Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
American Political Science Association is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to
The American Political Science Review.
http://www.jstor.org
Science involves the accumulation of knowledge, which means not only the formulation of new
sentences about discoveries but also the reformulation of empirically falsified or theoretically dis-
credited old sentences. Science has therefore a history that is mainly a chronicle and interpretation of
a series of reformulations. It is often asserted that political science has no history. Although this asser-
tion is perhaps motivated by a desire to identify politics with belles lettres, it may also have a
reasonable foundation, in that political institutions may change faster than knowledge can be ac-
cumulated. To investigate whether propositions about evanescent institutions can be scientifically
falsified and reformulated, I examine in this essay the history of the recent and not wholly accepted
revisions of the propositions collectively called Duverger's law: that the plurality rule for selecting the
winner of elections favors the two-party system. The body of the essay presents the discovery, revi-
sion, testing, and reformulation of sentences in this series in order to demonstrate that in at least one
instance in political science, knowledge has been accumulated and a history exists.
force of this counterexample by calling the Hare Furthermore, the percentage of the primary vote
system a modified form of the plurality rule for the top candidate (and for the top two can-
(because voting is for individual candidates, not didates) was much greater in the plurality states
parties), and by predicting then (p. 61), from than in the runoff states, which is exactly what
Duverger's hypothesis, that the number of parties one would expect if the two-ballot system en-
in Ireland should be more than the number in courages multifactionalism. Still, longitudinal
Britain (with the unmodified plurality rule) and averages cover up significant deviations. Canon
fewer than the number in Italy (with the party-list also noted that Alabama, a runoff state, has in the
system of proportional representation). This is, last decade developed something close to bifac-
however, too easy a way out. The Hare system is tionalism, whereas West Virginia, a plurality
indubitably proportional, and it lacks entirely the state, still had fairly evident multifactionalism in
main feature of the plurality rule, namely the the earlier part of this period. Since these two ex-
force encouraging parties to maximize votes. ceptions are not fully explained at present, the
Since there appears to be nothing in common case is strengthened that Duverger's hypothesis is
among these four counterexamples, it seems im- no more than a probabilistic association.
possible to save the hypothesis by modifying it, This is, I believe, what a theoretical interpreta-
and that is the lesson to be learned from Rae's tion, in terms of rational choices by politicians,
more general analysis of the cases (Rae 1971). He would suggest. The rational choice theory, stand-
has shown very neatly that for the development of ing implicitly behind the hypothesis, is that pro-
a successful new party, proportional representa- portional representation and the second ballot
tion is neither a necessary condition (see, for runoff both offer politicians an incentive for the
example, the British Labour party in a plurality formation of new parties and do not give them
system) nor a sufficient condition (see the absence any disincentive. The incentive is that, given par-
of successful third parties in Austria). Instead, ticular configurations of potential coalitions,
Rae offered a list of seven variables, one of which these systems sometimes permit new parties (and
is the presence of proportional representation, heretofore-excluded politicians) to get a bit of
that may be associated with successful new parties political influence with relatively few votes. That
(pp. 151-58). Altogether Rae made an extremely is, in these systems a new party does not have to
strong case that the hypothesis, at least as it get the most votes to win, merely some indefinite
related to proportional representation, cannot be number less than the most. Under proportional
more than a probabilistic association. representation, the candidate or list with the
The empirical evidence is not so conclusive in second most votes can always win seats and some-
the case of the two-ballot majority. No one, aside times so can candidates with the third or fourth
from Duverger, has devoted much attention to most votes. Indeed the purpose of the system is to
party systems associated with this rule. Most con- encourage this result. In the runoff majority
tinental governments used it before they adopted system a candidate who initially has the second
proportional representation, and, as has already most votes can ultimately win, provided the sup-
been remarked, Lowell (1896) and later some ad- porters of eliminated candidates vote for her or
vocates of proportional representation (e.g., Wil- him at the second ballot. Hence, if a group of
liams 1918) believed that the multiparty system politicians can see a chance to come in second or
developed as politicians' rational response to this third, it is often worthwhile to form a new party.
rule. Canon (1978) conducted the most impressive In the plurality system, on the other hand, this
test of the relationship. He was inspired mainly by positive incentive is turned into a disincentive
Key's (1949) uncertainty about the application of because it is rare for the prospective builders of a
the hypothesis to the multifactionalism in new party to see a chance to come in first past the
southern states. Canon used as data the presence post. This system, then, constitutes a real
of bifactionalism from 1932 to 1977 in the Demo- disincentive because the leaders of the new party
cratic gubernatorial primaries in sixteen southern are likely to be regarded as politically irrelevant.
and border states. Ten of these states use the run- This disincentive is absent from proportional
off primary with a majority required for nomina- representation and runoff systems, however,
tion at either the first or second ballot. The other because even leaders of failed parties are welcome
six use the plurality method with just one primary. in expanded coalitions of continuing parties.
