[G.R. No. 104768.

July 21, 2003]

Republic of the Philippines, petitioner, vs. Sandiganbayan, Major General Josephus Q. Ramas
and Elizabeth Dimaano, respondents.

Statement of Facts

Presidential Commission on Good Governance (PCGG)

President Corazon C. Aquino, immediately upon assuming Malacañang, enacts Executive

Order 1 (EO No. 1) or the Presidential Commission on Good Governance (PCGG). It is
mandated to recover all ill-gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his
immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates.

EO No. 1 vested the PCGG with the power:

(a) to conduct investigation as may be necessary in order to accomplish and carry out the
purposes of this order and the power

(h) to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purpose of
this order.

Accordingly, the PCGG, through its then Chairman Jovito R. Salonga, created an AFP Anti-
Graft Board (AFP Board) tasked to investigate reports of unexplained wealth and corrupt
practices by AFP personnel, whether in the active service or retired.

AFP Board

The AFP Board, in line with its mandate, investigates Major General Q. Josephus Ramas.

On July 1987, the AFP Board issues a resolution and findings on Ramas’ alleged ill gotten
wealth. It submits the following findings:

Evidence in the record showed that respondent is the owner of a house and lot located at 15-
Yakan St., La Vista, Quezon City. The aforementioned property in Quezon City may be
estimated modestly at P700,000.00.

He is also the owner of a house and lot located in Cebu City. The lot has an area of 3,327
square meters.

Communication equipment and facilities are found in the premises of Elizabeth Dimaano, a
Confidential Agent of the Military Security Unit, and are confiscated by elements of the PC
Command of Batangas.

These items could not have been in the possession of Elizabeth Dimaano if not given for her
use by respondent Commanding General of the Philippine Army.

Aside from the military equipment/items and communications equipment, the raiding team
was also able to confiscate money in the amount of P2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars in
the house of Elizabeth Dimaano on 3 March 1986.

Aside from the military equipment/items and communications equipment, the raiding team
was also able to confiscate money in the amount of P2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars in
the house of Elizabeth Dimaano on 3 March 1986.
Elizabeth Dimaano is allegedly Major General Q. Josephus Ramas’ mistress. She does not
have any means to acquire the communications equipment as well as the aforementioned
money.

The AFP Board finds a prima facie case against Major General Josephus Ramas for ill gotten
wealth and unexplained wealth in the amount of P2,974,134.00 and $50,000 US Dollars.

Decision: It is recommended that Maj. Gen. Josephus Q. Ramas (ret.) be prosecuted and
tried for violation of RA 3019, as amended, otherwise known as Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act and RA 1379, as amended, otherwise known as The Act for the Forfeiture of
Unlawfully Acquired Property.

On 1 August 1987, the PCGG filed a petition for forfeiture under Republic Act No. 1379 (RA
No. 1379) against Ramas.

Amended Complaint: Amended Complaint further alleged that Ramas acquired funds, assets
and properties manifestly out of proportion to his salary as an army officer and his other
income from legitimately acquired property by taking undue advantage of his public office
and/or using his power, authority and influence as such officer of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and as a subordinate and close associate of the deposed President Ferdinand
Marcos.

The Amended Complaint also alleged that the AFP Board, after a previous inquiry, found
reasonable ground to believe that respondents have violated RA No. 1379. The Amended
Complaint prayed for, among others, the forfeiture of respondents properties, funds and
equipment in favor of the State.

Ramas’ Answer:

Ramas contends that his property consisted only of a residential house at La Vista Subdivision,
Quezon City, valued at P700,000, which was not out of proportion to his salary and other
legitimate income.

He denies ownership of any mansion in Cebu City and the cash, communications equipment
and other items confiscated from the house of Dimaano.

Dimaano filed her own Answer to the Amended Complaint. Admitting her employment as a
clerk-typist in the office of Ramas from January-November 1978 only, Dimaano claimed
ownership of the monies, communications equipment, jewelry and land titles taken from her
house by the Philippine Constabulary raiding team.

The Sandiganbayan

On 13 April 1989, petitioner filed a motion for leave to amend the complaint in order to
charge the delinquent properties with being subject to forfeiture as having been unlawfully
acquired by defendant Dimaano alone x x x.

Petitioner fails to present witnesses and delays the court for over a year.

on 18 May 1990, petitioner again expressed its inability to proceed to trial because it had no
further evidence to present. Again, in the interest of justice, the Sandiganbayan granted
petitioner 60 days within which to file an appropriate pleading. The Sandiganbayan, however,
warned petitioner that failure to act would constrain the court to take drastic action.
Private respondents then filed their motions to dismiss based on Republic v. Migrino.The
Court held in Migrino that the PCGG does not have jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute
military officers by reason of mere position held without a showing that they are subordinates
of former President Marcos.

Dispositive: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the Amended Complaint,

without pronouncement as to costs. The counterclaims are likewise dismissed for lack of merit,
but the confiscated sum of money, communications equipment, jewelry and land titles are
ordered returned to Elizabeth Dimaano.

The records of this case are hereby remanded and referred to the Hon. Ombudsman, who has
primary jurisdiction over the forfeiture cases under R.A. No. 1379, for such appropriate action
as the evidence warrants. This case is also referred to the Commissioner of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue for a determination of any tax liability of respondent Elizabeth Dimaano in
connection herewith.

Ruling of the Sandiganbayan

(1.) The actions taken by the PCGG are not in accordance with the rulings of the Supreme
Court in Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan[10] and Republic v. Migrino[11] which involve the same
issues.

(2.) No previous inquiry similar to preliminary investigations in criminal cases was conducted
against Ramas and Dimaano.

(3.) The evidence adduced against Ramas does not constitute a prima facie case against him.

(4.) There was an illegal search and seizure of the items confiscated.

Issues

PCGG’s Jurisdiction to Investigate Private Respondents

Propriety of Dismissal of Case Before Completion of Presentation of Evidence — Petitioner

also contends that the Sandiganbayan erred in dismissing the case before completion of the
presentation of petitioners evidence.

Third Issue: Legality of the Search and Seizure — Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan
erred in declaring the properties confiscated from Dimaanos house as illegally seized and
therefore inadmissible in evidence. This issue bears a significant effect on petitioners case
since these properties comprise most of petitioners evidence against private respondents.
Petitioner will not have much evidence to support its case against private respondents if these
properties are inadmissible in evidence.Ruling

First issue:

The PCGG, through the AFP Board, can only investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt
practices of AFP personnel who fall under either of the two categories mentioned in Section 2
of EO No. 1. These are: (1) AFP personnel who have accumulated ill-gotten wealth during the
administration of former President Marcos by being the latters immediate family, relative,
subordinate or close associate, taking undue advantage of their public office or using their
powers, influence x x x; or (2) AFP personnel involved in other cases of graft and corruption
provided the President assigns their cases to the PCGG.
Ramas case should fall under the first category of AFP personnel before the PCGG could
exercise its jurisdiction over him. Petitioner argues that Ramas was undoubtedly a
subordinate of former President Marcos because of his position as the Commanding General
of the Philippine Army. Petitioner claims that Ramas position enabled him to receive orders
directly from his commander-in-chief, undeniably making him a subordinate of former
President Marcos.

We hold that Ramas was not a subordinate of former President Marcos in the sense
contemplated under EO No. 1 and its amendments.

Mere position held by a military officer does not automatically make him a subordinate as this
term is used in EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A absent a showing that he enjoyed close association
with former President Marcos.

Second issue:

Based on the findings of the Sandiganbayan and the records of this case, we find that
petitioner has only itself to blame for non-completion of the presentation of its evidence. First,
this case has been pending for four years before the Sandiganbayan dismissed it.

Third issue:

On 3 March 1986, the Constabulary raiding team served at Dimaanos residence a search
warrant captioned Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition. Dimaano was not present
during the raid but Dimaanos cousins witnessed the raid. The raiding team seized the items
detailed in the seizure receipt together with other items not included in the search warrant.
The raiding team seized these items: one baby armalite rifle with two magazines; 40 rounds
of 5.56 ammunition; one pistol, caliber .45; communications equipment, cash consisting of
P2,870,000 and US$50,000, jewelry, and land titles.

Petitioner wants the Court to take judicial notice that the raiding team conducted the search
and seizure on March 3, 1986 or five days after the successful EDSA revolution. Petitioner
argues that a revolutionary government was operative at that time by virtue of Proclamation
No. 1 announcing that President Aquino and Vice President Laurel were taking power in the
name and by the will of the Filipino people. Petitioner asserts that the revolutionary
government effectively withheld the operation of the 1973 Constitution which guaranteed
private respondents exclusionary right.

Moreover, petitioner argues that the exclusionary right arising from an illegal search applies
only beginning 2 February 1987, the date of ratification of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner
contends that all rights under the Bill of Rights had already reverted to its embryonic stage at
the time of the search. Therefore, the government may confiscate the monies and items
taken from Dimaano and use the same in evidence against her since at the time of their
seizure, private respondents did not enjoy any constitutional right.

Petitioner is partly right in its arguments.

The correct issues are: (1) whether the revolutionary government was bound by the Bill of
Rights of the 1973 Constitution during the interregnum, that is, after the actual and effective
take-over of power by the revolutionary government following the cessation of resistance by
loyalist forces up to 24 March 1986 (immediately before the adoption of the Provisional
Constitution); and (2) whether the protection accorded to individuals under the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Covenant) and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (Declaration) remained in effect during the interregnum.

