MORAVCSIK. Taking Preferences Seriously

Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics
Author(s): Andrew Moravcsik

Reviewed work(s):
Source: International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 4 (Autumn, 1997), pp. 513-553
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TakingPreferencesSeriously:
A Liberal Theoryof
InternationalPolitics
AndrewMoravcsik
Thisarticlereformulatesliberalinternational (IR) theory

relations ina nonideological and
nonutopian formappropriate toempirical socialscience.LiberalIR theory elaboratesthe
insight relations-the
thatstate-society relationshipofstatestothedomestic andtransna-
tionalsocialcontext in whichtheyareembedded-havea fundamental impacton state
behaviorinworldpolitics. Societalideas,interests, influence
andinstitutions statebehavior
byshaping statepreferences,thatis,thefundamental socialpurposesunderlying thestrate-
giccalculationsofgovernments. Forliberals, theconfigurationofstatepreferencesmatters
mostinworldpolitics-not, argue,theconfiguration
as realists ofcapabilitiesandnot,as
(thatis,functional
institutionalists regime maintain,
theorists) theconfigurationofinforma-
Thisarticle
tionandinstitutions. codifies intheform
thisbasicliberalinsight ofthree core
theoretical
assumptions, derivesfromthemthreevariants ofliberaltheory,anddemon-
strates
that
theexistence ofa coherent liberaltheoryhassignificant methodologi-
theoretical,
cal,andempirical Restated
implications. inthisway,liberal theorydeservestobetreated as
a paradigmatic alternativeempirically coequalwithandanalytically morefundamen-
talthanthetwodominant theoriesincontemporary IR scholarship: realismandinsti-
tutionalism.
Fordetailedcomments andcriticisms, aboveall toAnne-Marie

I am grateful Slaughter, whowas there
fromthebeginning, andtoLea Brilmayer, LawrenceBroz,MarcBusch,JamesCaporaso,Dale Copeland,
David Dessler,Jeffry Frieden,MarthaFinnemore, CharlesGlazer,MichaelGriesdorf, StefanoGuzzini,
ErnstHaas, StanleyHoffmann, StephenHolmes,Ted Hopf,Alan Houston,David Lumsdaine,Robert
Keohane,YuenKhong,LarryKramer, David Long,StevenLukes,JamesMarquart, Lisa Martin,Jonathan
Mercer,HenryNau, KalypsoNicolaidis,JamesNolt,JosephNye, JohnOdell, KennethOye, Robert
Paarlberg,Daniel Philpott, GideonRose, Judith Shklar,David Skidmore, AllisonStanger, JaniceStein,
Andrew Wallace,CelesteWallander, Stephen Walt,Alexander
Wendt, MarkZacher,FareedZakaria,Michael
Zirn,andthreeanonymous referees.I thankalso twoothercritics:PeterKatzensteinencourageda more
directcomparisonwithconstructivist approachesand JohnMearsheimer invitedme to statetheliberal
case vis-a-visrealismin a seriesofpublicdebates.I am also indebtedto participantsin seminarsat the
Program onInternationalPolitics,Economics,andSecurity (PIPES), UniversityofChicago;University of
Konstanz;University ofToronto;University San Diego; OlinInstitute
ofCalifornia, andCenterforInter-
nationalAffairs,HarvardUniversity; InternationalJurisprudenceColloquium,NewYorkUniversity Law
School;FletcherSchool,TuftsUniversity; andtheEuropeanUniversity Forresearchsupport,
Institute. I
thankAmitSevak,BrianPortnoy, andPIPES. Formoredetailedanddocumented versionsofthisarticle,
see Moravcsik1992.
International 51, 4, Autumn1997,pp. 513-53

Organization
? 1997byThe 10 Foundation
andtheMassachusetts Institute
ofTechnology
Organization
514 International
Grounding liberaltheory in a setofcoresocialscientific assumptions helpsover-

comea disjuncture betweencontemporary empiricalresearchon worldpoliticsand
thelanguageemployedby scholarsto describeIR as a field.Liberalhypotheses
stressing variation instatepreferences playan increasingly central roleinIR scholar-
ship.Theseincludeexplanations stressing thecausalimportance of state-society re-
lationsas shapedbydomesticinstitutions (forexample,the"democratic peace"), by
economicinterdependence (forexample,endogenous tariff
theory), andbyideasabout
national, political,andsocioeconomic publicgoodsprovision(forexample,theories
abouttherelationship betweennationalism andconflict). Liberalhypotheses do not
include,forreasonsclarified later,functional regimetheory. Yettheconceptuallan-
guageofIR theory has notcaughtup withcontemporary research.IR theorists con-
tinueto speakas ifthedominant theoretical cleavageinthefieldwerethedichotomy
betweenrealismand ("neoliberal")institutionalism. The result:liberalIR theory of
thekindoutlinedearlieris generally ignoredas a majorparadigmatic alternative.
Worse,its lack of paradigmatic statushas permitted criticsto caticatureliberal
theoryas a normative, evenutopian,ideology.Postwarrealistcriticssuchas Hans
Morgenthau andE. H. Carrtookrhetorical advantageofliberalism's roleas
historical
an ideologytocontrast itspurported altruism ("idealism,""legalism,""moralism,"
or "utopianism")withrealism's"theoretical concernwithhumannatureas it actu-
allyis [and]historical processesas theyactuallytakeplace."' Fortyyearslater,little
has changed.RobertGilpin'sinfluential typology in international politicaleconomy
juxtaposesa positivemercantilist view("politicsdetermines economics")againsta
narrower and conspicuously normative liberalone ("economicsshoulddetermine
politics").KennethWaltz,a realistcritic,assertsthat"if theaims ... of statesbe-
comematters of. . . centralconcern, thenwe areforcedbacktothedescriptive level;
andfromsimpledescriptions no validgeneralizations can be drawn."2
Liberalshaveresponded to suchcriticisms notbyproposing a unified setofpositive
socialscientific assumptions onwhicha nonideological andnonutopian liberaltheory can
be based,as hasbeendonewithconsiderable successforrealism andinstitutionalism, but
byconceding itstheoretical incoherence andturning insteadto intellectualhistory.It is
widelyaccepted thatanynontautological socialscientifictheorymustbe grounded ina set
ofpositive assumptions fromwhicharguments, andpredictions
explanations, canbe de-
rived.3Yetsurveys ofliberalIR theory either collectdisparateviewsheldby "classical"
liberalpublicists ordefineliberaltheory teleologically,thatis,according toitspurported
optimism concerning thepotential forpeace,cooperation, andinternational in
institutions
worldhistory. Suchstudies offeranindispensable sourceoftheoreticalandnormative inspi-
ration.Judged bythemorenarrowly socialscientific adoptedhere,however,
criteria they
donotjustify reference toa distinct"liberal"IR theory.
LeadingliberalIR theorists freelyconcedetheabsenceofcoherent microfounda-
tionalassumptions butconcludetherefrom thata liberalIR theory inthesocialscien-
1. See Morgenthau1960,4; Keohane1989,68, n. 17; andHoward1978,134.

2. See Waltz1979,65, 27; Gilpin1975,27 (emphasisin original);andGilpin1987.
3. See Buenode Mesquita1996,64-65; andKeohane1986.
Politics 515
LiberalTheoryofInternational
tificsensecannotexist.RobertKeohane,an institutionalist sympathetic to liberal-

ism,maintains that"incontrast toMarxismandRealism,Liberalism is notcommitted
to ambitiousandparsimonious structuraltheory." MichaelDoyle,a pioneerin ana-
lyzingthe"democratic peace," observesthatliberalIR theory, unlikeothers,lacks
"canonical"foundations. MarkZacherand RichardMatthew, sympathetic liberals,
assertthatliberalismshouldbe consideredan "approach,"nota theory, since "its
propositions cannotbe ... deducedfromits assumptions."4 Accuratethoughthis
maybe as a characterization history
of intellectual and current theory,it is second-
bestsocialscience.
I seek to move beyondthisunsatisfactory situationby proposinga set of core
assumptions on whicha generalrestatement of positiveliberalIR theorycan be
grounded. In thefirstsectionofthearticleI arguethatthebasic liberalinsight about
thecentrality of state-societyrelationsto worldpoliticscan be restated in termsof
threepositiveassumptions, concerning, respectively, thenatureof fundamental so-
cial actors,thestate,andtheinternational system.
Drawingon theseassumptions, I thenelaboratethreemajorvariantsof liberal
theory-eachgrounded in a distinctivecausalmechanism linkingsocialpreferences
and statebehavior.Ideationalliberalismstressestheimpacton statebehaviorof
conflictandcompatibility amongcollectivesocialvaluesoridentities concerning the
scopeandnatureofpublicgoodsprovision.Commercial liberalism stressestheim-
pacton statebehaviorof gainsandlossesto individuals andgroupsin societyfrom
transnational economicinterchange. Republicanliberalismstressestheimpacton
statebehaviorof varyingformsof domesticrepresentation andtheresulting incen-
tivesforsocialgroupstoengageinrentseeking.'
Finally,I demonstrate thattheidentification ofcoherent theoreticalassumptions is
notsimplyan abstract and semanticmatter. It has significant methodological, theo-
retical,andempiricalimplications. The utility of a paradigmatic restatement should
be evaluatedon thebasis of fourcriteria, each relevantto theempiricalresearcher:
superior parsimony, coherence, empiricalaccuracy, andmulticausal consistency.
First,a theoreticalrestatement shouldbe generalandparsimonious, demonstrat-
ingthata limitednumber ofmicrofoundational assumptions canlinka broadrangeof
previously unconnected theories andhypotheses. Thisrestatement does so byshow-
ing how liberalismprovidesa generaltheoryof IR linkingapparently unrelated
areas of inquiry. The theoryoutlinedhereappliesequallyto liberaland nonliberal
states,economicand nationalsecurity affairs, conflictual and nonconflictual situa-
tions,andthebehaviorbothofindividualstates("foreignpolicy")andof aggrega-
tionsofstates("international relations").Liberaltheory, moreover, explainsimpor-
tantphenomena overlooked byalternativetheories, including thesubstantive content
of foreignpolicy,historicalchange,and thedistinctiveness of interstate relations
amongmodernWestern states.
4. See Keohane 1990, 166, 172-73; Doyle 1986, 1152; Zacherand Matthew1992,2; Matthewand
Zacher1995,107-11,117-20;Hoffmann 1987,1995;andNye 1988.
see Keohane1990;andDoyle 1983.
5. Forothersuchdistinctions,
Organization
516 International
Second,a theoretical restatement shouldbe rigorous and coherent,offeringa clear

definition of its own boundaries.This restatement does so by demonstrating that
institutionalisttheoriesofregimes-commonly treatedas liberaldue to ideological
and historical connotations-areinfactbasedonassumptions closertorealismthan
toliberalism. ThishelpstoexplainwhyIR theorists havefounditdifficult todistilla
setofcoherent microfoundational assumptions forliberaltheory.
Third,a theoretical restatement shoulddemonstrate empiricalaccuracyvis-a'-vis
othertheories;itshouldexposeanomaliesin existingwork,forcing reconsideration
of empiricalfindings and theoretical positions.This restatement of liberaltheory
meetsthiscriterion byrevealing significantmethodological biasesinempirical evalu-
ationsof realisttheoriesof "relativegains-seeking" and constructivistanalysesof
ideasandIR duetotheomissionofliberalalternatives. Ifthesebiaseswerecorrected,
liberalaccountsmightwell supplantmanywidelyacceptedrealistandinstitutional-
ist,as wellas constructivist,explanations ofparticular phenomena in worldpolitics.
Fourth, a theoreticalrestatement shoulddemonstrate multicausalconsistency. By
specifying theantecedent conditions underwhichit is validand theprecisecausal
linksto policyoutcomes,a theoryshouldspecifyrigorously how it can be synthe-
sized withothertheoriesintoa multicausalexplanationconsistent withtenetsof
fundamental socialtheory.Thisrestatement does so byreversing thenearlyuniversal
presumption amongcontemporary IR theorists that"systemic"theories likerealism
andinstitutionalism shouldbe employedas an analytical"first cut,"withtheories of
"domestic"preference formation brought in onlyto explainanomalies-a prescrip-
tionthatis bothmethodologically biasedandtheoretically In itsplace,this
incoherent.
restatement dictatesthereverse:Liberaltheory priorto bothrealismand
is analytically
institutionalismbecauseitdefinestheconditions underwhichtheir assumptions hold.
If thisproposedreformulation of liberalIR theorymeetsthesefourcriteria, as I
argueit does,thereis good reasonto accordit a paradigmatic positionempirically
coequalwithandanalytically priortorealismandinstitutionalism, as wellas construc-
tivism, intheory andresearchon worldpolitics.
Core AssumptionsofLiberal IR Theory
LiberalIR theory'sfundamental premise-thattherelationshipbetweenstatesand

thesurrounding societyinwhichtheyareembeddedcriti-
domesticandtransnational
callyshapesstatebehaviorbyinfluencingthesocialpurposesunderlying statepref-
erences-can be restatedin termsofthreecoreassumptions.Theseassumptions are
appropriatefoundationsofanysocialtheoryofIR: theyspecifythenatureofsocietal
actors,thestate,andtheinternational
system.
1: ThePrimacyofSocietalActors
Assumption
Thefundamental politicsare individuals
actorsin international andprivategroups,
whoare on theaveragerationaland risk-averse and whoorganizeexchangeand
collectiveactionto promotedifferentiatedinterests underconstraintsimposedby
materialscarcity,
conflictingvalues,and variationsinsocietalinfluence.
Politics 517
Liberaltheoryrestson a "bottom-up" viewof politicsin whichthedemandsof

individualsand societalgroupsaretreatedas analytically priorto politics.Political
actionis embeddedin domesticand transnational civil society,understood as an
aggregation ofboundedly rationalindividuals withdifferentiated tastes,socialcom-
mitments, andresourceendowments. Sociallydifferentiated individuals definetheir
materialand ideationalinterests independently of politicsand thenadvancethose
intereststhrough politicalexchangeand collectiveaction.6Individualsand groups
areassumedto actrationally inpursuit ofmaterial andidealwelfare.7
Forliberals,thedefinitionoftheinterests ofsocietalactorsis theoretically central.
Liberaltheory rejectstheutopiannotionthatan automatic harmony ofinterestexists
amongindividualsand groupsin society;scarcityand differentiation introduce an
inevitablemeasureofcompetition. Wheresocialincentives forexchangeandcollec-
tiveactionareperceivedtoexist,individuals andgroupsexploitthem:thegreater the
expectedbenefits, thestronger theincentive toact.In pursuing thesegoals,individu-
als areon theaveragerisk-averse; thatis, theystronglydefendexistinginvestments
butremainmorecautiousaboutassumingcostandriskinpursuit ofnewgains.What
is trueaboutpeopleon theaverage,however,is notnecessarily truein everycase:
someindividuals in anygivensocietymaybe risk-acceptant orirrational.
Liberaltheoryseeks to generalizeaboutthesocial conditionsunderwhichthe
behaviorofself-interested actorsconverges towardcooperation orconflict.Conflict-
ual societaldemandsandthewillingness to employcoercionin pursuitof themare
associatedwitha numberof factors, threeof whichare relevantto thisdiscussion:
divergent fundamental beliefs,conflict overscarcematerialgoods,and inequalities
in politicalpower.Deep, irreconcilable differencesin beliefsabouttheprovisionof
publicgoods,suchas borders, culture,fundamental politicalinstitutions,and local
socialpractices,promote conflict, whereascomplementary beliefspromote harmony
and cooperation. Extremescarcitytendsto exacerbateconflictoverresourcesby
increasing thewillingness of social actorsto assumecost and riskto obtainthem.
Relativeabundance, bycontrast, lowersthepropensity forconflict byproviding the
opportunity tosatisfy wantswithout inevitableconflictandgivingcertainindividuals
andgroupsmoretodefend.Finally,whereinequalities insocietalinfluence arelarge,
conflictis morelikely.Wheresocial poweris equitablydistributed, thecostsand
benefitsof actionsare morelikelyto be internalized to individuals-forexample,
through theexistenceofcomplex,cross-cutting patterns ofmutually beneficialinter-
actionor strongandlegitimate domesticpoliticalinstitutions-and theincentive for
selectiveor arbitrarycoercionis dampened.By contrast, wherepowerasymmetries
permit groupstoevadethecostsofredistributing goods,incentives ariseforexploit-
ative,rent-seeking behavior,eveniftheresultis inefficient forsocietyas a whole.8
6. Thisdoes notimplya "pre-social"conceptionoftheindividualunencumbered bynation,commu-

