InternationalNormDynamics

and PoliticalChange
Sikkink
andKathryn
MarthaFinnemore

Normative andideationalconcernshave alwaysinformed thestudyofinternational

politicsandarea consistentthreadrunning through thelifeofInternational Organi-
zation.WhenIO was founded,dominant realistviews of politics,whilerejecting
idealism,wereverymuchconcernedwithissues of legitimacy and ideology.The
earlyCold War,afterall, was notsimplya positionalconflictamonganonymous
greatpowers:it was a war for"heartsand minds."The couplingof powerwith
"legitimate socialpurpose"was centraltoAmericanforeign policyof thisperiod.'
At the same time,international relationsscholarswerebusystudying two of the
greatestsocialconstructionprojectsoftheage: Europeanintegration anddecoloniza-
tion.Neofunctionalists,liketherealists,wereconsciouslytrying to distancethem-
selvesfrom"idealist"predecessors (inthiscase,David Mitrany andhiscolleagues),
butthecomplexweboftechnical tasksthattheydesignedaimedatmorethanpromot-
ingmaterialwell-being;theyaimedultimately at ideationaland social ends.Spill-
overwas supposedtodo morethancreateadditional technicaltasks;itwas supposed
tochangeattitudes, andaffect
identity, amongparticipants. Likewise,scholarsrecog-
nizedthatdecolonization was drivenby a profoundly normative agendaand thatit
explicitlysoughttoreconstitutetheidentities ofboththenewstatesandtheirformer
colonizers,as wellas therelationshipsbetweenthem.
Attempts inthe1960sand 1970stobuilda scienceofpoliticsmodeledoneconom-
ics ornaturalscienceneverdisplacedthesenormative andideationalconcernscom-
pletely.Theyhave surfacedconsistently in thestreamof critiquesof thedominant
state-centricparadigmsthatfocusedon materialpower.Scholarsof transnational
relationsin the 1970scalled attention to transnational actorswho weresometimes
influenced bynormsandideas.2Theregimesscholarship oftheearly1980ssimilarly

Wewouldliketothankthethreeeditors,tworeviewers,andEmanuelAdler,MichaelBarnett,
Elizabeth
Boyle,AudieKlotz,JeffLegro,RichardPrice,ThomasRisse,andDaniel Thomasfortheirveryhelpful
comments of themanuscript.
on variousdrafts to JamesFearon,KurtGaubatz,and
We arealso grateful
JimMorrowforanswering sharing
questions, manuscripts, relatedtoourwork.
andmakingsuggestions
1. Ruggie1983b.
2. KeohaneandNye 1971.

52,4, Autumn1998,pp. 887-917

Organization
International
? 1998byThe 10 Foundation
andtheMassachusetts ofTechnology
Institute
888 International
Organization

emphasized theroleofprinciples andnormsin waysthatopenedthedoorfora more

sweeping"ideationalturn"inthelate1980s.
Elsewherein thisissueJohnRuggie,JamesMarch,andJohanOlsenexplorethe
intellectualhistory of thisrecent"turn"and locateitsproponents in themoreab-
stracttheoretical debatesof social science.Buildingon theircontributions, we ad-
dresstheoretical issuesfacingthoseofus interested in empiricalresearchon social
construction processesand norminfluences in internationalpolitics.We are con-
cernedwithsuchquestionsas How do we knowa normwhenwe see one?How do
we knownormsmakea difference in politics?Wheredo normscomefrom?How do
theychange?Weareparticularly interestedintherolenormsplayinpoliticalchange-
boththeways in whichnorms,themselves, changeand the ways in whichthey
changeotherfeatures ofthepoliticallandscape.Likeothertheoretical frameworks in
internationalrelations (IR), muchofthemacrotheoretical equipment ofconstructiv-
ismis better at explaining stabilitythanchange.Claimsthatactorsconform to "log-
ics of appropriateness"3 say littleabouthow standardsof appropriateness might
change.SuchstaticapproachestoIR areparticularly unsatisfyingduringthecurrent
era of global transformation whenquestionsaboutchangemotivatemuchof the
empiricalresearchwe do. Lackinggood macrotheoretic guidance,ourapproachto
thesequestionsreliesheavilyon induction fromtheextensiveandgrowingbodyof
normsresearchthathas sprungup,notjustin politicalscience,butin law,econom-
ics, sociology,andpsychology. Thisvariety ofconceptualandempiricalmaterialis
usefulforourinductiveenterprise, butit also raisessome important questionsfor
macrotheory thatwe exploreattheendofthearticle.
We use ourreviewof scholarship on normsandrelatedideationalphenomena in
thisarticleto makethreearguments. First,theideational"turn"of recentyearsis
actuallya return to sometraditional concernsofthediscipline, butithas notbrought
us backtoprecisely thesameplacewe began.Standards forgoodempirical research
havechangeddramatically (andforthebetter)sincethefounding ofIO, andapplying
thesestandards to long-standing normative issueshas had realpayoffs. Second,we
generatesomepropositions aboutthreeaspectsofnorms-theirorigins, themecha-
nismsbywhichtheyexerciseinfluence, andtheconditions underwhichnormswill
be influentialin worldpolitics.Specifically, we arguethatnormsevolvein a pat-
terned"lifecycle"andthatdifferent behaviorallogicsdominatedifferent segments
ofthelifecycle.Third,we arguethatthecurrent tendency to opposenormsagainst
rationalityorrationalchoiceis nothelpfulin explaining manyofthemostpolitically
salientprocesseswe see in empiricalresearch-processeswe call "strategic social
construction," in whichactorsstrategize rationallyto reconfigurepreferences,iden-
tities,orsocialcontext.4 Rationalitycannotbe separated fromanypoliticallysignifi-
cantepisodeofnormative influenceornormative change,justas thenormative con-
textconditionsany episode of rationalchoice. Normsand rationality are thus
intimately connected, butscholarsdisagreeabouttheprecisenatureoftheirrelation-

3. MarchandOlsen,thisissue.
4. See Kahler,thisissue,fora history
ofdebatesoverrationality relations.
ininternational
 NormDynamicsandPoliticalChange 889

ship.We identify fourfocalpointsof debatewheretherelationship

betweennorms
and rationality
is leastunderstoodand mostimportant,
and we showhow thesede-
batescross-cutresearch traditions
inpotentially
fruitful
ways.

The Returnto Norms

Normsandnormative issueshavebeencentraltothestudyofpoliticsforatleasttwo
millennia.Studentsofpoliticshavestruggled withquestionsnotonlyaboutthemean-
ingofjusticeandthegoodsocietybutalso abouttheinfluence onhumanbehaviorof
ideas aboutjusticeand good. Our conclusions(or ourassumptions) abouttheseis-
suescondition everyformofpoliticalanalysis.Aristotle andPlatounderstood thisin
thefourth century B.C.E. just as E. H. Carrdid in thetwentieth century.Carrhas
becomecanonizedin thedisciplineas a debunkerof Wilsonianidealism,butthis
simplificationmisrepresents hismessage:"Politicalactionmustbe basedon a coor-
dinationofmorality andpower."Realismfails,in Carr'sanalysis,precisely because
itexcludesessentialfeatures ofpoliticslikeemotionalappealto a politicalgoal and
grounds formoraljudgment.5 Thisconviction thatunderstanding socialpurposeand
legitimacy was essentialto understanding politicscontinuedthrough the1950sand
1960s and is evidentin thepages of IO. Inis Claude's workon thelegitimation
functionoftheUnitedNationsdealspreciselywiththisissue.6EarlyIR scholarship
on certainissues-decolonization, humanrights, education-recognized thatmuch
UN activity involvedestablishing norms,butitoftenfailedto theorizethesenorma-
tiveprocesses.7Certainly theworkof theintegration theorists
suchas ErnstHaas
was implicitly,
andoftenexplicitly, aboutcreatingsharedsocialpurpose.8 Evenreal-
istslikeHans Morgenthau wroteextensively aboutthewayin whichideationaland
normative factorssuchas nationalism, morality,and international
law limitstates'
exerciseofpower.9
The "turn"awayfromnormsandnormative concernsbeganwiththebehavioral
revolutionand itsenthusiasm formeasurement. Normative and ideationalphenom-
ena weredifficultto measureand so tendedto be pushedaside formethodological
reasons.Thistendency was reinforced bytheemerging infatuation
ofpoliticalscien-
tistswitheconomicmethodsin thelate 1970sand 1980s.10Realistsbeganrecasting
thepursuitofpoweras "utility maximization" and,following theeconomists, tended
to specifyutility
functions in materialtermsonly.Liberalsdrewon microeconomic
analysesofcollectiveactiongames(Prisoners' Dilemma,StagHunt)toreinvigorate
theirlong-standingdebatewithrealistsandshowthatcooperation, welfareimprove-

5. Carr[1946] 1964,97, 89.

6. Claude 1966.
7. See Kay 1967;Henkin1965;Jacobson1962;andBall 1961.
8. Haas 1961,1964a.Foran argument relatedto someconcernsofthisarticle,see Haas 1993.
9. Morgenthau [1948] 1985,pt.5, 6.
10. Fora discussionaboutthecausesandeffects ofthedominance ofeconomicmodelsandmethods in
thestudyofU.S. politics,see Lowi 1992;Simon1993a;Lowi 1993a,b;andSimon1993b.
890 International
Organization

ment, and"progress" werepossibleevengivensomeofrealism'spessimistic assump-

tionsaboutself-seeking humannature.In fact,these"neos,"bothrealistandliberal,
mightmoreappropriately be called "econorealists"and "econoliberals," sincewhat
was newinbothcases was an injectionofmicroeconomic insights.'1
Althoughthemoveto rationalchoicein no way requireda moveto a material
ontology, itsproponents showedlittleinterestinideationalorsocialphenomena, and
studyoftheseissueslanguished duringthisperiod.However,wheninterest in these
matters revivedin the1980s,first withtheregimesprojectl2 andlaterwiththecon-
structivistsled by JohnRuggie,FriedrichKratochwil, AlexanderWendt,and oth-
ers,'3thedisciplineto whichnormsreturned had changedin important ways.Al-
thoughthebehavioralrevolution and the"economicturn"of the 1970sand 1980s
mayhaveneglected norms,theymadeimportant contributions byforcing scholarsto
thinkmuchmorerigorously aboutissuesofresearch design,theoreticalclarity,disci-
plinary cumulation, andparsimony.
As contemporary researchers
maketheirarguments aboutnorms, culture,andideas,
theywill need to specifyideationalcausal claimsand mechanisms clearly,think
seriouslyaboutthemicrofoundations on whichtheoretical claimsaboutnormsrest,
andevaluatethoseclaimsin thecontextofcarefully designedhistorical andempiri-
cal research.'4David Lumsdaine'sanalysisof therole of morality in international
politics,forexample,is verydifferent fromCarr's.Carrusesevidenceanecdotally to
illustratehis arguments aboutthemoralcharacter of "the ordinary man" and the
politicalconsequencesof thatmorality. The resultis a brilliantpiece of political
thought butone vulnerableto chargesof wishfulthinking, sinceCafrprovidesno
systematic evidencethathumanbeingsactuallydo behaveas his "ordinary man""
does and notaccordingto someotherconceptionof humannature.Lumsdaine,by
contrast,offers evidencethatmorality
systematic actuallydoesplaya significant role
inforeign aid byexamining predictions fromalternativeexplanations andcompiling
extensiveevidence,bothquantitative and qualitative,
to arbitrateamongexplana-
tions.'5The same attention to alternativeexplanations, rigorousstandardsof evi-
dence,andsocialtheoretic microfoundations has characterized thearticle-lengthre-
searchon normsinIO on suchissuesas theendofapartheid in SouthAfrica,theend
of theCold War,prohibitions againstcertainkindsof weapons,theend of slavery,
and otherprohibition regimes.'6In a widevarietyof issueareas,normsresearchers
have madeinroadspreciselybecausetheyhave been able to provideexplanations
substantiated byevidenceforpuzzlesin international politicsthatotherapproaches
hadbeenunabletoexplainsatisfactorily.

