Historio Nature Meiji Restoration

Meiji Revolution
Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Asian History

Meiji Revolution
Hiroshi Mitani
Subject: Japan, Meiji Japan, 1868-1912 Online Publication Date: Apr 2017
DOI: 10.1093/acrefore/9780190277727.013.84
Summary and Keywords
The Meiji Revolution (1853–1890) transformed Japan from a double-headed federation

state with hereditary status system into a unitary monarchy that afforded greater rights
and freedoms to the Japanese people. After ending the revolution by the establishment of
constitutional monarchy, Japan promoted industrialization that would later energetically
support its imperial expansion during the first half of the 20th century.
Intellectuals during the late Edo period (1603–1868) became disillusioned with the
hereditary system of the Tokugawa regime. Because tradition prohibited them from
criticizing any upper authorities directly, the intellectuals capitalized on a threat from
outside to advocate for the necessity of political reforms, when Western envoys urged the
opening of Japan toward the West after more than 200 years of seclusion. The
intellectuals at first appealed to their lords to recreate military powers. Soon, they
directed their efforts towards the emperor in Kyoto, and began to criticize the Tokugawa
Shogunate openly. After ten years of political negotiations and small civil wars, they
finally chose imperial restoration to oust the Tokugawa and set out for a series of radical
reforms that would abolish local governments, dismantle samurai status, integrate
discriminated people with commoners, and introduce various social institutions from the
West.
Interesting characteristics distinguish the Meiji Revolution from other modern

revolutions. For one, it fully utilized the authority of monarchy. Second, it appealed to the
symbol “return to our ideal past” instead of the symbol “Progress.” Third, the death toll
was also quite low: about 30,000, in contrast to 2,000,000 in French Revolution. At first
glance, these characteristics would seem to set the Meiji Revolution apart from European
movements—nevertheless, the Meiji Revolution inaugurated the beginning of an
egalitarian and free society, and careful examination of the Meiji Revolution has the
potential to shed new light on hidden aspects of other modern revolutions across the
globe.
Keywords: Revolution, Daimyo, Ronin, Tokugawa, Shogunate, samurai, modern Japan, political development,
political sacrifice, hereditary status system, Westernization, constitutional monarchy
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Meiji Revolution
Overview and Terminology

The Meiji Restoration was one of the largest revolutions in the modern world. Japan
transformed itself from a double-headed federation-state with a hereditary status system
into a unitary nation-state under a constitutional monarchy that promoted social and
economic liberalism during the third quarter of the 19th century.
Traditionally, this fundamental change has been called the “Meiji Restoration” in
English.1 This comes from one of the translations of the Japanese term Meiji Ishin.2 Yet, it
is inappropriate. The term “restoration” stresses the return in 1868 of the emperor to a
position of political primacy in Japan and tends to conceal the following radical reforms,
including the dissolution of the samurai aristocracy and the beginning of the liberation of
the discriminated classes. In addition, the new government not only pursued economic
development but also introduced constitutional politics. The Meiji Ishin was completely
different from the royal restorations that took place in 19th-century France. Thus, it is
better to call the Meiji Ishin the “Meiji Revolution” in comparative perspective.3
Structural Changes: Japan in 1858 and 1877

In order to assume a bird’s-eye view of the Meiji Revolution, it is useful to compare the
state of Japanese polity and society in 1858 and 1877. The year 1858 was the starting
point of the collapse of the early modern regime, while the year 1877 saw the beginning
of a period of steady development following the end of armed rebellions against the new
Meiji state.
Changes in Polity: From a Double-Headed Federal State with a

Hereditary Status System to a Unified Nation State under a Single
Emperor.
In 1858, Japan had a very unique polity that consisted of two ruling heads who governed
around 260 integrated daimyo states.4 The basic units of governance were local states
headed by daimyo lords who controlled administration, taxation, and justice within their
domains. The largest daimyo was the Tokugawa Shogunate, which governed one-fourth of
Japan. Other daimyo had feudal relationships with the Shogunate, which monopolized
such supreme powers as command of the national military, diplomacy, the minting of
coins, and the authority to supervise the royal court in Kyoto. Around thirty daimyo were
large enough to finance their armies. Yet, they were excluded from national decision
making, regardless of their kinship with the Tokugawa Shogunate.5
Each top-level daimyo had about 1,000 to 2,000 registered samurai vassals. Among these
vassals, 2 percent became top administrators, and others assumed various offices
according to their hereditary status. Commoners who lived in rural areas and towns
shared the obligation to pay taxes and provide corvée labor. At the bottom of the social
ladder, there were peoples called Eta and Hinin segregated from others by birth. In spite
of the ubiquity of the hereditary status system, there were some people who moved
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Meiji Revolution
beyond status borders, such as Buddhist monks, physicians, surgeons, scholars, and the
blind. Such figures were visible by their lack of the ubiquitous topknot hairstyle that
characterized members of other social groups.
Early modern Japan had

another political head in
Kyoto: Tennō (emperor in
English, hereafter). From
ancient periods, the
emperor retained the right
to worship national deities
and to confer ranks to
court noblemen, the
Tokugawa, and other
samurai. In this aspect, the
emperor’s court held a
Figure 1. The Double-headed Federation State in higher status than the
Early Modern Japan. © Hiroshi Mitani. Shogunate. Yet, it had no
right to make country-wide
decisions and was compelled to obey laws set forth by the Shogunate. While people did
not question this double-headed monarchy during the early half of early modern period,
by the late 18th century, intellectuals began to promote and disseminate the idea that the
emperor in Kyoto was the true sovereign of Japan.6
In 1877, Japan became a single polity organized under the authority of the Meiji emperor.
The emperor directly legitimized governmental policy and law. Governmental officials
were sent to rule the former daimyo domains. Moreover, the Meiji government began to
create a nation through various means: the invitation of men of ability, including
commoners, to governmental offices; the establishment of a compulsory educational
system and a military conscription system; the abolishment of the hereditary status
system; and the announcement of the future adoption of a constitution. The Meiji
Revolution led to a highly centralized political system and brought about a semi-classless
government, at least in principle.
Changes in Society
One of the most remarkable changes during the Meiji Revolution was the abolition of the
samurai aristocracy.7 The Meiji government began its efforts to ease status discrimination
from the first stage of the Meiji Revolution. The Meiji emperor announced the integration
of court nobility and samurai in his very first decree and declared the invitation of any
person with ability irrespective of their hereditary status in its first constitution (Seitai) in
1868. Thus, non-samurai by birth accounted for 20 percent of governmental positions
before 1877.8 Next, the government dared to dissolve the traditional hereditary status
system. The samurai class, which amounted to around 6 percent of the Japanese
population, lost their income in exchange for small amounts of public bonds and were
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Meiji Revolution
forced to eke out a living for themselves. On the other hand, the Meiji government
incorporated traditionally discriminated groups into the status of commoners. Yet, there
was an exception to this official renunciation of status distinction. The government
created a new Peerage class, consisting of about 400 families of former court nobility and
daimyo lords. The royal family remained separate from the subjects.
Reform of the taxation system not only improved public finance but also changed social
ties among the people.9 The old system of rice-based agricultural taxes was transformed
into a new cash-based land tax, which was collected according to a uniform nationwide
standard. This change greatly eased the process of budget making for the Meiji
government. Yet, it is noteworthy that this reform changed the nature of people’s rights
and duties. Before, taxes were imposed on communities, villages, or towns. After the
reform, individuals became taxpayers who were officially recognized the right to own
property. The tax reform eased the transfer of land ownership. Yet, it also loosened
preexisting social ties within various groups of people. Peasants with heavy debts became
obliged to relinquish their land in order to pay taxes after villages ceased to subrogate
the tax.
The Meiji government also relaxed various regulations that had been previously imposed
on the people in regard to travel, habitation, occupation, and marriage. Such measures
were meant to increase social mobility in order to expand national power. Thus Meiji
leaders combined these measures with plans for enlightenment and industrialization.
They made great efforts to acquire Western knowledge, sending students abroad,
creating a compulsory education system, and forming state schools and state factories.
Such measures encouraged and supported peoples’ ambitions for an improved standard
of life. The Meiji state thus institutionalized its Westernization efforts.10
The Meiji Revolution introduced radical changes in polity and society and created a
nation with equal rights, at least as far as males were concerned. These changes mirrored
similar developments in the West during the same century. Yet, it is remarkable that
people never discussed the abolition of discrimination among people of various statuses
during the late Tokugawa period.11 In order to understand this unexpected outcome, we
should turn to the political process itself instead of searching for absent manifests for
radical reforms.
Political Changes during the Meiji Revolution:

