HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS and KARL BECK vs. HON. JOSE W.

DIOKNO
G.R. No. L-19550 June 19, 1967

Facts:
Respondent judges issued on different dates a total of 42 search warrant against petitioners and/or
corporations of which they were officers, directed to any peace officer, to search the persons and/or the
premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residence and to seize and take possession of the following
personal proper: “books of account, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipt ledger, journals,
portfolios, credit journals, typewriters and other document and/or paper showing all sheets and profit
and loss statements and bobbins.” As the subject of the offense, stolen or embezzled and proceeds or
fruits of the offense or used or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense which is
described in the applications adverted to above as violation of central bank laws, tariff and custom laws,
internal revenue code and revised penal code.

Issue:
Whether or not the search warrant is valid

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that to be valid two points must be stressed: 1. that no warrant shall be
issued but upon probable cause to be determined by the judge in a manner set forth in the provision 2.
That the warrant shall particularly described the things to be seized. None of these requirements has been
complied with the contested warrant.
Indeed, the same were issued upon application stating that the natural and juridical person therein
named had committed a “violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code
and Revised Penal Code”. In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said application. It was
impossible for the judge who issued the warrant to have found the existence of probable cause. The
application do not alleged any specific acts performed by petitioner.

The warrant authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions
of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The warrant sanctioned
the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the corporation whatever their nature, thus openly
contravening the explicit command of our bill of rights - that the thing to be seize be particularly described
as well as tending to defeat it major objectives to eliminate general warrants.
Digest (2)
Facts:
Respondents issued, on different dates, 42 search warrants against petitioners personally, and/or
corporations for which they are officers directing peace officers to search the persons of petitioners and
premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences to search for personal properties “books of
accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit
journals, typewriters, and other documents showing all business transactions including disbursement
receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins(cigarettes)” as the subject of the
offense for violations of Central Bank Act, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code, and Revised
Penal Code.
Upon effecting the search in the offices of the aforementioned corporations and on the respective
residences of the petitioners, there seized documents, papers, money and other records. Petitioners then
were subjected to deportation proceedings and were constrained to question the legality of the searches
and seizures as well as the admissibility of those seized as evidence against them.
On March 20, 1962, the SC issued a writ of preliminary injunction and partially lifted the same on
June 29, 1962 with respect to some documents and papers.
Held:
Search warrants issued were violative of the Constitution and the Rules, thus, illegal or being
general warrants. There is no probable cause and warrant did not particularly specify the things to be
seized. The purpose of the requirement is to avoid placing the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of
communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice or passion of peace officers.
Document seized from an illegal search warrant is not admissible in court as a fruit of a poisonous
tee. However, they could not be returned, except if warranted by the circumstances.
Petitioners were not the proper party to question the validity and return of those taken from the
corporations for which they acted as officers as they are treated as personality different from that of the
corporation.
VALENTIN L. LEGASPI, petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent.

FACTS : The fundamental right of the people to information on matters of public concern is invoked in this
special civil action for mandamus instituted by petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi against the Civil Service
Commission. The respondent had earlier denied Legaspi's request for information on the civil service
eligibilities of certain persons employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City. These
government employees, Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, had allegedly represented themselves as
civil service eligibles who passed the civil service examinations for sanitarians.

ISSUE : WON the petitioner has legal to access government records to validate the civil service eligibilities
of the Health Department employees

