Professional Documents
Culture Documents
I
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction 6
The Scope of Administrative law 10
The Pertinent Legal Sources of Administrative Law 10
Constitution 10
Basic Rights and the Rules of Natural Justice 14
Constitution Foundation of Administrative Law 20
The Supremacy of the Constitution 26
Written Laws 26
Principal Legislation and Subsidiary/Subordinate Legislation 27
Subsidiary/Subordinate Legislation 27
Delegation and Sub-delegation of Powers 29
Case Law Development on Administrative Law 35
THE LIST OF PROMINENT REFERRED CASES 37
APPENDIX I 38
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW VERSUS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 38
APPENDIX II 39
GENERAL PRINCIPLES IN MAKING SUBSIDIARY LEGISLATION 39
APPENDIX III 40
TUTORIAL QUESTIONS 40
COVERED TOPICS
TOPIC
1 Nature and Scope of Administrative Law
- Defining Administrative law
- Sources of Administrative law
- Growth of Administrative law
- The Executive Agencies
- Classification of Administrative
Functions/Actions
2 The Pillars of the State
- The Executive
- The Parliament
- The Judiciary
Basic Constitutional Principles
- Separation of Powers
- Independence of the Judiciary
- Rule of Law
- Parliamentary Supremacy
- Supremacy of the Constitution
- Respect of Human Rights
- Sovereign of the People
3 Principles/Rules of Natural Justice
- The Right to be heard
- The Right against bias
- Reasons for the Decision
1. Introduction
The sources of law can be classified as either legal or historical. The former
are those which are recognized as such by law itself and the latter are those
sources lacking formal recognition by law. The legal sources of law are
authoritative while the historical are unauthoritative. The legal sources take
precedence and command in the courts of law while the historical sources
have no such command, they influence more or less extensively the course
of legal development. 1
The term sources of law in ordinary expression means where do we find the
laws governing National or International legal system or a particular
discipline of law. Herein, the term sources of law have been linked with
only national laws particularly administrative law and the legal system of
Tanzania at large. The question of what are the sources of law governing a
particular discipline of law may be tentative, at least in administrative law
this issue is settled. This discipline of law is said to be of political nature so
associated with the constitutional law. Hitherto, this fact cannot be
denied as Constitutional law is of paramount importance for the appropriate
comprehension of Administrative law. Above all, Constitution is the
superlative legal source of Administrative law accompanied with written
laws and case laws.
This lecture paper is the summation of all lectures on administrative law in
relation to the three prime sources of administrative law. The paper
describes each source independently and underlines the interconnection
between one source and another commencing with the Constitution, Written
laws while deriving authoritative support from Case laws.
Prior to the synopsis of the sources of administrative law in Tanzania, the
foremost part of this paper appreciates the meaning, concept and scope of
administrative law, following by the pertinent legal sources of
administrative law including Constitution and its supremacy feature, written
laws including principal and subsidiary legislation.
2. Defining Administrative Law
Administrative law as the name suggests, is the law relating to
administration. However, describing administrative law in such context, it
does not explore the legal content and concern of this law. A better way of
defining administrative law would therefore be to say administrative law is
the law relating to control of government power. Every government wields
enormous powers over its subjects and such powers are likely to be abused.
Administrative law keeps administrative powers within their legal limits so
as to protect the citizens against the abuse. Administrative law compels
public authorities to operate within the cycle of defined legal duties. 2
At large, administrative law deals with the structure, powers and functions of
the organs of administration; the methods and procedures followed by them
in exercising their powers and functions; the methods by which their
controlled and the remedies which are available to a person against them
when his rights are infringed by their operation. Dr Mahajan argues that, for
3
“if you cause disturbance, having being been told not to do this, if you decide to obstinate,
you only have to be beaten up… and I am saying, you only have to be beaten up… and
I am saying you should keep on beating them because we don’t have other means…”
Even though the petition was struck out but the petitioners were aggrieved by
the quoted statement and challenged the same on ground that it contravenes
fundamental rights of the constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania,
1977 which prohibit violation of the right to life and seek to protect the rule
of law and natural justice particularly fair hearing. The statement was said
to encourage abuse of powers by the Police and hence Articles 12(2), 13 and
14 of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, 1977 were said
to be infringed. The petitioners in this case acted for and on behalf of the
public, this mechanism necessitated the petition to fall under what so called
Public Interest Litigation.