1853–1890
The Meiji Revolution began in 1853 and ended in 1890. In 1853, U.S. envoy Commodore
Matthew C. Perry arrived in Japan and challenged Japan’s seclusion policy toward the
West. In 1890, the new government established in 1868 opened the National Diet and
became a constitutional monarchy. To fully comprehend the Meiji Revolution, it is better
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to analyze changes over a longer period than simply the era of political turmoil from 1858
to 1877.
Japan’s Opening toward the West and Its Technological Reforms

(1853–1858)
Perry’s arrival forced Japan to open its ports to Western vessels.12 After expelling the
Spanish and Portuguese from Japan in the early 17th century, the Tokugawa Shogunate
maintained very limited international relations with the neighboring states of Korea,
Ryukyu, and China, as well as the Netherlands in the West. At the end of the 18th century,
the Tokugawa government began to pursue a conscious seclusion policy after becoming
aware through Dutch sources of the reappearance of Western powers in East Asia.
Perry’s arrival confirmed the Tokugawa Shogunate’s worst fears about the Western
threat. Perceiving its military weakness, the Tokugawa government made a concession to
the American envoy to open a few select ports. It also began implementing reforms such
as the introduction of Western military technology and the encouragement of the study of
English, French, and German in addition to Dutch.13 On the other hand, this concession
also evoked a strong sense of humiliation and anger among samurai elites.
The Beginning of Political Disorder: The Emergence of Public

Opinion and Demand for Imperial Rule (1858–1863)
This latent disaffection exploded in 1858 when the government concluded its second
treaty with the United States to begin formal diplomatic relations and trade based on a
policy of gradual opening. In order to build a national consensus around this decision, the
Tokugawa government, for the first time in its history, asked the emperor in Kyoto to
approve the treaty. This move resulted in an opposite, fatal outcome when the Tokugawa
later signed the treaty despite the emperor’s refusal to approve it. This contempt of the
emperor stirred up public opinion against the Tokugawa’s deliberate decision, which was
denounced as unmanly treachery.
Criticism of Tokugawa foreign policy happened to be intertwined with another grave

issue: the selection of the Shogun’s heir. Some major lords like Echizen, Satsuma, and
others longed for an able leader to overcome the grave foreign crisis. Yet, the Shogunate
chose another candidate and punished these lords when they protested the decision. The
regents of the new, young Shogun purged all their opposition from positions of power,
which included not only protesting daimyo and their vassals but also Kyoto noblemen and
various intellectuals.14
These measures fomented further anger and discontent at the ruling Tokugawa order,
starting a fatal vicious cycle. Men of high purpose (Shishi) sought for any method of
resistance, with some of them finally assassinating the Shogun’s regent in 1860. After
this incident, lords, their vassals, and intellectuals began to express open defiance toward
the Tokugawa government and headed for Kyoto to engage in “national” politics.
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Meiji Revolution
In the midst of the crisis, there emerged two slogans of defiance: “revere the emperor,
expel the barbarians,” and “public discussion for Japan.” Major lords appealed to the
latter in order to justify their ambitions for national politics.15 The head of Satsuma
initiated his bid to mediate between the emperor and the Tokugawa regime by demanding
the Shogunate’s reform. After securing the emperor’s support, he succeeded in releasing
the court noblemen and major lords punished in 1858 and making two of the latter
become the top leaders of the Tokugawa government. Yet, another lord blocked the
completion of his ambitions. The lord of Chōshū decided to dedicate his domain to the
cause of “expelling the barbarians.”16 In 1863, the Tokugawa was forced to decree the
expulsion of the Westerners following the demands of the royal court, which in turn was
largely driven by the radical sentiment prevailing in Kyoto. Radicals in Chōshū, after
shelling Western ships at Shimonoseki Strait, proceeded to carry out a military campaign
against the Tokugawa. They planned to gather the lords in western Japan in the name of a
national war against the West that would be led by the emperor.
The Efforts to Rebuild Political Order: Toward Two Ways of Imperial

Rule and Armed Conflicts (1863–1868)
Yet, this move made the other major lords, court noblemen, and the emperor himself
anxious about the prospect of a civil war. The lord of Aizu in ally with Satsuma and other
daimyos launched a coup d’état to expel the radicals from the court and started planning
for the reconstruction of the political order. The anti-Tokugawa sentiment that had been
mounting since 1858 apparently seemed to have stopped.
At this critical point, the Tokugawa Shogunate made a fatal mistake.17 It did succeed in
reconciling with the emperor through mediation by Satsuma and its ally Echizen, one of
the influential daimyo within the Tokugawa family. Yet, it refused to bestow any rewards
on Satsuma or its allies. Tokugawa officials were obsessed by the dream to recover
Tokugawa hegemony before 1858, when the orders by Tokugawa cabinet consisted of
small daimyos were faithfully obeyed. They coldly rejected Satsuma’s demand to be a
member of the Tokugawa cabinet. Instead, they won the emperor’s favor by making a
false promise to close the largest port, Yokohama, and also succeeded in establishing a
liaison organization between the Shogunate and the imperial court in Kyoto.18 Yet, their
success left a strong sense of disappointment, dishonor, and anger among the Satsuma
samurai. Satsuma quit lending aid to the Tokugawa regime and began searching for any
way to realize the participation of major lords in national politics. Their conclusion was to
become allies with Chōshū, a former rival and hostile power against the Tokugawa.19 At
this point, Chōshū had already abandoned its expulsion policy and shifted its goal to
radical, domestic reform in the cause of restoring the emperor’s glory.20 The new political
order in 1864 was far from stable, with two large, energetic enemies outside the
Tokugawa regime’s control.
In 1864, Chōshū dialed in recovering Kyoto. The emperor became hostile enough to order
the Tokugawa to punish Chōshū. Facing the allied powers including Satsuma, Chōshū
offered an apology. Yet, it remained obstinate. Perceiving Chōshū’s apology inadequate,
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Meiji Revolution
the Tokugawa government tried to reorganize its forces to launch a punitive mission. Yet,
most major lords refused to join them, as the rumor spread that Satsuma openly criticized
the second campaign. There was a secret agreement between Satsuma and Chōshū that
the former would check Tokugawa forces in the case of war.21 Thus, the Tokugawa was
forced to attack Chōshū with a few allied lords among Tokugawa vassals and failed.22 The
victory of a single domain against the Shogunate, Chōshū, made all the parties concerned
expect that a new regime was necessary to recover peace and reunify Japan.
Under this situation, Tokugawa Yoshinobu became the head of Tokugawa. At first, he
sought for the introduction of an extended cabinet with some major daimyos to recover
their support. Yet, after emperor Komei refused this plan, he assumed the position of
Shogun and concentrated his efforts on the reform of Tokugawa organization by
promoting lower retainers to higher positions, re-creating his army in French style and
giving audiences to Western diplomats to demonstrate him as a sovereign.
Radical Reforms in Polity and Society by the Meiji Government

