1. Saudi Arabia Airlines vs.

CA

Found: Characterization or the Doctrine of Qualification

A factual situation that cuts across territorial lines and is affected by the diverse laws of two or more states is
said to contain a foreign element. The presence of a foreign element is inevitable since social and economic
affairs of individuals and associations are rarely confined to the geographic limits of their birth or conception.

The forms in which this foreign element may appear are many. The foreign element may simply consist in the
fact that one of the parties to a contract is an alien or has a foreign domicile, or that a contract between
nationals of one State involves properties situated in another State. In other cases, the foreign element may
assume a complex form.

In the instant case, the foreign element consisted in the fact that private respondent Morada is a resident
Philippine national, and that petitioner SAUDIA is a resident foreign corporation. Also, by virtue of the
employment of Morada with the petitioner Saudia as a flight stewardess, events did transpire during her many
occasions of travel across national borders, particularly from Manila, Philippines to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and
vice versa, that caused a conflicts situation to arise.

After a careful study of the private respondents Amended Complaint, and the Comment thereon, we note that
she aptly predicated her cause of action on Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil Code.

The aforecited provisions on human relations were intended to expand the concept of torts in this jurisdiction
by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human
foresight to specifically provide in the statutes.

Based on the allegations in the Amended Complaint, read in the light of the Rules of Court on jurisdiction we
find that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City possesses jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
suit. Its authority to try and hear the case is provided for under Section 1 of Republic Act No. 7691, to wit:

Section 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1980, is hereby amended to read as follows:

SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction:

(8) In all other cases in which demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property in controversy
exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila,
where the demand, exclusive of the above-mentioned items exceeds Two hundred Thousand
pesos (P200,000.00).

Pragmatic considerations, including the convenience of the parties, also weigh heavily in favor of the RTC
Quezon City assuming jurisdiction. Paramount is the private interest of the litigant. Enforceability of a
judgment if one is obtained is quite obvious. Relative advantages and obstacles to a fair trial are equally
important. Plaintiff may not, by choice of an inconvenient forum, vex, harass, or oppress the defendant, e.g. by
inflicting upon him needless expense or disturbance. But unless the balance is strongly in favor of the
defendant, the plaintiffs choice of forum should rarely be disturbed.

As to the choice of applicable law, we note that choice-of-law problems seek to answer two important
questions: (1) What legal system should control a given situation where some of the significant facts occurred
in two or more states; and (2) to what extent should the chosen legal system regulate the situation.
Before a choice can be made, it is necessary for us to determine under what category a certain set of facts or
rules fall. This process is known as characterization, or the doctrine of qualification. It is the process of
deciding whether or not the facts relate to the kind of question specified in a conflicts rule. The purpose of
characterization is to enable the forum to select the proper law.
Our starting point of analysis here is not a legal relation, but a factual situation, event, or operative fact. An
essential element of conflict rules is the indication of a test or connecting factor or point of contact. Choice-of-
law rules invariably consist of a factual relationship (such as property right, contract claim) and a connecting
factor or point of contact, such as the situs of the res, the place of celebration, the place of performance, or the
place of wrongdoing.

Note that one or more circumstances may be present to serve as the possible test for the determination of the
applicable law. These test factors or points of contact or connecting factors could be any of the following:

(1) The nationality of a person, his domicile, his residence, his place of sojourn, or his origin;
(2) the seat of a legal or juridical person, such as a corporation;
(3) the situs of a thing, that is, the place where a thing is, or is deemed to be situated. In particular, the lex
situs is decisive when real rights are involved;
(4) the place where an act has been done, the locus actus, such as the place where a
contract has been made, a marriage celebrated, a will signed or a tort committed. The
lex loci actus is particularly important in contracts and torts;
(5) the place where an act is intended to come into effect, e.g., the place of performance of contractual
duties, or the place where a power of attorney is to be exercised;
(6) the intention of the contracting parties as to the law that should govern their agreement, the lex loci
intentionis;
(7) the place where judicial or administrative proceedings are instituted or done. The lex forithe law of the
forumis particularly important because, as we have seen earlier, matters of procedure not going to the
substance of the claim involved are governed by it; and because the lex fori applies whenever the
content of the otherwise applicable foreign law is excluded from application in a given case for the
reason that it falls under one of the exceptions to the applications of foreign law; and
(8) the flag of a ship, which in many cases is decisive of practically all legal relationships of the ship and
of its master or owner as such. It also covers contractual relationships particularly contracts of
affreightment.

Considering that the complaint in the court a quo is one involving torts, the connecting factor or point of
contact could be the place or places where the tortious conduct or lex loci actus occurred. And applying
the torts principle in a conflicts case, we find that the Philippines could be said as a situs of the tort (the place
where the alleged tortious conduct took place). This is because it is in the Philippines where petitioner
allegedly deceived private respondent, a Filipina residing and working here. According to her, she had
honestly believed that petitioner would, in the exercise of its rights and in the performance of its duties, act
with justice, give her due and observe honesty and good faith. Instead, petitioner failed to protect her, she
claimed. That certain acts or parts of the injury allegedly occurred in another country is of no moment. For in
our view what is important here is the place where the over-all harm or the fatality of the alleged injury
to the person, reputation, social standing and human rights of complainant, had lodged, according to the
plaintiff below (herein private respondent).All told, it is not without basis to identify the Philippines as the
situs of the alleged tort.
Moreover, with the widespread criticism of the traditional rule of lex loci delicti commissi, modern theories
and rules on tort liability have been advanced to offer fresh judicial approaches to arrive at just results. In
keeping abreast with the modern theories on tort liability, we find here an occasion to apply the State of the
most significant relationship rule, which in our view should be appropriate to apply now, given the factual
context of this case.
In applying said principle to determine the State which has the most significant relationship, the following
contacts are to be taken into account and evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the
particular issue:

a. the place where the injury occurred;

b. the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred;
c. the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and
d. the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.

2. Christensen Aznar vs. Garcia

Found: The Renvoi Doctrine

Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen Christensen Garcia, insofar as it
deprives her (Helen) of her legitime as an acknowledged natural child, she having been declared by Us in
G.R. Nos. L-11483-84 an acknowledged natural child of the deceased Edward E. Christensen. The legal
grounds of opposition are (a) that the distribution should be governed by the laws of the Philippines, and
(b) that said order of distribution is contrary thereto insofar as it denies to Helen Christensen, one of two
acknowledged natural children, one-half of the estate in full ownership. In amplification of the above
grounds it was alleged that the law that should govern the estate of the deceased Christensen should
not be the internal law of California alone, but the entire law thereof because several foreign
elements are involved, that the forum is the Philippines and even if the case were decided in
California, Section 946 of the California Civil Code, which requires that the domicile of the
decedent apply, should be applicable.

There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the State of
California at the time of his death. But there is also no question that at the time of his death he was
domiciled in the Philippines.

In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the deceased is the Philippines, we are persuaded by the
fact that he was born in New York, migrated to California and resided there for nine years, and since he
came to the Philippines in 1913 he returned to California very rarely and only for short visits (perhaps to
relatives), and considering that he appears never to have owned or acquired a home or properties in that
state, which would indicate that he would ultimately abandon the Philippines and make home in the State
of California.

Acquisition of a domicile of choice requires the exercise of intention as well as physical presence.
Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires
bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile.' Residence, however, is a
term used with many shades of meaning, from the merest temporary presence to the most permanent
abode, and it is not safe to insist that any one use is the only proper one.

The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in Article 16 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, which is as follows:
"ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it
is situated.

"However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession
and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions,
shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration,
 whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said
property may be found."

The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of the meaning of the term
"national law" as used therein.

There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United States,
each State of the Union having its own private law applicable to its citizens only and in force only within
the state. The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted can not, therefore,
possibly mean or apply to any general American law. So it can refer to no other than the private law of the
state of which the decedent is a citizen, in the case at bar, the private law of the State of California. The
next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of personal property? The
decision of the court below, sustains the contention of the executor-appellee that under the California
Probate Code, a testator may dispose of his property by will in the form and manner he desires, citing the
case of Estate of McDaniel, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952. But appellant invokes the provisions of
Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, which is as follows:

"If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated, it is deemed to
follow the person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile."

"This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented which the conflict-of-laws rule of the forum refers
to a foreign law, the conflict-of-laws rule of which, in turn refers the matter back again to the law of the
forum. This is renvoi in the narrower sense. The German term for this judicial process is
'Ruckverweisung.'"

The theory of the doctrine of renvoi is that the court of the forum, in determining the question before it,
must take into account the whole law of the other jurisdiction, but also its rules as to conflict of laws, and
then apply the law to the actual question which the rules of the other jurisdiction prescribe. This may be
the law of the forum. The doctrine of the renvoi has generally been repudiated by the American
authorities."

"The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the rules of the conflict of laws are to be understood as
incorporating not only the ordinary or internal law of the foreign state or country, but its rules of the
conflict of laws as well. According to this theory 'the law of a country' means the whole of its law.

Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out as the national law
is the internal law of California. But as above explained the laws of California have prescribed two sets of
laws for its citizens, one for residents therein and another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions.
Reason demands that We should enforce the California internal law prescribed for its citizens residing
therein, and enforce the conflict of law rules law for the citizens domiciled abroad. If we must enforce the
law of California as in comity we are bound to do, as so declared in Article 16 of our Civil Code, then we
must enforce the law of California in accordance with the express mandate thereof and as above
explained, i.e., apply the internal law for residents therein, and its conflict of laws rule for those domiciled
abroad.

As explained in the various authorities cited above the national law mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil
Code is the law on conflict of laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the
reference or return of the question to the law of the testator's domicile. The conflict of law rule in
California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in
California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile cannot
and should not refer the case back to California; such action would leave the issue incapable of
determination because the case will then be like a football, tossed back and forth between the two states,
between the country of which the decedent was a citizen and the country of his domicile. The Philippine
court must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of law rule of the state of the decedent, if the
question has to be decided, especially as the application of the internal law of California provides no
legitime for children while the Philippine law, Arts. 887 (4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines, makes
natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.

3. Gibbs vs. Government of the Philippine Islands

Found: Application of Art. 10 old Civil Code (now Art. 16 of the NCC)

“that in accordance with the law of California, the community property of spouses who are citizens of
California, upon the death of the wife previous to that of the husband, belongs absolutely to the surviving
husband without administration; that the conjugal partnership of Allison D. Gibbs and Eva Johnson
Gibbs, deceased, has no obligations or debts and no one will be prejudiced by adjudicating said parcels of
land (and seventeen others not here involved) to be the absolute property of the said Allison D. Gibbs as
sole owner.”

Section 1547 of Article XI of Chapter 40 of the Administrative Code provides in part that:

"Registers of deeds shall not register in the registry of property any document transferring real
property or real rights therein or any chattel mortgage, by way of gifts mortis causa, legacy or
inheritance, unless the payment of the tax fixed in this article and actually due thereon shall be
shown. And they shall immediately notify the Collector of Internal Revenue or the corresponding
provincial treasurer of the nonpayment of the tax discovered by them. . . ."

Acting upon the authority of said section, the register of deeds of the City of Manila, declined to accept as
binding said decree of court of September 22, 1930, and refused to register the transfer of title of the said
conjugal property to Allison D. Gibbs, on the ground that the corresponding inheritance tax had not been
paid.

Article XI of Chapter 40 of the Administrative Code entitled "Tax on inheritances, legacies, and other
acquisitions mortis causa" provides in section 1536 that "Every transmission by virtue of inheritance . . .
of real property . . . shall be subject to the following tax." It results that the question for determination in
this case is as follows: Was Eva Johnson Gibbs at the time of her death the owner of a descendible
interest in the Philippine lands above-mentioned?

Having regard to the practical autonomy of the Philippine Islands, as above stated, we have concluded
that if article 10 is applicable and the estate in question is that of a deceased American citizen, the
succession shall be regulated in accordance with the norms of the State of his domicile in the United
States.

The trial court found that under the law of California, upon the death of the wife, the entire
community property without administration belongs to the surviving husband; that he is the
absolute owner of all the community property from the moment of the death of his wife, not by
virtue of succession or by virtue of her death, but by virtue of the fact that when the death of the
wife precedes that of the husband he acquires the community property, not as an heir or as the
beneficiary of his deceased wife, but because she never had more than an inchoate interest or
expectancy which is extinguished upon her death. Quoting the case of Estate of Klumpke (167
Cal., 415, 419), the court said: "The decisions under this section (1401 Civil Code of California)
are uniform to the effect that the husband does not take the community property upon the death of
 the wife by succession, but that he holds it all from the moment of her death as though acquired
by himself. . . . It never belonged to the estate of the deceased wife."

The argument of the appellee apparently leads to this dilemma: If he takes nothing by succession
from his deceased wife, how can the second paragraph of article 10 be invoked? Can the appellee
be heard to say that there is a legal succession under the law of California? It seems clear that the
second paragraph of article 10 applies only when a legal or testamentary succession has taken
place in the Philippines in accordance with the law of the Philippine Islands and no legal
succession under the law of California? It seems clear that the second paragraph of article 10
applies only when a legal or testamentary succession has taken place in the Philippines in
accordance with the law of the Philippine Islands; and the foreign law is consulted only in regard
to the order of succession or the extent of the successional rights; in other words, the second
paragraph of article 10 can be invoked only when the deceased was vested with a descendible
interest in property within the jurisdiction of the Philippine Island.

"In accord with the rule that real property is subject to the lex rei sitai, the respective rights of husband
and wife in such property, in the absence of an antenuptial contract, are determined by the law of the
place where the property is situated, irrespective of the domicile of the parties or of the place where the
marriage was celebrated." (See also Saul vs. His Creditors, 5 Martin [N. S.], 569; 16 Am. Dec., 212 [La.];
Heidenheimer vs. Loring, 26 S. W., 99 [Texas].)

Under this broad principle, the nature and extent of the title which vested in Mrs. Gibbs at the time
of the acquisition of the community lands here in question must be determined in accordance with
the lex rei sitai.

Under the provisions of the Civil Code and the jurisprudence prevailing here, the wife, upon the
acquisition of any conjugal property, becomes immediately vested with an interest and title therein equal
to that of her husband, subject to the power of management and disposition which the law vests in the
husband. Immediately upon her death, if there are no obligations of the decedent, as is true in the present
case, her share in the conjugal property is transmitted to her heirs by succession.

It results that the wife of the appellee was, by the law of the Philippine Islands, vested of a descendible
interest, equal to that of her husband.

The descendible interest of Eva Johnson Gibbs in the lands aforesaid was transmitted to her heirs by
virtue of inheritance and this transmission plainly falls within the inheritance and this transmission plainly
falls within the language of section 1536 of Article XI of Chapter 40 of the Administrative Code which
levies a tax on inheritances. It is unnecessary in this proceeding to determine the "order of succession" or
the "extent of the successional rights" (article 10, Civil Code, supra) which would be regulated by section
1386 of the Civil Code of California which was in effect at the time of the death of Mrs. Gibbs.

4. Cadalin vs. POEA

Found: The parties to a contract may select the law by which it is to be governed

First to be determined is whether it is the Bahrain law on prescription of action based on the Amiri Decree
No. 23 of 1976 or a Philippine law on prescription that shall be the governing law. Article 156 of the
Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 provides:

"A claim arising out of a contract of employment shall not be actionable after the lapse of one
year from the date of the expiry of the contract"
As a general rule, a foreign procedural law will not be applied in the forum. Procedural matters, such as
service of process, joinder of actions, period and requisites for appeal, and so forth, are governed by the
laws of the forum. This is true even if the action is based upon a foreign substantive law.

A law on prescription of actions is sui generis in Conflict of Laws in the sense that it may be viewed
either as procedural or substantive, depending on the characterization given such a law.

However, the characterization of a statute into a procedural or substantive law becomes irrelevant when
the country of the forum has a "borrowing statute." Said statute has the practical effect of treating the
foreign statute of limitation as one of substance.

A "borrowing statute" directs the state of the forum to apply the foreign statute of limitations to the
pending claims based on a foreign law (Siegel, Conflicts 183 [1975]). While there are several kinds of
"borrowing statutes," one from provides that an action barred by the laws of the place where it
accrued, will not be enforced in the forum even though the local statute has not run against it
(Goodrich and Scoles, Conflict of Laws 152-153 [1938]). Section 48 of our Code of Civil Procedure is of
this kind. Said Section provides:

"If by the laws of the state or country where the cause of action arose, the action is barred, it is
also barred in the Philippines Islands."

Section 48 has not been repealed or amended by the Civil Code of the Philippines. Article 2270 of said
Code repealed only those provisions of the Code of Civil Procedures as to which were inconsistent with
it. There is no provision in the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is inconsistent with or contradictory
to Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

In the light of the 1987 Constitution, however, Section 48 cannot be enforced ex proprio vigoure insofar
as it ordains the application in this jurisdiction of Section 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976.

The courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the forum's public policy.
To enforce the one-year prescriptive period of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as regards the claims in
question would contravene the public policy on the protection to labor.

"In the determination of whether or not the right to a "speedy trial" has been violated, certain
factors may be considered and balanced against each other. These are length of delay, reason for
the delay, assertion of the right or failure to assert it, and prejudice caused by the delay. The same
factors may also be considered in answering judicial inquiry whether or not a person officially
charged with the administration of justice has violated the speedy disposition of cases."

"It must be here emphasized that the right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to
speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious,
and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured,
or when without cause or justified motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the
party having his case tried."

NLRC applied the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976, which provides for greater benefits than those stipulated
in the overseas-employment contracts of the claimants. It was of the belief that "where the laws of the
host country are more favorable and beneficial to the workers, then the laws of the host country shall form
part of the overseas employment contract." It quoted with approval the observation of the POEA
Administrator that ". . . in labor proceedings, all doubts in the implementation of the provisions of the
Labor Code and its implementing regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor" (Rollo, pp. 90-94).
AIBC and BRII claim that NLRC acted capriciously and whimsically when it refused to enforce the
overseas-employment contracts, which became the law of the parties. They contend that the principle that
a law is deemed to be a part of a contract applies only to provisions of Philippine law in relation to
contracts executed in the Philippines.

