Northeastern Political Science Association

Beyond the Three Faces of Power: A Realist Critique

Author(s): Jeffrey C. Isaac
Source: Polity, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Autumn, 1987), pp. 4-31
Published by: Palgrave Macmillan Journals
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BeyondtheThreeFaces of Power:
A RealistCritique*
C. Isaac
Jeffrey
of Indiana,Bloomington
University

ThisarticlecritiquesthedebateinpoliticalscienceamongRobert
Dahl, PeterBachrach/Morton Baratz,and StevenLukesoverthe
meaningofpowerand thepropermethod for itsstudy.Theauthor
arguesthat,theirdifferencesaside,thesethreeviewsofpowersharea
commonproblem,groundedin a misconception of thenatureofsocial
science,thatleadsthemall to viewpowerin termsof empirical causa-
tion.Drawingon recentarguments in thephilosophy ofscienceand
socialscience,he challenges
this"empiricist"perspectiveand offers
insteada "realist"theoryofpoweras sociallystructured and enduring
for action.
capacities

Jeffrey C. Isaac is AssociateProfessorof PoliticalScienceat Indiana

University, His
Bloomington. book, Power and MarxistTheory:A
RealistView,waspublishedrecently byCornellUniversity Press.He
has also publishedarticleson social theoryand thehistory ofpolitical
thought in a numberofjournals,including PoliticalTheory,History
of PoliticalThought,and theCanadianJournalof Politicaland Social
Theory.

A greatdealofinkhasbeenspilleddebating themeaning oftheconcept

ofpower.In Anglo-American politicalsciencethefulcrum ofthedebate
is whatis sometimes called "the threefacesof power"controversy.
Thereis an airofscholasticism surrounding thisdebate,andthereisthus
a healthyskepticism amongmanyabouttheusefulness of yetanother
intervention. This paper,however,is not simplyanotherentryin the
debate.It is a critiqueof thedebateitself.
The debateabouttheterm"power" restson themisconception that
thepurposeof socialscienceis to document empirical I will
regularities.

*The authorwishesto thankthe followingpeople fortheirhelp in preparationof this

article:TerenceBall, RobertDahl, PeterManicas, Roy Bhaskar,Erik Olin Wright,David
Mayhew,BurtZweibach, Mike Krasner,Ian Shapiro, and Debra Kent.

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 C. Isaac 5
Jeffrey

labelthisviewempiricism and suggestthatthebehavioral revolutionin

politicalscienceis responsibleforit.Thismisconception hasledmanyto
thinkof poweras a behavioralconcept,referring to theconjunctionof
thebehaviors oftwoparties, suchthat"A haspoweroverB" meansthat
in somesenseA does something to getB to do something. I willargue
thatthisviewis doublyconfused.First,it is limitedto situations of
"powerover" and failsto see that"powerover," or whatI willcall
domination, is parasiticupon a "powerto." Second,it failsto dis-
tinguish between thepossessionand theexerciseof power.
I willarguethatnoneof thethreefacesof poweris ableto recognize
thisbecauseof theircommitments to behaviorism. I willproposethat
another, increasingly acceptedphilosophy of science-realism-enables
us to thinkbetteraboutpower.Moreover, I willproposethatpowerbe
conceivedin structural ratherthanbehavioraltermsor, to be clearer
fromtheoutset,in termsof thestructures withinwhichbehaviortakes
In
place. conclusion, I willsuggestsome ofthe implications ofthisargu-
mentforresearch, as it
specifically regardstheorizing about thestate.

I. Behavioralism
andtheFaces ofPower
The behavioralrevolution in politicalsciencehas, unsurprisingly,
had
and
important long-term effectson the practiceof politicalresearch.
Theseeffects,however, havebeenmuchlessinnocent thantherevolu-
tionaryvanguard believed.RobertDahl, inhisfamous"monument to a
successful
protest,"wrote:"the behavioralapproachis an attempt to
improve ourunderstanding ofpoliticsbyseeking to explaintheempirical
aspectsof politicallifeby meansof methods,theories, and criteriaof
proofthatare acceptableaccordingto the canons,conventions, and
assumptions of modernempirical science."'Thisquotationgivessome-
thingof theflavorof theintellectual moment-optimistic, naivelyself-
assuredabout the natureof the scientific outlookwhichwas to be
emulated.Butas Dahl himself, unwittingly, makesclear,thesuccessof
thisprotestmovement representedinfactmuchlessthetriumph ofscien-
tificmethodsthan an emerging hegemony of an empiricistviewof
science.Dahl quotesan earlyprescriptive tract,whichhe presents as
simplyand matter-of-factly scientific:
[Wefavor]a decisionto explorethefeasibility
ofdeveloping
a new
approachto thestudyof politicalbehavior.Baseduponthestudy
1. Robert A. Dahl, "The Behavioral Approach in Political Science: Epitaph for a
Monumentto a SuccessfulProtest," American Political Science Review 58 (December
1961): 767.

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6 BeyondtheThreeFacesofPower

of individuals
in politicalsituations,
thisapproachcalls forthe
examinationof thepoliticalrelationshipsof men . . by disciplines
whichcan throwlighton theproblems withtheobjectof
involved,
formulating and testinghypotheses
concerninguniformities
of
behavior....2
Thisviewof scientific explanation as thedocumentation and prediction
of empiricaluniformities was a centraltenetof thebehavioralmove-
ment.A theory, David Eastonwrote,is "any kindof generalization or
proposition thatassertsthattwoor morethings,activities, or events,
covaryunderspecifiedconditions."3A more recentwork asserts:
"Scienceis concerned withtheexplanation (and prediction)of specific
eventsbymeansofstatements whichareinvariantly truefromonesetof
circumstances to another.""
Thisunderstanding of scienceis whatI, following RoyBhaskarand
RomHarr6,willcall empiricism. It takestheempirical world,theworld
of experienced occurrences, to be theobjectof scientific investigation
and eschewsanyappealto underlying causesand naturalnecessities as
unscientific"metaphysics."' This view extends the
beyond positivist
claimthattheoriesare verifiable in experience and referto unprob-
lematicand unmediated observables. Empiricism hingesprimarily on an
or of
ontology, theory reality, which is Humean,namely thatthere is
nothingbut a flux of eventswhose onlyrelationship is oneof contingent
conjunction. This viewis widelyacceptedby philosophers and social
whoareotherwise
scientists criticsofHumeanbedrockempiricism. Thus
KarlPopper,arguably the most important post-positivistphilosopher of
science, distinguishes between scientific method, which he calls
"methodological nominalism," and "essentialism." "Insteadofaiming
at findingoutwhata thingreallyis, and at defining truenature,"he
its
writes,"methodological nominalism aims at describing how a thing

2. Ibid., p. 764.
3. David Easton, A SystemsAnalysisof Political Life (New York: Wiley, 1965), p. 7;
see also his "AlternativeStrategiesin Theoretical Research," in Varietiesof Political
Theory,ed. Easton (Englewood Cliffs,NJ: Prentice-Hall,1966).
4. Adam Przeworskiand HenryTeune, TheLogic of ComparativeSocial Inquiry(New
York: Wiley-Interscience, theory,see RobertT.
1970),p. 18. For a similarviewof scientific
Holt and JohnE. Turner,eds., The Methodologyof ComparativeResearch (New York:
Free Press, 1970).
5. Cf. Rom Harr6,Principlesof ScientificThinking(London: MacMillan, 1970); and
Roy Bhaskar,A Realist Theoryof Science,2nd edition(AtlanticHighlands,NJ: Humani-
tiesPress, 1978). For a defenseof thislabel, and of thepositionwhichitdenotes,see Bas C.
Van Fraassen, The ScientificImage (Oxford: ClarendonPress, 1980).

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 C. Isaac 7
Jeffrey

behavesin variouscircumstances,
and especially,
whetherthereare any
in
regularities itsbehavior."6
LikeHume,Popperassociatesanyattempt to providerealdefinitions
and analyzecausalnecessities
withmedievalscholasticismand unscien-
tificmetaphysics.Also likeHume,he construes causalityas constant
conjunction.Popperwrites:
To givea causalexplanationof an eventmeansto deducea state-
mentwhichdescribes ofthededuction
it,usingas premises one or
moreuniversallaws,togetherwith certain
singular the
statements,
initialconditions.. . . The initialconditionsdescribewhatis usually
calledthe"cause" of theeventin question.7
Thus,becauseanytalkof naturalnecessity is derisively
brandedmeta-
physicsandbecausetheonlymeaning thatcanthusbe givento causality
is as empiricalregularity,the task of scientificexplanationbecomes
deductive-nomological-the formulation ofgeneralizationsaboutempir-
icalregularities
whichenableus to predict that"Whenever A, thenB."'
Thisidealofscientificexplanation, oncedominant withinphilosophy of
science,has beensubjected to muchcriticism in philosophy.But,justas
ittookpoliticalscientists
sometimebeforetheywerewilling toadoptthis
ideal,therehasalsobeena lagbetween itsabandonment byphilosophers
anditsrejection bypoliticalscientists.
Oneconsequence ofthisis itscon-
tinuinginfluence on thedebateaboutpower.