(1868–1877)
Amid the political dispute that had been ongoing since 1858, a consensus arose among
Japanese leaders that any new government should be established in the name of the
emperor. The death of the emperor Kōmei in 1867 paved the way. The shogun Tokugawa
Yoshinobu decided to yield the Tokugawa’s sovereignty to the royal court, expecting that
he would be the prime minister of a new cabinet under the new, young emperor, which
would consist of able daimyo and court noblemen.23 Yet, Satsuma and Chōshū provided
another plan to exclude Tokugawa from the coming government.24 By doing so, they
attempted to totally abolish the Tokugawa regime, a federation of states manned by a
hereditary aristocracy.
In early 1868, Satsuma and court nobility Iwakura Tomomi carried out a coup d’état of
imperial restoration. The new government declared the restoration of the emperor as the
only sovereign and the abolishment of old institutions within the royal court in addition to
the Tokugawa Shogunate.
In the coup d’état, Satsuma tried to divide the pro-Tokugawa major daimyos. In order to
make power transfer easier, Satsuma tried to isolate Aizu who had been clinging to
Tokugawa hegemony by forming an alliance with Echizen, Owari, and Tosa. Utilizing this
situation, Echizen and Owari succeeded in getting the new court’s decision to welcome
Tokugawa Yoshinobu, who had moved to Osaka with Aizu to avoid war, to the new
government in exchange for his approval to return Shogunate domain.
Yet, new government under Tokugawa Yoshinobu would never be realized. When
outraged Tokugawa banner men and Aizu attempted to recapture Kyoto by force, the
allied powers of Satsuma and Chōshū, which had entered Kyoto after the coup d’état,
defeated Tokugawa armies in a small battle near Kyoto. This victory urged Echizen,
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Meiji Revolution
Owari, and Tosa to fully support the Satsuma-Choshu leadership, and daimyos in western
Japan began to join the alliance one by one.
In this situation, the Meiji emperor promulgated the “Charter Oath.” This brief platform
consisted of five articles, in which the first article ordered that “various meetings should
be held to make all decisions through public discussion,” a statement developed from
various discourses circulating during the late Tokugawa era.25
Although the last Tokugawa shogun avoided opposing the new government, some
domains in northeastern Japan began a war of resistance in cooperation with a few
Tokugawa banner men. They fought hard against the allied powers of domains in western
and central Japan with Aizu at the center. Yet, the outcome was almost decided when Aizu
surrendered in November, leaving a small group still resisting at Hakodate in Ezo island
until June 1869.26
One month after the end of the civil war, the Meiji government ordered all daimyo to
present Tokugawa certificates that had endorsed the right to govern their domains to the
emperor. After collecting them, the Meiji government changed the lords into governors
appointed by the emperor while allowing them to rule their former domains. Then, two
years later, in 1871, the government finally changed the daimyo domains into imperial
prefectures and ordered the former lords to move to the capital Tokyo (formerly Edo).
Japan was transformed from a federation of some 260 domains into a fully integrated
political body directly controlled by Tokyo.27
This second coup evoked almost no salient resistance from former lords and their vassals.
Yet, as the Meiji government proceeded to abolish the hereditary status of the samurai, a
few rebellions occurred in the region that had supplied the government with major forces
in 1868, while no rebellions occurred among the defeated domains in the northeast. After
resigning from the government in protest, political leaders from Saga, Chōshū, and
Satsuma gathered frustrated former samurai in each region to launch a rebellion against
Tokyo. The largest of these rebellions was the Satsuma Rebellion of 1877, led by Saigō
Takamori, the most famous figure during the imperial restoration.28 The Tokyo
government barely won this civil war, the death toll of which was almost similar to the
one in 1868, by utilizing the conscripted army it established after the restoration.
Toward a Constitutional Monarchy (1877–1890)
The Satsuma Rebellion marked the threshold to the age of peaceful, continuous political
development.29 People perceived that it was now impossible to return to the past.
Newcomers to the political arena abandoned violence as an essential means of
governance and decided to concentrate mainly on manipulating public discussion to gain
political power. This change of political strategy allowed newly formed political parties to
gain support from local elites with wealth and knowledge. When the general election of
the lower house of the National Diet started in 1890, political parties continuously won
majorities.30 This fact forced the Meiji government to take measures to compromise with
them. After both sides made various efforts to win power within the newly established
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constitutional framework, the Meiji monarchy reached an equilibrium after the Russo-
Japanese War in 1905 that Meiji bureaucrats and a majority party in the House of
Representatives began to organize cabinets alternately.
The Meiji Revolution in Comparative

Perspective
In comparative perspective, the Meiji Revolution had some interesting characteristics. (1)
It was accomplished through a series of consecutive reforms without years of sustained
reactionary opposition. (2) It was carried out through the use of the emperor’s symbolic
authority. (3) Core leaders quickly changed their slogan without hesitation from
advocating a “return to an ideal past” to promoting “progress.” (4) The human costs of
the conflict, about 30,000 deaths, were comparatively small for a revolution that entailed
such a radical redistribution of social rights.
Duration
The Meiji Revolution took many years: about twenty years in terms of political conflicts,
including armed confrontations, and thirty-eight years from its origins in the sudden
change in the international environment that beset late Tokugawa Japan to the
institutionalization of political development by the introduction of constitutional politics.
Yet, the length seems to be average for a revolution of comparable scale.
The progression of changes that took place during the Meiji Revolution was noteworthy. It
was slow in its early stage and became very quick later on. It took ten years for the
Tokugawa Shogunate to collapse; considerable time was spent on political negotiations,
which were interspersed with a few armed conflicts. Yet, following this collapse, the new
Meiji government rushed into a series of radical reforms, including the abolition of
daimyo domains in the three and a half years following the restoration coup. This pattern
was opposite to that of the French Revolution, where major changes occurred in its early
stages: the establishment of a National Assembly and the Declaration of Human Rights in
the first year, and the abolition of the monarchy in the fourth year. The Meiji Revolution
was gradual enough to nurture national consensus for coming radical reforms, and there
was little reactionary protest after 1877.
The Role of the Monarchy
After the catastrophe of 1858, the slogan to “return sovereignty to the emperor in Kyoto”
almost reached the point of national consensus by 1868, with the exception of a few
samurai loyalists in Aizu domain and a small portion of Tokugawa vassals. The descendent
of a long line of ancient emperors held enormous significance as a symbol of radical
reforms.
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It is natural to question how the Meiji Revolution could both abolish samurai aristocracy
and limit the power of the emperor within a constitutional framework. It was because
Japanese emperors had possessed little power in decision making since the 14th century.
Emperors’ authority was traditionally contingent upon the ability of the Shogun, whom
they relied on for actual power. The late Tokugawa-era emperor Kōmei hardly deviated
from this tradition to share sovereignty with the shogun, even though he dared to express
his opinions on foreign policy. The Meiji emperor also followed this tradition when he was
enthroned at the age of seventeen by seldom resisting the advice of his cabinet members
on national affairs.31
The Japanese emperor’s political position was similar to the position of British modern
monarchs who “reigned but did not rule.” This was why the status of Japanese emperors
was seldom challenged, although the throne was sometimes disputed within the family.
The samurai founding fathers of the Meiji government utilized this tradition to build a
constitutional monarchy that limited the power of emperor even while his status
remained ostensibly absolute. Such a system was relatively rare worldwide. While Korean
and Chinese monarchs tried to adopt constitutional systems with the successful Japanese
model in mind, they nonetheless never dared to abandon the power of decision making on
personnel and budget allocation.
Symbol of Revolution: “Return to an Ideal Past”
The Meiji government was established via a declaration that demanded “returning to the
time when the first emperor Jinmu established our dynasty.” Yet, the government soon
began to adopt European models to reform Japan in the name of “civilization.” Although
some intellectuals who believed in restoring the mythical past of Japan were disappointed
by this move, most political leaders who had led the imperial restoration showed little
hesitation. They quickly changed their political slogans from “returning to the past” to
“progress” and suppressed any resistance from anti-Westernization groups. This attitude
appeared to contradict the “Great Cause” they had initially utilized to mobilize the
samurai. How can we solve this aporia?
Historians tend to interpret modern revolutions and reforms in terms of the standards of
“progress” introduced by 18th-century Europeans. This is why many feel perplexed to see
the slogan “returning to the past.” But is there no room to regard the idea of “returning
to an ideal past” as a general phenomenon for human beings present before the 18th
century?
In 19th-century Japan, the idea of “return to ideal past” was used for a variety of reforms,
not simply for the restoration of the emperor to the sovereign of Japan.32 In 1862, Shogun
Tokugawa Iemochi announced a radical reform of his army along Western lines.
Politicians after the Meiji Revolution would use the slogan “progress to civilization” to
enact similar reforms. Iemochi declared,
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My government has become corrupt and ostentatious, with the morale of banner
men in decline. It is a serious deviation from what my house ought to be.
Especially, we have to recover our military strength after beginning international
relations with foreign countries. To adapt my government to the current situation,
I would like to make fundamental reforms by returning to the origin of my house
when institutions were simple and samurai lived in a humble way, and thus
recover our great military glory.
There is another example. In 1838, just before the outbreak of Opium War in China, Koga
Tōan, a Confucian scholar of the Tokugawa Academy, wrote a book named “On Coastal
Defense,” in which he insisted on lifting the ban on sending Japanese ships abroad. He
justified his assertion in the following manner: “We cannot predict the various situations
that our navy will face in the ocean. If we are to acquire sufficient naval defense
capabilities, we have to practice in real situations. . . .We should return to the old policy
in place before the 1630s and allow our vessels to go abroad to India, Siam, and Vietnam
to engage in trade.”
The above examples show how the Japanese before the 1870s used the slogan of
“returning to the past” to legitimize fundamental reforms. Because it was their custom to
make use of precedents to justify every policy, they used remote historical precedents to
justify present reform initiatives. When making minor reforms, they made use of more
recent historical precedents; when engaging in radical reforms, leaders looked to more
distant historical precedents or mytho-histories. This idea of using historical precedent, in
fact, might have been the only way for pre-Enlightenment societies to foster appeal for
radical reforms.
Justifying radical reforms by the symbol of returning to a legendary past was a general
practice during the premodern era. The idea of a “return to the past” as being compatible
with the idea of “progress” was similar to how the French people utilized Roman-style
symbolism during their revolution.33 Yet, among the revolutions and great reforms that
utilized this symbol, there were not many as radical as the Meiji Revolution. Most of them
were caught in the trap of old institutions. Japanese in the 19th century were fortunate
enough to be able to refer to the mythical era of emperor Jinmu, about which no
institutional memory was inherited. They could create any institution they wanted and
even imitate Western models at will as long as they simply adhered to their “Great
Cause”: the centrality of the throne.
We can also find another symbol of social reform: millenarianism.34 Millenarian ideas
have existed even in societies that lack written history. According to Peter Worsley, a
phenomenon called “cargo cults” existed in early 20th-century Melanesia. One day, a
prophecy began circulating that predicted the return of their ancestors with a hoard of
treasure aboard a ship. Hearing this news, villagers stopped working, wore clothes of the
opposite gender, and began a feast to welcome the ancestors. A similar phenomenon is
also found in societies that have written history. During the Meiji Revolution, groups of
people near Kyoto engaged in a millenarian carnival-like religious spree just before the
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imperial restoration. Singing “ee ja nai ka” (“who cares?” Or, “isn’t it great?”), they
welcomed the coming of deities that would bring paradise on earth.35
Limited Death Toll
The course of world history shows that revolution and other abrupt political-social
reforms cause untold suffering. In general, however, the Meiji Revolution emerged
through relatively peaceful political negotiations. Still, civil war, assassinations, and other
punishments occurred throughout the period. During the civil war between 1868 and
1869, combined dearth tolls totaled around 13,600 people. Moreover, during the 1877
Satsuma Rebellion, both sides suffered a combined total of 13,200 deaths. These two lone
incidents claimed the lives of at least 26,800 people. If we include the Mito Uprising in
1864, Chōshū Rebellion in 1866, foreign wars, minor revolts by former samurai during
the early Meiji period, punishments, and assassinations, the death toll for the Meiji
Revolution likely reaches as high as 30,000 people in a country with a population of 34
million.
Compared to other revolutions, however, the death toll was quite low. The French
Revolution had a death toll of at least 600,000 out of a total population of 27.8 million.36
If we add the death tolls incurred in its foreign wars, the number may reach 2 million.
The Russian and Chinese revolutions were even more violent and perhaps led to much
higher death tolls. Seen in this light, the Meiji Revolution was not nearly as violent as
other great revolutions, although it accomplished the abolition of daimyo domains and the
samurai aristocracy.
Nationalist Ideology
Why was the Meiji Revolution able to achieve its goals with comparatively smaller
sacrifice? It would be improper to attribute it to some fixed characteristic of the Japanese
people. It was true that they experienced over two hundred years of peace just before the
revolution. There had been no civil wars from 1639 to 1863 and no foreign wars during
the same period except for small skirmishes with Russia in the early 19th century. Yet, the
Japanese after the Meiji Revolution fought many foreign wars in which combined death
tolls might exceed 10,000,000. We cannot think of national character as the determinant
of the death toll.
Shared nationalist ideology and a custom of conflict avoidance developed during the long
peace of the Tokugawa period, which may explain the limited death toll.37 Yet, it is
inadequate. It was true that daimyo and upper samurai did share a sense of common
Japanese identity with people of lower social classes. Yet, it must have been difficult for
samurai aristocracy to abandon their hereditary rights. We have to find other causes that
led them to give up their hereditary status.
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Initial Conditions: Double-Headed Federation State

