Chapter I

Introduction

A. Background of The Study

Speech-acts are utterances that perform actions. Speech-acts theory was introduced in
1975 by Oxford philosopher J.L. Austin in “How to Do Things With Words” and
further developed by American philosopher J.R. Searle. Speech-acts the basis unit of
language is central to effective communication since they allow people to perform a
wide range of functions such as affirming, asserting, blaming, concluding, explaining,
informing, notifying, praising, and other. The use of speech acts determines how the
teaching and learning process will happen. Celce-Murcia (2000) emphasizes that the
language used by the lecturer (speech acts) is particularly important since it will
support and enhance learning. The use of appropriate speech acts will lead to
successful teaching and learning process. However, sometimes it is difficult to
understand what the lecturer says in the acts; thus, it often causes misunderstanding in
interpreting the messages. The understanding of the utterances also depends crucially
on the actual contexts and the pragmatic knowledge, especially speech acts. In this
case, we are trying to solve that problem. We will briefly cover the understanding of
speech act in this paper to learn more about how to use speech act appropiately.

B. Formulation of The Study

What is the concept of speech acts?
What are the taxonomies of speech acts?
What are the types of speech acts?
 Chapter II
Theoretical Frameworks

Language is inseparable part in or everyday life. It is main device to convey message,

communicate ideas opinions and thought. Generally, speech acts can be defined as
the acts of communication. In addition, Parker (1986, p.14) defined speech act as
every utterance of speech act constitutes some sort of fact. In the communication, the
speaker expresses certain attitude that has the relationship with the performance of a
particular type of speech acts. The success of speech acts in its rule at the act of
communication occurred when the audience or the hearer is able to identify the
expression of the speaker’s attitude when he/she intends to communicate something.
In short, speech acts success if the hearer comprehends the speaker’s intention in
communication by means of his/her acts performances. However it is also possible
that the function of speech acts is to affect some institutional states of affairs which
demand certain circumstances and position such as the judge’s utterances use in the
court. Further it is called the felicity condition, i.e. the requirements needed in
performing certain act of speech. The first is that there is a specific person that acts
certain utterance, and the second that these utterances have to be spoken in specific
context. (Yule, 1996, p.50).

Speech acts are often associated with illocutionary meaning of the utterance as they
are the uses to which language can be put in society. Austin also proposes “felicity
conditions‟ which are necessary for successful communication. Following Austin, J.
R. Searle classified speech acts into five categories: assertives, directives, expressive,
commissives and verdictives. Searle also proposes the notion of indirect speech acts
in which the speaker communicates to the hearer more than he actually says by way
of relying on their mutually shared background information, both linguistic and non-
linguistic, together with the general powers rationality and inference on the part of the
hearer (Searle: 1979).
 Chapter III
Analysis

A. Concept of Speech Act

Speech acts are utterances that perform actions. It is the theory that analyzes the
effect of an utterance in the relationship between the speaker and the listener‟s
behavior. (Austin, 1962, p.110). Their focus is usually less on their truth value than
on their illocutionary effect, the effect that a speaker wishes to have on his or her
environment. The study of speech acts initially focused on performative acts such as
making a bet, naming a ship (or a person), or declaring two people to be married
(Flowerdew, 2013, 98). However, no utterance exists in a vacuum, and all speech can
be considered to have illocutionary effects. Therefore, the study of speech acts has
broadened to include more or less every kind of utterance, as well as the interpersonal
aspects of whole texts.

The basic idea behind speech act theory is to consider language as a tool for
conveying actions, language/speech actions. For example:

You most put actions behind your words.

In this sentence it is implied that words, by them self, just by uttering them, do not
perform any actions. This is of cause, in some situations, true, but speech act theory
suggests that in most situations our words actually perform actions just by being
uttered. Lets consider a situation where (1) would typically be used. If one agent a for
example says to another agent b:

I will come and help you build your new garage,

But actually never comes and helps, then b might rightfully say (1) to a. Or more
precisely he could say:
You most put physical actions behind your words,

Meaning that it is not enough to promise to help someone; there must also put
physical actions behind them.

What speech act theory suggests is, that this situation is actually created by the
performance of a speech act by a: The speech act of making a promise, and thereby
creating a social obligation (commitment) from the speaker, a, towards the listener, b.
The speech act may also convey other actions: a expresses its intention to help b,
which may create a belief in b that a truly intends (and is committed) to help b.

B. Taxonomies of Speech Acts

1. Austin’s Taxonomy
Austin (1962, p.109) conveys the distinction of speech acts into three types, they are
locutionary acts or locution, illocutionary acts or illocution, and perlocutionary acts or
perlocution. He defines those three kinds of acts they are locution, illocution and
perlocution. Locutionary acts is the act of saying something, illocutionary acts is the
acts in saying something, and perlocutionary acts is the acts by saying something
(Austin: 1962, p.109).