II. The FirstFace ofPower

Thisunderstanding of scientific shapeda newand rigorous
explanation
effortto formalize the conceptof power.A numberof articleswere
published,all variationson thesametheme-poweris a causalrelation
between thebehaviors oftwoagents,causalitybeingunderstood
as con-
stantconjunction.9
6. Karl R. Popper, The Open Societyand itsEnemies,Vol. I (Princeton,NJ: Princeton
UniversityPress, 1966), p. 32.
7. Karl R. Popper, The Logic of ScientificDiscovery(London: Hutchinson,1959,and
New York: Harper& Row, 1968), pp. 59-60.
8. See, in additionto Popper, Carl Hempel's Aspects of ScientificExplanation(New
York: Free Press, 1965), especiallypp. 364-67. As Holt and Turnerwrite:"Typically,the
[scientific]hypothesisinvolvesa predictedrelationshipbetweenat least two variablesand
takes the generalformof 'If A, thenB.' " Holt and Turner,Methodology,p. 6.
9. See, forexample,HerbertA. Simon, "Notes on theObservationand Measurement
of PoliticalPower," Journalof Politics 15 (1953); and JamesG. March, "An Introduction
to the Theory and Measurementof Influence," AmericanPolitical Science Review 49
(1955).

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8 BeyondtheThreeFacesofPower

Thisapproachwastakenup byRobertDahl, one ofthemostimpor-

tantfiguresin thethreefacesof powerdebate.Dahl, in a seriesof arti-
cles,arguedtheneedfora definition of poweramenableto thekindof
empiricalresearch envisioned
by behavioralism.
Thushe wrote:"power
termsin modernsocialsciencereferto subsetsofrelationsamongsocial
unitssuchthatthebehavior ofoneormoreunits(theresponse units,R),
dependin somecircumstances on thebehaviorof otherunits(thecon-
units,C).'o Power,then,is an empirical
trolling regularitywhereby the
behaviorof one agentcausesthebehaviorof another.Dahl is explicit
aboutthis,notingthat:
'C has poweroverR' wecan substitute
For theassertion theasser-
tion 'C's behaviorcauses R's behavior' . . . thelanguageof cause,
in which
situations
likethelanguageof power,is usedto interpret
thatsomeeventwillintervene
thereis a possibility to changethe
orderof otherevents."
Thatthisnotionof powerrestson a Newtonian analogyseemsobvious.
We areall naturallyat restorat constantvelocity,untilourmovement is
alteredby an external force.Poweris thatforcewhereby socialagents
alterthebehaviorofotheragentsor,as Dahl putsit,getthemtodo what
theywouldnototherwise do.12Trueto hisempiricism, Dahl insiststhat
thereare no necessary relationshipsbetweenthe behaviorsof agents,
writing that"the onlymeaningthatis strictly causal in thenotionof
poweris one of regularsequence:thatis, a regularsequencesuchthat
whenA does something, whatfollows,or whatprobablyfollows,is an
actionbyB.""'
Theseremarks maysoundunexceptionable, buttheirforcemustbe
emphasized. Dahl is here
insisting thathisnotion ofpowersmacksofno
metaphysics, thatits assertioninvolvesnothing thatis notempirically
evident.Thisviewofpoweris thebasisoftheentire threefacesofpower
debate.All ofthecontestants agreethatpoweris an empirical relationof
causeand effect,and noneofthemconceives of poweras involving any
necessary connections, or whatI willlatercall structuralrelationships.
This is notto say thatthereasonforthisis becausesubsequent con-

10. RobertA. Dahl, "Power," InternationalEncyclopediaof theSocial Sciences,vol.

12 (New York, 1968), p. 407.
11. Ibid., p. 418.
12. RobertA. Dahl, "The Concept of Power," BehavioralScience2, no. 3 (July1957):
203-4.
13. RobertA. Dahl, "Cause and Effectin theStudyof Politics," in Cause and Effect,
ed. Daniel Lerner(New York: Free Press, 1965), p. 94.

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 C. Isaac 9
Jeffrey

testants consciously wishedto endorsetheHumeanview.It is, rather,

thattheysimplyfailedto challenge it,mostlikelybecausetheyfailedto
recognize it-an interesting exampleof thepowerof a viewwhichis
neither assertednorrecognized as such.
The controversy about powerdoes not revolvearoundthismajor
premise. It revolves, instead,aroundthefollowing question:How do we
identify those instances in which A getsB to do thatwhichB wouldnot
otherwise havedone?As StevenLukespointsout,thisquestionhinges
on thequestionofa counterfactual: WhatwouldB haveotherwise done?
Dahl's answerto thisis thatB's revealedpreferences indicatethis.'4
Thus,"A haspoweroverB" meansthatA's behavior regularly causesB
to do something whichB does notwantto do. Thishas beencalledthe
"firstfaceofpower"insofaras itinvolves manifest instances ofconflict
andcompliance. It hasalso beencalledthe"decisionist"viewinsofaras
it is limitedto instances of actualdecisionmaking or choicein action.
It is on thebasisofthisinterpretation ofthecounterfactual thatDahl,
and hisstudent NelsonPolsby,insisted thatanyscientific claimsabout
powermustfocuson instances of manifest conflict.In thisinsistence,
theyemployedtheirunderstanding of scientificmethodin orderto
delegitimate radicalcriticsof Americansocietywhowroteaboutpower
without referring toregular sequencesoftheabove-mentioned sort.Thus
Polsby,inhisCommunity PowerandPoliticalTheory, chastised whathe
called"categorialism," categorical claimssuchas "A haspoweroverB"
whichrefuseto specify theempirical conditions,thecausal behaviors,
underwhichB canbe predicted toact(notethesimilarity ofthiscriticism
to Popper'sinvidiousdistinction betweenmethodological nominalism
and essentialism). Thus Polsbywritesabout the claimthatthereis a
dominant class:
For thislatterstatementto meananything in a scientific
sense,we
must,accordingto the formalrequirements postulatedabove,
makereference to specificdecisionsin whichparticular outcomes
are affectedby members of theclasses into which we dividethe
population,and secondly,we muststatethe conditionsunder
whichwecan takeitas demonstrated thattheupperclassdoesnot
havemorepowerthanthelowerclass."
of power,then,are falsifiable
Ascriptions aboutthestimuli
predictions

14. Dahl, "The Concept of Power."

15. NelsonPolsby,CommunityPower and Political Theory(New Haven, CT: Yale Uni-
versityPress, 1980), pp. 5-6.

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10 BeyondtheThreeFacesofPower

ofthepowerful andtheresponses ofthepowerless. SimilarlyDahl,inhis

now-classic "Critiqueof theRulingEliteModel," criticized C. Wright
Millsbyasserting that"I do notseehowanyonecansupposethathehas
established thedominance of a specificgroupin a community or nation
without basinghisanalysison thecarefulexamination ofa seriesofcon-
cretedecisions.'"6
It is importantto seewhatthesecriticisms accomplished, fordoingso
willclarifyexactly what thisarticle is On
criticizing. the one hand,some
very sensible and plausiblepoints are made the
regarding importance of
empirical evidence and the possibility of theoreticalcriticism.On the
otherhand,thewhiphandof scienceis deployedto questionthevery
meaningand reference of claimsaboutpowerthatdo notconform to
Dahl's decisionistperspective.It is not Dahl's emphasis on theempirical,
buthisrelianceon empiricism, on theHume/Popper viewof causality
and scientific explanation,thatis theproblemwithhisviewof power.

III. TheSecondFaceofPower
The Dahl-Polsbyviewof powerwas challenged byPeterBachrachand
MortonBaratz, who introducedthe notionof a "second face of
power.""7Theircriticism restson twopoints.The first is thatDahl and
Polsby sometimes write in a naivelypositivist vein, as though theloca-
tionofpowerwereunproblematic and simply a questionofobservation.
Bachrachand Baratzinsistthatthisis mistaken, thatall scienceinvolves
of of
themaking judgements significance which are derivedfroma theo-
reticalperspective.Their second objectionis that Dahl's formulation
missesa crucialfeatureof power-thesuppression conflict.
of In criticiz-
ing Dahl's decisionistfocus on actual conflict,Bachrach and Baratz
developtheconcept of a nondecision, which they define as "a decision
thatresultsin suppression or thwarting ofa latentor manifest challenge
to thevaluesor interests of the decision-maker.""'
Thepointofthisargument is thatpowerentailsnotsimply interaction,
butlimitations on interaction. Yet,theirformulation is also ambiguous
and opento thechargethatitis littledifferent fromDahl's. On theone
hand,Bachrachand Baratzsuggest a structural formulation, conceiving

16. RobertA. Dahl, "A Critiqueof theRulingEliteModel," AmericanPoliticalScience

Review 58 (1958): 463-4.
17. Cf. Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz, "The Two Faces of Power," American
PoliticalScienceReview56 (1962): 942-52, and "Decisions and Nondecisions:An Analytic
Framework," American Political Science Review 57 (1963): 632-42. These essays are
reprintedin the authors' Power and Poverty(New York: OxfordUniversityPress, 1970).
18. Bachrachand Baratz, Power and Poverty,pp. 43-44.