enterthepoliticalrealmwhen
butonlythattheseidentities
nity,family,or othercollectiveidentities
andgroupsengageinpoliticalexchangeonthebasisofthem;see,forexample,Coleman1990.
individuals
7. Kant1991,44.
8. MilgromandRoberts1990,86-87.
Organization
518 International
and StatePreferences
2: Representation
Assumption
States(or otherpoliticalinstitutions)
representsomesubsetofdomesticsociety,on
thebasis of whoseinterests and act purpo-
stateofficialsdefinestatepreferences
sivelyinworldpolitics.
In theliberalconception ofdomesticpolitics,thestateis notan actorbuta repre-

sentativeinstitution constantly subjectto captureand recapture, constructionand
reconstruction bycoalitionsofsocialactors.Representative institutions andpractices
constitute thecritical"transmission belt"bywhichthepreferences andsocialpower
ofindividuals andgroupsaretranslated intostatepolicy.Individuals turntothestate
to achievegoals thatprivatebehavioris unableto achieveefficiently.9 Government
policyis therefore constrained by theunderlying identities,interests, and powerof
individuals andgroups(insideandoutside the stateapparatus) who constantlypres-
to
surethecentraldecisionmakers pursuepolicies consistent with theirpreferences.
This is notto adopta narrowly pluralistview of domesticpoliticsin whichall
individualsand groupshave equal influence on statepolicy,norone in whichthe
structureofstateinstitutions is irrelevant. No government restson universal orunbi-
ased politicalrepresentation; everygovernment represents some individualsand
groupsmorefullythanothers.In an extreme hypotheticalcase,representation might
empowera narrowbureaucratic class orevena singletyrannical individual, suchas
an ideal-typicalPol PotorJosefStalin.Betweentheoretical extremes oftyranny and
democracy, manyrepresentative institutionsand exist,
practices each ofwhich privi-
leges particular demands;hencethenatureof stateinstitutions, alongsidesocietal
intereststhemselves, is a key determinant ofwhat states
do internationally.
Representation, intheliberalview,is notsimplya formalattribute ofstateinstitu-
tionsbut includes other stablecharacteristics of thepoliticalprocess, formal orinfor-
mal, thatprivilege particular societal interests.Clientalistic authoritarian regimes
maydistinguish thosewithfamilial, bureaucratic, oreconomictiesto thegoverning
elitefromthosewithout. Even wheregovernment institutions are formally fairand
open,a relatively inegalitarian distribution ofproperty, risk,information, ororgani-
zationalcapabilitiesmay createsocial or economicmonopoliesable to dominate
policy.Similarly, theway in whicha staterecognizesindividualrightsmayshape
opportunities forvoice.'0Certaindomesticrepresentational processesmaytendto
selectas leadersindividuals,groups,and bureaucracies socializedwithparticular
attitudestowardinformation, risk,andloss. Finally,cost-effective exitoptions,such
as emigration, noncompliance, or thetransfer of assetsto newjurisdictions or uses,
insofaras theyconstrain governments, maybe thought of as substitutes forformal
representation."I
and practicesresultfrompriorcontracts
politicalinstitutions
9. Representative and can generallybe
takenforgrantedin explainingforeignpolicy;butwheretheprimary and allegiancesof indi-
interests
vidualsandprivategroupsaretransferredtosubnationalorsupranationalinstitutions
empowered torepre-
shifttotheselevels.
a liberalanalysiswouldnaturally
sentthemeffectively,
10. Doyle 1997,251-300.
11. NorthandThomas1973,87.
Politics 519
Societalpressures transmittedbyrepresentative institutions andpractices alter"state

preferences." This termdesignatesan ordering amongunderlying substantive out-
comesthatmayresultfrominternational politicalinteraction. Hereitis essential-
particularlygiventheinconsistency of commonusage-to avoidconceptualconfu-
sionby keepingstate"preferences" distinctfromnational"strategies," "tactics,"
and "policies,"thatis, theparticular transientbargaining positions, negotiating de-
mands,orpolicygoalsthatconstitute theeveryday currency offoreign policy.State
preferences,as theconceptis employedhere,comprisea setoffundamental interests
defined across"statesoftheworld."Preferences arebydefinition causallyindepen-
dentofthestrategies ofotheractorsand,therefore, priorto specificinterstate politi-
cal interactions,
including externalthreats, incentives, manipulation ofinformation,
orothertactics.By contrast, strategies andtactics-sometimes also termed"prefer-
ences"in game-theoretical analyses-arepolicyoptionsdefinedacrossintermediate
politicalaims,as whengovernments declarean "interest" in "maintaining thebal-
ance of power,""containing"or "appeasing"an adversary, or exercising"global
leadership."12Liberaltheory focuseson theconsequencesforstatebehaviorofshifts
in fundamental preferences, notshiftsin thestrategic circumstances underwhich
statespursuethem.
Representative institutionsandpracticesdetermine notmerelywhichsocialcoali-
tionsare represented in foreignpolicy,buthow theyare represented. Two distinc-
tionsarecritical.First,statesmayactin eithera unitary or "disaggregated" way.In
manytraditional areas of foreignpolicy,"politicsstopsat thewater'sedge," and
thereis strongcoordination amongnationalofficials and politicians. In otherareas,
thestatemaybe "disaggregated," withdifferent elements-executives, courts,cen-
tralbanks,regulatory bureaucracies, and rulingparties,forexample-conducting
semiautonomous foreign policiesin theserviceofdisparatesocietalinterests.'3Sec-
ond,domesticdecisionmakingmaybe structured so as to generate statepreferences
thatsatisfya strongrationalitycondition, suchas transitivity orstrict expectedutility
maximization, or so as to satisfyonlytheweakerrationality criterion of seeking
efficientmeans.Recently, formaltheorists have derivedspecificconditionsunder
whichnonunitary statebehaviorcanbe analyzed"as if" itwereunitary andrational,
implyingthatmuchsuperficially "nonrational" or "nonunitary" behaviorshould
actuallybe understood intermsofshifting statepreferences. 14
Takentogether, assumptions 1 and2 implythatstatesdo notautomatically maxi-
mizefixed,homogeneous conceptions of security,sovereignty, or wealthperse, as
tendtoassume.Insteadtheyare,inWaltzianterms,
realistsandinstitutionalists "func-
tionallydifferentiated";thatis, theypursueparticular interpretations and combina-
tionsof security,welfare,and sovereignty preferred by powerfuldomesticgroups
12. The phrase"country A changeditspreferencesin responseto an actionby countryB" is thusa

misuseofthetermas definedhere,implying rationalbehavior;see Sebenius1991,
less thanconsistently
207.
13. See Slaughter1995;andKeohaneandNye 1971.
14. Achen1995.
Organization
520 International
enfranchised byrepresentative andpractices.

institutions 15As ArnoldWolfers, John
Ruggie,and othershave observed,thenatureand intensity of nationalsupportfor
anystatepurpose-evenapparently fundamental concernslikethedefenseofpoliti-
cal andlegalsovereignty, nationalsecurity,
integrity,
territorial oreconomicwelfare-
It is notuncommon
variesdecisivelywiththesocial context.'6 forstatesknowingly
to surrender sovereignty,compromise security,or reduceaggregateeconomicwel-
amongsuchgoals,as wellas cross-national
fare.In theliberalview,trade-offs differ-
encesintheirdefinition, highlyvaried,andcausallyconsequential.'7
areinevitable,
and theInternational
3: Interdependence
Assumption System
statepreferences
ofinterdependent
Theconfiguration statebehavior
determines
For liberals,statebehaviorreflects varyingpatterns of statepreferences. States

requirea "purpose,"a perceivedunderlying stakein thematter at hand,in orderto
provokeconflict, proposecooperation, or takeanyothersignificant foreignpolicy
action.The precisenatureofthesestakesdrivespolicy.Thisis notto assertthateach
statesimplypursuesitsidealpolicy,obliviousofothers;instead,each stateseeksto
realizeitsdistinctive preferencesundervaryingconstraints imposedby theprefer-
encesof otherstates.Thusliberaltheoryrejectsnotjusttherealistassumption that
statepreferences mustbe treated as ifnaturally butequallytheinstitution-
conflictual,
alistassumption thattheyshouldbe treatedas if theywerepartiallyconvergent,
compromising a collectiveactionproblem.18 To thecontrary, liberalscausallyprivi-
lege variationin theconfiguration of statepreferences, whiletreating configurations
ofcapabilitiesandinformation as iftheywereeitherfixedconstraints orendogenous
to statepreferences.
The criticaltheoreticallinkbetweenstatepreferences, on theone hand,and the
behaviorof one or morestates,on theother,is providedby theconceptof policy
interdependence. Policyinterdependence is defined hereas thesetofcostsandben-
efitscreatedforforeignsocietieswhendominant social groupsin a societyseekto
realizetheirpreferences, thatis, thepattern of transnational externalities
resulting
fromattempts to pursuenationaldistinctive purposes.Liberaltheoryassumesthat
thepattern ofinterdependent statepreferences imposesa bindingconstraint on state
behavior.
Patternsofinterdependence orexternalities inducedbyefforts torealizestatepref-
erencescan be dividedintothreebroadcategories,corresponding to thestrategic
situation(thepattern of policyexternalities) thatresults.'9Wherepreferences are
naturally compatible orharmonious, thatis,wheretheexternalities ofunilateralpoli-
15. Ruggie1983,265.
16. Ruggie1982,1983.
within
17. On thecontradictions Waltz'sefforttoavoidtheseambiguities, see Baldwin1997,21-22.
18. Keohane 1984, 10; 1986, 193. Note thattheseare all "as if" assumptions.The worldmustbe
withthem,butneednotfulfill
consistent themprecisely.
19. See Stein1982;Snidal1985;andMartin1992.
Politics 521
cies areoptimalforothers(or insignificant), thereare strong incentives forcoexist-

encewithlow conflict.
Where,bycontrast, underlying statepreferences arezero-sumordeadlocked,that
is,wherean attempt bydominant socialgroupsin onecountry torealizetheirprefer-
encesthrough stateactionnecessarily imposescosts(negativeexternalities) ondomi-
nantsocialgroupsin othercountries, governments facea bargaining gamewithfew
mutualgainsand a highpotentialforinterstate tensionand conflict. The decisive
precondition forcostlyattempts atcoercion,forexample,is neither a particular con-
figurationofpower,as realistsassert,norofuncertainty, as institutionalistsmaintain,
buta configuration ofpreferences conflictual enoughto motivate willingness to ac-
cepthighcostandrisk.20 In otherwords,intenseconflict requiresthatan aggressor or
revisioniststateadvancedemandsto whichotherstatesare unwillingto submit.
Revisionist preferences-underlying, sociallygrounded interests in revisingthesta-
tusquo-are distinct fromrevisionist "strategies," thatis, a needto alterthestatus
quo to protectenduring interestsundernew strategic circumstances. Liberalsfocus
on theformer, realists(andinstitutionalists) on thelatter.Hencewhileboththeories
predictsecurity conflict, theydo so underdifferent circumstances. Forexample,in-
creasedmilitary spendingin responseto an adversary's armsbuildupis a changein
strategywithfixedpreferences consistent withrealism;increasedspendinginitiated
bya newrulingeliteideologically committed toterritorialaggrandizement is a pref-
erence-induced changein strategy consistent withliberalism.21
Where,finally, motivesare mixedsuchthatan exchangeof policyconcessions
through coordination or precommitment can improvethewelfareof bothparties
relativetounilateral policyadjustment (i.e.,a collectiveactionproblem), stateshave
an incentiveto negotiatepolicycoordination. Gameslike coordination, assurance,
prisoner'sdilemma,and suasionhave distinctive dynamics, as well as imposepre-
cise costs,benefits,andriskson theparties.Withineach qualitative category, incen-
tivesvaryfurther according totheintensity ofpreferences.
Forliberals,theform, substance, anddepthofcooperation dependsdirectly on the
natureofthesepatterns ofpreferences. Hencewhere"Pareto-inefficient" outcomes
are observed-tradeprotection is a commonly citedexample-liberalsturnfirstto
countervailing socialpreferences andunresolved domesticandtransnational distribu-
tionalconflicts,whereasinstitutionalists andrealists, respectively,turntouncertainty
andparticular configurations ofinterstate power.22
LiberalTheoryas Systemic
Theory
in particular
Theseliberalassumptions, thethird-inessence,"whatstateswantis
theprimary ofwhattheydo"-may seemcommonsensical,
determinant eventauto-
IR theoryhas uniformly
logical.Yet mainstream rejectedsuchclaimsforthepast
analysesdismisssuchrisk-acceptant
20. Note thatsome rationalist as "irrational";see
preferences
Fearon1995.
21. Forexample,VanEvera1990-91,32.
22. Grieco'sstudyofNTB regulationis discussedlater.
Organization
522 International
half-century.At theheartof thetwoleadingcontemporary IR theories, realismand

