rn becomes the most like-
2003), politics (Stryker, Owens, and White ly. S will then consist of all the relations A1–n
2000), intellectual life (Gross 2008), and inti- –P1–n –H1–n –R1–n that, in aggregate or sequen-
macy (Gross 2005) suggest that factors of iden- tially, bring about the I–O relationship.
tity, morality, or tradition can certainly underlie For example, suppose we are interested in
the adoption of a social practice by a group, as the relationship between race and income
well as shape individuals’ enactments of it. Such inequality and follow Pager (2003) in consid-
factors must not be seen as residual or epiphe- ering African American men and the effects of
nomenal elements but as coexisting and in some a criminal record and “negative credentialing”
cases intersecting with strategic concerns over on the likelihood of gaining employment. Many
social positioning. In part because pragmatist kinds of actors, problem situations, and habit-
understandings of action were not designed to ual responses make up this mechanism, but a

pragmatist approach might concentrate on social mechanisms. How, then, with respect to
understanding how, for employers trying to meet questions of meaning, does a pragmatist
staffing needs with reliable workers, and in the approach to mechanisms differ from Hedström’s
context of prevailing racial-juridical cultural approach?
structures, certain habits of thought and action Drawing inspiration in part from Peirce’s
are employed according to which potential work on semiotics (see Deledalle 2000), prag-
employees are coded in terms of trustworthiness matists would insist that meaning is not
depending on their race and history with the jus- reducible to belief in Hedström’s sense of propo-
tice system, giving rise to discriminatory allo-
sitions about the world that actors hold to be true
cation decisions. Aggregated across employers,
(e.g., that a bank is or is not solvent). In the prag-
such an A-P-H-R chain is the mechanism of
negative credentialing in this case. matist view, consistent with other work follow-
I hypothesize that most social mechanisms ing from the cultural or linguistic turn, such
can be understood in this way—as chains or propositions, while important, become mean-
aggregations of actors, problem situations, and ingful only insofar as they string together sym-
habitual responses—always with the possibili- bolic elements that acquire their individual and
ty, greater in some circumstances than others, relational meanings in larger cultural systems
that a novel way of responding to a problem and structures. The belief that a bank is or is not
could emerge for any of the actors involved, solvent, for example, and that its solvency has
potentially altering the workings of the mech- implications for whether actors should with-
anism. A pragmatist social science concerned draw their deposits, presupposes that actors
with mechanisms would aim to uncover the understand what a bank is, what it means to
nature of such chains: the types into which they say that an institution like a bank can have sol-
may be classified, the actors involved in their vency, that actors see themselves and others as
operation, the habits employed by such actors oriented toward the maximization of their short-
and their origins, the circumstances in which the
term and individual or familial monetary inter-
mechanisms operate, their interconnection with
ests, that they had enough trust in the
other mechanisms, and their causal effects.
Note the centrality of meaning in the Pager institutional order to place their money in a
example; the mechanism is interpretive all the bank in the first place, that they are acclimated
way down. For pragmatists, humans inhabit to a system of monetary exchange, and so on.
worlds of meaning. Pragmatism is not a form of Merton’s postulated mechanism of the self-ful-
methodological individualism; it does not filling prophesy functions in this case only
require that mechanisms operating at the meso- because actors are positioned in cultural systems
or macro-levels be explained exclusively in from which they derive these assumptions and
terms of the actions of the individuals involved, orientations, and hence have the beliefs they
meaning-interpretive or otherwise. It does insist, do. A pragmatist approach, taking meaning seri-
however, that the potential contribution of indi- ously, would argue that mechanisms cannot be
vidual action to the operation of mechanisms be adequately understood without an analysis of
taken into account. This requires that we grasp such assumptions. This implies that the study of
how the relevant individuals understand the sit- social mechanisms must be undertaken along-
uations before them and act on those under- side a project of cultural interpretation.
standings, helping thereby to enact the
Social mechanisms that affect collective
mechanism.
actors (e.g., firms, states, or organizations) can
In this respect, pragmatism comes close to the
weak version of methodological individualism be analyzed in the same way. Collective actors
championed by Hedström and Swedberg. also face problem situations and respond in
Hedström (2005), in particular, makes belief habit-bound, culturally mediated ways, and
central to his account of social action, mobiliz- social mechanisms involving collective actors
ing Weber’s stress on subjective meaning to consist of chains or aggregations of such
argue that actors’ beliefs about the social world responses, whether or not there is explanatory
are as important as their desires and opportu- value in further decomposing them into indi-
nities in explaining their actions, and hence vidual-level action.