The overseas-employment contracts, which were prepared by AIBC and BRII themselves, provided that
the laws of the host country became applicable to said contracts if they offer terms and conditions more
favorable that those stipulated therein.

The overseas-employment contracts could have been drafted more felicitously. While a part thereof
provides that the compensation to the employee may be "adjusted downward so that the total computation
(thereunder) plus the non-waivable benefits shall be equivalent to the compensation" therein agreed,
another part of the same provision categorically states "that total remuneration and benefits do not fall
below that of the host country regulation and custom."

Any ambiguity in the overseas-employment contracts should be interpreted against AIBC and BRII, the
parties that drafted it.

"The interpretation of obscure words or stipulations in a contract shall not favor the party who
caused the obscurity."

Said rule of interpretation is applicable to contracts of adhesion where there is already a prepared form
containing the stipulations of the employment contract and the employees merely "take it or leave it."

The presumption is that there was an imposition by one party against the other and that the employees
signed the contracts out of necessity that reduced their bargaining power.

Applying the said legal precepts, we read the overseas-employment contracts in question as adopting the
provisions of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as part and parcel thereof.

The parties to a contract may select the law by which it is to be governed. In such a case, the foreign law
is adopted as a "system" to regulate the relations of the parties, including questions of their capacity to
enter into the contract, the formalities to be observed by them, matters of performance, and so forth.

Instead of adopting the entire mass of the foreign law, the parties may just agree that specific provisions
of a foreign statute shall be deemed incorporated into their contract "as a set of terms." By such reference
to the provisions of the foreign law, the contract does not become a foreign contract to be governed by the
foreign law. The said law does not operate as a statute but as a set of contractual terms deemed written in
the contract.

A basic policy of contract is to protect the expectation of the parties. Such party expectation is protected
by giving effect to the parties' own choice of the applicable law. The choice of law must, however, bear
some relationship to the parties or their transaction There is no question that the contracts sought to
be enforced by claimants have a direct connection with the Bahrain law because the services were
rendered in that country.

5. Van Dorn vs. Romillo

Found: Effect of foreign divorce obtain by alien spouse; application of Art. 15 of the NCC
Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-P of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon
Shop, for short), is conjugal property of the parties, and asking that petitioner be ordered to render an
accounting of that business, and that private respondent be declared with right to manage the conjugal
property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous
judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he
and petitioner had "no community property" as of June 11, 1982. The Court below denied the Motion to
Dismiss in the mentioned case on the ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines so that the
Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case.

For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged conjugal property in the
Philippines.

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States. The
decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue
petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is
not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy.

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce
in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which
divorce dissolves the marriage.

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no
standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he
is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose
decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his
right over the alleged conjugal property.

6. Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera

Found: Application of Art. 26 of the Family Code vis-à-vis reckoning point when to be
considered as an “offended spouse” in private crimes.

Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes against
chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has long
since been established, with unwavering consistency, that compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not
merely a formal, requirement. While in point of strict law the jurisdiction of the court over the offense is vested
in it by the Judiciary Law, the requirement for a sworn written complaint is just as jurisdictional a mandate
since it is that complaint which starts the prosecutory proceeding and without which the court cannot exercise
its jurisdiction to try the case.

Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person who can
legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else. Unlike the offenses of seduction,
abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, no provision is made for the prosecution of the crimes of adultery
and concubinage by the parents, grandparents or guardian of the offended party. The so-called exclusive and
successive rule in the prosecution of the first four offenses above mentioned do not apply to adultery and
concubinage. It is significant that while the State, as parens partriae, was added and vested by the 1985 Rules
of Criminal Procedure with the power to initiate the criminal action for a deceased or incapacitated victim in
the aforesaid offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, in default of her parents,
grandparents or guardian, such amendment did not include the crimes of adultery and concubinage. In other
words, only the offended spouse, and no other, is authorized by law to initiate the action therefor.

Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows
that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the
criminal action. This is a familiar and express rule in civil actions; in fact, lack of legal capacity to sue, as a
ground for a motion to dismiss in civil cases, is determined as of the filing of the complaint or petition.

This policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer the outrage in
silence rather than go through the scandal of a public trial. Hence, as cogently argued by petitioner, Article 344
of the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the
institution of the criminal action for adultery. This is a logical consequence since the raison d'etre of said
provision of law would be absent where the supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged
offender at the time of the filing of the criminal case.

To repeat, there does not appear to be any local precedential jurisprudence on the specific issue as to when
precisely the status of a complainant as an offended spouse must exist where a criminal prosecution can be
commenced only by one who in law can be categorized as possessed of such status. Stated differently and with
reference to the present case, the inquiry would be whether it is necessary in the commencement of a
criminal action for adultery that the marital bonds between the complainant and the accused be
unsevered and existing at the time of the institution of the action by the former against the latter.

We are convinced that in cases of such nature, the status of the complainant vis-a-vis the accused must be
determined as of the time the complaint was filed. Thus, the person who initiates the adultery case must be an
offended spouse, and by this is meant that he is still married to the accused spouse, at the time of the filing of
the complaint.

In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal
Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines
insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of
status of persons.

Article 26 whereof provides that "where marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or
her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." (See
Republic vs. Manalo)

7. Llorente vs. CA

Found: Filipino who has been naturalized in another country is not govern by Art. 15

Who are entitled to inherit from the late Lorenzo N. Llorente?

The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American citizen long before and at the time of: (1) his
divorce from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3) execution of his will; and (4) death, is duly established,
admitted and undisputed.

The Civil Code clearly provides:

Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
 Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is
situated.

However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession and to the
amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be
the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.

First, there is no such thing as one American law. The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code
cannot possibly apply to general American law. There is no such law governing the validity of testamentary
provisions in the United States. Each State of the union has its own law applicable to its citizens and in force
only within the State. It can therefore refer to no other than the law of the State of which the decedent was a
resident. Second, there is no showing that the application of the renvoi doctrine is called for or required by
New York State law.

In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. we held that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the
Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. In the same case, the Court ruled that aliens
may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their national law.
Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of Appeals, that once proven that respondent was
no longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce from petitioner, the ruling in Van Dorn would
become applicable and petitioner could "very well lose her right to inherit" from him.

The Civil Code provides:

Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed
by the laws of the country in which they are executed.

When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of
the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed
in their execution.

Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues best proved by foreign law
which must be pleaded and proved. Whether the will was executed in accordance with the formalities required
is answered by referring to Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly probated.

As a guide however, the trial court should note that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved
in our system of legitimes, Congress did not intend to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals.

Congress specifically left the amount of successional rights to the decedent's national law.

8. Garcia-Recio vs. Recio

A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid
according to the national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the governing personal law of
the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign
laws and judgments; hence, like any other facts, both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must
be alleged and proven according to our law on evidence.

Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. A marriage between
two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 15 and 17 of the
Civil Code. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code allows the
former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is "validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry." A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws.

A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and proof are concerned, can be made. Van
Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decrees that "aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law." Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree
can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its
conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient.

Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and
admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best
evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an
official body or tribunal of a foreign country.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a public or
official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the
officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign
service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his
office.

Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary; respondent was no
longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992. Naturalization is
the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen.
Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their former states, don the attires of their adoptive
countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum
juris that had tied him to Philippine personal laws.

The burden of proof lies with "the party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the
prosecution or defense of an action." In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material
allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of proving
the material allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters. Since the divorce was a defense
raised by respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.

It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other
facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not among those matters that judges are
supposed to know by reason of their judicial function. The power of judicial notice must be exercised with
caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.

In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage.
But divorces are of different types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2)
limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage, while the second suspends it and
leaves the bond in full force. There is no showing in the case at bar which type of divorce was procured by
respondent.

Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree -- a conditional or provisional judgment of

divorce. It is in effect the same as a separation from bed and board, although an absolute divorce may follow
after the lapse of the prescribed period during which no reconciliation is effected.

Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes and practices, still restrict
remarriage. Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited by statute; thus, the guilty party in a
divorce which was granted on the ground of adultery may be prohibited from marrying again. The court may
allow a remarriage only after proof of good behavior.
Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a naturalized Australian
citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. We agree with petitioner's contention
that the court a quo erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal
capacity to remarry without requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to show the Australian personal law
governing his status; or at the very least, to prove his legal capacity to contract the second marriage.

Neither can we grant petitioner's prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and void on the ground of
bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian law, he was really capacitated to marry petitioner as a
direct result of the divorce decree.

9. Republic vs. Obrecido

Found The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of
the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating the latter to remarry

Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized as a foreign citizen
and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry
under Philippine law?

In 1986, Cipriano's wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later,
Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.

Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married
a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue,
San Gabriel, California.

Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article
26 of the Family Code.

At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial court actually constituted a
petition for declaratory relief. In this connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 1. Who may file petition-Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or other
governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate
Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a
declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.