Ruling

We hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during the
interregnum. However, we rule that the protection accorded to individuals under the
Covenant and the Declaration remained in effect during the interregnum.

During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the revolutionary government were the
supreme law because no constitution limited the extent and scope of such directives and
orders. With the abrogation of the 1973 Constitution by the successful revolution, there was
no municipal law higher than the directives and orders of the revolutionary government. Thus,
during the interregnum, a person could not invoke any exclusionary right under a Bill of
Rights because there was neither a constitution nor a Bill of Rights during the interregnum.

As the Court explained in Letter of Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno:A revolution has been
defined as the complete overthrow of the established government in any country or state by
those who were previously subject to it or as a sudden, radical and fundamental change in
the government or political system, usually effected with violence or at least some acts of
violence. In Kelsen’s book, General Theory of Law and State, it is defined as that which
occurs whenever the legal order of a community is nullified and replaced by a new order . . .
a way not prescribed by the first order itself.

During the interregnum, the government in power was concededly a revolutionary

government bound by no constitution. No one could validly question the sequestration orders
as violative of the Bill of Rights because there was no Bill of Rights during the interregnum.
However, upon the adoption of the Freedom Constitution, the sequestered companies
assailed the sequestration orders as contrary to the Bill of Rights of the Freedom Constitution.

The revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration during the
interregnum. Whether the revolutionary government could have repudiated all its obligations
under the Covenant or the Declaration is another matter and is not the issue here. Suffice it
to say that the Court considers the Declaration as part of customary international law, and
that Filipinos as human beings are proper subjects of the rules of international law laid down
in the Covenant. The fact is the revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or
the Declaration in the same way it repudiated the 1973 Constitution. As the de jure
government, the revolutionary government could not escape responsibility for the States
good faith compliance with its treaty obligations under international law.

During the interregnum when no constitution or Bill of Rights existed, directives and orders
issued by government officers were valid so long as these officers did not exceed the
authority granted them by the revolutionary government. The directives and orders should
not have also violated the Covenant or the Declaration. In this case, the revolutionary
government presumptively sanctioned the warrant since the revolutionary government did
not repudiate it. The warrant, issued by a judge upon proper application, specified the items
to be searched and seized. The warrant is thus valid with respect to the items specifically
described in the warrant.

It is obvious from the testimony of Captain Sebastian that the warrant did not include the
monies, communications equipment, jewelry and land titles that the raiding team confiscated.
The search warrant did not particularly describe these items and the raiding team confiscated
them on its own authority. The raiding team had no legal basis to seize these items without
showing that these items could be the subject of warrantless search and seizure. Clearly, the
raiding team exceeded its authority when it seized these items.The seizure of these items
was therefore void, and unless these items are contraband per se, and they are not, they
must be returned to the person from whom the raiding seized them. However, we do not
declare that such person is the lawful owner of these items, merely that the search and
seizure warrant could not be used as basis to seize and withhold these items from the
possessor. We thus hold that these items should be returned immediately to Dimaano.

The Dispositive

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The questioned Resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan dated 18 November 1991 and 25 March 1992 in Civil Case No. 0037,
remanding the records of this case to the Ombudsman for such appropriate action as the
evidence may warrant, and referring this case to the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue for a determination of any tax liability of respondent Elizabeth Dimaano, are
AFFIRMED.

MIJARES ET AL. VS. RANADA

FACTS:

• Petitioners are prominent victims of human rights violations during the Marcos era.
• On May 9, 1991, the petitioners filed a complaint to the United States District Court,
Dstrict of Hawaii, against the estate of former president Marcos (Marcos Estate).
• Invoking the Alien Tort Act, petitioners obtained a final judgment in their favor against
the estate thereof amounting to roughly $1.9B in compensatory and exemplary
damages which was eventually affirmed by the US court of Appeals.
➢ Alient Tort Act- involve a suit by aliens for tortious violations of international law.
• Petitioners filed a complaint with the Makati RTC for the enforcement of the final
Judgement, paying P410.00 as docket and filing fee.
• Estate Marcos filed a Motion to dismiss alleging the non-payment of the correct filing
fees.
• September 9, 1998, Respondent Judge Santiago Javier Ranada of the Makati RTC
dismissed the petitioners’ complaint.
• Petitioners filed a Motion for reconsideration, then, was denied.
• Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the twin order of
respondent judge.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the filing fees computed by the Makati RTC was correct considering the
petitioners’ contention that the subject matter in the action is the enforcement of a foreign
judgment, and not an action for collection of a sum of money or recovery of damages, and in
contrary with the respondent’s contention that it involves a judgment of rendered by a
foreign court ordering the payment of definite sums of money, allowing for easy
determination of the value of the foreign judgment. On that score, Section 7(a) of Rule 141 of
the Rules of Civil Procedure would find application and the RTC estimated the proper amount
of the filing fees was approximately P472 million which obviously not paid.

RTCs Basis of computation: Sec.7 (a) of Rule 47.

Sec. 7. Clerk of Regional Trial Court.-

(a) For filing an action or a permissive counterclaim or money claim against an

estate not based on judgment, or for filing with leave of court a third-party, fourth-
party, etc., complaint, or a complaint in intervention, and for all clerical services in the
same time, if the total sum claimed, exclusive interest, or the started value of the
property in litigation is:

Less than 100k 500 pesos

100k or more-less than 150k 800 pesos

150k or more-less than 200k 1k

200k or more-less than 250k 1,500k

250k or more-less than 300k 1,750k

300k or more-not more than 400k 2k

350k or more-not more than 400k 2,250k

For each 1k in excess of 400k 10 pesos

Petitioners’ Basis of computation: Sec.7 (b) of Rule 47.

(b) For filing

1. Actions where the value of the subject matter cannot be estimated --- P600
(invoked by the petitioners)
2. Special Civil Actions except judicial foreclosure which shall be governed by
paragraph (a) above --- P600
3. All other actions not involving property --- P600

*It is worth noting that the provision also provides that in real actions, the assessed value or
estimated value of the property shall be alleged by the claimant and shall be the basis in
computing the fees. Yet again, this provision does not apply in the instant case. A real action
is one where the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property or an action affecting title to or
recovery of possession of real property. Neither the complaint nor the award of damages by
the US District Court involves any real property of the Marcos Estate.

RULING:

No, the filing fees computed by the Makati RTC is incorrect, and that the amount paid by the
petitioners as filing fee is proper, but on a different basis – amount merely corresponds to the
same amount required for “other actions not involving property.”

In the case at hand, RTC Makati erred in concluding that the filing fee should be computed on
the basis of the total sum claimed or the stated value of property in litigation. Given the
circumstance, given that the complaint is lodge against an estate and is based on the US
District Court’s final judgment, this foreign judgment may, for the purpose of classification
under the governing procedural rule, be deemed as subsumed under section 7 (b)(3) of Rule
141. Thus, only the blanket filing fee or minimal amount is required.
Note: Petitioners also erred in stating that the foreign final judgment is incapable of pecuniary
estimation because it is so capable. On this point, petitioners state that this might lead to an
instant wherein a first level court would have jurisdiction to enforce a foreign judgment.
Under B.P 129, such court are not vested with such jurisdiction. Section 33 of B.P 129 refers
to instances wherein the cause of action or subject matter pertains to an assertion of rights
over property or a sum if money. But in the present case, the subject matter is the foreign
judgment itself. Thus, Section 16 thereof reveals that the complaint for enforcement of
judgment even if capable of pecuniary estimations would fall under the jurisdiction of the
RTCs.

A simple note as regards to the Enforcement of Foreign Judgment:

“There is no obligatory rule derived from treaties or convention that requires the
Philippines to recognize foreign judgments, or allow a procedure for the
enforcement thereof. However, generally accepted principles of international law,
by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the
land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations… The fact that there is no
binding universal treaty governing the practice is not indicative of a widespread
rejection of the principle, but only a disagreement as to the imposable specific rules
governing procedure for recognition and enforcement.”

“The classical formulation in international law sees those customary rules accepted
as binding result from the combination of two elements: (a) the established,
widespread, and consistent practice of the state, and (b) psychological element
known as the opinion JURIS SIVE NECESSITATES (Opinion as to law or necessity).
Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice in question is rendered
obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.”

Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (PBMEO) vs. Philippine Blooming

Mills Co., Inc. (PBMCI) (1973)
G.R. No. L-31195 | 1973-06-05

Subject: Primacy of right of free expression and of assembly over property rights; The mass
demonstration by the petitioners was not in violation of the CBA; PBMCI is guilty of unfair
labor practice; Dismissal of the union leaders was a denial of social justice; A violation of a
constitutional right divests the court of jurisdiction; Procedural rules cannot prevail over the
Constitution; Suspension of the procedural rule is justified; CIR may suspend application of
its procedural rules as may be equitable and just under the circumstances; 5 day period to
file MR is unreasonable

Facts:

Petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization ( PBMEO) is a legitimate labor

union, composed of the employees of the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc.
(PBMCI).
On March 1, 1969, PBMEO decided to stage a mass demonstration at Malacañang on March 4,
1969, in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police, to be participated in by the
workers in the first shift (from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M.) as well as those in the regular second (from
7 A.M. to 4 P.M.) and and third shifts (from 8 A.M. to 5 P.M.). They informed the company -
PBMCI - of their proposed demonstration.