A FURTHER SPECIFICATION OF THE pragmatist understanding, the habits an actor is

THEORY endowed with will affect the ways in which she
understands the significance of and uses the
The pragmatist theory of social mechanisms nonhuman resources at her disposal, while the
outlined here can be further developed and elab- availability of resources—an objective feature
orated—and preemptively defended—by of problem situations—may help instill in her
responding to four objections it might encounter
distinctive habits. Insofar as social mechanisms
on first hearing.
are decomposable into problem situations and
The first concerns the theory’s emphasis on
the habits actors use to resolve them, the avail-
culture and interpretation: Will such an approach
ability of resources is, from a pragmatist view-
inevitably neglect the centrality of resources, and
point, a potentially important aspect of every
struggles over them, in social life? The prag-
social mechanism.
matist response comes into relief by compari-
A second potential objection revolves around
son with Sewell’s (1992) account of the
the notion of habit. Isn’t this concept too vague
“duality” of structure. Reformulating aspects of
and poorly specified to make sense of causal
Giddens’s and Bourdieu’s theories, Sewell
mechanisms operating at multiple levels of
agrees with Giddens (1984) that “rules” and
“resources” must factor into any understanding analysis? This objection highlights the need to
of social structure. He recasts Giddens’s empha- distinguish among kinds of habits. In my view
sis on rules as “generalizable procedures,” how- there are three kinds:
ever, arguing that the rules that help constitute 1. Individual cognitive-affective habits. These
structures “should be thought of as including all are habitual ways individual actors have of
the varieties of cultural schemas that anthro- understanding and responding emotionally to
pologists have uncovered .|.|. : not only the array situations in general, resulting from their psy-
of binary oppositions that make up a society’s chosocial experience or their biological endow-
fundamental tools of thought, but also the var- ments or propensities. Someone who is
ious conventions, recipes, scenarios, principles clinically depressed and sees the world through
of action, and habits of speech and gestures a glass half-empty is displaying a cognitive-
built up with these fundamental tools” (pp. affective habit; so too is a person continually ori-
6–7). Schemas in this sense are habits. Yet ented toward sexual conquest or the
Sewell’s emphasis on cultural schemas does not consumption of goods and services. Insofar as
entail a loss of concern for resources. He dis- the tendency to employ one cognitive schema for
tinguishes two types: “nonhuman resources are interpreting the world rather than another also
objects .|.|. naturally occurring or manufactured, falls under this analytic rubric, cognitive-affec-
that can be used to enhance or maintain power” tive habits are major sites of cultural-interpre-
and “human resources are physical strength, tive activity, and they refer outward to wider
dexterity, knowledge” (p. 9). Both types, he cultural frameworks while also revolving around
argues, “are media of power.” Yet neither is internal neural processes.
unconnected from cultural schemas: “human 2. Individual behavioral habits. These habits
resources .|.|. may be thought of as manifesta- involve the disposition to enact specific behav-
tions and consequences of the enactment of ioral responses or routines when individual
cultural schemas,” while “what [nonhuman actors are faced with particular kinds of prob-
resources] amount to as resources is largely a lem situations. They derive primarily from indi-
consequence of the schemas that inform their vidual and social experience. For example,
use” (p. 11). Bittner (1967:702) argues that in many social-
Schemas and resources are indeed interre- disorder situations, “policemen not only refrain
lated, but a pragmatist understands this rela- from invoking the law formally but also employ
tionship somewhat differently from Sewell. alternative sanctions,” ranging from warnings
According to pragmatists, when actors confront for offenders to “direct disciplining.” This is an
a problem situation they mobilize their habits, individual behavioral habit learned on the job
including some of the capacities described by and through exposure to the police subculture.
Sewell as human resources. Yet this mobiliza- 3. A third category of habits consists of those
tion typically also involves putting nonhuman that are collectively enacted: that is, ways that
resources to work—for example, money. In a groups of individual actors, including those