The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2)
the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party seeking the
relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial determination.

Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2
of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the
marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains
a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a
foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity
and injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to
mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its
spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute may therefore be extended to
cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
 1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage,
but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the
latter to remarry.

In this case, when Cipriano's wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that
has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently
obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the "divorced" Filipino spouse, should
be allowed to remarry.

10. Perkins vs. Dizon

Found: When the defendant is a non-resident and refuses to appear voluntarily, the court
cannot acquire jurisdiction over his person even if the summons be served by publication,
for he is beyond the reach of judicial process ( applies only in action in personam)

The controlling issue here involved is whether or not the Court of First Instance of Manila has acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the present petitioner as a non-resident defendant, or, notwithstanding the
want of such jurisdiction, whether or not said court may validly try the case.

Section 398 of our Code of Civil Procedure provides that when a non-resident defendant is sued in the
Philippine courts and it appears, by the complaint or by affidavits, that the action relates to real or
personal property within the Philippines in which said defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or
contingent, or in which the relief demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding such person from any
interest therein, service of summons may be made by publication.

We have fully explained the meaning of this provision in El Banco Español Filipino vs. Palanca, 37 Phil.,
921, wherein we laid down the following rules:

(1) In order that the court may validly try a case, it must have jurisdiction over the subject-matter and
over the persons of the parties. Jurisdiction over the subject-matter is acquired by concession
of the sovereign authority which organizes a court and determines the nature and extent of its
powers in general and thus fixes its jurisdiction with reference to actions which it may entertain
and the relief it may grant. Jurisdiction over the persons of the parties is acquired by their
voluntary appearance in court and their submission to its authority, or by the coercive power of
legal process exerted over their persons.

(2) When the defendant is a non-resident and refuses to appear voluntarily, the court cannot
acquire jurisdiction over his person even if the summons be served by publication, for he is
beyond the reach of judicial process. No tribunal established by one State can extend its process
beyond its territory so as to subject to its decisions either persons or property located in another
State. "There are many expressions in the American reports from which it might be inferred that
the court acquires personal jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by publication and
notice; but such is not the case. In truth, the proposition that jurisdiction over the person of a non-
resident cannot be acquired by publication and notice was never clearly understood even in the
American courts until after the decision had been rendered by the Supreme Court of the United
States in the leading case of Pennoyer v. Neff (95 U. S., 714; 24 Law. ed., 565). In the light of
that decision, and of other decisions which have subsequently been rendered in that and other
 courts, the proposition that jurisdiction over the person cannot be thus acquired by publication
and notice is no longer open to question; and it is now fully established that a personal
judgment upon constructive or substituted service against a non-resident who does not
appear is wholly invalid. This doctrine applies to all kinds of constructive or substituted
process, including service by publication and personal service outside of the jurisdiction in
which the judgment is rendered; and the only exception seems to be found in the case where
the non-resident defendant has expressly or impliedly consented to the mode of service.

(3) The general rule, therefore, is that a suit against a non-resident cannot be entertained by a
Philippine court. Where, however, the action is in rem or quasi in rem in connection with
property located in the Philippines, the court acquires jurisdiction over the res, and its jurisdiction
over the person of the non-resident is non-essential. In order that the court may exercise power
over the res, it is not necessary that the court should take actual custody of the property, potential
custody thereof being sufficient. There is potential custody when, from the nature of the action
brought, the power of the court over the property is impliedly recognized by law. "An illustration
of what we term potential jurisdiction over the res, is found in the proceeding to register the title
of land under our system for the registration of land. Here the court, without taking actual
physical control over the property, assumes, at the instance of some person claiming to be owner,
to exercise a jurisdiction in rem over the property and to adjudicate the title in favour of the
petitioner against all the world."

(4) As before stated, in an action in rem or quasi in rem against a non-resident defendant, jurisdiction
over his person is non-essential, and if the law requires in such case that the summons upon the
defendant be served by publication, it is merely to satisfy the constitutional requirement of due
process.

The reason for the rule that Philippine courts cannot acquire jurisdiction over the person of a non-resident,
as laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States in Pennoyer v. Neff, supra, may be found in a
recognized principle of public law to the effect that "no State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority
over persons or property without its territory.

When, however, the action relates to property located in the Philippines, the Philippine courts may validly
try the case, upon the principle that a "State, through its tribunals, may subject property situated within its
limits owned by non-residents to the payment of the demand of its own citizens against them; and the
exercise of this jurisdiction in no respect infringes upon the sovereignty of the State where the owners are
domiciled. Every State owes protection to its own citizens; and, when non-residents deal with them, it is a
legitimate and just exercise of authority to hold and appropriate any property owned by such non-
residents to satisfy the claims of its citizens. It is in virtue of the State's jurisdiction over the property
of the non-resident situated within its limits that its tribunals can inquire into the non-resident's
obligations to its own citizens, and the inquiry can then be carried only to the extent necessary to
control the disposition of the property. If the non-resident has no property in the State, there is nothing
upon which the tribunals can adjudicate."

In the instant case, there can be no question that the action brought by Eugene Arthur Ferkins in his
amended complaint against the petitioner, Idonah Slade Perkins, seeks to exclude her from any interest in
a property located in the Philippines. That property consists in certain shares of stock of the Benguet
Consolidated Mining Company, a sociedad anonima, organized in the Philippines under the provisions of
the Spanish Code of Commerce, with its principal office in the City of Manila and which conducts its
mining activities therein. The situs of the shares is in the jurisdiction where the corporation is created,
whether the certificates evidencing the ownership of those shares are within or without that jurisdiction.
Under these circumstances, we hold that the action thus brought is quasi in rem, for, while the
judgment that may be rendered therein is not strictly a judgment in rem, "it fixes and settles the title to the
property in controversy and to that extent partakes of the nature of the judgment in rem."

"It is true that, in a strict sense, a proceeding in rem is one taken directly against property, and has
for its object the disposition of the property, without reference to the title of individual claimants;
but, in a larger and more general senses the terms are applied to actions between parties, where
the direct object is to reach and dispose of property owned by them, or of some interest therein.”

The action being quasi in rem, the Court of First Instance of Manila has jurisdiction to try the same even
it can acquire no jurisdiction over the person of the non-resident. In order to satisfy the constitutional
requirement of due process, summons has been served upon her by publication. There is no question as to
the adequacy of the publication made nor as to the mailing of the order of publication to the petitioner's
last known place of residence in the United States. But, of course, the action being quasi in rem and notice
having been made by publication, the relief that may be granted by the Philippine court must be confined
to the res, it having no jurisdiction to render a personal judgment against the non-resident.

Voluntary appearance cannot be implied from either a mistaken or superfluous reasoning but from
the nature of the relief prayed for.

11. Philsec Investment Corporation vs. CA

Found: Effect of foreign judgment

This case presents for determination the conclusiveness of a foreign judgment upon the rights of the
parties under the same cause of action asserted in a case in our local court.

First. It is important to note in connection with the first point that while the present case was pending in
the Court of Appeals, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas rendered
judgment in the case before it. The judgment, which was in favor of private respondents, was affirmed on
appeal by the Circuit Court of Appeals. Thus, the principal issue to be resolved in this case is whether
Civil Case No. 16536 is barred by the judgment of the U.S. court.

Private respondents contend that for a foreign judgment to be pleaded as res judicata, a judgment
admitting the foreign decision is not necessary. On the other hand, petitioners argue that the foreign
judgment cannot be given the effect of res judicata without giving them an opportunity to impeach it on
grounds stated in Rule 39, Sec. 50 of the Rules of Court, to wit: "want of jurisdiction, want of notice to
the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact."

Petitioners' contention is meritorious. While this court has given the effect of res judicata to foreign
judgments in several cases, it was after the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample
opportunity to repel them on grounds allowed under the law. It is not necessary for this purpose to initiate
a separate action or proceeding for enforcement of the foreign judgment. What is essential is that there is
opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the court to properly determine its efficacy.
This is because in this jurisdiction, with respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from actions in
rem, a foreign judgment merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of the claim of a party
and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary. Rule 39, Sec. 50 provides:

SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments. - The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a foreign
country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:
 (a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title to the
thing;

(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title; but the judgment
may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

In the case at bar, it cannot be said that petitioners were given the opportunity to challenge the judgment
of the U.S. court as basis for declaring it res judicata or conclusive of the rights of private respondents.
The proceedings in the trial court were summary. Neither the trial court nor the appellate court was even
furnished copies of the pleadings in the U.S. court or apprised of the evidence presented thereat, to assure
a proper determination of whether the issues then being litigated in the U.S. court were exactly the issues
raised in this case such that the judgment that might be rendered would constitute res judicata.

Third. It was error we think for the Court of Appeals and the trial court to hold that jurisdiction over 1488,
Inc. and Daic could not be obtained because this is an action in personam and summons were served by
extraterritorial service. Rule 14, Sec. 17 on extraterritorial service provides that service of summons on a
non-resident defendant may be effected out of the Philippines by leave of Court where, among others,
"the property of the defendant has been attached within the Philippines." It is not disputed that the
properties, real and personal, of the private respondents had been attached prior to service of summons
under the Order of the trial court dated April 20, 1987.