Although factionalism is not easy to measure, a Neither feature of this incentive system is strong
reasonable index of it showed in fairly close ap- enough to permit one to say for certain that these
proximation of Duverger's hypothesis that fac- electoral systems favor multiple parties. The in-
tionalism in all but one of the plurality primary centive is weak because it operates only when peo-
states was lower-often much lower-than in all ple want to form new parties for other reasons.
the runoff primary states. For the one anomaly, However, there are surely many configurations of
West Virginia, the index was only slightly higher. potential coalitions, configurations lasting
gets the same proportion of seats in a legislature supporters of the weakest party (i.e., one of the
as it gets proportion of votes, regardless of the two larger parties nationally) strengthens the third
size of the party's vote. In nearly all systems par- party. This latter effect is probably what has kept
ties with a small proportion of votes get an even alive the Liberal party in Britain and some
smaller proportion of seats (a negative bias), and Canadian third parties. Because third parties re-
parties with a large proportion of votes get an main third parties, however, the main force of
even larger proportion of seats (a positive bias). sophisticated voting must work against third par-
Building on Tufte (1973), Sprague defined an ex- ties.
actly unbiased threshold point, B, of the propor- Given the significance of sophisticated voting in
tion of the vote, through which a party would the explanation of why Duverger's law works, one
pass, as its vote increased, from suffering a nega- very important question is: Does sophisticated
tive bias to enjoying a positive bias. Using Rae's voting occur? That is, are ordinary voters clever
data, Sprague calculated B for plurality systems to and bold enough to vote against their true
be 0.32 and for proportional systems to be 0.12; tastes?
that is, third parties in proportional systems get a Shively (1970) made the first attempt to dis-
fair or positively biased proportion of seats if they cover sophisticated voting. He interpreted Duver-
get one-eighth or more of the vote, whereas in ger's law (rather too broadly, I think) as the
plurality systems they get a fair share only if they sentence: "Where the likelihood that a party can
get one-third or more of the vote. This compari- win . . . is low, voters are less likely to continue
son demonstrates quite vividly how severely voting for it, or . .. to begin voting for it." For a
Duverger's mechanical effect discourages the for- test, he created an index of the likelihood of win-
mation of third parties in plurality systems. ning and regressed the change of a party's propor-
The main dispute is about the validity of the tion of the vote in two consecutive elections on
psychological factor, which Downs bluntly de- this index. He expected a positive association, i.e.,
scribed thus: low likelihood linked with decline in share of
votes, but he got a negative one. This result led
A rational voter first decides what party he
believes will benefit him most; then he tries to him to further statistical manipulation and a re-
estimate whether this party has any chance of interpretation which he believed supported the
winning.He does this becausehis vote shouldbe law, though only weakly. Hence he concluded
expendedas partof a selectionprocess,not as an that the psychological factor had "a trivial impact
expression of preference. Hence even if he on election outcomes."
preferspartyA, he is "wasting"his vote on A if Given the empirical strength of Duverger's law
it has no chance of winning, becausevery few at the institutional level, these results from elec-
other voters prefer it to B or C. The relevant toral data were, to say the least, perplexing. Since
choice in this case is betweenB and C. Since a Shively's form of the hypothesis and his method
vote for A is not useful in the actual processof
selection,castingit is irrational(Downs 1957, p. were far too gross to study the truly relevant
48). behavior, however, other scientists have looked
more precisely at voters' desertion from third par-
What Downs describes has come to be called ties. These investigators have found a relatively
"sophisticated" voting, by which is meant that large amount of sophisticated voting in Britain,
the voter takes account of anticipated votes by Canada, Germany, and the United States, as de-
others and then votes so as to bring about the best scribed below.
