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Race and Recruitment in the Indian Army: 1880– 1918

Author(s): KAUSHIK ROY


Source: Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 47, No. 4 (JULY 2013), pp. 1310-1347
Published by: Cambridge University Press
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/24494199
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Modern Asian Studies 47,4 (2013) pp. 1310-1347. © Cambridge University Press 2013
doi:10.1017/S0026749X12000431 First published online 8 February 2013

Race and Recruitment in the Indian Army:


1880-1918*
KAUSHIK ROY

Peace Research Institute, Oslo, Norway


Email: kroymHhist@yahoo.com

Abstract

In 1914, the Indian Army was deployed against the enemies of the Britis
Empire. This paper analyses the administrative mechanism as well as the imperi
assumptions and attitudes which shaped the recruitment policy of the Indian
Army during the First World War. From the late nineteenth century, the Marti
Race theory (a bundle of contradictory ideas) shaped the recruitment policy. Wi
certain modifications, this theory remained operational to the first decade of th
twentieth century. The construction of the 'martial races' enabled the British
to play-off different communities against each other to prevent the emergenc
of a unified anti-British sentiment among the colonized. During the Great War
faced with the rising demands of manpower, the army was forced to modify
the Martial Race theory. However, a conscript army did not emerge in Britis
India. This was due to imperial policies, the inherent social divisions of Indian
society, and because the demands for military manpower remained relatively lo
in comparison to India's demographic resources. Due to innovations in the theor
and praxis of recruitment, the volume of recruitment showed a linear increa
from 1914 to 1918, with maximum intensification of recruitment occurring
during 1917 and 1918. But as the war ended in November 1918, despite th
entry of several new communities, the bulk of the Indian Army still came fro
the traditional martial races.

Introduction

The British-officered Indian Army (hereafter Indian Army), selecte


contingents of the princely states (known as the Imperial Service
Troops), and the British regiments stationed in India, constituted th

* My thanks to the three unknown referees, the editor, and Suhrita for thei
comments on earlier versions of this paper. I am grateful to Moumita and
Priyadarshini for providing some of the data mentioned in the sources.

131°

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RECRUITMENT IN THE INDIAN ARMY 1311

three components of the Army in India, which had three fun


a colonial police force geared to crush internal rebellions with
subcontinent; it was designed to check a Russian-sponsored A
invasion along the north-west frontier of the subcontinent; a
used as an imperial fire brigade force to quell disorders in the
Indian territories of the British Empire.1 In the twentieth ce
the Army in India acquired a new role. During the First Worl
it was called upon to conduct warfare against the European and
enemies of the British Empire and, as a result, underwent a m
expansion.
Of the three components of the Army in India, the Indian Army was
numerically the strongest. In peacetime, the Indian Army recruited
between 15,000 and 20,000 peasants annually, being a multi-ethnic
volunteer force. This paper analyses the administrative mechanism
as well as the imperial assumptions and attitudes which shaped
the recruitment policy of the Indian Army during the First World
War. The motivation of the groups selected for enlistment and the
impact of military service on them will be touched upon. The focus
remains on the recruitment of the combatants to the Indian Army.
As this paper will show, despite the massive pressures of wartime
demand and radical changes made to the mechanism of recruitment,
overall, the 'martial race' character of the Indian Army persisted up to
1918.

Imperial ideologies and recruitment policies

From the late nineteenth century, the Martial Race theory shaped
recruitment policy. With minor modifications this theory remained in
operation until the first decade of the twentieth century. However,
as this section will show, discourse on the Martial Race theory from
the late nineteenth century to the 1920s was full of contradictions.
This was partly because its chief advocates were military officers and
not trained anthropologists. Furthermore, the theory legitimized the
manpower demands of the army in relation to changing circumstances.
The Martial Race theory was premised on the fact that only selected
communities within the subcontinent, due to their biological and

1 Kaushik Roy, 'Recruiting for the Leviathan: Regimental Recruitment in the


British-Indian Army, 1859-1913', Calcutta Historical Journal, nos. 23-24 (Combined
Special Number) (2001-4), pp. 59-60.

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13X2 KAUSHIK ROY

cultural superiority, were capable of bearing arm


(Commander-in-Chief of India 1885—1893) portray
father figure of the Martial Race theory. Actually Ro
and publicized the various strands of ideas about t
which were already in vogue. On 30 June 1882, h
people living in west and south India lacked coura
an inferior physique.2 He believed that the fight
subcontinent were Sikhs, Gurkhas, Dogras, Rajpu
The wheat-eating small peasants (those peasant hou
owned an average 60 acres of land and 4 bullocks)
inhabiting the cold frontier regions were considered
claimed that the heat of India results in the degen
capabilities.4
Many military officers both in Britain and in In
the cold climatic mountainous regions generated b
is interesting to note that Lord Bacon (Francis Ba
his Essays notes: '.. .the Northern tract of the wor
more martial region.... The cold of the Northern p
the bodies hardiest and the courage warmest'.5 Fro
century onwards, the West European medical pract
to differentiate between healthy and unhealthy local
a climate which resembled that of Britain were consi
In the writings of Montesquieu, Buffon and others, i
by Hippocratic notions of environmental influence, c
to exert an important influence in physical character
munities. James Johnson challenged the Orientali
assertion that humanity spread from a single source.
race was distinct and the unique product of a particu
Overall, the medical men believed that an unhealthy
unhealthy or unwholesome races. Like Bacon, they
regions with a temperate climate produced tall

2 Brian Robson (ed.), Roberts in India: The Military Papers of Field


1876-1893 (Stroud: Sutton, 1993), p- 256.
5 Roberts to the Secretary of State, 12 September i8g7, R
1904, 11/36, Reel no. 2, Kitchener Papers, Microfilm (hencef
no. 2094, National Archives of India (hereafter NAI), New De
4 Field-Marshal Lord Roberts of Kandahar, Forty-One Years in
to Commander-in-Chief (1897, reprint, New Delhi: Asian Educa
P-532
3 Quoted from T. Miller Maguire, Outlines of Military Geography (Cambridg
University Press, 1900), p. 324.

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RECRUITMENT IN THE INDIAN ARMY !313

proportioned humans whereas malarial tropical regions w


and marshes, such as Bengal Terai and Arakan, produce
races.6 However, the military and intellectual circle's atti
India, with regard to the inter-linkages between climate
of the communities, was ambiguous. Some pointed out that
operation of other factors such as discipline, public spirit, o
good warriors were also found in the hotter regions.7
Hence the Kashmiris, despite hailing from a cold m
region, were regarded as unmartial. In contrast, one 'm
which British officials thought very highly of were the Ja
from eastern Punjab and Delhi-Agra region—which is n
nor mountainous. In addition, those Jat peasants who ha
Sikhism (the British considered it a martial religion) fr
Punjab were favoured. Major A. E. Barstow of the 2nd B
the 11th Sikh Regiment noted in 1928: 'The position
Sikh, however, is considerably higher than that of his Hind
This may be attributed partly to the fact that he is a sol
as an agriculturist, and partly to the freedom and bold
he has inherited from the traditions of the Khalsa'.8 T
belief of the British officers was that peasants make g
and most of the martial races (who happened to be of mi
were of peasant stocks. The British administrators believ
population of Punjab to be the paragon of virtue and
population as 'degenerate' villains. A modern historian w
the positive view of the rural population of Punjab was r
paternalistic ethos and psychology of British rulers. The Br
that the rural people of Punjab were loyal, courageous a
was somewhat shaped by the early Victorian 'muscular' Ch
Brigadier-General C. G. Bruce, writing in 1927, claimed t
the peasantry of Nepal belonged to the military clans.10

6 Mark Harrison, Public Health in British-India: Anglo-Indian Preventive


1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 38-46.
7 Maguire, Outlines of Military Geography, pp. 325-331.
8 A. E. Barstow, The Sikhs: An Ethnology (1928, reprint, Delh
Publications, 1993), pp. 153-154.
9 Ian Talbot, 'British Rule in the Punjab, 1849-1947: Charact
Consequences', Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. ig
pp. 204-206.
10 W. Brook Northey and C. J. Morris, The Gurkhas (1927, reprin
Cosmo Publications, 1987), Foreword, pp. xxvii.

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KAUSHIK ROY
W4

The Gurkhas from Nepal, Garhwalis from Simla


from the Indus border were the other favoured 'martial races' of the
Indian Army.11 Some of the advocates of the Martial Race doctrine
were somewhat influenced by the Aryan Invasion theory. They believed
that in ancient times, the tall slender, light skinned Aryans with
blue eyes from the cold northern regions of Eurasia invaded India
and defeated the dark and short uncultured Dravidians who were
then pushed back down to south India. The degenerate and the
defeated Dravidians, like the Tamils or Telugus, were looked down
upon by the spokesmen of the Martial Race theory. The traditional
warriors of India, the British assumption ran, were from the Kshatriyas
who made up the second caste of the chaturvarna system of the
Aryans. One of the 'martial races' of the British, the Rajputs, were
considered to be descendants of the Kshatriyas. During the Muslim
invasion of medieval India, several Rajput clans escaped to Nepa
and intermarried with local women. Their descendants, the British
officers believed, were the Gurkhas. Several Rajput communities
also defended themselves in the mountainous enclaves of Punjab
(modern Himachal Pradesh) and they were the Garhwalis. Many
Rajputs accepted Islam in medieval India and became Rangars
and intermarried with the Muslims and became Punjabi Muslims
(Muslims in west Punjab, especially in the Salt Range). Hence, these
two communities were also given the status of being martial races.
In the first half of the twentieth century, Lieutenant-General G. F
MacMunn (he at least is well informed about the different positions
taken by the scholars of the Aryan invasion of India during the lat
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries) and other spokesmen of the
Martial Race theory partly sidelined the climactic and geographical
determinism of Roberts, but nevertheless accepted the theory of the
Aryan invasion.12
The theory of the Aryan invasion can be traced back to William
Jones who, in 1786, introduced the concept of the Indo-European
language family. However, the 1840s witnessed the rise of comparative
anatomy. Racial essentialism based on biology became somewha
dominant by the 1850s. Comte Gobineau in his publication entitled
Essay on the Inequality of Races (1853-1855), claimed that the Aryan

11 Roy, 'Recruiting for the Leviathan', pp. 62-73.


12 Eden Vansittart, Gurkhas (1906, reprint, New Delhi: Asian Educational Services
1991), pp. 10-11; Captain A. H. Bingley, Handbook on Rajputs (t8gg, reprint, Delh
Low Price Publications, 1999), pp. 1-24.