12. Raytheon International vs. Stockton Rouzie

Found: Three phases in Judicial Resolution of conflicts-of-laws problems

Recently in Hasegawa v. Kitamura, the Court outlined three consecutive phases involved in judicial
resolution of conflicts-of-laws problems, namely: (a) jurisdiction, (b) choice of law, and (c) recognition
and enforcement of judgments. Thus, in the instances where the Court held that the local judicial
machinery was adequate to resolve controversies with a foreign element, the following requisites had to
be proved:

(1) that the Philippine Court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort;
(2) that the Philippine Court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the
facts; and
(3) that the Philippine Court has or is likely to have the power to enforce its decision.

On the matter of jurisdiction over a conflicts-of-laws problem where the case is filed in a Philippine court
and where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter, the parties and the res, it may or can proceed
to try the case even if the rules of conflict-of-laws or the convenience of the parties point to a foreign
forum. This is an exercise of sovereign prerogative of the country where the case is filed.

That the subject contract included a stipulation that the same shall be governed by the laws of the State of
Connecticut does not suggest that the Philippine courts, or any other foreign tribunal for that matter, are
precluded from hearing the civil action. Jurisdiction and choice of law are two distinct concepts.
Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the
further question whether the application of a substantive law which will determine the merits of the case
is fair to both parties. The choice of law stipulation will become relevant only when the substantive issues
of the instant case develop, that is, after hearing on the merits proceeds before the trial court.
Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a court, in conflicts-of-laws cases, may refuse impositions
on its jurisdiction where it is not the most "convenient" or available forum and the parties are not
precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere.

Moreover, the propriety of dismissing a case based on the principle of forum non conveniens requires a
factual determination; hence, it is more properly considered as a matter of defense. While it is within the
discretion of the trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so only after
vital facts are established, to determine whether special circumstances require the court's desistance.

Failure to state a cause of action refers to the insufficiency of allegation in the pleading. As a general rule,
the elementary test for failure to state a cause of action is whether the complaint alleges facts which if true
would justify the relief demanded.

13. Manila Hotel vs. NLRC

We note that the main aspects of the case transpired in two foreign jurisdictions and the case involves
purely foreign elements. The only link that the Philippines has with the case is that respondent Santos is a
Filipino citizen. The Palace Hotel and MHICL are foreign corporations. Not all cases involving our
citizens can be tried here.

The employment contract.-- Respondent Santos was hired directly by the Palace Hotel, a foreign
employer, through correspondence sent to the Sultanate of Oman, where respondent Santos was then
employed. He was hired without the intervention of the POEA or any authorized recruitment agency of
the government.

Under the rule of forum non conveniens, a Philippine court or agency may assume jurisdiction over the
case if it chooses to do so provided: (1) that the Philippine court is one to which the parties may
conveniently resort to; (2) that the Philippine court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the
law and the facts; and (3) that the Philippine court has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision.

This is not to say that Philippine courts and agencies have no power to solve controversies involving
foreign employers. Neither are we saying that we do not have power over an employment contract
executed in a foreign country. If Santos were an "overseas contract worker", a Philippine forum,
specifically the POEA, not the NLRC, would protect him. He is not an "overseas contract worker" a fact
which he admits with conviction.

Not Convenient.-- We fail to see how the NLRC is a convenient forum given that all the incidents of the
case - from the time of recruitment, to employment to dismissal occurred outside the Philippines. The
inconvenience is compounded by the fact that the proper defendants, the Palace Hotel and MHICL are not
nationals of the Philippines. Neither are they "doing business in the Philippines." Likewise, the main
witnesses, Mr. Shmidt and Mr. Henk are non-residents of the Philippines.

No power to determine applicable law.-- Neither can an intelligent decision be made as to the law
governing the employment contract as such was perfected in foreign soil. This calls to fore the application
of the principle of lex loci contractus (the law of the place where the contract was made). The
employment contract was not perfected in the Philippines. Respondent Santos signified his acceptance by
writing a letter while he was in the Republic of Oman. This letter was sent to the Palace Hotel in the
People's Republic of China.
No power to determine the facts.-- Neither can the NLRC determine the facts surrounding the alleged
illegal dismissal as all acts complained of took place in Beijing, People's Republic of China. The NLRC
was not in a position to determine whether the Tiannamen Square incident truly adversely affected
operations of the Palace Hotel as to justify respondent Santos' retrenchment.

Principle of effectiveness, no power to execute decision.-- Even assuming that a proper decision could be
reached by the NLRC, such would not have any binding effect against the employer, the Palace Hotel.
The Palace Hotel is a corporation incorporated under the laws of China and was not even served with
summons. Jurisdiction over its person was not acquired.

14. Bank of America vs. American Realty Corp.

Does a mortgage-creditor waive its remedy to foreclose the real estate mortgage constituted over a third
party mortgagor's property situated in the Philippines by filing an action for the collection of the principal
loan before foreign courts?

"In the absence of express statutory provisions, a mortgage creditor may institute against the mortgage
debtor either a personal action for debt or a real action to foreclose the mortgage. In other words, he may
pursue either of the two remedies, but not both. By such election, his cause of action can by no means be
impaired, for each of the two remedies is complete in itself. Thus, an election to bring a personal action
will leave open to him all the properties of the debtor for attachment and execution, even including the
mortgaged property itself. And, if he waives such personal action and pursues his remedy against the
mortgaged property, an unsatisfied judgment thereon would still give him the right to sue for a deficiency
judgment, in which case, all the properties of the defendant, other than the mortgaged property, are again
open to him for the satisfaction of the deficiency. In either case, his remedy is complete, his cause of
action undiminished, and any advantages attendant to the pursuit of one or the other remedy are purely
accidental and are all under his right of election. On the other hand, a rule that would authorize the
plaintiff to bring a personal action against the debtor and simultaneously or successively another action
against the mortgaged property, would result not only in multiplicity of suits so offensive to justice
(Soriano vs. Enriques, 24 Phil. 584) and obnoxious to law and equity (Osorio vs. San Agustin, 25 Phil.,
404), but also in subjecting the defendant to the vexation of being sued in the place of his residence or of
the residence of the plaintiff, and then again in the place where the property lies."

The rule is now settled that a mortgage creditor may elect to waive his security and bring, instead, an
ordinary action to recover the indebtedness with the right to execute a judgment thereon on all the
properties of the debtor, including the subject matter of the mortgage x x x, subject to the qualification
that if he fails in the remedy by him elected, he cannot pursue further the remedy he has waived.

Anent real properties in particular, the Court has laid down the rule that a mortgage creditor may institute
against the mortgage debtor either a personal action for debt or a real action to foreclose the mortgage.

In our jurisdiction, the remedies available to the mortgage creditor are deemed alternative and not
cumulative. Notably, an election of one remedy operates as a waiver of the other. For this purpose, a
remedy is deemed chosen upon the filing of the suit for collection or upon the filing of the complaint in an
action for foreclosure of mortgage, pursuant to the provision of Rule 68 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. As to extrajudicial foreclosure, such remedy is deemed elected by the mortgage creditor upon
filing of the petition not with any court of justice but with the Office of the Sheriff of the province where
the sale is to be made, in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118.

Notwithstanding, there is no legal provision nor jurisprudence in our jurisdiction which makes a
third person who secures the fulfillment of another's obligation by mortgaging his own property, to
be solidarily bound with the principal obligor. The signatory to the principal contract - loan - remains
to be primarily bound. It is only upon default of the latter that the creditor may have recourse on the
mortgagors by foreclosing the mortgaged properties in lieu of an action for the recovery of the
amount of the loan.

For non-payment of a note secured by mortgage, the creditor has a single cause of action against the
debtor. This single cause of action consists in the recovery of the credit with execution of the security. In
other words, the creditor in his action may make two demands, the payment of the debt and the
foreclosure of his mortgage. But both demands arise from the same cause, the non-payment of the debt,
and for that reason, they constitute a single cause of action. Though the debt and the mortgage constitute
separate agreements, the latter is subsidiary to the former, and both refer to one and the same obligation.
Consequently, there exists only one cause of action for a single breach of that obligation. Plaintiff, then,
by applying the rules above stated, cannot split up his single cause of action by filing a complaint for
payment of the debt, and thereafter another complaint for foreclosure of the mortgage. If he does so, the
filing of the first complaint will bar the subsequent complaint. By allowing the creditor to file two
separate complaints simultaneously or successively, one to recover his credit and another to foreclose his
mortgage, we will, in effect, be authorizing him plural redress for a single breach of contract at so much
cost to the courts and with so much vexation and oppression to the debtor."

Accordingly, applying the foregoing rules, we hold that petitioner, by the expediency of filing four civil
suits before foreign courts, necessarily abandoned the remedy to foreclose the real estate mortgages
constituted over the properties of third-party mortgagor and herein private respondent ARC. Moreover, by
filing the four civil actions and by eventually foreclosing extrajudicially the mortgages, petitioner in
effect transgressed the rules against splitting a cause of action well-enshrined in jurisprudence and our
statute books.