The early modern Japanese state was easily dissolvable. Unlike the centralized polities
that existed in France, China, and Korea, its federation structure enabled the
reorganization of coalitions among lords without disturbing the order within their
domains. On the other hand, early modern Japan was also easy to re-integrate. Once the
Tokugawa Shogunate lost its legitimacy by giving concessions to the foreign barbarians,
people could rely on a Kyoto-based political authority who expressed a hardline expulsion
policy. This was the condition that made the Japanese polity easy to reconstruct and
reconfigure under the preexisting authority of the emperor.
Indirect Approach
Yet, this unique set of initial conditions was not enough for the Meiji Revolution to
succeed. It must have been very difficult for daimyo and upper samurai to abandon their
privileges. Why did they accept such a painful proposition?
One answer is that samurai unconsciously entered the path of the “indirect approach.”38
The “indirect approach” means that if you hope to accomplish goal A, which is unpopular
with the majority, you had better present another goal B, which not only is acceptable to
the people but also has a high probability of accomplishing goal A.39 It is well known that
Meiji leaders utilized this strategy when they attempted to abolish daimyo domains.40
Because they had expected strong objection from daimyo and their vassals, they followed
an indirect approach; in 1869 they asked four major daimyo to propose the return of their
domains and peoples to the emperor. After the four daimyo made this proposal, other
daimyo joined in, following the tradition of returning the certificates authorizing rule over
their domains when a new Tokugawa Shogun assumed his duty. The Meiji emperor
accepted these “voluntary” proposals, praising those daimyo’s loyalty to the “Great
Cause” of the Imperial Restoration.
However, most reforms and changes were not achieved by this intentionally indirect
approach. During the late Tokugawa period, most political leaders merely pursued short-
term goals that would bring about medium-term solutions. After extensive negotiations,
they made reforms one by one at a very slow pace. After Perry came to Japan, they
recommended some lower vassals to learn Western languages and technology. As political
negotiations with the Tokugawa and other daimyo became frequent, they accepted the
need for promoting men of ability from among low-ranking samurai. Once radicals and
some daimyos gathered in Kyoto, they began to accept the authority of the emperor. They
also accepted proposals from below, including those from ronin (self-professed samurai).
Thus, the ruling elite became ready to accept radical reforms when a new government
was organized in Kyoto. They embarked on an indirect path toward the abolition of
domains and the samurai aristocracy. Once such conditions had ripened, leaders from
Satsuma and Chōshū began to intentionally utilize this indirect approach to realize their
ideals for a future Japan. Daimyo and upper samurai lost every possible opportunity to
protect their traditional hereditary privileges.
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A Side Effect of the Civil War in 1868

The civil war of 1868 provided important conditions for the abolition of the hereditary
status system. Although the war was fought in a limited area in northeast Japan and
ended in a year, it had enormous side effects. No daimyo except minor ones could escape
mobilization to the battlefield for either side. They had to cut customary expenses and
pool limited hereditary stipends to cover war costs, especially by reducing the stipends of
upper-strata samurai. Upper samurai could not follow the traditional way of fighting:
going to the front on horseback while accompanied by their valets. As the Meiji
government ordered daimyo to present musket troops only, they had no other choice but
to line up with lower samurai or to stay home if they were unfamiliar with commanding
musket units. After the civil war, heroes from below began to demand official upper
positions. As in World War I and World War II, conflict often acts as a social equalizer.
Thus, the civil war in 1868 Japan indirectly paved the way for the abolition of the samurai
aristocracy.
The Meiji Revolution in Global Context