realizable outcome for himself, regardless of Britain. Spafford (1972) observed that Shively's
whether or not his vote is sincere, i.e., for his pre- hypothesis involved no discrimination between
ferred alternative. situations in which sophisticated voting would or
In the election of single executives, if sophisti- would not be efficient, but in fact one would ex-
cated voting occurs, it always works against third pect more sophisticated voting as the chance in-
parties. (Indeed, early statements of Duverger's creases to affect the outcome between one's sec-
law in the United States, e.g., by MacMahon ond and third preferences. That is, if the race is
(1933), emphasized the special importance of the close between the major parties, then third-party
elected executive in bringing the psychological supporters are more likely to desert their party at
factor into play.) In the election of members of a the polls. Spafford tested this for 104 constituen-
legislature, however, which of the several parties cies with Liberal candidates in both the 1964 and
is weakened by sophisticated voting depends on 1966 elections and found a highly significant,
conditions in the constituency. If the third party positive association between the Liberal share of
nationally is the weakest locally, then sophisti- the vote in 1966 and the share of the vote of the
cated voting by its supporters weakens it. How- winning party in 1964. For example, lower Liberal
ever, if the third party nationally is one of the two shares went with lower shares for the winning par-
larger parties locally, then sophisticated voting by ty in the previous election, which means that, with
(i.e., small preference for first over second choice) Ordeshook and I have elaborated (Riker and
and nonmarginal (large preference). The marginal Ordeshook 1968), it may be impossible for an in-
voters were found to be much more likely to vote dividual to influence the selection process. One in-
sophisticatedly than the nonmarginal, and for terpretation of influence is the chance to make a
those marginals for whom sophisticated voting tie or to break a tie that occurs in the absence of
was advantageous, actual voting for the second the individual's vote. This chance is, of course,
choice ranged between 50 and 100 percent. These extremely tiny in most elections in the modern
two tests were repeated and confirmed in elab- state. Under this definition, it is objectively the
orate regression equations. Altogether they in- case that one cannot expect to contribute much to
dicate a remarkable amount of sophisticated the decision process. If so, the rational action may
voting. be simply to express a preference.
United States. The 1968 presidential election Ferejohn and Fiorina (1974, 1975) have sug-
with a third-party candidate and national survey gested that individuals do not calculate their
data about preference orders allowed Bensel and chance of influence but merely their satisfaction,
Sanders (1979) to estimate the proportion of minimizing thereby the maximum regret they
sophisticated voting in that election. Comparing would feel if an undesired candidate won. The
those for whom sophisticated voting was advan- debate over the relative merits of minimax regret
tageous (mostly Wallace supporters) with those and expected utility is extensive (Beck 1975;
for whom it was not, they found that the 12 per- Mayer and Good 1975). Although the bulk of the
cent of the advantaged voted sophisticatedly, evidence about the way people behave now seems
whereas only 4 percent of the not advantaged did. to favor expected utility (Black 1978; Cain 1978;
Since the electoral college breaks up the national Aldrich 1976), still the fact that the minimax
electorate into fifty parts with different informa- regret interpretation can be put forward plausibly
tion about probable outcomes in each one, this suggests that some people may be interested mere-
allowed them to compare voters' calculations. If ly in utility, not expected utility.
voting is sophisticated, it should be the case that If the chance to influence is negligible, then
where Wallace was strong (i.e., had more chance energy spent on a calculus and sophisticated
to carry the state), his supporters would be more voting is wasted and irrational, whereas voting
likely to vote sincerely than where he was weak. merely to express a preference may be entirely
The effect was striking: in strong Wallace states rational. Meehl (1977) has faced this problem
only 4 percent voted sophisticatedly as opposed to squarely and has insisted that the "wasted vote"
17 percent in states where Wallace was weak. argument is at best meaningless and at worst a
fraud. Voters' motivation is rational, he argued,
VII only in terms of their sense of moral obligation.
This obligation cannot involve a means-end calcu-
The evidence renders it undeniable that a large lation-for that is meaningless when votes are not
amount of sophisticated voting occurs-mostly to influential-but must instead respond to a moral
the disadvantage of the third parties nation- imperative. He acknowledged that moral impera-
ally-so that the force of Duverger's psycho- tives might also lack meaning, in which case all
logical factor must be considerable. It seems in- justifications of voting are irrational. But if only
itially appropriate and attractive, therefore, to the morally motivated vote is rational, then it is
construct a theory to explain Duverger's law out impossible to waste a vote (or to behave
of the theory of rational choice. Nevertheless, we irrationally) by voting simply for one's first
cannot do so blithely. In the first place, not every- preference.
one votes sophisticatedly, although the evidence Granting some persuasiveness to Meehl's argu-
collected here suggests that most people who ment, the theoretical underpinning of Duverger's
"should" do so by reason of the expected utility law is surely weak if behavior in accord with the
calculus probably do so in fact. It is difficult, psychological factor of individual voters' calcula-
however, to build a theory on behavior that is not tion of expected utility is itself irrational. It seems
certainly universal, and even if it is universal, necessary, therefore, to find some new, or at least
there remains a serious and unresolved paradox in additional, theoretical explanation of why
the argument, which is that the expected utility Duverger's law works.
calculus of voting may itself be irrational. The direction one must go, I believe, is to turn
In Downs's statement of the theory, which I attention away from the expected utility calculus
cited previously, the rational voter should expend of the individual voter and to the expected utility
his vote "as part of the selection process," not as calculus of the politician and other more substan-
"an expression of preference." Yet this statement tial participants in the system. The groups and in-
may be indefensible because, as Downs himself dividuals who buy access and the politicians who
pointed out (1957, pp. 36-50, 260-76) and as buy a future have substantial interests, and it is