who comprise collective actors of various kinds, repertoires (Clemens 1993; Feldman and
have of working together to solve problems. I Pentland 2003).
noted earlier that of the main conceptual 4. Alongside this differentiated understand-
approaches to mechanisms, Tilly’s is the one that ing of habit, I would argue that habits often
seems unobjectionable in action-theoretical come bundled in habit sets. These are relative-
terms. Complementarities between his approach ly coherent repertoires for thinking and acting
and my own are such that an example from his vis-à-vis a set of problems, as in Tilly’s idea that
work can help illustrate what I have in mind by there may be specific repertoires of contention,
this category of habits.10 In Popular Contention such as arose in early-nineteenth-century
in Great Britain, Tilly (1995b) argues that the Britain. To say that habit sets may be relatively
best way to explain a major transformation in coherent does not mean the cultures of practice
the British political structure between the mid- or lifeworlds they structure and inform are seam-
eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries—the less cultural webs, but only that some habits tend
growing “capacity” of “ordinary people .|.|. to to appear alongside others when they are dis-
intervene .|.|. in national affairs” (p. 14)—is to played by individuals or groups, and that there
may be systematic relationships between them
account for the emergence of new “repertoires
at the level of meaning and action. The distinct
of contention.” By a repertoire he means “a
epistemic cultures that shape knowledge-mak-
limited set of routines that are learned, shared,
ing practices in physics and biology (Knorr-
and acted out through a relatively deliberate
Cetina 1999) are good examples of habit sets,
process of choice” (p. 42). By repertoires of con-
as are sharply defined occupational subcultures
tention, he means the routines by which “pairs (Hughes 1971).
of actors make and receive claims bearing on Unpacking the notion of habit helps explain
each other’s interests” (p. 43). A repertoire of how mechanisms operating at various levels
contention can thus be understood as a set of can rest on a foundation of habit; we can add that
habits or practices enacted collectively by mem- pragmatists would see social mechanisms as
bers of a group to make political claims and varying in abstraction and clustering into an
attempt to resolve problems they may be facing, indefinite number of types. Mechanisms under-
from political disenfranchisement to econom- lying specific cause and effect relationships
ic marginalization. The idea of repertoires of (e.g., between racial heterogeneity in cities and
contention is of considerable importance for elite investment in social control resources) are
the social analysis of politics (Tarrow 1996), but at the low end of abstraction (Jackson and
I see it as simply one type of habit that actors Carroll 1981). At the high end are more gener-
can enact jointly to solve problems. “Group al processes that recur across many kinds of
style,” as analyzed by Eliasoph and Lichterman situations, such as mechanisms of brokerage.
(2003:737)—“recurrent patterns of interaction These poles correspond to the distinction drawn
that arise from a group’s shared assumptions above between substantive and formal mecha-
about what constitutes good or adequate par- nisms. While it may be easier to see how sub-
ticipation in the group setting,” such as how stantive mechanisms conform to a pragmatist
group members talk about personal commit- model, formal mechanisms can also be under-
ments or politics—is another type of collective stood in terms of actors, problem situations,
habit. So too are organizational routines and and habitual response. For example, to say that
an outcome or event—such as the 1950s Mau
Mau revolt in Kenya as analyzed by McAdam,
10 Despite these complementarities, Tilly never
Tarrow, and Tilly (2001)—involved brokerage
is to say that a subset of the actors involved
laid out the action-theoretical foundations for his
faced problem situations that they sought to
conception of practices or made clear how practices
might underlie the full range of causal mechanisms
resolve by mobilizing habits of making social
of interest to sociologists. More generally, his connections between disparate parties. In this
approach to mechanisms may be too closely tied to understanding, brokerage mechanisms revolve
his own interests, methodological orientation, and around a particular kind of practice (a point
substantive theoretical commitments to serve as a McAdam et al. also make); to understand the
conceptual framework for the discipline as a whole. nature of the situations those actors faced, the