Such litigations are said to be the catalyst for the proactive development and
wide spread of constitutional and administrative law in the sense that, it
evidences proper proceedings to advance public interest, the proceedings
contribute to the proper understanding of the law and involve no private
gain or costs of the case. It is noted under the last paragraph of the ruling that;
“…Consequently, we order that the petition be and is hereby, struck out. Costs are
within the Courts discretion, though they usually follow the event. However, as the
case falls within the category of public interest litigation, we would refrain from making
any order as to costs.’ [Emphasis supplied].
Even where the petition was struck out, the general objective of public
interest litigation in one way or another was attained, in quintessence that, the
petition called upon public attention on the understanding of constitutional
and administrative law and hence the message was delivered and the public
understanding of the constitution law, basic rights and the rules of fair
hearing was upgraded. 11
Tanzania, the right to be heard has been expounded to include the right to be
heard for the accused and detained persons.
This does not go far as it is under Articles 47, 48 and 50 of the Kenyan
Constitution, 2010 where the provision for the fair administrative action, fair
hearing and access to justice are as good as wide to cover enhanced
administrative procedures including but not limited to the rules of natural
justice and the supplement right for the review of administrative actions by
the competent court or independent and impartial tribunals.
One of the prominent features of the right to be heard is access to justice
through legal representation. One of the disparity observed both under the
1977 Constitution and the 2014 proposed Constitution of the United Republic
of Tanzania is that the two constitutions only enact for the right to be heard
(aud alteram paterm) and the other two developed rules that of against bias
(nemo debet esse judex in propria sua causa or nemo judex in re sua) and
reasons for the decisions (nullum arbitrium sine rationibus) find no tighten
security under the Constitution and written laws. Save only in case law for
example where Lord Dening established the test for the rule against bias in
the following attitude;
“In considering whether there was a real likehood of bias, the court does not look at the mind
of the justice himself or at the mind of the tribunal or whoever it may be, who sits in a
judiciary capacity. It does not look to see if there was a real likelihood that he would or did
in fact favour one side at the expense of the other. The court look at the impression which
would be given to other people….there must be circumstances from which a reasonable
man would think it likely or probable that the justice or the chairman would or did
favour one side unfairly at the expense of the other….it suffice if reasonable people must
think he did, justice must be rooted in confidence. And confidence is destroyed when the
right minded people go away thinking the judge was biased.”19
Under the Common law of England where the rules of natural justice
actually derive it roots from, the rule against bias seems to be the oldest rule
of which the other two rules, fair hearing and the reason for the decision
emanates from. In fact, the existence of only aud alteram paterm in the
20
they are not the creature of the Constitution but rather they have the status
of Human rights incorporated in Tanzania in 1984 from the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, 1948. The rules for fair hearing are also
enshrined under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
1966 and also referred from the believed verses of the Bible where God did not
victimize Adam without the right to be heard.
It is contended by Lord Fortescue J in R vs. Chancellor of the University of
Cambridge (Dr Bentley’s case) (1723) that;
“The laws of God and Man both give the party an opportunity to make his defence if he
has any. I remember to have heard it observed by a very learned man upon such occasion,
that even God himself did not pass sentence upon Adam, before he was called upon to
make his defence.”