11. See also Ruggie,thisissue.

12. Krasner1983b.
13. See KratochwilandRuggie1986;Wendt1987;Dessler1989;Kratochwil 1989;andAdler1997.
14. Readersshouldnotethatwe use ideational"causation"hereina waythatrecognizesthatideasand
normsareoftenreasonsforactions,notcausesinthephysicalsenseoftheword.See Ruggie,thisissue.
15. Lumsdaine1993.
16. See Klotz 1995a;Risse-Kappen1994;Price1995;Ray 1989;andNadelmann1990.
 NormDynamicsandPoliticalChange 891

Normsare no easierto measuretodaythantheywerein the1930sor 1960s,but

conceptualprecisionis essentialforbothmeaningfultheoretical
debateand defen-
sibleempiricalwork.In theremainder ofthissectionwe takeup threeissueswhere
conceptualclarification
seemsmostpressingandmostpossible:definitions,therela-
tionshipbetweendomesticandinternationalnorms, andwhethernormsareagentsof
orchange.
stability

Definitions

Thereis generalagreement on thedefinition of a normas a standard of appropriate

behaviorforactorswitha givenidentity,17 buta number ofrelatedconceptualissues
stillcause confusionand debate.First,whereasconstructivists in politicalscience
talka languageof norms,sociologiststalka languageof "institutions" to referto
thesesamebehavioralrules.Thus,elsewherein thisissueMarchand Olsen define
"institution"as "a relativelystablecollectionofpracticesandrulesdefining appro-
priatebehaviorforspecificgroupsofactorsin specificsituations."18One difference
between"norm"and "institution" (in thesociologicalsense) is aggregation: the
normdefinition isolatessinglestandards ofbehavior, whereasinstitutions emphasize
thewayin whichbehavioralrulesarestructured andinterrelate
together (a "collec-
tionof practicesand rules").The dangerin usingthenormlanguageis thatit can
obscuredistinct andinterrelated elementsofsocialinstitutions ifnotusedcarefully.
For example,politicalscientists tendto slip intodiscussionsof "sovereignty" or
"slavery"as iftheywerenorms, wheninfacttheyare(orwere)collections ofnorms
andthemixofrulesandpracticesthatstructure theseinstitutionshas variedsignifi-
cantly overtime.19Used carefully, however, normlanguagecanhelptosteerscholars
towardlookinginsidesocial institutions and considering thecomponents of social
as wellas thewaytheseelements
institutions arerenegotiated intonewarrangements
overtimetocreatenewpatterns ofpolitics.20
Scholarsacross disciplineshave recognized different
typesorcategories ofnorms.
The most common is
distinction betweenregulative norms,which order and con-
strainbehavior,andconstitutive norms, whichcreatenewactors,interests, orcatego-
riesofaction.21Somescholarshavealso discusseda category ofnormscalledevalu-
ativeorprescriptive norms, butthesehavereceivedmuchless attention and,indeed,
areoftenexplicitly omittedfromanalysis.22 Thislackofattention is puzzling,sinceit
is preciselytheprescriptive (or evaluative)qualityof "oughtness"thatsetsnorms
apartfromotherkindsofrules.Becausenormsinvolvestandards of "appropriate" or
"proper"behavior, boththeintersubjective andtheevaluativedimensions areines-
capablewhendiscussingnorms.We onlyknowwhatis appropriate byreference to

17. See Katzenstein1996b,5; Finnemore 1996a,22; andKlotz 1995b.

18. MarchandOlsen,thisissue.
19. Krasner1984,1988,1993;Thomson1994;Strang1991;Ruggie1993;andSpruyt1994.
20. Foran excellentdiscussionoftheseissues,see Jepperson1991.
21. Ruggie,thisissue;Searle 1995;Katzenstein 1996b;andWendtforthcoming.
22. Gelpi 1997.See, forexample,thetreatment in Katzenstein
1996b,5, fnl2.
892 International
Organization

thejudgmentsof a community or a society.We recognizenorm-breakingbehavior

because it generatesdisapprovalor stigmaand normconforming behavioreither
becauseitproducespraise,or,in thecase ofa highlyinternalized norm,becauseitis
so takenforgrantedthatit provokesno reactionwhatsoever.23 Thus,JamesFearon
arguesthatsocialnormstakethegenericform"Good peopledo (ordo notdo) X in
situationsA, B, C . . ." because"we typicallydo notconsidera ruleofconducttobe
a social normunlessa sharedmoralassessmentis attachedto its observanceor
non-observance.'"24
One logicalcorollaryto theprescriptive qualityof normsis that,by definition,
thereare no bad normsfromthevantagepointof thosewho promotethenorm.
Normsmostof us wouldconsider"bad"-norms aboutracial superiority, divine
right,imperialism-were oncepowerful becausesomegroupsbelievedintheappro-
priateness(thatis, the "goodness") of thenorm,and otherseitheracceptedit as
obviousorinevitable orhadno choicebutto acceptit.Slaveholders andmanynon-
slaveholders believedthatslaverywas appropriate behavior;without thatbelief,the
institution ofslaverywouldnothavebeenpossible.
Giventhisdiscussion, we canbegintoanswertheessentialresearch question:how
do we knowa normwhenwe see one?We can onlyhaveindirect evidenceofnorms
just as we can onlyhave indirect evidenceof mostothermotivations forpolitical
action(interests orthreats,forexample).However,becausenormsbydefinition em-
bodya qualityof "oughtness" andsharedmoralassessment, normsprompt justifica-
tionsforactionandleavean extensive trailofcommunication amongactorsthatwe
can study. Forexample,theUnitedStates'explanations aboutwhyitfeelscompelled
to continueusinglandminesin SouthKorearevealthatit recognizestheemerging
normagainsttheuse of suchmines.If notforthenorm,therewouldbe no needto
mention, explain,orjustifytheuse of minesin Korea at all. Notethatwe separate
normexistenceor strength fromactualbehavioralchangein ouroperationalization.
Becauseonecentral questionofnormsresearch is theeffect
ofnormson statebehav-
ior,itis important to operationalize a normin a waythatis distinct fromthestateor
nonstate behavioritis designedto explain.25
Normsas sharedassessments raisethequestionofhowmanyactorsmustsharethe
assessment beforewe call it a norm.In partthisis a questionof empiricaldomain.
Normsmaybe regional,forexample,butnotglobal.Even withina community,
normsare "continuous, rather thandichotomous, entities.... [They]comein vary-
ingstrengths" withdifferent normscommanding levelsofagreement.26
different We
arguethatonewaytounderstand thedynamics ofthisagreement processis byexam-
iningwhatwe call the "life cycle" of norms.We showhow agreement amonga
criticalmassofactorson someemergent normcan createa tipping pointafterwhich

23. For a particularly

good discussionof theway in whichconventions producejudgments
of social
"oughtness"andmorality, see Sugden1989.See also Elster1989a,c;andSunstein1997.
24. Fearon1997,25, fnl8.
25. Legro1997.
26. Ibid.,33.
 NormDynamicsandPoliticalChange 893

agreement becomeswidespread
in manyempirical cases,andwe providesomesug-
gestionsaboutcommonfeatures
of "criticalmass."

ConnectingDomestic and InternationalNorms

In thisarticlewe are concernedwithinternational or regionalnormsthatset stan-
dardsfortheappropriate behaviorofstates.27Domesticnorms,however,aredeeply
entwined withtheworkings ofinternationalnorms.Manyinternational normsbegan
as domesticnormsandbecomeinternational through theefforts ofentrepreneurs of
variouskinds.Women'ssuffrage, forexample, beganas a demandfordomestic change
withina handfulof countriesand eventually becamean international norm.28 In
addition, international
normsmustalwayswork theirinfluence through the filterof
domesticstructures can
anddomesticnorms,which produceimportant variations in
and of
compliance interpretationthesenorms.29 in
Even situations where it might
appearatfirst glancethatinternationalnormssimplytrump domesticnorms, whatwe
oftensee is a processbywhichdomestic"normentrepreneurs" advocatinga minor-
itypositionuse internationalnormsto strengthen theirpositionin domesticdebates.
In otherwords,thereis a two-levelnormgameoccurring in whichthedomesticand
theinternational normtablesareincreasingly linked.30 We arguelater,however, that
all thesedomesticinfluences at theearlystageof a norm'slifecycle,
are strongest
and domesticinfluences lessensignificantlyonce a normhas becomeinstitutional-
ized intheinternationalsystem.
Recentworkin U.S. legalcirclesalso suggeststhatthereis moresimilarity in the
way normsand law workdomestically and internationally thanIR scholarshave
thought. IR scholarshave generallyassumedthattheexistenceof a coercivestate
able to enforcelaws madedomesticorderverydifferent frominternational order.A
prominent groupoflegalscholarsattheUniversity ofChicago,however, nowargue
that,evenwithina domesticsetting, makingsuccessfullaw and policyrequiresan
understanding ofthepervasiveinfluence of social normsofbehavior.Thisis a par-
ticularlycompelling insightforIR scholars,sincetheinternational systemis charac-
terizedbylaw andnormsoperating without directpunitivecapacity.The processes
through whichtheselegal scholarsclaimthatnormsworkdomestically-involving
normentrepreneurs, imitation,"normcascades,"and "normbandwagons"-areen-
tirelyconsistentwiththeresearchdoneon normsby scholarsin IR and suggestthat
IR normsresearchmightalso learnfromdomesticanalogies.For example,thenor-
mativeand legal processthrough whichSoutherngentlemen in theUnitedStates
stoppeddueling,examinedbyLawrenceLessig,may relevant be forthinking about

27. Foranalysesofdomesticnormsandtheirinfluence on domesticpolitics,see Kier 1997;Johnston

1995a; Katzenstein1996a, 1993; and Berger1998. For a critiqueof thisemphasison international
as
opposedtodomesticnorms,see Checkel1998.
28. Dubois 1994.
29. See Risse-Kappen1995b;andRisse,Ropp,andSikkinkforthcoming.
30. See Putnam1988;andEvans,Jacobson, andPutnam1993.
894 International
Organization

whatkindsofnormsandrulescouldlead toa decreaseinconflict

intheinternational
system.3'

VersusChange
Stability
Macro-leveltheorizing has providedgood explanations of theway normsproduce
Normschanneland regularizebehavior;theyoftenlimit
social orderand stability.
therangeofchoiceandconstrain Froma constructivist
actions.32 perspective,inter-
nationalstructure is determinedby theinternationaldistributionof ideas.33Shared
ideas,expectations, andbeliefsaboutappropriate behaviorare whatgivetheworld
structure,order,andstability.
Theproblemforconstructivists thusbecomesthesame
problemfacingrealists-explaining structure,
change.In an ideationalinternational
idea shiftsand normshiftsare themainvehiclesforsystemtransformation. Norm
shiftsareto theideationaltheoristwhatchangesin thebalanceofpowerare to the
realist.
JohnRuggiearguesin thisissuethat"havingidentified thepossibilityof system
transformationinthemacrolevel,corresponding micropracticesthatmayhavetrans-
formative mustbe identified
effects and inventoried."The followingsectionis an
attempt toidentify thesepractices.