actors’ habits, and their effects is to understand tances rather than a few close friends, but this
the mechanism. Pragmatists would also agree depends on the degree to which information
with scholars such as McAdam and colleagues about the housing market is decentralized and
that there is value in cataloging the wide vari- nontransparent, on whether landlords and prop-
ety of social mechanisms found in social real- erty managers favor legalistic arrangements
ity, which presumes that mechanisms fall into over those requiring trust between parties,
distinct types and clusters. Yet the pragmatist whether city living is seen as so desirable that
theory is uniquely poised to understand how people will do so despite the difficulty and cost
this presumption could be valid. According to involved, and so on. Such factors are usually
the theory, what makes mechanisms different is incorporated into formal models by virtue of an
precisely the configuration of actors, problem implied ceteris paribus clause, but insofar as
situations, habits, and patterns of aggregation of they represent the conditions for the mecha-
which they are composed, so that the project of nism operating as postulated, we cannot really
cataloging them becomes one of cataloging understand the mechanism unless we under-
types of A-P-H-R chains. Similar kinds of stand the conditions. Instead, pragmatism would
chains may recur across diverse circumstances; suggest that mechanisms resulting from the for-
the extent of recurrence determines the abstract- mal structure of social relations are best seen as
ness of the mechanism. more or less obdurate features of the problem
This discussion raises a third objection: What situations individual or collective actors con-
about formal mechanisms that seem to operate front—that is, features that enable or constrain
behind actors’ backs and to involve few lines of activity. How actors understand and
moments of situational interpretation? Many respond to the situations they face will be no less
such postulated mechanisms concern the formal important in the context of such confronta-
structure of social networks. The pragmatist tions.11
view overlaps Emirbayer and Goodwin’s A fourth possible objection follows from the
(1994:1445–46) critique of network analysis, third. Many mechanisms of interest to sociolo-
which, they argue, neglects culture by failing “to gists, it would seem, are not formal, as I have
thematize more explicitly .|.|. the inherently been using the term, but center on processes of
constructed nature of individual and collective aggregation whose effects equally appear not to
identities .|.|. [and] the complex ways in which depend on actors’ possessing and mobilizing
actors’ social identities are culturally and nor- culturally mediated habits. For example,
matively, as well as societally, determined.” Schelling’s (1971) model of residential segre-
Glossed another way, their point can be gener- gation postulates that if whites and blacks hold
alized and squared with the theory presented even mild preferences for not being outnum-
here by invoking a critique of formalism going bered in their neighborhoods by people from the
back to Durkheim’s ([1900] 1960) attack on other racial group, there will be no equilibrium
Simmel: although the formal structure of social in housing patterns and neighborhoods will seg-
relations can indeed shape and constrain action, regate and resegregate over time, even if this is
the situations in which actors act are always
not desired by any individual. How can a prag-
characterized by particularity of content, and
matist model accommodate such a mecha-
such particularity should never be ignored in
social explanation. An actor who finds himself
possessing “the strength of weak ties”
11 Pragmatists would have a similar attitude toward
(Granovetter 1973), for example, does so not
abstractly but in regard to specific situations “environmental mechanisms.” These create problem
such as finding a job. These situations involve situations to which actors must attempt to respond.
The distinction drawn by Tilly (2001) and McAdam
configurations of objective elements and mean-
and colleagues (2001)—between cognitive/disposi-
ing that make possible and set the parameters tional, relational, and environmental mechanisms—
for the causal effect of network structure. is thus a false trichotomy: all social mechanisms run
To give another example, whom one knows through the nexus of habituality, creativity, and inter-
may strongly influence the likelihood of find- pretation. This is not to deny that mechanisms may
ing an apartment in New York City, with special be classified as relatively more dispositional, rela-
advantages flowing to those with many acquain- tional, or environmental.