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RECRUITMENT IN THE INDIAN ARMY 1315

race was the carrier of true civilization. And when Arya


diluted due to mixing it with other races then civilization d
Peter Van Der Veer writes that the nineteent h century wit
replacement of science based on language with the notion
based on biology. Friedrich Max Muller rejected philology bu
the Aryan Invasion theory and connected it with the biologi
of racial groupings in India. And there was much enthusiasm
British civil servants in India regarding the views of Max M
The British looked down upon the Eurasians as imbued
worst characteristics of both the European and Indian 'races'
the Eurasians were not recruited to the army except as
in the regiments. A sort of quasi-Martial Race theory a
recruitment in the Indian police. As in the army, Eurasians,
and untouchables were not recruited to the police for racial
reasons.15 The British equated criminality with the low
inferior races. Overall, indigenous recruitment of the col
was a break with the pre-colonial past as the pre-colonia
recruited mostly the hill tribes like Bhils and low caste
chaukidars and watchmen of the highways. Except for a
the British relied on the 'martial races' to fill up the po
For instance, the military police in Burma and Assam com
high castes of north India, Sikhs, Punjabi Muslims and the G

13 Peter Van Der Veer, Imperial Encounters: Religion and Modernity in Ind
(2001, reprint, Delhi: Permanent Black, 2006), pp. 135-142. For a sum
Aryan Invasion debate see Thomas R. Trautmann (ed.), The Aryan Debat
Oxford University Press, 2005).
14 Gregory Martin, 'The Influence of Racial Attitudes on British Po
India during the First World War', Journal of Imperial and Commonwe
Vol. 14, No. 2 (1986), p. 98.
15 Sir Percival Griffiths, To Guard my People: The History of the Indian P
Ernest Benn Limited, 1971), is an account of the organizational evolu
structure of the police in colonial India by an ex-imperialist. There
modern monograph on the Indian police. David Arnold's article entitled
Recruitment and Subordination in Colonial India: The Madras Consta
1947', in Ranajit Guha (ed.), Subaltern Studies, vol. 4, Writings on South
and Society (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 1-25, and his mo
Power and Colonial Rule: Madras, iSjy-igjy (Delhi: Oxford University
both focus on the Madras Police. However, there are some scattered dat
in other parts of India.
16 From official secretary, to the chief commissioner, British Bur
Department, to Quarter Master General in India, 26 February 1
Proceedings of the Government of India, Burma 1885-6, Serial No.
NAI.

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1316 KAUSHIK ROY
And the village police in Punjab and nort
'martial races' like the Pathans and Punja
The core concept of the Martial Race theor
different things for different people in
created further incoherence and heterog
Race theory. In Enlightenment as well as in
thinking, race meant a geographically boun
a common genealogical descent. At the s
race is hierarchical. Different races of pe
levels in the ladder of progress. Towards
century, the term race for some denoted
of observable characteristics. Traits such
shape of the nose, which were believed to b
became markers of different races. And th
to scientific measurement and empirical
despite the dominance of the biological v
also noted the importance of culture and ph
the physique and mentality of the martial
The Martial Race theory was partly the
quest by the British civilian and militar
in ethnology which meant the study of
ethnography, or study of social customs.19
and early twentieth centuries, the Gover
a series of anthropometric projects. Th
nature and geared to generate informat
imperialists' assumed, the colonial administ
individuals were physically measured and
Anthropometric projects slotted the individ
according to the colonial calculations of the
Colonel L. W. Shakespear (who was awa
regarding comparative anatomy that were g

17 Memorandum on the Different Systems adopted on


Employment of Local Levies, Intelligence Branch, Q
in India (Simla: Government Central Press, 1888),
India Office Records (hereafter IOR), British Librar
18 Heather Streets, Martial Races: The Military, Race
Culture, 185J-1914 (Manchester: Manchester Univ
19 Mary Des Chene, 'Military Ethnology in Brit
Vol. 19, No. 2 (1999), pp. 121-122.
20 Clare Anderson, Legible Bodies: Race, Criminali
(Oxford/New York: Berg, 2004), p. 57.

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RECRUITMENT IN THE INDIAN ARMY 1317

intellectuals) commanding officer of the 2nd Gurkha Rifles i


noted:

The genuine Goorkha is recognized by his high cheek bones, broad


features, small elongated eyes, and the absence of whisker or moustach
the exception of a few straggling hairs on the upper lip.... As a race, th
considerably below the average height of the natives of Hindustan
chested and bull-necked, with the muscles of the thigh and leg so
developed as in some instances to appear unnatural.21

Edmund Candler writing in 1919 about the two tribes who consti
the Gurkha 'race' noted: 'The Magars and Gurungs are the
Tartar like, short, with faces flat as scones'.22
Besides the military officials, the civilian intellectuals of th
also conducted an ethnographic survey, in fact, their survey
Indian Army during the hunt for martial races was part of the l
process of an intellectual programme of the Raj's civilian intellec
For instance, the Director of Ethnography for India, H. H. R
(1851-1911) in his, The People of India, emphasized the existen
different castes and races in the subcontinent.23 W. Brook North
Major C.J. Morris published a book on the Gurkhas in 1927. W
discussing the practicability of recruiting Gurkhas from eastern
they depended on Risley's Tribes and Castes of Bengal published i
For understanding the languages of the people of Nepal, North
Morris also drew on the expertise of Captain R. L. Turner w
the 1920s, was Professor of Sanskrit at the University of Lon
Lieutenant-Colonel J. M. Wikeley when writing the Handbook
Punjabi Muslims in 1915 depended on the Census Reports of
1901 and 1911 and also on the Gazetteers of the Punjab and
West Frontier Provinces.25
The process of categorization and classification was part of
larger Enlightenment endeavour. The objective was to observ
study the world outside Europe in order to understand it. 'An ur
count and classify the various things the British encountered', w
Thomas R. Metcalf, 'characterized much of [the] Victorian intellec

21 Colonel L. W. Shakespear, History of the 2nd King Edward's Own Goorkha Rif
Sirmoor Rifles) (Aldershot: Gale and Polden, 1912), p. 29.
22 Edmund Candler, The Sepoy (London: John Murray, 1919), p. 22.
23 Thomas R. Metcalf, The New Cambridge History of India, III: 4, Ideologies of
(1998, reprint, New Delhi: Foundation Books, 2005), p. 119.
24 Northey and Morris, Gurkhas, pp. viii, 272.
25 J. M. Wikeley, Punjabi Musalmans (1915, reprint, New Delhi: Manohar
List of Authorities Consulted.

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1318 KAUSHIK ROY
programme'. The categories used by the Br
India's society were caste, community and trib
after the 1857 Mutiny, in order to rule Ind
social structure, the British attempted a sci
India's myriad peoples.26
In the pre-1857 era, the British relied on c
to recruit selected communities to the arm
Mutiny of the Bengal Army resulted in the r
of categorizing diverse communities of In
race.27 During the nineteenth century, th
held two contradictory views about caste.
(which included William Crooke and Denzil
of Census Operations in Punjab), caste was
merely reflected the occupational categori
contrast, for the other camp (which include
Wise, Civil Surgeon of Dacca), caste ind
hierarchy. And the racial types were revealed
analysis (naso-malar index and craniometr
size of the cranium). The relationship be
and racial hierarchy was put forward by p
pursued by the phrenological societies fro
of phrenology which attempted to link cultur
was pursued by a number of central Europ
early nineteenth century and then was acc
like George Combe.28 In i8gi, Risely wrote
was associated with a certain physical typ
with a markedly different type. Risely
endogamous nature of the caste, one could
within the Indian populace. The restrictio
anthropometry scientific.29
The wider intellectual climate influenced the British civilian and
military elite. Darwinism influenced the pseudo-scientific theory, that
acquired characteristics were inherited and a hierarchy of human

26 Metcalf, Ideologies of the Raj, pp. 113-114, 116.


27 David Omissi, '"Martial Races": Ethnicity and Security in Colonial India, 1858
1939', War & Society, Vol. 9, No. 1 (iggi), pp. 6-7.
28 Crispin Bates, 'Race, Caste, and Tribe in Central India: The Early Origins of
Indian Anthropometry', in Peter Robb (ed.), The Concept of Race in South Asia (Delhi:
Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 224.
29 Anderson, Legible Bodies, pp. 60-61, 183-186.

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RECRUITMENT IN THE INDIAN ARMY !3!9

races could be constructed reflecting superior and inferior


Susan Bayly rightly comments that the civilian scholar-adm
who provided much of the intellectual backup data as r
Martial Race theory were very much concerned with a w
speculative scholarship in which the biological and mora
race were perceived as universal human endowments.31
century Victorians believed in a hierarchy of races and also
characteristics could be passed on genetically from one g
another. They believed that warrior instincts were char
some blood types.33
Martiality for the British was mostly an attribute of r
it passed down through the blood lines. In addition, th
that social milieu and physical geography also shaped t
characteristics of the races.34 In March 1874, Lieutena
R. Sale Hill of the 1st Gurkha Light Infantry empha
the Gurkha's acquaintance with the forest, makes him
a Pioneer in a jungle, almost unrivalled; where with
to suit himself with, he is quite at home'.35 There w
tension amongst Victorian British intellectuals, bure
military officers about the nature (heredity) versus nurtur
habitat) debate. They believed that occasionally bad behaviou
reinforced bad heredity. Since environment influences h
character of the communities could be improved by al
physical and cultural environment.16 To give an exa
Gurungs who moved out of their original habitat in centra
settled in eastern Nepal were considered non-martial by
The British officers concluded that the migrant Gurungs h
martial capabilities due to intermarriages with local wom
Nepal. Furthermore, the Gurungs' habit (especially dietar

30 Peter Robb, 'South Asia and the Concept of Race', in Robb (ed.), T
Race in South Asia, pp. 3—4.
31 Susan Bayly, 'Caste and "Race" in the Colonial Ethnography of I
(ed.), The Concept oj Race in South Asia, pp. 167-168.
32 Lionel Caplan, '"Bravest of the Brave": Representations of "Th
British Military Writings', Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 25, No. 3 (1991),
33 Streets, Martial Races, p. 8.
34 Chene, 'Military Ethnology', pp. 132-133.
33 The Gurkhas, Note by Lieut-Col. R. Sale Hill, with Addenda by C.
of Chief Commands, 1865-76, Notes and Minutes by Lord Napier
MSS.EUR.F.i 14, IOR, BL.
36 Veer, Imperial Encounters, pp. 150-153.