A meeting was called by PBMCI on March 3, 1969. The union was informed that any
demonstration should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the company. For which
reason, Atty. C.S. de Leon, as PBMCI's spokesperson, warned the PBMEO representatives that
workers who belong to the first shifts, who without previous leave of absence approved by
the Company, who shall fail to report for work the following morning (March 4, 1969) shall be
dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be
amounting to an illegal strike.

Another meeting was called in the afternoon where PBMCI appealed to the PBMEO
representatives that the workers for the first shift of March 4, 1969 should be excused from
joining the demonstration and should report for work in order not to violate the provisions of
the CBA providing for 'No Strike and No Lockout.' All those who will not follow this warning of
the Company shall be dismissed.

PBMEO proceeded with the demonstration as planned.

Procedural History:

PBMCI filed charges in the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) against the union members and
officers composing the first shift for violating the CBA provisions on strike/lockout.

In their answer, petitioners claim that they didn’t violate CBA because they gave PBMCI prior
notice of the mass demonstration which is a valid exercise of their constitutional right
directed against the alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen, not the respondent firm.

The CIR issued an Order finding PBMEO guilty of bargaining in bad faith and its officers
(petitioners) as directly responsible for perpetrating the said unfair labor practice and were,
as a consequence, considered to have lost their status as employees of the company.

Petitioners claim that they received on September 23, 1969 the aforesaid order and that they
filed on September 29, 1969, because September 28, 1969 fell on Sunday, a motion for
reconsideration (MR) of said order.

PBMCI averred that petitioners received the order on September 22, 1969, thus the MR was
filed beyond the 5 day period under Section 15 of the amended Rules of the Court of
Industrial Relations. The CIR dismissed the MR of petitioner for being pro forma and for being
filed out of time.

Petitioners filed with the CIR a petition for relief from the dismissal. Without waiting for any
resolution on their petition for relief, they filed an appeal with the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether or not the petition should be granted

Whether or not the right of free expression and of assembly or so called human rights have
superior position over property rights.
Held:

Yes, the Constitution recognizes the superior position of human rights (right of free
expression and of assembly) over property rights

Basis and Purpose of Bill of Rights which underlie the issues posed by the case

1. Importance accorded to the dignity and worth of the individual

2. To preserve democratic ideals (liberty, equality and security)

3. To safeguard fundamental rights (life, liberty and property, to free speech or free press,
freedom of worship and assembly and other fundamental rights)

4. To promote the happiness of the individual

5. The liberties of one are the liberties of all; and the liberties of one are not safe unless the
liberties of all are protected (-Justice Douglas)

6. Rights of free expression, free assembly and petition as not only a civil rights but also
political rights essential to man's enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to his full and
complete fulfillment.

7. While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights
over property rights is recognized.8 Because these freedoms are "delicate and
vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society" and the "threat of sanctions
may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions," they "need
breathing space to survive," permitting government regulation only "with narrow specificity."
Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are
imprescriptible.

In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a
preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and
political institutions, and such priority "gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not
permitting dubious intrusion

The superiority of these freedoms over property rights is underscored by the fact that a mere
reasonable or rational relation between the means employed by the law and its object or
purpose that the law is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory nor oppressive would suffice to
validate a law which restricts or impairs property rights. On the other hand, a constitutional
or valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent criterion, namely existence of
a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent.

In this case, in seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression as well as their right of
assembly and of petition against alleged persecution of local officialdom, the employees and
laborers of herein private respondent firm were fighting for their very survival, utilizing only
the weapons afforded them by the Constitution. The pretension of their employer that it
would suffer loss or damage by reason of the absence of its employees from 6 o'clock in the
morning to 2 o'clock in the afternoon, is a plea for the preservation merely of their property
rights.

The mass demonstration by the petitioners was not in violation of the CBA

The demonstration held by petitioners on March 4, 1969 before Malacanang was against
alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen, not against their employer. Said demonstration was
purely and completely an exercise of their freedom of expression in general and of their right
of assembly and of petition for redress of grievances in particular before the appropriate
governmental agency, the Chief Executive, against the police officers of the municipality of
Pasig.

To regard the demonstration against police officers, not against the employer, as evidence
of bad faith in collective bargaining and hence a violation of the collective bargaining
agreement and a cause for the dismissal from employment of the demonstrating employees,
stretches unduly the compass of the collective bargaining agreement, as "a potent means of
inhibiting speech" and therefore inflicts a moral as well as mortal wound on the constitutional
guarantees of free expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition.

The mass demonstration staged by the employees on March 4, 1969 could not have been
legally enjoined by any court, for such an injunction would be trenching upon the freedom of
expression of the workers, even if it legally appears to be an illegal picketing or strike. The
CIR concedes that the mass demonstration was not a declaration of a strike "as the same is
not rooted in any industrial dispute although there is a concerted act and the occurrence of a
temporary stoppage of work.

PBMCI is guilty of unfair labor practice

Because of the refusal on the part of PBMCI to permit all its employees and workers to join
the mass demonstration against alleged police abuses and the subsequent separation of the
eight (8) petitioners from the service constituted an unconstitutional restraint on their
freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and freedom to petition for redress of grievances,
the company committed an unfair labor practice defined in Section 4(a-1) in relation to
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875, otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act. Section 3
thereof guarantees to the employees the right "to engage in concerted activities for . . .
mutual aid or protection"; while Section 4(a-1) regards as an unfair labor practice for an
employer "to interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights
guaranteed in Section Three." The threat of dismissal tended to coerce the employees from
joining the mass demonstration.

On the other hand, while the respondent Court of Industrial Relations found that the
demonstration "paralyzed to a large extent the operations of the complainant company," the
respondent Court of Industrial Relations did not make any finding as to the fact of loss
actually sustained by the firm. This significant circumstance can only mean that the firm did
not sustain any loss or damage. On the contrary, the company saved a sizable amount in the
form of wages for its hundreds of workers, cost of fuel, water and electric consumption that
day. Such savings could have amply compensated for unrealized profits or damages it might
have sustained by reason of the absence of its workers for only one day.

Dismissal of the union leaders was a denial of social justice

The dismissal of the eight (8) leaders of the workers for proceeding with the demonstration
and consequently being absent from work, constitutes a denial of social justice likewise
assured by the fundamental law to these lowly employees. Section 5 of Article II of the
Constitution imposes upon the State "the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being
and economic security of all of the people," which guarantee is emphasized by the other
directive in Section 6 of Article XIV of the Constitution that "the State shall afford protection
to labor . . ." The Court of Industrial Relations as an agency of the State is under obligation at
all times to give meaning and substance to these constitutional guarantees in favor of the
working man.

Even if the questioned Court of Industrial Relations orders and rule were to be given effect,
the dismissal or termination of the employment of the petitioning eight (8) leaders of the
Union is harsh for a one-day absence from work. The appropriate penalty if it deserves any
penalty at all should have been simply to charge said one-day absence against their vacation
or sick leave. But to dismiss the eight (8) leaders of the petitioner Union is a most cruel
penalty, since as aforestated the Union leaders depend on their wages for their daily
sustenance as well as that of their respective families aside from the fact that it is a lethal
blow to unionism, while at the same time strengthening the oppressive hand of the petty
tyrants in the localities.

A violation of a constitutional right divests the court of jurisdiction

It has been established that a violation of a constitutional right divests the court of
jurisdiction; and as a consequence its judgment is null and void and confers no rights. Both
the Court of Industrial Relations and PBMCI trenched upon the constitutional immunities of
petitioners. Both failed to accord preference to such rights and aggravated the inhumanity to
which the aggrieved workers claimed they had been subjected by the municipal police.
Having violated these basic human rights of the laborers, the Court of Industrial Relations
ousted itself of jurisdiction and the questioned orders it issued in the instant case are a nullity.

Procedural rules cannot prevail over the Constitution

The exercise and enjoyment of their rights must not be nullified by a mere procedural rule
promulgated by the Court of Industrial Relations exercising a purely delegated legislative
power, when even a law enacted by Congress must yield to the untrammelled enjoyment of
these human rights. Otherwise, these guarantees in the Bill of Rights would be vitiated by a
rule on procedure prescribing the period for appeal.

The motion for reconsideration was filed on September 29, 1969, or seven (7) days from
notice on September 22, 1969 of the order. Does the mere fact that the MR was filed two (2)
days late defeat the rights of the petitioning employees? To accord supremacy to the
foregoing rules of the Court of Industrial Relations over basic human rights sheltered by the
Constitution, is not only incompatible with the basic tenet of constitutional government
that the Constitution is superior to any statute or subordinate rules and regulations, but also
does violence to natural reason and logic. The dominance and superiority of the constitutional
right over the Court of Industrial Relations procedural rule of necessity should be affirmed.