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 C. Isaac 11
Jeffrey

poweras implicated
in institutionalized It is inthisregardthat
practices.
theyreferto Schattschneider's
conceptof the"mobilization of bias,"
that:
writing
Politicalsystemsand sub-systems developa "mobilizationof
bias," a set of predominant values,beliefs,rituals,and institu-
tionalprocedures ("rulesofthegame")thatoperatesystematically
and consistentlyto thebenefit groupsandpersonsat the
of certain
expenseofothers.Thosewhobenefit areplacedina preferred posi-
tionto defendand promotetheirvestedinterests.'9
This formulation, however,comes dangerously close to postulating
underlying structural
relationsas determiningbehavior,riskingthe
essentialismso scornedby properly
trainedscientific
theorists.
Polsby
makesthepoint:
Thecentralproblem is this:Evenifwecanshowthata givenstatus
quo benefits
some peopledisproportionately(as I thinkwecan for
any real worldstatus quo), such a demonstration fallsshortof
showingthatthebeneficiaries createdthestatusquo, act in any
meaningfulwayto maintainit,or could,in thefuture, act effec-
to
tively deterchangesin it.20
Once again,themarkof scienceis theexamination of behavior,buta
givenstatusquo, in and of itself,holdsno interest forthetheorist of
power.
In theend,Bachrachand Baratzsacrifice theirinterest
in structure
to
theinterest of science.Theysay explicitly thatpowerinvolvesactual
compliance andgo so faras to assertthat"it cannotbe possessed,"only
exercised.2' Concedingto behavioralism, they hold that "although
absenceof conflict maybe a non-event, a decisionwhichresultsin pre-
ventionof conflictis verymuchan event-andan observableone, to
boot."22 Byadmitting this,Bachrachand Baratzexposethemselves to a
criticismmadebyGeoffrey Debnam-thatimplicit in theirformulation

19. Ibid.
20. Polsby, CommunityPower, p. 208, emphasisadded. See also RaymondWolfinger,
"Nondecisions and the Study of Local Politics," AmericanPolitical Science Review 65
(1971), fora similarcriticism.For an interesting
critiqueof the positivismwhichPolsby/
Wolfingerfallinto,and a defenseof thepossibilityof discoveringcovertdecisionsof Bach-
rachand Baratz's sort,see FrederickFrey's"Nondecisionsand theStudyof Local Politics:
A Comment,"
American
PoliticalScienceReview65 (1971).
21. Bachrachand Baratz, Power & Poverty,p. 19.
22. Ibid., p. 46.

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12 BeyondtheThreeFacesofPower

is an importantdistinctionbetween poweras nondecision, andpoweras

mobilization ofbias.Theformer refersto behavioral differ-
regularities,
ingfromthefirstfaceonlyinsofaras itincludescovertinstances ofsup-
pressionas well as overtinstancesof compliance.23 The latteris an
unexplicatedand ultimatelynon-behavioral phenomenon.Polsby's
criticismis thusdecisive:"How to studythissecondfaceof power?To
whatmanifestations of social realitymightthe mobilization of bias
refer?Are phenomena of thissortin principalamenableto empirical
investigation?"24BachrachandBaratzneverexplicitly answerthisques-
tion, but insteadsacrificetheirinsight about the basisof
institutional
power to the scholarly"mobilization of bias" which I have labelled
empiricism.

IV. The ThirdFace ofPower

StevenLukes,in hisPower:A Radical View,picksup whereBachrach
andBaratzleftoff.He applaudstheir"twodimensional view"ofpower
as an advanceoverDahl's "one dimensional" He agrees
perspective.
thatthestudyof powerinvolvesinterpretative questions about which
phenomena to study,but he also believesthatBachrach and Baratz's
critiqueof Dahl's behaviorism"is too qualified."As he writesof their
formulation:
pictureof thewaysin whichindividuals
It givesa misleading and,
succeedin excluding
above all, groupsand institutions, potential
issuesfromthepoliticalprocess.Decisionsarechoicesconsciously
and intentionally made by individualsbetweenalternatives,
whereasthebias of thesystemcan be mobilized,recreated, and
reinforced in waysthatare neitherconsciously chosennor the
intendedresultof particularindividuals'choices. . . . Moreover,
thebias of thesystemis notsimplysustainedbya seriesof indi-
viduallychosenacts,butalso, moreimportantly,by thesocially
structuredand culturally behaviorof groups,and prac-
patterned
whichmayindeedbe manifested
ticesofinstitutions byindividuals'
inaction.25

Lukesthusproposesthatiftheconceptofpoweris totakeaccountofthe
itcannotlimititself
is itselfshapedandlimited,
wayinwhichinteraction

23. GeoffreyDebnam, "Nondecisions and Power: The Two Faces of Bachrach and
Baratz," AmericanPolitical Science Review 69 (September1975).
24. Polsby, CommunityPower, p. 190.
25. StevenLukes, Power: A Radical View(London: Macmillan, 1974), pp. 22-23.

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 C. Isaac 13
Jeffrey

to instances of behavioralcompliance as theone-and two-dimensional

views do. He asks, "Is not thesupreme exerciseof powerto avertcon-
flictand grievance byinfluencing, shaping,and determining thepercep-
tionsand preferences of others?"26
Lukessubmitsthathisviewof power,alongwiththoseof Dahl and
Bachrachand Baratz,all "can be seenas alternative interpretationsand
applications of one and thesameunderlying conceptof power,accord-
ingto whichA exercises poweroverB whenA affects B ina manner con-
traryto B's interests.""1It is Lukeswhomakestheconceptof interest
centralto thedebate,yetitis important to seehowmuchhissimilarities
withhispredecessors outweigh hisdifferences. Lukesagreesthatpower
is a causalconceptdenoting behavioralregularities. He agreestoo that
"A has poweroverB" meansthatA's behaviorcausesB to do some-
thingthatB wouldnototherwise do. As Lukesputsit,"any attribution
oftheexercise ofpower. . . alwaysimpliesa relevant counterfactual."28
In thecases of thefirsttwofacesof power,thecounterfactual is pro-
videdbytheexistence of empirical conflict between therevealedprefer-
ences of A and B. Lukes differsfromtheseviewsin insisting that
preferences canthemselves be theeffect oftheexercise ofpower.He thus
insiststhatwhatB woulddo otherwise cannotbe gaugedproperly byB's
preferences, butratherby B's interests. Lukes,then,definespoweras
follows:"A exercises poweroverB whenA affectsB contrary to B's
interest."29The conceptof powercan thusreferto relations between A
and B evenin theabsenceof empirical conflict.
Lukes contendsthatthisviewcapturesthe essenceof poweras an
empirical relationbetween A and B andthatthesoledifference between
thisviewand thosearticulated byhisantagonists is that"thoseholding
thethreedifferent viewsof powerI havesetout offerdifferent inter-
pretations ofwhataretocountas interests andhowtheymaybe adverse-
lyaffected."30 Lukes'sviewis thattheconceptof interest, or whathas
beencalled"objectiveinterest," referstowhatan agentwoulddo under
idealdemocratic circumstances. It thusfollowsthatifitcan be plausibly
arguedthatA affects B in a mannerwhichlimitsB fromdoingwhatB

26. StevenLukes, "Power and Authority,"in A Historyof Sociological Anslysis,ed.

Tom Bottomoreand RobertNisbet(New York: Basic Books, 1978), p. 669.
27. Lukes, Power: A Radical View,p. 27.
28. Ibid., p. 41.
29. Ibid., pp. 22-25.
30. Ibid., p. 27.

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14 BeyondtheThreeFacesofPower

woulddo underidealconditions, thenitcanbe properly saidthatA exer-

cisespoweroverB.3'
Thisnotionof objectiveinterest has beensubjectedto a greatdealof
criticism, someof whichwillbe discussedbelow.Butregardless of the
meritof Lukes'sunderstanding of interests, theimportance of thecon-
ceptforhimis groundedin his commitment to viewingpoweras an
empiricalregularity. Despite his criticisms of his antagonists, he is
explicitthathe is merely interpretinga sharedconcept.Insofaras thisis
true,Lukes'sformulation, likethatof Bachrachand Baratz,is ambigu-
ous regarding the"sociallystructured and culturally patterned" dimen-
sionof power.
In a lateressay,"Powerand Structure," Lukesseeksto clarify this,
arguing that structural and empiricalapproaches must be synthesized
andsuggesting thatthereis a "dialecticofpowerandstructure."32 Social
structure limitsaction,and power,beingan event-like phenomenon, is
discernible empirically. he
Power, says, is an "agency"concept, a not
"structural" one, yet he writesthat it "is held and exercised byagents
or
(individual collective) within systems and structural determinants.""
Thisclarifiessomewhat therelationbetween powerandstructure-social
structure provides the limits withinwhich poweris exercised. Butitalso
leavesunanswered theproblemposedby Lukes's earlier discussion of
powerin structural terms. In other words, what is the nature of these
structural determinants ofpower?Howdetermining arethey?Ifpoweris
an agencyconceptratherthan a structural one, and if it denotes
behavioralregularities, thenwhatprecisely is the difference between
Lukes'sthirdfaceof powerand theviewof Bachrach and Baratz? Is it