Evolutionand InfluenceofNorms

In thissectionwe advancesomepropositions about(1) theoriginsor emergence of

internationalnorms,(2) theprocessesthroughwhichnormsinfluence stateandnon-
statebehavior,and(3) whichnormswillmatter andunderwhatconditions. We illus-
tratethearguments withmaterialdrawnfromtwomajorissueareas:women'srights,
andlaws ofwar.International
especiallysuffrage, normsaboutwomen'srights often
cameintodirectcompetition withstronglyhelddomesticnorms,and,typically, there
was no self-evident
state"interest"inthepromotionofsuchnorms.Although topics
relatedtogenderandwomenhavebeenabsentfromthepagesofInternational Orga-
nization,34thesuffrage of halfof
campaignled to theformalpoliticalparticipation
theworld'spopulation andtherefore seemsworthy ofstudy.Laws ofwarallowus to
discusstheimpactofnormswherewe mightleastexpectit-the traditional security

31. See Sunstein1997;andLessig 1995.Foran interesting journalist's

overview, see Rosen 1997.
32. See Katzenstein1996a,3; and Sunstein1997,40. Even Waltz,in his discussionof socialization,
saysthatnormsencourageconformity andthat"socializationreducesvariety." Waltz1979,76.
33. Wendt1992andforthcoming.
34. In itsfirstfifty
yearsInternational
Organization haspublishedonlyone articleon anyissuerelated
to genderor women,CraigMurphy'sreviewessayon genderand international relations;Murphy1996.
We suggestthattheremayhave been a well-internalized norm(witha taken-for-granted quality)that
researchon genderandwomendid notconstitute an appropriatetopicforinternationalrelationsscholar-
ship.Notethatas withanywell-internalized norm,thisdoes notimplythattheeditorsself-consciously
rejectedarticleson gender-related
topics.To thecontrary,we knowa strong normis ineffectwhenitdoes
notoccurto authorsto writeon thetopicor submitarticlesbecauseit is notgenerally understoodas an
appropriate topic.
 NormDynamicsandPoliticalChange 895

field,wheresuchnormslimitstatediscretion
in an area perceivedas essentialto
andsecurity.
nationalsovereignty

TheNorm"LifeCycle"
Norminfluence maybe understood as a three-stageprocess.As shownin Figure1,
thefirststageis "normemergence";thesecondstageinvolvesbroadnormaccep-
tance,whichwe term,followingCass Sunstein,35 a 4normcascade"; and thethird
stageinvolvesinternalization. The firsttwo stagesare dividedby a threshold or
"tipping"point,atwhicha criticalmassofrelevant stateactorsadoptthenorm.This
patternofnorminfluence has beenfoundindependently in workon socialnormsin
U.S. legal theory,quantitativeresearchby sociology'sinstitutionalists or "world
andvariousscholarsofnormsin IR.36The pattern
polity"theorists, is important for
researcherstounderstand becausedifferentsocialprocessesandlogicsofactionmay
be involvedat different stagesin a norm's"life cycle."Thus,theoretical debates
aboutthedegreeto whichnorm-based behavioris drivenbychoiceorhabit,specifi-
cationissuesaboutthecostsofnorm-violation orbenefits fromnormadherence, and
relatedresearchissuesoftenturnoutto hingeon thestageof thenorm'sevolution
one examines.Changeat each stage,we argue,is characterized by different actors,
motives,andmechanisms ofinfluence.
Thecharacteristicmechanism ofthefirststage,normemergence, is persuasion by
normentrepreneurs. Normentrepreneurs attempttoconvincea criticalmassofstates
(normleaders)to embracenewnorms.The secondstageis characterized morebya
dynamicofimitation as thenormleadersattempt to socializeotherstatestobecome
normfollowers. The exactmotivation forthissecondstagewherethenorm"cas-
cades" through therestof thepopulation(in thiscase, of states)mayvary,butwe
arguethata combination ofpressureforconformity, desireto enhanceinternational
legitimation,and thedesireof stateleadersto enhancetheirself-esteem facilitate
normcascades.At thefarend of thenormcascade,norminternalization occurs;
normsacquirea taken-for-granted qualityandareno longera matter ofbroadpublic
debate.Forexample,fewpeopletodaydiscusswhether womenshouldbe allowedto
vote,whetherslaveryis useful,or whethermedicalpersonnelshouldbe granted
immunity duringwar.Completionof the "lifecycle" is notan inevitableprocess.
Manyemergent normsfail to reacha tippingpoint,and laterwe offerarguments
aboutwhichnormsaremorelikelyto succeed.Internalized orcascadingnormsmay
eventually becometheprevailingstandardof appropriateness againstwhichnew
normsemergeandcompeteforsupport.
Researchon women'ssuffrage globallyprovidessupportfortheidea of thelife
cycleofnormsandthenotionofa "tippingpoint"orthreshold ofnormative change.
Althoughmanydomesticsuffrage organizations wereactivein thenineteenth cen-

35. Sunstein1997.
36. See Sunstein1997;MeyerandHannan1979;Bergesen1980;Thomaset al. 1987;andFinnemore
1993.
896 International
Organization

Norm "Norm Internalization

emergence cascade"

Stage1 Tipping Stage2 Stage3

point
FIGURE 1. Normlifecycle

tury,itwas notuntil1904,whenwomen'srights advocatesfoundedtheInternational

Women'sSuffrage Association(IWSA), thatan international campaignforsuffrage
was launched.In fact,rather thana singleinternationalcampaignforwomen'ssuf-
frage,therewerethreeorfouroverlapping campaignswithdifferent degreesofcoor-
dination.37
A quantitativeanalysisofthecross-national acquisition
ofsuffrage rights
revealsa different
dynamic atworkforearlyandlateadopters ofwomen'ssuffrage.38
Priortoa thresholdpointin 1930,no country hadadoptedwomen'ssuffrage without
strong fromdomesticsuffrage
pressure Between1890and1930,West-
organizations.
erncountries withstrongnationalwomen'smovements weremostlikelyto grant
femalesuffrage.Althoughsomeoriginalnormentrepreneurs camefromtheUnited
Statesand theUnitedKingdom,thiswas nota case of "hegemonicsocialization,"
sincethefirststatesto grantwomentherightto vote(New Zealand,Australia, Fin-
land)werenothegemons, andtheUnitedStatesandtheUnitedKingdomlaggedten
to twentyyearsbehind.After1930,international and transnationalinfluences be-
comefarmoreimportant thandomesticpressures fornormadoption,andcountries
adoptedwomen'ssuffrage eventhoughtheyfacedno domesticpressuresto do so.
Forwomen'ssuffrage, thefirststageofnormemergence lastedovereightyyears:it
tookfromtheSenecaFalls Conference in 1848until1930fortwenty statesto adopt
women'ssuffrage. In thetwenty yearsthatfollowedthetipping point,however, some
forty-eightcountries
adoptedwomen'ssuffrage norms.39

Stage 1: Originsor emergenceof norms. Althoughlittletheoretical workhas

focusedexclusively theaccountsofnormorigins
on theprocessof "normbuilding,"
in moststudiesstresshumanagency,indeterminacy,chanceoccurrences,
andfavor-
able events,usingprocesstracingor genealogyas a method.40
Generalizingfrom
theseaccounts,twoelementsseemcommonin thesuccessfulcreationofmostnew
norms: normentrepreneurs
andorganizational from
platforms whichentrepreneurs
act.

Norms
NORMENTREPRENEURS. donotappearoutofthinair;theyareactively
builtby
notionsaboutappropriate
agentshavingstrong ordesirablebehaviorintheircommu-
normsthatmedicalpersonnel
nity.Prevailing andthosewoundedinwarbe treated as
are clearlytraceableto theefforts
neutralsand noncombatants of one man,a Gen-

37. See Dubois 1994;andBerkovitch

1995.
38. Ramirez,Soysal,andShanahan1997.
39. Ibid.
40. See KowertandLegro1996;andPrice1995.
 NormDynamicsandPoliticalChange 897

evese Swiss bankernamedHenryDunant.Dunanthad a transformative personal

experienceat thebattleof Solferinoin 1859 and helpedfoundan organization to
promotethiscause (whatbecametheInternational Committee of theRed Cross)
through an international
treaty(thefirst
GenevaConvention).The internationalcam-
paignforwomen'ssuffrage was similarly
indebtedto theinitialleadershipof such
normentrepreneurs as ElizabethCady StantonandSusanB. Anthony in theUnited
Statesand MillicentGarrettFawcettand EmmelinePankhurst in England.Bothof
thesecases areconsistentwiththedescriptionEthanNadelmanngivesof "transna-
tionalmoralentrepreneurs" who engagein "moralproselytism."'41Legal theorist
Lessig uses theterm"meaningmanagers"or "meaningarchitects" to describethe
samekindof agencyin theprocessof creatingnormsand largercontextsof social
meaning.42
Normentrepreneurs arecriticalfornormemergence becausetheycall attentionto
issuesoreven "create"issuesbyusinglanguagethatnames,interprets, anddrama-
tizesthem.Social movement theoristsreferto thisreinterpretationorrenaming pro-
cess as "framing."43The construction ofcognitive framesis an essentialcomponent
ofnormentrepreneurs' politicalstrategies,
since,whentheyare successful, thenew
framesresonatewithbroaderpublicunderstandings andareadoptedas newwaysof
talkingaboutandunderstanding issues.In constructingtheirframes, normentrepre-
neursfacefirmly embeddedalternative normsandframesthatcreatealternative per-
ceptionsofbothappropriateness and interest.
In thecase of theRed Cross,Dunant
andhiscolleagueshadto persuademilitary commanders notto treatvaluablemedi-
cal personnel andresourcestheycapturedas spoilsofwar,tobe treatedas theysaw
fit.In thecase of women'ssuffrage and laterwomen'srights, normentrepreneurs
encountered alternative
normsaboutwomen'sinterests andtheappropriate rolefor
women.In otherwords,new normsneverentera normative vacuumbutinstead
emergein a highlycontested normative space wheretheymustcompetewithother
normsandperceptions ofinterest.
Thisnormative contestation
has important implications forourunderstandings of
thewaysinwhicha "logicofappropriateness" relatestonorms.44Efforts topromote
a new normtakeplace withinthestandards of "appropriateness" definedby prior
norms.To challengeexistinglogics of appropriateness, activistsmay need to be
explicitly"inappropriate."Suffragetteschainedthemselves to fences,wenton hun-
ger strikes,brokewindowsof government buildings,and refusedto pay taxesas
waysofprotesting theirexclusionfrompoliticalparticipation. Deliberatelyinappro-
priateacts (suchas organizedcivil disobedience),especiallythoseentailingsocial
ostracism orlegalpunishment, canbe powerful toolsfornormentrepreneurs seeking
to senda messageandframean issue.Thus,at thisemergent stageof a norm'slife

41. Nadelmann1990.
42. Lessig 1995.
43. David Snow has called thisstrategic
activity
framealignment-"byrendering eventsor occur-
rencesmeaningful,framesfunction toorganizeexperience
andguideaction,whether
individual
orcollec-
tive."Snowetal. 1986,464.
44. MarchandOlsen 1989,andthisissue.
898 International
Organization

TABLE 1. Stagesofnorms

Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3

Norm emergence Normcascade Internalization

Actors NormentrepreneursStates,internationalLaw,professions,
withorganizational organizations, bureaucracy
platforms networks

Motives Altruism,empathy, Legitimacy, Conformity

ideational, reputation,
esteem
commitment

Dominant Persuasion Socialization, Habit,

mechanisms institutionalization,
institutionalization
demonstration

cycle,invoking a logicofappropriateness to explainbehavioris complicated bythe

factthatstandards ofappropriateness areprecisely whatis beingcontested.
Giventhecostsofinappropriate actionandmanyofthepersuasivetoolstheyuse,
one has to wonderwhatcouldpossiblymotivate normentrepreneurs (see Table 1).
Obviouslytheanswervarieswiththenormandtheentrepreneur, butformanyofthe
socialnormsofinterest topoliticalscientists,
itis verydifficulttoexplainthemotiva-
tionsof normentrepreneurs without reference to empathy, altruism, and ideational
commitment. Empathyexistswhenactorshavethecapacityforparticipating in an-
other'sfeelingsor ideas. Such empathymaylead to empathetic interdependence,
whereactors"areinterested inthewelfareofothersforitsownsake,evenifthishas
no effectontheirownmaterial well-being orsecurity."45
Altruism existswhenactors
actuallytake"actiondesignedtobenefit another evenat theriskofsignificant harm
totheactor'sownwell-being."46 KristenMonroearguesthattheessenceor "heart"
of altruism is a "sharedperception of commonhumanity. . .. a verysimplebut
deeplyfeltrecognition thatwe all sharecertaincharacteristics and are entitledto
certainrights,merelybyvirtueofourcommonhumanity."47 Ideationalcommitment
is themainmotivation whenentrepreneurs promotenormsor ideas because they
believein theidealsand valuesembodiedin thenorms,eventhoughthepursuitof
thenormsmayhaveno effect on theirwell-being.
Of course,manynormentrepreneurs do notso muchactagainsttheirinterests as
theyactin accordancewitha redefined understanding oftheirinterests. Suffragists,

45. See Keohane1984,chap.7; Keohane1990a;andMansbridge1990.

46. Monroe1996.See also OlinerandOliner1988.
47. Monroe1996,206.
 NormDynamicsandPoliticalChange 899

forexample,wereworking on behalfofa coherent conception ofwomen'spolitical

interests,
butit was notan understandinginitiallysharedby thegreatmajorityof
womenin theworld.Womenhadtobe persuadedthatitwas indeedintheirinterests
to pursuesuffrage. theRed Cross had to persuademilitary
Similarly, leadersthat
thewoundedwas compatible
protecting withtheirwaraims.