The Meiji Revolution occurred in the midst of the revolution of global communication by
the West. The purpose of Perry’s expedition to Japan was to open Pacific lines toward
China that would complete the around-the-world steamship lines.41 Although the first
liner from San Francisco to Shanghai via Yokohama departed fifteen years later,
steamship lines on the Pacific became active when many coolies from China began to use
the line for the construction of North American transcontinental railways. Two years after
the first transcontinental railway was completed, top leaders of the Meiji government led
by Iwakura Tomomi visited the United States and European countries by this newly
installed global transportation system.42 Their route was almost similar to the one Jules
Verne described in his Around the World in Eighty Days, published just after their stay in
Europe. It is noteworthy that the Iwakura mission was ordered to come back through
transcontinental telegram when the two cables from Europe to East Asia had been
connected in Nagasaki.43 The waves of globalization by the West not only prompted Japan
to execute the Meiji Revolution but also offered a big chance for Japan to launch
socioeconomic development.
After the establishment of the Meiji government, Japan, in turn, sought for the renovation
of international relations with neighboring countries. It concluded a treaty with China in
1871 that restored diplomatic relations after 300 years’ absence. Japan also concluded a
treaty with Korea in 1876 to open Korean ports. In addition, Japan began to redefine its
territory according to Western international law; it first absorbed the northern island Ezo-
chi as Hokkaido in 1869, and annexed Ryukyu kingdom as a prefecture Okinawa in 1879
that had maintained double tributary relationships with China and a Japanese daimyo
Satsuma since early 17th century.
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When Japan began redefining its relationships with neighboring area, not a few conflicts
with China and Korea occurred. The main reason was the clash between traditional
Chinese tributary system and Western international laws Japan had adopted. Yet,
Japanese government was cautious enough to avoid war, although public opinion tended
to become hawkish to expand Japanese influence toward neighboring areas. It was in the
early 1890s that Japanese government decisively changed its attitude toward neighboring
countries. Japan chose the war against China to become a European-style empire by
utilizing newly acquired economic, military, and national powers.
Discussion of the Literature

Research on the Meiji Revolution has evolved from political history to a focus on
economic and social history. Political history began to flourish around 1890, before and
after the convention of the first Japanese National Diet.44 To avoid political conflict, the
government, led by former Chōshū and Satsuma samurai, decided not to edit an official
history but to encourage former daimyo to compile their documents from the period,
which were later published as the Nihon Shiseki kyōkai sōsho.45 Intellectuals, including
former Tokugawa officials, also published various histories. This intellectual climate led to
the publication of two voluminous, and relatively impartial, histories around 1920. This
was true not only with the biography of the last Shogun Tokugawa Yoshinobu,46 but also
with Suematsu Kenchō’s history of Chōshū.47
Yet, simplification of the period’s history began as people who lived during the late
Tokugawa period passed away. Around 1940, the government published a five-volume
official history, the Ishinshi.48 It presented a master narrative focused on imperial
restoration promoted mainly by Satsuma and Chōshū. Marxist historian Toyama Shigeki,
one of the authors of the Ishinshi, further placed singular importance on the role of
Chōshū in a 1950 book that would become a standard text in postwar Japan.49
One of the factors behind this tendency derived from bias in the data they relied on: the
Dai Nihon Ishin shiryō kōhon compiled for the Ishinshi.50 This was a vast collection of
materials arranged in chronological order. Yet, apart from arbitrary selection from the
original data, it had another significant bias. The choice to begin its narrative at the
enthronement of Emperor Kōmei meant a lack of any mention of the Shogunate’s Tenpō
reforms; ending the narrative with the abolishment of daimyo domains resulted in a lack
of documents about the dissolution of the status system and ex-samurai rebellions. The
Shiseki kyokai sōsho also shared this bias, as the scarcity of documents from the
Tokugawa side shows.
Later historians tended to unconsciously inherit this bias. Except for Marius Jansen, even
English-language writers could not avoid it, as classical studies by W. A. Beasley, Albert
Craig, and Conrad Totman testify.51 Yet, it is necessary to ask whether it would have been
possible to accomplish the Meiji Revolution with limited bloodshed if the clash between
the pro-Tokugawa and the anti-Tokugawa forces had really dominated the political arena.
Would have it been possible for Satsuma and Chōshū leaders to accept the demand for
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national participation from below if they had also not committed to the ideal of “public
discussion” beforehand?
As for international relations, the field has long been defined by two classics: Inobe
Shigeo’s book on foreign policy before Perry and Ishii Takashi’s account of late Tokugawa
diplomacy based on British archives.52 Yet, there has emerged new lines of study, in
addition to Mitani Hiroshi’s book.53 Yokoyama Yoshinori presented a revisionist account
of diplomatic history before Perry by utilizing original materials in Japanese and Dutch.
Fukuoka Mariko analyzed the conclusion of a Prussian–Japanese treaty based on German,
Dutch, English, and Japanese sources. Hoya Toru analyzed the British plans of military
operations that began by Shogunate’s demand for the closing of port Yokohama. Yet,
there are still few studies of foreign relations, especially with regard to the relations with
neighboring countries today.54
From the 1920s, Japanese research on the Meiji Revolution welcomed the age of the
social sciences. Yoshino Sakuzō, a famous political scientist, organized the “Society for
the Study of Meiji Culture” to explore the origins of the Japanese public sphere. Osatake
Takeki’s books are still useful in this field.55
Socioeconomic history emerged during the same period. As Marxism became influential,
the ideology formed the master narrative that defined the scope and narrative of
historical studies.56 There were two schools determined by their respective attitudes
toward the Comintern’s world revolution program. One school followed the Comintern
program by regarding the Meiji Revolution as a formation of absolutism, while the other
regarded it as the beginning of bourgeois society. Scholars in the latter school made great
efforts to collect original materials concerning the economy. After World War II, the
former also began similar research and formed the mainstream of the Japanese academy.
The history of landownership was a favorite theme of this school, reflecting the urgent
political issue of land reform. Among them, Niwa Kunio’s book on land tax reform during
the Meiji Revolution became the classic.57
After the 1980s, as ordinary Japanese began to enjoy affluent lives, Marxist
interpretations lost their former influence, and various approaches began to flourish. In
economic history, quantitative analysis led by Ohkawa Kazushi, Hayami Akira, Nakamura
Takafusa, and others revealed the continuity before and after the revolution and paved
the way for comparative studies of economic history with younger generations.58 Satō
Seizaburō played a similar role in political history.59 Leftist historians also began the
search for new horizons. Haraguchi Kiyoshi presented reliable accounts of late Tokugawa
politics.60 Inoue Katsuo analyzed the changes in the decision-making system of Chōshū
domain;61 Miyachi Masato uncovered the rural information network that flourished
during the era from the arrival of Perry to the spread of newspapers. Miyachi also retains
a classical interpretative focus on the “revere the emperor, expel the barbarians”
movement while utilizing numerous original materials.62
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After World War II, historians became interested in social and intellectual history. Once
Irokawa Daikichi paved the way, many historians like Kano Masanao entered this field.63
The object of research shifted from literate, wealthy commoners to ordinary people.
Yasumaru Yoshio succeeded in approaching the latter group by focusing on “new
religions” that emerged during the late Tokugawa period.64 His analysis, along with
Makihara Norio’s works, revealed the cleavage between the illiterate ordinary people and
the governments and upper commoners that tried to include the former in the body of the
nation through Confucianism, Shintoism, and Western thoughts.
In social history, scholars writing in the English language contributed much.65
After so-called modernization theory lost influence, Harry D. Harootunian explored the
new realm of intellectual history from postmodernist viewpoints. Ann Walthall wrote a
biography of an older woman who joined the “revere the emperor” movement. Its feminist
approach, along with its skillful use of original materials, provides a lively image of the
period. Kären Wigen analyzed the long-term effects of the Meiji Revolution on local
society in central Japan. Daniel Botsman analyzed the transformation of the official
punishment system before and after the Meiji Revolution, subsequently also highlighting
changes in the status of outcasts. David Howell studied another minority, the Ainu, to
stress the meaning of status-system abolishment in forging a new national identity.
Today, the East Asian context of the Meiji Revolution attracts historians’ attention. Park
Hun suggested the role of “Confucianization” as a fundamental factor behind the
revolution.66 Bitō Masahide’s analysis of Sonnō thought and Matsuura Rei’s biography of
Yokoi Shōnan, together with Watanabe Hiroshi’s lucid lectures on early modern
intellectual history, would offer invaluable insights into this field.67
Primary Sources
For beginners in Japanese modern history, the handbook edited by Miwa Ryoichi and
Hara Akira offers a useful introduction to various documents and statistics.68 For more
detailed information, see Meiji jidai-shi Dai jiten, 4 volumes.69
For political institution and personnel data of the central governments during the late
Tokugawa and early Meiji period, supplemental volume in Monbusho’s Ishinshi is
useful.70 For long-term economic statistics, Nihon Ginko’s handbook offers reliable data
in one volume.71 There are fourteen volumes of long-term economic statistics available on
line.72
For the political history from 1846 to 1871, one must refer to Dai Nihon ishin shiryō
kōhon (manuscript of historical materials on the great Japanese revolution),73 a huge
collection of primary sources compiled in chronological order. Its microfilm images are
available online via Ishin shiryō kōyō (a summary of historical documents on the Meiji
Revolution),74 http://wwwap.hi.u-tokyo.ac.jp/ships/shipscontroller. Various sources
of daimyo, shishi, and so on were compiled in Nihon Shiseki Kyōkai sōsho (library of
historical sources by the Society of Japanese Annals).75 Shidankai sokkiroku
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(stenographic records of the Society of Reminiscences) offered the testimonies of