The further explanation in order to get understanding, here are the example of those
three kinds of acts based on Austin:

“The weather is so hot today.”

- Locution: the saying of the speaker, i.e. the words uttered by the speaker.
- Illocution: it can be a request for the hearer to take a glass of water for the speaker.
It is also possible to use that sentence in order to make a statement, or a request to
turn on the air conditioner, to make an explanation, or the other communicative
purposes that so called as the illocutionary force in general (Austin: 1962, p.100-
103).
- Perlocutio: it can be the hearer take a glass of water for the speaker, or turn on the
air conditioner, or do not obey to the speaker‟s say. It is the act of the speaker to get
the hearer to do something (Austin: 1962, p.100-103).

It is also assumed that the three types explained above are the parts of speech acts.
Where locution defined as the communicative acts, illocution as the speakers‟
intention, and perlocution as the effect that the speech act has on the context of
participants‟ words (Spenader:2004). In addition, those three types of acts can be
defined as the levels of speech acts. However, generally the meaning and the
functions are the same (Bach, 1994, p.1-3).

2. Searle’s Taxonomy
Searle (1975) proposed four processes involved in a speech act: the utterance acts
which has to do with the uttering of words and which is synonymous with Austin’s
locutionary acts, the propositional acts which has to do with the content of the
utterance and involves referring and predicating, the illocutionary acts which involves
the action of promising, questioning, commanding and stating, etc. This is perfectly
in sync with Austin’s own illocutionary acts and it is the most important concept in
the speech act theory such that it is what comes to the minds of many people when
speech act is mentioned. Lastly, Searle brings in Austin’s perlocutionary acts which
are the effects of the illocutionary acts of the speakers on the hearers. It seems that
Searle only split Austin’s locutionary acts into utterance acts and propositional acts. It
is however, pertinent to note that these processes naturally occur together and not in
isolation of one another. For example:

1. There is a policeman by the corner.

In saying 1 above, I would have performed the utterance act of uttering words, the
propositional content act of referring and predicating, the illocutionary act of
asserting or warning and the perlocutionary act of frightening the hearer and making
him run away or some other effect depending on the situation.

However Searle’s theory of speech act is still the most popular speech act theory
today. His taxonomy of speech act is useful as a language theory so much that
although, it was originally the concern of philosophers, many linguists have delved
into the study of speech acts today. Contrary to Levinson’s view, Sbisa (2009, p.229)
sees Searle’s principles as diverging sharply from Austin’s. His brilliant observation
that language has an illocutionary character and that whenever we use language
something is done, is yet to be disproved. Some languages may not have some of
Searle’s speech acts but every language has some speech acts (at least assertions, if
not any other) which makes Searle’s theory really a universal one.

C. Types of Speech Acts

1. Assertive utterances
In the assertive function speakers and writers use language to tell what they know or
believe; assertive language is concerned with facts. The purpose is to inform. For
example:

1. I voted for Aaronson in the last election.

2. Most plastics are made from soy beans.
3. Cape Ann Lighthouse is a mile from the beach.

This is language concerned with knowledge, with cognition. It deals with data, what
exists or existed, what is happening or has happened— or not (Kreidler, 1998, p.
184). So assertive utterances are either true or false, and generally they can be
verified or falsified—not necessarily at the time of the utterance or by those who hear
them, but in a general sense they are subject to empirical investigation. The above
sentences are indirect assertives. Direct assertive utterances start with I or we and an
assertive verb:

4. I say that I voted for Aaronson in the last election,

5. We declare that most plastics are made from soy beans.
6. I can now announce that Cape Ann Lighthouse is ten miles from the beach.

Reported assertive utterances also include assertive verbs: Jarvis announced that he is
voting for Aaronson…, and so on. Assertive verbs are, in English, followed by a full
clause. They include allege, announce, agree, report, remind, predict, protest. They
are independent of time or aspect and are neutral with respect to who is involved in
what is reported. They are comments on a state of affairs. We may question whether
these really constitute a class of utterances or a class of verbs which introduce
information.

2. Verdictive utterances
Verdictives are speech acts in which the speaker makes an assessment or judgement
about the acts of another, usually the addressee (Kreidler, 1998, p. 187). These
include ranking, assessing, appraising, condoning. Verdictive verbs include accuse,
charge, excuse, thank in the explicit frame I ____ you of/for _____-ing. For example:

1. I accuse you of putting on airs.

2. I congratulate you for performing so well.
3. The Mayor blamed the media for not accurately reporting his
accomplishments.