HELD : The constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public concern is not absolute. It does
not open every door to any and all information. Under the Constitution, access to official records, papers,
etc., are "subject to limitations as may be provided by law" The law may therefore exempt certain types
of information from public scrutiny, such as those affecting national security It follows that, in every case,
the availability of access to a particular public record must be circumscribed by the nature of the
information sought, i.e., (a) being of public concern or one that involves public interest, and, (b) not being
exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee. The threshold question is, therefore,
whether or not the information sought is of public interest or public concern. This question is first
addressed to the government agency having custody of the desired information. However, as already
discussed, this does not give the agency concerned any discretion to grant or deny access. In case of denial
of access, the government agency has the burden of showing that the information requested is not of
public concern, or, if it is of public concern, that the same has been exempted by law from the operation
of the guarantee. To hold otherwise will serve to dilute the constitutional right. As aptly observed, ". . .
the government is in an advantageous position to marshall and interpret arguments against release . . ."
(87 Harvard Law Review 1511 [1974]). To safeguard the constitutional right, every denial of access by the
government agency concerned is subject to review by the courts, and in the proper case, access may be
compelled by a writ of Mandamus Public office being a public trust it is the legitimate concern of citizens
to ensure that government positions requiring civil service eligibility are occupied only by persons who
are eligibles. Public officers are at all times accountable to the people even as to their eligibilities for their
respective positions. In the instant, case while refusing to confirm or deny the claims of eligibility, the
respondent has failed to cite any provision in the Civil Service Law which would limit the petitioner's right
to know who are, and who are not, civil service eligibles. We take judicial notice of the fact that the names
of those who pass the civil service examinations, as in bar examinations and licensure examinations for
various professions, are released to the public. Hence, there is nothing secret about one's civil service
eligibility, if actually possessed. Petitioner's request is, therefore, neither unusual nor unreasonable. And
when, as in this case, the government employees concerned claim to be civil service eligibles, the public,
through any citizen, has a right to verify their professed eligibilities from the Civil Service Commission. The
civil service eligibility of a sanitarian being of public concern, and in the absence of express limitations
under the law upon access to the register of civil service eligibles for said position, the duty of the
respondent Commission to confirm or deny the civil service eligibility of any person occupying the position
becomes imperative. Mandamus, therefore lies
Legaspi v CSC 150 SCRA 530 (1987)
Facts: The petitioner invokes his constitutional right to information on matters of public concern in a
special civil action for mandamus against the CSC pertaining to the information of civil service eligibilities
of certain persons employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City. The standing of the
petitioner was challenged by the Solicitor General of being devoid of legal right to be informed of the civil
service eligibilities of government employees for failure of petitioner to provide actual interest to secure
the information sought.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner may invoke his constitutional right to information in the case at bar.

Held: The court held that when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to
procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the
relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special
interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution
of the laws. The Constitution provides the guarantee of adopting policy of full public disclosure subject to
reasonable conditions prescribed by law as in regulation in the manner of examining the public records
by the government agency in custody thereof. But the constitutional guarantee to information on matters
of public concern is not absolute. Under the Constitution, access to official records, papers, etc., are
"subject to limitations as may be provided by law" (Art. III, Sec. 7, second sentence). The law may therefore
exempt certain types of information from public scrutiny, such as those affecting national security.

The court delves into determining whether the information sought for by the petitioner is of public
interest. All appointments in the Civil Service Commission are made according to merit and fitness while
a public office is a public trust. Public employees therefore are accountable to the people even as to their
eligibilities to their positions in the government. The court also noted that the information on the result
of the CSC eligibility examination is released to the public therefore the request of petitioner is one that
is not unusual or unreasonable. The public, through any citizen, has the right to verify the civil eligibilities
of any person occupying government positions.
EBRALINAG v. THE DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF CEBU
G.R. No. 95770 March 1, 1993

Facts:
The petitioners in both (consolidated) cases were expelled from their classes by thepublic school
authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem andrecite the patriotic pledge
as required by Republic Act No. 1265 (An Act making flagceremony compulsory in all educational
institutions) of July 11, 1955 , and by DepartmentOrder No. 8 (Rules and Regulations for Conducting the
Flag Ceremony in All EducationalInstitutions) dated July 21, 1955 of the Department of Education, Culture
and Sports (DECS)making the flag ceremony compulsory in all educational institutions. Jehovah's
Witnesses admitted that they taught their children not to salute the flag,sing the national anthem, and
recite the patriotic pledge for they believe that those are"acts of worship" or "religious devotion" which
they "cannot conscientiously give to anyoneor anything except God". They consider the flag as an image
or idol representing the State. They think the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute
and pledgetranscends constitutional limitations on the State's power and invades the sphere of
theintellect and spirit which the Constitution protect against official control..

