ENGLISH SEMANTIC

LOCUTIONS, ILLOCUTIONS, AND COOPERATIVE

PRINCIPLE

GROUP VI:

Prasetiyo cahyono . p (21113026)

Rahmat (21113033)

Sukmawan (21113045)

Fitra febriananda (20913023)

La Arcan (21013107)

TEACHER TRAINING AND EDUCATION FACULTY

MUHAMMADIYAH UNIVERSITY OF KENDARI

2013
 PREPACE

Praise be to Allah, who has given us healthy until finish a paper under the title “Semantics”,

which in content has a ‘’Speech Act’’ in linguistic, description locutions, illocutions and the

cooperative principle. It is also seen in attempts made identify we can hope this paper have a

function for us especially for a reader to add his knowledge about semantics.

Kendari,

Writer
 UNIT I: Introduction

A. Background
Semantics is the study of meaning communicated through language. One of the
insights modern linguistics is that speakers of a language have different type of
linguistic knowledge, including how to pronounce words, how to construct sentences,
and about the meaning of individual words and sentences. To reflect this, linguistic
description has different levels of analysis. So, semantics is the study of the meanings
of words and sentences. Many content of semantic we can learn in this paper there
are locutions, illocutions and the cooperative principle
B. Formula of problem
1. What the mean of locutions, illocutions and the cooperative principle?
2. What the kind of the cooperative principle?
C. Purpose
1. In order to know the locutions, illocutions and the cooperative principle
2. In order to know the cooperative principle

UNIT II:

Locutions and Illocutions

Locutionary act

In linguistics and the philosophy of mind, a locutionary act is the performance of an

utterance, and hence of a speech act. The term equally refers to the surface meaning of an
utterance because, according to J. L. Austin's posthumous "How To Do Things With Words",
a speech act should be analysed as a locutionary act (i.e. the actual utterance and its
ostensible meaning, comprising phonetic, phatic and rhetic acts corresponding to the verbal,
syntactic and semantic aspects of any meaningful utterance), as well as an illocutionary act
(the semantic 'illocutionary force' of the utterance, thus its real, intended meaning), and in
certain cases a further perlocutionary act (i.e. its actual effect, whether intended or not).

For example, my saying to you "Don't go into the water" (a locutionary act with
distinct phonetic, syntactic and semantic features) counts as warning you not to go into the
water (an illocutionary act), and if you heed my warning I have thereby succeeded in
persuading you not to go into the water (a perlocutionary act). This taxonomy of speech acts
was inherited by John R. Searle, Austin's pupil at Oxford and subsequently an influential
exponent of speech act theory.

Illocutionary act

Illocutionary act is a term in linguistics introduced by the philosopher John L. Austin

in his investigation of the various aspects of speech acts. We may sum up Austin's
terminology with the following example. In uttering the locution "Is there any salt?" at the
dinner table, one may thereby perform the illocutionary act of requesting salt, as well as the
distinct locutionary act of uttering the interrogatory sentence about the presence of salt, and
the further perlocutionary act of causing somebody to hand one the salt.

The notion of an illocutionary act is closely connected with Austin's doctrine of the
so-called 'performative' and 'constative utterances': an utterance is "performative" just in case
it is issued in the course of the "doing of an action" (1975, 5), by which, again, Austin means
the performance of an illocutionary act (Austin 1975, 6 n2, 133). According to Austin's
original exposition in How to Do Things With Words, an illocutionary act is an act (1) for the
performance of which I must make it clear to some other person that the act is performed
(Austin speaks of the 'securing of uptake'), and (2) the performance of which involves the
production of what Austin calls 'conventional consequences' as, e.g., rights, commitments, or
obligations (Austin 1975, 116f., 121, 139). Thus, for example, in order to make a promise I
must make clear to my audience that the act I am performing is the making of a promise, and
in the performance of the act I will be undertaking an obligation to do the promised thing: so
promising is an illocutionary act in the present sense. Since Austin's death, the term has been
defined differently by various authors.