31. Ibid., pp. 34-35. This viewof interests,as Lukes acknowledges,has been developed
by William E. Connolly, "On in
'Interests' Politics," Politicsand Society,2, no. 4 (Sum-
mer 1972). This conceptionowes muchto the workof Jiurgen Habermas, particularlyhis
Knowledge and Human Interests (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968). Lukes explicitlylinks
himselfto the idiom of criticaltheoryin a laterpaper, "On the Relativityof Power," in
PhilosophicalDisputes in the Social Sciences, ed. S. C. Brown (Sussex and New Jersey:
Harvesterand Humanities,1979), p. 267. It is therefore curiousthatin a morerecentpaper
he rejectsHabermas's (and his own earlier)transcendental conceptionof objectiveinterest,
optinginsteadfora Weberiansubjectivismin manywaysakinto Polsby. See StevenLukes,
"Of Gods and Demons: Habermasand PracticalReason," in Habermas: CriticalDebates,
ed. John B. Thompson and David Held (Cambridge,MA: MIT Press, 1982). This is an
issue on which Lukes shows some confusion.For a critique,see Michael Bloch, Brian
Heading, and Phillip Lawrence, "Power in Social Theory: A Non-RelativeView," in
Brown,PhilosophicalDisputes, pp. 243-60.
32. See StevenLukes, "Power and Structure,"in Essays in Social Theory,ed. Steven
Lukes (London: Macmillan, 1977).
33. See Lukes, "Power & Authority,"p. 635; "Relativityof Power," pp. 263-4.

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 C. Isaac 15
Jeffrey

simplya focuson a different class of events,thosewhichinvolvethe

of
transgression objective interest ratherthansimplycompliance?If
Lukes'sviewis different, hisbifurcation ofpowerandstructure doesnot
go farin showing us how. In short, Lukes seems unableto articulate the
structuralnatureofsocialpowerwhich,herightly notes,is so important.
In theend,Lukesleanstowarda viewof powerdiffering littlefrom
thatof hispredecessors. Likethem,he viewspowerin termsof behav-
ioralregularities
rather thantheirstructural determinants. Andlikethem
he conflatesthe possessionof powerwithits exercise,insisting that
power is an agencyconcept rather than a one.
structural Lukes explicitly
rejectsthe locution"power to," and insteadacceptsan exclusive
emphasison "powerover."Forhim,poweris exhausted ininteraction,
in theregularity withwhichA can getB to do something, thushaving
power over B. His formulation leavesno room forconsideration of the
enduring powers to act which are possessedby A and B, and which are
broughtto bearin interaction. He justifiesinattention to thelocution
"powerto" byarguing thatitis "out oflinewiththecentral meaning of
as
power traditionally understoodand withthe concernsthathave
alwayspreoccupied students of power.""3But it is precisely thistradi-
tionalidiomthatI wishto question.An adequateformulation of the
conceptofpowermustrecognize thatthepoweroneagentexercises over
another agentininteraction is parasiticuponthepowerstoactwhichthe
agentspossess.
The purposeof theabove discussionhas beento demonstrate some
rootsimilaritiesamongthecontestants ofthethreefacesof powercon-
troversy, and to pointout thatthedebateaboutpowerhas beencon-
ductedwithinrathernarrowparameters.Nonetheless, withinthese
parameters, someseriousproblemsare leftunresolved. And whilethe
irresolutionof conflictis notalwaysa signalof something awry,in this
caseitmayindicate theneedtobroadentheparameters ofdebate,andin
factto freethediscussion fromitsbehavioralist legacy.
Themajorunresolved difficulty ofthedebateconcerns theproblem of
thelimitswithin whichinteraction occurs,orwhatI havecalledthestruc-
turalnatureof power.Thisproblemhas proveninarticulable within the
confines ofthedebate,invirtue ofthesharedpremise, established bythe
behavioralrevolution, thatpoweris the empiricalcausationof one
actor'sbehaviorbythatof anotheractor.Bachrachand Baratz,as well
as Lukes,have failedto developthestructural dimension of powerto
whichtheyrightly point.Thisis nota problem forDahl,whoneverraises

34. Lukes, Power: A Radical View,p. 31.

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16 BeyondtheThreeFacesofPower

thisissue,and in thisrespectDahl's viewis themostconsistent."3 How-

ever,itsconsistency is purchased at a price-itsinabilitytoconceptualize
thewaypoweris implicated intheconstitution oftheconditions ofinter-
action.Dahl's criticsinsist,rightly, thatA can have powerover B
without itbeingthecasethatB resists inanyway,in factinvirtueofB's
quiescence.However,it doesnotseemthatthecritics havebeenableto
formulate a clearalternative conception. To takean example,it seems
reasonableto claimthatthe SovietCommunist Partyapparatushas
poweroverSovietworkers and peasantseventhoughitclearlydoesnot
prevailovertheminsituations ofactualconflict ofrevealedpreferences,
butDahl's viewwouldprevent us fromclaiming this(I do notmean,and
do notbelieve,thatDahl woulddenythis,onlythatthelogicofhisarti-
cles aboutpowerwoulddenyit). Yet, to stickwiththisexample,is it
necessary to argueabouttheobjectiveclassinterests oftheworkers and
peasants in orderto say this? I should think not. There is of course
anotherpossibility, one whichappearsstartlingly commonsensical but
whichviolatesthe basic premiseof the threefacesdebate-thatthe
CPSU has powerovertheSovietmassesby virtueof thestructure of
Sovietsocietyin whichpoliticalpoweris monopolized a
by singleparty.
Thisclaimis, however, clearlyessentialist in Popper'ssense,inthatitis
interestedin thenatureof Sovietsocietyratherthanin thesearchfor
behavioraluniformities. Such theoretical interests,therefore, require
morethangoingbeyond threefacescontroversy;
the theyrequirereject-
ingtheempiricism whichis thecontroversy's foundation.

V. RealismandSocialScience
As I haveemphasized,theempiricism whichis at therootof thedebate
about poweris primarily an ontologicaldoctrineaboutthenatureof
causalityand the aim of scientificexplanation.Few social theorists
woulddenywhatcontemporary likeThomasKuhnhave
conventionalists
taughtus-that scienceis irreducibly
interpretative, access
thescientist's
to theworldbeingmediatedby theconceptualand theoretical frame-
worksof hisor herscience.36However,through behavioralism,political

35. JamesMarch, "The Power of Power," in Varietiesof Political Theory,ed. David

Easton (New Jersey:PrenticeHall, 1966), pp. 67-68. As he writes:"The measurement of
poweris usefulprimarilyin systemsthatconformto some variantof theforcemodel [i.e.,
behavioralcompliance]. ... If I interpretrecentresearchcorrectly,the class of social-
usefulconceptis muchsmallerthanI pre-
choicesituationsin whichpoweris a significantly
viouslybelieved."
36. On "conventionalism,"see Russell Keat and JohnUrry,Social Theoryas Science
(London: Routledge& Kegal Paul, 1975). See also Harold I. Brown,Perception,Theory,

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 C. Isaac 17
Jeffrey

haveacceptedthiswithout
scientists questioningtheontology of empir-
icism.Realistphilosophy of scienceinvolvesa critique of thisontology.
Contemporary realists
rejecttheunderstanding ofnaturallawsas con-
tingentempiricalregularities and of as
causality regularsequencesof
events."Theydefendtheconceptof naturalnecessity, thatscientific
laws explainthe properties and dispositions of thingswhichare not
reducibleto theirempirical effects. The physicalproperties of copper
(malleability,
fusibility,
ductility, electrical
conductivity),are,forexam-
ple, not contingenteffectscausedby antecedent events;theyare the
enduring of as a
properties copper metal, which can be accountedforby
itsatomicstructure.
In thisview,causality is understood as theactualiza-
tionoftheproperties ofrealnaturalentities withcausalpowers."3 Scien-
tistsdeveloptheorieswhichexplainthephenomena of experience, like
thefactthatcopperconducts andstring
electricity doesnot,byan appeal
to thestructures
whichgenerate them.
In therealistview,theworldis notconstituted suchthatit can be
explainedbysubsuming eventsundercovering lawsoftheform"when-
everA, thenB." Rather, itis composedofa complexofwhatHarr6calls
"powerfulparticulars,"or causal mechanisms, whichoperatein an
unpredictablebutnotundetermined manner.As RoyBhaskarwritesin
hisinfluential
A RealistTheoryof Science:
The worldconsistsof things,not events.. . . On thisconceptionof
scienceit is concerned withwhatkindsof thingsthere
essentially
areandwithwhattheytendto do; itis onlyderivatively concerned
withpredicting whatis actuallygoingto happen.It is onlyrarely,
and normally underconditionswhichareartificiallyproducedand
controlled, thatscientists
can do thelatter.And,whentheydo, its
significance liesprecisely
in thelightthatit castson theenduring
naturesand waysof actingof independently existingand trans-
factuallyactivethings.39
Thisunderstandingofsciencedoesnoteschewempiricalevidence,but
construes
thisevidenceas themeansbywhichscientists explainunder-
lyingcauses.In therealistview,thisunderstanding
is implicit
in what

and Commitment:The New Philosophyof Science(Chicago: University of Chicago Press,

1977). Indispensableis Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave,eds., Criticismand the Growth
of Knowledge(London: CambridgeUniversityPress, 1970).
37. See Harr6,Principles;Bhaskar,Realist Theory;and Keat and Urry,Social Theory.
38. See Rom Harre and E. H. Madden, Causal Powers (New Jersey:Rowman and
Littlefield,1975).
39. Bhaskar,Realist Theory,p. 51.