CIR may suspend application of its procedural rules as may be equitable and just
under the circumstances

The suspension of the application of Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules
with reference to the case at bar, is also authorized by Section 20 of Commonwealth Act No.
103, the C.I.R. charter. Under Section 20, 'The Court of Industrial Relations shall adopt its
rules or procedure and shall have such other powers as generally pertain to a court of justice:
Provided, however, That in the hearing, investigation and determination of any question or
controversy and in exercising any duties and power under this Act, the Court shall act
according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to
technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence
but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable.' By this provision,
the industrial court is disengaged from the rigidity of the technicalities applicable to ordinary
courts. Said court is not even restricted to the specific relief demanded by the parties but
may issue such orders as may be deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling
the dispute or dispelling any doubts that may give rise to future disputes. (see Ang Tibay v.
C.I.R)

5 day period to file MR is unreasonable

Said Court of Industrial Relations rule, promulgated as it was pursuant to a mere legislative
delegation, is unreasonable and therefore is beyond the authority granted by the Constitution
and the law. A period of five (5) days within which to file a motion for reconsideration is too
short, especially for the aggrieved workers, who usually do not have the ready funds to meet
the necessary expenses therefor.

Court Judgement:

(1) setting aside as null and void the orders of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations
dated September 15 and October 9, 1969; and

(2) directing the re instatement of the herein eight (8) petitioners, with full back pay from the
date of their separation from the service until re instated, minus one day's pay and whatever
earnings they might have realized from other sources during their separation from the service.

With costs against private respondent Philippine Blooming Company, Inc.

G.R. No. 89571 February 6, 1991

FRANCISCO LIM TUPAS and IGNACIO LIM TUPAS, petitioners,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Facts / Procedural History:

The petitioners received a copy of the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City on
April 3, 1989, and that the motion for reconsideration thereof was filed on April 17, 1989, or
fourteen days later.

The order of May 3, 1989, denying the motion was received by the petitioners' counsel on
May 9, 1989.

Instead of filing the petition for review with the Court of Appeals within the remainder of the
15-day reglementary period, that is, on May 10, 1989, the petitioner did so only on May 23,
1989, or 14 days later.

The petition was denied by the Court of Appeals on the ground of tardiness

In its resolution dated October 12, 1989, the Court denied the petition for certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court for failure to show that the respondent court committed
reversible error in its resolution dated May 31, 1989.

The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on November 23, 1989, to which we required
a Comment, which was followed by a Reply and later a Rejoinder

Issue:

Whether or not the motion should be granted

Whether or not rejecting the said motion is a denial of due process.

Ruling:

No.
I.

If a motion for reconsideration is filed with and denied by a regional trial court, the movant
has only the remaining period within which to file a petition for review. Hence, it may be
necessary to file a motion with the Court of Appeals for extension of time to file such petition
for review

The petitioners' counsel did not file the petition for review within the remaining period, which
he should have known was only one day. Neither did he move for an extension that would
have been granted as a matter of course. The petition for review being indisputably late, he
could not thereafter ask that it be treated as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, which can be filed within a reasonable time. This remedy cannot be employed
as a substitute for a lost appeal. Thus, it follows that for having themselves forfeited the right
to appeal, the petitioners cannot now plaintively claim that they have been denied due
process.

II.

Rules of procedure are intended to ensure the orderly administration of justice and the
protection of substantive rights in judicial and extrajudicial proceedings. It is a mistake to
suppose that substantive law and adjective law are contradictory to each other or, as has
often been suggested, that enforcement of procedural rules should never be permitted if it
will result in prejudice to the substantive rights of the litigants

Observance of both substantive and procedural rights is equally guaranteed by due process,
whatever the source of such rights, be it the Constitution itself or only a statute or a rule of
court

The petitioners have not shown that their counsel was exceptionally inept or motivated by
bad faith or excusably misled by the facts. There is no reason why we should not apply the
rule that clients should be bound by the acts of their counsel, including his mistakes.

Moreover, the petitioners' submission that their counsel's failure to appeal on time should be
regarded as excusable neglect or honest error is not compatible with his impressive
credentials.

Thus, the procedural mistake might have been understandable in an ordinary lawyer but not
in the case of the petitioners' former counsel.

III. “Aequetas nunquam contravenit legis – Equity never contravenes the law”

Equity is available only in the absence of law and not as its replacement. Equity is described
as justice outside legality, which simply means that it cannot supplant although it may, as
often happens, supplement the law.

It would seem to the Court that if the petitioners felt so strongly that the said decision was
erroneous they would have demonstrated more spirit and promptitude in assailing it. Instead,
they waited to move for reconsideration until the last hour and, ultimately, when the motion
was denied, filed the petition for review only when it was already too late. Under these
circumstances, equity cannot be extended to them to soften the rigor of the law they have
not chosen to observe.

Court Judgement:

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED with finality. It is so ordered.

G.R. Nos. 159017-18 March 9, 2011

PAULINO S. ASILO, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and Spouses VISITACION AND CESAR C.
BOMBASI, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 159059

VICTORIA BUETA VDA. DE COMENDADOR, IN REPRESENTATION OF DEMETRIO T.

COMENDADOR,Petitioner,
vs.
VISITACION C. BOMBASI AND CESAR C. BOMBASI, Respondents.

PEREZ, J.:

FACTS:

Private Respondent Visitacion’s late mother Marciana Vda. De Coronado (Vda. De Coronado)
and the Municipality of Nagcarlan, Laguna entered into a lease contract whereby the
Municipality allowed the use and enjoyment of property comprising of a lot and a store in
favor of the respondent’s mother for twenty years, extendible for another 20 years. The lease
contract provided that the late Vda. De Coronado could build a firewall on her rented property
which must be at least as high as the store; and in case of modification of the public market,
she or her heir/s would be given preferential rights. Visitacion took over the store when her
mother died Visitacion secured the yearly Mayor’s permits.

A fire razed the public market of Nagcarlan. Upon Visitacion’s request for inspection, District
Engineer Gorospe of the then Ministry of Public Works and Highways, found that the store of
Visitacion remained intact and stood strong. This finding of Engineer Gorospe was contested
by the Municipality of Nagcarlan. The store of Visitacion continued to operate after the fire.

The Sangguniang Bayan of Nagcarlan, Laguna issued Resolution No. 183 authorizing Mayor
Comendador to demolish the store being occupied by Visitacion using legal means. Mayor
Comendador relying on the strength of Sangguniang Bayan Resolution Nos. 183 and 156
authorized the demolition of the store with Asilo and Angeles supervising the work.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Visitacion, filed with a case for damages before the RTC. Spouses Bombasi, thereafter, filed a
criminal complaint21 against Mayor Comendador, Asilo and Angeles for violation of Sec. 3(e)
of Republic Act No. 3019 otherwise known as the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act"
before the Office of the Ombudsman.

Sandiganbayan promulgated a Resolution ordering the consolidation of Civil Case No. SP-
4064 (94) with Criminal Case No. 23267 pending before the Third Division

During the pendency of the case, Alberto S. Angeles died on 16 November 1997. Accordingly,
the counsel of Angeles filed a motion to drop accused Angeles. On 22 September 1999, the
Third Division of Sandiganbayan issued an Order DISMISSING the case against Angeles

The death of Mayor Comendador followed on 17 September 2002. As a result, the counsel of
the late Mayor filed on 3 March 2003 a Manifestation before the Sandiganbayan informing the
court of the fact of Mayor Comendador’s death.
Sandiganbayan rendered a decision, finding the accused Demetrio T. Comendador and
Paulino S. Asilo, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sec. 3(e) of Republic Act.
No. 3019.

Asilo, through his counsel, filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision alleging that
there was only an error of judgment when he complied with and implemented the order of his
superior, Mayor Comendador. He likewise alleged that there is no liability when a public
officer commits in good faith an error of judgment.

The Sandiganbayan, on its Resolution28 dated 21 July 2003 denied the Motion for
Reconsideration on the ground that good faith cannot be argued to support his cause in the
face of the court’s finding that bad faith attended the commission of the offense charged

The counsel for the late Mayor also filed its Motion for Reconsideration alleging that the death
of the late Mayor had totally extinguished both his criminal and civil liability.

The Sandiganbayan granted the extinction of the criminal liability is concerned and denied the
extinction of the civil liability holding that the civil action is an independent civil action.

Hence, these Petitions for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUE

Whether or not the accused is guilty of violating RA 3019

DECISION

The Supreme Court sustain the Sandiganbayan in its finding of criminal and civil liabilities
against petitioner Asilo and petitioner Mayor Comendador.

The elements of the offense are as follows: (1) that the accused are public officers or private
persons charged in conspiracy with them; (2) that said public officers commit the prohibited
acts during the performance of their official duties or in relation to their public positions; (3)
that they caused undue injury to any party, whether the Government or a private party;
(4) OR that such injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to
the other party; and (5) that the public officers have acted with manifest partiality, evident
bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.

It is quite evident in the case at bar that the accused public officials committed bad faith in
performing the demolition.

1. First, there can be no merit in the contention that respondents’ structure is a public
nuisance.

Nuisance per se is that which is nuisance at all times and under any circumstance, regardless
of location and surroundings.

In this case, the market stall cannot be considered as a nuisance per se because as found out
by the Court, the buildings had not been affected by the 1986 fire. This finding was certified
to by Supervising Civil Engineer Wilfredo A. Sambrano of the Laguna District Engineer Office.

2. Second, the Sangguniang Bayan resolutions are not enough to justify demolition.

Unlike its predecessor law, the present Local Government Code does not expressly provide for
the abatement of nuisance.
In this case, even assuming that the power to abate nuisance is provided for by the present
code, the accused public officials were under the facts of this case, still devoid of any power
to demolish the store. A closer look at the contested resolutions reveals that Mayor
Comendador was only authorized to file an unlawful detainer case in case of resistance to
obey the order or to demolish the building using legal means. Clearly, the act of demolition
without legal order in this case was not among those provided by the resolutions, as indeed,
it is a legally impossible provision.