institutionalism, is thebeliefthatstatebehaviorhas ironicconsequences.23Power
politicsand informational uncertainty constrain statesto pursuesecond-and third-
beststrategies strikingly at variancewiththeirunderlying preferences.24 Thusvary-
ingstatepreferences shouldbe treated as iftheywereirrelevant, secondary, orendog-
enous.In his classicdefinition of realismMorgenthau contrasts it to "twopopular
fallacies:theconcernwithmotivesandtheconcernwithideologicalpreferences."25
NeorealistWaltz'scentralobjectionto previous,"reductionist" theoriesis thatin
worldpolitics"resultsachievedseldomcorrespond totheintentions ofactors";hence
"no valid generalizations can logicallybe drawn"froman examination of inten-
tions.26 Thoughtheinterests itassumesaredifferent, Keohane'sinstitutionalism re-
lies on a similaras ifassumption: it "takestheexistenceofmutualinterests as given
andexaminestheconditions underwhichtheywilllead to cooperation."27 In short,
Powellobservesthat"structural theories... lack a theoryofpreferences overout-
comes."28Whatstatesdo is primarily determined bystrategic considerations-what
theycan getor whattheyknow-whichin turnreflect theirinternational political
environment. In short, variationinmeans,notends,matters most.29
Liberaltheoryreversesthisassumption:Variationin ends,notmeans,matters
most.Realistsandinstitutionalists, as well as formaltheorists whoseekto integrate
thetwo,criticizethiscoreliberalassumption becauseitappearsat first glancetorest
on whatWaltztermsa "reductionist" rather thana "systemic"understanding ofIR.
In otherwords,liberalism appearsto be a purely"domestic"or "unit-level" theory
thatignorestheinternational environment. In particular,realistsareskepticalofthis
viewbecauseitappearsat first glancetobe grounded in theutopianexpectation that
everystatecan do as it pleases.This commonplacecriticism is erroneousfortwo
important reasons.
First,statepreferences mayreflect patterns of transnationalsocietalinteraction.
Whilestatepreferences are (by definition) invariant in responseto changinginter-
statepoliticalandstrategic circumstances, theymaywellvaryinresponsetoa chang-
ingtransnational socialcontext. Inthepoliticaleconomyforforeign economicpolicy,
23. WhataboutMarxism?Marxismprovidesdistinctive normative insights (Doyle 1997),butitsnon-

teleologicalpositiveassumptions-the ofdomesticeconomicinterests,
centrality theimportance oftrans-
nationalinterdependence, thestateas a representativeof dominant social forces-are quitecompatible
withthisrestatement ofliberalism.Forexamples,see thecontribution byFriedenandRogowskiin Keo-
haneandMilner1996.
24. Waltz1979,60-67,93-97.
25. The resulting "autonomy ofthepolitical"in geopoliticsgivesrealismits "distinctiveintellectual
and moralattitude";see Morgenthau 1960,5-7. The factthatMorgenthau distinguishednonrealist
ele-
mentsofhis ownthought a further
illustrates dangerof defining realismnotin termsof social scientific
assumptions, butin termsof its intellectual
history,thatis, assumingthateverything a "realist"wrote
constitutes
a coherent realisttheory;see Morgenthau 1960,5, 227.
26. WaltzfollowsMorgenthau almostverbatim:"Neo-realismestablishestheautonomyof interna-
tionalpoliticsand thusmakesa theoryaboutit possible"; see Waltz1979,29, and also 65-66, 79, 90,
108-12,196-98,271.
27. See Keohane1984,6; andHellmannandWolf1993.
28. Powell 1994,318.
29. Ruggie1983,107-10.
Politics 523
forexample,social demandsare derivednot simplyfrom"domestic"economic

assetsand endowments, butfromtherelativepositionof thoseassetsand endow-
mentsinglobalmarkets.Similarly, valuesina transnational
thepositionofparticular
culturaldiscoursemayhelp definetheirmeaningin each society.In thisregard,
liberalismdoes notdrawa strictlinebetweendomesticand transnational levelsof
analysis.30
A secondandmoreWaltzianreasonwhythechargeof "reductionism" is errone-
ous is thataccordingto liberaltheory theexpectedbehaviorofanysinglestate-the
strategiesitselectsandthesystemic constraintsto whichitadjusts-reflect notsim-
plyitsownpreferences, buttheconfiguration of preferencesofall stateslinkedby
patterns of significantpolicyinterdependence. Nationalleadersmustalwaysthink
systemically abouttheirpositionwithina structure composedof thepreferences of
otherstates.Sincethepattern of andinterdependence amongstatepreferences, like
thedistribution of capabilitiesand thedistribution of information and ideas, lies
outsidethecontrolof anysinglestate,itconforms toWaltz'sowndefinition of sys-
temictheory, wherebyinterstate interactionsare explainedby reference to "how
[states]standin relationto one another."'31Hence thecausal preeminence of state
preferences does notimplythatstatesalwaysgetwhattheywant.
One implication ofliberalism's systemic,structuralqualityis that,contraWaltz,it
can explainnotonlythe "foreignpolicy"goals of individualstatesbutthe "sys-
temic"outcomesofinterstate Thatsystemic
interactions. predictionscanfollowfrom
domestictheoriesof preferences shouldbe obvioussimplybyinspecting thelitera-
tureon thedemocratic peace.32In addition,bylinkingsocialpurposeto thesymme-
tryandrelativeintensity of statepreferences, liberalism offersa distinctiveconcep-
tionofpoliticalpowerin worldpolitics-something traditionallyconsidered unique
torealisttheory.
The liberalconception ofpoweris based on an assumption moreconsistent with
basic theoriesofbargaining andnegotiation thanthoseunderlying realism:namely
thatthewillingness ofstatestoexpendresources ormakeconcessionsis itselfprimar-
ilya function ofpreferences, notcapabilities.In thisview-the foundation of Nash
bargaining analysis,whichhas beenextendedto IR byAlbertHirshman, Keohane,
JosephNye,and others-bargaining outcomesreflect thenatureandrelativeinten-
sityofactorpreferences.33 The "win-set,"the"bestalternative to negotiated agree-
ment,"thepattern of "asymmetrical interdependence," therelativeopportunity cost
offorgoing an agreement-allthesecoretermsinnegotiation analysisrefer todiffer-
entaspectsoftherelationship ofbargainingoutcomeson thepreference functions of
theactors.The capability-based powertothreaten centraltorealismenterstheequa-
tioninspecificcircumstances andonlythrough linkagetothreats andside-payments.
Even wherecapability-based threatsand promisesare employed,preference-based
determinants ofthetolerance forbearingbargaining costs,including differential
tem-
30. 1976.
Forexample,see Gourevitch
31. Ruggie1983,90-91.
32. see Elman1996,especially58-59.
Fora moregeneralargument,
33. See Harsanyi1977;Hirshman1945;andKeohaneandNye 1987,733.
Organization
524 International
poraldiscountrates,risk-acceptance, andwillingness to acceptpunishment, remain

central.34
The liberalclaimthatthepattern ofinterdependence amongstatepreferences is a
primary determinant notjust of individualforeignpolicies,but of systemicout-
comes,is commonsensical. Nationsare rarelypreparedto expendtheirentireeco-
nomicor defensecapabilities, or to mortgage theirentiredomesticsovereignty, in
pursuit of anysingleforeign policygoal. Few warsaretotal,fewpeaces Carthagin-
ian.Treating thewillingnessofstatestoexpendresources inpursuitofforeign policy
goals as a strict ofexistingcapabilitiesthusseemsunrealistic.
function On themar-
gin,thebindingconstraint is insteadgenerally"resolve"or "determination"-the
willingness ofgovernmentstomobilizeandexpendsocialresources forforeignpolicy
purposes.
Extensiveempiricalevidencesupportsthisassumption. Even in "least likely"
cases,wherepoliticalindependence andterritorial areat stakeandmilitary
integrity
meansaredeployed,relativecapabilitiesdo notnecessarily determine outcomes.A
"strongpreference fortheissueat stakecan compensate fora deficiencyincapabili-
ties,"as demonstratedbyexamplesliketheBoerWar,Hitler'sremilitarization ofthe
Rhineland, Vietnam,Afghanistan, andChechnya.In each case therelativeintensity
of statepreferencesreshapedtheoutcometo theadvantageof the"weak."35Such
examplessuggestthattheliberalviewofpowerpolitics,properly understood, gener-
atesplausibleexplanations notjustofharmony andcooperation amongnations,but
ofthefullrangeofphenomena centralto thestudyofworldpolitics,frompeaceful
economicexchangetobrutalguerrilla warfare.
Variants of Liberal Theory
Like theirrealistandinstitutionalist
counterparts,thethreecoreliberalassumptions
introduced earlierare relatively
thinor content-free.Takenby themselves, theydo
notdefinea singleunambiguous modelor setofhypotheses, notleastbecausethey
do notspecifyprecisesourcesof statepreferences. Insteadtheysupport threesepa-
ratevariantsof liberaltheory, termedhereideational,commercial, and republican
liberalism.Each restson a distinctive ofthecentralelementsofliberal
specification
theory:social demands,thecausal mechanisms wherebytheyare transformed into
statepreferences, andtheresulting patternsofnationalpreferences inworldpolitics.
Ideationalliberalismfocusesonthecompatibility ofsocialpreferences acrossfunda-
mentalcollectivegoodslikenationalunity, andsocio-
politicalinstitutions,
legitimate
economicregulation. Commercial liberalismfocuseson incentivescreatedbyoppor-
fortransborder
tunities economictransactions. Republicanliberalism focuseson the
natureofdomesticrepresentation andtheresulting forrent-seeking
possibilities be-
havior.
andPutnam1993;andKeohaneandNye 1977.
34. See Raiffa1982;Sebenius1991;Evans,Jacobson,
35. See Morrow1988,83-84; andMack 1975.
Politics 525
Social Order
and Legitimate
IdeationalLiberalism:Identity
Drawingon a liberaltradition datingback to JohnStuartMill, GiuseppeMazzini,
andWoodrowWilson,ideationalliberalism viewstheconfiguration ofdomesticso-
cial identitiesand values as a basicdeterminant ofstate preferencesand, therefore, of
interstateconflict andcooperation. "Social identity" is definedas thesetof prefer-
encessharedbyindividuals concerning theproperscopeandnatureofpublicgoods
provision, whichinturnspecifiesthenatureoflegitimate domesticorderbystipulat-
ingwhichsocialactorsbelongtothepolityandwhatis owedthem.36 Liberalstakeno
distinctivepositionon theoriginsofsocialidentities, whichmayresultfromhistori-
cal accretionor be constructed through consciouscollectiveor stateaction,noron
thequestionofwhether theyultimately reflect ideationalormaterial factors.37
Threeessentialelements ofdomesticpublicorderoftenshapedbysocialidentities
are geographical borders,politicaldecision-making processes,and socioeconomic
regulation. Each canbe thought ofas a publicorclubgood;theeffectiveness ofeach
typically requiresthatitbe legislateduniversally Recall that
acrossa jurisdiction.38
forliberals,eventhedefenseof (or,less obviousbutno less common,thewilling
compromise integrity,
of) territorial politicalsovereignty, or nationalsecurity is not
an endin itself,buta meansof realizingunderlying preferences definedby thede-
mandsof societalgroups.Accordingto assumption 2, social actorsprovidesupport
to thegovernment in exchangeforinstitutions thataccordwiththeiridentity-based
preferences; suchinstitutions arethereby"legitimate." Foreignpolicywillthusbe
motivated inpartbyan effort torealizesocialviewsaboutlegitimate borders, politi-
cal institutions,andmodesofsocioeconomic regulation.
The consequencesof identity-based preferences forIR depend,accordingto as-
sumption 3, on thenatureoftransnational externalities createdbyattempts torealize
them.Wherenationalconceptionsof legitimate borders,politicalinstitutions, and
socioeconomic equalityarecompatible, thusgenerating positiveornegligibleexter-
nalities,harmony is likely.Wherenationalclaimscan be mademorecompatible by
reciprocalpolicyadjustment, cooperation is likely.39Wheresocial identities arein-
compatibleand createsignificant negativeexternalities, tensionand zero-sumcon-
flictis morelikely.Parallelpredictions aboutinternational politicsfollowfromeach
ofthethreeessentialsourcesofideationalpreferences: national,political,andsocio-
economicidentity.40 Letus briefly considereach.
36. Thisconceptis similarbutnarrowerthanRuggie's"legitimate socialpurpose"and Katzenstein's

see Ruggie1983;Katzenstein
"collectiveidentity"; 1996a,6.
37. Hereis a pointoftangency work;see Katzenstein
withrecentconstructivist 1996a,5; Finnemore
1996,27-28; andWendt1996,7.Whether thefiundamental areideationalis
sourcesofsocietalpreferences
thefocusofa debateamonggeneralsocialtheorists forwhichIR theorists compara-
lackanydistinctive
tiveadvantage.
38. Fearon1995.
39. Oye 1986.
40. Liberaltheoryneednotand in generaldoes notclaimthatsharedidentities emergefromchance
interactionsamong"atomistic"individuals, mustreflect"timeless"factorslikelan-
or thatnationality
orethnicity.
guage,religion, needonlybe translated
Identities through
intopoliticalpreferences individual
andgroupcommitments; compareFinnemore 1996,147.
Organization
526 International
The first
fundamental typeof socialidentity centralto thedomesticlegitimacy of
foreign policycomprisesthesetoffundamental societalpreferences concerning the
scopeofthe"nation, " whichin turnsuggestthelegitimate locationofnationalbor-
dersand theallocationofcitizenship rights.Therootsofnationalidentity mayreflect
a sharedsetoflinguistic, orreligiousidentifications
cultural, ora sharedsetofhistori-
cal experiences-often interpretedandencouraged bybothprivategroupsand state
policy.In explainingconflict andcooperation overbordersand citizenship, realism
stressestheroleof relativepower,and institutionalism stressestherole of shared
legalnorms,whereasideationalliberalism stressestheextentto whichborderscoin-
cidewiththenationalidentities ofpowerful socialgroups.41 Whereborderscoincide
withunderlying patterns of identity,coexistenceand even mutualrecognition are
morelikely.Where,however,inconsistencies betweenbordersand underlying pat-
ternsofidentityexist,greater potential forinterstateconflictexists.In suchcircum-
stances,somesocialactorsandgovernments arelikelyto havean interest in uniting
nationalsin appropriate jurisdictions,perhapsthrough armedaggressionor seces-
sion;othergovernments mayintervene to promoteor hindersuchefforts.
militarily
Morethantwenty yearsbeforeconflict reemerged in theformer Yugoslavia,Myron
Weinertermedtheresulting disruptive international behavior-a recurrent complex
of aggression,exacerbation of nationalistideologies,offensive allianceformation,
andriskacceptanceinforeign policy-the "Macedoniansyndrome."42
Strongempirical evidencesupports theproposition thatdisjunctures betweenbor-
dersandidentities areimportant determinants ofinternational conflict andcoopera-
tion.In earlymodernEurope,interstate conflictreflected in partthecompetition
betweentwocommunalreligiousidentities-eachof which,at leastuntildomestic
andinternationalnormsoftolerancespread,was perceivedas a threat to theother.43
Overthelastcentury anda half,frommid-nineteenth-century nationalistuprisings to
late-twentieth-centurynationalliberationstruggles, thedesirefornationalautonomy
constitutesthemostcommonissue overwhichwarshave been foughtand great
powerintervention has takenplace; theBalkanconflicts preceding WorldWarI and
succeedingtheCold Warare onlythemostnotorious examples.44 The post-World
WarII peace inWestern Europeandthereintegration ofGermany intoEuropewere
assistedbythereestablishment ofbordersalongethniclinesin theSaar andAlsace-
Lorraine,as well as muchof EasternEurope.Even leadingrealistsnowconcede-
thoughit in no way followsfromrealistpremises-thatdisputesbetween"inter-
mingledor dividednationalities" are themostprobablecatalystforwarin Eastern
Europeandtheformer SovietUnion.45
41. See Jackson1990;andGilpin1989.