In Bachrach, this Court resolved to deny the creditor the remedy of foreclosure after the collection suit
was filed, considering that the creditor should not be afforded "plural redress for a single breach of
contract." For cause of action should not be confused with the remedy created for its enforcement.

Incidentally, BANTSA alleges that under English Law, which according to petitioner is the governing law
with regard to the principal agreements, the mortgagee does not lose its security interest by simply filing
civil actions for sums of money.

This argument shows desperation on the part of petitioner to rivet its crumbling cause. In the case at
bench, Philippine law shall apply notwithstanding the evidence presented by petitioner to prove the
English law on the matter.

In a long line of decisions, this Court adopted the well-imbedded principle in our jurisdiction that there is
no judicial notice of any foreign law. A foreign law must be properly pleaded and proved as a fact.
[Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43; Sy Joc Lieng vs. Syquia, 16 Phil. 137.] Thus, if the foreign
law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same
as our local or domestic or internal law. [Lim vs. Collector, 36 Phil. 472.] This is what we refer to as the
doctrine of processual presumption.
In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter were properly pleaded and
proved in accordance with Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court and the jurisprudence laid down in
Yao Kee, et al. vs. Sy-Gonzales,32 [167 SCRA 736.] said foreign law would still not find applicability.

Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established public
policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied.
Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their
object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or
judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work undeniable injustice to the
citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important function of law; hence, a law, or
judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws.

When evidence is presented by one party, with the expressed or implied consent of the adverse
party, as to issues not alleged in the pleadings, judgment may be rendered validly as regards those
issues, which shall be considered as if they have been raised in the pleadings. There is implied
consent to the evidence thus presented when the adverse party fails to object thereto.

Clearly, a court may rule and render judgment on the basis of the evidence before it even though
the pleading had not been previously amended, so long as no surprise or prejudice is thereby
caused to the adverse party. Put a little differently, so long as the basis requirements of fair play
had been met, as where litigants were given full opportunity to support their respective
contentions and to object to or refute each other's evidence, the court may validly treat the
pleadings as if they had been amended to conform to the evidence and proceed to adjudicate on
the basis of all the evidence before it.

15. Yao Kee vs. Sy-Gonzales

These evidences may very well prove the fact of marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat. However, the
same do not suffice to establish the validity of said marriage in accordance with Chinese law or custom.

Custom is defined as "a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly observed (practiced) as a
social rule, legally binding and obligatory." The law requires that "a custom must be proved as a fact,
according to the rules of evidence."

On this score the Court had occasion to state that "a local custom as a source of right cannot be
considered by a court of justice unless such custom is properly established by competent evidence like
any other fact.” The same evidence, if not one of a higher degree, should be required of a foreign custom.

The law on foreign marriages is provided by Article 71 of the Civil Code which states that:

Art. 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were performed, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous marriages, as determined by Philippine
law.

Construing this provision of law the Court has held that to establish a valid foreign marriage two
things must be proven, namely: (1) the existence of the foreign law as a question of fact; and (2)
the alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence.
In proving a foreign law the procedure is provided in the Rules of Court. With respect to an unwritten
foreign law, Rule 130 section 45 states that:

SEC. 45. Unwritten law. The oral testimony of witnesses, skilled therein, is admissible as
evidence of the unwritten law of a foreign country, as are also printed and published books of
reports of decisions of the courts of the foreign country, if proved to be commonly admitted in
such courts.
Proof of a written foreign law, on the other hand, is provided for under Rule 132 section 25, thus:

SEC. 25. Proof of public or official record. An official record or an entry therein, when
admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy
attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied,
if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If
the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a
secretary of embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any
officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept and authenticated by the seal of his office.

The Court has interpreted section 25 to include competent evidence like the testimony of a
witness to prove the existence of a written foreign law.

In the case at bar petitioners did not present any competent evidence relative to the law and custom of
China on marriage. The testimonies of Yao and Gan Ching cannot be considered as proof of China's law
or custom on marriage not only because they are self-serving evidence, but more importantly, there is no
showing that they are competent to testify on the subject matter. For failure to prove the foreign law or
custom, and consequently, the validity of the marriage in accordance with said law or custom, the
marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction.

16. Recto vs. Harden

The third objection is not borne out, either by the language of the contract between them, or by the intent
of the parties thereto. Its purpose was not to secure a divorce, or to facilitate or promote the procurement
of a divorce. It merely sought to protect the interest of Mrs. Harden in the conjugal partnership, during the
pendency of a divorce suit she intended to file in the United States. What is more, inasmuch as Mr. and
Mrs. Harden are admittedly citizens of the United States, their status and the dissolution thereof are
governed - pursuant to Article 9 of the Civil Code of Spain (which was in force in the Philippines at the
time of the execution of the contract in question) and Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines – by
the laws of the United States, which sanction divorce. In short, the contract of services, between Mrs.
Harden and herein appellee, is not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.

17. Pioneer Concrete vs. Todaro

Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, as amended, defines a cause of action as the act or omission by which
a party violates a right of another. A cause of action exists if the following elements are present:

(1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created;

(2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and,

(3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a
breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action
for recovery of damages.

The elementary test for failure to state a cause of action is whether the complaint alleges facts which if true
would justify the relief demanded. Stated otherwise, may the court render a valid judgment upon the facts
alleged therein? The inquiry is into the sufficiency, not the veracity of the material allegations. If the
allegations in the complaint furnish sufficient basis on which it can be maintained, it should not be dismissed
regardless of the defense that may be presented by the defendants.

As to the question of jurisdiction, this Court has consistently held that where no employer-employee
relationship exists between the parties and no issue is involved which may be resolved by reference to the
Labor Code, other labor statutes or any collective bargaining agreement, it is the Regional Trial Court that has
jurisdiction. In the present case, no employer-employee relationship exists between petitioners and respondent.
In fact, in his complaint, private respondent is not seeking any relief under the Labor Code, but seeks payment
of damages on account of petitioners' alleged breach of their obligation under their agreement to employ him.
It is settled that an action for breach of contractual obligation is intrinsically a civil dispute. In the alternative,
respondent seeks redress on the basis of the provisions of Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Hence, it is
clear that the present action is within the realm of civil law, and jurisdiction over it belongs to the regular
courts.

The doctrine of forum non conveniens, literally meaning 'the forum is inconvenient', emerged in private
international law to deter the practice of global forum shopping, that is to prevent non-resident litigants
from choosing the forum or place wherein to bring their suit for malicious reasons, such as to secure
procedural advantages, to annoy and harass the defendant, to avoid overcrowded dockets, or to select a more
friendly venue. Under this doctrine, a court, in conflicts of law cases, may refuse impositions on its
jurisdiction where it is not the most "convenient" or available forum and the parties are not precluded
from seeking remedies elsewhere.

Whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on the basis of said doctrine depends largely upon the facts
of the particular case and is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.

A Philippine Court may assume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do so; provided, that the following
requisites are met:

(1) that the Philippine Court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to;
(2) that the Philippine Court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts;
and,
(3) that the Philippine Court has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision.

In Philsec. Investment Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, that the doctrine of forum non
conveniens should not be used as a ground for a motion to dismiss because Sec. 1, Rule 16
of the Rules of Court does not include said doctrine as a ground. This Court further ruled that
while it is within the discretion of the trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this
ground, it should do so only after vital facts are established, to determine whether special
circumstances require the court's desistance; and that the propriety of dismissing a case
based on this principle of forum non conveniens requires a factual determination, hence it is
more properly considered a matter of defense.

18. Navida vs. Shell

The rule is settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is determined by
the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are
entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein. Once vested by law, on a particular court or body, the
jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action cannot be dislodged by anybody other than by the
legislature through the enactment of a law.
At the time of the filing of the complaints, the jurisdiction of the RTC in civil cases under Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, was:

SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction:

8. In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s
fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds One hundred
thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where the demand, exclusive
of the abovementioned items exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00).

Corollary thereto, Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 09-94, states:

2. The exclusion of the term "damages of whatever kind" in determining the jurisdictional amount
under Section 19 (8) and Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, applies to
cases where the damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of action.
However, in cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of
action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court.

Moreover, the injuries and illnesses, which NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., allegedly suffered resulted
from their exposure to DBCP while they were employed in the banana plantations located in the Philippines or
while they were residing within the agricultural areas also located in the Philippines. The factual allegations in
the Amended Joint-Complaints all point to their cause of action, which undeniably occurred in the Philippines.
The RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City obviously have reasonable basis to assume
jurisdiction over the cases.

It is, therefore, error on the part of the courts a quo when they dismissed the cases on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction on the mistaken assumption that the cause of action narrated by NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et
al., took place abroad and had occurred outside and beyond the territorial boundaries of the Philippines, i.e.,
"the manufacture of the pesticides, their packaging in containers, their distribution through sale or other
disposition, resulting in their becoming part of the stream of commerce," and, hence, outside the jurisdiction
of the RTCs.