nism—which is aggregative and, at the indi- life from which a broader sociological theory
vidual level, seems to involve no more than a could be deduced, it is impossible to predict
simple decision-rule—let alone shine new light the specific forms that explanations informed
on it? by the theory will take and equally impossible
The answer to the first part of the question is to demonstrate the theory’s explanatory value a
that the mechanism can be respecified as an priori. What I can do is identify three kinds of
aggregation of individual actors’ efforts at prob- analytical problems for which a pragmatist the-
lem solving—the problem being to live in a ory of mechanisms seems particularly helpful.
neighborhood in which one is comfortable, and 1. The problem of specifying scope condi-
a key feature of the mechanism being that the tions. Alongside challenges to sociological pos-
kinds of situations actors confront depend on itivism in recent years have been calls from
problem-solving activities enacted previously by various quarters for sociologists to clarify the
their neighbors, which may have altered the circumstances in which they expect their expla-
composition of a neighborhood beyond some nations of social phenomena to hold.
demographic tipping point. But what, in this Postpositivist historical sociologists, for exam-
case, would be the value of such a respecifica- ple, point to social and cultural differences sep-
tion? Beyond the intrinsic value of greater arating societies at different historical junctures
action-theoretical adequacy, a pragmatist and the constraints they impose on the project
approach would allow preferences for varying of social-scientific generalization (see Adams,
levels of racial homophily in one’s neighborhood Clemens, and Orloff 2005). Similarly, Abbott
and the tendency to move if those preferences (2001), influenced by a vision of social process-
are violated—the decision-rule in question—to es as heavily dependent on place and time—in
be profitably reconceptualized as individual particular, geographic location and sequential-
behavioral habits. This would permit such pref- ity—insists that sociology not overstep certain
erences to remain latent without losing their boundaries with respect to the scope of the
causal power; relax information and calcula- explanations it pursues. Inter alia, these lines of
bility assumptions and replace them with a thinking demand a better specification of scope
focus on interactionally and culturally mediat- conditions, and I argue that a pragmatist theo-
ed experiences of comfort within socially ry of mechanisms could be helpful in fleshing
defined neighborhood boundaries; put greater out what this means. First, the theory views
emphasis on the social and historical condi- social mechanisms as decomposable into prac-
tions under which the relevant habits formed for tices qua habits that are always located in time
and are enacted by the social groups in question, and space, emerging primarily from social expe-
including those by which they came to see one rience. Specifying scope conditions means, in
another in racial or other categorical terms; and part, accounting for such habits. Second, the the-
allow the possibility that under different con- ory insists that habits, and the mechanisms they
ditions—for example, in societies placing more compose, function as they do only in conjunc-
emphasis on multicultural tolerance—different tion with broader, historically specific cultural
habits might be in place, resulting in different codes and repertoires. And third, reconceiving
aggregate-level effects. mechanisms in terms of A-P-H-R chains draws
Would such a move increase the explanato- attention to their intrinsic temporality and hence
ry power of Schelling’s model? Taking this to time-dependent sequential processes. To the
opportunity to speak to the issue more generally, extent that the theory thus points the way toward
I hold it to be an empirical question whether the relatively rich specification of the conditions
theory of mechanisms laid out here will give under which particular mechanisms operate,
sociology more explanatory purchase. we should expect improvements in the precision
Researchers who are persuaded by the theory to of explanatory accounts.
reconceptualize the mechanisms they study will 2. The problem of accounting for behavior
either find such reconceptualizations helpful where cultural meanings vary widely among
in producing more robust explanations or they actors. In a pragmatist model, all social action
will not. Because the theory is offered as a flex- involves cultural interpretation. But phenome-
ible conceptual toolkit for comprehending social na obviously vary in the degree to which actors
mechanisms, not a set of postulates about social interpret problem situations in similar ways.