ORGANIZATIONALPLATFORMS. All normpromoters at theinternationallevelneedsome

kindof organizational platform fromand through whichtheypromotetheirnorms.
Sometimes theseplatforms areconstructedspecifically forthepurposeofpromoting
thenorm,as aremanynongovernmental organizations (NGOs) (suchas Greenpeace,
theRed Cross,andTransafrica) and thelargertransnational advocacynetworks of
whichtheseNGOs becomea part(suchas thosepromoting humanrights, environ-
mentalnorms,and a ban on land minesor thosethatopposedapartheid in South
Africa).48Often,however, entrepreneursworkfromstanding international organiza-
tionsthathavepurposesandagendasotherthansimplypromoting onespecificnorm.
Thoseotheragendasmayshapethecontent ofnormspromoted by theorganization
significantly.49
The structureoftheWorldBankhasbeenamplydocumented toeffect
thekindsofdevelopment normspromulgated fromthatinstitution; itsorganizational
structure,theprofessions fromwhichit recruits, and itsrelationship withmember
statesand privatefinanceall filter
thekindsof normsemerging fromit.50The UN,
similarly,has distinctive
structuralfeaturesthatinfluence thekindsofnormsitpro-
mulgatesaboutsuchmattersas decolonization, sovereignty, and humanitarian re-
1 Thetripartite
lief.5 structureoftheInternational LaborOrganization, whichincludes
laborand businessas well as states,strongly influences thekindsof normsit pro-
motesandthewaysitpromotes them.52
One prominent featureofmodernorganizations andan important sourceofinflu-
enceforinternational organizationsinparticularis theiruseofexpertise andinforma-
tionto changethebehaviorof otheractors.Expertise,in turn,usuallyresidesin
professionals,and a numberof empiricalstudiesdocumenttheways thatprofes-
sionaltraining ofbureaucrats intheseorganizations helpsorblocksthepromotion of
newnormswithinstanding PeterHaas's studyof thecleanupof the
organizations.
Mediterranean showshowecologistsweresuccessful inpromoting theirnormsover
others'in partbecausetheywereable to persuadegovernments to createnewagen-
cies to deal withthecleanupand to staffthosepostswithlike-minded ecologists.
StudiesoftheWorldBanksimilarly document a strong roleforprofessional training
in filtering
thenormsthatthebankpromotes. In thiscase, theinability to quantify
manycostsandbenefits associatedwithantipoverty andbasic humanneedsnorms

48. See Sikkink1993a;KeckandSikkink1998;Klotz1995a,b;andPrice1997.

49. See StrangandChang1993;Finnemore 1996a;Adler1992;andIkenberryandKupchan1990.
50. See Ascher1983;Miller-Adams1997;Wade 1996b;andFinnemore 1996a.
51. See Barnett1995,1997;McNeely1995;andWeissandPasic 1997.
52. StrangandChang1993.
900 International
Organization

createdresistanceamongthemanyeconomistsstaffing thebank,becauseprojects
promoting thesenormscouldnotbe justified on thebasisof "good economics."53
Whatevertheirplatform, normentrepreneurs and theorganizations theyinhabit
usuallyneedto securethesupportof stateactorsto endorsetheirnormsand make
normsocialization a partoftheiragenda,anddifferent organizational platforms pro-
videdifferent kindsoftoolsforentrepreneurs todo this.54International organizations
liketheUN andtheWorldBank,thoughnottailoredto normpromotion, mayhave
theadvantageofresourcesandleverageoverweakordevelopingstatestheyseekto
convertto theirnormative convictions.Networksof NGOs and intergovernmental
organizations (IGOs) dealingwithpowerful states,however,arerarelyable to "co-
erce" agreement to a norm-theymustpersuade.Theymusttakewhatis seen as
naturalor appropriate andconvertitintosomething perceivedas wrongor inappro-
priate.Thisprocessis notnecessarily orentirely intherealmofreason,thoughfacts
andinformation maybe marshaled tosupport claims.Affect, empathy, andprincipled
ormoralbeliefsmayalso be deeplyinvolved,sincetheultimate goal is notto chal-
lengethe"truth" ofsomething, butto challengewhether itis good,appropriate, and
deservingof praise.55 In thesecases, whattheorganizational network providesis
information andaccesstoimportant audiencesforthatinformation, especiallymedia
anddecisionmakers.
In mostcases, foran emergent normto reacha threshold and movetowardthe
secondstage,itmustbecomeinstitutionalized in specificsetsof international rules
andorganizations.56 Since 1948,emergent normshaveincreasingly becomeinstitu-
tionalizedin international law,intherulesofmultilateral organizations, andinbilat-
eralforeign policies.Such institutionalization
contributes strongly to thepossibility
fora normcascadebothbyclarifying what,exactly, thenormis andwhatconstitutes
violation(oftena matterof somedisagreement amongactors)and by spellingout
specificprocedures bywhichnormleaderscoordinate disapproval andsanctionsfor
normbreaking. ofnormsaboutbiologicalandchemicalweapons,
Institutionalization
forexample,has beenessentialto coordinating thenearuniversalsanctionson Iraq
following theGulfWarandhas enabledstatesto coordinate an invasiveinspections
regimeaimedat securingcompliancewiththosenorms.Institutionalization is nota
necessaryconditionfora normcascade,however,and institutionalization mayfol-
low,rather thanprecede,theinitiation ofa normcascade.Women'ssuffrage was not
institutionalizedin intemational rulesor organizations priorto thebeginning of the
normcascade.The firstintergovernmental agencycreatedto deal withwomen'sis-
sueswas a regionalorganization, theInter-American Commission ofWomen(CIM),
established in 1928.Although scholarslocatethetipping pointon women'ssuffrage
around1930,thenormcascadedin similarwaysbothinLatinAmerica(whereitwas

53. See Ascher1983;Miller-Adams 1997;andFinnemore 1996a.

54. Paul Wapnerpointsoutthatthereareexceptions to thecentralityofthestatein theseprocessesin
environmentalpoliticswhereactivistslobbypollutingcorporations to bringaboutchange(for
directly
example,thecampaignagainstMcDonald'sclamshellcontainers foritssandwiches).Wapner1996.
55. Fearon1997.
56. See GoldsteinandKeohane1993b;andKatzenstein 1996b.
 NormDynamicsandPoliticalChange 901

and in otherplaces aroundtheworldwherewomen'srightswere

institutionalized)
notsimilarly
institutionalized.

TIPPING OR THRESHOLD POINTS. Afternormentrepreneurs have persuadeda critical

massof statesto becomenormleadersand adoptnewnorms,we can say thenorm
reachesa threshold or tippingpoint.Althoughscholarshave providedconvincing
quantitative empiricalsupportfortheidea of a normtippingpointand normcas-
cades,theyhavenotyetprovideda theoretical accountforwhynormtipping occurs,
norcriteriaforspecifying a prioriwhere,when,and how we wouldexpectit.We
proposetwotentative hypotheses aboutwhatconstitutes a "criticalmass"andwhen
andwheretoexpectnormtipping. First,although itis notpossibletopredictexactly
how manystatesmustaccepta normto "tip" theprocess,because statesare not
equal whenit comesto normative weight,empiricalstudiessuggestthatnormtip-
pingrarelyoccursbeforeone-third ofthetotalstatesin thesystemadoptthenorm.57
In thecase of women'ssuffrage, FranciscoRamirez,YaseminSoysal,and Suzanne
Shanahanplace thethreshold pointin 1930,whentwenty states(or approximately
one-third of thetotalstatesin thesystemat thattime)had acceptedwomen'ssuf-
frage.58 In case oflandmines,byMay 1997thenumber ofstatessupporting theban
on anti-personnel land minesreached60, or approximately one-third of thetotal
statesinthesystem. Afterthatpoint,a normcascadeoccurred, and 124 statesratified
theOttawalandminetreaty inDecember1997.
It also matters whichstatesadoptthenorm.Some statesare criticalto a norm's
adoption;othersareless so. Whatconstitutes a "criticalstate"willvaryfromissueto
issue,butonecriterion is thatcriticalstatesarethosewithout whichtheachievement
ofthesubstantive normgoal is compromised. Thus,inthecase oflandmines,a state
thatdid notproduceor use land mineswould nothave been a criticalstate.By
contrast, thedecisionin mid-1997by Franceand GreatBritain,bothland mines
producers, to supportthetreaty couldwellhavecontributed tothenormcascadethat
happenedinlate1997.59Securingsupport ofthosesametwostateswas simplyessen-
tialtoproducing thenormcascadeandnearuniversalacceptanceofthefirst Geneva
Convention in Europe130 yearsearlier.Statesmayalso be "critical"becausethey
havea certainmoralstature. Forexample,thedecisionofSouthAfricaunderNelson
Mandelato support thelandminetreaty was veryinfluential, especiallywithother
statesin Africabutalso globally.60 Althoughcascadesrequiresupportfromsome
criticalstates,unanimity amongthemis notessential.For example,afterinitially
supporting thenormofbanninglandmines,theUnitedStatesrefusedto support the
treaty, butthenormcascadednevertheless.

law hashadtowrestlewiththisproblemrepeatedly,
57. International sincemanymoderninternational
normsareembodiedin treaties.
Treatiesimplicitly
recognizethisconceptof criticalmassby specifying
thata particular
numberof countries
mustratifyforthetreatyto enterintoforce.Wheretreatiesexist,
theentryintoforceofthetreaty
maybe a usefulproxyforthecriticalmassnecessaryto saythata norm
exists.
58. Ramirez,Soysal,andShanahan1997.
59. Price1998.
60. Ibid.
902 International
Organization

Stage 2: Normcascades. Up to thetippingpoint,littlenormative changeoccurs

withoutsignificant domesticmovements supporting suchchange.Afterthetipping
pointhas beenreached,however,a different dynamicbegins.Morecountries begin
to adoptnewnormsmorerapidlyevenwithout domesticpressureforsuchchange.
Empiricalstudiessuggestthat,atthispoint,oftenan international orregionaldemon-
strationeffect or "contagion"occursin whichinternational andtransnational norm
influencesbecomemoreimportant thandomestic politicsforeffectingnormchange.61
Contagion, however,is too passivea metaphor; we arguethattheprimary mecha-
nismforpromoting normcascadesis an activeprocessofinternational socialization
intended to inducenormbreakersto becomenormfollowers.62 KennethWaltzsug-
gestedsomeof thewayssocializationin occurs:emulation(of heroes),praise(for
behaviorthatconforms togroupnorms),andridicule(fordeviation).63 In thecontext
of international politics,socializationinvolvesdiplomaticpraiseor censure,either
bilateralor multilateral, whichis reinforced by materialsanctionsand incentives.
States,however, arenottheonlyagentsofsocialization. Networks ofnormentrepre-
neursandinternational organizationsalso actas agentsofsocialization bypressuring
targetedactorstoadoptnewpoliciesandlawsandtoratify treaties
andbymonitoring
compliancewithinternational standards.The International Committee of theRed
Cross(ICRC) certainly didnotdisappearwiththesigning ofthefirstGenevaConven-
tion.Instead,theICRC becameitschiefsocializingagent,helpingstatestoteachthe
newrulesofwartotheirsoldiers,collecting information aboutviolations, andpubli-
cizingthemtopressure violatorstoconfolrm.
Socializationis thusthedominant mechanism ofa normcascade-the mechanism
through whichnormleaderspersuadeothersto adhere-butwhatmakessocializa-
tionwork?Whatarethemotivesthatinducestatesopposedtothenormtoadhereand
adherequickly?We arguethatstatescomplywithnormsin stage2 forreasonsthat
relatetotheiridentities as members ofaninternational society.Recognition thatstate
identityfundamentally shapesstatebehavior, andthatstateidentity is,inturn, shaped
by thecultural-institutional contextwithinwhichstatesact,has been an important
contribution of recentnormsresearch.64 JamesFearonsimilarly arguesthatone's
identityis as a memberof a particular social category,and partof thedefinition of
thatcategory is thatall members followcertainnorms.65 Whathappensatthetipping
pointis thatenoughstatesandenoughcriticalstatesendorsethenewnormto rede-
fineappropriate behaviorfortheidentity called "state"or somerelevantsubsetof
states(suchas a "liberal"stateora Europeanstate).
To thedegreethatstatesand stateelitesfashiona politicalselfor identity in
relationtotheinternational community, theconceptofsocialization suggeststhatthe