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18 BeyondtheThreeFacesofPower

actuallydo, in theirclassification
scientists schemata,in theirexperi-
mentation,and in theirdevelopment of causal concepts.Stephen
Toulminwritesof thescientist:
He beginswiththeconvictionthatthingsare notjust happening
(noteven butratherthatsomefixedset
just-happening-regularly)
oflawsorpatternsormechanisms accountsforNature'sfollowing
thecoursethatitdoes,and thathisunderstandingoftheseshould
his
guide expectations. Furthermore, he has thebeginnings of an
ideawhattheselawsandmechanisms are... [and]heis lookingfor
evidencewhichwillshowhimhowto trimand shapehisideasfur-
ther.. . . This is what makes 'phenomena' importantforhim.4o

Scienceis thus both essentialist and metaphysical in Popper's and

Polsby's invidious
sense. But itdoes not therefore presume anyimmuta-
or
bility teleology about the world, nor does it presume it can be
that
unproblematically rationally It
perceived. presumes, instead,thatthe
world existsindependently of human experience, it has certain
that
enduringproperties, and that science,throughthe development and
criticism of theoretical
explanations, can come to have some knowledge
of it. No greatertestimony can be providedon behalfof thisviewthan
thatof thematureAlbertEinsteinwho,in a 1931letter to thepositivist
MoritzSchlick,wrote:
In generalyourpresentationfailsto correspondto myconceptual
so to speakmuchtoo
styleinsofaras I findyourwholeorientation
positivistic.. .. I tellyou straightout: Physicsis theattemptat the
conceptual ofa modeloftherealworldanditslawful
construction
... In short,I suffer
structure. of
underthe(unsharp)separation
Realityof Experienceand Realityof Being. . . . You willbe aston-
ishedaboutthe"metaphysicist" Buteveryfour-andtwo-
Einstein.
leggedanimalis de factothismetaphysicist."'
concerned
view,socialsciencewouldbe similarly
In therealist withthe
construction of modelsof the social worldand its lawfulstructure.
The primaryobject of theoretical analysiswould not be behavioral
buttheenduring
regularities, thatstructure
socialrelationships them.42

40. StephenToulmin,Foresightand Understanding(New York: Harper Torchbooks,

1961), p. 75.
41. Quoted in Gerald Holton, "Mach, Einstein,and the Search forReality,"Daedalus
97 (Spring 1968).
42. See Roy Bhaskar, The Possibilityof Naturalism:A Philosophical Critiqueof the
Contemporary Human Sciences(Sussex: HarvesterPress, 1979). See also my"Realism and

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 C. Isaac 19
Jeffrey

This approachneednot resultin a formof hyper-determinism which

reifies
socialstructure.Indeed,theidea of socialstructuredevelopedby
is basedon a categorical
realists of thebifurcation
rejection of structure
and humanagency.43 Anthony Giddenshasarguedthatthereis a "dual-
ityof structure.""" He proposesthatsocial structures are both the
medium andtheeffect ofhumanaction.As such,theyexistneither apart
fromtheactivities whichtheygovernnorfromhumanagents'concep-
tionsoftheseactivities.Atthesametime,theyarealso a material condi-
tionoftheseactivities.Giddensusestheanalogyoflanguagetoillustrate
this:therewouldbe no languagewithoutspeakersspeaking,and yet
languageis at thesametimethemediumofspeech.Languagehas struc-
turalpropertieson whichagentsdrawin orderto perform communica-
tiveacts. The majorpointof thisapproachis thatpurposivehuman
activityhas socialpreconditions,whicharetherelatively enduring rela-
tions(e.g., husband/wife,capitalist/worker, that
citizen/representative)
constitute thecomplexity of anygivensociety.Individuals and groups
participate withintheseconditions,reproducing and transforming them
in thecourseoftheirordinary As
lives."' Giddens "In
writes: respectof
sociology, thecrucialtaskof nomological analysisis to
[i.e.,theoretical]
be foundin theexplanation of theproperties of structures."46

VI. The ConceptofPowerRevisited

We arenowina better
positionto appreciatethelimitationsofthethree
facesof powerdebateand to reformulate theconceptof power.The
behavioralist
foundations
ofthedebateconstrained itsparticipantsfrom
conceiving as
power anything more thana behavioral and
regularity pre-
ventedthemfromseeingitas an enduringcapacity.To do so, ofcourse,

Social ScientificExplanation: A Critiqueof Porpora," Journalfor the Theoryof Social

Behaviour 13, no. 3 (October 1983).
43. See PeterT. Manicas, "On theConceptof Social Structure,"Journalforthe Theory
of Social Behaviour 10, no. 2 (1980).
44. See AnthonyGiddens,New Rules of SociologicalMethod (New York: Basic Books,
1976), p. 121; and Bhaskar, Possibilityof Naturalism,pp. 39-43. Giddens has further
developedthisnotionof structure in CentralProblemsof Social Theory(Berkeley:Univer-
sityof CaliforniaPress, 1979), and A ContemporaryCritiqueof HistoricalMaterialism
(Berkeley:Universityof CaliforniaPress, 1981).
45. On transformation see Bhaskar,Possibilityof Naturalism,pp. 42-45; Giddens has
called the processof the constitutionand transformation of social structures"structura-
tion." See his "On theTheoryof Structuration,"inStudiesin Social and Political Theory,
ed. Giddens (New York: Basic Books, 1977).
46. Giddens,New Rules, p. 160.

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20 BevondtheThreeFacesofPower

riskspresupposing whatNagelhas called"objectionablemetaphysical

implications."But, as I havesuggested, in therealistviewof science,
presuppositionsabout the enduringnature ofcausalmechanisms arethe
essenceofactualscientific It is at
practice. only great costthatthediscus-
santsof powerhaveeschewedsuchpremises.
Pitkinhas rightlypointedoutthatempiricist theoriesof powerhave
abusedlanguagein theirinattention to linguistic
complexitiesand to
of
questions meaning."' for
Witness, example, JackNagel's observation:
Words,as HumptyDumptyobserved,can mean anything we
choosethemto mean.Whybotherto disputedefinitions?I do so
preciselybecause definitionsare merelyarbitrary,whereas
hypotheses subjectto agreement
are potentially producingtests.
the
Therefore, mostusefuldefinitions
arethose
which
direct
efforts
to empirical
research."'
Thiswas, as we haveseen,theattitude of thebehavioralistinnovators
regarding theconceptof power-thattheconceptshouldacquirea for-
mal definition amenableto theirnotionof scientific explanation and
The firstthingto noteabout this,however,is thatthis
falsification.
effortwas a strikingfailurein itsownterms.If themostusefuldefini-
tionsare thosewhichdirectefforts towardempirical research,thenthe
threefacesof powerdebatecan onlybe adjudgedfruitless, as it has
resultedin a dearthof research thatactuallyconforms to themethods
prescribed by thedebate.'9The empiricist viewof definitionis simply
wrong,but it is mistaken in a waythatshedslighton thetheoretical
of thedebateoverpower.
sterility
Wordscan onlybe intelligibly used in thecontextof theirprevious
usage.Empiricist powertheorists haveconfined themselves to one par-
ticularlocution,"power over," corresponding to theirbeliefthata

47. See Hannah Feneichel Pitkin, Wittgenstein and Justice(Berkeley:Universityof

CaliforniaPress, 1972), pp. 264-86.
48. Jack Nagel, The DescriptiveAnalysis of Power (New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 1975), p. 175.
49. My pointhereis not thatthedebate has failedto stimulateinquiry.It is simplythat
most of the researchdone on power, even by Dahl and Bachrach and Baratz, does not
strictlyconformto thestandardsof empiricism.Two studieswhichattemptto "operation-
alize" the concepts discussed are Matthew Crenson, The Un-Politicsof Air Pollution
(Baltimore,MD: JohnsHopkins UniversityPress, 1971), and JohnGaventa, Power and
Powerlessness:Quiescenceand Rebellionin an Appalachian Valley(Urbana: University of
IllinoisPress, 1980). I would argue,however,thatneitherbook does operationalizeitspur-
portedmethod,and thatthe successof theseworksis due to theirabandonmentof a con-
cern withmethodology.