42. See Weiner1971;andPillar1983,24-26.
43. Philpott1996.
44. Holsti1991.Eventhosewhostresstheabsenceofcrediblecommitment mechanismsinexplaining
nationalistconflictsconcedetheimportance ofunderlying see Fearon1996,56.
identities;
45. To be sure,Mearsheimer heroicallyassertsthatnationalismis a "second-order
forcein interna-
tionalpolitics,"witha "largely... international"
cause,namelymultipolarity;see Mearsheimer
1990,21.
This is testable:Is violentnationalism problemin Centraland EasternEurope
moreof an international
thaninWestern Europe,as liberalismpredicts,oran equalprobleminbothareas,as realismpredicts?
Politics 527
A secondfundamental typeofsocialidentity central toforeign policymaking is the

commitment of individualsand groupsto particularpoliticalinstitutions. Realism
accordstheoretical weightto domesticregimetypeonlyinsofaras it influences the
distribution institutionalism
of capabilities, onlyinsofaras it contributes to thecer-
tainty ofcoordination andcommitment. Ideationalliberalism,bycontrast, maintains
thatdifferences inperceptions ofdomesticpoliticallegitimacy translateintopatterns
of underlying preferences and thusvariationin international conflictand coopera-
tion.Wheretherealization oflegitimate domesticpoliticalorderin onejurisdiction
threatens its realizationin others,a situationof negativeexternalities, conflictis
morelikely.Wheretherealizationof nationalconceptionsof legitimate decision
makingreinforce orcanbe adjustedtoreinforce oneanother, coexistence orcoopera-
tionis morelikely.46
Plausibleexamplesabound.Thucydides accordsan important roleto conflict be-
tweenoligarchsanddemocrats in allianceformation duringthePeloponnesian War.
In theseventeenth andeighteenth centuries,absolutist kingsfought to establishdy-
nasticclaimsand religiousrule;in thenineteenth century, theycooperatedto pre-
servemonarchical ruleagainstsocietalpressures forreform.47 The twentieth century
has witnesseda struggle betweengovernments backingfascist,communist, andlib-
eral ideologies,as well as morerecently a resurgence of religiousclaimsand the
emergence of a groupofdevelopedcountries thatsharedemocratic normsoflegiti-
matedisputeresolution-aplausibleexplanation forthe"democratic peace"phenom-
enon.48A morecomplexpattern, consistent withtheprecedingassumptions, may
emergewhenindividualdomesticactors-mostoftennationalexecutives-exploit
thelegitimacy of particular internationalpoliciesas a "two-level"instrument to
increasetheirinfluence overthedomesticpolity.Thisis a constant themein modern
worldpolitics,fromBismarck'smanipulation of domesticcoalitionsto thecurrent
use ofmonetary bytoday'sEuropeanleadersto "strengthen
integration thestate"at
home.49
A third fundamental typeofsocialidentity central toforeign policyis thenatureof
legitimate socioeconomicregulation and redistribution.Modernliberaltheory(as
opposedto thelaissezfairelibertarianism sometimes invokedby criticsas quintes-
sentially"liberal")has longrecognizedthatsocietalpreferences concerning thena-
tureand level of regulation imposelegitimate limitson markets.50 In a Polanyian
vein,Ruggierecently reminds us thatdomesticandinternational markets areembed-
dedinlocalsocialcompromises concerning theprovision ofregulatory publicgoods.51
Suchcompromises underlie varying nationalregulations on immigration, socialwel-
fare,taxation,religiousfreedom,families,healthand safety,environmental and
46. Governments mayactuallyhavealtruistic

preferences(see Lumsdaine1993)ormayseektocreate
environment
an international ofdomesticvalues(see Moravcsik1995).
conducivetotherealization
47. See Nolt1990;andBarkinandCronin1994.
48. Russett1993,30-38.
49. See Evans,Jacobson,andPutnam1994;Wehler1985;andMoravcsik1994.
50. Holmes1995.
51. Ruggie1992.
Organization
528 International
consumer protection,culturalpromotion, andmanyotherpublicgoodsincreasingly

discussedininternational economic negotiations.
In theliberalview,statepreferences concerning legitimatesocioeconomicprac-
ticesshapeinterstate behavior when their
realization imposes transborder
significant
Evidence
externalities. from the European Community (EC) suggeststhatsubstantial
priorconvergence ofunderlying valuesis a necessary forcooperation
prerequisite in
regulatory issue areas like environmental and consumer protection,many tax and
socialpolicies,immigration, andforeign policy,as wellas forsignificantsurrenders
ofsovereign decision making to supranationalcourts and Regulatory
bureaucracies.
pluralismlimitsinternational cooperation,in particulareconomicliberalization.
and
Courts,executives, parliaments mutually recognize"legitimate differences"of
in
policy foreign jurisdictions.52 Concerns about the proper balancebetween policy
coordination and legitimate domesticregulation are givingriseto evenmorecom-
plex formsof cooperation. Hence regulatory issuesplayan increasingly important
rolein internationaleconomicnegotiations suchas the1992initiative oftheEC, the
UruguayRoundofGATT,NAFTA,andtheU.S.-JapanStructural Impediments Ini-
tiative.53
CommercialLiberalism:EconomicAssetsand
Transactions
Cross-Border
Commercial liberalismexplainstheindividual andcollectivebehaviorofstatesbased
on thepatterns of marketincentivesfacingdomesticand transnational economic
actors.At its simplest,thecommercialliberalargument is broadlyfunctionalist:
Changesin thestructure of thedomesticand global economyalterthecostsand
benefits oftransnationaleconomicexchange,creating pressureon domesticgovern-
mentsto facilitate or blocksuchexchangesthrough foreigneconomic
appropriate
andsecurity policies.
It is tempting, forcritics,to associatecommercial
particularly liberaltheory with
ideologicalsupportforfreetrade.Yet as theoryratherthanideology,commercial
liberalism does notpredictthateconomicincentives automaticallygenerateuniver-
sal freetradeandpeace-a utopianpositioncriticswhotreatliberalism as an ideol-
ogyoftenwrongly toit-but insteadstressestheinteraction
attribute betweenaggre-
gateincentives policiesandobstaclesposedbydomesticandtransnational
forcertain
distributional The greatertheeconomicbenefits
conflict.54 forpowerful privateac-
tors,thegreatertheirincentive, otherthingsbeingequal, to pressgovernments to
facilitate suchtransactions; themorecostlytheadjustment imposedby economic
interchange, themoreopposition is likelyto arise.Ratherthanassumingthatmarket
structure alwayscreatesincentives forcooperation amongsocial actorsas well as
states,orfocusingexclusively on thoseissueareaswhereitdoes,as do someliberal
52. Burley1992.
53. Ruggie1995.
54. CompareGilpin1975,27.
Politics 529
ideologies,liberalIR theory focuseson market structureas a variablecreating incen-

tivesforbothopennessandclosure.
Accordingly, manycommercial liberalanalysesstartwithaggregate welfaregains
fromtraderesulting fromspecialization and functional differentiation,thenseekto
explaindivergences fromforeigneconomicand security policiesthatwouldmaxi-
mize thosegains.To explaintherejection of aggregate gains, commercial liberals
fromAdamSmithto contemporary "endogenous"tariff theorists look to domestic
and international distributional conflicts.The resulting commercial liberalexplana-
tionofrelative-gains seekinginforeign economicpolicyis quitedistinct fromthatof
realism,whichemphasizessecurity externalitiesandrelative(hegemonic)power,or
thatofinstitutionalism, whichstressesinformational andinstitutional constraints on
collectiveaction.55
interstate
One sourceof pressureforprotection is domesticdistributional conflict, which
ariseswhenthecostsandbenefits ofnationalpoliciesarenotinternalized tothesame
actors,thusencouraging rent-seeking effortsto seekpersonalbenefit at theexpense
of aggregatewelfare.In thisview,uncompetitive, monopolistic, or undiversified
sectorsorfactors lose themostfromliberalization andhavean incentive toopposeit,
inducinga systematic divergence fromlaissezfairepolicies.Smithhimself reminds
us that"thecontrivers of [mercantilism are]theproducers, whoseinterest has been
so carefully attended to ... ourmerchants and manufacturers"-a viewechoedby
manyliberalssince.56 Recentresearchsupports theviewthatprotectionist pressure
fromrent-seeking groupsis mostintensepreciselywheredistributional concernsof
concentrated groupsarestrongest, forexample,whenindustries areuncompetitive or
irreversibleinvestments (assetspecificity) imposehighadjustment costson concen-
tratedinterests. Free tradeis morelikelywherestrongcompetitiveness, extensive
intra-industry trade,or tradein intermediate goods,largeforeigninvestments, and
low assetspecificity internalize thenetbenefits offreetradetopowerful actors,thus
reducing theinfluence ofnetlosersfromliberalization.57
The distributional consequencesof globalmarketimperfections createa second
sortofdisjuncture betweentheaggregate benefits ofeconomicinterdependence and
nationalpolicies.Moderntradetheoryidentifies incentivesforstrategic behavior
whereincreasing returns toscale,highfixedcosts,surpluscapacity, orhighlyconcen-
tratedsourcesofsupplyrender international markets imperfectly competitive. Firms
hopingto create(or breakinto)a globaloligopolyor monopoly, forexample,may
have an incentiveto engagein predatory dumpingabroadwhileseekingdomestic
protectionand subsidization at home,eventhoughthisimposescostson domestic
consumers andforeign producers. Suchpoliciescan createsubstantial international
sincegovernment
conflict, interventionto assistfirms can improvewelfareforsoci-
etyas a whole,thoughusuallynotforall societiesinvolved.58
55. Grieco1988;Gowa 1989;andKeohane1984.

56. EkelundandTollison1981,25.
57. Milner1988.
58. KeohaneandMilner1996.39.
Organization
530 International
Commercial liberalism hasimportant implicationsforsecurity as well.Trade

affairs
is generallya less costlymeansofaccumulating wealththanwar,sanctions, orother
coercivemeans,notleastdue to theminimization ofcollateraldamage.Yetgovern-
mentssometimes havean incentive to employcoercivemeansto createandcontrol
internationalmarkets. To explainthisvariation, domesticdistributional issuesand
thestructure ofglobalmarkets areagaincritical.Commercial liberalsarguethatthe
morediversified andcomplextheexisting transnational commercial tiesandproduc-
tionstructures, theless cost-effectivecoercionis likelyto be.59Cost-effective coer-
cionwas mostprofitable inanerawherethemainsourcesofeconomicprofit, suchas
farmland, slavelabor,rawmaterials, orformalmonopoly, couldbe easilycontrolled
inconqueredorcolonialeconomies.Yeteconomicdevelopment tendstoincreasethe
materialstakeofsocialactorsinexisting investments,thereby reducing theirwilling-
nessto assumethecostandriskofcoercionthrough waror sanctions.60 As produc-
tionbecomesmorespecializedandefficient andtrading networks morediverseand
complex,politicalextraction (forexample,warandembargoes) becomemoredisrup-
tive,andprofitable monopoliesovercommercial opportunities becomemoredifficult
toestablish.Bothcross-cultural anthropologicalevidenceandmoderncross-national
evidencelinkwarfareto theexistenceof monopolizableresources;overthepast
century,ithasremained themajordeterminant ofboundary disputes.61Yettheadvent
of modernindustrial networks, thosebased on postindustrial
particularly informa-
tionalexchange,has increasedtheopportunity costsofcoercivetacticsranging from
militaryaggression tocoercivenationalization.62
and RentSeeking
RepublicanLiberalism:Representation
Whileideationalandcommercial liberaltheory, stressdemandsresult-
respectively,
ing from patterns
particular ofunderlying societal and
identities economicinterests,
republicanliberaltheoryemphasizesthewaysin whichdomesticinstitutions and
practicesaggregatethosedemands,transforming themintostatepolicy.The key
variablein republicanliberalismis themode of domesticpoliticalrepresentation,
whichdetermines whosesocialpreferences areinstitutionally Whenpo-
privileged.
groups,theytendto "cap-
is biasedin favorof particularistic
liticalrepresentation
ture"government institutionsandemploythemfortheirendsalone,systematically
passingon thecostsandrisksto others.The precisepolicyofgovernments depends
on whichdomesticgroupsarerepresented. The simplestresulting is that
prediction
policyis biasedinfavorofthegoverning coalitionorpowerful domesticgroups.
A moresophisticated extensionof thisreasoningfocuseson rentseeking.When
groupsareable to formulate
particularistic policywithoutnecessarilyproviding off-
setting gainsforsocietyas a whole,theresultis likelyto be inefficient,
suboptimal
59. VanEvera1990.
60. Realisttheory,withitsassumptions stateandfixedpreferences,
ofa unitary simplypresumesthat
thegreater costofdeploying
thewealthandpowerofa state,theless themarginal power
it,thusreducing
Liberaltheory
tocapabilities. suggestsdifferent The twoaretestable.
predictions.
61. See Huth1996;andKeeley1996.
62. See VanEvera1990,14-16,28-29; andKaysen1990,53.
Politics 531
policiesfromtheaggregate perspective-oneformofwhichmaybe costlyinterna-

tionalconflict.63 Whilemanyliberalarguments are concernedwiththeseizureof
stateinstitutionsbyadministrators (rulers,armies,andbureaucracies), similarargu-
mentsapplyto privileged societalgroupsthat"capture" the state, according to as-
sumption 2, orsimplyactindependently of it.If, following assumption 1, most indi-
vidualsandgroupsin society, while acquisitive, tend also to be risk-averse (at least
wheretheyhavesomething tolose),the more unbiased the range ofdomestic groups
represented, theless likelytheywill supportpoliciesthatimposehighnetcostsor
riskson a broadrangeof social actors.Thus aggressivebehavior-thevoluntary
recoursetocostlyorriskyforeign policy-is mostlikelyinundemocratic orinegali-
tarianpolitieswhere privileged individuals can easily pass costs on to others.64
Thisdoes not,ofcourse,implytheexistenceof a one-to-one correspondence be-
tweenthebreadth ofdomesticrepresentation and internationalpolitical or economic
cooperation, fortworeasons.First,in specificcases,elitepreferences maybe more
convergent thanpopular ones. If commercial or ideational preferences areconflict-
ual,forexamplewherehypernationalist ormercantilist preferences prevail, a broad-
of
ening representation may have the opposite effect-a point to which I willreturn.
Elites,such as thoseleaders that constructed the Concert ofEurope or similararrange-
mentsamongAfrican leaderstoday,havebeenattributed totheirconvergent interests
in maintaining themselves in office.Second,theextentofbias in representation, not
democratic participationperse, is thetheoretically criticalpoint.Directrepresenta-
tionmayoverrepresent concentrated, organized, short-term, or otherwise arbitrarily
salientinterests.Predictable conditions existunderwhichgoverning elitesmayhave
an incentiveto represent long-term social preferences moreunbiasedlythandoes
broadopinion.65
Despitethesepotential complexities and caveats,republican liberalismnonethe-
less generates parsimonious predictions whereconflictual policiesimposeextremely
highcostsandriskson themajority ofindividuals in domesticsociety.Withrespect
to extremebuthistorically commonpolicieslike war,famine,and radicalautarky,
fairrepresentation tendsto inhibit international conflict.In thisway,republican lib-
eraltheory has helpedto explainphenomena as diverseas the"democratic peace,"
modernanti-imperialism, and international tradeand monetary cooperation. Given
theprimafacieplausibility of theassumption thatmajorwarimposesnetcostson
societyas a whole,itis notsurprising thattheprominent republican liberalargument
concernsthe "democratic peace," whichone scholarhas termed"as close as any-
thingwe havetoa law ininternational relations"-onethatappliestotribalsocieties
as wellas tomodernstates.66 Liberaldemocratic institutionstendnottoprovokesuch
warsbecauseinfluence is placedin thehandsof thosewhomustexpendblood and
treasureandtheleaderstheychoose.67
63. EkelundandTollison1981.
64. MilgromandRoberts1990.
65. See KeohaneandMilner1996,52-53; andWooley1992.
66. Levy 1988,662.
67. 1987.
By analogytoHirshleifer
Organization
532 International
Oftenoverlookedis thetheoretical corollary of "democratic peace" theory: a re-