For example, in the economic phenomenon 3. The problem of accounting for new prac-
whereby lowering interest rates spurs econom- tices and mechanisms. Change and dynamism
ic activity, one component of the operative mech- are obvious features of every society, and an
anism is that companies find it cheaper to borrow important aspect of social change is the emer-
cash and do so to make capital investments. gence of new practices. How do these come
Differences in economic positioning aside, some about? In most of the versions of practice the-
variation may occur across sectors and firms in ory discussed above, the answer centers on
how lowered interest rates are viewed, but not processes of social reproduction: new practices
much. By contrast, in the case of the mechanism emerge as elites struggle to maintain (or chal-
by which differential resource availability in a lengers contest) patterns of social domination
household is linked to variation in fertility rates, in the face of exogenously generated reconfig-
different actors whose behavior might be covered urations of the social field. Nothing in a prag-
by a single causal model (e.g., recent immi- matist model would deny that social practices,
grants from Mexico, poor African Americans in understood as habits, may indeed have their
the inner city, and upper-middle-class suburban origin in such strategic efforts, but the model
white professionals) may well understand child- would view practices emerging in this way as
bearing and its meaning in their lives in quite dif- responses to only one kind of problem situation
ferent terms. The difference between these actors may face—that is, the need for strategic
repositioning. In the pragmatist view, there are
examples is not that the first is economic and the
many kinds of problem situations, and how
second familial. Rather, social and historical
actors act to resolve the full range of these when
circumstances (e.g., processes of institutional
existing habits prove inadequate is a major
isomorphism and the secure institutionalization
source of new practices, with implications for
of capitalist social relations) render the relevant
the social mechanisms with which they intersect.
interpretive processes more or less homoge- A pragmatist theory of mechanisms therefore
neous in the first case but not in the second. A encourages researchers to examine the diversi-
pragmatist approach to mechanisms may have ty of problem-solving activities that may lie
particular explanatory payoff in situations where behind new practices. When accounting for
interpretive homogeneity across actors is low, for social change is critical and the dynamics of
here we should expect cultural differences to social reproduction do not tell the whole story,
have a significant effect on how problem situa- this theory should offer greater explanatory
tions are understood and responded to, and on leverage than would strains of practice theory.
how the social mechanisms thus constituted For example, a major change has taken place
function.12 The growth of cultural sociology in since the 1960s in how North American and
recent years owes little to a pragmatist theory of European police forces deal with social protests.
action or mechanisms, but the theory I propose In the 1960s, police viewed protests as chal-
implies a substantially broadened disciplinary lenges to social order and routinely contained
role for cultural sociology, in part because it them by force; today, protests have been nor-
suggests that, where meanings vary among malized and police often cooperate with activist
actors, cultural interpretation may generate more groups to ensure that protests do not get out of
explanatory specifications of mechanisms.13 hand (Della Porta and Reiter 1998; McCarthy
12 To return to the Schelling example, this is a cir- pragmatist roots. Space limits prevent engaging this
cumstance often faced by ethnographers who study question fully, but interactionism stresses agency
race and neighborhood change. Exemplary studies and contingency far more than causality. Focusing on
move beyond a simple preferences model to exam- the habit over the creativity end of the action con-
ine the interplay of structural factors and complex, tinuum, as I do, allows a pragmatist perspective to be
variegated understandings on the part of residents of better reconciled with the aspirations of a proba-
what makes for a good neighborhood (e.g., Hyra bilistically causal social science, and to provide
2008). action-theoretical foundations for such a science that
13 One might ask how the theory I propose differs neglect neither the interpretive nor the agentic aspects
from symbolic interactionism, which also claims of social experience.