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1320 KAUSHIK ROY

also degenerated due to the customs of east Nepal


Gurungs from central Nepal were recruited to the arm
Gavin Rand asserts that the Martial Race theory
of imperial power and governance.38 In a similar vein
Lionel Caplan by focusing on the imperial discourse
asserts that although the Gurkha martial capabili
in a romantic manner, the issue of power was very
'childlike Gurkhas' were portrayed as subordinate
British officers.39 The British discourse on the Gurk
latter as having both elements of the gentlemanly
the British officers as well as being perpetually j
a strong controlling hand.40 Candler, who wrote
soldiers of India one year after the end of the First W
about the Gurkhas: 'The relations between officers and men are as
close as between boys and masters on a jaunt together out of school
and the Gurkha no more thinks of taking advantage of this when he
returns to school. It is part of his jolly, boyish, uncalculating nature'.41
The animal imagery also comes out in Candler's writing about the
relationship between the British officer and the Gurkhas: '.. .once
accepted, he is served with a fidelity and devotion that are human and
dog-like at the same time'.42 The same could be applied with regard
to British discourse on other martial races. Barstow, in his Handbook
on the Sikhs published in 1928, noted:

The typical Jat Sikh is faithful and true to his employer, seldom shows
insubordination, and with a good deal of self-esteem has a higher standard
of honour than is common amongst most Orientals.... He requires a strong
hand, and punishment, when it is meted out, should not err on the side of
leniency, but should savour rather of the principle of full weight, if seldom
as opposed to that of lightly and often; this latter method approximates too
closely to pin pricks thus causing a feeling of discontent in his mind.43

37 Lionel Caplan, 'Martial Gurkhas: The Persistence of a British Military Discourse


on "Race"', in Robb (ed.), The Concept of Race in South Asia, pp. 267-268.
38 Gavin Rand, '"Martial Races" and "Imperial Subjects": Violence and Governance
in Colonial India, 1857-1914', European Review ofHistory, Vol. 13,No. 1 (2006), p. 8.
39 Caplan, "'Bravest of the Brave'", p. 573.
4(1 Lionel Caplan, Warrior Gentleman: 'Gurkhas' in the Western Imagination (Oxford:
Berghahn Books, 1995), p. 25.
41 Candler, Sepoy, p. 8.
42 Ibid., p. 9.
4,1 Barstow, Sikhs, p. 153.

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RECRUITMENT IN THE INDIAN ARMY 1321

The colonial discourse emphasized India's ethnic diversit


to assert the point that India was not a nation. The argum
Martial Race theory's spokesmen was that had it not bee
presence of the British, then the martial races would hav
up the non-martial races. Major G. F. MacMunn in his, T
Races of India published in 1933, noted: '.. .it is these virile
have dominated India in the past, and as the Simon Report h
would do so again if British control were removed'.44
DeWitt C. Ellinwood and Cynthia H. Enloe following th
sociological approach both assert that the ethnic imbalances
characterized the social composition of the Sepoy Army. Furthermore,
ethnic imbalances in the army were the deliberate product of the
policies of the imperial elite. Enloe claims:

By making military vocations an integral part of a group's sense of


its own ethnicity, the central state elites hopes not only to make the
military recruiter's task easier, but to wed ethnicity to state allegiance. The
consequence for the group targeted to be a "martial race" is often an increased
sense of ethnic cohesion bought at the price of growing vulnerability to state
manipulation.45

Enloe coins the term 'Gurkha Syndrome' to refer to state-fostering of


ethnicity.46 To an extent, Enloe's statement holds water. For instance,
in the nineteenth century, the British fostered war cry of the Gurkhas
became 'Maro Sangin Gorkhali ki jaV,47 Following Eric Hobsbawm, it
could be argued that the British constructed martial traditions for the
designated martial races.48
The perfect martial race is the one which produces loyal, disciplined
and brave soldiers. The regimental history of the 2nd Gurkha Rifles
published in 1912 noted: 'They are a tractable folk, and very amenable

44 G. F. MacMunn The Martial Races of India (London: Sampson, Low, Marston &
Co. Ltd., 1933), p. v.
45 Cynthia H. Enloe, Ethnic Soldiers: State Security in Divided Societies (Middlesex:
Penguin, 1980), p. 25.
46 Enloe, Ethnic Soldiers, p. 26.
47 Shakespear, Sirmoor Rifles, p. 23. My translation is 'Kill the enemies; victory goes
to the Gurkhas'.
48 Eric Hobsbawm, 'Introduction: Inventing Traditions', in Hobsbawm and Terence
Ranger (eds), The Invention of Tradition (1983, reprint, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1995), pp. 1-6. For details of how the British constructed martial
traditions of the Rajputs, Gurkhas and Sikhs, see Kaushik Roy, Brown Warriors of the
Raj: Recruitment and the Mechanics of Command in the Sepoy Army, 1859-1913 (New Delhi:
Manohar, 2008), pp. 190-222.

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1322 KAUSHIK ROY

to discipline'.49 It noted General Hugh Gough


Chief of British-India during the Anglo-Sikh Wa
the Gurkha soldiers: 'Soldiers of small stature, but i
they vied in ardent courage with the grenadiers of
armed with the short weapon of their country, wer
Heather Streets says that the martial race s
fictitious and consciously constructed by the imper
political ends.51 Enloe writes that generally a ma
geographically distinct territory at the periphery o
imperial elite used them against the dissident low
Enloe claims that the recruitment policies of the im
colonies were generally ethnically restrictive becaus
guided by the fact of political reliability and martia
different communities inhabit ing the colonies. '3 K
Retting note that every imperial power feared the m
it ruled. For example, Burmans, Javanese, Malay
might display disloyalty if inducted to the colonial
colonial power constructed 'knowledge' about its p
'martial' qualities of these groups designed in such a
imperial control over the colonies. Basically, the
was a technique of'divide and rule' policy that gener
to rule over plural societies.34 The British were
Burmans were recruited in large numbers then they
best way to establish British control over central
mainly on troops of Indian origins and marginal com
from the hilly frontier regions of Burma.55 Hence,
the colonial army in Burma, ethnic minorities lik
and Kachins were enlisted.1'3 Sarah Womack claim
in the light of the Martial Race theory of British-In

49 Shakespear, SirmoorRifles, p. 2q.


50 Ibid., p. 37.
51 Streets,Martial'Races, p. 10.
Enlot, Ethnic Soldiers, p. 26.
53 Cynthia H. Enloe, 'Ethnicity in the Evolution of Asia's Armed Bureaucracies',
in DeWitt C. Ellinwood and Enloe (eds), Ethnicity and the Military in Asia (London:
Transaction Books, 1981), pp. 4-5.
04 Karl Hack and Tobias Rettig, 'Imperial Systems of Power, Colonial Forces and
the makings of Modern Southeast Asia', in Hack and Rettig (eds), Colonial Armies in
Southeast Asia (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 11-12.
55 Robert H. Taylor, 'Colonial Forces in British Burma: A National Army
Postponed', in Hack and Rettig (eds), Colonial Armies in Southeast Asia, p. 198.
56 Enloe, Ethnic Soldiers, p. 134.

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RECRUITMENT IN THE INDIAN ARMY *323

Garde indigene in Cambodia during the 188os. The guiding pr


constructing the force was to use recruits from different eth
to balance each other. Historical enmities between central Viet
namese and Khmers and between northern Vietnamese and the Laos
were not only exploited but widened and solidified in order to maximize
imperial control and prevent any unity among the subject populace.57
The Martial Race theory, for Streets, was not merely an instrument
of colonial control. Rather, it also operated in the metropole—in the
British Army in Britain. For instance, the Scottish Highlanders were
regarded as a martial race just like the Sikhs and the Gurkhas. In fact,
Candler emphasized that the Gurkhas had the nerve of a Highlander.
Hugh Trevor-Roper would have agreed with Streets. Trevor-Roper
shows that the British constructed the tradition of martial Highland
Scottish soldiers from the 1740s.58 Streets continues that the military
elite used the Martial Race theory to manage global imperial politics.
The British media popularized the racial and gendered constructs of
savage martiality of certain communities in the guise of the Martial
Race theory. In Streets' language, the Martial Race stereotype rep
resented the idealized version of masculinity.59 In George Hamilton's
(Secretary of State of India) suggestions to Viceroy Elgin penned in
1897, the most disloyal and unmartial elements within India were
the 'babus, pleaders and the students'.60 The Deccani and Maratha
Brahmins, due to their education, were considered seditious.61 Hence,
the implication was that they should not be recruited. The educated
urban middle class Indians were considered as effeminate. These
communities from the beginning of the twentieth century challenged
the Raj by initiating mass demonstrations and party politics.
Ellinwood says that British belief in racial distinctions between
various communities amalgamated with India's social distinctions
along the lines of castes, religion, and occupation, and that the en

37 Sarah Womack, 'Ethnicity and Martial Races: The Garde indigene of Cambod
in the 1880s and 1890s', in Hack and Rettig (eds), Colonial Armies in Southeast Asia
pp. 107, 110-111.
58 Hugh Trevor-Roper, 'The Invention of Tradition: The Highland Tradition of
Scotland', in Hobsbawm and Ranger (eds), The Invention of Tradition, pp. 25-27; Streets,
Martial Races, p. 1; Candler, Sepoy, p. 18.
59 Streets, Martial Races, pp. 2, 12.
1,0 George Hamilton to Elgin, 16 September 1897, no. 139, Reel no. 2, Hamilton
Papers, Accession no. 1572, M/F, NAI.
61 Hamilton to Elgin, 16 November 1898, no. 228, Hamilton to Curzon, 5 January
igoo, C126/2, Reel no. 1, Hamilton Papers.