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 C. Isaac 21
Jeffrey

propersocial scienceis a scienceof behavioralregularities. What is

crucialis that.they
haveall failedto providea realdefinition
ofpower,50
substitutinginsteadan operationaldefinitionoftheform,"A haspower
over B meansthat.. . ." Power, a potentialword,becomesredefinedto
describenotpotentialities butactualevents."
"Power" derivesfromtheLatinpotere,meaning"to be able." It is
generallyusedtodenotea property, ability,orcapacity
toeffectthings.52
Theattribution ofproperties orcapacitiesis a commonfeatureofevery-
daylife,e.g.,"thatcaris fast."Thisdoesnotmeanthatordinary ascrip-
tionsconstitutevalidscientific
explanations, butitdoesindicate
thecon-
gruenceoftheordinary senseofthetermwiththearguments developed
here.
According to therealistphilosophyofscienceoutlinedabove,powers
are a centralsubjectmatterof naturalscience.As Harr6writes:"To
ascribea powerto a thingor material is to saysomethingaboutwhatit
will or can do ... in virtueof its intrinsicnature.""3To use an example
referred to above,to say thatconductivity is a powerof copperis to
claimthatcopperpossessesan enduring capacityto conductelectricity
in itsnature,in thiscase itsatomicstructure.
thatis intrinsic I wantto
argue that social sciencebe similarlyconcerned withthe of
ascription
powers to social agents,and with the explanatory referenceof these
powerstoagents'intrinsic natures.Bytheintrinsic ofsocialagents
natures
I meannottheiruniquecharacteristics as individuals,
but theirsocial
identities in enduring,
as participants sociallystructured relationships.
Theoriesof power,then,shouldbe conceivedas interpretative models,
developedbysocialscientists subjectto therigorsof criticalconsidera-
tion,aboutthesocialstructures whichshapehumanaction.To speakin
thiswayof thesocialstructures thataccountforpoweris no different
fromspeakingof theatomicstructure thataccountsforconductivity.
Bothsortsofclaimareequallyfallible, areequallysubjectto theoretical
and empirical criticismand are equallyconcerned withunderlying,and
non-observable, causalmechanisms.

50. See Peter T. Manicas and ArthurN. Kruger,Logic: The Essentials (New York:
McGraw Hill, 1976), pp. 34-38, on real definitions.
51. I am here buildingupon an importantessay by TerenceBall, "Power, Causation,
and Explanation," Polity8, no. 2 (Winter1975). See also his "Models of Power: Past and
Present," Journalof the Historyof the Behavioral Sciences (July1975); and his "Two
Concepts of Coercion," Theoryand Society 15, no. 1 (January1978).
52. See "Power," OxfordEnglishDictionary(Oxford:ClarendonPress, 1933),p. 1213;
see also Pitkin,Wittgenstein
& Justice,pp. 274-79.
53. Rom Harr6, "Powers," BritishJournalof thePhilosophyof Science21
(1970): 85.

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22 BeyondtheThreeFacesofPower

andAgency
VII. Power,Structure,
Social powershouldbe understood relationally, by whichI meanin
termsoftheunderlying socialrelations whichstructure behavioral inter-
actionand notintermsofthecontingent regularities in thebehaviors of
discreteagents who may have no necessaryrelationshipto one
another.54 The relation between teacherand student, forexample,is not
a contingent relationbetween twopartieswhohappento engageininter-
action.It is an historicallyenduring relation,thenatureofwhichis pre-
ciselythat teachers have students and viceversa. It is thenatureofthese
socialidentities tobe inrelation to oneanother. As such,itis theirnature
to possesscertainpowers,powerswhichsimplycannotbe conceivedas
contingent regularities.The teacherpossessesthepowerto designthe
syllabus,direct classroom andgiveandgradeassignments.
activities, The
student the
possesses power to attend class,to do the schoolwork, to
and
evaluatetheteacher'sperformance. Thesepowersto actare partofthe
natureof therelationship. Theyare notregularities, strictlyspeaking,
butareroutinely performed and purposeful activities. Thepossessionof
thesepowersin theperformance of socialactivities is necessaryto these
but
activities, the successfulexercise of these is
powers contingent. Thus,
theteachermaynotsucceedin directing theclassroom'sactivities, and
theclassmaybe unruly. But the teacher'spower is not thereby nullified.
Anyparticular teacher'sconsistent failuretodirect theclassroom is a dif-
ferentstory, anditmaywellnullify hisor her power.However, would
we
a
thenlikelysaythathe/sheis badteacher, unsuited totheroleofteacher
and personally unableto exercisethesocialpowersassociatedwiththe
role. More generally, thepersistent inabilityof teachersin generalto
directtheirclassroomssuccessfully maywellindicatethattheteacher-
student relationis incrisis,andthatstudents areexercising theirpowers
to contesttheirsubordination.
I willthusdefinesocial poweras thecapacitiesto actpossessedby
socialagentsinvirtue oftheenduring relations in whichthey participate.
Giddensdistinguishes betweena broadsenseof poweras thecapability
of an actorto intervene, and a narrower sense,as "the capability to
secureoutcomeswheretherealization oftheseoutcomes dependson the
agencyof others.""WhatI havedefinedas socialpoweris thelatter.
Thus,whilethetermpoweris properly usedto describe manysituations,
as forinstancemyneighbor's persuasive abilitywhichresidesin his.45

54. The followingdiscussiondraws heavilyfromChapter3 of myPower and Marxist

Theory:A Realist View(Ithaca, NY: CornellUniversityPress, 1987).
55. Giddens, CentralProblems,p. 93.

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 C. Isaac
Jeffrey 23

Magnum, the termsocial power is intendedto call attentionto the way

thecapacityto act is distributed by generalizedand enduringsocial rela-
tionships(is it thecase thatmypersuasiveneighboris also a policeman?).
In thissense,social powerinvolveswhatGiddenscalls relationsof inter-
dependence. The teacher's power entails the student's presence and
requiresthatthe studentact in a certainway.
This relational understandingof power clarifies the distinction
between"power to" and "power over," or whatI would call relationsof
dominationand subordination,a distinctionignoredin thethreefacesof
power debate. I have suggestedthatsocial relationsdistributepowerto
act in certainways to those who participatein them. Insofaras thisis
true, it is these relations,ratherthan the behaviorswhichtheyshape,
whichare the materialcauses of interaction.To returnto the teacher/
studentexample: the teacher's behavior does not cause the student's
behaviorin thissense,and thestudent'sbehavioris notsimplya response
to the teacher'sstimulus.Rather,the teacher/student relationshippro-
videstheteacherwiththepowerto givehomeworkassignments, whichis
successfullyor unsuccessfully exercisedin interactionwiththe student.
The relationshipis thematerialcause of interaction, thespecificwaysin
whichtheteacherand the student,who is equally a purposiveagent,act
as the efficientcause.
This sortof structuraldetermination of poweris preciselywhatBach-
rach and Baratz, and Lukes, gesturedat but failedto articulate.They
were interestedin the reason why the studentis subordinateand saw
rightlythatthissubordinationis not properlyconceivedas simplya con-
tingentregularity. They suspectedthattherewas some necessaryinstitu-
tional cause of this subordinationbut, because theylacked a capacity-
concept of power, theycould not clarifythis. I want to suggestthat a
theoreticalexplanationof thesubordinationof studentsmustanalyzethe
structure of educationand theway poweris distributed by thisstructure.
Whateverregularities existin behaviormustbe explainedwithreference
to the structuralrelationsof power.
To propose this is not to detach the concept of power fromhuman
agency.As I definedit, social powerrefersto thecapacitiesto act which
are possessed by agentsin virtueof theirsocial relations.But what are
theserelationsbut idioms of humanconduct?To say thatteachersand
studentsare in a certainstructuralrelationshipis onlyto
say thatthere
are people called teachersand studentswho do the
characteristically
thingswhichtherelationshipinvolves.If social poweris neverexercised,
it can hardlybe said to exist. But its exerciseis always
shaped and con-
strainedby certainenduringrelations.I am going to school thisafter-
noon to givea lectureon Dahl, and in doingso, howeverunintentionally,

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24 BeyondtheThreeFaces of Power

I am exercisingthe power of a teacher. The sorts of structurally dis-

tributedpowers which I have discussedare constantlyexercisedin the
courseof ordinarylife,at home,at work,at school, at thetax collector's
office,and the exerciseof themis always contingent.Bosses by nature
have the powerto superviseproduction,but tomorrowtheworkersmay
strike.Teachers by naturehave the power to conductclass lessons,but
tomorrowthe studentsmay boycottclass and conducttheirown teach-
in. It is a necessaryfeatureof the existingstructureof educationthat
teachersare dominantand studentssubordinate.But theexerciseof these
powers,the way thisrelationshipis workedout in concretepractice,is
contingent,determinedby the way particularindividualsand groups
choose to deal withtheircircumstances.
The contingencyof the exerciseof power is, ultimately,connectedto
anotherimportantreality-the openness of history,and the fact that
social structures are onlyrelativelyenduring,not immutable.Insofaras
the exerciseof poweris alwayscontingent,it is constantlynegotiatedin
thecourse of everydaylife.Thus not onlytheexerciseof power,but the
veryexistenceof relationsof power themselves,can become objects of
contentionand struggle. In such strugglessubordinate groups will
obviouslybe at a disadvantage.But theyneversimplyrespond to the
behaviorof the powerful.The reproductionof the relationshipalways
involvestheiragency,whichcan be mobilizedas well to transformthe
relationshipitself.Power relationsapproximateless a model of stimulus
and response,and morea modelof endemicreciprocity, negotiation,and
struggle, with both dominant and subordinate groups mobilizingtheir
specificpowers and resources. A theory powermustanalyzestructural
of
relationsand theway they are worked out concretelyby sociallysituated
humanbeings.To think of the latterapart fromtheformeris mistaken.
But it is equally mistaken to ignore the way people make theirown his-
if
tory,even they do not do so under conditionsof theirown choosing.