publicanliberaltheoryof war thatstressesabnormally risk-acceptant leadersand
rent-seeking coalitions.Substantialevidenceshowsthattheaggressorswho have
provokedmodemgreatpowerwarstendeithertobe risk-acceptant individuals inthe
extreme orindividuals wellabletoinsulatethemselves fromthecostsofwarorboth.
Most leadersinitiating twentieth-century greatpowerwarslostthem;AdolfHitler
and Saddam Hussein,forexample,initiatedconflictsagainstcoalitionsfarmore
powerfulthantheirown.68In the same vein,JackSnyderhas recentlydeepened
Hobson'sclassicrent-seeking analysisofimperialism-whereby themilitary, uncom-
petitiveforeigninvestors andtraders,jingoisticpoliticalelites,andotherswhoben-
efitfromimperialism are particularly well-placedto influence policy-by linking
unrepresentative andextreme outcomestologrolling coalitions.Consistent withthis
analysis,thehighlyunrepresentative consequencesofpartialdemocratization, com-
binedwiththedisruption ofrapidindustrialization andincomplete politicalsocializa-
tion,suggestthatdemocratizing states,ifsubjecttotheseinfluences, maybe particu-
larlywarprone.Such findings maychallengesomevariantsof liberalideologybut
areconsistent withliberaltheory.69
The linkbetweengreat-power military aggressionand small-group interests in
nonrepresentative statesimpliesneitherunceasingbelligerenceby autocraticre-
gimesnorunquestioning pacifismby democratic ones. Enlightened despotismor
democratic aggression remainspossible.The morepreciseliberalprediction is thus
thatdespoticpower,boundedbyneither law norrepresentative institutions, tendsto
be wieldedin a morearbitrary manner bya widerrangeofindividuals, leadingboth
to a widerrangeofexpectedoutcomesanda moreconflictual average.Nonetheless,
liberaltheorypredictsthatdemocratic statesmayprovokepreventive warsin re-
sponseto director indirectthreats, againstveryweak stateswithno greatpower
allies,orinperipheral areaswherethelegalandpoliticalpreconditions fortradeand
otherformsofprofitable transnational relations arenotyetinplace.70
Scholarsalso oftenoverlookpreciseanalogstothe"democratic peace" inmatters
ofpoliticaleconomy. The liberalexplanation forthepersistence ofilliberalcommer-
cialpolicies,suchas protection,monetary andsectoralsubsidization,
instability, where
suchpoliciesmanifestly undermine thegeneralwelfareofthepopulation, is pressure
frompowerful domesticgroups.71 Thusin theliberalviewthecreationandmainte-
nanceofregimesassuringfreetradeandmonetary stabilityresultnotprimarily from
commonthreats tonationalsecurity orappropriate internationalinstitutions, butfrom
theabilityofstatestoovercomedomesticdistributional conflicts ina waysupportive
of internationalcooperation. This mayultimately reflecttheeconomicbenefits of
doingso, as commercial liberaltheorysuggests, butitcan also be decisivelyhelped
or hinderedby biases in representative Wheresuchbiases favorshel-
institutions.
teredgroups,and substantial misrepresentation of thistypeis seen as endemicto
68. See Kaysen1990,59; andMueller1991,23-44.

69. andSnyder1995;Snyder1991;andVanEvera1990,18,20.
See Mansfield
70. Hopkins1980.
71. see KeohaneandMilner1996.
Foran overview,
Politics 533
mostcontemporary rent-seeking
institutions,
representative groupsarelikelyto gain
through
protection tariffs, devalua-
or competitive
subsidies,favorableregulation,
tion.Wherepolicymakers areinsulatedfromsuchpressures, whichmayinvolveless
democraticbutmorerepresentative or wherefreetradeinterests
institutions, domi-
natepolicy,openpoliciesaremoreviable.72
BroaderImplicationsofLiberal Theory
Do labelsmatter? I haveexploredthreevariantsofliberaltheory thatsharea setof

assumptions. Whatis gainedby subsuming themundera singlerubric, as proposed
here?
To demonstrate itsutility
forempirical researchandtheoretical inquiry,a paradig-
maticrestatement suchas thismustmeetfourcriteria. First,itsassumptions should
highlight unexplored conceptual connectionsamongpreviously unrelatedliberal hy-
potheses.Second,itshouldclearlydefineitsownconceptual boundaries in a manner
conforming to fundamental in thiscase clearlydistinguishing
social theory, liberal
hypotheses fromideologicallyor historically relatedhypotheses based on different
social scientific
assumptions. Third,it shouldrevealanomaliesin previoustheories
andmethodological weaknessesinprevioustesting, newpresumptions
creating about
thepropertheoriesand methods that structureempiricalresearch. Fourth, it should
definehowthetheory in questioncan be combinedrigorously ratherthanrandomly
withothertheories toformcoherent multicausalexplanations.
and Coherence
Liberalismas a GeneralTheory:Parsimony
One advantageof thisrestatement is thatit suggestsa theoryof worldpoliticsthat
parsimoniously connectsa widerangeofdistinctive andpreviously unrelated
hypoth-
eses concerning areas unexplainedby existingtheories.These hypotheses are not
limitedto cooperation amongliberalstates,butsubsumeliberalandnonliberal poli-
ties,conflictualand cooperativesituations, securityand politicaleconomyissues,
and bothindividualforeignpolicyand aggregatebehavior.Its keycausal mecha-
nismscan be generalizedto manyissue areas.Thus liberaltheorychallengesthe
conventional presumption thatrealismis themostencompassing andparsimonious
ofmajorIR theories. Although areeasyto specify,
notall liberaltheories hypotheses
aboutendogenoustariff thedemocratic
setting, conflict
peace,and nationalist sug-
gestthatliberalism generatesmanyempiricalarguments as powerful,
parsimonious,
as thoseofrealism.73
and "efficient"
Notonlydoes liberaltheory applyacrossa widedomainofcircumstances, butits
threevariants-ideational,commercial, andrepublican taken
liberalism-arestronger
and Lange and by Haggardand

by Garrett
72. See Wooley1992; Bailey et al. 1997; contributions
Maxfieldin KeohaneandMilner1996;andMoravcsik1994.
73. On theefficiency see King,Keohane,andVerba1994,182-87.
criterion,
Organization
534 International
together thanseparately. Not onlydo theyshareassumptions and causal mecha-

nisms,buttheirempiricalimplications aggregatein interesting ways.It is widely
accepted,forexample,thateconomicdevelopment has a stronginfluence on the
viabilityofdemocratic governance, withitspacificimplications; liberaldemocratic
governments tendin turnto support commerce, whichpromotes economicdevelop-
ment.74 KarlDeutsch,ErnstHaas, andNye,amongmanyothers, haveexploredhow
economicinteraction canlead totransnational communication andthedissemination
information,
ofscientific whichmayinturnpromote secularizing cognitiveandideo-
logicalchange.75
Liberaltheoriescan be analytically reinforcingevenwheretheydo notmakepar-
Anomalieswithinone variantofliberaltheory
allelpredictions. maybe resolvedby
consideringothervariants.Positivemovementalong one liberal dimension-
patternsofnationalidentity, democratic ortransnational
participation, economictrans-
actions-maycondoneor exacerbatethenegativedistortions alonganotherliberal
dimension.76 NormanAngell,whosecommercial liberalclaimsareoftenparodiedby
secondhand maintained
critics, thathiswell-known "unprofitability ofwar"thesisin
no way implies"theimpossibility of war,"a doctrine he dismissedforrepublican
liberalreasonsas a "ridiculousmyth."77 Whererepresentative bias permitsrent-
seekinggroupsto controlpolicy,aggregateincentives forwelfare-improving trade
are likelyto have less effect.Indeed,recentstudiesrevealthatthecorrelation be-
tweeneconomicinterdependence and peace holdsonly(or moststrongly) among
Conversely,
liberalstates.78 wheredemocratization heightens socioeconomic inequal-
cleavages,unevenpatterns
ity,nationalist ofgains,andlossesduetointerdependence
orextreme heterogeneity ofinterests-asmayhaveoccurred in theformer Yugosla-
via-it mayexacerbateinternational economicandpoliticalconflict.79 Suchinterac-
tioneffectsamongliberalfactors offer a promising areaformoredetailedanalysis.
Liberaltheory also illuminates at leastthreemajorphenomena forwhichrealism
andinstitutionalism offer few,ifany,predictions-another indicator ofgreaterparsi-
mony.First,liberaltheory providesa plausibletheoretical explanation forvariation
in thesubstantive content offoreign policy.Neitherrealismnorinstitutionalism ex-
plainsthechangingsubstantive goals and purposesoverwhichstatesconflictand
cooperate;bothfocusinsteadon formalcauses,suchas relativepowerorissueden-
sity,andformalconsequences, suchas conflict andcooperation perse.80By contrast,
liberaltheory providesa plausibleexplanation notjustforconflict andcooperation,
74. Huntington 1991,46-72.

75. See Deutsch1954;Haas 1989;andNye 1988.
polemicagainstliberaltheories
76. Realistcriticstendtooverlookthis.Howard'sbrilliant ofwaroften
employsone liberaltheoryto debunkanother;forexample,theexistenceof nationalist irredentism is
evidenceagainsttheclaimthatgreatereconomicdevelopment and democratization lead to peace; see
Howard1986,98-99, 130-31;compareMansfield andSnyder1995.
77. Angell1933,53, 268-70.
78. Oneal 1996.
79. Fearon1996.
80. YetRuggieconcedestoomuchwhenhe observesthat"powermaypredicttheformoftheinterna-
butnotitscontent,"
tionalorder, becauseliberaltheorydoeshelppredictbargainingoutcomesandinstitu-
tionalform;see Ruggie1982,382.
Politics 535
butforthesubstantive contentof foreignpolicy.Major elementsof international

orderemphasized, butnotexplained, inrecentcriticisms ofrealismandinstitutional-
ismincludethedifference betweenAnglo-American, Nazi, and Sovietplansforthe
post-World WarII world;U.S. concernabouta fewNorthKorean,Iraqi,orChinese
nuclearweapons,ratherthanthegreaterarsenalsheldby GreatBritain,Israel,and
France;thesubstantial differencesbetweenthecompromise of "embeddedliberal-
ism" underlying Bretton Woodsand arrangements undertheGold Standard;diver-
gencesbetweeneconomiccooperationundertheEC and theCouncilforMutual
EconomicAssistance;and thegreaterprotectionism of theOrganization forEco-
nomicCooperation andDevelopment's agricultural policy,as comparedtoitsindus-
trialtradepolicy.81 LiberalIR theoryoffersplausible,parsimonious hypotheses to
explaineachofthesephenomena.82
Second,liberaltheory offersa plausibleexplanation forhistoricalchangein the
international system. The staticqualityof bothrealistand institutionalist theory-
theirlackofan explanation forfundamental long-term changeinthenatureofinter-
nationalpolitics-is a recognized weakness.In particular, globaleconomicdevelop-
mentoverthepastfivehundred yearshas beencloselyrelatedto greater percapita
wealth,democratization, educationsystemsthatreinforce newcollectiveidentities,
and greaterincentivesfortransborder economictransactions.83 Realisttheoryac-
cordsthesechangesno theoretical importance. Theorists likeWaltz,Gilpin,andPaul
Kennedylimitrealismtotheanalysisofunchanging patterns ofstatebehaviororthe
cyclicalriseanddeclineofgreatpowers.Liberaltheory, bycontrast, forgesa direct
causal linkbetweeneconomic,political,and social changeand statebehaviorin
worldpolitics.Hence,overthemodernperiodtheprinciples of international
order
havebeendecreasingly linkedtodynastic legitimacy andincreasingly tiedtofactors
directly drawnfromthethreevariantsof liberaltheory: nationalself-determination
andsocialcitizenship, theincreasing complexity ofeconomicintegration, andliberal
democratic governance.84
Third,liberaltheory offersa plausibleexplanation forthedistinctiveness ofmod-
erninternational politics.Amongadvancedindustrial democracies, a stableformof
interstatepoliticshasemerged, grounded inreliableexpectations ofpeacefulchange,
domesticruleoflaw,stableinternational institutions,andintensive societalinterac-
tion.This is theconditionDeutschtermsa "pluralisticsecurity community" and
KeohaneandNyeterm"complexinterdependence."85
Whereasrealists(and constructivists) offerno generalexplanation fortheemer-
genceofthisdistinctive modeofinternational politics,liberaltheory arguesthatthe
emergenceof a largeand expandingbloc of pacific,interdependent, normatively
satisfiedstateshas beena precondition forsuchpolitics.Consider,forexample,the
current stateofEurope.Unlikerealism,liberaltheory explainstheutterlackofcom-
81. See Ruggie1982;andWendt1994.