Furthermore, the Municipality of Nagcarlan, Laguna, as represented by the then Mayor

Comendador, was placed in estoppel after it granted yearly business permits in favor of the
Spouses Bombasi

Thus, the bad faith of the petitioners completes the elements of the criminal offense
of violation of Sec. 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. The same bad faith serves as the
source of the civil liability of Asilo, Angeles, and Mayor Comendador.

COURT JUDGMENT

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision of the Sandiganbayan
dated 28 April 2003 is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The Court affirms the
decision finding the accused Paulino S. Asilo, Jr. and Demetrio T. Comendador guilty of
violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. We declare the finality of the dismissal of
both the criminal and civil cases against Alberto S. Angeles as the same was not appealed. In
view of the death of Demetrio T. Comendador pending trial, his criminal liability is
extinguished; but his civil liability survives. The Municipality of Nagcarlan, Paulino Asilo and
Demetrio T. Comendador, as substituted by Victoria Bueta Vda. De Comendador, are hereby
declared solidarily liable to the Spouses Bombasi for temperate damages in the amount of
₱200,000.00 and moral damages in the amount of ₱100,000.00.

Costs against the petitioners-appellants.

Government of Hong Kong Special Admnistrative Regions vs Olalia, Jr. & Muñoz
GR No. 153675 April 19, 2007

Facts:
• Juan Antonio Muñoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three counts of the
offense of "accepting an advantage as agent” and seven counts of the offense of
“conspiracy to defraud”.

• An Order of Arrest was issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Manila against Muñoz
in lieu of the request received by the Department of Justice (DOJ) from the Hong Kong
Department of Justice for his provisional arrest. On the same day of the issuance of the
warrant, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) arrested and detained him.

• Upon petition of Muñoz, the Court of Appeals (CA) declared the Order of Arrest void.
The Supreme Court (SC), however, sustained the validity of the Order of Arrest against
Muñoz. This became final and executory on April 10, 2001.

Procedural History:
RTC Manila
 • November 22, 1999: Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HK-SAR) filed with the
RTC Manila a petition for the extradition of Muñoz. In response, Muñoz filed a petition
for bail. The same was denied for the reason that there is no Philippine law granting
bail in extradition cases and that Muñoz is a high “flight risk”.

• Muñoz filed a motion for reconsideration which the court granted(December 20, 2001).

• The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, in turn, filed an urgent motion to vacate
the said order granting bail but it was denied(April 10, 2002).

Issue:
WON the granting of bail is valid.

Whether or not respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction as there is no provision in the Constitution granting bail to a
potential extraditee.

WON the potential extraditee has a right to bail under the Constitution or statutory law,
the right being limited solely to criminal proceedings.

Petitioner’s contention:
Hong Kong-SAR alleged that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in admitting
Muñoz to bail, that there is nothing in the Constitution or statutory law providing that a
potential extraditee has a right to bail, the right being limited solely to criminal proceedings.

Respondent’s contention:
Muñoz on the other hand contends that the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of
Rights extends to a prospective extraditee and that extradition is a harsh process resulting in
a prolonged deprivation of one’s liberty.

Ruling:
Yes, the potential extraditee has a right to bail under the Constitution or statutory law.

In the case of Government of United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan,

the Court limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings. However, various
international treaties are now giving recognition and protection to human rights, particularly
the right to life and liberty.
In this case, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction
must be viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning
respect for the promotion and protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the
presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the right
to liberty of every individual is not impaired.

Furthermore, the Court ruled that if bail can be granted in deportation cases, there is
no justification why it should not also be allowed in extradition cases. Likewise, considering
that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to deportation cases, there is no
reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all, both are administrative
proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue.

Notes:
 • Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law)
defines "extradition" as "the removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object
of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or
government to hold him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against
him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of
the requesting state or government."

• It is not a criminal proceeding.(Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, G.R. No. 139465,

October 17, 2000, 343 SCRA 377)

• Even if the potential extraditee is a criminal, an extradition proceeding is not by its

nature criminal, for it is not punishment for a crime, even though such punishment
may follow extradition.(US ex rel Oppenheim v. Hecht, 16 F2d. 955, cert den. 273 US
969, 71 L. Ed. 883, 47 S. Ct. 572)

• It is sui generis, tracing its existence wholly to treaty obligations between different
nations.(State v. Chase, 107 So. 541, 91 Fla. 413; State v. Quigg, 108 So. 409, 91 Fla.
197)

• It is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential extraditee.(Benson

v. McMahon, 127 US 457, 32 L. Ed. 234, 8 S. Ct. 1240; Jimenez v. Aristequieta, 311
F2d. 547, stay den. 314 F2d. 649)

• Nor is it a full-blown civil action, but one that is merely administrative in

character.(Spatola v. US, 741 F. Supp. 362, Affd. 925 F2d. 615)

• Its object is to prevent the escape of a person accused or convicted of a crime and to
secure his return to the state from which he fled, for the purpose of trial or
punishment.(Re Henderson, 145 NW 574, 27 ND 155; State ex relTresoder v. Remann,
4 P2d. 866, 165 Wash. 92)

• But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized by the following:

(a) it entails a deprivation of liberty on the part of the potential extraditee and (b) the
means employed to attain the purpose of extradition is also "the machinery of criminal
law."

Pestaño v. GRP-Human Rights Committee

Facts:
• Phillip Pestaño was an Officer of the Philippine Navy serving as cargo officer of the ship
“BRP Bacolod City” during its Mindanao voyage in September 1995.

• Sept. 25, 1995: Ship commander allows loading of 14k board feet of logs without
proper papers or authorization.

• Sept. 26: Phillip discloses to his father that unauthorized cargo includes 20 sacks of
shabu

• Sept. 27: 4 am, Phillip Pestaño boards BRP Bacolod City; 11 am: parents asked to
proceed to Navy HQ, since Phillip had an accident. Navy alleges their son committed
suicide

• PNP-CID (Criminal Investigation Division) and NBI affirms Navy's findings

• Radio operator of BRP Bacolod City (a friend of Phillip Pestano) drowns under highly
suspicious circumstances

• Another member of the Navy (perceived as an ally of Pestano) who was also aboard
BRP Bacolod City during Pestano's death mysteriously disappears

• Several Navy Flag Officers ask Felipe Pestano, the victim's father, to refrain from
pursuing their son's case against the Navy. The elder Pestano was offered a hundred
million peso contract together with a waiver of his action against the Navy. Pestano
refuses and subsequently, four ships being repaired by his company sinks
mysteriously, and their offices are ransacked and looted. His nephew, the company's
property custodian was also shot dead.

• Leaked copy of an armed forces intelligence report states the Phillip was killed to
prevent him from revealing criminal activities aboard the ship

• Another member of the Philippine Navy mysteriously died in a military hospital, after a
strange and quick deterioration of his condition. This person was suspected of
involvement in the “shabu operation” in the BRP Bacolod City, as well as in the death
of Phillip, and had engaged in discreet talks with Spouses Pestaño before their’s son’s
death. He was believed to be ready to reveal important information before he died.

• Four persons are killed in connection with the September 1995 voyage of the BRP
Bacolod City. The four killings remain uninvestigated, and unaccounted for.

• Spouses Pestaño filed complaints against the Commanding Officer and certain crew
members of the BRP Bacolod City:
(1) in September 1995 with the Philippine Navy;
(2) in September 1995 with the Philippine National Police and the National
Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice. Both proceedings led to
the conclusion that Phillip had committed suicide;
(3) in January 1998 with the Philippine Senate (Committees on Justice-Human
Rights and Defense-National Security);
(4) in March 2000 with Ombudsman Aniano Desierto;
(5) and in October 2005 with a new Ombudsman (Simeon Marcelo), who was
replaced thereafter. No action was taken on the case by the new Ombudsman,
Merceditas Gutierrez, since she took office in December 2005.

• After eight Committee hearings, a visual inspection of the stateroom of the authors’
son in the ship, and relying, inter alia, on expert evidence and witness testimonies, two
Senate Committees issued a Joint report on the Pestaño case, which contained the
following findings:
(i) The authors’ son did not kill himself on the BRP Bacolod City on 27 September
1995;
(ii) he was shot in one place in the vessel different from the one where his body was
found;
(iii) after his death, his body was moved and laid on the bed where it was found;
(iv) he must have been shot on board the BRP Bacolod City before the vessel reached
the Navy Headquarters on 27 September 1995;
(v) there was a deliberate attempt to make it appear that the authors’ son killed
himself inside his stateroom; and
(vi) such an attempt was so deliberate and elaborate that one person could not have
accomplished it by himself.

• The Senate Committees also recommended, inter alia, that an independent

investigation be conducted on the circumstances surrounding the murder of the
 authors’ son, so as to bring the perpetrators to justice, and identify the other
individuals who participated in the deliberate attempt to portray a suicide.

• The Ombudsman (Fact-finding and Intelligence Bureau) in charge of the file dismissed
the case without prejudice, concluding in its evaluation report that “the conduct of
further investigation in order to find out the identity of the perpetrator and his
accomplices, if any, will only be a waste of time, considering that the physical evidence
has already been tampered with, not to mention the lapse of time”.