Approaches to defining "illocutionary act"

Many define the term "illocutionary act" with reference to examples, saying for example that
any speech act (like stating, asking, commanding, promising, and so on) is an illocutionary
act. This approach has generally failed to give any useful hints about what traits and elements
make up an illocutionary act; that is, what defines such an act. It is also often emphasised that
Austin introduced the illocutionary act by means of a contrast with other kinds of acts or
aspects of acting: the illocutionary act, he says, is an act performed in saying something, as
contrasted with a locutionary act, the act of saying something, and also contrasted with a
perlocutionary act, an act performed by saying something. Austin, however, eventually
abandoned the "in saying" / "by saying" test (1975, 123).

According to the conception adopted by Bach and Harnish in 'Linguistic Communication and
Speech Acts' (1979), an illocutionary act is an attempt to communicate, which they analyse as
the expression of an attitude. Another conception of the illocutionary act goes back to
Schiffer's book 'Meaning' (1972, 103), in which the illocutionary act is represented as just the
act of meaning something.

According to a widespread opinion, an adequate and useful account of "illocutionary acts"

has been provided by John Searle (e.g., 1969, 1975, 1979). In recent years, however, it has
been doubted whether Searle's account is well-founded. A wide ranging critique is in FC
Doerge 2006. Collections of articles examining Searle's account are: Burkhardt 1990 and
Lepore / van Gulick 1991.
Classes of illocutionary acts

Searle (1975) set up the following classification of illocutionary speech acts:

 assertives = speech acts that commit a speaker to the truth of the expressed
proposition
 directives = speech acts that are to cause the hearer to take a particular action, e.g.
requests, commands and advice
 commissives = speech acts that commit a speaker to some future action, e.g. promises
and oaths
 expressives = speech acts that express on the speaker's attitudes and emotions
towards the proposition, e.g. congratulations, excuses and thanks
 declarations = speech acts that change the reality in accord with the proposition of
the declaration, e.g. baptisms, pronouncing someone guilty or pronouncing someone
husband and wife

Illocutionary force

Several speech act theorists, including Austin himself, make use of the notion of an
illocutionary force. In Austin's original account, the notion remains rather unclear. Some
followers of Austin, such as David Holdcroft, view illocutionary force as the property of an
utterance to be made with the intention to perform a certain illocutionary act -- rather than as
the successful performance of the act (which is supposed to further require the
appropriateness of certain circumstances). According to this conception, the utterance of "I
bet you five pounds that it will rain" may well have an illocutionary force even if the
addressee doesn't hear it. However, Bach and Harnish assume illocutionary force just in case
this or that illocutionary act is actually (successfully) performed. According to this
conception, the addressee must have heard and understood that the speaker intends to make a
bet with them in order for the utterance to have 'illocutionary force'.

If we adopt the notion of illocutionary force as an aspect of meaning, then it appears that the
(intended) 'force' of certain sentences, or utterances, is not quite obvious. If someone says, "It
sure is cold in here", there are several different illocutionary acts that might be aimed at by
the utterance. The utterer might intend to describe the room, in which case the illocutionary
force would be that of 'describing'. But she might also intend to criticise someone who should
have kept the room warm. Or it might be meant as a request to someone to close the window.
These forces may be interrelated: it may be by way of stating that the temperature is too cold
that one criticises someone else. Such a performance of an illocutionary act by means of the
performance of another is referred to as an indirect speech act.

Illocutionary force indicating devices (IFIDs)

Searle and Vanderveken (1985) often speak about what they call 'illocutionary force
indicating devices' (IFIDs). These are supposed to be elements, or aspects of linguistic
devices which indicate either (dependent on which conceptions of "illocutionary force" and
"illocutionary act" are adopted) that the utterance is made with a certain illocutionary force,
or else that it constitutes the performance of a certain illocutionary act. In English, for
example, the interrogative mood is supposed to indicate that the utterance is (intended as) a
question; the directive mood indicates that the utterance is (intended as) a directive
illocutionary act (an order, a request, etc.); the words "I promise" are supposed to indicate
that the utterance is (intended as) a promise. Possible IFIDs in English include: word order,
stress, intonation contour, punctuation, the mood of the verb, and performative verbs.

Illocutionary negations

Another notion Searle and Vanderveken use is that of an 'illocutionary negation'. The
difference of such an 'illocutionary negation' to a 'propositional negation' can be explained by
reference to the difference between "I do not promise to come" and "I promise not to come".
The first is an illocutionary negation - the 'not' negates the promise. The second is a
propositional negation. In the view of Searle and Vanderveken, illocutionary negations
change the type of illocutionary act.