Issue:
Whether or not school children who are members or a religious sect may be expelledfrom school for
disobedience of R.A. No. 1265 and Department Order No. 8

Held:
No. Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highestpriority and the amplest
protection among human rights, for it involves therelationship of man to his Creator
The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of religiousfreedom is the existence
of a grave and present danger of a character both grave andimminent, of a serious evil to public safety,
public morals, public health or any otherlegitimate public interest, that the State has a right (and duty) to
prevent." Absent such athreat to public safety, the expulsion of the petitioners from the schools is not
justified.(Teehankee) The petitioners further contend that while they do not take part in the
compulsoryflag ceremony, they do not engage in "external acts" or behavior that would offend
theircountrymen who believe in expressing their love of country through the observance of theflag
ceremony. They quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony to show theirrespect for the right of
those who choose to participate in the solemn proceedings. Sincethey do not engage in disruptive
behavior, there is no warrant for their expulsion.
Ebralinag vs. Division Superintendent of School of Cebu
GR 95770, 29 December 1995; En Banc Resolution, Kapunan [J]

FACTS:
Two special civil actions for certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition were filed and consolidated raising the
same issue whether school children who are members or a religious sect known as Jehovah’s Witnesses
may be expelled from school (both public and private), for refusing, on account of their religious beliefs,
to take part in the flag ceremony which includes playing (by a band) or singing the Philippine national
anthem, saluting the Philippine flag and reciting the patriotic pledge.
All of the petitioners in both (consolidated) cases were expelled from their classes by the public school
authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge
as required by Republic Act No. 1265 (An Act making flagceremony compulsory in all educational
institutions) of July 11, 1955 , and by Department Order No. 8 (Rules and Regulations for Conducting the
Flag Ceremony in All Educational Institutions)dated July 21, 1955 of the Department of Education, Culture
and Sports (DECS) making the flag ceremony compulsory in all educational institutions.
Petitioners are Jehovah’s Witnesses believing that by doing these is religious worship/devotion akin to
idolatry against their teachings. They contend that to compel transcends constitutional limits and invades
protection against official control and religious freedom. The respondents relied on the precedence of
Gerona et al v. Secretary of Education where the Court upheld the explulsions. Gerona doctrine provides
that we are a system of separation of the church and state and the flag is devoid of religious significance
and it doesn’t involve any religious ceremony. The children of Jehovah’s Witnesses cannot be exempted
from participation in the flag ceremony. They have no valid right to such exemption. Moreover, exemption
to the requirement will disrupt school discipline and demoralize the rest of the school population which
by far constitutes the great majority. The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution does
not and cannot mean exemption from or non-compliance with reasonable and non-discriminatory laws,
rules and regulations promulgated by competent authority.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the expulsion of petitioners violated their freedom of religion?

HELD:
YES. The Court held that the expulsion of the petitioners from the school was not justified.
Religious freedom is a fundamental right of highest priority and the amplest protection among human
rights, for it involves the relationship of man to his Creator. The right to religious profession and worship
has a two-fold aspect, vis., freedom to believe and freedom to act on one’s belief. The first is absolute as
long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The second is subject to regulation where the
belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare. The only limitation to religious freedom
is the existence of grave and present danger to public safety, morals, health and interests where State has
right to prevent.
Petitioners stress that while they do not take part in the compulsory flag ceremony, they do not engage
in “external acts” or behavior that would offend their countrymen who believe in expressing their love of
country through the observance of the flag ceremony. They quietly stand at attention during the flag
ceremony to show their respect for the right of those who choose to participate in the solemn
proceedings. Since they do not engage in disruptive behavior, there is no warrant for their expulsion.
Cruz vs DENR, G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000
Isagani Cruz v. Dept. of Energy and Natural Resources,G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000

FACTS:
Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the validity of the RA 8371 or the Indigenous People’s Rights Act
on the ground that the law amount toan unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the
public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine
embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. The IPRA law basically enumerates the rights of the
indigenous peoples over ancestral domains which may include natural resources. Cruz et al content that,
by providing for an all-encompassing definition of “ancestral domains”and “ancestral lands” which might
even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of said law violate the rights of
privatelandowners.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the IPRA law is unconstitutional.