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*324 KAUSH1K ROY

product was the Martial Race theory.62 Similarly


(unlike Enloe) asserts that the Martial Race theor
an 'Orientalist' invention by British officers for strat
and hegemonic control but was also the product of in
indigenous social differentiation of Kshatriya identity
martial race categorization was mostly a deliberate
for implementing the policy of divide and rule. Da
that the issue was not merely on who the British
on those groups who were eager to serve in the B
Army. So, those communities with inherent warri
the Indian Army. Hence, the Martial Race theory
figment of British imagination.64 For instance, th
that the best Gurkhas came from central Nepal,
from central Nepal (Magars and Gurungs) joined
of Ranjit Singh. Since they went to Lahore for enli
known as lahures. Even during the second decade
century, the men from central Nepal who came to
regiments were still known as la.horias,65
The Army in India's racial classification process d
the civilian and military ethnographers of the British
the colonized. The Indians played an important role
of the Martial Race theory. The Brahmin informa
provided information to their British masters wh
the ethnographic project.66 Several times the Brit
designate a community as martial but the refusal o
to serve in the army resulted in the failure of the B
One example is that the British considered the Co
race of south India. However, in 1904 the disband
Coorg Rifles occurred due to lack of recruits.67
The Martial Race theory contained many elemen
imagined by the British officials who thought that s

62 DeWitt C. Ellinwood, 'Ethnicity in a Colonial Asian Army:


and the Indian Army, 1914-18', in Ellinwood and Enloe (eds), Eth
in Asia, pp. gi-g2.
63 Philip Constable, 'The Marginalization of a Dalit M
Nineteenth- and Early Twentieth-Century Western India', Jou
Vol. 60, No. 2 (2001), p. 443.
64 Omissi '"Martial Races": Ethnicity and Security in Coloni
65 Caplan, Warrior Gentleman, p. 33; Northey and Morris, Gurk
66 Metcalf, Ideologies of the Raj, p. 113.
1,7 John Gaylor, Sons of John Company: The Indian and Pakistan
reprint, New Delhi: Lancer, 1993), p. 9.

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RECRUITMENT IN THE INDIAN ARMY 13^5

and classification would aid them in army recruitment and


The construction of the 'martial races' enabled the Brit
off different communities against each other and prev
emergence of a unified anti-British sentiment amongst the
The Government of India set up an army commission in
Its president was Field-Marshal Lord Nicholson and its three
were Lieutenant-General Percy Lake, Lieutenant-Genera
Scallon and an Indian Civil Service officer named William
This commission tabled the Minority Report which noted
was not much 'racial' difference between the Jats and th
However, these two communities should always be or
different regiments in order to prevent them from conspiri
against the Raj.68
Lieutenant-Colonel J. M. Wikeley who served in the 17
and then worked as a recruiting officer for the Punjabi Mus
in the Handbook on that particular 'martial race' publish

The term Punjabi Musalman roughly describes those Muhamm


and tribes which are to be found in that portion of the Punja
West Frontier Province which lies between the Indus and Sutl
the south of the main Himalayan Range. The recruiting area f
includes the Hazara District, portions ofjammu and Poonch.. .a
tracts of the Rawalpindi District. The term does not denote et
classification; it is more a form of military nomenclature or
recruiting requirements. Punjabi Musalmans maybe classed under f
heads: (i) Rajputs (ii) Jats (iii) Gujars (iv) Foreign tribes who c
none of the first three groups.69

Wikeley continued that in the Punjabi Musalman recruiting


are many types of the race, distinguished from one another
moral and physical characteristics. He favoured those R
inhabited Punjab and accepted Islam in the medieval era a
Punjabi Muslims. He noted that although most of the Rajput
India were Aryans, many who inhabited west Punjab had
from the Central Asian mounted nomads (he categorized
Huns and the Scythians) who had invaded India during the a
early medieval eras. These Central Asian nomadic warrior
India and fought against the Buddhists. As a reward, they w
Rajput status by the grateful Brahmins. Amongst these Rajp

68 Proceedings of the Army in India Committee, 1912 (Simla: Government Ce


Press, 1913), vol. l-A, Minority Report, pp. 1, 157.
1,9 Wikeley, Punjabi Musalmans, p. 1.

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1326 KAUSHIK ROY
who failed to follow the social customs prop
Jats. Later these Rajputs andjats accepted I
Muslims.'0 Again, the Dogras recruited fro
hills ofjammu and Kashmir were actually R
mountainous regions of the above mentioned
Similarly, Brigadier-General C. G. Bruce n
foreword of Brook Northey and Morris' 19
the Gurkhas that, the term Gorkha/Goork
construction of the British. The term origi
state in the Kathmandu Valley. The ruler of t
eighteenth century unified Nepal. The subj
were an amalgam of Mongolian hill tribes, Ne
and other menial clans were called Gorkhali
Gorakh Nath. The British used the term Gurkhas to refer to the
conglomeration of military races found mostly in central Nepal and
parts of west and east Nepal.7" During the mid-nineteenth century
the British obtained recruits from Kumaun and Garhwalis and they
were also categorized as Gurkhas.73 Thus, the term Gurkha was never
a homogeneous category. Linguistic and cultural boundaries divided
the men from Nepal who joined the British-Indian Army.74
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, it is easy to criticize
the Martial Race theory as an Orientalist construction when the
anthropologists themselves are abandoning the idea of discrete races
And the archaeologists and historians have abandoned the Aryan
Invasion theory. To sum up, it would be too mechanistic to argue that
the Martial Race theory was a fictitious construction of indigenous
society. The Martial Race theory was a blend of both reality and
imagination. Caste system, Kshatriya tradition of pre-Islamic India
and Mughal recruitment tradition resulted in the monopolization o
military service by certain communities. Most of the acharya s of ancien
India argued that warfare is the dharma of the Kshatriyas. In early
medieval India, warfare was almost monopolized by the Kshatriya
(Tfttf/jHrs/Rajputs). And the Mughals believed that the Turanis from
the cold mountainous regions of Central Asia were the best warrior
This was part of a wider Islamic belief which also operated in case o

70 Ibid., pp. 2-3.


71 Gaylor, Sons oj,John Company, p. 188.
72 Northey and Morris, Gurkhas, Foreword, pp. xv-xvi.
73 Shakespear, SirmoorRifle, pp. 67, 73.
74 Caplan, Warrior Gentleman, p. 52.

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RECRUITMENT IN THE INDIAN ARMY 1327

the other medieval Islamic regimes. Within India, the Mugha


recruited Rajputs from Rajputana and the Marathas unde
of war during the mid seventeenth century. The Tamils
and Bengalis rarely featured in the Mughal combatant br
British elaborated, rigidified and systematized these trends
certain elements drawn from the West European intellectual
on race and heredity. The Martial Race theory was partly fu
and partly ideological in nature. Segmented Indian socie
West European intellectual trends strengthened the Bri
and rule' policy. This enabled the British to construct a m
army of long service volunteers drawn from different co
But, the Raj ran into problem when the Indian Army h
multi-million mass armies in the Age of Total War. Then, th
Race theory was partly modified. The Martial Race theo
frozen in time but evolved gradually. For instance, with risi
manpower demands, between the late nineteenth and early
centuries, the cultural and climactic elements were sidelined
of racial-biological elements. Race became the stream in w
other variables such as climate and custom had to swim.
Ellinwood writes that from the 1890s, the Indian Army followed
an ethnic recruitment policy. In accordance with this policy only the
'martial races' were recruited and they were organized on an ethnic
basis. During the start of the First World War, the Indian Army stuck
to the pre-1914 ethnic 'martial race' recruitment policy. But, due
to extensive recruitment during the course of the War, new groups
were recruited from rural and urban areas.76 And the most recent
work on the martial races by Streets also does not focus on the actual
mechanics of recruitment during the Great War. The complexities
involved in the process and the continuities as well as discontinuities
between pre 1914 and post 1914 recruitment policies are highlighted
in the following sections.

7o Stephen Peter Rosen, Societies and Military Power: India and Its Armies (New Delhi:
Oxford University Press, 1996); Kaushik Roy, Hinduism and the Ethics of Warfare in South
Asia: From Antiquity to the Present (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2012).
'6 Ellinwood, 'Ethnicity in a Colonial Asian Army: British Policy, War, and the
Indian Army, 1914-18', in Ellinwood and Enloe (eds), Ethnicity and the Military in Asia,
p. 89.

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1328 KAUSHIK ROY
Recruitment to the Indian Army bef

In 1913, there were 128,854 sepoys and 25,0


Service Troops numbered about 22,479 men
in India amounted to 75,000 personnel, and
India had 239,561 soldiers.78 The Indian so
pension after the completion of 21 years'
in the reserves until they had completed 25
those soldiers who had served for 32 years
the reserves as they were considered to be too
(silladari) cavalry, most of the men served fo
to receive the maximum pension after dis
Each Gurkha battalion had a reserve of about 100 men and the
military officers calculated that they could supply the unit for at l
6 months in peacetime. In 1913, when the Adjutant-General M
General F.J. Aylmer tried to increase the number of reserves in
Gurkha regiments, the Nepal durbar (court) opposed the scheme.
Government of India deliberately kept the number of reservist
the other 'martial' communities small. In 1913, the Indian Arm
comprised only 34,767 reservists. Th& Minority Report in 1913 argu
that a small peace establishment of the Indian Army with a la
reserve might prove to be dangerous for British rule in India.
short service scheme, modelled on West European armies, was
considered politically dangerous.79 The Raj was nervous that a l
number of free-floating indigenous people, after acquiring mili
skills, might be ready-material in the hands of political agitator
the other hand, large scale attritional warfare required the pres
of a large number of reserves. So a contradiction developed bet
the political imperatives of the Raj and the military capability of t
Indian Army.