Certainly, the cases below are not criminal cases where territoriality, or the situs of the act complained of,
would be determinative of jurisdiction and venue for trial of cases. In personal civil actions, such as claims for
payment of damages, the Rules of Court allow the action to be commenced and tried in the appropriate court,
where any of the plaintiffs or defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant, where he may be
found, at the election of the plaintiff.

19. Hazegawa & Nippon vs. Kitamura

The pivotal question that this Court is called upon to resolve is whether the subject matter jurisdiction of
Philippine courts in civil cases for specific performance and damages involving contracts executed outside the
country by foreign nationals may be assailed on the principles of lex loci celebrationis, lex contractus, the
"state of the most significant relationship rule," or forum non conveniens.
The dismissal of a case without prejudice signifies the absence of a decision on the merits and leaves the
parties free to litigate the matter in a subsequent action as though the dismissed action had not been
commenced. In other words, the termination of a case not on the merits does not bar another action
involving the same parties, on the same subject matter and theory.

Necessarily, because the said dismissal is without prejudice and has no res judicata effect, and even if
petitioners still indicated in the verification and certification of the second certiorari petition that the first had
already been dismissed on procedural grounds, petitioners are no longer required by the Rules to indicate in
their certification of non-forum shopping in the instant petition for review of the second certiorari petition, the
status of the aforesaid first petition before the CA. In any case, an omission in the certificate of non-forum
shopping about any event that will not constitute res judicata and litis pendentia, as in the present case, is not a
fatal defect. It will not warrant the dismissal and nullification of the entire proceedings, considering that the
evils sought to be prevented by the said certificate are no longer present.

Further, the Court has observed that petitioners incorrectly filed a Rule 65 petition to question the trial court's
denial of their motion to dismiss. It is a well-established rule that an order denying a motion to dismiss is
interlocutory, and cannot be the subject of the extraordinary petition for certiorari or mandamus. The
appropriate recourse is to file an answer and to interpose as defenses the objections raised in the motion, to
proceed to trial, and, in case of an adverse decision, to elevate the entire case by appeal in due course. While
there are recognized exceptions to this rule, petitioners' case does not fall among them.

Asserting that the RTC of Lipa City is an inconvenient forum, petitioners question its jurisdiction to hear and
resolve the civil case for specific performance and damages filed by the respondent. The ICA subject of the
litigation was entered into and perfected in Tokyo, Japan, by Japanese nationals, and written wholly in the
Japanese language. Thus, petitioners posit that local courts have no substantial relationship to the parties
following the [state of the] most significant relationship rule in Private International Law.

To elucidate, in the judicial resolution of conflicts problems, three consecutive phases are involved:
jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition and enforcement of judgments. Corresponding to these phases are
the following questions: (1) Where can or should litigation be initiated? (2) Which law will the court apply?
and (3) Where can the resulting judgment be enforced?

Analytically, jurisdiction and choice of law are two distinct concepts. Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to
cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the further question whether the application of a
substantive law which will determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties. The power to exercise
jurisdiction does not automatically give a state constitutional authority to apply forum law. While jurisdiction
and the choice of the lex fori will often coincide, the "minimum contacts" for one do not always provide the
necessary "significant contacts" for the other. The question of whether the law of a state can be applied to a
transaction is different from the question of whether the courts of that state have jurisdiction to enter a
judgment.

In this case, only the first phase is at issue-jurisdiction. Jurisdiction, however, has various aspects. For a court
to validly exercise its power to adjudicate a controversy, it must have jurisdiction over the plaintiff or the
petitioner, over the defendant or the respondent, over the subject matter, over the issues of the case and, in
cases involving property, over the res or the thing which is the subject of the litigation. In assailing the trial
court's jurisdiction herein, petitioners are actually referring to subject matter jurisdiction.

Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority which
establishes and organizes the court. It is given only by law and in the manner prescribed by law. It is further
determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of
the claims asserted therein. To succeed in its motion for the dismissal of an action for lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the claim, the movant must show that the court or tribunal cannot act on the matter
submitted to it because no law grants it the power to adjudicate the claims.
In the instant case, petitioners, in their motion to dismiss, do not claim that the trial court is not properly vested
by law with jurisdiction to hear the subject controversy for, indeed, Civil Case No. 00-0264 for specific
performance and damages is one not capable of pecuniary estimation and is properly cognizable by the RTC of
Lipa City. What they rather raise as grounds to question subject matter jurisdiction are the principles of lex loci
celebrationis and lex contractus, and the "state of the most significant relationship rule."
Lex loci celebrationis relates to the "law of the place of the ceremony" or the law of the place where a
contract is made. The doctrine of lex contractus or lex loci contractus means the "law of the place where a
contract is executed or to be performed." It controls the nature, construction, and validity of the contract and it
may pertain to the law voluntarily agreed upon by the parties or the law intended by them either expressly or
implicitly. Under the "state of the most significant relationship rule," to ascertain what state law to apply to
a dispute, the court should determine which state has the most substantial connection to the occurrence and the
parties. In a case involving a contract, the court should consider where the contract was made, was
negotiated, was to be performed, and the domicile, place of business, or place of incorporation of the parties.
This rule takes into account several contacts and evaluates them according to their relative importance with
respect to the particular issue to be resolved.

Since these three principles in conflict of laws make reference to the law applicable to a dispute, they are
rules proper for the second phase, the choice of law. They determine which state's law is to be applied in
resolving the substantive issues of a conflicts problem. Necessarily, as the only issue in this case is that of
jurisdiction, choice-of-law rules are not only inapplicable but also not yet called for.

Further, petitioners' premature invocation of choice-of-law rules is exposed by the fact that they have not yet
pointed out any conflict between the laws of Japan and ours. Before determining which law should apply, first
there should exist a conflict of laws situation requiring the application of the conflict of laws rules. Also, when
the law of a foreign country is invoked to provide the proper rules for the solution of a case, the existence of
such law must be pleaded and proved.

It should be noted that when a conflicts case, one involving a foreign element, is brought before a court or
administrative agency, there are three alternatives open to the latter in disposing of it: (1) dismiss the case,
either because of lack of jurisdiction or refusal to assume jurisdiction over the case; (2) assume jurisdiction
over the case and apply the internal law of the forum; or (3) assume jurisdiction over the case and take into
account or apply the law of some other State or States. The court's power to hear cases and controversies is
derived from the Constitution and the laws. While it may choose to recognize laws of foreign nations, the court
is not limited by foreign sovereign law short of treaties or other formal agreements, even in matters regarding
rights provided by foreign sovereigns.

Neither can the other ground raised, forum non conveniens, be used to deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction
herein. First, it is not a proper basis for a motion to dismiss because Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court
does not include it as a ground. Second, whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on the basis of the
said doctrine depends largely upon the facts of the particular case and is addressed to the sound discretion of
the trial court. In this case, the RTC decided to assume jurisdiction. Third, the propriety of dismissing a case
based on this principle requires a factual determination; hence, this conflicts principle is more properly
considered a matter of defense.

20. Manufacturers Hanover vs. Guerrero

"Section 2. Summary judgment for defending party. - A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory relief is sought may, at any time, move with supporting affidavits
for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof."

A court may grant a summary judgment to settle expeditiously a case if, on motion of either party, there
appears from the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits that no important issues of fact are
involved, except the amount of damages. In such event, the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.

In a motion for summary judgment, the crucial question is: are the issues raised in the pleadings genuine,
sham or fictitious, as shown by affidavits, depositions or admissions accompanying the motion?
A genuine issue means an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence as distinguished from
an issue which is fictitious or contrived so as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial.

There can be no summary judgment where questions of fact are in issue or where material allegations of
the pleadings are in dispute. The resolution of whether a foreign law allows only the recovery of actual
damages is a question of fact as far as the trial court is concerned since foreign laws do not prove
themselves in our courts. Foreign laws are not a matter of judicialj notice. Like any other fact, they
must be alleged and proven. Certainly, the conflicting allegations as to whether New York law or
Philippine law applies to Guerrero's claims present a clear dispute on material allegations which can be
resolved only by a trial on the merits.

Under Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents of a sovereign authority or tribunal may be
proved by (1) an official publication thereof or (2) a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody
thereof. Such official publication or copy must be accompanied, if the record is not kept in the
Philippines, with a certificate that the attesting officer has the legal custody thereof. The certificate may
be issued by any of the authorized Philippine embassy or consular officials stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. The attestation must state,
in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be,
and must be under the official seal of the attesting officer.