survivors.76
For Tokugawa Shogunate, Zoku Tokugawa jikki offered official records of personnel and
orders.77 Ii-ke Shiryo presented the records of Ii house, the largest fudai daimyo that
included regent Ii Naosuke’s documents.78 Katsu kaishū zenshu (complete works of Katsu
Kaishū) showed the reforms of the Shogunate during the late Tokugawa period.79 For
Kyoto court, a huge collection titled Kōmei Tennō ki (complete records of Emperor Kōmei)
is useful.80
Among daimyos, Daimyo of Mito among the Tokugawa family played an essential role in
the early late Tokugawa period that compiled a good annotated collection of documents:
Mito-han shiryō (records of Mito domain).81 For Daimyo of Fukui among the Tokugawa
family that took an initiative of open political participation allying with Satsuma
(Kagoshima), see several volumes such as Saimu kiji in Nihon Shiseki Kyokai Sosho along
with the letters and other writings of Hashimoto Sanai, who was one of the brightest
figures during the period: Hashimoto Sanai zenshū (records of Hashimoto Sanai).82
For the daimyos who became major figures in the establishment of the imperial
government, see Kagoshima-ken shiryō: Nariakira-kō shiryō (records from Kagoshima
prefecture: records of Shimazu Nariakira),83 Kagoshima-ken shiryō: Tadayoshi-kō shiryō
(records from Kagoshima prefecture: records of Shimazu Tadayoshi),84 Kagoshima-ken
shiryō: Tamasato Shimazu-ke shiryō (records from Kagoshima prefecture: records of the
Tamasato Shimazu house, i.e., Shimazu Hisamitsu),85 and Yamaguchi kenshi: shiryōhen
Bakumatsu Ishin (history of Yamaguchi prefecture: materials from the late Tokugawa
period).86
The following materials from Higo (Kumamoto) will offer a fine third-party’s view: Kaitei
Higo-han kokuji shiryō (records of Higo-han on national politics during the late Tokugawa
period, revised),87 in National Diet Library Digital Collections: http://dl.ndl.go.jp/.
For diplomatic history, first consult a fine, one-volume book by W. G. Beasley: Select
Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy, 1853–1868.88 Its data came from Tsūshin zenran
(complete diplomatic documents), and Zoku tsūshin zenran, which covered from 1858 to
1868 in sixty volumes.89 These data are being re-compiled, adding other original
materials as Dai Nihon komonjo: Bakumatsu gaikōku kankei monjo (documents
concerning foreign affairs during the late Tokugawa period).90
For diplomatic history before Perry, see Tsūkō ichiran zokushū (records of foreign affairs,
continued), which covers the era from 1825 to 1854.91 To understand the foreign
information received by the Shogunate, see Betsudan Fusetu-gaki ga kataru 19 seiki:
honyaku to kenkyū (the Dutch special reports to Japan: a depiction of the 19th century:
Japanese translation and interpretations).92
To find basic political data and the titles of sources, consult the Meiji emperor’s chronicle:
Meiji Tennō ki (biography of Emperor Meiji).93 To get more precise data of orders and
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laws, see Hōrei zensho (complete collection of laws and regulations) available online.94
For various publications during the Meiji period, see Meiji bunka zenshū (collection of
sources on Meiji cultural history).95
For economic documents, see Meiji zenki zaisei keizai shiryō shūsei (collected documents
of economic and financial affairs during the early Meiji era)96 and Shibusawa Eiichi denki
shiryō (complete collection of sources related to Shibusawa Eiichi).97 For social history,
see Nihon shomin seikatsu shūsei (collected sources on Japanese commoners’ lives).98 For
newspapers, there is a useful selection of articles: Shinbun shūsei Meiji hennenshi
(collection of paper articles during the Meiji era).99
For intellectual history, useful collections have been published: Kindai Nihon shisō taikei
(collection of sources on Japanese modern ideology).100
Links to Digital Materials

A chronological index of political incidents from 1846 to 1871 that allows the access to
primary sources is Ishin shiryō kōyō (ISK), 10 volumes: http://wwwap.hi.u-tokyo.ac.jp/
ships/.
Orders and laws after November 9, 1867, are accessible from the index at http://
dajokan.ndl.go.jp/SearchSys/index.pl.
National Diet Digital Collection is partly available on line with 350,000 books, 9,000
journals, and so on: http://dl.ndl.go.jp/
The table of contents of Shibusawa Eiichi denki shiryo is available at http://

www.shibusawa.or.jp/eiichi/mokuji.html
Long term statistics are available at http://www.ier.hit-u.ac.jp/histatdb/stats/view/4?

lang=ja.
Further Reading
There are many excellent studies of the Meiji Revolution in Japanese. Yet, I was obliged to
limit the number to a minimum of works seldom explored by English-languages scholars.
People
Fukuzawa, Yukichi. The Autobiography of Yukichi Fukuzawa. Translated by Kiyooka

Eiichi. New York: Columbia University Press, 2007.
Sato, Ernest. A Diplomat in Japan. London: Seeley, Service and Co., 1921.
Shiba, Goro. Remembering Aizu: The Testament of Shiba Goro. Edited by Ishimitsu
Mahito. Translated by Craig Teruko. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1999.
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Meiji Revolution
Shibusawa, Eiichi. The Autobiography of Shibusawa Eiichi: from Peasant to Entrepreneur.

Translated by Craig Teruko. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1994.
Yamakawa, Kikue. Women of the Mito Domain: Recollections of Samurai Family Life.
Translated by Kate Wildman. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001.
Studies in Japanese
Bitō, Masahide. Nihon no kokka shugi (an intellectual history of nationalism in Japan).
Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2015.
Fukuoka, Mariko. Puroisen Higashi Ajia ensei to bakumatsu gaikō (Prussian expedition to
East Asia and Japanese diplomacy during the late Tokugawa period). Tokyo: Tokyo
Daigaku Shuppankai, 2013.
Hoya, Toru. Bakumatsu Nihon to Taigai senso no Kiki: Shimonoseki Senso no Butai ura
(the Japanese crisis of foreign wars: British plan for Shimonoseki War). Tokyo: Yoshikawa
Kobunkan, 2010.
Inoue, Yoritaka, and Sakamoto Koremaru, editors. Nihon-gata Sekyo Kankei no Tanjyo
(the formation of Japanese style relationship between politics and religion). Tokyo: Daiichi
shobo, 1987.
Kusumi, Shinya. Bakumatsu no shogun (Shoguns during the late Tokugawa period).
Tokyo: Kodansha, 2009.
Makihara, Norio. Kyakubun kara kokumin e (from mere tax payers to Japanese citizen).
Tokyo: Yoshikawa kobunkan, 1998.
Makihara, Norio. Meiji 7 nen no dai ronsō: kenpakusho kara mita kindai kokka to Minshū
(national debate in 1874: popular addresses that revealed the relations between the
modern state and the people). Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Hyōronsha, 1990.
Matsuura, Rei. Yokoi Shōnan. 3d ed. Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 2010.
Matsuzawa, Hiromichi. Kindai Nihon no keisei to Seiyo keiken (Japanese experience of