VIII. PowerandInterest
Lukes, we may recall, introducedthe conceptof interestinto the three
facesof powercontroversy. While a fulltreatmentof theconceptwould
the
go beyond scope of thispaper, some comments about theconnection
betweenpower and interestare in order.
For Lukes, the concept of interestis necessaryto the discussionof
powerinsofaras it answersto the questionof the counterfactual:What
would B do wereit not forA's behavior?I have arguedthatthisway of
thinkingabout power is mistakenand that ratherthan treatingA's
behavioras thecause of B's behavior,we should thestructural
focus-on

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 C. Isaac
Jeffrey 25

relationsthatbindA and B together,viewingtheseas thematerialcause

of bothA's and B's conduct.In thissense,Lukes's counterfactual ques-
tion does not figurein my account, because I reject the Newtonian
premiseon whichit rests.RatherthanA gettingB to do somethingwhich
B would not otherwisedo, social relationsof power typicallyinvolve
both A and B doing what theyordinarilywould do. The structureof
education, not teachers,causes studentsto act like students,just as it
causes teachersto act like teachers.Teachers and students,giventheir
social identities,would not otherwisedo anythingbut whatteachersand
studentsregularlydo. And neithera conflictof revealedpreferences, nor
of objectiveinterests,mustbe discoveredin orderto attributepowerto
theseroles.
As Lukes recognizes,a relationof powercan existeven in theabsence
of an empiricalconflictof revealedpreferences.However, contraryto
Lukes, a relationof powercan also existin the absence of a conflictof
objectiveinterests.It may well be the case thatmypower over mystu-
dentsis in theirbest interest,but the relationshipis not forthatreason
anyless one of dominationand subordination.Lukes's own formulation
would seem to deny this, openinghim up to the chargesof vanguard-
ism.'5 However, to say that the use of the concept of power does not
logicallyrequirerecourseto the concept of interestin the way Lukes
argues is not to denythat the idea of interesthas a role to play in the
analysisof power. As poweris determinedby social structure, so too is
interest.
We mustbe clearabout what"interest"means,forithas at leastthree
meaningsthatmustbe distinguished. The firstmeaningof interestrefers
to therevealed,or subjective,preferences actuallyheldby individuals.In
thissense,as I have suggested,theconceptis not epistemically necessary
to claimsabout social power.Different individualshave different prefer-
ences. Some mayliketheirsocial role. Some maynot. Some maynotand
yet preferto do nothingabout it. We can talk about the structureof
power in the classroomwithoutreferenceto the preferences of the stu-
dents,who are subordinateeveniftheypreferto remainso. This is notto
denythatpeoples's preferences are causallyimportant,onlyto question
Dahl's view of whytheyare.
The second meaningis Lukes's idea of "objective interest,"i.e. what

56. See Peter Abell, "The Many Faces of Power and Liberty:Revealed Preference,
Autonomy, and Teleological Explanation," Sociology 11, no. 1 (January 1977); K.
Thomas, "Power and Autonomy: FurtherCommentson the Many Faces of Power,"
Sociology 12, no. 2 (May 1978); and G. W. Smith,"Must Radicals Be Marxists?Lukes on
Power, Contestability, and Alienation," BritishJournalof Political Science 11 (1978).

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26 BeyondtheThreeFaces of Power

reallyis in theinterest,or good, of an agentwhetherhe thinksso or not.

I have arguedthatwe need not have recourseto thisconceptin orderto
locate a relationof power, for the peasant with a gun to her head is
subordinateevenif collectivizationis in herinterest.WhileI believethat
we can thus talk about power independentlyof the issue of objective
interests,I do not believethattheconceptis unintelligible or irrelevant,
as manyof Lukes's criticshave claimed.57We will returnto thisissue.
These two usages have preoccupied theoristsin the debate about
power,but theidea of interestmay also be understoodin a thirdway. I
will call this "real interests"and defineit as those norms,values, and
purposesimplicitin the practiceof social lifeand associated withsocial
roles as principlesof action.5"So understood,interestsare real because
theyare causallyeffectivein practicein a sensein whichobjectiveinter-
estsare not. To returnto theteacher/student example:ProfessorX may
have a preferencefor extremedisciplinein her class; she may have an
objectiveinterest,as a pedagogue,in teachinga seminar;but as a college
Englishteachershe has a real interestin teachinga particularbody of
work withinthe guidelinesof the university (grades, exams, schedules,
room assignments,etc.). This is the interestthat is shared by college
Englishteachersin theuniversity systemas such. Similarly,herstudents
may preferto read RollingStone magazine;theymay have an objective
interestin readingShakespeare;but as studentsin theuniversity system
theyhave a real interestin goingto class, somehowfulfilling thecourse
requirements, and gettingcollege credit.
What I have called real interestsobviouslyplay a centralrole in the
constitutionof social power. They are thepracticalnormswhichjustify
and legitimatepower relations.The rationalitywhichcharacterizesthe
role of theuniversity students,in thisexample,sustainstheirsubordina-
tion. Similarly,whilethe proletarianmay preferto make more money
and may have an objectiveinterestin the transformation of capitalism
into socialism,he has, in a capitalisticsociety,a real interestin finding
and keepinga job. The satisfactionof hispreferences mustbe tailoredto
thisand thusdespitehis objectiveinterests, he is unlikelyto challengethe
system. Once again, the rationalitywhich characterizesthe role of
workerin a capitalistsocietysustainsthe structureof power.59
The analysis of power thus requiresan analysisof the real interests
and of the ideologieswhichsustainit. The analysisof ideologyand its

57. See particularlyPolsby, CommunityPower, pp. 223-24.

58. See Erik Olin Wright,Classes (London: Verso, 1985).
59. For a finerecentdiscussionof this,see JoelRogersand JoshuaCohen, On Democ-
racy(London: Penguin, 1984).

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 C. Isaac
Jeffrey 27

connectionto powerplayeda centralrole in whatMills called "classical

social theory,"60and yet ideology has receivedverylittleattentionin
debates among politicalscientistsabout power.
I would, at the same time, argue that the analysis of power also
requires,in a different sense, an analysisof objectiveinterests.This of
coursehingeson thequestionof therelationshipbetweenfactand value,
and of descriptionversusevaluation,in social analysis.Many of Lukes's
critics, particularlyPolsby, ridicule any attemptto move from an
analysisof social realityto a critiqueof it. However,manycontemporary
philosophershave arguedthatitis bothpossibleand necessaryto do so.6'
There are two ways in whichwritersdealingwithpowerhave dealt with
thisand whileboth are problematic,thereis meritin theirinterestin an
analysisof powerwithpractical,emancipatoryintent.
The firststrategyis thatof Lukes and, moregenerally,of Habermas,
whichmay be called theneo-Kantianapproach. In thisview,theanalyst
of power mustjudge empiricalrealityagainsta postulatedideal condi-
tionof autonomousagency.Habermas's ideal speechsituation,in which
individualscould hypotheticallyengage in "undistortedcommunica-
tion" about what to do, is paradigmatic.62The problem with this
approach is not that it enjoins the theoristto make normativejudge-
mentsabout the actionsof others.All normativetheory,fromPlato to
Dahl's A Prefaceto DemocraticTheory,does this.The problemis thatit
detaches the analysis of objective interestfromthe analysis of actual
powerrelations.As in Kant,thisviewseemsto reston a sharpdichotomy
betweenthe real world of causal relationsand an ideal worldof auton-
omy. How those subject to relationsof power mightidentifywiththis
ideal conditionand be inclinedto bringit about is leftproblematic.63
The second strategyis that most often associated with
Marxists.If thefirststrategyfailsto bridgethegap betweenthe Luka.csian
real and
the ideal, the second obliteratesit. It does this by positinga teleology
wherebythosein a subordinatepositionare eitheractuallyor immanent-

60. See C. WrightMills, The Sociological Imagination(London: Oxford University

Press, 1956).
61. See particularly
Roy Bhaskar,"ScientificExplanationand Human Emancipation,"
Radical Philosophy(Autumn 1980).
62. See JuirgenHabermas,Knowledge& Human Interests,and his "On Systematically
DistortedCommunication,"Inquiry13 (1970).
63. On thisdualismin Habermas, see QuentinSkinner's"Habermas's Reformation,"
The New YorkReview of Books (October 1, 1982), pp. 35-39; on Lukes's failingsin this
regard,see Ted Benton,"Objective Interestsand the Sociologyof Power," Sociology 15,
no. 2 (May 1981).