82. Moravcsik1992,forthcoming.
83. Huntington 1991.
84. See BarkinandCronin1994;andKeohaneandNye,1971.
85. See Deutsch1957;andKeohaneandNye 1977,chap.2.
Organization
536 International
petitiveallianceformation amongthe leadingdemocraticpowerstoday.For ex-

ample,theabsenceof seriousconflict amongWestern powersoverYugoslavia-the
"WorldWarI scenario"-reflects inlargeparta sharedperceptionthatthegeopoliti-
cal stakesamongdemocratic governments liberalism
arelow.Similarly, makesmore
sense of thesuddenreversalof East-Westrelations, a shiftmade possibleby the
widespread viewamongRussianofficials datareveal)thatGermany
(so interview is
ethnically democratic,
politically
satisfied, andcommercially inclined.86
TheConceptualLimitsofLiberalism:WhyFunctionalRegimeTheory
Is NotLiberal
A secondadvantageof thereformulation is to clarifythefundamental divergence
betweentheoriesof statepreferences andmoderntheoriesof international regimes.
This divergence helpsexplainwhyliberalshavefailedto identify a coherent setof
assumptions
socialscientific underlying existing"liberal"IR theory.
Thosewhochooseto defineliberaltheory in termsofitsintellectual historynatu-
rallyconflatethebeliefin institutions witha concernaboutthesocietalsourcesof
statepreferences.Liberalismas an ideologyandpartisanmovement has oftenbeen
associatedin thepopularmindwithadvocacyofinternational law andorganization,
despitetheviewsofmanyleadingliberals.87 Otherslinkthesetwoarguments ideo-
logically:Bothseemto suggestan optimistic, ameliorative trendin modernworld
politics.Whateverthereason,contemporary "functional"theoriesof international
regimesareoftenreferred to as formsof "neoliberalinstitutionalism," thoughit is
fairto notethatKeohane,originator of "functional regimetheory," has abandoned
theterm.DanielDeudneyandG. JohnIkenberry's attempted restatement ofliberal-
ismgoes furthest, assertingflatlythat"thepeace oftheWestdoes notderivesimply
or mainlyfromthefactthatitspolitiesareall democracies," butfrominternational
institutions.88
ImreLakatosremindsus, however,thatthecoherenceof scientific theoriesis
measurednotby theirconclusions, butby theconsistency of their"hard-core"as-
sumptions. By thisstandard, neoliberalinstitutionalisttheoryhas relativelylittlein
commonwithliberaltheory as elaboratedhere,becausemostoftheanalyticassump-
tionsandbasic causal variablesemployedbyinstitutionalist theoryaremorerealist
thanliberal.Like realism,institutionalism takesstatepreferences as fixedor exog-
enous,seeks to explainstatepolicyas a function of variationin thegeopolitical
environment-albeit forinstitutionalists
information andinstitutionsandforrealists
material capabilities-andfocuseson thewaysinwhichanarchy leadstosuboptimal
outcomes.
86. Wallander1993.
87. Nearlyall treatments combineinstitutionalist
of liberalIR theory strainsin
andpreference-based
thisway; see Doyle 1997; Keohane 1990; Russett1993; Matthewsand Zacher 1995, 133-37; Risse-
Kappen1996,365; andDeudney1995,191-228.Despitea seriousmisreading ofKant,theEnglishschool
whichdistinguishes
trichotomy, forexample,see Wight1991.
GrotiusfromKant,is moreconsistent;
88. DeudneyandIkenberry 1994.Fora liberalcritique,
see Moravcsik1996.
Politics 537
Liberalism, bycontrast, sharesnoneoftheseassumptions. It permits stateprefer-

ences to varywhileholdingpowerand information constant, explainspolicyas a
function of thesocietalcontext, andfocuseson howdomesticconflict, notinterna-
tionalanarchy, imposessuboptimal outcomes. Therefore,contemporary regimetheory
oughtmoreproperly to be termed"modifiedstructural realism"(as itwas initially)
or "institutionalism" (as some now prefer),ratherthan"neoliberalinstitutional-
ism."89Thisdivisionpermits us tospeakofa coherent setofsocialscientific assump-
tionsunderlying both.Ratherthantreatedas partsof thesametheoretical tradition,
thetwotheories shouldbe testedagainstone another orcarefully craftedintoexplic-
itlymulticausal explanations-options exploredin moredetailin thenexttwosec-
tions.
This is not to imply,however,thatliberaltheoryis of no utilityin analyzing
internationalregimes.To thecontrary, itcontributesto suchanalysisin at leasttwo
distinctiveways.First,liberaltheoryexplainswhenand whytheconfiguration of
statepreferences assumedbyinstitutionalists-a mixed-motive collectiveactionprob-
lem thatcan be overcomeby thecentralized manipulation of information through
commonrules-is likelyto emerge.Since,moreover, particular institutionalstruc-
turessolvespecificcollectiveactionproblems, theconfiguration ofpreferences per-
mitsus topredictdetailedcharacteristics ofinternationalregimes.90
Second,liberaltheorydeepensthe institutionalist accountof regimestability.
Realistsarguethatregimestability and expansionare functions of enduring hege-
monicpower;institutionalists maintainthatthehighinterstate transaction costsof
regimecreationor renegotiation explainregimestability, even if patterns of func-
tionalbenefits wouldrecommend renegotiation.Liberaltheorysuggestsan alterna-
tivehypothesis: namelythatinternational regimesarestablewhensocietalindividu-
als and groupsadjustso as to makedomesticpolicyreversal(or even stagnation)
costly-as neofunctionalist regionalintegration theoristshavelongargued.Thisac-
countis consistent withthetransaction costfoundations ofinstitutionalist reasoning
butgrounded in societal"lock in" effects and theresultingstability of stateprefer-
ences,notthecostsofinterstate bargaining, monitoring, andsanctioning. Such "so-
cial embeddedness" maytaketheformof fixedinvestments byprivatefirms, ideo-
logical commitments by politicalpartiesconcernedabouttheirreputation, costly
adaptation
institutional bydomestic bureaucracies,orgovernment investment inmili-
tarydefense.91
The liberalviewof regimesas "sociallyembedded"can be extendedto suggest
endogenouscauses of regimechangeovertime.International regimesthatinduce
greatersocietaldemandsforcooperation are morelikelyto deepenor expandover
time,whereasthosethatdo notare likelyto be fragile.One exampleis theliberal
accountof international law,whichsuggeststhatinternational rulesand normsare
mosteffectively implemented as "horizontalcommitments" enforcedby national
courtsand parliaments, not "verticalcommitments" enforced by supranational ac-
89. Keohane1985,1989.
90. Martin1993.
see Keohane1991.
adaptation,
91. On institutional
Organization
538 International
commitments
tors,andthatsuchhorizontal can generateself-sustaining
momentum
overtimebyempowering domesticgroups.92
particular
ofLiberalTheory:
Implications
Methodological
TheDangerofOmission
A thirdpotential advantageofreformulating a social scientific theoryis to increase
itssalience,thuscompelling empirical studiestogiveseriousconsideration tohypoth-
eses drawnfromitanddiscouraging omittedvariablebias.93Powerful liberalhypoth-
eses existto accountformanymajorphenomena in worldpolitics,yetsurprisingly
fewstudiesdirectly confront realistandinstitutionalist (orconstructivist) hypotheses
withtheirliberalcounterparts. Instead,empiricalstudiestendto treatrealism(or
occasionallyinstitutionalism or "rationalism") as an exclusivebaseline.Theresultis
notjust incompleteanalysis.It is omittedvariablebias thatinflatestheempirical
supportfornewtheoretical propositions due to theexclusionof (correlated) liberal
ones.Tworecentexamples-onerealist, oneconstructivist-demonstrate theconsid-
erableempiricalsignificance ofthisbias.94
examplecomesfromperhapsthemostprominent
The first debateinrecentrealist
theory-namely, thatsurrounding JosephGrieco's"relative-gains" critiqueofinsti-
tutionalism. Based on an analysisof theimplementation of nontariff barrier(NTB)
provisions negotiated intheTokyoRoundofGATT,Griecoseekstodemonstrate that
securityconcernsabout relativegains, not fears of futurecheating,motivate
noncooperation, evenin foreign economicpolicy.95 Yetin focusingon institutional-
ism, Grieco ignoresliberalexplanationsfornoncooperation based on domestic
institutions,ideas,and distributional conflictamongdomesticeconomicinterests.96
Subsequent interventions intherelative-gains debatebyformal theorists,whichhave
donemuchto clarifythestrategic conditionsunderwhichparticular strategies are
likelyto emerge,exacerbatethisneglectby seekingto makea virtueof omission.
EmersonNiou and PeterOrdeshooksee preferences as "tangential to a theoryof
international systems.. . . We can conductthisdiscussionwithoutreferences to
goals."97As a result,therelative-gains debatehas remainedextraordinarily narrow.
BothGriecoandthosehe criticizestreatnationalinterests as fixedand seekonlyto
determine whichexternalpoliticalconstraint-capabilities or information-consti-
tutestheprimary determinant ofstatebehavior.
Thisneglectofliberalhypotheses wouldbe ofonlyabstract significance haditnot
led all participantsin therelative-gains debateto overlooktheexplanation of non-
cooperation thatmostanalystsofinternational tradepolicy,nottomention nearlyall
whoactuallyconductnegotiations ofthiskind,considerdecisive-namely,pressure
92. See Slaughter1995;BurleyandMattli1993;andMoravcsik1995.

93. TetlockandBelkin1996,34.
94. King,Keohane,andVerba1994,168-82.
95. See Grieco1988,1990;andBaldwin1993.
96. Griecoconcedesthis;see Grieco1990,486-88 n.
97. See NiouandOrdeshook1994;Powell 1994,318; andSnidal1991.
Politics 539
fromparticularistic domesticgroupswithintensedistributional concerns.Liberal

preference-based explanationsdominate thespecializedeconomic,politicalscience,
andpolicyliterature ontrade,particularlyinprecisely thosethreeareaswhereGrieco
finds"relativegains":government procurement, industrialstandard-setting, andad-
ministrative protection. Yet Griecocodes thesethreecriticalcases of interstate bar-
gainingfailureas confirming his account,withoutconsidering alternativemotiva-
tionsnor,exceptinoneminorcase,providing anydirectevidenceofnationalsecurity
concerns. Studiesinotherareasthatdo testliberaltheories againstrealistalternatives
revealthatpressure fromeconomicspecialinterests tendsto dominatesecurity con-
cerns,evenin "leastlikely"cases likemilitary procurement.98 Since thereis good
reasonto suspectomittedvariablebias, our theoretical understanding of relative
gainsseekingwouldhavebeenfarmorereliable(butalso surelyfarless realist!)if
theinitialresearchdesignhadincludedliberalhypotheses.
A secondexampleofomitted variablebias is drawnfromrecentefforts todevelop
a constructivistapproachtoIR. Constructivism, though notyetformulated as a theory,
is a welcomeeffort to broadenIR debatesby focusingon ideationalsocialization.
Yet,likerealistclaimsaboutrelativegains,constructivist arguments are generally
employedso as toprevent confrontationwithpreexisting liberaltheory.Thetheoreti-
cal introduction to a recentcollectionof constructivist essays,The CultureofNa-
tionalSecurity, forexample,identifies "two majoranalyticalperspectives on IR":
Waltzianneorealismand the "neoliberal"regimetheoryof Keohaneand Robert
Axelrod.Withonlya fewexceptions, recentconstructivist workemploysthisdi-
chotomy, therefore neglectingliberaltheoriesfocusingon therelationship between
conflict anddemocratic government, economicinterdependence, anddomesticcoali-
tions-theoriesrecognizedas amongthemostpowerfulin contemporary security
studies.99
Thisis unfortunate. Therearegooda priorireasonstosuspectthatomitted variable
bias is inflatingtheempiricalsupportforanyconstructivist claimthatremainsun-
testedagainsta liberalhypothesis. Notonlydo bothliberaland constructivist argu-
mentsfocuson variation in statepreferences, butwe knowthatthereceptiveness to
particular ideasis closelycorrelated withauthoritative domesticinstitutions, patterns
of interdependence, andexistingpatterns ofculturalidentity. "Systemic"construc-
tivistclaims-the viewthatnationalideas andidentities resultfromthesocializing
"feedback"effects of previousinternational politicalinteractions-are particularly
vulnerableto suchbias, because domesticpreferences are thecriticalcausal link
betweensystemic socializationandstatepolicy.Without a theory ofdomesticprefer-
enceformation, howcana constructivist specifywhichfeedbackprocessesofsocial-
izationmatter, let alone whenand how theymatter?Sociologistshave long since
concludedthat"new institutionalist" analysesof thiskindare crippledunlesscon-
98. Moravcsik1993.
are Katzenstein1996,3, 12-13,25, 37; andWendt1996.Finnemore
99. Typicalof theliterature is a
welcomeexception,whereasRisse-Kappenand Legro attempt syntheses;see Finnemore1996; Risse-
Kappen1996;andLegro1996.
Organization
540 International
joined witha reliabletheoryof actorsand agency.100 In short,in orderto theorize

rigorously aboutsystemic socialconstruction, wefirstrequirea liberaltheory.
Existingliberalhypotheses, moreover, offera generalaccountof variationin
socialization-a theoryof whenthetransnational transmission of ideas matters-
something forwhich"systemic"constructivists as ofyetlackan explanation. Social-
izationeffects, liberalspredict,willreflect theextentof convergence or divergence
amongpreexisting domestic andideas.Forexample,
institutions toward
socialization con-
vergent normsstemsfrom convergentdomestic andideas.Liberalinstitutions
institutions
andnorms maybe particularly conducive tothepromotion ofpeaceandcooperation, but
theargument implies thattheconvergence ofcertain
other sortsofnonliberal values,such
as monarchy intheConcert ofEuropeor"Asianvalues"inASEAN,mayalsohavesignifi-
cant,ifgenerally effects
lessstriking, onworldpolitics.
Consider,forexample,thecurrent revivalof interest amongconstructivists in
Deutsch'sanalysisofhowtransnational communication creates"pluralistic security
communities" (PSGs) in whichgroupsof states"cease to contemplate" military
conflict. PSGs are said to demonstrate theimportance of thesocializingpowerof
transnational ideas,theimportance of "common.. . we-feeling" rather than"conver-
gent"interests.101 YetDeutschhimselfviewedliberalfactors-anautonomous civil
societywithindividual mobility,theruleoflaw,andcompetitive politics-as precon-
ditionsfortransformative ofhighlevelsofinternational
effects transactionsandcommuni-
cation.Is itjustcoincidence thatoftheofthetwelvesuccessful post-1750 PSGs identified
byDeutsch, tenorelevenwerecomposed ofliberalornearly liberalstates?102
Thisanalysisposestwogeneralchallengestoconstructivism. First,itsuggeststhat
liberalvariablesaremorefundamental thanconstructivist ones,becausetheydefine
theconditions underwhichhighratesof communication and transaction alterstate
behavior.Second,it raisesthepossibility thatdomesticliberalfactorsmayexplain
bothpeaceandtransactions, rendering thecorrelation betweeninternational commu-
nicationandpeace notjust secondary, butspurious.103 Without directlyconfronting
liberaltheory, we cannotdismisseither possibility.Surelyourunderstanding ofworld
politicswouldbe betterservedby morerigorousempiricalconfrontation between
constructivism andliberalism. Betteryetwouldbe a sophisticated synthesis,as found
in the "liberal constructivist" researchprogramadvocatedby Thomas Risse-
Kappen.This approach-a "constructivist interpretationof liberaltheory"-backs
awayfromthenotionthatvaluesresultfrominterstate socializationand arguesin-
steadin a liberalvein thatideas and communication matterwhentheyare most
congruent withexistingdomesticvaluesandinstitutions.'04
These examplesdemonstrate whyit is essentialto treatliberalismas a constant
theoretical baselineagainstwhicheitherrealistor constructivist hypothesesare
100. DiMaggio 1988,10ff.