the West in the formation of modern Japan). Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1993.
Meiji, Ishinshi Kenkyūkai, editor. Kōza Meiji Ishin (studies in the Meiji Revolution). 12
volumes. Tokyo: Yūshisha, 2010–.
Mitani, Hiroshi. Meiji Ishin to nashonarizumu (the Meiji Revolution and nationalism).
Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppansha, 1997.
Miyachi, Masato. Bakumatsu ishinki no shakaiteki seijishi kenkyū (a study of sociopolitical

history during the late Tokugawa and early Meiji era). Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1999.
Namihira, Tsuneo. Kindai Higashi Ajiashi no naka no Ryūkyū heigo (Japanese annexation
of Ryukyu in modern East Asian history). Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2014.
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Ochiai, Hiroki. Chitsuroku shobun (the abolishment of hereditary stipends in Japan),

revised edition. Tokyo: Kōdansha, 2015.
Yasumaru, Yoshio. Kamigami no Meiji Ishin (transformation of deities during the Meiji
Revolution). Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1979.
Studies in English
Abe, Takeshi, Osamu Saito, and Yuzo Yamamoto, editors. Economic History of Japan:
1600–1990, volume 2: Economic History of Japan 1860–1914: The Age of
Industrialization. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017.
Botsman, Daniel V. Punishment and Power in the Making of Modern Japan. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2005.
Conrad, Totman. The Collapse of the Tokugawa Bakufu. Hawaii: University of Hawaii
Press, 1980.
Craig, Albert. Chōshū in the Meiji Restoration. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1961.
Howell, David. Geographies of Identity in Nineteenth Century Japan. Berkeley, CA:

University of California Press, 2005.
Jansen, Marius B. Sakamoto Ryōma and the Meiji Restoration. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1959.
Mitani, Hiroshi. Escape from Impasse: The Decision to Open Japan. Translated by David
Noble. Revised edition. Tokyo: I-House Press, 2008.
Takii, Kazuhiro. Itō Hirobumi: Japan’s First Prime Minister and Father of the Meiji
Constitution. Translated by Takechi Manabu. Edited by Patricia Murray. Abingdon:
Routledge, 2014.
Walthall, Anne. The Weak Body of a Useless Woman: Matsuo Taseko and the Meiji
Restoration. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998.
Watanabe, Hiroshi. History of Japanese Political Thought, 1600–1901. Translated by David

Noble. Tokyo: I-House Press. 2012.
Wigen, Kären. The Making of a Japanese Periphery: 1750–1920. Berkeley, CA: University
of California Press, 1995.
Notes:
(1.) For a traditional understanding of the period’s history, see W. G. Beasley, The Meiji
Restoration, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1972).
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(2.) The word ishin was introduced in the early Meiji period to refine the word isshin (to
undertake a thorough reform), which was often used during the late Tokugawa period.
Although it was based on a Chinese classic “Shi” that originally indicated a change of
dynasties, Meiji Japanese derived this word from the classic they were more familiar with
“Great Learning,”where it meant the daily innovations undertaken by an existing dynasty.
Mitani Hiroshi, Meiji Ishin wo kangaerru (Thoughts on Meiji Revolution), revised ed.
(Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2012), Introduction.
(3.) Hiroshi Watanabe, History of Japanese Political Thought, 1600–1901, trans. David
Noble (Tokyo: I-House Press, 2012), preface.
(4.) For a brief account, see Mitani Hiroshi, Ishinshi to gurobaruka (A History of the Meiji
Revolution in Global Context) (Tokyo: NHK Shuppan, 2017).
(5.) During the 19th century, there were some federation states in the world such as the
German Empire and the United States. Although the total number of daimyo lords in
Japan was outnumbered by the constitutive parts of these federation-states, the number
of influential daimyo was almost the same.
(6.) Double-headed polities are rare in human history. Vietnam in the 18th century had
two courts in Hanoi and Hue for an extended period. Yet there were major conflicts
between them, and the Hanoi kingship soon absorbed Hue. The Japanese case was even
more rare in that the two courts enjoyed a stable relationship for more than two hundred
years.
(7.) Hiroki Ochiai, Chitsuroku Shobun (The Abolition of the Samurai’s Hereditary
Stipends), 2d ed. (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 2015).
(8.) Masumi Junnosuke, Nihon seitōshi ron (history of political parties in Japan), vol. 2
(Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1966), 28.
(9.) Kunio Niwa, Meiji Ishin no tochi henkaku (The Transformation of Land Ownership
During Meiji Ishin) (Tokyo: Ochanomizu Shobō, 1962).
(10.) For a brief look, see Nakamura Satoru, Meiji Ishin (Tokyo: Shueisha, 1992); Masato
Matsuo, ed., Meiji Ishin to bunmei kaika (Meiji Ishin and Civilization) (Tokyo: Yoshakawa
kobunkan, 2004). For an overview of the Meiji Revolution in English, see Marius B.
Jansen, ed., The Cambridge History of Japan, vol. 5: The Nineteenth Century, (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1989).
(11.) The only exception was Yokoi Shonan, a Confucianist hired by Fukui domain, who
maintained the abolition of hereditary succession of monarchs according to the oldest
model in ancient China. Matsuura Rei, Yokoi Shonan (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo, 2010)
(12.) Hiroshi Mitani, Escape from Impasse: The Decision to Open Japan, rev. ed., ed.
David Noble (Tokyo: I-House Press, 2008). For materials, see William G. Beasley, Select
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Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy, 1853–1868 (London: Oxford University Press,

1955).
(13.) Miyazaki Fumiko presents a fine account of this move in a chapter on the Bansho
Shirabe sho (school for the study of barbarian books) in Tokyo daigaku, Tokyo daigaku
hyakunenshi (One Hundred Years of the University of Tokyo), vol. 1: Tsūshi (general
history) (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku, 1984).
(14.) For the account of the catastrophe in 1858, see Satō Seizaburō, Shi no chōyaku wo
koete: seiyō no shōgeki to Nihon (Beyond “Salto Mortale”: the Western Impact and
Japan), 2d ed. (Tokyo: Chikura Shobō, 2009), ch. 3. For details, see Yoshida Tsunekichi,
Ansei no taigoku (The Great Punishments in the Ansei Era) (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kobunkan,
1991).
(15.) From the perspective of the opening of the public sphere, see Mitani Hiroshi, “Nihon
ni okeru ‘Kōron’ kanshū no keisei” (the development of the custom of “public discussion”
in Japan) in Mitani Hiroshi, ed., Higashi Ajia no kōron keisei (Development of the Public
Sphere in East Asia) (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 2004), ch. 1.
(16.) At first, Chōshū tried to mediate between the emperor and the Tokugawa by
persuading the emperor to adopt a policy of gradual opening. For Chōshū’s turn to the
opposite policy, see Albert Craig, Chōshū in the Meiji Restoration (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1961); and Thomas M. Huber, The Revolutionary Origins of
Modern Japan (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1981).
(17.) Mitani Hiroshi, Meiji Ishin to nashonarizumu (the Meiji Revolution and nationalism)
(Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppansha, 1997), ch. 7.
(18.) Iechika Yoshiki, Edo bakufu hokai: Kōmei tenno to “Ichi-Kai-So” (The Collapse of the
Edo Bakufu: Emperor Kōmei and His Ally Tokugawa Yoshinobu, Matsudaira Katamori, and
Matsudaira Sadaaki), rev. ed. (Tokyo: Kodansha, 2014). For more on the Tokugawa
Shogun and his cabinet, see Kusumi Shinya, Bakumatsu no Shogun (Tokugawa Shoguns in
the Late Tokugawa Period) (Tokyo: Kodansha, 2009).
(19.) Takahashi Hidenao, Bakumatsu Ishin no seiji to tennō (Politics and the Emperor in
Late Tokugawa and Early Meiji Period) (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 2007), chs. 5–6.
(20.) Chōshū sent a group of vassals, including later prime minister Itō Hirobumi, to
Britain just before the shelling at Shimonoseki. They utilized their expulsion policy as a
means to promote domestic reform.
(21.) This was mediated by two samurai who fled from Tosa. Jansen, Marius B., Sakamoto
Ryoma and the Meiji Restoration (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1961).
(22.) Miyake Tsugunobu, Bakuchō Sensō (Civil War Between Bakuhu and Chōshū) (Tokyo:
Yoshikawa kobunkan, 2013); and Shunya Kusumi, Chōshū Sensō to Tokugawa Shogun:
Page 23 of 30