Professor C. P. Maina argues that, the constitution gives the rules of natural
justice special status in Tanzania legal system and it is not easy to ignore them
anymore, even in absence of Article 13(6) (a) that was in the eon prior to
23
1984, the Courts of law in East Africa particularly Tanganyika had a proactive
tradition of applying the rules of natural justice as done elsewhere under
common law system and particularly through case law. This is evidenced in
the case of Hypolito Cassiano De Souza vs. Chairman and Members of the
Tanga Town Council where in 1961 the Court of Appeal for Eaten African
24
revealed that the accused person must know the nature of the accusation
and fair opportunity to be heard must be given to those who are parties to
the dispute. 25
The rules of natural justice apply not only in administrative law as a unique
discipline of law but also in judicial civil and criminal proceedings, extra
judicial practice, in tribunals and in communal relations. In the case of
Sadik Athuman vs. R (1986) T.L.R (HC) at 238 the Court emphasized that;
“There is a misconception of the rules of natural justice that it is exclusive principle of
Administrative Law. It is not, it s first a universal principle and therefore a rule of
administrative law. It is that part of judicial procedure which is imported into
administrative process because of its universality.”
Surprisingly, children though not aware of, yet they perpetually practice
the rules of natural justice in their ordinary game play life. For example A
may ask B why did you eat my chocolate? The answer to that question
determines continuation of friendship or the verdict of ending the existing
friendship, but at least B has been afforded with the right to be heard. If at
all A decides to end the friendship, the reasons for the decision will
obvious be B is not a good friend as he did eat his friend chocolate without
any permission.
The importance of reasons of the decision in administration of justice was
highly emphasized in the case of Tanzania Air Services Limited vs. Minister
for Labour, Attorney General and The Commissioner for Labour (1996) TLR
217 (HC) where it was noted that under common law there is no general
requirement that public authorities should give reasons for the decisions but
this position has been under criticism. The Court argues that;
“The judge must give reasons for his decision: for by so doing, he gives proof that he has
heard and considered the evidence and arguments that have been produced before him
on each side: and also that he has not taken extraneous considerations into account. It is of
course true that his decision may be correct even though he should give no reasons for it
or even give a wrong reason: but, in order that a trial should be fair, it is necessary, not
only that a correct decision should be reached, but also that it should be seen to be based
on reasons; and that can only be seen if the judge himself states his reasons.
Furthermore if his reasons are at fault, then they afford a basis on which the party
aggrieved by his decision can appeal to a higher court. No judge is infallible, and every
system of justice must provide for an appeal to a higher court to correct the errors of the judge
below. The cry of Paul "I appeal unto Caesar" represents a deep-seated human response.
But no appeal can properly be determined unless the appellate court knows the
reasons for the decision of the lower court. For that purpose, if for no other, the judge
who tries the case must give his reasons.'
Furthermore, the Court articulated the importance of giving reasons for the
decisions in the following manner;
`... First, the requirement of a reasoned opinion provides considerable assurance that the
decision will be better as a result of its being properly thought out. Second, reasons will
enable a person who has a right of appeal to determine whether he has good
grounds for an appeal and will inform him of the case he will have to meet if he does
decide to appeal. In this regard, if an administrative determination is not the result of
unanimous votes of the decision makers, the minority opinion may be of considerable
value to an unsuccessful party Third, reasons will make a tribunal more amenable to the
supervisory jurisdiction of the courts and will ensure that a tribunal is acting within
its powers.
That is to say, reasons will inform a person why a decision has been made and will
make manifest any errors of law. Fourth, reasoned opinions will encourage public
confidence in the administrative process. As was noted in a leading English case, even
though a decision may be perfectly correct, if a party was not given reasons he "was left
with the real grievance that he was not told why the I decision had been" (In re
Poyser and Mills' Arbitration [1964] 2QB
A breach of the rules of natural justice renders the whole decision nullity. It
is a sufficient ground for judicial review. In the case of D.P.P vs. S.I Tesha and
R. Tesha [1993] TLR 237 it was stated that;
“If the principles of natural justice are violated n respect of any decision it is immaterial
whether the same decision would have been arrived at in the absence of departure from
essential principles of natural justice. That decision must be declared to be no decision.”