• Upon the retirement of the Ombudsman, and the appointment of his successor, whose
reputation for integrity was unassailable, the authors filed a new complaint with the
Office of the Ombudsman on 27 October 2005.

• In December 2005, the Ombudsman found merit in the authors’ petition, reopened the
case, and requested from the Commanding Officer of the BRP Bacolod City in
September 1995, and from eight senior and junior officers and enlisted personnel to
submit counter-affidavits as respondents within ten days. Only one week after
reopening the authors’ case, the Ombudsman stepped down, and was replaced. Since
then, the case was left uninvestigated in the Office of the Ombudsman for military
affairs.

• Thus, this petition.

The complaint:
1. The authors submit that the State party violated their son’s rights under article 2,
paragraph 3; article 6; article 9, paragraph 1, and article 17, paragraph 1, of the
Covenant.

2. They recall the Senate Committee’s findings of 1998, which they believe conclusively
established that their son did not commit suicide, but was murdered. They add that
there was a deliberate and elaborate conspiracy to cover-up his death, including
through fabrication destruction or tampering of evidence, as well as misrepresentation
and distortion of facts, all of which constituted an obstruction of justice, and an
unlawful attack against the authors’ son honour.

3. The authors add that the entire State party’s apparatus, including its criminal
investigation law enforcement and judicial organs, jointly and severally participated in
such conspiracy, with the exception of the Senate. By so doing, the State party
deprived the authors’ son of his right to redress for the violation of his human rights,
and thereby denied him justice for twelve years.

State’s arguments:
• State challenges admissibility of the communication per exhaustion of administrative
remedies, as the case is still pending with the Ombudsman.

• The State party further notes that the death of the authors’ son is an “ordinary criminal
case”, with no evidence of State participation or acquiescence. This is confirmed by the
fact that the Office of the Ombudsman reopened the action. Since the case is being
actively heard by the latter instance, the authors have not exhausted domestic
remedies within the meaning of article 2 of the Optional Protocol.

• On the merits, and regarding the authors’ allegation of a violation of their son’s right to
life, the State party contends that this claim is ill-founded, as nothing in the authors’
allegations or in the evidence available is capable of establishing the participation of
the State party in the alleged violation. The fact that two Senators filed a resolution on
 the case, which paved the way for the investigation and the very same report, of which
the authors avail themselves for the present complaint, is in itself an indication that the
State party cannot be accused of conspiracy to deprive the authors’ son of his right to
life and his right to an effective remedy.

Author’s comments:
• On the question of exhaustion of domestic remedies, they draw the Committee’s
attention to the Ombudsman’s Order which enjoined respondents in the case to file
counter-affidavits, after he found merit in the authors’ complaint. This Order was
issued for the counts of murder and grave misconduct, and thus covered both the
criminal and administrative parts of the action. The request for an extension, which
they sought, only concerned the administrative part of the proceedings.

• The authors add that as per the Ombudsman’s Order, the deadline for the submission
of affidavits by respondents was ten days from receipt of the Order, and has therefore
long elapsed. The Order expressly stated that the absence of submission of a defense
by the respondents should be considered as a waiver of their right to produce rebuttal
evidence. Accordingly, the case should have been considered on the basis of available
evidence, without further notice. The authors had submitted all required documents for
the criminal and administrative proceedings, and the case should have already have
been considered a long time ago.

• This delay demonstrates that the Ombudsman, as an instrument of the State party, is
responsible for delaying the judicial process, which in turn demonstrates that the
authors do not have effective remedies at their disposal within the State party’s
instances. According to them, the deliberate delay of thirteen years in the proceedings
is tantamount to a denial of justice.

• The authors also dispute the State party’s contention on the merits. They argue that its
direct and continuous participation in the violation of the right to life of their son is
manifest. In their action filed with the Ombudsman, all respondents were members of
the State party’s Navy, an institution of the State party. Respondents were represented
by the Office of the Naval Judge Advocate, i.e. an agent of the State party.

Issue:
Whether or not the communication is admissible under the Optional Protocol to the
Covenant.

State’s contention:
The State party has argued that the communication is inadmissible for failure to
exhaust domestic remedies.

Authors’ contention:
The authors claim that the procedure within the Office of the Ombudsman is an
ineffective remedy, since this body failed to initiate a timely and effective investigation into
the alleged murder of their son since it was seized of the case in 2000. The authors affirm
that despite the fact that the case was reopened in October 2005, no meaningful action has
been taken by the incumbent Ombudsman since she took office in December 2005.

Ruling:
Consideration of admissibility
• The Committee recalls that it is precluded from considering any communication unless
it has been ascertained that all available domestic remedies have been exhausted. For
the purposes of article 5, paragraph 2 (b), of the Optional Protocol, however, domestic
remedies must both be effective and available, and must not be unduly prolonged.
 In the circumstances of this case, the Committee notes that the State party has
failed to show that any investigation has been initiated since the date of the alleged
offence, with the final aim of ensuring the effective prosecution and punishment of the
perpetrator/s of the alleged murder. Under these circumstances, and considering that
almost 15 years elapsed since the date of the alleged offence, the Committee considers
that domestic remedies have been unreasonably prolonged. The Committee
accordingly finds that article 5, paragraph 2 (b) of the Optional Protocol does not
preclude it from considering the complaint.

• Concerning the alleged violation of article 9, paragraph 1 of the Covenant, the authors
claim that they received an anonymous call, informing them that their son’s life was in
danger, the day before he was found dead. However, there is no evidence that the
authors reported these threats against their son to the State au0thorities, and if so,
that the State party failed to take appropriate action for this protection. Nor is there
any conclusive evidence that the State party was itself involved in threatening the
authors’ son.

In the absence of any further arguments put forward by the authors on this
issue, the Committee considers that these claims are not sufficiently substantiated for
the purposes of admissibility and concludes that they are inadmissible under article 2
of the Optional Protocol.

• The Committee notes that the authors’ claim under article 17 paragraph 1, to the effect
that the State party’s attempt to make it appear that the victim committed suicide, is
to be construed as an unlawful attack against his honour. It considers that this claim
has not been sufficiently substantiated for the purposes of admissibility, and is
inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol.

• The Committee considers that the authors’ claims under article 6, read in conjunction
with article 2, paragraph 3, have been sufficiently substantiated, for the purposes of
admissibility, and proceeds to their examination on the merits.

Consideration of the merits:

• With regard to the authors’ contention that article 6 was violated, the Committee
recalls that the right to life is the supreme right, from which no derogation is
permitted.

• It further recalls that States parties have a positive obligation to ensure the protection
of individuals against violations of Covenant rights, which may be committed not only
by its agents, but also by private persons or entities.

• The Committee also refers to its jurisprudence, according to which both a criminal
investigation and consequential prosecution are necessary remedies for violations of
human rights such as those protected by article 6. A violation of the Covenant may
therefore arise as a result of a State party’s failure to take appropriate measures to
punish, investigate or redress such a violation.

• Despite the initial findings of the State party’s National Police and Department of
Justice, which both concluded in October 1995 that the victim had committed suicide, it
now appears undisputed that the death of the authors’ son was a violent one, resulting
from a homicide.

• The State party’s submissions of 18 January and 8 May 2008, contending that the
author’s case was “an ordinary criminal case”, at least concede this fact.
• The Committee took note of the conclusions of the substantial Senate, which
established that the victim was shot on board the BRP Bacolod City on 27 September
1995, that there had been a deliberate attempt to make it appear that the authors’ son
killed himself, and which recommended that an independent investigation be
conducted. The Committee further noted that an administrative and criminal action
filed by the authors is currently pending against members of the State party’s Navy,
i.e. of an organ of the State party.

• The Committee takes note of the authors’ assertions:

(1)the deaths of two other members who were close to the victim and the death of the
possible informant of the authors;
(2) having been threatened by a Vice-Admiral of the State party’s Navy to lose their
business with the Navy should they persist in their complaint;
(3) authors lost their business, and their nephew, the company’s property custodian,
was killed.

• In the absence of rebuttal statements, or any comments from the State party on these
facts, the Committee gives due weight to the authors’ contentions, which raise a strong
presumption of direct participation of the State party in the violation of their son’s right
to life.

• The Committee considers that the killing of the authors’ son on board a ship of the
State party’s Navy warranted a speedy, independent investigation on the possible
involvement of the Navy in the crime.

• The Committee recalls that the deprivation of life by the authorities of the State is a
matter of utmost gravity, and that the authorities have the duty to investigate in good
faith all allegations of violations of the Covenant made against it and its authorities. To
simply state that there was no direct participation of the State party in the violation of
the victim’s right to life falls short of fulfilling such positive obligation under the
Covenant.

• While close to fifteen years elapsed since the death of the victim, the authors are still
ignorant of the circumstances surrounding their son’s death, and the State party’s
authorities have yet to initiate an independent investigation.

• The Committee has given due consideration to the authors’ claim under article 6 that
the death of their son is directly attributable to the State party. When a person dies in
circumstances that might involve a violation of the right to life, the State party is
bound to conduct an investigation and ensure that there is no impunity. The State
party must accordingly be held to be in breach of its obligation, under article 6, read in
conjunction with article 2, paragraph 3, to properly investigate the death of the
authors’ son, prosecute the perpetrators, and ensure redress.

