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Case Analysis Apple Vs FBI
Case Analysis Apple Vs FBI
Parties involved:
Plaintiff: US Government
Relevant Facts:
On Dec 2nd 2015, San Bernardino County health inspector Syed Rizwan Farook, with
his wife, Tashfeen Malik, attacked at the Inland Regional Center in San Bernardino.
The
unfortunate incident claimed lives of 14 people and left 22 wounded. Farook and
Malik
died a few hours later in a shootout with police. The police recovered iPhone 5c on
Dec.
3 in a warrant search of Farook’s mother’s car. Apple provided the FBI Farook's
iCloud
backups through mid-October, and it was discovered that Farook had stopped backing
up his iPhone since October. The data left on the phone is encrypted with 256-bit
AES
security, which makes a brute-force attack on the iPhone 5C by the FBI nearly
network, it will create a new iCloud backup which would have the missing
information
between the October backup and December 2. Meanwhile, without consulting Apple
Inc., FBI tried to reset the iCloud password with the help of San Bernardino County
officials who owns the phone. The password reset meant that someone would need to
log in to the phone and enter the new password before it could sync with Apple's
iCloud
servers again. According to FBI, Farook’s phone has iOS 9 which is programmed to
shut down after 10 failed attempts at the pass code. FBI is seeking software from
Apple
to modify its iOS and bypass the security feature and remove a delay between
passcode attempts that’s usually intended to make brute-force entry even more
difficult.
Main Issues:
This case highlights a very interesting issue of privacy vs security, how much of
digital
security is required especially when it comes to terrorism. This issue has much
broader
perspective than just about unlocking one phone. If we look at the bigger picture,
things
cars, or anything connected to internet. The issue is not whether Apple should
build
software to bypass the security mechanisms in iOS 9 to unlock Farooq’s iPhone. Main
issue lies in developing a solution that would give law enforcement some ways to
stop
acts of terror yet not creating backdoor into gadgets which could be provide access
to
hackers. In this case, both sides are abiding by its duties to protect its
customers.
FBI’s arguments:
Direct data extraction from the phone will have more information than the
iCloud
backup since backup does not contain all the information available on the
phone.
The courts are relying heavily on the All Writs Act of 1789 which gives them
the
authority to order Apple to hack the iPhone under a "lawful search warrant"
in the
Co. set precedent for allowing the All Writs Act to be used to force
companies to
the iPhone's encryption does not raise any First Amendment issues, having "an
company, allowing the courts to order the assistance to aid law enforcement.
FBI is requesting Apple to perform the passcode-bypass in its own lab, using
its
granting the application will not affect the technological security of any
Apple
CR-5525.
Apple’s arguments:
The All Writs Act of 1789 allows courts to "issue all writs necessary or
privacy rights of anyone in the world with a smartphone. Moreover, there are
limits where this law is applicable. The judge must have no other legal
options
available, the target of the writ (Apple) must be closely connected to the
case,
searches and seizures. FBI’s demand to compromise the security of the iPhone
may extend to other iPhones in future which will violate the Fourth Amendment
rights.
"Government OS" that would affect the integrity of the company's products.
The order to develop the software program would not be limited to one iPhone,
but instead would provide a "master key" to the government to seek similar
information.
If FBI wins the case, then it could act as a precedent for future.
Modified iOS would create a "backdoor" into the iPhone that hackers and
malicious governments could use to undermine the privacy and security of all
iPhone users.
Apple will have to invest in more resources in a new 'hacking' department" to
telecommunications carriers.
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (“ECPA”) is directed to
not applicable to Apple. ECPA does not address the duty of Apple to assist in
phone.
Furthermore, Apple could use following cases as precedents to support argument for
Amendment rights. Under this case, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled
that software source code was speech protected by the First Amendment and
Court reasoning:
Before giving ruling, here is an analysis of this case using five principles of
this course:
Legal: Apple’s arguments against All Writs Act is justified as Apple is not
connected to
the case, it merely manufactured and sold the iPhone to a customer. Also, FBI’s ask
poses a great amount of burden on Apple not only to build the “Govt OS” but to
maintain
and fight similar future cases. As stated above, the order violates First Amendment
and
private and secure. At the same time, it is a moral responsibility to help the FBI
in cases
which involves acts of terror. There is a very delicate balance between choosing
the
privacy of its customers and security of the country. Apple was helpful in
providing the
information which it could retrieve from Farook’s iCloud account. But developing
software which could hack the privacy does not seem to be a moral solution from
customer’s perspective.
Ethical: Apple is standing by its ethics to provide a secure and private platform
to its
users. If Apple develops the hack which could potentially get into hands of
hackers, that
will ruin what Apple has invested so far in its encryption technology. Also, this
could also
hurt Apple’s bottom-line as customers become less confident (& trustful) of Apple
devices.
Societal: There shall be a huge impact on the society if Apple decides to build the
“Govt
OS”. Encryption is not only about privacy but it is about public security as well.
People
want to address both the issues of privacy and security to go hand in hand. If
hackers
somehow get the encryption key for the iPhone, it will become a threat to personal
security as people save all sorts of data on their iPhone. Apple is acting to
preserve
crimes.
Business: If Apple agrees to provide hack software to FBI, it will cost them lot of
money
to build such software. Even after this case is over, Apple fears that such
requests will
not end and it has to set up a special department to run the overhead of handling
government requests. Moreover, people pay premium to Apple to keep their data safe
and helping FBI to crack down iPhone and potentially to hackers will severely
impact
Apple’s business.
As a judge, I would rule in favor of Apple and not force Apple to build a “Govt OS”
which
could open doors for hundreds of such open requests. This case could become
precedent for similar cases in future. If “Govt. OS” gets leaked somehow, it will
be
software to FBI, Apple will be harming its business. When people buy iPhone or any
other products, they have an expectation that their data will remain secure and
private,
and Apple intends to maintain the reliable reputation among its customers.
References:
https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Apple-EDNY-AWA-
Government-District-Court-Application-for-Order-to-Compel.pdf
http://www.csoonline.com/article/3038731/security/apple-vs-the-fbi-the-
legal-
arguments-in-a-nutshell.html
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bernstein_v._United_States