101. AdlerandBarnett,forthcoming.
102. Deutsch1957,29-30, 36, 66-69, 123-24.
103. Onealetal. 1996,13.
1995;BurleyandMattli1993;
104. Forexample,see Risse-Kappen1996,365; Legro 1996;Johnston
Moravcsik1995;andSikkink1993.
Politics 541
tested-thatis,as a fundamental paradigmatic inIR. Failuretocontrol

alternative for
underlying variationin statepreferences has confounded recentattempts, quantita-
tiveand qualitative, to testmonocausalrealisttheoryin manyotherareas.These
includethestudyof deterrence, hegemonicinfluence, allianceformation, interna-
tionalnegotiation, monetary
international cooperation, multilateral cooperation,eco-
nomicsanctions, andEuropeanintegration. 105 Similarcriticisms couldbe directedat
functional regimetheory; baselinepredictions aboutthepreciseformandthesubse-
quentconsequencesofinternational regimescouldbe derivedfromliberaltheory.106
Failuretodo so posesa clearthreat tovalidempirical inference.
We alreadysee realistsandconstructivists "borrowing" liberalhypotheses, even
whereitundermines the"hardcore"oftheories. RealistStephenWaltsuggeststhat
"intentions" shouldbe includedalongsidepower,proximity, andoffense dominance
in theirspecificationof "threat."Constructivist AlexanderWendtis in retreat from
his "holistic"or "top-down"claimthatstateidentities areideationally constructed
by interactionof states(notsocieties)withintheinternational system.Now he ac-
ceptsa view heavilydependenton "unit-levelchangesin the structure of state-
societyrelations," embeddedindomestic(as wellas international) which
institutions,
leads himto embracephenomenaforwhichwell-established liberaltheorieshave
longprovidedwidelyacceptedexplanations, forexample,thedemocratic peace,U.S.
fearofnuclearweaponsinthehandsofroguestatesbutnotdemocratic allies,andthe
"distinctiveness of theWest." 107The prognosis:Unbiasedtestswouldverylikely
supplantnumerousacceptedrealist,institutionalist, and constructivist explanations
ofstatebehaviorwithliberalaccounts.
In thelongrun,comparative theory testingshouldbe aimedat a clearerdefinition
of theempiricaldomainwithinwhicheach majortheoryperforms best.Detailed
predictions concerning theseempiricaldomainsgo beyondthescope of thisessay,
sincetheyrequireissue-specific analysisof at leastthreetheories.We can nonethe-
less concludethatoft-cited aboutthescopeofrealismandliberalism
generalizations
needtobe revised fundamentally.Liberaltheory remains important, evenprimary, evenin
whatarecurrently considered "leastlikely"cases,forexample, wherethereexistdirect
threatstonational highlevelsofinterstate
security, andlargenumbers
conflict, ofnonliberal
states.Therestatement proposedhereaimstofacilitate empiricalresearchthatwouldmove
usbeyond thesesimplistic aboutthelimited
assertions explanatory domain ofliberaltheory.
ofPreferences
ThePriority
Liberalismand TheorySynthesis:
that,as a monocausaltheory,
The previoussectiondemonstrates liberalism
offersa
coherent
theoretically promising
and empirically to realismand institu-
alternative
105. See Fearon,forthcoming; Walt 1987, 21-28; Baldwin 1985; and Moravcsik,forthcoming. An
exampleis Martin,
instructive whofindsliberalandinstitutionalist that
tobe so closelycorrelated
factors
analysiscannotdistinguish
quantitative them-a resultconsistentwiththeexistenceofpotential forsig-
nificant
omittedvariablebias; see Martin1992.
106. Martin1993.
107. See Walt1987;Elman1996,33;Wendt1996,1-4,6, 11,28-30,33-40,109ff, 328-33,344ff,400ff.
542 International
Organization
tionalism,as wellas to constructivism. Yetitis notalwaysappropriate to employa

monocausaltheory. If foreignpolicymaking is a processof constrained choiceby
purposivestates,a view sharedby realist,institutionalist, and liberaltheory, there
maywellbe cases inwhicha combination ofpreferences andconstraints shapesstate
behavior.In suchcases,a multicausal synthesis,one thattreatsthesetheories notas
substitutes
butas complements, is required. Ifso, whatsynthetic modelshouldprop-
erlybe employed? Fundamental theories shouldbe formulated so as toproviderigor-
ous meansofdefining theirproperrelationship toothertheories.
A fourthimportant advantageofthistheoretical restatement is thatitoffersa clearer
and moreinternally consistentmodelformulticausaltheorysynthesis in IR than
currentlyexists.It does so, moreover, byreversing thenearlyuniversal presumption
amongIR theorists that"liberalism makessenseas an explanatory theory withinthe
constraintspointedoutby... Realism."108Waltz,Keohane,andmanyothersrecom-
mendthatwe synthesize theoriesby employing realismfirst(withpreferences as-
sumedtobe invariant) andthenintroducing competing theories ofdomesticpolitics,
state-society
relations, andpreference changeas neededtoexplain residual variance.109
Yetthisconventional procedure lacksanycoherent methodological or theoretical
justification.
Methodologically, theprocedureovertlyintroduces omittedvariable
bias by arbitrarilyprivilegingrealistexplanations of anyphenomena thatmightbe
explainedbybothrealistandliberaltheories, without evertesting thelatterexplana-
tion.Theoretically, theprocedureis groundedin an incoherent underlying model.
The assumption of staterationality, centralto realism,institutionalism, and most
variantsof liberalism, oughtto implypreciselytheopposite:Once we acceptthat
bothpreferences andconstraints arecausallyimportant, liberaltheory enjoysanalyti-
inanysynthesis.
cal priority
To see whythisis so andwhatitimplies,oneneedonlynotethattheassumption of
or purposivebehaviorcentralto realism(likethe"boundedrationality"
rationality
claimsofinstitutionalism) impliesactionon thebasisofa prior,specific, andconsis-
tentsetofpreferences. Unlesswe knowwhatthesepreferences are(thatis,unlesswe
knowtheextenttowhichstatesvaluetheunderlying stakes),we cannotassessrealist
or institutionalist
claimslinkingvariation in the particular meansavailableto states
(whether coercivecapabilitiesor institutions) on interstateconflict or cooperation.
Preferences determine thenatureandintensity ofthegamethatstatesareplayingand
thusare a primary determinant of whichsystemic theoryis appropriate and how it
shouldbe specified. Variationin statepreferences ofteninfluences thewayin which
statesmakecalculationsabouttheirstrategic environment, whereastheconverse-
thatthestrategicsituation leadstovariation instatepreferences-isinconsistent with
therationality assumptionsharedby all threetheories."10 In short,liberaltheory
108. See Keohane1990,192; andMatthewandZacher1996,46.

109. See Waltz1989, 1996,57. Thereis "somethingparticularly
satisfying
aboutsystemicexplana-
tionsandaboutthestructuralformsof [systemicandstructural]
explanations";see Keohane1986,193.
110. To be sure,as someconstructivists
and neofunctionalists
argue,a reverseeffectmightoccurby
feedbackovertimefrompreviousdecisions,butsucha dynamicprocessstillpresupposes an underlying
liberaltheoryofstateaction.
Politics 543
explainswhenand whytheassumptions aboutstatepreferences underlying realism

or institutionalismhold,whereasthereverseis notthecase. In situations wherethese
assumptions do nothold,realismand institutionalism (as well as somevariantsof
constructivism) arenotjustoflimitedimportance, theyaretheoretically inappropri-
ateandthusempirically irrelevant.
Itfollowsthatinanymulticausal synthesis withrealistandinstitutionalist theory-
thatis,anyanalysisthatremainsopento thepossibility thatvariation in state prefer-
ences,as wellas powerandinstitutions, mightinfluence statepolicy-liberaltheory
enjoyscausalpriority. StevenKrasner'swell-known metaphor capturesthisinsight:
If institutionalism determines whether governments reach the Pareto-frontier, and
realismdetermines whichpointon the Pareto-frontier governments select, liberalism
definestheshapeofthePareto-frontier itself."'ISurelythelattertaskis primary. This
conclusionshouldhardlybe surprising to politicalscientists,foritis theunambigu-
ous lessonoftheclassicliterature on themethodology of studying powerandinflu-
ence, whetherin local communities or global politics.Robert Dahl's analysisof
powerteachesus thatwe cannotascertain whether B
"A influenced todo something"
(thatis, influence) unlesswe know"whatB wouldotherwise do" (thatis, prefer-
ences)."12The implication forrealismis clear: Not only do we needto knowwhat
statepreferences are,butunlesstheyarearrayed so that substantialinterstate conflict
of interestexistsand the deployment of capabilities to achieve a marginal gain is
acceptable,realist is
theory powerless to explain statebehavior. Similarly, institution-
alist explanationsof suboptimalcooperationare appropriate onlyundercircum-
stancesin whichstateshave an interest in resolvingparticular interstate collective
actionproblems.KennethOye drawstheimplication: "Whenyouobserveconflict,
think Deadlock-the absenceofmutualinterest-before puzzlingoverwhya mutual
interestwas notrealized."113
The analytical priority ofliberalism is notsimplyan abstract requirement oftheo-
reticalconsistency; itis empiricallysignificant. "4 Realistsandinstitutionalists alike
are retreating to whatKeohanetermsa "fall-backposition,"wherebyexogenous
variationin theconfiguration of stateinterests definestherangeof possibleout-
comes,within whichcapabilities andinstitutions explainoutcomes."5I Thisimplicitly
concedesnotjust theneedformulticausalsynthesis, buttheanalyticalpriority of
liberaltheory.
The popularity ofthe"fallback"positionalso defusesa practicalobjectionoften
raisedagainst"societal"or "domestic"theories, namelythatresearchintodomestic
preferences is overlydemanding, ifnotimpossible.To be sure,theinvestigation of
nationalmotivations poses particularchallenges.Statepreferences mustbe clearly
distinguished fromstrategies andtacticsandthenmustbe inferred eitherbyobserv-
111. Krasner1993.
112. See Dahl 1969;Coleman1990,132-35;andBaldwin1989,4.
113. See Oye 1986,6; andMorrow1994.
orlesserexplanatory
providegreater
liberalexplanations
114. Thisis notto prejudgewhether power,
question.
whichis an empirical
115. Keohane1986,183.
Organization
544 International
ingconsistent patterns of statebehavioror by systematically analyzingstableele-

mentsinternal to states,as revealedin decision-making documents, trustworthyoral
historiesandmemoirs, patterns ofcoalitionalsupport, andthestructure ofdomestic
Yettheexistenceofsuchdifficulties
institutions."I6 does notconstitute a validreason
to neglectliberaltheory. No respectable philosophy of sciencerecognizesthediffi-
cultyof performing relevantempiricalresearchwithcurrent techniquesas a legiti-
matereasontoabandona promising paradigm.
scientific Instead,scientifictechnique
andtraining shouldadjust-an argument forthorough training in languagesandpri-
mary-source analysis,as wellas in rigoroustheoriesofcomparative politics.More-
over,thepopularity ofthefall-back positiondemonstrates thatthedifficultyofascer-
tainingpreferences is notuniqueto liberalism. We have seenthatevenmonocausal
empiricaltestsofrealistandinstitutionalist theoriesmustcontrolreliablyforvaria-
tionin underlying preferences (notjust strategies) of states.Thisrequiresprecisely
thesamedetailedresearchintodomestic politics.Such a baselinecontrolis, more-
over,mostreliablewherebackedbyan explicitandgeneralizable theory ofdomestic
preference formation, thatis,a liberaltheory. In short, researchintodomesticprefer-
enceformation is unavoidable.
Thepriority ofliberalism inmulticausal modelsofstatebehaviorimplies,further-
more,thatcollectivestatebehaviorshouldbe analyzedas a two-stage processof
constrained social choice.Statesfirstdefinepreferences-astageexplainedby lib-
eraltheories of state-society relations.Thentheydebate,bargain,orfight toparticu-
lar agreements-asecondstageexplainedby realistand institutionalist (as well as
liberal)theories ofstrategic interaction.''1The two-stage modeloffers a generalstruc-
tureforresearchdesignand theoretical explanation.In thosecases whereliberal
factorsonlyinfluence strategic outcomesdirectly, through preferences and prefer-
enceintensities (a in Figure1), liberalism can be testedas a monocausalhypothesis
againstalternative realistor institutionalistfactors(c in Figure1). Liberalfactors
mayalso influence outcomesindirectly, becausethenatureofpreferences helpsde-
termine(b in Figure1) thenatureand strength of thecausal relationship between
strategiccircumstances and actions(c in Figure1). Recall thatpreferences do not
simplyshapeoutcomes, theytellus whichrealistorinstitutionalist factorsareimpor-
tantand how theyrelateto statebehavior.In such cases, explaining(or at least
controlling for)variationin statepreferences is analytically priorto an analysisof
strategicinteraction. Without a prioranalysisofpreferences, onlymonocausalformu-
lationsofrealistorinstitutionalist theory canbe tested."18
The primacyof liberaltheory in suchmulticausal explanations mayappearto be
an abstractadmonition, yetpreciselythistwo-stage approachhas characterized lib-
eraltheoryand practicefromKant'sphilosophy to thepracticalcalculationsbythe
American architects ofthepost-World WarII settlement. Throughout, multicausal or
advantagesof analyzing"corporate"ratherthan"personal"actors,see
116. On themethodological
Coleman1990,513,933ff.
117. See Morrow1988;Ruggie1982;andLegro1996.
1 8. WatsonandMcGaw 1970,chap.15.
Politics 545
variables Liberalfact s Realistand institutionalist

(ideationalcommercial factors
andrepubali,
and
,ial
canvariants) ofcapabilities
(distribution
republican adifrain
yarn, ~~and
information)
Ve (b) (c)
Stagesin the State preferences
processof
interstate (a) Strategicinteraction
interaction
Outcome l
variable Systemicoutcomes
FIGURE 1. A two-stage
modelofstatebehavior
two-stage liberalism makessenseofwhathavelongbeenconsidered contradictions

andambiguities in classicliberalthoughtandmodemliberalstatecraft.
ConsiderWilson'sproposalfortheLeague ofNations,oftencitedas theepitome
ofliberal"legalism"and "utopianism." At firstglance,Wilson'sproposalseemsto
reflecta naive confidencein international Understoodas an implicit
institutions.
socialsciencetheory, notideology,we see thatitwas neither utopiannorfundamen-
It restedinsteadon a pragmatic
tallyinstitutionalist. two-stage liberalview,and its
failureactuallyconfirms liberalpredictions.
Fromthestart, Wilsonwas skepticalabouttheautonomous influence of interna-
He caredlittleabouttheirpreciseform,becausehe viewedthem
tionalinstitutions.
as no morethan"a symbolicaffirmation of democraciesin their
of the 'rightness'
mutualrelations." 119Thus,forexample,hisinitialdraft oftheCovenantincludedno
provisions forinternational law ora supranational court;bothwereeventually added
onlyat theinsistence ofmoreconservative (andmorecynical)foreign anddomestic
politicians.Insteadwhathe termedthe"firstpoint"to remember abouttheLeague
was notinstitutionalistbutliberal:Itsmembership was tobe restrictedtothosecoun-
triesenjoyingrepublican government andnationalself-determination. Insofaras the
Leaguewas torelyon publicopinion,itwas tobe solelydemocratic publicopinion.
Based on a multicausal liberalanalysis,Wilsonexplicitlyidentifieda setofnarrow
preconditions underwhichcollectivesecurity couldsucceed.TheLeague,
institutions
heargued,wouldfunction onlyifnationally self-determiningdemocracy was a nearly
universalformofgovernment amonggreatpowers,whichinturncontrolled an over-
whelming proportion of globalmilitarypower.In 1917,Wilsonbelievedthissitua-
tionto be imminent: "Thereare notgoingto be manyotherkindsof nationsfor
119. Holsti1991. 187.