77 S. I). Pradhan, 'Indian Army and the First World War', in DeWitt C. Ellinw
and S. D. Pradhan (eds), India and World War I (New Delhi: Manohar, 1978), p
53; The Army in India and its Evolution including an Account of the Establishment of the
Air Force in India (1924, reprint, New Delhi: Anmol Publications, 1985), p. 156.
78 India's Contribution to the Great War (Calcutta: Superintendent of Govern
Printing, 1923), p. 79.
79 Statistical Abstract of Information regarding the Armies at Home and Abr
1914-20, p. 785, L/MIL/i 7/5/2382, IOR, BL\ Minority Report, pp. 120-121, 123
130, 215; Proceedings of the Army in India Committee, 1912 (Simla: Government Ce
Branch Press, 1913), vol. 3, Minutes of Evidence, p. 538.

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RECRUITMENT IN THE INDIAN ARMY *32g

The advent of the 'martial races' at the expense of the


and west Indians which had started with Roberts continued under
Lord Kitchener (Commander-in-Chief of India, 1902—igog) and
his successor General O'Moore Creagh (igog-1914).80 Following
Roberts, Kitchener believed that the unmartial Madrassi soldiers
(Tamils, Telugus and Deccani Muslims) should be replaced by the
martial Gurkhas and Sikhs.81 Roberts, then considered an authority
on the Indian Army, whilst posted outside India, supported Kitchener's
policy of replacing the 'inferior Madrassis with fighting races'.82
Besides the senior military officers, British politicians also accepted
the Martial Race theory. In 1 goo, Hamilton informed Viceroy Curzon
that the fighting power of the Marathas had degenerated.83 In igi3,
W. Meyer, a civil bureaucrat, warned that the recruiting ground of the
Indian Army being very narrow posed a political danger. Lieutenant
General William Birdwood responded: 'True. The Maratha once best
soldiers of India had lost the respect and Pax Britannica had reduced
the fighting material of peninsular India. Some Rajputs of Rajputana
are available for enlistment'.84 The Minority Report noted that Deccan
and Bengal were inhabited by 'unwarlike races', whereas Punjab was
full of 'warlike races'. The favoured recruiting regions within India
were Punjab, Nepal and the North-West Frontier Province.85 Table 1
shows the effect of the Martial Race theory on the social composition
of the Indian Army. The so called non-martial races comprised less
than 17 per cent of the Indian Army.

Administrative reorganization and expansion of the Indian


Army during the First World War

Roberts asserted that the martial races loved fighting and the
excitement of war.86 Ellinwood argues that the sepoys and sowars
joined the Indian Army to acquire social prestige and to make

80 Kitchener to Brodrick, 3 December 1901, Y/5, Brodrick to Kitchener, 9 June


1904, Y/51, Reel no. 1, Kitchener Papers.
81 Kitchener to Brodrick, 25 April 1904, Y/166, Reel no. 2, Kitchener Papers.
82 Roberts to Kitchener, i4july 1904, EI 27/2, Reel no. 2, Kitchener Papers.
83 Hamilton to Curzon, 15 August 1900, Reel no. 1, Hamilton Papers.
84 Army Committee, vol. 3, p. 552.
85 Minority Report, p. 18.
8b Robson (ed.), Roberts in India, p. 266.

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133° KAUSHIK ROY
Table i
Social composition of the Indian Army in 1912

Communities Number Percentage


Sikhs 32,702 20.5
Punjabi Muslims 25.299 16
Gurkhas 18,100 11.5
Pathans 12,202 7-7
Rajputs 12,051 7.6
Dogras and Garhwalis 10,42 1 6.7
Other Hindus* 10,252 6.5
Jats 9,670 6
Hindustani Muslims 9>°54 5-7
Other Muslims** 8,717 5-5
Marathas 5.685 3
Brahmins 2,636 i-7
Christians 1.491 •75
Burmese, Assamese, and Karens 306 .24
Jews 18 .01

Total 158,604 99-4

* Ahirs, Gujars, Mers, Mians, Bhils, Pariahs and Tamils.


** Muslims recruited from the cities of north India for the
artillery branch.
Source: Proceedings of the Army in India Committee, 1912 (Simla:
Government Central Branch Press, 1913), vol. l-A, Minority
Report, p. 156.

monetary gains.87 At least two members of the Army Committee of


1912 (Meyer and Adjutant-General Aylmer) accepted that the sepoys
and the sowars were basically mercenaries.88 Even those military
officers who were the most ardent proponents of the Martial Race
theory accepted the importance of tangible incentives in attracting
recruits to the military ranks. In 1927, C. G. Bruce noted: As a
Gurkha, living in India, once said to me, "The whole question is
this.. .the rupee will always win".... There was a distinct analogy
between the Switzerland of the Middle Ages and Nepal. The Swiss
were poor and made fine soldiers.... The Nepalese are the same.
Actually, large scale migration from central Nepal began from the
mid nineteenth century due to land shortages resulting from a rise in
the population. The hill dwellers also left their homes to avoid high

87 DeWitt C. Ellinwood, 'The Indian Soldier, the Indian Army, and Change, 1914
18', in Ellinwood and Pradhan (eds), India and World War I, pp. 202-207.
88 Army Committee, vol. 3, p. 652.
89 Northey and Morris, Gurkhas, Foreword, pp. xxvii, xxix.

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RECRUITMENT IN THE INDIAN ARMY !331

taxation, forced labour service, and loss of land to the h


Also, the high caste officers of the Nepali Army liked to rec
from their own castes rather than from the Tibeto-Burm
who flocked to British-India.90 Philip Mason, a 'liberal' b
who served in the Government of India's military departmen
the Second World War, noted in his account of the Indian Ar
prior to 1919 most of the 'martial races' had been recruited f
backward politically insulated regions. The recruits joine
service for izzat (honour), abstract loyalty to the King-Em
for the pay.91
Initially, there was much enthusiasm for recruitment as th
were under the impression that they were enlisted for a shor
expedition. Furthermore, in late 1914, the rise in the pric
and sugar also pushed the sons of small peasantry towards
service.92 To an extent, the manpower flow into the arm
partly shaped by non-material factors. A wave of enthusiastic
writes Algernon Rumbold, spread through the ranks of
Indians and this surprised the authorities. This feeling w
on an acceptance of the Tightness of Britain's decision to
defence of Belgium with the hazy idea that a German vict
harm India. The prospect that Indian soldiers would fight
British, generated a sense of pride amongst certain sectio
Indians and they believed that India's contribution in the d
the British Empire would be rewarded by the sahibs later.93
However, the manpower flow somewhat subsided with time.
Probably, the news of'horrendous' carnage on the Western Front due
to capital-intensive attritional warfare which filtered back to India,
was responsible for the flagging enthusiasm of potential recruits.94
Generally, Indians joined the army for material gain and upward social
mobility. They were accustomed to fighting 'limited wars/small wars'
along the north-west frontier. In such campaigns, casualties were few.
However, from late 19x4 onwards, the Indian Army was engaged in

90 Caplan, Warrior Gentleman, pp. 32-34.


91 Philip Mason, A Matter of Honour: An Account of the Indian Army, its Officers and Men
(1974, reprint, Dehra Dun: EBD Publishers, 1988), pp. 405-453.
92 Tan Tai Yong, The Garrison State: The Military, Government and Society in Colonial
Punjab, 1849-1947 (New Delhi: Sage, 2005), p. 102.
93 Sir Algernon Rumbold, Watershed in India: 11)14-22 (London: Athlone Press,
University of London, 1979), p. 20.
94 Indian Voices of the Great War, Soldiers' Letters, 11)14-18, Selected and Introduced
by David Omissi (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999), pp. 27-28.

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1332 KAUSHIK ROY

Total War. In Flanders field, casualties mounted am


and their morale dipped when they encountered t
and heavy artillery of the Germans in the trench lines
inadequate clothing and lack of adequate modern
the transformation of warfare and the increasing let
filtered back to the home front in India and resu
enthusiasm amongst potential recruits.95
In order to stimulate recruitment, the military auth
several measures for remunerating the recruiters.
attempt was made to make the military service more
offering tangible incentives in order to attract volun
On 2 November 1914, a grant of Rs. 3 was initiat
personnel bringing a candidate who was selecte
branch. On 26 April 1915, promotion to the rank
initiated for a junior non-commissioned officer who
in x 14 recruits. Promotions to the slots of havildars a
initiated for those serving soldiers who were able t
each. The short service scheme in place of long term
service was introduced under the pressure of war.
the general rule was that men should be engaged
of war.96 The last measure was initiated to tap far
unwilling to serve in the army throughout life but
military service to tide over unfavourable seasons.
In August 1916, the quarter-master general w
serious shortage of transport personnel. With the
Government large bonuses were offered: Rs. 50 f
Rs. 75 for camel drivers. Due to these large bonu
Muslims, rather than join the combatant branch, j
drivers.9' This happened despite Wikeley's asserti
the Punjabi Muslims regarded employment in the
branches of the army as beneath their dignity.98
In January 1917, the War Office decided that th
units serving overseas should be raised to the size

95 Robert McLain, 'The Indian Corps on the Western Front


in Geoffrey Jensen and Andrew Wiest (eds), War in the Age of T
of Modern Armed Conflict (New York and London: New York U
pp. 167-193.
96 Recruiting in India before and during the War of 1914-18, p. ig,
L/MIL/17/5/2152, IOR, BL.
97 Recruiting in India, pp. 19-20, 22, 73.
98 Wikeley, Punjabi Musalmans, p. 3.