• Under article 2, paragraph 3(a), of the Covenant, the State party is under an
obligation to provide the authors with an effective remedy in the form, inter
alia, of an impartial, effective and timely investigation into the circumstances
of their son’s death, prosecution of perpetrators, and adequate compensation.
The State party is also under an obligation to prevent similar violations in the
future.
 Stonehill vs Diokno GR No. L-19550 June 19, 1967
Facts:
• Several judges issued 42 search warrants against Stonehill and other petitioners to
seize “books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts,
ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or
papers showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance
sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers),” claiming
violations of “Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code)
and Revised Penal Code.” The documents were seized from two locations: (1) their
corporate offices and (2) the personal residences of the petitioners.

• Petitioners filed an original action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction.

• SC issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in the petition. However, by
resolution, the writ was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as the papers, documents
and things seized from the offices of the corporations above mentioned are concerned;
but, the injunction was maintained as regards the papers, documents and things found
and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.

• Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the
warrants in question may be split into two (2) major groups, namely:
(a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations, and
(b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.

Issue:
I. Whether or not the search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures made
under the authority thereof, are valid.

II. If the answer to the preceding question is in the negative, whether or not said
documents, papers and things may be used in evidence against petitioners herein.

Petitioner’s contention:
Petitioners alleged that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as
contravening the Constitution and the Rules of Court — because, inter alia:
(1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to
be seized;
(2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized;
(3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned
petitioners in deportation cases filed against them;
(4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the
documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that
issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law.

Respondent’s contention:
The respondent-judges claim that the warrants were valid, alleging:
(1) that the contested search warrants are valid and have been issued in
accordance with law;
(2) that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners' consent;
and
 (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence against
herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality of the aforementioned
searches and seizures and any possible defects are cured by Stonehill’s consent.

Ruling:
I.
No, the search warrants (with regards to seizures made in the residences of petitioners)
in question, and the searches and seizures made under the authority thereof, are not valid.

Note: As regards the warrants issued to the corporations, SC held that petitioners herein
have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures
made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have their respective
personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of
the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and
whatever the offices they hold therein may be.

Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the
party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful
search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties.

(Digester’s Note: In the warrants issued regarding the seizures in the corporate offices, the
court cannot decide whether it is valid or not because the petitioners cannot assail the validity
of said warrants. Reason stated above.)

Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the 1935 Constitution provides: “The right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable
cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” Furthermore, two points must be stressed
in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but
upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision;
and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.

In this case, to uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out
completely one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in the Constitution, for it would
place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at
the mercy of the whims caprice or passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought
to be remedied by the constitutional provision above quoted — to outlaw the so-called
general warrants. It is not difficult to imagine what would happen, in times of keen political
strife, when the party in power feels that the minority is likely to wrest it, even though by
legal means.

II.
No, said documents, papers and things may not be used in evidence against petitioners
herein.

In the language of Judge Learned Hand: “As we understand it, the reason for the
exclusion of evidence competent as such, which has been unlawfully acquired, is that
exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the constitutional privilege.” (Pugliese (1945)
133 F. 2d. 497)

In this case, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to
the spirit of the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. To be
sure, if the applicant for a search warrant has competent evidence to establish probable
cause of the commission of a given crime by the party against whom the warrant is intended,
then there is no reason why the applicant should not comply with the requirements of the
fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no such competent evidence, then it is not
possible for the Judge to find that there is probable cause, and, hence, no justification for the
issuance of the warrant. The only possible explanation (not justification) for its issuance is the
necessity of fishing evidence of the commission of a crime. But, then, this fishing expedition
is indicative of the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.

Notes:

• In fact, over thirty (30) years before, the Federal Supreme Court had already declared:
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in
evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the 4th Amendment,
declaring his rights to be secure against such searches and seizures, is of no value, and,
so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the
Constitution. The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to
punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those
great principles established by years of endeavor and suffering which have resulted in
their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land.(Weeks vs. United States (1914)
232 U.S. 383, 58 L. ed. 652, 34 S. Ct. 341; emphasis supplied)

FACTS:
Description of Petitioners:
Member of unnamed corporation, "the President and/or General Manager"
Description of Respondents:
As above mentioned
Juridical Antecedents:
Several judges issued 42 search warrants against Stonehill and other petitioners to seize
“books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals,
portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all
business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss
statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers),” claiming violations of “Central Bank Laws,
Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code.”
The documents were seized from two locations: (1) their corporate offices and (2) the
personal residences of the petitioners.

FCI: -
CA: -
SC:
On March 20, 1962, the petitioners filed with the Supreme Court an original action for
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction, and prayed that, pending final disposition of
the present case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining Respondents-
Prosecutors, their agents and /or representatives from using the aforementioned seized
things or papers or any copies thereof and thereafter, decision be rendered quashing the
contested search warrants and declaring the same null and void, and commanding the
respondents, their agents or representatives to return to petitioners herein, in accordance
with Section 3, Rule 67, of the Rules of Court, the documents, papers, things and cash
moneys seized or confiscated under the search warrants in question.

On March 22, 1962, the Supreme Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in
the petition. However, by resolution dated June 29, 1962, the writ was partially lifted or
dissolved, insofar as the papers, documents and things seized from the offices of the
corporations; but, the injunction was maintained as regards the papers, documents and
things found and seized in the residences of petitioners.

ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not the search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures pursued
against the petitioners are constitutional considering the petitioners contention that search
warrants are null and void, as it violates the Constitution and the Rules of Court — because,
among others:
(1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized;
(2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized;
(3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in
deportation cases filed against them;
(4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and
(5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that
issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law.

and considering further, the respondent’s contention that,

(1) the contested search warrants are valid and have been issued in accordance with law;
(2) that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners' consent; and
(3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence against herein petitioners,
regardless of the alleged illegality of the aforementioned searches and seizures.

RULING/HELD:
Position:
No, the search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures pursued against the
petitioners are unconstitutional.

Legal Basis/Law/ Doctrine/Obiter Dictum:

The Constitution (1935) provides that,
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but
upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Note:
Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely:
(1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the
manner set forth in said provision; and
(2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
Conclusion/SC Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that,
(1) the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be abandoned;
(2) that the warrants for the search of three (3) residences of the petitioners, as specified
in the Resolution of June 29, 1962, are null and void;
(3) that the searches and seizures therein made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary
injunction heretofore issued, in connection with the documents, papers and other effects thus
seized in said residences of herein petitioners is hereby made permanent;
(4) that the writs prayed for are granted, insofar as the documents, papers and other
effects so seized in the aforementioned residences are concerned;
(5) that the motion for Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as it is hereby, denied;
(6) and that the petition herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for denied, as regards
the documents, papers and other effects seized in the twenty-nine (29) places, offices and
other premises enumerated in the same Resolution, without special pronouncement as to
costs.

Ratio:
Right Against Unlawful Search is Personal

1. As regards the warrants issued to the corporations, we hold that petitioners herein have no
cause of action to assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in
pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have their respective
personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of
the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and
whatever the offices they hold therein may be.

2. Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party
whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and
seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties.

Right Against Unreasonable Search

3. The Constitution [Art III, Sec 2] provides that “the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.”

4. Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1)
that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the
manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the
things to be seized.

General Warrants

5. The subject warrants were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical
persons therein named had committed a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs
Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words, no specific offense
had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense
committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the
warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the
introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed
particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal
laws.

6. General search warrants are outlawed because they place the sanctity of the domicile and
the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice or
passion of peace officers.

Exclusionary Rule: Inadmissibility of illegally seized items

7. The prosecutors, relying on Moncado vs. People's Court, maintain that, even if the
searches and seizures under consideration were unconstitutional, the documents, papers and
things thus seized are admissible in evidence against petitioners. Said position was in line
with the American common law rule, that the criminal should not be allowed to go free
merely "because the constable has blundered," 1 upon the theory that the constitutional
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is protected by means other than the
exclusion of evidence unlawfully obtained, such as the common-law action for damages
against the searching officer, against the party who procured the issuance of the search
warrant and against those assisting in the execution of an illegal search.

8. The court declared that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case is abandoned. Most
common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach and have adopted the
exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional
injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. In the language of Justice Hand: “As
we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which has
been unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the
constitutional privilege.”

9. The non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but, also, to spirit of the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if the
applicant for a search warrant has competent evidence to establish probable cause of the
commission of a given crime by the party against whom the warrant is intended, then there is
no reason why the applicant should not comply with the requirements of the fundamental law.
Upon the other hand, if he has no such competent evidence, then it is not possible for the
judge to find that there is probable cause, and, hence, no justification for the issuance of the
warrant. The only possible explanation (not justification) for its issuance is the necessity of
fishing evidence of the commission of a crime. But, then, this fishing expedition is indicative
of the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause..

Concurring and dissenting opinion of Castro, J:

All the search warrants, without exception, in this case are admittedly general, blanket and
roving warrants and are therefore admittedly and indisputably outlawed by the Constitution;
and the searches and seizures made were therefore unlawful.

The U.S. doctrines and pertinent cases on standing to move for the suppression or return of
documents, papers and effects which are the fruits of an unlawful search and seizure, may be
summarized as follows; (a) ownership of documents, papers and effects gives "standing;" (b)
ownership and/or control or possession — actual or constructive — of premises searched
gives "standing"; and (c) the "aggrieved person" doctrine where the search warrant and the
sworn application for search warrant are "primarily" directed solely and exclusively against
the "aggrieved person," gives "standing."