HELD:
The SC deliberated upon the matter. After deliberation they voted and reached a 7-7 vote. They
deliberated again and the same resulttranspired. Since there was no majority vote, Cruz’s petition was
dismissed and the IPRA law was sustained. Hence, ancestral domains may includenatural resources –
somehow against the regalian doctrine

Isagani Cruz vs Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources

Civil Law – Land Titles and Deeds – IPRA Law vis a vis Regalian Doctrine

Facts:
Former Justice Isagani Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the validity of the Republic Act No. 8371 or
the Indigenous People’s Rights Act (IPRA Law) on the ground that the law amount to an unlawful
deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural
resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution. The IPRA law basically enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over ancestral
domains which may include natural resources.
In addition, Cruz et al contend that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of “ancestral domains”
and “ancestral lands” which might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and
3(b) of said law also violate the rights of private landowners.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the IPRA law is unconstitutional.

HELD:
The Supreme Court deliberated upon the matter. After deliberation they voted and reached a 7-7 vote.
They deliberated again and the same result transpired. Since there was no majority vote, Cruz’s petition
was dismissed and the constitutionality of the IPRA law was sustained. Hence, ancestral domains may
include public domain – somehow against the regalian doctrine.
People v. Genosa, GR No. 135981

Applications of the provisions of Art. 11(1) and Art. 14 of the Revised Penal Code

Facts:
Marivic Genosa, the appellant, on November 15, 1995, attacked and wounded his husband which
ultimately led to his death. According to the appellant, she did not provoke her husband when she got
home that night and it was her husband who began the provocation. The appellant said she was frightened
that her husband would hurt her and she wanted to make sure she would deliver her baby safely.
The appellant testified that during her marriage she had tried to leave her husband at least five times, but
that Ben would always follow her and they would reconcile. The appellant said that the reason why Ben
was violent and abusive towards her that night was because he was crazy about his recent girlfriend, Lulu
Rubillos. The appellant, after being interviewed by specialist, has been shown to be suffering from
Battered Woman Syndrome. The appellant with a plea of self-defense admitted the killing of her husband.
She was found guilty of the crime of parricide, with the aggravating circumstance of treachery, for the
husband was attacked while asleep.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not appellant acted in self-defense.
(2) Whether or not treachery attended the killing.

Held:
(1) For the first issue, the SC held that the defense failed to establish all the elements of self-defense
arising from battered woman syndrome, to wit: (a) Each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be
proven to have characterized at least two battering episodes between the appellant and her intimated
partner; (b) The final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have produced in
the battered person’s mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief
that she needed to use force in order to save her life, and; (c) At the time of the killing, the batterer must
have posed probable – not necessarily immediate and actual – grave harm to the accused based on the
history of violence perpetuated by the former against the latter.

(2) For the second issue, the SC ruled out treachery as an aggravating circumstance because the quarrel
or argument that preceded the killing must have forewarned the victim of the assailant’s aggression.
White Light Corp., vs City of Manila
Police Power – Not Validly Exercised – Infringement of Private Rights

Facts:
On 3 Dec 1992, then Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7774 entitled “An Ordinance” prohibiting short time
admission in hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of
Manila. White Light Corp is an operator of mini hotels and motels who sought to have the Ordinance be
nullified as the said Ordinance infringes on the private rights of their patrons. The RTC ruled in favor of
WLC. It ruled that the Ordinance strikes at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed by the
Constitution. The City maintains that the ordinance is valid as it is a valid exercise of police power. Under
the LGC, the City is empowered to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes,
restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar
establishments, including tourist guides and transports. The CA ruled in favor of the City.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Ord 7774 is valid.

HELD:
The SC ruled that the said ordinance is null and void as it indeed infringes upon individual liberty. It also
violates the due process clause which serves as a guaranty for protection against arbitrary regulation or
seizure. The said ordinance invades private rights. Note that not all who goes into motels and hotels for
wash up rate are really there for obscene purposes only. Some are tourists who needed rest or to “wash
up” or to freshen up. Hence, the infidelity sought to be avoided by the said ordinance is more or less
subjected only to a limited group of people. The SC reiterates that individual rights may be adversely
affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or
public welfare.

WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION v. CITY OF MANILA, represented by DE CASTRO, MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM

FACTS:
The City Mayor, Alfredo Lim signed into law Ordinance No. 7774 which is entitled, "An Ordinance
Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels,
Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila" on
December 3, 1992. Petitioners in this case filed a case before the RTC praying that the ordinance be
declared invalid and unconstitutional. RTC eventually rendered its decision declaring the said ordinance
null and void. It was then elevated to the Court of Appeals which reversed the decision of the RTC and
affirmed the constitutional of the ordinance.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the said Ordinance is null and Void

RULING:
Yes, though the goal of the ordinance According to the Supreme Court, is to eliminate and if not, minimize
the use of covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals by themselves
are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the State. However, the
desirability of these ends do not sanctify any all means for their achievement. Those means must align
with the Constitution, and our emerging sophisticated analysis of its guarantees to the people. The Bill of
Rights stands as a rebuke to the seductive theory of Macchiavelli, and, sometimes even, the political
majorities animated by his cynicism.
The Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of wash rate depriving patrons of a product and the petitioners
of lucrative business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the Ordinance as
police power measure. It must appear that the interest of the public, generally, as distinguished from
those of particular class, require an interference with private rights and that the means employed be
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private rights.
It must be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of the
private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between the purpose of the
measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the
public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be
arbitrarily invaded. Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as
an arbitrary intrusion into private rights.
ULPIANO P. SARMIENTO III AND JUANITO G. ARCILLA, petitioners,
vs.
SALVADOR MISON, in his capacity as COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, AND GUILLERMO
CARAGUE, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET, respondents, COMMISSION
ON APPOINTMENTS, intervenor.

FACTS:
In this petition for prohibition, the petitioners, who are taxpayers, lawyers, members of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and professors of Constitutional Law, seek to enjoin the respondent Salvador Mison
from performing the functions of the Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and the
respondent Guillermo Carague, as Secretary of the Department of Budget, from effecting disbursements
in payment of Mison’s salaries and emoluments, on the ground that Mison’s appointment as
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by
the Commission on Appointments. The respondents, on the other hand, maintain the constitutionality of
respondent Mison’s appointment without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.

ISSUE:
W/N all appointments made by the president require approval of the Commission on Appointments to be
valid?

HELD:
NO. Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the
heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the
armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested
in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments
are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The
Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the
courts, or in the heads of the departments, agencies, commissions or boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether
voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.
It is apparent, that there are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These four (4)
groups are:
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers
of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are
vested in him in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
The first group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments, the President appoints.
The second, third and fourth groups of officers are the present bone of contention. By following the
accepted rule in constitutional and statutory construction that an express enumeration of subjects
excludes others not enumerated, it would follow that only those appointments to positions expressly
stated in the first group require the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.
The position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those within the
first group of appointments where the consent of the Commission on Appointments is required. As a
matter of fact, as already pointed out, while the 1935 Constitution includes “heads of bureaus” among
those officers whose appointments need the consent of the Commission on Appointments, the 1987
Constitution on the other hand, deliberately excluded the position of “heads of bureaus” from
appointments that need the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.
Consequently, we rule that the President of the Philippines acted within her constitutional authority and
power in appointing respondent Salvador Mison, Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, without
submitting his nomination to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation. He is thus entitled to
exercise the full authority and functions of the office and to receive all the salaries and emoluments
pertaining thereto.

SARMIENTO III VS MISON AND CARAGUE

156 SCRA 549 G.R. No. 79974 December 17 1987 [Appointing Power]

FACTS:
Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and Carague as the Secretary of the
Department of Budget, without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. Sarmiento assailed
the appointments as unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by CoA.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appointment is valid.

RULING:
Yes. The President acted within her constitutional authority and power in appointing Salvador Mison,
without submitting his nomination to the CoA for confirmation. He is thus entitled to exercise the full
authority and functions of the office and to receive all the salaries and emoluments pertaining thereto.
Under Sec 16 Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, there are 4 groups of officers whom the President shall
appoint:
1st, appointment of executive departments and bureaus heads, ambassadors, other public ministers,
consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers with the
consent and confirmation of the CoA.
2nd, all other Government officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law;
3rd those whom the President may be authorized by the law to appoint;
4th, low-ranking officers whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
First group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments, the President appoints.
2nd, 3rd and 4th group of officers are the present bone of contention. By following the accepted rule in
constitutional and statutory construction that an express enumeration of subjects excludes others not
enumerated, it would follow that only those appointments to positions expressly stated in the first group
require the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.

It is evident that the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of
those within the first group of appointments where the consent of the Commission on Appointments is
required. The 1987 Constitution deliberately excluded the position of "heads of bureaus" from
appointments that need the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.