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28 BeyondtheThreeFaces of Power

ly in oppositionto the existingsystemof power.64One consequenceof

this is that discreteacts of resistance,and more ordinaryformsof
negotiationand conflict,are inaccuratelyinterpreted as signsof a move-
menttowardsocial transformation. This mistakeleads to themoralizing
of theoreticalanalysis, and a failureto recognizethe coherenceand
stabilityof social forms.A second consequenceof thisis an inattention
to real normativequestions. Insofaras change is seen as immanent,it
becomesless imperativeto figureout whychangeis justifiedand how the
futureshould be betterorganized.65
Somewherebetweenthe idealismof the firststrategyand the histori-
cism of the second lies the terrainwithinwhichthe analysisof power
can properlybroachthequestionof objectiveinterest.Normativetheory,
as an analysisof what formsof social lifeare just and legitimate,must
alwaysaddressquestionsof actual social practiceand historicalpossibili-
ty,yetit can neverbe reducedto a merecorollaryof descriptive analysis.
And it is only at the limitingcase that the conclusionsof normative
theorybecome causallyeffectiveas the objectiveof a real social group.

IX. Conclusion
I have argued thatthe threefaces of power debate falterson its shared
premiseof behavioralismand that social power is betterconceivedas
thosepowersdistributed by thevariousenduringstructuralrelationships
in societyand exercisedbyindividualsand groupsbased on theirlocation
in a givenstructure.I would liketo concludebysuggestingsome implica-
tionsof myargumentforempiricalresearch.
First, the argumentof this paper is a critiqueof a meta-theoretical
debate about the conceptof power, not of the actual researchdone by
theparticipantsin thedebate. It seemsclear thatthedebate has failedas
a methodologicalagenda forempiricalresearch.More interesting is the
possibilitythat the participantsthemselves,in their own empirical
analysesof power,did not strictly employtheirformalconcepts.Books
such as Dahl's Polyarchy,or his more recentDilemmas of Pluralist

64. See George Lukacs, Historyand Class Consciousness(Cambridge,MA: MIT Press,

1971). The same problemcan be foundin Ralf Dahrendorf'sClass Conflictin Industrial
Society (Stanford,CA: StanfordUniversityPress, 1959), pp. 175-79; I have criticized
Benton on thisin my "On Benton's 'Objective Interestsand the Sociology of Power': A
Critique," Sociology 16, no. 3 (August 1982).
65. On this problem withinclassical Marxism,see Svetozar Stojanovic's excellentIn
Search of Democracy in Socialism: History and Party Consciousness (New York:
PrometheusBooks, 1981); also Norman Geras, "The ControversyAbout Marx and
Justice,"New Left Review 150 (March-April1985).

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 C. Isaac
Jeffrey 29

Democracy, do not conformin any obvious sense to the canons of

behavioralism.And even Who Governs?talksabout thepowerof Mayor
Lee of New Haven in termsmuchcloserto theviewI have developedin
thisessay.66
Second, there is a great deal of empiricaland theoreticalanalysis
whichalreadypresupposestheviewof powerI have developed.Debates
in contemporaryfeministtheoryabout patriarchy,for example,center
around the structuralrelationsof genderand how theydistributepower
and opportunitiesbetweenmen and women.67Marxismas a theoretical
traditionhas always treatedpower in structuralterms."Capital," as
Marx put it, "is a social power."68In theiranalysesof thelabor process
and changingformsof capital accumulation,contemporaryMarxists
have emphasizedthestructural dimensionsof class domination,focusing
particularlyon the question of ideology. Moreover, the traditional
Marxian emphasison class struggleinvolvesa view of the contingency
and negotiationof the exercise of power akin to the one I have
suggested.69
I would also suggestthatMills's The Power Elite can be seen as pre-
supposinga realistviewof power.Mills insiststhroughoutthebook that
thepowerof theeliteis structurally determined, thattheyare a group"in
positions to make decisions having major consequences" and that
"behind such men and behindtheeventsof history,linkingthetwo, are
the major institutions of modernsociety.These hierarchiesof stateand
corporationconstitutethe means of power."'7 This is not to endorse
Mills's theoryor to paperoverthekindsof evidentiary weaknesseswhich
Dahl and othershave pointedout. But it is to suggestthatto dismissit as
meaninglessand metaphysics, as thebehavioralistcriticsdid, does notdo
it justice. There is a differencebetweenquestionablescience and non-
science, a differenceignored, all too often self-righteously,by
behavioralists.
In termsof contemporary debates withinpoliticalscience,the theory

66. See Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy(New Haven, CT: Yale UniversityPress, 1971);
Dilemmas of PluralistDemocracy (New Haven, CT: Yale UniversityPress, 1982); Who
Governs?(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1959). For theargumentthatDahl does
notemployhis own methodologyin his actual research,see PeterMorriss,"Power in New
Haven: A Reassessmentof 'Who Governs?' " BritishJournalof PoliticalScience2 (1972).
67. See Michele Barret'ssynthetic
discussionin Woman's OppressionToday (London:
Verso, 1981).
68. Karl Marx and FreidrichEngels,"The CommunistManifesto,"in TheMarx-Engels
Reader, ed. RobertC. Tucker,FirstEdition (New York: Norton, 1969), p. 347.
69. See myPower and Marxist Theory,Part II.
70. C. WrightMills, The Power Elite (London: Oxford, 1956), pp. 4-5.

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30 BeyondtheThreeFaces of Power

of thestateis thatarea whichis mostilluminatedby therealistview.The

advent of behavioralismled to the declineof the state as an object of
theory(the real state, of course, grew into, among other things,a
massive financial supporter of behavioral research). Lasswell and
Kaplan, advocatingbehavioralistapproaches, insistedon seeing "such
political abstractionsas 'state' and 'sovereignty'in termsof concrete
influenceand control."" David Easton, in The Political Systemand
otherworks,unleashedan assault on the metaphysicalconnotationsof
the conceptof the state,preferring insteadthe conceptof the political
system as one more amenable to the developmentof empiricallydeduc-
tivetheories.72It is common knowledgethatthe conceptof the stateis
experiencinga renaissance.Political economists,democratictheorists,
and theoristsof internationalrelationsare all discoveringthat thereis
some overarchingcoherenceto the institutionsof governmentthat is
obscuredbytheconceptof thepoliticalsystem.In thefaceof thisrenais-
sance, Easton has reiteratedthebehavioralistcritiquein a recentissue of
Political Theory. The specific target was the Greek Marxist, Nicos
Poulantzas, but theenemywas reallytheconceptof thestate.As Easton
argued, either the state is the empirical behaviors of government
officials,"or it is some kind of undefinedand undefinableessence, a
'ghost in the machine,' knowable only throughits variable manifesta-
tions.""73This argumentshould sound familiar.It formsthe basis of
Popper's critiqueof Marxismand of Polsby's book on power.Easton is
clear thatthevalidityof theconceptof thestaterestson questionsabout
the natureof science.
But what Easton fails to see is that all scienceis based on reasoning
fromempiricalphenomenato theircausal mechanisms.In thisrespect,
the conceptof the stateis no different fromthe conceptof a magnetic
field-we cannot observesuch a field,and yetthe concepthas definite
meaningand denotes a hypothetically real structurewith real effects.
Theoristsof the statehave begunto recognizethatconceptualissues of
thesortraisedin thisarticleare centralto theirown research.Thus Bob
Jessop,in The CapitalistState, discussesthe stateas a set of structural
relationshipswhich distributepower to governmentofficials. As he
writes:"The state is a set of institutions thatcannot, qua institutional
ensemble,exercisepower." The powersof thestateare, rather,exercised

71. Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society(New Haven, CT: Yale
UniversityPress, 1950), pp. x-xv.
72. David Easton, The Political System(New York: Knopf, 1953).
73. David Easton, "The PoliticalSystemBeseigedby theState," Political Theory9, no.
3 (August 1981), p. 316.

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 C. Isaac
Jeffrey 31

separately,by specificofficials,occupyingspecificinstitutionalroles.
But, he insists,a theoryof thispowermustbe a theoryof thestructural
relationswhichdistributethe power so exercised."74
No meta-theoretical analysisof thesortpresentedherecan everdecide
substantivequestionsin social theory.The beliefthat such an analysis
could so functionwas one of the greatmistakesand greattragediesof
behavioralism.In its empiricistzeal, it stigmatizeda greatdeal of valua-
ble substantiveworkon purelyformalgrounds.The pointof thispaperis
not to repeatthiserrorby once again providingan, albeitdifferent, lit-
mus test with which to judge who deserves the badge of scientific
approval. It is, rather,to expose some fundamentalweaknessesin the
prevailingdebate about power, in the hope that social researcherscan
now proceed to examine social structureuninhibitedby the stigmaof
metaphysics.In exposingthe mobilizationof bias underlyingthe three
faces of power debate, I hope, in some small way, to empowerthose
theoristswho have been constrainedby the power of empiricism.

74. Bob Jessop,The CapitalistState (New York: New York University Press, 1982), p.
221. For a good summaryof recentargumentsabout the state, see MartinCarnoy's The
State and Political Theory(Princeton,NJ: PrincetonUniversityPress, 1984).

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