3.3. Constitution Foundation of Administrative Law
The constitution foundation of administrative law form the basis of it being
the source of administrative law and whoever sought to comprehend
administrative law must first grasp the general knowledge of constitutional
law. Thus is why constitutional law as of practice in Tanzania law programme
is the first year course and administrative law is the second or third year
course depending on the duration of the law programme. The bush lawyer
may easily draw unqualified line of demarcation between administrative
law and constitutional law while learned brothers and sisters ought to and
not just once, but always apply the constitutional principles of separation
of powers, independence of the judiciary, rule of law, supremacy of the
constitution, parliament supremacy, sovereignty of the people and respect
of human rights in line with administrative law. 26
Save that, not all Constitutional principles may easily match up for in
administrative law. For example, the principle of Separation of powers as
set in Article 4 of the Constitution is said to have no basis in administrative
law as the Parliament under Article 97(5) delegates its exclusive legislative
powers under Article 64 to other persons, Government department and
executive agencies who may make subsidiary legislation, interpret them as
judiciary and enforce them as the executive. So far as a single Executive
Agency or administrative authority can legislate, interpret and adjudicate,
the principle of separation of powers is therefore derogated. However,
Nyalali Cj (as he then was) in Attorney General vs. Lohay Akonay & Joseph
Lohay noted that; 27
“It is the basic structure of a democratic constitution that state power is divided and
distributed between three state pillars. These are the executive, vested with executive
powers; the legislature vested with legislative powers, and the judicature vested with
judicial powers. This is clearly stated under Article 4 of the constitution….it follows
therefore that wherever the constitution establishes or permits the establishment of any
other institution or body with executive or legislative or judicial power, such institution
or body is meant to function not in lieu of or in derogation of these three central
pillars of the state, but only in aid of and subordinate to those pillars. …” [Emphasis supplied]
It should be noted that, even though the constitutional principle of separation
of powers is not pertinent in administrative law, yet administrative law is to
the effect that, where the constitution or any Act of the parliament delegates
the legislative, adjudicative and enforcement powers to other bodies,
Government department or executive agencies, the delegated powers are
not absolute, not lieu of or in derogation of the supreme powers vested
to the three pillars of the state and hence the abuse of such powers by the
delegates may be challenged in the courts of law basing on the fact that
the delegated powers are not absolute but rather subordinate to executive,
judiciary and the parliament.
H.W.R. Wade argues that, all subordinate (delegated/subsidiary) powers are
subject to the following inherent characteristics; 29
a) They are all subject to legal limitations, not absolute. There is no such thing
as absolute or unregulated administrative powers.
b) It is always possible for the powers to be abused. Even where the Act of the
parliament enacts that Minister, Persons, Independent institutions, Government
department and executive agencies may make such orders, exercise such powers
or make subsidiary legislation as they think fit for a certain purpose, the court
may still invalidate the orders, powers or any subsidiary legislation if it infringes
or else go beyond the prescribed powers or the general rights of the public.
Accordingly, the powers enacted for under Article 97(5) of the Constitution
of the United Republic of Tanzania, 1977 are subordinate to Article 64 of
the same constitution. Administrative law has set its mechanism to ensure
that all subordinate powers remain intact with the description of the
Constitution and written laws, even where separation of powers may have
been derogated but such derogation does not supersede the supreme pillars
of the state but only in aid of and subordinate to those pillars. Any
purported ouster of jurisdiction for the competent courts to deal with
unreasonable abuse of subordinate powers is unconstitutional.