61. See Ramirez,Soysal,andShanahan1997;andWhitehead1996.

62. Socializationinvolvesthe "inductionof new members.. . intotheways of behaviorthatare
ina society."Barnes,Carter,
preferred andSkidmore1980,35. Socializationcanthusbe seenas a mecha-
nismthrough whichnewstatesareinducedtochangetheirbehaviorbyadopting thosenormspreferredby
an international
societyofstates.See also Risse,Ropp,andSikkink,
forthcoming.
63. Waltz1979,75-76.
64. Katzenstein 1996b.
65. Fearon1997.
 NormDynamicsandPoliticalChange 903

cumulative effectofmanycountries ina regionadopting newnorms"maybe analo-

gousto 'peerpressure'amongcountries."66 Threepossiblemotivations forrespond-
ingto such"peerpressure"arelegitimation, conformity, andesteem.
Scholarshave longunderstood thatlegitimation is important forstatesand have
recognizedtheroleofinternational sourcesoflegitimation in shapingstatebehavior.
Claude,forexample,described international organizations as "custodians oftheseals
ofinternational approvalanddisapproval," andemphasizedtheircrucialrolein es-
tablishing and assuringadherence to international norms.67 Certainly therearecosts
thatcomewithbeinglabeleda "roguestate"in international interactions,sincethis
entailsloss of reputation, trust,and credibility, thepresenceof whichhave been
amplydocumented to contributetoPareto-improving effects frominterstate interac-
tion.We argue,though, thatstatesalso careaboutinternational legitimationbecause
ithasbecomean essentialcontributor toperceptions ofdomesticlegitimacy heldby
a state'sowncitizens.Domesticlegitimacy is thebeliefthatexisting politicalinstitu-
tionsare betterthanotheralternatives and therefore deserveobedience.68 Increas-
ingly,citizensmakejudgments aboutwhether theirgovernment is betterthanalterna-
tivesbylookingatthosealternatives (in theinternational andregionalarena)andby
seeingwhatotherpeopleand countries say abouttheircountry. Domesticlegitima-
tionis obviouslyimportant becauseitpromotes compliancewithgovemment rules
andlaws;rulingbyforcealoneis almostimpossible. Thus,international legitimation
is important insofaras itreflects
backon a government's domesticbasisoflegitima-
tionandconsentandthusultimately onitsabilityto stayinpower.Thisdynamicwas
partof theexplanation forregimetransitions in SouthAfrica,LatinAmerica,and
southern Europe.69
Conformity and esteemsimilarly involveevaluativerelationships betweenstates
andtheirstate"peers."Conformity involveswhatRobertAxelrodrefersto as "so-
cial proof"-statescomplywithnormsto demonstrate thattheyhaveadaptedtothe
social environment-that they"belong." "By conforming to theactionsof those
aroundus,we fulfill a psychologicalneedtobe partofa group."70 Esteemis related
tobothconformity andlegitimacy, butitgoesdeeper,sinceitsuggeststhatleadersof
statessometimes follownormsbecausetheywantothersto thinkwell ofthem,and
theywanttothink wellofthemselves.71 Social normsaresustained, inpart,by "feel-
ingsofembarrassment, anxiety,guilt,andshamethata personsuffers attheprospect
ofviolating them."72 Fearonhas arguedthatidentity is basedon thoseaspectsofthe
selfin whichan individual has specialprideorfromwhichan individualgainsself-
esteem.73 Thus,thedesireto gainor defendone's prideoresteemcan explainnorm

66. Ramirez,Soysal,andShanahan1997.
67. Claude 1966.For morecontemporary thatintemational
arguments organizations
continueto play
thisrole,see Bamnett
1997,1995;andBarnettandFinnemore1997.
68. Linz 1978.
69. See Klotz 1995a,b;andWhitehead1996.
70. Axelrod1986,1105.
71. Fearon1997.
72. Elster1989c.
73. Fearon1997,23.
 Organization
904 International

following. In thissense,statescareaboutfollowing normsassociatedwithliberalism

becausebeing"liberalstates"is partoftheiridentity in thesenseofsomething they
takeprideinorfromwhichtheygainself-esteem.
The microfoundations ofboththeconformity andesteemarguments forindividu-
als arepsychological andreston extensive researchon theimportance ofself-esteem
andconformity forindividuals.Thepowerofconformity togroupnormsis so strong
in someexperimental thatindividuals
situations willmakestatements thatareobjec-
tivelywrongin orderto avoiddeviatingfromgroupjudgments. In situationswhere,
theobjectivereality is ambiguous,individualsareevenmorelikelytoturnto "social
reality"to formand evaluatetheirbeliefs.74 Theoriesof cognitivedissonancemay
also provideinsightsintothemotivations fornorm-conforming behavior.Studies
suggestthatcognitivedissonanceis arousedprimarily whenpeoplenoticethattheir
behaviorleadstoaversiveconsequencesthatcannotbe easilyrectified. The unpleas-
antexperienceof dissonanceleads actorsto reduceitby changingeithertheiratti-
tudesor theirbehavior.75 We arguethatan analogto thisexistsat thelevel of the
state:stateleadersconform to normsin orderto avoid thedisapprovalarousedby
normviolationandthusto enhancenationalesteem(and,as a result,theirownself-
esteem).It is difficulttogeneralizetothestatelevelfromresearchon esteemdoneat
theindividual level,butnormentrepreneurs frequentlytargetindividualstateleaders
forcriticism. Because muchnormadvocacyinvolvespointing to discrepancies be-
tweenwordsandactionsandholdingactorspersonally responsibleforaverseconse-
quencesof theiractions,one way to thinkaboutnormentrepreneurs is thatthey
providetheinformation andpublicitythatprovokecognitive dissonanceamongnorm
violators.In theareaofhumanrightsa bodyof empiricalresearchis emerging that
suggeststhatsomestateleaderscaredeeplyabouttheirinternational imageas human
rightsviolatorsandmakesignificant policychangesin orderto changethatimage.76

Stage 3: Internalization. At theextremeof a normcascade,normsmaybecome

so widelyacceptedthattheyare internalized by actorsand achievea "taken-for-
granted"qualitythatmakesconformance withthenormalmostautomatic. Forthis
normscanbe bothextremely
reason,internalized powerful (becausebehavioraccord-
ingto thenormis notquestioned)and hardto discern(becauseactorsdo notseri-
ouslyconsiderordiscusswhether toconform). Preciselybecausetheyarenotcontro-
thesenormsareoftennotthecenterpiece
versial,however, ofpoliticaldebateandfor
thatreasontendto be ignoredby politicalscientists. in sociology,
Institutionalists
however, havemademanyofthesemostinternalized normsthecenterpiece oftheir
researchprogram andhavedoneus theserviceofproblematizing and "denaturaliz-
ing"manyofthemostprominent Western normsthatwe takeforgranted-suchas
thoseaboutmarketexchange,sovereignty, Insteadof trying
and individualism. to
in statebehavior,
explainvariation thesescholarsarepuzzledbythedegreeof simi-

74. For a surveyof thisliterature,see Eagly and Chaiken1993; on compliancewithsocial norms,

conformity in groups,and thenormative originsof conformity,ibid.,630-34, 642-44; on self-esteem
maintenance, ibid.,484; on ego defense,ibid.,480-81,576-78; andon self-concept,ibid.,177-78.
75. EaglyandChaiken1993.
76. See Risse,Ropp,andSikkinkforthcoming, esp. chap.bySieglindeGranzeron Morocco.
 NormDynamicsandPoliticalChange 905

larityor "isomorphism" amongstatesandsocietiesandhowthosesimilarities have

increasedinrecentyears.Theirexplanations forthesesimilarities pointtopastnorm
cascades leadingto statestakingup new responsibilities or endowingindividuals
withnewrights as a matterofcourse.77
Professions oftenserveas powerfuland pervasiveagentsworkingto internalize
normsamongtheirmembers.Professional trainingdoes morethansimplytransfer
technicalknowledge;itactivelysocializespeopleto valuecertainthingsaboveoth-
ers.Doctorsaretrainedto valuelifeabove all else. Soldiersaretrainedto sacrifice
lifeforcertainstrategic goals.Economists, ecologists,andlawyersall carrydifferent
normative biases systematicallyinstilledbytheirprofessional As statebu-
training.
reaucracies andinternational organizations havebecomemoreandmoreprofession-
alizedoverthetwentieth century,we shouldexpectto see policyincreasingly reflect-
ingthenormative biasesoftheprofessions thatstaffdecision-making agencies.78A
numberofempiricalstudieshavealreadydocumented a roleforhighlyinternalized
normsheldbyprofessionals determining policy.In additiontotheroleofeconomists
attheWorldBankmentioned Anne-Marie
earlier, Burley'sworkshowsa crucialrole
forlegalprofessional normsincreating thepost-World WarII politicalorder,andher
workwithWalterMattlishowstheirimportance intheEuropeanUnion.79
Anotherpowerfuland relatedmechanism contributing to theconsolidation and
universalizationof normsaftera normcascademaybe iterated behaviorandhabit.
Politicalscientists have understood thepowerof thesemechanisms foryearsbut
havenotconnected themtheoretically tonormsandsocialconstruction debates.The
coreoftheneofunctionalist argument aboutintegration inEurope,afterall,was that
frequent interactions amongpeopleinvolving jointworkon technicaltaskswould
ultimately createpredictability,stability,and habitsof trust.As trustbecameha-
bitual,it wouldbecomeinternalized and internalized trustwould,in turn,change
affectamongtheparticipants. Changedaffectmeantchangedidentity and changed
normsas empathy withothersshifted.
andidentification Thus,theengineofintegra-
tionwas indirectand evolutionary. Diplomatictools such as confidence-building
measuresandtrack2 diplomacymayfollowa similarlogic.Generalized, thisargu-
mentsuggeststhatroutesto normative changemaybe similarly indirect
andevolu-
tionary:procedural changesthatcreatenewpoliticalprocessescan lead to gradual
andinadvertent normative, ideational,andpoliticalconvergence.80

WhichNormsMatterUnderWhatConditions?
Oneofthecommoncriticisms
ofnormsresearch hasbeenthatitprovidesno substan-
tivehypotheses
aboutwhichnormswill be influential
in worldpoliticsand under

77. See Bergesen1980;Thomasetal. 1987;ScottandMeyer1994;McNeely1995;Meyeretal. 1997;

andFinnemore 1996b.
78. See Haas 1989;Ascher1983;Adler1992;Miller-Adams 1997;Finnemore 1995; andBamettand
Finnemore 1997.
79. See Burley1993; and Burleyand Mattli1993.Theseempiricalfindings withtheo-
areconsistent
reticalarguments madebyDiMaggioandPowell 1983.
80. See also Rosenau1986.
906 International
Organization

theywillbe influential.
whatconditions revealsa number
Ourreviewoftheliterature
ofsuchhypotheses infuture
thatcouldbe testedandelaborated research.