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RECRUITMENT IN THE INDIAN ARMY !333

establishment. This measure involved the recruitment of an additional


36,754 men. It was suggested that by the spring of 1918, India should
be able to deploy another 100,000 soldiers. On 22 January 1917,
the scheme of issuing free rations was started for all the recruits
and serving soldiers. In May 1917, the new demands necessitated
recruitment of 23,000 combatants per month for the next 8 months.
In May 1917, it was decided that 20,000 gunners and drivers were
required for service in Egypt alone. In response, a bonus of Rs.
50 was given to all recruits. In 1917, in an attempt to raise the
volume of recruitment, the following concessions were offered to the
recruiters: (i) any interference in the domestic affairs of the soldiers
whilst absent on overseas service became a cognizable offence; (ii)
immediate allotment of a part of the land earmarked for military
service; (iii) removal of the ban placed on the enlistment of returned
emigrants. From 22 October 1917 onwards, free clothing was issued
QO
to new recruits.

On 1 January 1918, a consolidated allowance of Rs. 2 pe


was given to meet the cost of rail fares and a subsistence
In April 1918, to stimulate recruitment, the following measu
taken: (i) to extend the age limit of the combatant recruit
to 30; (ii) to reduce the height standard for the infantry rec
5 feet 6 inches to 5 feet 2 inches; (iii) to recommend a d
for good service to Indians. On 13 August 1918, it was dec
the recruits on completing the training course would be
gratuity of Rs. 15 and a bonus of Rs. 10. If they were cer
by the medical officer, they also received another Rs. 40 b
were sent overseas. Furthermore, on completion of 6 months
a war bonus at the following rates was issued: resaldar/sub
60; resaidar, jemadar = Rs. 30; non-commissioned officer
and sowars = Rs. 20 each.'00 When war broke out, in order
the peasantry to join the army, the Lieutenant-Governor
Michael O'Dwyer placed at the disposal of the army 180,
of canal irrigated land for allotment to the Viceroy's Com
Officers and men who had served with distinction in the
About 15,000 acres of irrigated canal lands were granted

99 Recruiting in India, pp. 22, 73.


100 Ibid., pp. 25, 73, 87.
101 Michael O'Dwyer, India as I Knew it: 1885-1925 (1926, reprint, D
Publications, 2004), p. 216.

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1334 KAUSHIK ROY

who aided in recruitment.102 Overal


to the welfare policies pursued by th
military manpower. From a micro p
Gurgaon District is taken. Between
pension exceeded the land revenue (a
about Rs. 75,ooo.103
In addition, the Government of India
machinery. Centralization was cons
1916, recruitment in all branches wa
Prior to that date, recruiting par
regiments themselves to enlist recr
the linked units was stationed in th
to train the reservists and collect
recruiting officers.104 Some examples
enlisted Jats from Hoshiarpur and t
ofjalandhar in Punjab; the 20th Infan
and the Brahmins of the Simla Hill Sta
Brahmins who were zamindars from
Poonch State; the 12th and 48th Pion
Punjab; and the 1st Battalion of 1
Muslims, Kaimkhanis and Khanazad
Rajput Muslims were those Rajputs
the medieval era—one such group be
and eastern Punjab ,106
Early in 1917, it was found that the sy
was ill-suited to the increasing demand
war. Under the class recruiting system
for each 'martial class/race'. For inst
officer for the Punjabi Muslims and a
the Sikhs. This system made the army
of new classes difficult. Furthermore,
same area causing overlapping. It wa
the class system and conduct recrui

102 Nirad C. Chaudhuri, 'The Martial Race


Vol. XLIX, No. 289 (1931), p. 69.
103 Rajit K. Mazumder, The Indian Army
Permanent Black, 2003), p. 25.
104 Minority Report, 137
105 Recruiting in India, pp. 133, 144-145.
106 G. F. MacMunn, The Armies of India
Publishers, iggi),p. i6g.

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RECRUITMENT IN THE INDIAN ARMY *335
Table 2
Recruitment by the Class Recruiting Officers from August 1914 up to the
introduction of the Territorial Recruiting Scheme in December ic/i 7

Race Number

Gurkhas 51>536
Jats and Hindustani Muslims 26,008
Punjabi Muslims 23,470
Rajputana and Central India Hind
Sikhs 22,724
Hindustani Hindus 14,494
Madrasi Muslims, Hindus and Christians* 12,858
Marathas and Deccani Muslims 11,881
Pathans 11,139
Burmans 10,870
Dogras 6,249
Garhwalis 3338
Total 217,850
Notes: 'Communities considered non-martial but recruited
under the pressure of war.
Source: Recruiting in India before and during the War of
1914-1918, p. 64, L/MIL/i7/5/2152, India Office Records,
British Library, London.

territorial recruiting scheme came into existence in December 1917


Under the new system, a recruiting officer was made responsible for
recruitment of all the groups in a particular region correspondin
to a civil division. This streamlined cooperation with the civilian
authorities. Each recruiting division was divided into circles. Each
circle was in charge of an assistant recruiting officer and in each distric
which was considered to possess martial race(s), one or more distric
assistant recruiting officers were posted. These officers were civilians
who were nominated by local government. They constituted a direc
link between the local civil government and the military recruitment
staff. This system was first introduced in Punjab and then extende
to the other provinces but not introduced in Assam and Baluchistan
which were considered to be regions inhabited by non-martial races.107
The fact that the territorial recruiting scheme was more advantageous
than recruitment by the class recruiting officers is clear, if we compar
Table 2 and Table 3.
Tan Tai-Yong notes that the demands of military manpower
mobilization resulted in greater cooperation between the civilian

107 Recruiting in India, p. ig.

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1336 KAUSHIK ROY

Table 3
Recruitment by the Divisional Recruiting
Officers under the Territorial Recruitment
Scheme up to 30 November igi8

Divisional Recruiting
Officers at Various
Places Total

Delhi 58,078
Jalandhar 45'5°°
Bareilly 40,922
Rawalpindi 40,314
Lucknow 37.197
Bangalore 30,656
Pune 29*363
Lahore 27473
Ajmir 27.299
Faizabad 14.837
Peshawar 9.913
Bankipur 6.377
Calcutta 5.586
Secunderabad 3.599
Lansdowne 3.329
Jabalpur 2.925
Almora 2.574
Burma 1.293
Multan 1.238
Total 388,473

Source: Recruiting in India before and


during the War of 1914-1918, p. 64,
L/MIL/i 7/5/2152, India Office Records,
British Library, London.

infrastructure and the army, resulting in the genesis of a militarized


bureaucracy in Punjab.108 This observation is partially true for some o
the other provinces as well. On njune 1917, the Government of Ind
formed a central recruiting board which advised on recruitment an
served as a link between Army Headquarters and local government
Its president was the Finance Member Sir William Meyer. Tw
other members of the viceroy's council (the adjutant-general and
the secretary of the Army Department), two Indian princes and
Michael O'Dwyer, were the other members comprising the centr
recruiting board. The objective was to tap the untapped regions an

108 Tan Tai-Yong, 'An Imperial Home-Front: Punjab and the First World War
Journal of Military History, Vol. 64, No. 2 (2000), p. 4-Og.

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RECRUITMENT IN THE INDIAN ARMY 1337

to avoid competition with industrial requirements. In August 1917,


local governments were asked to form provincial recruiting boards.
By August 1917, every province had a provincial recruiting board run
by the divisional recruiting officers of that area. In Punjab and North
West Frontier Province, all the divisions were under the charge of army
officers who worked in close cooperation with the provincial recruiting
boards of which they were members. The lieutenant-governor was
the president of the provincial recruiting board in Punjab. In other
provinces, the civil administration took a more active role. In Bombay,
Central Provinces, Bihar and Orissa, the duties of the divisional
recruiting officers were performed by members of the Indian Civil
Service who held commissions in the Indian Army as reserve officers.
In the Central Provinces, the divisional recruiting officer was secretary
to the provincial war board. In the United Provinces, two out of
three divisional recruiting officers were members of the local civil
administration whereas the third was an army officer. Especially in
Punjab, the local gentry were inducted to the civilian bureaucracy
and, in return, they utilized clan and kinship networks to mobilize
recruits for the Raj. The civilian recruiters were able to induct larger
number of recruits during the later part of the war. For instance,
in August 1918, whilst the military officers acquired 6,216 recruits
from Punjab, the corresponding figure for recruitment by the civilian
recruiters was 10,622.109 During the course of the First World War,
1 o recruiting centres were opened in Nepal. Under the direction of the
Premier Chandra Shamsher, the Nepalese civil and military officials
liaised with village headmen in order to ensure smooth flow of Gurkha
recruits to the Indian Army.110
However, by early 1918, as military manpower demand increased,
the British officials realized that they could not extract more
manpower from the 'martial races' merely by voluntary enlistment and
by increasing the material attractions of military service. There was
some talk by a minority section amongst British officials for imposing
a limited military conscription in the 'martial' province of Punjab. One
such official was Michael O'Dwyer who, on 4 May 1918, delivered a
speech at the University Hall, Lahore, in which he asserted:

109 Recruiting in India, pp. 21-24, 26, 74; Tai-Yong, 'An Imperial Home-Front:
Punjab', pp. 398-401. According to Michael O'Dwyer the central recruiting board
was set up in May 1917. Michael O'Dwyer, India as I Knew It, p. 220.
110 Purushottam Banskota, The Gurkha Connection: A History of the Gurkha Recruitment
in the British Indian Army (New Delhi: Nirala, 1994), pp. 122-125.

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i338 KAUSHIK ROY

No one, of course, dreams of conscripting the whole of Indi


half million combatants required.... But, splendid as has
response of the Punjab hitherto, we must face the fact
been severe, that the burden has not been evenly distri
tribes and localities which have done their duty are no
against those who have not. The landowning classes feel th
the main burden of the war both in purse and in person
other classes who pay little or nothing in either form. Ine
as between classes is always a legitimate grievance.... I b
Punjab at any rate there is now a strong feeling in favo
conscription to raise the necessary quotas both within t
between the various provinces.. ..ln

For political reasons, the Government of India never


limited conscription not to speak of wholesale conscri
in Europe. Rather, the army and the Government of
section shows, pursued different schemes to tackle th
demand for military manpower.