Besides, the constitutional principle of the separation of powers and
independence of the judiciary are not pertinent in judicial administration in
Tanzania. The judiciary means the Court of Appeal, the High court and the
Courts subordinate thereto where the functions of those institutions are
performed by the judicial officers who determines and adjudicate diverse
of cases. Nonetheless, it is evidenced under the provisions of Sections 50
and 51 of the Judiciary Administration Act, 2011 where disciplinary31
Regional Commissioners are clearly not elected leaders, the two are
appointed leaders and accountable to the President, yet they preside over
another pillar of the state which is the judiciary, this infringes not only the
doctrine of separation of powers but also independence of the judiciary.
In the case of DPP vs. Daudi Pete [1993] it was uttered that, the doctrine of
separation of powers can be said to be infringed when either the executive
or the legislature takes over the function of the judicature involving the
interpretation of the laws and duties in disputes either between individual
persons or between the state and individuals. From this perspective, it is
apparent that, the Judiciary Administration Act, 2011 infringes the
constitutional principle of separation of powers and independence of the
judiciary by amalgamating the Regional Commissioner and District
Commissioner in the judicial administration. As against inclusion of
35
executive and political figures in the judiciary, Chipeta J in Republic vs. Idd
Mtengule (Criminal Rev No 1 of 1979) noted that;
“ ..as I understand the constitutional position in our country, the judiciary is supposed to
be an independent institution in the sense that those who are entrusted by the Constitution
to decide the rights and liabilities or the guilt or innocence of people must be free from all
kinds of pressures regardless the corners from which those pressures come. The
judiciary must be free from political, executive or emotional pressures if it is going to
work with the smoothness and integrity expected of it under the supreme law of the land-
the constitution…”36
The executive functions and powers of the Regional Commissioners and
District Commissioners are enacted for under the Regional Administration
Act, under which the theme of the whole Act seems to be of political
37
operation. The association of such function with the judiciary will easily
destabilize the praised constitutional principle of the independence of the
judiciary.
Worse enough, Article 66(3) of the Tanzania Constitution implies the validity
of the Regional Commissioners to be members of the Parliament. 39
to the Interpretation of laws Act, 2002 defines written laws to mean all
Acts for the time being in force and all subsidiary legislation for the time
being in force, and includes the Acts of the community and all applied
laws.
At this stage of interests in this definition are the Acts of the Parliament
and subsidiary/subordinate/delegated legislation as the sources of
administrative law.
3.6. Principal Legislation and Subsidiary/Subordinate
Legislation
Legislation is either supreme or subordinate. Supreme legislation proceeds
from the supreme or sovereign power of the state which is therefore
incapable of being repealed, annulled or controlled by any other legislative
authority other than the supreme legislative authority. On the other hand,
subordinate legislation is that which proceeds from any authority other
than the sovereign power of the state, and is therefore dependent for its
continued existence and validity on supreme authority. 43
Supreme Court of India in Chief Settlement Commr vs. Om Prakesh AIR 1969
SC 33, 36; (1968) that;
“…..under our constitutional system the authority to make law is vested in parliament
and the state legislatures and other law making bodies and whatever legislative power
the executive administration posses must be derived directly from the delegation of the
legislation and exercised validly only within the limits prescribed...”
For there to be subsidiary legislation which includes by-law, regulations,
notice, proclamation, instrument, rules and rules of the court there must a
principal legislation enabling a particular authority so to make such
subsidiary legislation. It is the sole role of administrative law to ensure that
46
Kabourou [1996] TLR 156 Nyalali C.J (as he then was) noted;
“The High Court of this country has a supervisory jurisdiction to inquire into the legality
of anything done or made by a public authority and private institutions, and this
jurisdiction power includes the power to inquire into the legality of an official
proclamation by Electoral Commission as it is a subsidiary legislation” [ emphasis
supplied]
4. Delegation and Sub-delegation of Powers
In the case of Huth vs. Clarke [1980] 25 QBD 391 lord Coleridge CJ define
delegation in the following perspectives;
`….delegation does not imply a denudation of power and authority The word
"delegation" implies that powers are committed to another person or body which is as
a rule always subject to resumption by the power delegating, and many examples of this
might be given. Unless, therefore, it is controlled by statute, the delegating power can at
any time resume its authority.'