Organization
546 International
long.... The HapsburgsandtheHohenzollerns arepermanently outofbusiness."120

GivenWilson'sunderlying theory, is itsurprising thattheLeaguehadbecomemori-
bundby 1936,aftertwelveEuropeancountries hadmovedfromdemocracy todicta-
torship? Or thatthisshiftisolateddemocratic FranceandBritain, exacerbating their
oft-noted geopoliticaldilemmasinManchuriaandAbyssinia?Herewe againsee the
virtueofdefining liberaltheory ina nonideological manner: Thefailure oftheLeague,
oftencitedas a realistrefutationofliberalideology, infactconfirms liberalIR theory.
Multicausal liberalismhelpstoexplainnotonlyambitious schemes forcooperationlike
collective
security, policyoutcomes
but"realist" likepowerbalancing andbipolarconflict.
Kant,forexample, recognizedthebalanceofpoweras anunstable, second-best mechanism
suitableonlytoa particular
setofcircumstances defined byliberal theory, namely relations
amongnonrepublican In theoretical
states. terms, realismwasembedded ina deeperand
moreencompassing liberaltheory
transhistorical of socialdevelopment. The balanceof
powerservestolimitthe"vigorous ... rivalry"amongstates, permitting theprogressive
emergence ofrepublicangovernment andcommerce (as wellas,though clearlysecondary,
international
rules),whichwouldinturn diminish
steadily therelevance ofinterstate
balanc-
ing.LikeWilson,Kantremained skeptical of strong international institutions,
focusing
insteadonthedevelopment ofsocietal preferences.'2'
A formof multicausal liberalism verysimilarto thatespousedby Kantunderlay
thepost-World WarII U.S. policyof containment-apolicytraditionally treatedas
theembodiment ofrealism.Containment was neversimplypowerbalancing.It was
an integratedmulticausal liberalgrandstrategy, as madeexplicitafter WorldWarI by
WilsonandJohnDewey,thenafterWorldWarII byGeorgeKennan.Kennan,inthis
regarda liberal,linkedtheEuropeanthreatto thenatureof theSovietregime;it is
oftenforgotten thatnine-tenths of the seminal"X" articlewas givenoverto an
analysisof Sovietdomesticbeliefs.'22 A Westernmilitary deterrent wouldbe re-
quired,he argued,onlyuntiltheBolshevikrevolution hadrunitscourse,whereupon
theSovietsystemwouldcollapseof itsown accord.ThusthedecisiveWestern ac-
tionsintheColdWar,accordingtoKennan,werethereconstruction ofGermany and
Japanas capitalistdemocraciesthrough policiesliketheMarshallPlan.The goal of
thepolicywas thetransformation ofsocialpurposesandstatepreferences inWestern
countries,neither ofwhichwouldassumemuchimportance purely in a realistanaly-
sis. Thismulticausal liberalinterpretation of containment banishesvariousambigu-
itiesandtensionsinKennan'sthought thathavebedeviledbiographers-not leasthis
singularsynthesis ofbalance-of-power thinking andstrident antimilitarism.'23
The conductand conclusionof theCold Warproceededpreciselyas Kennan's
two-stage liberalmodelhadpredicted. Realistpowerbalancingservedthroughout as
120. See Wilsonin Foley 1923, 64-65, see also 58-59, 64-65, 74-87, 147, 198-99; Kuehl 1969,
340-44; Foley 1923,129; andWolfersandMartin1956,178.
121. Kant1991,49, 92, 112-14.
122. See Kennan1947;andGellman1984,37, 83-105, 130-38.
123. "To nearlyeveryonewithan opinionon thesubject,it seemsplainthattherehave been two
GeorgeKennans.... KennantheCold Warrior [and]Kennanthepeacemonger, thedovishhistorian";see
Gellman1984,xiii.
Politics 547
a static,interiminstrument to maintainthestatusquo, butshifting statepreferences

explaintheoutbreakand eventualpassingof theconflict. By 1959, standingin a
Moscowexhibitofkitchenware, RichardNixonandNikitaKhrushchev declaredthat
theCold Warwouldbe won and lostnotthrough relativemilitary but
capabilities,
through therelativeeconomicprowessand ideologicalattractiveness of the two
superpowers. Economicstagnation anda measureof ideologicalchangein theEast
predatedforeignpolicychange.If theWest,as Khrushchev rashlypromised,had
beenburiedunderthesuperior economicperformance oftheEast,theoutcomemight
wellhavebeendifferent.'24
These examplesdemonstrate theabilityof multicausalliberaltheoryto explain
criticaltwentieth-centuryforeign policydecisions,suchas thosetakenin 1918,1947,
and 1989,evenwhennationalsecurity arefullyengaged.'25
interests In interpreting
suchcases, themajordifference betweenrealistsand liberalslies not,as is often
claimed,in theobservation thatstatesareconcernedaboutsecurity threatsandbal-
ancing;thisfinding is consistent witha multicausalliberalexplanation. Wherethe
twotheoriesgenuinely differis on thesourcesof security themselves,
threats with
themtoparticular
realistsattributing configurations attrib-
ofpower,institutionalists
utingthemto uncertainty, and liberalsattributingthemto ideological,institutional,
andmaterial conflict
amongstatepreferences. Ifliberaltheorycontributestoexplain-
ingcorerealistcases suchas bipolarconflict, thereis goodreasontobelievethatthe
mostpowerful influences in worldpoliticstodayarenotthedeployment ofmilitary
forceortheconstruction ofinternational butthetransformation
institutions, ofdomes-
ticandtransnational socialvalues,interests,andinstitutions.
Conclusion:The VirtuesofTheoreticalPluralism
LiberalIR theoryis notsimplyan ideologicalfoilformorerealisticand rigorous

theories,as itscriticsclaim,noran eclecticcollectionofhypotheses linkedonlyby
commonintellectual history and normative commitment, as itsproponents are cur-
rentlyforcedto concede.It is insteada logicallycoherent, theoretically distinct,
empirically generalizable theory-onethatfollowsfromexplicitas-
socialscientific
sumptions andgenerates a richrangeofrelatedpropositionsaboutworldpoliticsthat
reachfarbeyondcasesofcooperation amonga minority ofliberalstates.By reformu-
latingliberalism as theoryratherthanideology,we have repeatedly seenthatwhat
areoftentreated as liberalfailuresbecomeliberalpredictions.
Moreover, liberalismexhibits considerable
potential extension.
fortheoretical Aside
fromthemyriadopportunities forempiricaltestingand theoretical refinement of
specifichypotheses, a number ofbroaderareasarepoisedfortheoretical innovation.
Relaxingtheassumption of unitarystatebehaviorwouldsupporta rangeof "two-
124. Jervis1996.
125. King,Keohane,andVerba1994,209-12.
Organization
548 International
level"hypotheses aboutthedifferential abilityofvariousdomesticstateandsocietal

actorsto pursuesemiautonomous transnational activities.Relaxingtheassumption
thatdecisionmakingis staticwouldsupportanalysesof changeovertime.Greater
attention to feedbackfrompriordecisionsmediatedby intervening liberalfactors
likedomesticideas,institutions, andinterests mightprovidefirmer microfoundations
fortheoriesofregimestability and change-an areaof potential collaboration with
constructivists andhistorical institutionalists.Finally,therichinteraction amongdo-
mesticand transnational ideas, interests, and institutionsis onlybeginningto be
explored.
A finalwordto thosereaderswho objectto usingthetermliberalto distinguish
thisrestatement. Such potentialcriticsfallintotwogroups.One groupis likelyto
findthisformulation ofliberaltheory toonarrow, theothertoobroad.
The first groupofcriticswillprotest thatthisrestatement failsto acknowledge the
fullrichnessoftheintellectual history and,in particular,thenormative implications
of liberalism.This criticism is correct,buttheomissionis deliberate. This article
doesnotaimtoprovidea comprehensive intellectual
history ofclassicalliberalinter-
nationalthought, nora self-sufficientguidetothenormative evaluationofpolicy,but
to distilla coherent coreofsocialscientific assumptions forthenarrower purposeof
explaining international 126The projectis bestjudgedon itsownterms-the
politics.
fourcriteria outlinedinthepreceding section-notitsfidelity topriorusage.
The secondgroupofcriticswillcomplainthatliberalism has toomanydefinitions
as itstands,mosttoovaguetobe useful.Somerejectaltogether theuse of "isms"to
designatefoundational theoreticalpositionsin IR. This criticism is semanticrather
thansubstantive. In contrastto otherfundamental divisions-forexample,thosebe-
tweendomesticand systemic"levelsof analysis,"optimistic andpessimistic prog-
noses,orrealist,liberal,andMarxistideologies-thetripartite divisionamongreal-
ism,liberalism, andinstitutionalismis fullyconsistentwiththefoundation ofrationalist
socialtheory, whichdividesthedeterminants ofsocialbehaviorintothreecategories:
interests, resources, andinstitutions orinformation.'27 Thosewhoviewstatebehav-
ioras theresultofa processofconstrained choicewoulddo welltochampionrather
thancriticize effortstoimposegreater theoreticalcoherenceandconsistency ontheo-
riesofrationalstatebehavior.
Eithertypeof criticmaynonetheless preferto call liberaltheorya "societal,"
"state-society," "social purpose,"or "preference-based" theory.The centralclaims
ofthisarticle, however, remainintact.First,majorIR theories shouldbe dividedinto
thosethatstressthepattern ofstatepreferences, thedistributionofresources, andthe
institutional provision ofinformation. Second,greater priorityshouldbe giventothe
furtherdevelopment ofthefirstcategory. Thisdevelopment neednotproceedad hoc,
butcanbe achievedbygrounding suchefforts inthecommonassumptions andcausal
processesproposedhere.Onlyfurther researchcanrevealtheirfullempirical power;
yetexistingstudies-fromexplanations ofthedemocratic peacetoendogenous tariff
theempiricalclaimsadvancedherehavenormative
126. Nonetheless, see Doyle 1997.
implications;
127. Coleman1990.
Politics 549
theory relating
totheories andideastoforeign
domesticinstitutions policy-suggest
considerablepromise.Third,a liberaltheory is themostfunda-
of statepreferences
mentaltypeof IR theory. Hypotheses thatendogenizechangesin statepreferences
deserveequal treatmentin monocausalexplanations andanalytical inmulti-
priority
causal ones,becauseliberaltheorydefinesthetheoreticalandempiricaldomainsin
whichitis appropriate claims.Thusthose
eventoconsiderrealistandinstitutionalist
who ignoreliberaltheorydo notsimplysacrificecomprehensiveness; theyunder-
minevalid empiricalevaluationof theirown theories.Onlyby buildingon these
threeconclusionscan liberalsand theircriticssupplantdebatesover labels with
debatesoverdata.
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Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics

Author(s): Andrew Moravcsik

Thisarticlereformulatesliberalinternational (IR) theory

Fordetailedcomments andcriticisms, aboveall toAnne-Marie

International 51, 4, Autumn1997,pp. 513-53

Grounding liberaltheory in a setofcoresocialscientific assumptions helpsover-

1. See Morgenthau1960,4; Keohane1989,68, n. 17; andHoward1978,134.

tificsensecannotexist.RobertKeohane,an institutionalist sympathetic to liberal-

Second,a theoretical restatement shouldbe rigorous and coherent,offeringa clear

Core AssumptionsofLiberal IR Theory

LiberalIR theory'sfundamental premise-thattherelationshipbetweenstatesand

Liberaltheoryrestson a "bottom-up" viewof politicsin whichthedemandsof

6. Thisdoes notimplya "pre-social"conceptionoftheindividualunencumbered bynation,commu-

In theliberalconception ofdomesticpolitics,thestateis notan actorbuta repre-

Societalpressures transmittedbyrepresentative institutions andpractices alter"state

12. The phrase"country A changeditspreferencesin responseto an actionby countryB" is thusa

enfranchised byrepresentative andpractices.

For liberals,statebehaviorreflects varyingpatterns of statepreferences. States

cies areoptimalforothers(or insignificant), thereare strong incentives forcoexist-

half-century.At theheartof thetwoleadingcontemporary IR theories, realismand

23. WhataboutMarxism?Marxismprovidesdistinctive normative insights (Doyle 1997),butitsnon-

forexample,social demandsare derivednot simplyfrom"domestic"economic

poraldiscountrates,risk-acceptance, andwillingness to acceptpunishment, remain

Variants of Liberal Theory

36. Thisconceptis similarbutnarrowerthanRuggie's"legitimate socialpurpose"and Katzenstein's

41. See Jackson1990;andGilpin1989.

A secondfundamental typeofsocialidentity central toforeign policymaking is the

46. Governments mayactuallyhavealtruistic

consumer protection,culturalpromotion, andmanyotherpublicgoodsincreasingly

ideologies,liberalIR theory focuseson market structureas a variablecreating incen-

55. Grieco1988;Gowa 1989;andKeohane1984.

Commercial liberalism hasimportant implicationsforsecurity as well.Trade

policiesfromtheaggregate perspective-oneformofwhichmaybe costlyinterna-

Oftenoverlookedis thetheoretical corollary of "democratic peace" theory: a re-

68. See Kaysen1990,59; andMueller1991,23-44.

Do labelsmatter? I haveexploredthreevariantsofliberaltheory thatsharea setof

and Lange and by Haggardand

together thanseparately. Not onlydo theyshareassumptions and causal mecha-

74. Huntington 1991,46-72.

butforthesubstantive contentof foreignpolicy.Major elementsof international

81. See Ruggie1982;andWendt1994.

petitiveallianceformation amongthe leadingdemocraticpowerstoday.For ex-

Liberalism, bycontrast, sharesnoneoftheseassumptions. It permits stateprefer-

92. See Slaughter1995;BurleyandMattli1993;andMoravcsik1995.

fromparticularistic domesticgroupswithintensedistributional concerns.Liberal

joined witha reliabletheoryof actorsand agency.100 In short,in orderto theorize

100. DiMaggio 1988,10ff.

tested-thatis,as a fundamental paradigmatic inIR. Failuretocontrol

tionalism,as wellas to constructivism. Yetitis notalwaysappropriate to employa

108. See Keohane1990,192; andMatthewandZacher1996,46.

explainswhenand whytheassumptions aboutstatepreferences underlying realism

ingconsistent patterns of statebehavioror by systematically analyzingstableele-

variables Liberalfact s Realistand institutionalist

two-stage liberalism makessenseofwhathavelongbeenconsidered contradictions

119. Holsti1991. 187.

long.... The HapsburgsandtheHohenzollerns arepermanently outofbusiness."120

a static,interiminstrument to maintainthestatusquo, butshifting statepreferences

LiberalIR theoryis notsimplyan ideologicalfoilformorerealisticand rigorous

level"hypotheses aboutthedifferential abilityofvariousdomesticstateandsocietal

Achen,Christopher 1995.How Can WeTella Unitary RationalActorWhenWe See One?Paperpresented

Elman,Colin.1996.HorsesforCourses:WhyNotNeorealist TheoriesofForeignPolicy?Security Studies

Howard,Michael. 1978. Warand theLiberal Conscience.New Brunswick, N.J.:RutgersUniversity

Mearsheimer, JohnJ. 1990.Back to theFuture:Instability in EuropeAftertheCold War.International

Sikkink,Kathryn. 1993.The Powerof Principled Ideas: HumanRightsPoliciesin theUnitedStatesand