Legitimation. Wearguedearlierthatanimportant conditionfordomestic receptive-

nesstointernationalnormsis a needforinternational Iflegitimation
legitimation. is a
mainmotivation fornormative we mightexpectstatestoendorseinternational
shifts,
normsduringperiodsofdomesticturmoil in whichthelegitimacy ofelitesis threat-
ened.81If statesseekto enhancetheirreputationor esteem,we wouldexpectstates
thatareinsecureabouttheirinternational
statusorreputationtoembracenewinterna-
tionalnormsmosteagerlyandthoroughly. AmyGurowitzhas argued,forexample,
thatJapanhas beenmoreopentoendorsing internationalnormsaboutrefugees than
hasGermany becauseJapanis "insecure"aboutitsinternationalpoliticalleadership
role.8'Dana Eyreand MarkSuchmansimilarlyarguethatdevelopingstatesmay
adopthigh-tech weaponryoutof statusconcernsrather thanfroma utilitarianwar-
fightingcalculus.83

Prominence. Somedomesticnormsappearmorelikelycandidatesforinternation-
alizationthanothers.Thiscouldbe due eitherto thequalityofthenormitself(dis-
cussedlater)or to thequalityofthestatespromoting thenorm.Drawingon natural
AnnFlorinihasarguedthat"prominence"
selectiontheory, is animportant character-
isticof normsthatare likelyto spreadthroughthesystem.84 Normsheldby states
widelyviewedas successfulanddesirablemodelsarethuslikelyto becomepromi-
nentanddiffuse. The factthatWestern normsaremorelikelyto diffuse internation-
allywouldseemto followfromthisobservation. Thisfitsthepatternofadoptionof
women'ssuffrage norms, sincealmostallthenormleaderswereWestern states(though
theUnitedStatesand Britainwerelatecomernormleaders,not earlyones). Jon
Elster,however,suggeststhatprominence shouldbe seeninculturalandeconomicas
termssincethereare manyexamplesof countries
well as military likeGreeceand
Chinathatwereconqueredbutwhosenormswereassimilated bytheirconquerors.85

Intrinsiccharacteristicsof the norm. Withinnormsresearch,thereare several

setsof claimsthatintrinsic
qualitiesof thenormitselfdetermine
itsinfluence.
We
can dividetheseclaimsbetweenthosestressing theformulationof thenorm(its
andthosestressing
clarityandspecificity) thesubstanceofthenormandtheissuesit
theformof thenormarguethatnormsthat
addresses(itscontent).Those stressing

81. See IkenberryandKupchan1990;andRon 1997.

82. Gurowitz1997.
83. EyreandSuchman1996.
84. Florini1996.
85. Elster1989a. Some authorshave discussed"hegemonicsocialization"in whichnormswill be
whentheyareembracedandespousedbythehegemon.Ikenberry
influential andKupchan1990.Thisis
clearlyrelatedtotheprominence sincestatesmaybe viewed
thesisbutcanonlybe a subsetofprominence,
as successfulwithoutbeinghegemonic.
 NormDynamicsandPoliticalChange 907

areclearandspecific, rather thanambiguous andcomplex,86 andthosethathavebeen

aroundforawhile,surviving numerous challenges, aremorelikelyto be effective.87
Institutionalists
insociologyhavealso arguedthatnormsmakinguniversalistic claims
aboutwhatis good forall peoplein all places(suchas manyWestern norms)have
moreexpansivepotentialthanlocalizedand particularistic normative frameworks
likethoseinBali describedbyClifford Geertz.88
Arguments aboutwhichsubstantive normative claimswillbe moreinfluential in
worldpoliticshavevariedwidely.Workbysociology'sinstitutionalists suggeststhat
normsaboutissues congruent withcapitalismand liberalismwill be particularly
powerful, butthisformulation is toovaguetobe useful.Manynorms(someofthem
conflicting)arecongruent withliberalism andcapitalism, butonlya subsetof such
normshavepowerful transnational effects.JohnBoli and GeorgeThomashavere-
finedthisobservation somewhatand arguethatfiveprinciples are centralto world
culture:universalism, individualism, voluntaristicauthority, rationalprogress,and
worldcitizenship.By implication theysuggestthatnormsunderpinned bytheseprin-
cipleswillbe moresuccessful BothJamesLee RayandNetaCraw-
internationally.89
fordhavearguedin a similarveinthatthereis a long-term trendtowardhumanizing
the"other,"or "moralprogress,"thathelpsto explainboththeendof slaveryand
theend of colonizationand could predictthedemiseof international war in the
MargaretKeck and Kathryn
future.90 Sikkinkhave advancedmorespecificclaims.
Theyarguethatnormsinvolving(1) bodilyintegrity andprevention ofbodilyharm
forvulnerableor "innocent"groups,especiallywhena shortcausal chainexists
betweencauseandeffect, and(2) legalequalityofopportunity areparticularly effec-
tivetransnationally Normentrepreneurs
andcross-culturally.91 mustspeakto aspects
ofbeliefsystems orlifeworldsthattranscend a specificculturalorpoliticalcontext.
Although notionsofbodilyharmareculturally interpreted,Keck andSikkinkargue,
theyalso resonatewithbasic ideasofhumandignity commonto mostcultures. The
notionthatnormsaboutequalityandprotecting vulnerable groupsfrombodilyharm
willhave moretransnational resonancethanothernormsexplainswhynormcam-
paignsaroundslaveryand women'ssuffrage succeededwhilea similar,powerful
temperance campaignorganized bymanyofthesamepeoplefailedtoreacha critical
massortippingpoint.It mightalso explainwhynolrms againstdrinking or smoking
suddenly becamemorepowerful whentheeffects on vulnerable orinnocent bystand-
ersofsecondhand smokeorfetalalcoholsyndrome becamemorewidelyknown.
Arguments thatthesubstantive contentof a normdetermines whether it will be
successfulimplythatnormevolution has a cleardirection ifnota finalendpoint and
suggestthatproponents of sucharguments supportsomenotionof "historicaleffi-
ciency."It movesthesenormsresearchers outofthe"history-dependent institution-

86. See ChayesandChayes1993;Legro1997;andFranck1992.

87. See Legro1997;andFranck1992.
88. See Meyer,Boli, andThomas1987;andGeertz1980.
89. Boli andThomas1998.
90. See Crawford1993;andRay 1989.
91. KeckandSikkink1998.
908 International
Organization

alism"boxthatJamesMarchandJohanOlsendiscussinthisissueintosomeversion
of "functional Not all researchers
institutionalism." acceptfunctionalarguments,
however.In his workon thechemicalweaponstaboo,RichardPricerejectsargu-
mentsabouttheintrinsic of theissue,arguinginsteadthatchemical
characteristics
weaponsare notanymoreterrible thanotherweapons,and yettheyare theonly
weaponsthathavebeenthesubjectof sucha prohibition.92 MarthaFinnemore has
also emphasized contradictions
amongdominant globalnormsas a barrier
toanysort
ofteleologicalargument abouttheireffects.93
Price'srecentworkon theprohibition
oflandmines,however, suggeststhattransnational
normentrepreneurs havesuccess-
fullyusedgraphicimagesofbodilyharmas a meansofmobilizing a powerfultrans-
nationalcampaignagainsttheseweapons.94 The speedwithwhichtheban on land
minesmovedfromnormemergence toa normcascadereinforces theideathatnorms
bodilyharmto innocent
prohibiting bystanders areamongthosemostlikelyto find
transnational
support.

ADJACENCY CLAIMS OR PATH DEPENDENCE. Therelationship ofnewnormative claims

to existingnormsmayalso influence thelikelinessof theirinfluence. This is most
clearlytruefornormswithin internationallaw,sincethepowerorpersuasiveness ofa
normative claimin law is explicitly tiedto the "fit"of thatclaimwithinexisting
normative frameworks (discussedlater).RobertSugdenmakesa similarargument
that"becauseprominence is largelya matterofcommonexperience... theconven-
tionsthatarebestable to spreadarethosethataremostsusceptible to analogy.Thus
we shouldfindfamilyrelationships amongconventions."95 also
Politicalscientists
makearguments aboutadjacency, precedent,andfit.Pricearguesthattheassociation
ofchemicalweaponswithpoison,whichhadalreadybeenprohibited, was important
forsustainingtheprohibition on chemicalweapons.96 Yet,as Priceandothersrecog-
nize,themeaningsof anyparticular normandthelinkagesbetweenexistingnorms
andemergent normsareoftennotobviousandmustbe activelyconstructed bypro-
ponentsof newnorms.Activistsworkhardto frametheirissuesin waysthatmake
persuasiveconnections betweenexistingnormsandemergent norms.Opponentsof
femalegenitalmutilation madelittleheadway,forexample,whenthepracticewas
called"femalecircumcision," becausemalecircumcision is oftena positivelyvalued
practice.However,whentheyreplacedthetermcircumcision withmutilation and
campaignedunderthebannerof "violenceagainstwomen,"the issue resonated
muchmorestrongly, andthecampaigngainedadherents. Theseactivists clearlyrec-
ognizedthepowerof adjacencyclaimsand activelyworkedto situatetheirissuein
sucha wayas tomakeitmoredifficult todismissbytyingittothebetter-established
bodyofhumanrights norms.97

92. Price1995,1997.
93. Finnemore1996a,chap.5 and 1996b.
94. Price1998.
95. Sugden1989,93.
96. Price1995.
97. KeckandSikkink1998.
 NormDynamicsandPoliticalChange 909

WORLD TIME-CONTEXT. Worldhistorical eventssuchas warsormajordepressions in

theinternationalsystemcan lead to a searchfornew ideas and norms.98 Ideas and
normsmostassociatedwiththelosingsideof a warorperceivedto havecausedan
economicfailureshouldbe at particular riskof beingdiscredited,openingthefield
foralternatives.99This kindof explanation wouldsuggestthattheend of theCold
Warwouldbe sucha periodofmajornormative growth andconsolidation, basedon
theprinciplesofthewinning coalitioninthe"war."
Notionsof "worldtime"are also presentin thearguments of thosewho see the
currentperiodofglobalization as onethatpromotes dramaticexpansionofnewnorms
andcreatesnewopportunities fornormentrepreneurs. Althoughnormshavealways
beena partofinternational life,changesin communication andtransportation tech-
nologiesandincreasing globalinterdependence haveled toincreasedconnectedness
and,in a way,areleadingto thehomogenization ofglobalnorms.Although thereis
stillinadequateinformation to makea conclusiveargument, we suggestas an addi-
tionalhypothesis thatthespeedofnormative changehas acceleratedsubstantiallyin
thelaterpartofthetwentieth century.If we comparethecase of women'ssuffrage,
wherenormemergence tookeightyyearsandthenormcascadeanother to the
forty,
issueofviolenceagainstwomen,whichmovedfromnormemergence to cascadein
less thantwenty years,itappearsthatthespeedofnormative changeis accelerating.
The expansionofinternational organization (especiallywiththeUN) is contributing
tothisacceleration processbyproviding moreopportunities toaddressandnegotiate
on a broadrangeofnormative issues.

and StrategicSocial Construction

Norms,Rationality,

The extensivebodyofempiricalresearchon normsrevealsan intimate relationship

betweennormsand rationality. However,thereis littlegood theoretical treatment
of thisrelationship,partlybecause scholarshave tendedto counterposenorms
in IR. The oppositionof constructivist
to rationality and "rationalist"arguments
thathas become widespreadin the disciplineimpliesthatthe issues construc-
tivistsstudy(norms,identities)are notrationaland, similarly, that"rationalists"
cannotor do nottreatnormsor identities in theirresearchprograms.10? However,
recenttheoreticalworkinrationalchoiceandempiricalworkon normentrepreneurs
makeitabundantly clearthatthisfaultlineis untenable
bothempiricallyandtheoreti-
cally.
Rationalchoicetheorists have beenworkingon problemsrelatedto norm-based
behaviorformorethattwodecadesnowandhavebegunworking on identityprob-