In the same line of reasoning Wills J said;
`Delegation, as the word is generally used, does not imply a parting with powers by the
person who grants the delegation, but points rather to the conferring of an authority to do
things which otherwise that person would have to do himself. The best illustration of
the use of the word is afforded by the maxim, Delegates non protest delegate, as to
the meaning of which it is significant that it is dealt with in Broom's Legal Maxims under
the law of contracts: it is never used by the legal writers, so far as I am aware, as implying
that the delegating person parts with his power in such a manner as to denude himself of his
rights.'
It is also noted in the case of Remtulla Gulamani Vs R [1936] T.L.R that the rule
against sub delegation of the subordinate powers is expressed through the Latin
maxim Delegatus non potest delegare meaning a delegate is not competent to
further sub-delegate. On the other hand, in the case of Geraghty vs. Porter [1943]
S.C.R kerwin J noted that;
“At common law the maxim Delegatus non potest delegare is not confined to agencies, a
maxim must be applied as a canon of construction of all supreme powers, and that unless a
power to sub delegate was expressly or by necessary implication conferred in a statute, it should
be declared that the power has been conferred to the delegates.” [Emphasis supplied]
The proper assimilation of the two afore cited cases brings about the common
principle of administrative law which states that; delegation of supreme powers
is always lawfully unless expressly stated by the enabling Act of the parliament,
while sub-delegation of powers is constantly unlawful unless explicit stated by
the enabling Act of the Parliament.
In the first side of the principle, delegation of powers is lawfully based on the
fact that, the modern state activities necessitate the need of
nongovernmental actors in line with the Government activities. The democratic
world have the seen the need to establish other administrative Agencies like
Executive Agencies, Parastatols, Ministerial Departments and Local Government
Authorities to function in line with the elected National Government. This is the
necessary evil for the efficient accountability of the Government to the people
and for the people.
The National or Central Government in Tanzania would not easily guarantee its
accountability to the people without the existence of the Executive Agencies,
Local Government Authorities, Public Corporation and Non-Governmental
Actors. This postulation is justified by Lord Green in Caltona vs. Work
Commissioner (1943) 2 AII E.R 560 where he argues that;
“ ..In the administration of government the functions which are given to ministers are
functions so multifarious that no minister could ever personally attend to them. The duties
imposed upon minister and the powers given to ministers are normally exercised under the
authority of ministers by responsible officials of the department or executive agencies.
Public business could not be carried on if that were not the case.” [Emphasis supplied]
For example, the Ministers in Tanzania have been mandated to establish
executive agencies under the Umbrella of the Executive Agencies Act for the
purpose of improving delivery of service and to create an environment
conducive to efficient and effective management of Government affairs. The 48
executive agencies falls under the executive branch of the Government and include
any Government affiliated authority other the Courts and the Legislature. Such 49
and every executive agency. For example for the TFDA it is Tanzania Food and
Drugs Authorities Act,2003 for OSHA it is Occupation Health and Safety Act,
51
and for the TRA it is the Tanzania Revenue Authority Act, 2004 revised edition
2006. 54
The necessity for delegation is also seen under Articles 145 & 146 of the
Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, 1977 where the Local
Government Authorities are established and mandated to implement
development programmes within the respective areas and to ensure the
enforcement of law and public safety. The powers delegated to the Local
Government Authorities are further enacted for under the Local Government
(District Authorities) Act , the Local Government (Urban
55
Authorities) Act and the Local Government Finances Act which not only
56 57
and powers to collect and impose revenue are vested to the Local Government
district and urban authorities in Tanzania. 59
that, the competent court can invalidate the provision or the portion of the Act
of the parliament. Conversely, only the parliament can alter its own enacted
provisions, where the executive wishes not to present the amendment to the
parliament, the Act of the Parliament remains valid till when amended by the
Parliament. It is the accepted principle in administrative law that the
61
parliamentary powers to repeal and amend principal laws can not be delegated
to the courts or any other administrative body. Laurence Tribe contends that;
“…thus the courts have no real power to repeal or abolish a statute..and..notwithstanding
a decision holding it unconstitutional a statute continues to remain on the statute books..”