Sentences 1 and 2 are verdictive utterances. Sentence 3 is the report of a verdictive

utterance. Since these utterances present the speaker’s assessment of the addressee’s
previous action(s) or of what has befallen the addressee, they are retrospective. For
example:

4. The teacher excused/pardoned Henry for missing the meeting.

The verbs excuse and pardon express speech acts that do more than comment on an
alleged previous action, but they presuppose the truth of that action, like blame,
admonish, criticize and scold.

3. Expressive Utterance
The next function is expressive, which is stated by Yule (1996, p.53) as the
psychological expressions regarding to the speaker‟s feeling. Those are including the
expression of thanking, congratulating, apologizing, and welcoming. In short, these
are the expression of pain, pleasure, like, dislike, and sorrow. An expressive utterance
springs from the previous actions—or failure to act—of the speaker, or perhaps the
present result of those actions or failures. Expressive utterances are thus retrospective
and speaker-involved (Kreidler, 1998, p. 189). For example:

1. I acknowledge that I didn’t do what I should have done.

2. We admit that we were mistaken.
3. I apologize for having disturbed you

As we can see on the example above that the most common expressive verbs (in this
sense of ‘expres-sive’) are: acknowledge, admit, confess, deny, apologize.

4. Directive utterances
Directive utterances are those in which the speaker tries to get the addressee to
perform some act or refrain from performing an act. Thus a directive utterance has the
pronoun you as actor, whether that word is actually present in the utterance or not. In
the other words, directives utterances used to express what the speaker wants to do by
the hearer (Yule, 1996:54). For example:

1. (You) wait here.

2. Turn to page 164.
3. Don’t (any of you) miss this opportunity to save.
A directive utterance is prospective; one cannot tell other people to do something in
the past. Like other kinds of utterances, a directive utterance presupposes certain
conditions in the addressee and in the context of situation. The utterance “Lift this
500-pound weight” is not felicitous if spoken to a person incapable of lifting 500
pounds, and “Close the door” is vapid if the only door in the vicinity is already
closed. When the utterance can be carried out, the utterance is felicitous, and if not, it
is infelicitous (Kreidler, 1998, p. 190)

Three kinds of directive utterances can be recognized: commands, requests and

suggestions. A command is effective only if the speaker has some degree of control
over the actions of the addressee. For example:

4. I (hereby) order you to appear in court next Monday at 10 a.m.

5. You must appear in court next Monday at 10 a.m.
6. I’m telling you not to waste your time on that.
7. Don’t waste your time on that.

a. Commands can be produced with various degrees of explicitness. Sentences 4 and

5 are more explicit than 6 and 7 but their utterances are less formal, therefore
more usual. They have the form You must…or they are imperative sentences. For
example:

8. Passengers are required to keep seat belts fastened when the sign is lit.
9. Smoking is not permitted in the lavatories.

These utterances are commands, and fairly explicit ones, not because of syntax but
because they contain such predicates as require and permit.
b. A request is an expression of what the speaker wants the addressee to do or
refrain from doing. A request does not assume the speaker’s control over the
person addressed. For example:

10. I appeal to you to help as much as you can.

11. We beg you to stay out of the way.
12. The receptionist asked the people in the waiting room not to smoke there.

General meaning:
Speaker, not in authority, expresses wish that Addressee <not> act as Speaker wants
Addressee not to act.

Request predicates:
appeal-to ask beg beseech entreat implore
petition plead-with request

c. Suggestions are the utterances we make to other persons to give our opinions as to
what they should or should not do. For example:

13. I advise you to be prompt; I warn you not to be late.

14. We suggest you (should) pay more attention to what you’re doing.

General meaning: Speaker expresses an opinion about Addressee’s choice of

performance. Addressee is the suggestee, not necessarily the addressee.

5. Comissive Uterrance
Speech acts that commit a speaker to a course of action are called commissive
utterances. These are used by the speaker to commit them self to some future action
such as promising, threatening, refusing, and pledging (Yule, 1996, p.54).
Commissive verbs are illustrated by agree, ask, offer, refuse, swear, all with
following infinitives. They are prospective and concerned with the speaker’s
commitment to future action. For example:
 1. I promise to be on time.
2. We volunteer to put up the decorations for the dance.

A commissive predicate is one that can be used to commit oneself (or refuse to
commit oneself) to some future action. The subject of the sentence is therefore most
likely to be I or we, as in 1 and 2.

Further, the verb must be in the present tense and there is some addressee, whether
the utterance shows it or not, since the speaker must be making a commitment to
somebody. In contrast, 3 and 4 below, with other kinds of subjects or a different
tense, are not commitments but reports of commitments.

3. Ernest promised us to be on time.

4. We volunteered to put up the decorations for the dance.
Chapter IV
Conclusion
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