98. BarkinandCronin1994.Thisis quitesimilartoexplanations inthe"ideas" literature

aboutfailure,
crisis,anddisappointment
leadingtochanging ideas.See Odell 1982;andHirschman 1982.
99. Hall makesthiskindofargument aboutshifts
ineconomicideas.Hall 1989a.
100. Fora relatedargument,see Fearon1997,28-29.
910 International
Organization

lemsas well.101The factthatrationalchoicemethodshavebeenappropriated in the

pastby thosewitha materialontologyhas tendedto obscurethefactthatnothing
aboutrationalchoicerequiressuchanontology. Theutilities
ofactorscouldbe speci-
fiedas social or ideationalas easilyas theycan be material.By makingdifferent
assumptions aboutsocial relationships and ideationalvalues,rationalchoicetheo-
ristsprovideinteresting insightsintothekindsof normative patterns thatmayde-
velopand be stable.For example,B. DouglasBernheimascribesto actorsconcern
aboutstatusand theopinionsof othersand showshow different patterns of social
conformity result,including customs, fads,andsubcultures.102 Sugdenexaminesthe
evolutionof socialconventions andshowshowsomeNashequilibriaareevolution-
arilystablein iteratedgames,whereasothersarenot,thusyieldingcertainkindsof
social conventions. His analysis,however,findsa largerolefor"commonexperi-
ence" in determining the "focalpoints"aroundwhichparticular conventions will
emerge, an argument dovetailingnicelywithconstructivist arguments abouttheways
in whichsocial structure and normative contextshape theactionsof agentsand,
again,suggesting theneedformoretheorizing abouttheconnection betweenstrate-
gicchoiceandnormative context.103
Similarly,empiricalresearchon transnational normentrepreneurs makesitabun-
dantlyclearthattheseactorsareextremely rationaland,indeed,verysophisticated in
theirmeans-endscalculationsabouthow to achievetheirgoals.104 Theyengagein
something we wouldcall "strategicsocial construction": theseactorsare making
detailedmeans-endscalculationsto maximizetheirutilities, buttheutilitiesthey
wantto maximizeinvolvechangingtheotherplayers'utility function in waysthat
reflectthenormative commitments of thenormentrepreneurs. The firsthalfof the
processfitsnicelyin a rationalgame-theoretic framework. The secondhalfdoes not.
This suggeststhatinsteadof opposinginstrumental rationalityand socialconstruc-
tionwe needtofindsomewaytolinkthoseprocessestheoretically.
FollowingSugden,theeditorsofthisvolumemaketheimportant observation that
whatgame theorists have called "commonknowledge"providesan openingfor
conversation betweenrationalchoicescholarsand constructivists, and theyfurther
suggesta two-stage divisionoflaborbetweentheframeworks: "Constructivists seek
to understand how preferences are formedand knowledgegenerated, priorto the
exerciseof instrumental Althoughthissuggesteddivisionof labor
rationality."105
capturesonepossibleinteraction ofthetwoapproaches, itdoes notexhaustthemul-
tiplewaysin whichnormsandrationality interact. thisdivisionignores
Specifically,
preciselywhattheempiricalstudiesreveal-namely,thatinstrumental rationality
and strategicinteractionplaya significant rolein highlypoliticizedsocialconstruc-

101. Akerlof1980;Jones1984;Axelrod1986;Elster1989a,c;Molfow1994b;Laitin1995;Fearonand
Laitin1996;andFearon1997.
102. Bernheim1994.
103. Sugden1989. For a discussionof commonknowledgeas "a pointof complementarity"
across
theoretical
perspectives,
see Katzenstein,
Keohane,andKrasner,
thisissue.
104. See Klotz1995a,b;Price1997;Sikkink1993a;KeckandSikkink1998;Finnemore
1996a;Thomas
1997;andNadelmann1990.
Keohane,andKrasner,
105. Katzenstein, thisissue.
 NormDynamicsandPoliticalChange 911

tionof norms,preferences, and commonknowledgeby normentrepre-

identities,
neursin worldpolitics.It ignoresthe "strategic"character of social construction.
One of theconsistent featuresof theempiricalresearchreviewedhereis thatthe
commonknowledge(or whatconstructivists wouldcall intersubjective understand-
ings)informing actors'calculations is notstaticnoris itjust "outthere"accretedby
historyandexperience in someautomatic wayliketheprominence ofGrandCentral
Station(in Schelling'saccount)or drivingon theleftside of theroad(in Sugden's
account).106 In manyof themostpoliticallysalientstrategic interactions,it is pre-
ciselythechangingcontours ofcommonknowledge thataretheobjectofthegame,
atleastforsomesetsofplayers.Commonknowledge aboutwhois a politicalpartici-
pant(suffrage), whattherulesofwarare,andevenwhois a person(slavery)hasbeen
createdbystrategic actorsinhighlycontested processesthatarecentraltoourunder-
standing ofpolitics.
We realizethatsimplypointingoutthecomplexity of thisrelationship between
normsand rationality is nothelpfulby itself.We also understand thatbracketing
segmentsof a complexprocesslike thisone can be a usefulway to understand a
largerwhole.Afterall, constructivists frequentlybracketstructure, thenagency,to
understand theirmutualconstitution. Our pointis simplythatprocessesof social
construction and strategic bargaining are deeplyintertwined, and pendinga better
theoreticaltreatment of thisrelationship we suggestthat,at a minimum, a staged
analysisof therelationship betweenrationality and social contextcouldruneither
way:onecouldmodelrationalchoiceas producing socialknowledgeas easilyas one
could modelsocial contextas a background forrationalchoice,dependingon the
empirical questionbeingresearched.
Rationality playsa roleinvirtually all researchonnorms.Eventheinstitutionalists
in sociology,whoseworkis perhapsmostanalytically distinct fromrationalchoice,
giverationality prideofplaceintheWeberianworldculturethatdrivesbehaviorand
emphasizetheways in whichrationalactionis prescribed and celebratedin that
culture.107However,althoughall theseresearchprograms recognizerationality and
linknormsto rationalbehaviorin important ways,theydisagreestrongly aboutthe
natureof thatlink.Our pointis notthatall scholarsagreeabouthow to research
norms.Theydo not.Rather, ourpointis thatthefights arenotabout(orshouldnotbe
about)whether rationality playsa rolein norm-based behavior.The fights areabout
thenatureof thelinkbetweenrationality and norm-based behavior.By unpacking
thatconnection betweenrationality andnormswe can see moreclearlytheissuesat
stakein contemporary researchandunderstand bettersomeofthedebatesdriving it.
Fourissuesstandoutandcreatebroadlinesofcleavageanddebateamongscholars:
materialism, utilitarianism, choice,andpersuasion.

106. Architecturalandsocialhistoriansnodoubtcouldprovidean accountoftheactiveconstruction of

thesebitsofcommonknowledge.
107. In fact,theinstitutionalists
couldmakea subsuming argument: Ifwe see somethingthatlookslike
rationalchoosinggoingon inhumanaffairs, wouldargue,thatis inlargepartan artifact
institutionalists of
ourculturethattellsus thatutility-maximization is the"right"wayto act (as opposedto,forexample,
actionaccordingto dutyor socialhierarchy or divinewill.In fact,thesuccessof rationalchoicetheory
a logicaloutgrowth
withinthesocialsciencesis,itself, ofworldculture,ininstitutionalist
terms.
912 Intemational
Organization

One problemwithclaimsin empiricalworkthatnormsarea cause ofbehavioris

that,in fact,suchclaimsdo notreallytellus verymuch.Therearelotsof possible
reasonsto conformto a norm,and scholarsdisagreeaboutthemotivations they
imputeto actorsin theiranalyses.108One setof disagreements involvestheprefer-
enceswe imputeto actorsand whether norm-based behaviorcan be explainedby
preferences thatare entirely material.Certainly,some normconformance maybe
drivenbymaterial self-interest.
Neoliberalinstitutionalists
andregimesscholarshave
been investigating normsflowingfromthistypeof motivation formanyyears.109
Morerecently, however,scholarshavebegundebatingtheadequacyof an entirely
materialistontology andhaveemphasized nonmaterial andevenother-regarding pref-
erencesin theiranalysesof norm-based behavior.Note,however,thatthereareno
obviousmethodological consequencestothisparticular debateoverthespecification
ofpreferences, sincerationalchoicecan specifya utility function thatincludesreli-
gious,ideological,or altruistic concerns,just as moreinterpretivist accountscould
focuson material ratherthansocialfacts.Note,too,thatfrequently heardarguments
aboutwhether behavioris norm-based or interest-based miss thepointthatnorm
conformance can oftenbe self-interested,dependingon how one specifiesinterests
andthenatureofthenorm.
Another debateamongthosestudying normsthatdoes,bycontrast, haveprofound
methodological andtheoretical consequences involvesthebehavioral logicthatschol-
arsbelievedrivesnorm-conforming behavior.The behaviorallogic underlying the
economistic andrationalchoiceapproaches tonormanalysisis utility maximization.
Actorsconstruct andconform tonormsbecausenormshelpthemgetwhattheywant.
An alternative approachto understanding normconformance is whatMarchand
Olsencall the"logicofappropriateness," in whichactorsinternalize rolesandrules
as scriptsto whichtheyconform, notforinstrumental reasons-to get whatthey
want-butbecausetheyunderstand thebehaviortobe good,desirable, andappropri-
ate. Habit,duty,senseof obligationand responsibility as well as principledbelief
mayall be powerful motivatorsforpeopleandunderpin significantepisodesofworld
politics.110
The debateoverbehaviorallogicsis thefocusof bothRuggie'sand Marchand
Olsen's articlesin thisissueanddoes notrequireextendedtreatment here.As those
articlesmake abundantly clear,whichlogic one invokesto explainbehaviorhas
significantmethodological and theoreticalconsequences.Most obviously,thetwo
logicslead onetodifferent sidesofthestructure-agent debatethathasbeenbubbling
through thefieldforsometime.The utilitarian andinstrumental approachis entirely
agent-driven. It is compatiblewithrationalchoiceand methodological individual-

108. We areindebted toFearonforhelpingus formulatethispointsuccinctly.

109. See Keohane1984;andKrasner1983b.
110. On thelogicof appropriateness witha "logic of consequences,"see Marchand
and itscontrast
Olsen 1989,chap.2; and thisissue. For moreon thesocial psychological underpinningsof scriptand
schemasandthewaysthesemayoverrideutility-maximizing choice,see FiskeandTaylor1994;Nisbett
andRoss 1980;Gilovich1991;andWilcoxandWilliams1990.Fora discussionof "habit-driven actors"
inworldpolitics,see Rosenau1986.
 NormDynamicsandPoliticalChange 913

ism,which,in turn,havelong-standing relationshipswithrealismandliberalism in

thefieldof IR. The logic of appropriateness, however,necessarily has a structure-
drivencomponent. Whatchannelsanddirectsbehaviorin thisviewarecomponents
of socialstructure-norms ofbehavior, socialinstitutions,andthevalues,roles,and
rulestheyembody.Undera logicofappropriateness, notionsofduty,responsibility,
identity,andobligation(all socialconstructions) maydrivebehavioras wellas self-
interestand gain.Theoretically, thislogic focusesattention on social construction
processesthatarenotwell explainedbyIR theoriesin theircontemporary incarna-
tionsandhas led scholarsbackintopoliticaltheory writingsdealingwiththegeneal-
ogyofmorality (Priceon Nietzsche),thesocialconstruction ofrationality (Michael
Barnett andFinnemore on Weber),thepoliticsofcommunication andargumentation
(Crawford andThomasRisse onAristotle andHabermas),symbolicinteraction and
the"presentation of self" (Wendton Meade andBarnetton Goffman), and theori-
ginsofindividualism andhumanitarianism inliberalthought. Methodologically, this
grouphas invokeddifferent kindsofstructuration, processtracing, textanalysis,and
verstehen. Unfortunately, debatein thefieldon thisissuehas notbeen overwhich
logic appliesto whatkindsof actorsunderwhatcircumstances. Rather,thedebate
has beenoverwhether a "logic of appropriateness" existsat all or whether one can
adequately capture all politicallysalientnormative effectswitha utilitarianandinstru-
mentalapproach.
A thirdissueon whichthereis disagreement and,we think, somemisunderstand-
ing,is theroleofchoiceanditsconverse,determinism, innorm-based behavior. For
rationalchoicescholars,actorsconform to norms(notsurprisingly) outof choice;
choicesmaybe constrained, attimeshighlyconstrained, butthefocusoftheanalysis
is on thechoice.Otherresearchers, however,focusalmostexclusivelyon theway
normsare "internalized" in actors,whichraisesimportant issuesaboutthelocusof
causalityinnormsarguments. Whennormsbecomeinternalized in actors,actorsare
no longerchoosingto conform to themin anymeaningful way.Forinstitutionalists
in sociology,manynorms,including someofthemostpowerful ones,havebeenso
internalizedthatwe no longthinkseriously aboutalternative behaviors.In thisview,
actorsnolongerthinkseriously aboutwhether "thestate"is thebestormostefficient
formofpoliticalorganization (it almostcertainly is not).Theyjust setup moreand
morestatesto theexclusionofotherpoliticalforms.Theyno longerthinkseriously
aboutwhether international institutionsarethebestwayto solveinternational prob-
lems (again,a mixedbag). Theyjust set up moreand moreinternational institu-
tions.111
Institutionalistsmightarguethat"choice" is nota particularly robustana-
lytictool, since muchof the mostbasic humanbehavioris not chosenin any
meaningful sense.Rather,it is suppliedto agentsby thelargersocial and cultural
environment. Socialstructure, notagentchoice,institutionalists wouldargue,is where
therealexplanatory actionlies.
In thisunderstanding, normconformance drivenby a logic of appropriateness
startsto look deterministic. Yet,as we surveythenormsresearchthatemphasizes