This perception is also cemented in the case of Julius Ishengoma Francis
Ndyanabo vs. A.G where the Court of Appeal found that it is not within the
63
competence of the Court or any other court for that matter to amend the statute
if it finds it unconstitutional. Even where a court may see exactly what is
64
64(5) should not be interpreted in any how that the court may supersede the
sovereign enactment of the parliament, the power to amend and repeal the an
Act of the parliament remains to be an exclusive powers of the Parliament.
Tanganyika, Tanzania Law Reports, Tanzania High Court Digest, the East African
Law Reports and East African Court of Appeal Reports should be taken into
consideration in the hierarchy of the sources administrative law in Tanzania;
it is from these authoritative reports where the proactive interpretation of
the administrative law provisions can be extracted from. Conscientious learned
brothers and sisters stands not only on the position of the laws but also
pertinent decided cases on administrative law in Tanzania and those in
common law jurisdictions. The development of administrative law finds the
69
way not only from strategic litigations but also in judicial activism where the
judges interpret the provisions of the law to safeguard the vulnerable section
of the society and for the public interest at large.
6. APPENDIX I
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW VERSUS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
The constitution is the superlative law of the state of which all other laws of
the land are subject to it
Establishes the general rights including basic human rights and duties
Derive the authoritative principles from the constitutional law like separation
of powers, independence of the judiciary, natural justice and reasonableness of
administrative actions
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Administrative law, rules and regulations are subject to the constitution. where
administrative law is inconsistence with the Constitution, the former will easily
be declared unconstitutional
Establishes the supreme powers of the states, the executive, judiciary and the
parliament and set general principles for the operations
Set the mechanism and procedures on how the rights are to be administered
both at the supreme level and by the delegated authorities
Lays the foundation for administrative law principles of natural justice.
Generally, both regulate the powers of the legislature, executive and the
judiciary, the operation of the supreme powers of the state depends on the
constitution; and administrative law draws the equilibrium on the exercise of
powers. The laws complement each other, thus there is no an easy application of
constitutional law without administrative law and vice-versa.
7. APPENDIX II
GENERAL PRINCIPLES IN MAKING SUBSIDIARY LEGISLATION
PRINCIPLE
BRIEF NOTES
Under the provision of section 4 of the Interpretation of laws Act, Subsidiary legislation
ought to be made under the Act of the Parliament or other lawfully authority. The Act of the
Parliament necessitating Subsidiary legislation is known as the Enabling Act which must
expressly states the powers to make subsidiary legislation.
The following expression have been used by the Tanzania Parliament to delegate legislative
powers;
i. The Minister may make regulations necessary
or expedient to achieve the objects of this Act ii. The Minister may make regulations with
regard to any matter that is governed by this Act.
iii. The Minister may make regulations regarding all matters which this Act are required
or
permitted to be prescribed by the Minister.
The Authority to make Subsidiary legislation must operate in compliance with the enabling Act
of the Parliament as;
a) To what is to be legislated to by the subsidiary legislation in terms of
substantive and procedural content
b) Who has been expressly empowered to make subsidiary legislation
c) There any room for sub delegation The making Authority is said to be intra-vires
where the making procedures are consistence with the Enabling Act or otherwise the
subsidiary legislation may be challenged for the procedural Ultra-vires.
The principle of intra-vires take into consideration the two maxims;
i. Delegata potestas non potest delegari
(a delegated authority can not delegate ii. Delegatus non potest delegare
(a delegate/Deputy can not appoint another/sub- delegate