and McPhail 1997). This change has important the American pragmatists—an approach that
implications for contentious politics and the has important affinities with more popular
mechanisms surrounding it. It has lowered phys- strains of practice theory—I propose an alter-
ical risks for protesters but also rendered protests native. I argue that social mechanisms—the
less symbolically potent. How and why did the nuts and bolts processes by which cause and
new practices come into being? A pragmatist effect relationships in the social world come
approach would focus on the complex prob- about—are best thought of as chains or aggre-
lem-situation to which they were a response: the gations of problem situations and the effects
need of police forces to deal with events hap- that ensue as a result of the habits actors use to
pening with increasing frequency, which were resolve them. This project of theoretical clari-
costly in terms of manpower and outside dom- fication aims not just at offering sociologists a
inant organizational repertoires of crime-fight- better understanding of what they are doing
ing, and that posed a high risk of loss of when they identify social mechanisms, but also
legitimacy. Organizational experimentation and at reforming sociological practice. The value of
innovation followed, with police forces near the theory is ultimately an empirical question,
college campuses taking the lead, and the newly but I offer reason to think that conceiving of
emergent practices diffused across the organi- mechanisms in the manner proposed may result
zational field. Few could have predicted the in better specified, and very likely more robust,
specific form the response took: it arose through explanatory accounts.
trial and error, in dialogue and negotiation with These considerations suggest a clear research
politicians, university administrators, and agenda: sociology should aim to identify the
activists that altered police understandings of main social mechanisms by which cause and
their goals, in an institutional context that some- effect relationships in the social world that are
times inhibited innovation, and against the back- of moral, political, or intellectual importance
drop of broader cultural changes in which come about. This entails breaking complex
protests came to be seen as more legitimate. A social phenomena into their component parts to
pragmatist approach would not deny that the see how aggregations or chains of actors
new practices strengthened the hand of the state, employing habits to resolve problem situations
contributing to processes of social reproduc- bring about systematic effects.
tion, but it would look skeptically on the claim Such a project will necessarily be multi-
that elite demands for social containment ade- methodological. Qualitative research—ethno-
quately explain their emergence. A similar graphic, interview-based, and historical—is
explanatory logic could be pursued in many necessary to identify mechanisms, the habits
research areas where accounting for the emer- they are composed of, and the kinds of problem
gence of new practices and habits could shed situations in which those habits tend to be
important light on operative social mecha- deployed. Cultural and historical research is
nisms.14 needed to understand the origins of habits and
habit sets, and hence of mechanisms, along
with their meanings for the actors involved and
CONCLUSION
the broader cultural configurations in which
The growing interest in social mechanisms is those meanings become possible. Quantitative
salutary. I argue, however, that several leading research is required to establish the variable
conceptualizations of social mechanisms are associations that lead us to inquire into cause-
problematic because they are constructed around effect relationships in the first place, to test
inadequate understandings of social action. across a large number of cases whether one
Championing the theory of action developed by posited mechanism rather than another is pro-
ducing the effect, to analyze patterns of aggre-
gation, and to establish numerically how habit
14 There are important similarities—and some dif- sets are distributed across groups and individ-
ferences—between a pragmatist approach as applied uals. Finally, sociological theory is needed to
to the study of organizational change and approach- establish new and fruitful conceptual vocabu-
es to the topic informed by “new institutional theo- laries for thinking about problems and to iden-
ry.” See Washington and Ventresca (2004). tify previously unrecognized social processes

and dynamics that have ramifications across Bittner, Egon. 1967. “The Police on Skid-Row: A
empirical domains. Sociology can then mark its Study of Peace Keeping.” American Sociological
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Prentice Hall.
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A Pragmatist Theory of Social Mechanisms

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2 For a more exhaustive review of the literature on

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MECHANISMS AS NOT NECESSARILY out an agenda for research on ascriptive

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they see as studying systems especially resist- (2005).

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A FURTHER SPECIFICATION OF THE pragmatist understanding, the habits an actor is

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Carmi Schooler, and Kazimierz M. Slomczynski. Importance of Motivation.” American Sociological

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