111. Barnett
andFinnemore
1997.
914 International
Organization

appropriateness logic in IR, verylittleof it looks deterministic. Indeed,mostof it

emphasizesthehighlycontingent and contestednatureof normative changeand
normative influence. We see tworeasonsforthis.First,IR scholarsapplyinga logic
ofappropriateness intheiranalysishaveneverbeenimperialistic intheirclaims.The
argument has neverbeenthatotherlogicsof actiondo noteverdrivebehavior;the
argument has beenthatappropriateness is a powerful andimportant motorofpoliti-
cal behaviorworthyof investigation. Second,and moreimportant, even withina
logicofappropriateness thereis oftensubstantial roomforagentchoice.Actorsmay
facevariedandconflicting rulesandnormsall makingclaimsfordifferent coursesof
action.Indeed,mostsignificant politicalchoicesare significant and difficultpre-
ciselybecausetheyinvolvetwoor moreconflicting claimsforactionon a decision
maker.Actorsmustchoosewhichrulesornormstofollowandwhichobligations to
meetattheexpenseofothersina givensituation, anddoingso mayinvolvesophisti-
catedreasoningprocesses.These processes,however,involvea different kindof
reasoning thanthatofutility maximization. Actorsmayaskthemselves, "Whatkind
of situationis this?"and "Whatam I supposedto do now?"rather than"How do I
getwhatI want?"Actorsoftenmustchoosebetweenverydifferent duties,obliga-
tions,rights, andresponsibilities withhugesocial consequences, butunderstanding
thechoicedependson an understanding, notof utility maximization, butof social
normsandrulesthatstructure thatchoice."12
A finalissuethatseparatesdifferent approachesto normsresearchis whether and
howtheytreatpersuasion. Persuasionis centraltomostoftheempirical case studies
aboutnormative influence andchange.It is themissionofnormentrepreneurs: they
seek to changetheutility functions of otherplayersto reflect somenewnormative
commitment. Persuasionis theprocessbywhichagentactionbecomessocialstruc-
ture,ideasbecomenorms, andthesubjective becomestheintersubjective. Itis essen-
tialto muchoftheprocesstracingthatscholarsarecurrently doing,yetwe haveno
good wayof treating Rationalchoicecan modelthewaysin which
it theoretically.
transfersofinformation maychangeactorstrategies, butchangesinunderlying pref-
erencescannotbe endogenized. Institutionalistsin sociologycantalkaboutapplying
culturalmodelsofactiontonewsituations andtheconsequent unfoldingorelaborat-
ingofglobalculture, buttheprocessbywhichsomemodelsappearcompelling and
othersdo not,whysomecultural innovations arepersuasiveandothersarenot,is not
wellexplained.Theseapproachesthusglossoverthisproblemin different ways,but
persuasion is centraltopoliticsofall kinds,andwe needa goodtheoretical apparatus
forunderstanding it.
Lookingtootherdisciplines, we see twotypesofarguments aboutpersuasion that
mightbe usefulinpoliticalscience:one structural andlogical,theotherpsychologi-
cal andaffective. International legalscholarsdrawon a complexstructure ofrulesto
craftarguments aboutand adjudicateamongcompeting normative claims.The per-
suasivenessof a normative claimin law is explicitly tiedto the"fit"of thatclaim

muchmorethando Meyerand his

112. Marchand Olsen emphasizechoicewithinappropriateness
colleaguesintheirwork.MarchandOlsen 1989.
 NormDynamicsandPoliticalChange 915

within existingnormativeframeworks; legalarguments arepersuasivewhentheyare

grounded inprecedent, andtherearecomplexrulesaboutthecreation ofprecedent-
suchas whichjudgments trumpwhichandhow theaccretionofjudgments is to be
aggregated overtime.Since normative contestationin law is so explicitand well
documented, andsincemuchofcontemporary normpoliticsintheworldhasa strong
legalcomponent, we believean examination oflegalmechanisms fornormselection
anddissemination willbe instructive forIR scholars."13
Approaches inpsychology emphasizeverydifferent factors inbringing aboutper-
suasion.In thesearguments bothcognition andaffectworksynergistically toproduce
changesinattitudes, beliefs,andpreferences. Mostofthisworkstressescommunica-
tiveprocessesthathappenthrough argumentation, but,unlikethelegal approach,
logicalonedoes notdictatetheresult,sinceappealsto emotionmaywellbe usedto
strengthen or undermine logical extensionsof norms."14 GermanIR scholars,for
example,arebeginning toapplyHabermas'stheory ofcommunicative action(which
requiresempathy)as a meansof understanding persuasion,accommodation, and
arrivalatmutualunderstandings in international politics.'15
Debatesoverthesefourissues-materialism, utilitarianism, choice,and persua-
sion-will continue toshapethewayswe understand normative influenceandnorma-
tivechangein worldpolitics.Ourconcernherehas notbeento settlethesedebates,
butto clarifywhat,exactly,is beingdebatedandwhatthestakesofthedebatesare.
Thesearenotdebatesaboutrationality, although rationality certainlyplaysa rolein
all of them.The debatesalso do notdividenormsresearchers intotwotidycamps.
Researchers maymarry ideational ontologies withrational choice;"16theymayexam-
inereasonedchoiceamongconflicting "appropriate" behaviors;"I7 theymayexam-
ine highlyinstrumental and strategic interactionsdesignedto construct new stan-
dardsofappropriateness, as moststudiesofnormentrepreneurs do;"18andtheymay
generally findthemselves cross-cut in waysthatarerefreshing and,we hope,stimu-
latenewkindsofconversations.

Conclusions

The "return"tonormsholdsimmensepromiseforshakinguptheIR research agenda

andopeningupexcitingnewavenuesforinquiry-andnotjustbecauseitoffers new
(or previously subjectmatter
forgotten) to study.Moreinteresting,
to ourminds,is
theway normsresearchopensup conversations withtheoretical
traditions
thatIR
scholarshaveignoredinrecentdecades.Theevaluativeandprescriptive
characterof

113. See Franck1990;BurleyandMattli1993;andBurley1993.

114. See EaglyandChaiken1993;andChaiken,Wood,andEagly1996.
115. Risse 1997.
116. See Laitin1995;FearonandLaitin1996;andFearon1997.
117. MarchandOlsen 1989.
118. See Klotz1995a,b;Price1997;Sikkink1993a;KeckandSikkink1998;Finnemore
1996a;Thomas
1997.andNadelmann1990.
916 International
Organization

normsopensthewayfora long-overdue conversation withpoliticaltheory andeth-

ics. For decadesnow IR researchhas been divorcedfrompoliticaltheoryon the
grounds(implicitly, ifnotexplicitly,articulated)thatwhat"is" intheworldandwhat
"oughttobe" areverydifferent andmustbe keptseparate, bothintellectually andin
policy.However,contemporary empiricalresearchon normsis aimedpreciselyat
showinghow the "ought"becomesthe "is." Empiricalresearchdocuments again
andagainhowpeople'sideasaboutwhatis goodandwhat"shouldbe" in theworld
becometranslated intopoliticalreality.People withprincipled commitments have
madesignificant changesin thepoliticallandscape:slaveryas a legal institution of
property rightshas been abolishedeverywhere on theplanetforthefirsttimein
humanhistory; women,morethanhalftheworld'spopulation, havefullformalpo-
liticalparticipationin moststatesof theworld;and thoughwar continuesto be a
horrible humanpractice, thereis no doubtthatitis less horribleas a resultofefforts
by humanitarians to curbthemostawfulweaponsandpractices. At thesametime,
principled commitments and notionsof what"shouldbe" have fueledxenophobic
nationalism, fascism,andethniccleansing.Understanding wherethese"oughtness"
claimscomefrom, howtheyarerelatedtoone another, whichoneswillbe powerful,
andwhattheirimplications areforworldpoliticsis vital,butitis an inquiry thatcan
onlybe undertaken atthenexusofpoliticaltheory andIR.
Similarconnections existbetweennormsresearchandotherfieldsofstudy.Inter-
nationallaw,likephilosophy andethics,hasbeenignoredbyIR scholarsfordecades,
yetcustomary international law is norms,and empiricalresearchin IR is, again,
demonstrating thattheselegalnormshavepowerful behavioraleffects. Legal norms
arealso boundup inextricably withtheworkings ofinternational which
institutions,
havebeena centralfocusofvirtually all typesofIR research inrecentyears.Further,
theselegalnormsare structured and channelbehaviorin waysthatcreateprecisely
thetypesofpatterns politicalscientists
seektoexplain.Understanding whichnorms
willbecomelaw ("soft" law as well as "hard"law) and how,exactly,compliance
withthoselaws comesaboutwouldseem,again,tobe a crucialtopicofinquiry that
lies atthenexusoflaw andIR.
Microfoundations fornorm-based behaviormightbe improvedby payingmore
attentionto studiesin psychology, particularlyworkon therolesofaffect, empathy,
conformity, and esteem.Like law and philosophy, affectand empathyhave been
sweptunderthecarpetinrecentdecades.Ideationalphenomena havebeentreated as
"information," whichreducesuncertainty or providesnew strategies to maximize
Theresultis politicswithout
utilities. passionorprinciples, whichis hardlythepoli-
ticsoftheworldin whichwe live.Emotionscan be politically dangerous andunde-
sirableinpolitics;hate,afterall,is affect,too.Buttopretend thataffect andempathy
do notexistis to missfundamental dynamicsof politicallife,and we havetriedto
suggesthowattempts inpsychology towrestlewiththeseissuesmaybe helpful.
Finally,we havetriedto showhownormsresearchcross-cuts ourowndiscipline
in waysthatare refreshing and stimulate new conversations. Contrary to whatwe
perceivedto be thepopularimpression, is nottheissue thatdividesIR
rationality
scholars.Rationalchoicetheorists can and do have a greatdeal to say aboutide-
 NormDynamicsandPoliticalChange 917

ationalphenomena andhownormswork,justas empirical studiesofsocialconstruc-

tionandnormemergence revealhighly
repeatedly rational
strategic
interaction.
Schol-
ars are divided,however,abouttherolethatchoiceplaysin norm-based behavior,
aboutwhatmotivates choice,andabouttherolepersuasionplaysin normative pro-
cessesandhowto treatit.No schoolofthought inthedisciplineis entirely
comfort-
ablewithitsanswerstothesequestionsatthemoment. Webelievethisis a goodstate
ofaffairs,onethatwillencouragescholarstoventure
beyondnarrowmethodological
commitments tothinkmorebroadlyabouttheseissues.