Widening the paradigm of recruitment

Faced with the rising demands for manpower, th


India tried to include some of the tribes and clans which were hitherto
considered non-martial within the ambit of the martial races. This was
done especially in the regions from which traditional 'martial races'
were recruited. Two such regions were Nepal and Punjab. Nepal is a
narrow tract of country extending about 520 miles along the southern
slopes of the central portion of the Himalayas. Nepal is bound by
Tibet in the north, Sikkim in the east, by Bihar and the United
Provinces in the south and in the west by Kumaun and the Maha
Kali River. The total area of Nepal was 54,000 square miles, with a
total population of 5.5 millions.112 The total number of combatants
recruited from Nepal during the First World War numbered 58,904.113
British officials considered that tribes such as the Dotis who lived in the
western division of Nepal, were not martial.114 Before the outbreak of
the First World War, there were 10 Gurkha regiments, each with two

111 War Speeches of His Honour Sir Michael O'Dwyer, Lieutenant-Governor of Punjab
(Lahore: Superintendent of Government Printing, 1918), pp. 17-18.
113 Major C.J. Morris, The Gurkhas: An Ethnology (1936, reprint, New Delhi: Low
Price Publications, 1993), pp. 1, 5-6.
113 India's Contribution, p. 277.
114 Morris, Gurkhas, p. 3.

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RECRUITMENT IN THE INDIAN ARMY 1339

battalions. Of these 20 battalions, 16 were enlisted from centr


(14 consisting of Magars and Gurungs, two of Thakurs and
and four battalions were from eastern Nepal consisting of recr
the Limbus and Rais tribes.115 In 1913, Aylmer argued that to
the volume of Gurkha recruitment, Limbus and Rais who had
in Sikkim should be enlisted and that the military police shou
allowed to recruit from these particular communities in th
Furthermore, Aylmer asserted that during an emergency
number of recruits should be enlisted from eastern Nepal.1
the First World War, due to the demand for military m
besides the Magars, Gurungs, Chetris, Limbus and Rais, oth
from Nepal such as the Khas, Sunwars, and Lohars, were also r
in large numbers to the 10 Gurkha regiments.117
Punjab, being the recruiting ground for Sikh and th
Muslims, comprised 9.7 per cent of the total recruiting area o
India.118 In 1911, male Sikhs numbered 1,651,595.119 In 1
Jat Sikhs were recruited. At that time, Sikhs in the Indi
amounted 17,774 men. But, with the doubling in number
recruitments by the first decade of the twentieth century, a
Sikh were enlisted. Furthermore, one British officer warned t
were becoming 'swollen head' [big-headed or arrogant] and
number of Jat Sikhs should be reduced.120 To the contrary, h
with the outbreak of war, the number ofjat Sikhs in the army
Nevertheless, as Table 4 makes clear, the army took care t
more Punjabi Muslims than Sikhs.121 Before the First W
Punjab provided half the combatant personnel of the India
including 33,000 Sikhs.122 From 1 August 1914 to 30 Novem
Punjab provided 349,688 combatants, thus representing 42
of the combatants recruited during the whole war.123

110 Captain W.J. M. Spaight, 'The History of Gurkha Recruiting', Jour


United Service Institution of India, Vol. LXX, No. 2gg (1940), p. 186.
116 Army Committee, vol. 3, p. 640.
117 Spaight, 'Gurkha Recuiting', p. 187.
118 Kaushik Roy, 'The Construction of Martial Race Culture in Britis
its Legacies in Post-Colonial South Asia', in Kaushik Bandopadhyay (ed.), A
2008: Understanding Popular Culture (New Delhi: Manohar, 2010), p. 250.
119 Barstow, Sikhs, p. 93.
120 Minority Report, pp. 156-157.
121 P. D. Bonarjee, A Handbook of the Fighting Races of India (Calcutta: Thac
and^Co., 1899), p. 13.
122 Barstow, Sikhs, p. 5.
123 Recruiting in India, p. 26.

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134° KAUSHIK ROY

Table 4
Recruitment of the Martial Races during

Total No. Total No. Total No. Total No. Total No. Total No.
recruited recruited recruited recruited recruited recruited
1st Year and Year
3rd Year 4th Year from 1 Aug. from 1 Aug.
ending 31 ending 31 ending 31 ending 31 1918 to 30 1914 to 30
Races July 1915 July 1916 July 1917 JulyNov. 1918
1918 Nov. 1918

Punjabi is. 597 23,302 23.938 54. 460 19.229 136,526


Muslims
Sikhs 12,293 14.973 16,231 31.265 14,160 88,g22
Rajputs 6, 248 7, 676 9.313 25, 266 13,687 62,190
Gurkhas 10,430 17,418 1 2, O4O 13, 208 2,493 55.589
Jats 6,3°7 9.449 H,591 18, 018 9.874 55.239
Hindustani i.777 3.435 7.372 15, 826 7.943 36,353
Muslims
Pathans 5.712 5.958 4.647 8,412 3,128 27.857
Dogras 3.699 3.954 5.391 7.836 2,611 23.491
Garhwalis 1.139 1. 165 1.231 2, 761 871 7,167

Source: India's Contribution to the Great War (Calcutta: Superintendent of Government


Printing, 1923), p. 276.

About one million Pathans lived in west Punjab and another one
million in the region between Indus and Afghanistan. The tract
between Indus and Afghanistan was known as the North-West Frontier
Province. British officers believed that the Indus tribes such as
the Afridis, Waziris, and Swatis were hostile towards the British
Furthermore, the frontier tribes venerated theAmir of Afghanistan.1
Moreover, the declaration of jihad by the Ottoman Sultan on
November 1914 made the Government of India anxious about vas
expanding the recruitment of frontier Pathans, especially for fight
against the Turks in Mesopotamia.125 Since the frontier tribes w
considered of doubtful loyalty, a large increase in their recruitm
was not considered to be a safe option. Again, the Afridis, Khattaks
the Bangash were not willing to serve away from their homeland.12
In August 1917, faced with the rising demand for milita
manpower and the apparent exhaustion of traditional recruitin
regions, the provinces without any 'martial' traditions were orde
to recruit combatants. From July 1917 to March 1918, the number o

124 Minority Report, 32-33.


i2.i p yv. Perry, The Commonwealth Armies: Manpower and Organisation in two World W
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988), pp. 8g-go.
126 Army Committee, vol. 3, p. 536.

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RECRUITMENT IN THE INDIAN ARMY 1341

combatants recruited was 200,871 compared with 84,384 c


for corresponding periods in previous years. The German off
the end of March 1918 and the British Prime Minister Lloyd
message for more manpower from India, partly altered th
On 16 April 1918, it was decided to raise 500,000 combat
objective was to raise 41,700 combatants per month, but
was possible to raise only 30,000 combatants monthly. Fro
to November 1918, 526,918 combatants were recruited. O
1918, at the meeting of the Central Recruiting Board, th
general asserted that the minimum monthly quota was
this monthly quota, 29,964 men were needed to replace w
the rest for the raising and upkeep of new units. The adjutan
further ordered that no more could be asked of Punjab, N
Frontier Province, Nepal and Rajasthan and that the new
must be tapped.127 In mid 1918, it was decided to rai
combatants between June 1918 and May 1919. The quota
1918 was 41,000 combatants, but only 28,000 were enliste
the number of recruits raised betweenjune 1918 and Arm
on 11 November 1918 was only 211,000. This period witn
expansion of recruitment of new groups from the United Pr
From the beginning of the First World War to Janu
only 35,000 combatants came from the United Provinces.
recruitment in this province intensified after mid 1917.
latter half of 1917, 28,000 combatants were enrolled from th
Provinces, and in 1918, 56,000 combatants were recru
this province.130 As recruitment spread into the hithert
areas, communities who were previously considered non-m
also recruited. Despite Elgin's assertion that the Maratha
Brahmins and Bhumihars ('fallen Brahmins because they
agriculture'), were unmartial, some of them, as evident from
were also enlisted.

In response to the increasing demand for military manpower was


an increasing focus on recruitment from the princely states where
about 20 per cent of the subcontinent's population lived.1'1 In fact,

12/ Recruiting in India, pp. 23-26.


128 India's Services in the War, 2 vols (1922, reprint, Delhi: Low Price Publications,
x993)> vo1- i.P- 32
129 Recruiting in India, p. 25.
130 Budheswar Pati, India and the First World War (New Delhi: Atlantic Publishers
and Distributors, igg6), pp. 31-32.
131 Gaylor, Sons of John Company, p. 50.