Cooperative principle

In social science generally and linguistics specifically, the cooperative principle

describes how people interact with one another.

As phrased by Paul Grice, who introduced it, it states, "Make your contribution such
as it is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the
talk exchange in which you are engaged."[1] Though phrased as a prescriptive command, the
principle is intended as a description of how people normally behave in conversation.

Listeners and speakers must speak cooperatively and mutually accept one another to
be understood in a particular way. The cooperative principle describes how effective
communication in conversation is achieved in common social situations.

The cooperative principle can be divided into four maxims, called the Gricean
maxims, describing specific rational principles observed by people who obey the cooperative
principle; these principles enable effective communication.Grice proposed four
conversational maxims that arise from the pragmatics of natural language. The Gricean
Maxims are a way to explain the link between utterances and what is understood from them.

Obeying the cooperative principle

People who obey the cooperative principle in their language use will make sure that
what they say in a conversation furthers the purpose of that conversation. Obviously, the
requirements of different types of conversations will be different.
 The cooperative principle goes both ways: speakers (generally) observe the
cooperative principle, and listeners (generally) assume that speakers are observing it. This
allows for the possibility of implicatures, which are meanings that are not explicitly conveyed
in what is said, but that can nonetheless be inferred. For example, if Alice points out that Bill
is not present, and Carol replies that Bill has a cold, then there is an implicature that the cold
is the reason, or at least a possible reason, for Bill's absence; this is because Carol's comment
is not cooperative — does not contribute to the conversation — unless her point is that Bill's
cold is or might be the reason for his absence. (This is covered specifically by the Maxim of
Relevance).

There are two principles of insurance

1. Principle of cooperation
2. Theory of probability

Grice's Maxims

Maxim of Quality

Be Truthful

 Do not say what you believe to be false.

 Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.

Maxim of Quantity

Quantity of Information

 Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the
exchange).
 Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.

Maxim of Relation

Relevance

 Be relevant.

With respect to this maxim, Grice writes, "Though the maxim itself is terse, its
formulation conceals a number of problems that exercise me a good deal: questions
about what different kinds and focuses of relevance there may be, how these shift in
the course of a talk exchange, how to allow for the fact that subjects of conversations
are legitimately changed, and so on. I find the treatment of such questions
exceedingly difficult, and I hope to revert to them in later work." (Grice 1989:27)
Maxim of Manner

Be Clear

 Avoid obscurity of expression.

 Avoid ambiguity.
 Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity).
 Be orderly.

Positive politeness

Positive politeness strategies seek to minimize the threat to the hearer’s positive face. They
are used to make the hearer feel good about himself, his interests or possessions, and are most
usually used in situations where the audience knows each other fairly well. In addition to
hedging and attempts to avoid conflict, some strategies of positive politeness include
statements of friendship, solidarity, compliments, and the following examples from Brown
and Levinson.

 Attend to H’s interests, needs, wants

You look sad. Can I do anything?

 Use solidarity in-group identity markers

Heh, mate, can you lend me a dollar?

 Be optimistic

I’ll just come along, if you don’t mind.

 Include both speaker (S) and hearer (H) in activity

If we help each other, I guess, we’ll both sink or swim in this course.

 Offer or promise

If you wash the dishes, I’ll vacuum the floor.

 Exaggerate interest in H and his interests

That’s a nice haircut you got; where did you get it?

 Avoid Disagreement
 Yes, it’s rather long; not short certainly.

 Joke

Wow, that’s a whopper!

Negative politeness

Negative politeness strategies are oriented towards the hearer’s negative face and emphasize
avoidance of imposition on the hearer. These strategies presume that the speaker will be
imposing on the listener and there is a higher potential for awkwardness or embarrassment
than in bald on record strategies and positive politeness strategies. Negative face is the desire
to remain autonomous so the speaker is more apt to include an out for the listener, through
distancing styles like apologies. Examples from Brown and Levinson include:

 Be indirect

Would you know where Oxford Street is?

 Use hedges or questions

Perhaps, he might have taken it, maybe.

Could you please pass the rice?