Ownership of matters seized gives "standing."

Ownership of the properties seized alone entitles the petitioners to bring a motion to return
and suppress, and gives them standing as persons aggrieved by an unlawful search and
seizure regardless of their location at the time of seizure.

Control of premises searched gives "standing."

Independent of ownership or other personal interest in the records and documents seized, the
petitioners have standing to move for return and suppression by virtue of their proprietary or
leasehold interest in many of the premises searched.

Thus, the petitioners have full standing to move for the quashing of all the warrants
regardless whether these were directed against residences in the narrow sense of the word,
as long as the documents were personal papers of the petitioners or (to the extent that they
were corporate papers) were held by them in a personal capacity or under their personal
control.

this Court, at all events, should order the return to the petitioners all personal and private
papers and effects seized, no matter where these were seized, whether from their residences
or corporate offices or any other place or places. The uncontradicted sworn statements of the
petitioners in their, various pleadings submitted to this Court indisputably show that amongst
the things seized from the corporate offices and other places were personal and private
papers and effects belonging to the petitioners.
Note: Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1), Respondents-Prosecutors maintain that, even
if the searches and seizures under consideration were unconstitutional, the documents,
papers and things thus seized are admissible in evidence against petitioners.

If there should be any categorization of the documents, papers and things which where the
objects of the unlawful searches and seizures, I submit that the grouping should be: (a)
personal or private papers of the petitioners were they were unlawfully seized, be it their
family residences offices, warehouses and/or premises owned and/or possessed (actually or
constructively) by them as shown in all the search and in the sworn applications filed in
securing the void search warrants and (b) purely corporate papers belonging to corporations.
Under such categorization or grouping, the determination of which unlawfully seized papers,
documents and things are personal/private of the petitioners or purely corporate papers will
have to be left to the lower courts which issued the void search warrants in ultimately
effecting the suppression and/or return of the said documents.

And as clearly indicated by the authorities above cited, the petitioners likewise have clear
legal standing to move for the suppression of purely corporate papers as "President and/or
General Manager" of the corporations involved as specifically mentioned in the void search
warrants.

The constitutional proscription on illegal searches and seizures do not withhold the mantle of
their protection from cases not criminal in origin or nature.
Note:

Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1)

Respondents-Prosecutors maintain that, even if the searches and seizures under
consideration were unconstitutional, the documents, papers and things thus seized are
admissible in evidence against petitioners.

Mapp vs. Ohio (supra.):

“All evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that
same authority, inadmissible in a State.”

ID: G.R. No. L-24693

Date: July 31, 1967
Petitioners: ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOCIATION,
INC., HOTEL DEL MAR INC. and GO CHIU,
Respondents: THE HONORABLE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, respondent-appellant.
VICTOR ALABANZA, intervenor-appellee.
Panganiban, Abad and Associates Law Office for respondent-appellant.
J. M. Aruego, Tenchavez and Associates for intervenor-appellee.
Remarks:

FACTS:
Juridical Antecedents:
On 13 June 1963, the Manila Municipal Board enacted Ord 4760 and the same was approved
by then acting mayor Astorga. Ord 4760 sought to regulate hotels and motels. It classified
them into 1st class (taxed at 6k/yr) and 2nd class (taxed at 4.5k/yr). It also compelled
hotels/motels to get the demographics of anyone who checks in to their rooms. It compelled
hotels/motels to have wide open spaces so as not to conceal the identity of their patrons.
Ermita-Malate impugned the validity of the law averring that such is oppressive, arbitrary and
against due process.

FCI:
The petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 was filed on July 5, 1963 by the
petitioners, Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, one of its members, Hotel
del Mar Inc., and a certain Go Chiu, who is "the president and general manager of the second
petitioner" against the respondent Mayor of the City of Manila who was sued in his capacity as
such "charged with the general power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila
and to give the necessary orders for the faithful execution and enforcement of such
ordinances."

The lower court on July 6, 1963 issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering respondent
Mayor to refrain from enforcing said Ordinance No. 4760 from and after July 8, 1963.

CA: An answer was filed by the respondent-City Mayor on August 3, 1963 praying for the
dissolution and the dismissal of the petition.

Instead of evidence being offered by both parties, there was submitted a stipulation of facts
dated September 28, 1964, which reads:
1. That the petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. and Hotel
del Mar Inc. are duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, both with
offices in the City of Manila, while the petitioner Go Chin is the president and general
manager of Hotel del Mar Inc., and the intervenor Victor Alabanza is a resident of Baguio City,
all having the capacity to sue and be sued;

2. That the respondent Mayor is the duly elected and incumbent City Mayor and chief
executive of the City of Manila charged with the general power and duty to enforce
ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the necessary orders for the faithful execution
and enforcement of such ordinances;

3. That the petitioners are duly licensed to engage in the business of operating hotels and
motels in Malate and Ermita districts in Manila;

4. That on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No.
4760, which was approved on June 14, 1963, by Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga, then the
acting City Mayor of Manila, in the absence of the respondent regular City Mayor, amending
sections 661, 662, 668-a, 668-b and 669 of the compilation of the ordinances of the City of
Manila besides inserting therein three new sections. This ordinance is similar to the one
vetoed by the respondent Mayor (Annex A) for the reasons stated in its 4th Indorsement
dated February 15, 1963 (Annex B);

5. That the explanatory note signed by then Councilor Herminio Astorga was submitted with
the proposed ordinance (now Ordinance 4760) to the Municipal Board, copy of which is
attached hereto as Annex C;

6. That the City of Manila derived in 1963 an annual income of P101,904.05 from license fees
paid by the 105 hotels and motels (including herein petitioners) operating in the City of
Manila.

Thereafter came a memorandum for respondent on January 22, 1965, wherein stress was laid
on the presumption of the validity of the challenged ordinance, the burden of showing its lack
of conformity to the Constitution resting on the party who assails it, citing not only U.S. v.
Salaveria, but likewise applicable American authorities. Such a memorandum likewise refuted
point by point the arguments advanced by petitioners against its validity. Then barely two
weeks later, on February 4, 1965, the memorandum for petitioners was filed reiterating in
detail what was set forth in the petition, with citations of what they considered to be
applicable American authorities and praying for a judgment declaring the challenged
ordinance "null and void and unenforceable" and making permanent the writ of preliminary
injunction issued.

After referring to the motels and hotels, which are members of the petitioners association,
and referring to the alleged constitutional questions raised by the party, the lower court
observed: "The only remaining issue here being purely a question of law, the parties, with the
nod of the Court, agreed to file memoranda and thereafter, to submit the case for decision of
the Court." It does appear obvious then that without any evidence submitted by the parties,
the decision passed upon the alleged infirmity on constitutional grounds of the challenged
ordinance, dismissing as is undoubtedly right and proper the untenable objection on the
alleged lack of authority of the City of Manila to regulate motels, and came to the conclusion
that "the challenged Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila, would be unconstitutional and,
therefore, null and void." It made permanent the preliminary injunction issued against
respondent Mayor and his agents "to restrain him from enforcing the ordinance in question."

SC:
A petition was filed by respondent appealing from the judgment of the lower court in an
action for prohibition is whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the
due process clause. For reasons to be more specifically set forth, such judgment must be
reversed, there being a failure of the requisite showing to sustain an attack against its validity.

ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not Ordinance No. 4760 is constitutional (due process clause) considering
the petitioners contention that the aforesaid ordinance is void for being arbitrary,
unreasonable and violative of due process and considering further, the respondents
contention that the same is reasonable and with proper purpose, which is to curb immorality,
a valid and proper exercise of the police power.

RULING/HELD:
Position:
Yes, Ordinance No. 4760 is constitutional.

Legal Basis/Law/ Doctrine/Obiter Dictum:

As said by Justice Malcolm:
"The presumption is all in favor of validity x x x . The action of the elected representatives of
the people cannot be lightly set aside. The councilors must, in the very nature of things, be
familiar with the necessities of their particular municipality and with all the facts and
circumstances which surround the subject and necessitate action. The local legislative body,
by enacting the ordinance, has in effect given notice that the regulations are essential to the
well being of the people x x x . The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action
when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police
regulation.

Note:
There is a primary presumption of validity in a statute or ordinance in the absence of any
evidence to offset its legality or constitutionality.

As said by Justice Laurel:

"Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of said law, and the state in order
to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with
business and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints
and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state x x x
To this fundamental aim of our Government the rights of the individual are subordinated.

Conclusion/SC Ruling:
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the lower court and the injunction issued was
lifted. With costs

Ratio:
There is a presumption that the laws enacted by Congress (in this case Municipal Board) is
valid. W/o a showing or a strong foundation of invalidity, the presumption stays. As in this
case, there was only a stipulation of facts and such cannot prevail over the presumption.
Further, the ordinance is a valid exercise of Police Power. There is no question but that the
challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public
morals. This is to minimize prostitution. The increase in taxes not only discourages
hotels/motels in doing any business other than legal but also increases the revenue of the lgu
concerned. And taxation is a valid exercise of police power as well. The due process
contention is likewise untenable, due process has no exact definition but has reason as a
standard. In this case, the precise reason why the ordinance was enacted was to curb down
prostitution in the city which is reason enough and cannot be defeated by mere singling out
of the provisions of the said ordinance alleged to be vague.