Certain exceptions to this rule were recognized in Asiavest Limited v. Court of Appeals which held that:

Although it is desirable that foreign law be proved in accordance with the above rule, however, the
Supreme Court held in the case of Willamette Iron and Steel Works v. Muzzal, that Section 41, Rule 123
(Section 25, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court) does not exclude the presentation of other
competent evidence to prove the existence of a foreign law. In that case, the Supreme Court considered
the testimony under oath of an attorney-at-law of San Francisco, California, who quoted verbatim a
section of California Civil Code and who stated that the same was in force at the time the obligations
were contracted, as sufficient evidence to establish the existence of said law. Accordingly, in line with
this view, the Supreme Court in the Collector of Internal Revenue v. Fisher et al., upheld the Tax Court in
considering the pertinent law of California as proved by the respondents' witness. In that case, the counsel
for respondent "testified that as an active member of the California Bar since 1951, he is familiar with the
revenue and taxation laws of the State of California. When asked by the lower court to state the pertinent
California law as regards exemption of intangible personal properties, the witness cited Article 4, Sec.
13851 (a) & (b) of the California Internal and Revenue Code as published in Derring's California Code, a
publication of Bancroft-Whitney Co., Inc. And as part of his testimony, a full quotation of the cited
section was offered in evidence by respondents." Likewise, in several naturalization cases, it was held by
the Court that evidence of the law of a foreign country on reciprocity regarding the acquisition of
citizenship, although not meeting the prescribed rule of practice, may be allowed and used as basis for
favorable action, if, in the light of all the circumstances, the Court is "satisfied of the authenticity of the
written proof offered." Thus, in a number of decisions, mere authentication of the Chinese Naturalization
Law by the Chinese Consulate General of Manila was held to be competent proof of that law."

The Bank's intention in presenting the Walden affidavit is to prove New York law and jurisprudence.
However, because of the failure to comply with Section 24 of Rule 132 on how to prove a foreign law and
decisions of foreign courts, the Walden affidavit did not prove the current state of New York law and
jurisprudence. Thus, the Bank has only alleged, but has not proved, what New York law and
jurisprudence are on the matters at issue.

21. Catalan vs. Catalan-Lee

Should petitioner prove the validity of the divorce and the subsequent marriage, she has the preferential right
to be issued the letters of administration over the estate. Otherwise, letters of administration may be issued to
respondent, who is undisputedly the daughter or next of kin of the deceased, in accordance with Sec. 6 of Rule
78 of the Revised Rules of Court.

This is consistent with our ruling in San Luis v. San Luis, in which we said:

Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which
absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the
present petition as Felicisimo's surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient
evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of
respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, the Court laid down the
specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely
of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution must be presented.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a
foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal
custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a
certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

22. San Luis vs. San Luis

The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly laid, and (2) whether respondent has legal capacity
to file the subject petition for letters of administration.

Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of
Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province "in which he resides at the time of his
death." In the case of Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, we laid down the doctrinal rule for determining the
residence - as contradistinguished from domicile - of the decedent for purposes of fixing the venue of the
settlement of his estate:

[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence
or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be
interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the
application of venue statutes and rules - Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such
nature - residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word
"domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some
cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in
statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term
"inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning,
the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of
abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term
means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence
simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily
presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile. No particular length of time of
residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary.

Needless to say, there is a distinction between "residence" for purposes of election laws and "residence" for
purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election cases, "residence" and "domicile" are treated as
synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention of
returning. However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the "residence" of a person is his
personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his
legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency. Hence, it is possible
that a person may have his residence in one place and domicile in another.

Anent the issue of respondent Felicidad's legal personality to file the petition for letters of administration, we
must first resolve the issue of whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly
remarry under the Civil Code, considering that Felicidad's marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20,
1974, or before the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. In resolving this issue, we need not
retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that
there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing us to rule in the affirmative.

Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which
absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the
present petition as Felicisimo's surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence
to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and
Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, the Court laid down the specific guidelines for
pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree
is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25
of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either
(1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If
the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which
the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in the estate of
Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves
the validity of the divorce and Felicisimo's capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him
was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article
144 of the Civil Code. This provision governs the property relations between parties who live together as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that
the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall
be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not necessary that the property be acquired
through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed
to have been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners shall be
presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven.

Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and the marriage, the applicable
provision would be Article 148 of the Family Code which has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code
by expressly regulating the property relations of couples living together as husband and wife but are
incapacitated to marry. In Saguid v. Court of Appeals, we held that even if the cohabitation or the
acquisition of property occurred before the Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs. The Court described
the property regime under this provision as follows:

The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are not legally
capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies to
properties acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to their respective contributions. Co-
ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of money, property or
industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares shall be
presumed to be equal.
23. Fujiki vs. Mahinay

The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in “gross violation” of the above provisions.
The trial court based its dismissal on Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which provides that “[f]ailure to
comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a ground for immediate dismissal of the petition.”8
Apparently, the RTC took the view that only “the husband or the wife,” in this case either Maekara or
Marinay, can file the petition to declare their marriage void, and not Fujiki.

(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.

(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment
nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of
bigamy.

(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for cancellation
or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic, this
Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity
or annulment of marriage “does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy.”

For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the
parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under
the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and
proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of
Court. Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a
certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody of the judgment. If the office which has custody is
in a foreign country such as Japan, the certification may be made by the proper diplomatic or consular officer
of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and authenticated by the seal of office.

To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign judgment would mean that
the trial court and the parties should follow its provisions, including the form and contents of the petition, the
service of summons, the investigation of the public prosecutor, the setting of pre-trial, the trial and the
judgment of the trial court. This is absurd because it will litigate the case anew. It will defeat the purpose of
recognizing foreign judgments, which is “to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues.” The interpretation
of the RTC is tantamount to relitigating the case on the merits. In Mijares v. Rañada, this Court explained that
“[i]f every judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on
his/her original cause of action, rendering immaterial the previously concluded litigation.” A foreign judgment
relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal capacity of its parties. However,
the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the
Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public
policy and other mandatory laws. Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that “[l]aws relating to family rights
and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines,
even though living abroad.” This is the rule of lex nationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine
State may require, for effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment
affecting its citizen, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal
capacity of such citizen.

A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation under a
Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts
cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which the foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot
substitute their judgment on the status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the
jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact
according to the rules of evidence.
Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment or final order against a person
creates a “presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title.” Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of Court states that “the judgment or final order may be
repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of
law or fact.”

Thus, Philippine courts exercise limited review on foreign judgments. Courts are not allowed to delve into the
merits of a foreign judgment. Once a foreign judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can
only be repelled on grounds external to its merits, i.e. , “want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.” The rule on limited review embodies the policy of efficiency
and the protection of party expectations, as well as respecting the jurisdiction of other states.

Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be made in a
special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that “[a] special proceeding is a remedy by which a
party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact.” Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a
person’s life which are recorded by the State pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753. These are
facts of public consequence such as birth, death or marriage, which the State has an interest in recording.

Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:

Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree
concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may
file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional
Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located.

There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the integrity of the
marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in
the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which compromises the public record
of his marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve,
in limited instances) his most intimate human relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by
operation of law the moment he contracts marriage. These property interests in marriage include the right to be
supported “in keeping with the financial capacity of the family” and preserving the property regime of the
marriage.

Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution, but a spouse’s right in a marriage
extends further to relational rights recognized under Title III (“Rights and Obligations between Husband and
Wife”) of the Family Code.

Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting marriage to question the
validity of a subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when Section 2(a) states that “[a]
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the
wife” it refers to the husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code,
bigamous marriages are void from the beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the
husband nor the wife under the law. The husband or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one
who has the personality to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage under
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a
bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country.
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an
action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and
procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws.
Among these safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of marriage,
support pendente lite of the spouses and children, the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of
the spouses, and the investigation of the public prosecutor to determine collusion. A direct action for
declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of
the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation
or correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court “where the corresponding
civil registry is located.” In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient
of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.

However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil registry entry based on the
recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign
country. There is neither circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under
Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A recognition of a foreign
judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity
of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which was already tried and decided under foreign law. The
procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment annulling a
bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369
define the jurisdiction of the foreign court.

Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce
decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage.
The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides that “[w]here a marriage between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law.”

The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the effects
of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot
try the case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a case for divorce. The second paragraph of Article
26 is only a corrective measure to address the anomaly that results from a marriage between a Filipino, whose
laws do not allow divorce, and a foreign citizen, whose laws allow divorce.

In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their judgment on how
a case was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the “family rights and duties, or on the status,
condition and legal capacity” of the foreign citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine
courts are limited to the question of whether to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the
Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign
country, Philippine courts only decide whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party, under the rule of
lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code.

For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is inconsistent
with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party is able to prove an
extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there is neither inconsistency with public policy nor
adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts should, by default, recognize the foreign judgment as
part of the comity of nations. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states that the foreign judgment is
already “presumptive evidence of a right between the parties.” Upon recognition of the foreign judgment,
this right becomes conclusive and the judgment serves as the basis for the correction or cancellation of entry in
the civil registry. The recognition of the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is a subsequent
event that establishes a new status, right and fact that needs to be reflected in the civil registry. Otherwise,
there will be an inconsistency between the recognition of the effectivity of the foreign judgment and the public
records in the Philippines.

However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is without prejudice to
prosecution for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The recognition of a foreign judgment
nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a ground for extinction of criminal liability under Articles 89 and 94 of
the Revised Penal Code. Moreover, under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, "[t]he term of prescription [of
the crime of bigamy] shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine archipelago."