 Be pessimistic

You couldn’t find your way to lending me a thousand dollars, could you?

 Minimize the imposition

It’s not too much out of your way, just a couple of blocks.

 Use obviating structures, like nominalizations, passives, or statements of general rules

I hope offense will not be taken.

Visitors sign the ledger.
Spitting will not be tolerated.

 Apologize

I’m sorry; it’s a lot to ask, but can you lend me a thousand dollars?

 Use plural pronouns

We regret to inform you.

Favor seeking, or a speaker asking the hearer for a favor, is a common example of negative
politeness strategies in use. Held observes three main stages in favor-seeking: the preparatory
phase, the focal phase, and the final phase:

1. The preparatory phase is when the favor-seeking is preceded by elaborate precautions

against loss of face to both sides. It often involves signals of openings and markers to
be used to clarify the situation (e.g. ‘You see,’ or ‘so,’). The request is often softened,
made less direct, and imposing (e.g. past continuous ‘I was wondering’; informal tag
‘What d’you reckon?). The speaker must also reduce his own self-importance in the
matter and exaggerate the hearer’s (down-scaling compliments).
2. The focal stage is subdivided into elements such as asker’s reasons or constraints (e.g.
‘I’ve tried everywhere but can’t get one’), the other’s face (e.g. ‘You’re the only
person I can turn to’), and more.
3. The third stage is the final stage which consists of anticipatory thanks, promises, and
compliments (e.g. ‘I knew you would say yes. You’re an angel.’).

An example that is given by McCarthy and Carter is the following dialogue from the
Australian television soap opera, "Neighbours":

Clarrie: So I said to him, forget your books for one night, throw a party next weekend.
Helen: A party at number 30! What will Dorothy say about that?
Clarrie: Well, what she doesn't know won't hurt her. Of course, I'll be keeping my eye
on things, and (SIGNAL OF OPENING) that brings me to my next problem.
(EXPLAIN PROBLEM) You see, these young people, they don't want an old codger
like me poking my nose in, so I'll make myself scarce, but I still need to be closer to
hand, you see. So, (ASK FAVOR) I was wondering, would it be all right if I came
over here on the night? What d'you reckon?
Helen: Oh, Clarrie, I...
Clarrie: Oh (MINIMIZATION) I'd be no bother. (REINFORCE EXPLANATION)
It'd mean a heck of a lot to those kids.
Helen: All right.
Clarrie: (THANK WITH BOOST) I knew you'd say yes. You're an angel, Helen.
Helen: Ha! (laughs)

All of this is done in attempt to avoid a great deal of imposition on the hearer and is
concerned with proceeding towards a goal in the smoothest way and with sensitivity to one’s
interlocutors. An English (‘Excuse me, sir, could you please close the window’) is associated
with the avoidance or downplaying of an imposition; the more we feel we might be imposing,
the more deferential we might be.[1] It is clearly a strategy for negative politeness and the
redressing of a threat to negative face, through things like favor-seeking.
 UNIT III: CONCLUSION

locutionary act is the performance of an utterance, and hence of a speech act.

Illocutionary act is a term in linguistics introduced by the philosopher John L. Austin in his
investigation of the various aspects of speech acts.

The cooperative principle describes how people interact with one another.

This pact of cooperation touches on four areas communication. Each can be described in a
maxim, there are:

A. Maxim of quantity
B. Maxim of relevance
C. Maxim of manner
D. Maxim of quality

There are two basic aspects to being polite:

1. Positive politeness strategies seek to minimize the threat to the hearer’s positive face.
They are used to make the hearer feel good about himself, his interests or possessions,
and are most usually used in situations where the audience knows each other fairly
well.
2. Negative politeness strategies are oriented towards the hearer’s negative face and
emphasize avoidance of imposition on the hearer. These strategies presume that the
speaker will be imposing on the listener and there is a higher potential for
awkwardness or embarrassment than in bald on record strategies and positive
politeness strategies.
 Reference

Rohn N. West. 1982. Semantic, speech act. New Delhi: Prentice Hall. Freeman

UMS. Munijanah, Rani. 2004. English Pragmatism: Locutions,Illocutions . Surakarta: UMS.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Illocutionary_act

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politeness_theory

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cooperative_principle#Obeying_the_cooperative_principle