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1342 KAUSHIK ROY

Table 5
Recruitment of new communities during t

Province Community
Madras Coorgis (853), Moplas (1,368), Nayars (3,598), Tiyyans
(1,638), Telugus (6,748), Tamils (16,390), Deccani Brahmins
Bombay Berads, Bhandaris, Chamars, Christians (5,905), Gujaratis,
Jamkhandis, Khandesh Bhils, Kolis, Lingayats, Mahars
(2,365), Sindis and Maratha Brahmins (12,038),
Bengal Bengalis (5,586)
Punjab and Delhi Baltis, Punjabi Brahmins, Hindu Aroras, Kambohs, Musalis
(927), Kashmiris (1,520), Arains, Bauria Sikhs, Bishnois
(446), Rors, Sainis, Brahmins (6,845), Christians (3,681)
Burma Arakanese, Burmans, Chins, Kachins, Karens and Shans
(12,163)
Central Provinces Lodhas, Dangis and Mahars (2,365)
Assam Jharuas (538), Manipuris, Sylheti Muslims
Bihar and Orissa Bhumihars (those Brahmins who practiced agriculture and were
considered as fallen), Brahmins and Ahirs (19,546),
United Provinces Lodhas, Nandbans, Pasis, Togars, Rajputs, Brahmins and
Muslims from Awadh, Bhumihars, Gwalahs (middle caste
whose profession was to sell milk of cows), Ahirs, Doms
(sweepers, an untouchable community), Kurmis, Kumaunis
(2,713)
North-West Bangash, Miranzais, Swatis of Hazara (2,218)
Frontier
Province

Source: Recruiting in India before and during the War of 1914-1918, pp. 65, 75,
L/MIL/l 7/5/2152, India Office Records, British Library, London; India's Contribution
to the Great War (Calcutta: Superintendent of Government Printing, 1923), p. 276.

recruitment was quite intense in selected princely states which were


supposed to be inhabited by the 'martial races'. Some examples
include: the Patiala State in Punjab comprising 5,951 square miles
which sent 35,000 recruits, or about 15 per cent of its population
who were eligible for military service; the princely state of Nabha
sent 5,600 persons constituting 16 per cent of its eligible population;
the princely state of Maler Kotla comprising 167 square miles with a
population of 71,144, sent 3,934 men representing 31.7 per cent of
those eligible for military service, and the Loharu State with an area
of 222 square miles and a population of 18,597 (3j°6o of whom were
of military age), sent 281 recruits.132 About 88,958 recruits were also
enlisted from other princely states outside Punjab, such as Mysore,

132 India's Services, vol. 2, pp. 227-229, 232, 236-237.

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RECRUITMENT IN THE INDIAN ARMY *343

Baroda, and Kashmir. In total, all the princely states, except Nepal,
provided 115,891 recruits.133
Stephen P. Cohen claims that high intensity warfare demanded
a greater quantum of military manpower which allowed the lower
castes to serve in the army—something generally denied them in
peacetime.134 This proved to be partly true during the First World
War, as the next few examples show. According to the 1911 Census
Report there were 40,000 Rors who claimed a Rajput origin and their
chief occupation was agriculture. They inhabited Rohtak, Delhi and
Karnal districts and thejhind State.135 They were never recruited to
the army before 1914. But due to the demands of war, some Rors,
as Table 5 shows, were inducted in to the army. The Mahars (an
untouchable group) from Maharashtra, who served in the pre-1857
Bombay Army, were denied entry by the Martial Race theorists from
the 1880s.136 As Table 5 and Table 6 show, they were recruited in
small numbers from the latter part of the First World War. Overall,
Table 6 shows that the induction of the low castes remained limited,
bearing in mind that there were 60 million people categorized as low
castes, including the 'untouchables'.137

Net Assessment

The spokesmen of the Martial Race theory believed, even afte


the First World War, that from India's 300 million, only around
25,000,000 were warlike. The warlike inhabitants were concentrated
in the cooler regions, where even amongst them, the martial quality
varied.138 On 21 July 1943, when the Raj was fighting another Tota
War, Lieutenant-General G. N. Molesworth noted: 'During the Great
War, by various methods amounting ultimately to desperation, w
managed [to] get about 850,000 good fighting men over 4 years. W
did not spread our net very much wider than the "martial classes",

133 India's Contribution, pp. 200, 277.


134 Stephen P. Cohen, 'The Untouchable Soldier: Caste, Politics, and the Indian
Army', Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 28, No. 3 (1969), p. 458.
135 Barstow, Sikhs, p. 78.
13,1 David Omissi, The Sepoy and the Raj: The Indian Army, 1860-1940 (Basingstoke:
Macmillan, 1994), p. 37.
137 MacMunn, Martial Races, p. 9.
138 General O'Moore Creagh, Indian Studies (London: Hutchinson & Co., n.d.),
P- 233

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1 344 KAUSHIK ROY
Table 6
Recruitment of Low Castes and Eurasians during the First World War

Total No.
recruited Grand
from the Total No. Total No. Total No. Total
beginning recruited recruited recruited Total No. from 1
of War in 1 Aug. 1 Aug. 1 Aug. recruited Aug.
i9x41° 1915 t0 1916 to 1917 to 1 Aug. to 191410
31 J"1 31 Ju' 3iJul 31 Jul 30 Nov. 30 Nov.
Castes 1915 1916 1917 1918 O) 00
1918
Mahars from 613 1, 160 592 2,365
Maharashtra
and Deccan
Jharuas '79 359 538
Mers and i>ii9 1,924 1.391 2,296 1,152 7,882
Minas from
Rajasthan
Paraiyans 601 633 1,085 2> 355 1,087 5,76i
Christians of 4OO 475 905 2,964 1,161 5,9°5
north India
Punjabi 169 858 679 1,978 557 4,241
Christians

Tiyans of 169 973 496 1,638


Punjab
Nayars 364 663 1,764 807 3,598
Bishnois 129 237 80 446
Musailis 737 191 928

Source: Recruiting in India before and during the War of 1914—1918, p. 65,
L/MIL/i7/5/2152, India Office Records, British Library, London.

but we drained those to the last drop'.139 The actual total number of
combatants provided by India during the First World War amounted
to 985,000 (including 757,747 privates/jawans), and of them, 579,252
were sent overseas.140 During the Great War, France raised 200,000
men from West Africa and 550,000 from its empire as a whole.
Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa provided the British
Empire with 1.2 million men. As is evident from Table 7, despite
the fact that the number of recruits raised from India was greater
compared with Britian's other colonies of limited demographic base,
the Military Participation Ratio in India remained quite low due to the

139 Recruitment in India, Appendix lg, LAVS/1/136, IOR, BL.


140 India's Services, vol. 1, pp. 23, 43; Total Contribution in Men and Casualties
suffered by India during the War, 21 November. 1918, CAB/24/70, TNA, Kew, UK.

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RECRUITMENT IN THE INDIAN ARMY 1 345

Table 7
Number of troops mobilized by the British Empire during the First World War

Number of troops mobilized between 4


Country August 1914 and 11 November 1918
British Isles 5,704,416
India *1,44°, 437
Canada 628,964
Australia 412,953
South Africa 136,070
New Zealand 128,525
Other Colonies Combined 134.837
Total 8,586,202

* This figure also includes 447,000 non-combatants.


Source: India's Services in the War, 2 vols (ig22, reprint, Delhi: Low Price
Publications, 1993), vol. 1, p. 43; Statistical Abstract of Information
regarding the Armies at Home and Abroad, 1914-1920, p. 764,
L/MIL/17/5/2382; Recruiting in India before and during the War of
1914-1918, p. 26, L/MIL/l7/5/2152, India Office Records, British
Library, London.

fact that its population was 300 million.1 On 11 November 1918, the
combat strength of the Indian Army numbered 573,484 men."' The
size of the army raised by India pales into insignificance compared
with the multi-million mass-armies raised by the European powers.
The largest number of soldiers was raised by Russia. The figure was 15
million men.143 The total strength of the American Army transported
to West Europe up to October 1918 was 2,040,000.144
Overall, Indian recruits came mostly from the rural sector, in the
main, peasants from Punjab, Nepal, United Provinces and some tribes
from the North-West Frontier Province. Most of the recruits were

illiterate and not politically aware.14'1 The Government of India wante


recruits from the agrarian context who lacked higher aspirations
Punjab and Uttar Pradesh provided 75 per cent of the combatant
recruits whilst the 'non-martial regions', however, remained

141 Nirad C. Chaudhuri, 'The Martial Races of India, Part II', Modern Review Vol.
XLVIII, No. 285 (1930), p. 295.
142 Army in India, p. 2 ig.
143 Hew Strachan, 'The First World War as a Global War', First World War Studies
Vol. 1, No. 1 (2010), p. 8.
144 Statistical Abstract, p. 715.
145 Ellinwood, 'The Indian Soldier, the Indian Army, and Change, 1914-1918', in
Ellinwood and Pradhan (eds), India and World War I, p. 177; Army Committee, vol. 3,
p. 548.

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i346 KAUSHIK ROY

under-represented For example, Punjab with a po


millions sent 349,000 recruits during the war, whe
population of 45 millions provided only 5,500 comb

Conclusion

Which community from a region will be recruited and in w


percentage, to a great extent, was shaped by imperial policies. Fr
the late nineteenth century, the Martial Race theory domina
recruitment to the Indian Army. The Martial Race theory was
a coherent body of ideas. There was much tension between differ
strands of thought. Nevertheless, a broad consensus existed amon
the doctrinaires of the theory. The Martial Race theory, which
suited to imperial control over the colonies, received a jolt when
colonies along with the metropolitan countries got sucked in to
Great War. During the War, the Indian Army's recruitment syst
witnessed innovations both in theory and in practice. In the theoret
sphere, many communities which had been classified as non-mar
pre-igi4were recruited. Not only was the Martial Race theory inflate
by including groups (clans and sub-clans) hitherto considered as
martial within the umbrella of martial races, but also the Governme
of India resorted to recruiting (albeit in limited numbers) the
martial communities. In practice, the class recruiting system g
way to the territorial recruiting system. Due to innovations in t
theory and practice of recruitment, the volume of recruitment sho
a linear increase from 1914 to 1918, with maximum intensificat
of recruitment occurring during the period 1917—1918. During
First World War, a conscripted army representing the society did n
emerge in British-India. This was due to imperial policies, the inhere
social divisions of Indian society, and also because the demands
military manpower remained relatively low when compared wi
India's demographic resources. If the war had lasted longer, Brit
India might have been forced to raise a multi-million mass-arm
Then probably all the distinctions as regards martial and non-ma
races would have been wiped out and the Indian Army might have b
transformed into a popular conscript force. Flowever, as the war en
in November 1918, despite the entry of several new communities, t

146 Lieutenant-Colonel Gautam Sharma, Nationalisation of the Indian Army: 18


1947 (New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1996), pp. 37, 105.

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RECRUITMENT IN THE INDIAN ARMY *347

bulk of the Indian Army (as shown in Table 4), still comprised the
traditional martial races. And once retrenchment had begun during
igig the Martial Race theory returned in a much more rigid form.
Just after the end of the First World War, the Government of India
felt it was imperative to maintain a small army for internal policing
and guarding the north-west frontier. The civilian-military elite of
British-India fell back to the time-tested policy of maintaining an army
comprised mostly of martial races. However, during the Second World
War as pressures for mass-army expansion increased, the Government
of India had again to experiment with recruiting the non-martial
classes, albeit on a larger scale. But, that is another story.

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