Meiji Revolution
bakumatsuki kinai no seiji kūkan (Chōshū Civil War and the Tokugawa Shogun: Political
Space in the Last Phase of Tokugawa Rule) (Tokyo: Iwata Shoin, 2005).
(23.) Takahashi, op. cit., part 2; and Iechika Yoshiki, Tokugawa Yoshinobu (Tokyo:
Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 2014).
(24.) Craig, op. cit., Norimasa Kanbashi, Shimazu Hisamitsu to Meiji Ishin (Father
Satsuma Shimazu Hisamitsu and the Meiji Revolution) (Tokyo: Shin Jinbutsu Ōraisha,
2001).
(25.) Osatake Takeki, Nihon kenseishi taikō (An Outline of the Formation of Japanese
Constitutional Politics), 2 vols. (Tokyo: Nihon Hyōron-sha, 1938–1939).
(26.) Hōya Tōru, Boshin Sensō (The Civil War in 1868) (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kobunkan,
2007).
(27.) Matsuo Masato, Haihan chiken no kenkyū (A Study of Domain Abolishment) (Tokyo:
Yoshikawa kobunkan, 2001). For institutional reforms, see Okuda Hiroki, Ishin to Kaika
(The Meiji Revolution and Civilization) (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kobunkan, 2016).
(28.) Igai Takaaki, Seinan Sensō: sensō no taigi (The Southwest Civil War in 1877: Saigō’s
Just Cause?) (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 2008).
(29.) Masumi Junnosuke, Nihon seitōshi ron (History of Political Parties in Japan) vol. 1
(Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1965); and Inada Masahiro, Jiyu Minken no bunkashi:
atarashii seiji bunka no tanjō (A Cultural History of the Freedom and People’s Rights
Movement: the Emergence of a New Political Culture) (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 2000).
Makihara Norio, Kyakubun to kokumin no aida (From the People Living in a Moral
Economy to the Nation) (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kobunkan, 1998); and Matsuzawa Yūsaku, Jiyu
Minken Undō (The Freedom and People’s Rights Movement) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten,
2016).
(30.) Banno Junji, The Establishment of the Japanese Constitutional System (London:
Routledge, 2003); and Kazuhiko Takii, Ito Hirobumi—Japan’s First Prime Minister and
Father of the Meiji Constitution (Oxon: Routledge, 2014).
(31.) See the diary of Erwin von Bälz, June 25, 1889; June 6, 1891; May 9, 1910, Berutsu
no nikki, dai 1 bu, jō, ge, ed. Erwin Toku Bälz (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1951, 1952).
(32.) Mitani Hiroshi, Meiji Ishin o kangaeru (Thoughts on the Meiji Revolution), rev. ed.
(Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2013), Introduction.
(33.) Simon Schama, Citizens (New York: Vitage Books, 1989), ch. 4.
(34.) Peter Worsley, The Trumpet Shall Sound: A Study of “Cargo” Cults in Melanesia
(New York: Schocken Books, 1968).
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(35.) Mita Munesuke, “Yokubō no kaihō to kaihō no yokubō: ‘ee ja nai ka’ no sekaizō to
kachi ishiki” (liberation of desires and desire for liberation: cosmology and value
consciousness in popular rapture during the Meiji Revolution), in Teihon Mita Munesuke
chosakushū, vol. 3 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2012), 1–85.
(36.) René Sédillot, Le coût de la Révolution française (Paris: Perrin, 1987), ch. 1.
(37.) Because nationalist ideology tends to induce people to engage in foreign wars like in
France, it requires deliberation to explain why Japanese during the Meiji Revolution
limited foreign wars to a minimum in spite of their “expel the barbarians” slogan.
(38.) Mitani Hiroshi, Meiji Ishin wo kangaeru, introduction.
(39.) Basil Henry Liddell Hart, Strategy: The Indirect Approach, 4th ed. (London: Faber,
1967).
(40.) Sidney Devere Brown and Akiko Hirota, trans., The Diary of Kido Takayoshi (Tokyo:
University of Tokyo Press, 1986).
(41.) John Curtis Perry, Facing the West: Americans and the Opening of the Pacific
(Westport, Conn: Praeger Publishers, 1994).
(42.) Kume Kunitake, comp., Japan Rising: The Iwakura Embassy to the USA and Europe
1871–73, eds. Chushichi Tsuzuki and R. Jules Young (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2009).
(43.) Mitani Hiroshi, Namiki Yorihisa, and Tsukiashi Tatsuhiko, eds., Otona no tame no
Kingendai-shi: 19 Seiki hen (A Modern History for East Asian People: 19th Century)
(Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 2009); and Tsuneo Namihira, Kindai Higashi Ajia-shi
no Naka no Ryukyu Heigo (Annexation of Ryukyu in East Modern History) (Tokyo:
Iwanami shoten, 2014).
(44.) For the historiography of the political history of the Meiji Revolution, see Mitani
Hiroshi, “Meiji Ishin no shigakushi: ‘shakai kagaku’ izen,” Yoroppa kenkyū 9 (2010): 179–
187 (available at http://ci.nii.ac.jp/naid/40018716714).
(45.) See primary sources: Nihon Shiseki Kyōkai sōsho.
(46.) Shibusawa Eiichi, Tokugawa Yoshinobu-kō den (The Biography of Yoshinobu

Tokugawa), 8 vols. (Tokyo: Ryūmonsha, 1818).
(47.) Suematsu Kenchō, Shūtei saihan Bōchō kaitenshi (The Domains of Suō and Nagato
During the Restoration, revised), 12 vols. (Tokyo: Suematsu Haruhiko, 1921).
(48.) Monbushō, ed., Ishinshi (The History of the Meiji Revolution), 5 vols. (Tokyo: Meiji
Shoin, 1939–1941).
(49.) Toyama Shigeki, Meiji Ishin (Meiji Revolution) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1950).
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Meiji Revolution
(50.) See primary sources: Dai Nihon Ishin shiryō kōhon.
(51.) William G. Beasley, The Meiji Restoration (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press,
1972); Albert Craig, Chōshū in the Meiji Restoration (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard
University Press, 1961); and Conrad Totman, The Collapse of the Tokugawa Bakufu.
(52.) Inobe Shigeo, Shūtei zōho Meiji Ishin zenshi no kenkyū (A Study of History Before
the Meiji Revolution, revised and expanded) (Tokyo: Chubunkan Shoten, 1942); and Ishii
Takashi, Zōtei Meiji Ishin no kokusai kankyō (International Environment of the Meiji
Revolution, revised) (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kobunkan, 1966).
(53.) Yokoyama Yoshinori, Kaikoku zenya no sekai (Japan and the World Before Japan’s
Opening Up) (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kobunkan, 2013); Fukuoaka Mariko, Puroisen Higashi
Ajia Ensei to bakumatsu gaikō (Prussian Expedition to East Asia and Japanese Diplomacy
During the Late Tokugawa Period) (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 2013); Hoya Toru,
Bakumatsu Nihon to Taigai senso no Kiki: Shimonoseki Senso no Butai ura (The Japanese
Crisis of Foreign Wars: British Plan for Shimonoseki War) (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kobunkan),
2010; and Hiroshi Mitani, Escape from Impasse.
(54.) For the efforts to look at Japan’s international relations within East Asia, see Mitani
Hiroshi, Namiki Yorihisa, and Tsukiashi Tatsuhiko, eds., Otona no tame no Kingendaishi:
19 Seiki hen (A Modern History for East Asian People: 19th Century) (Tokyo: Tokyo
Daigaku Shupankai, 2009); and Namihira Tsuneo, Kindai Higashi Ajiashi no naka no
Ryūkyū Heigo (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2014).
(55.) Mitani Taichirō, “Shisoka to site no Yoshino Sakuzō,” in Yoshino Sakuzō (Selected
Essays of Yoshino Sakuzō), ed. Mitani Taichirō (Tokyo: Chuō Kōron-sha, 1972), 7–62; and
Osatake Takeki. Ishin zengo ni okeru riken shisō no kenkyū (A Study of Constitutional
Thought Before and After the Meiji Revolution) (Tokyo: Chūbunkan Shoten, 1934). Nihon
kenseishi taikō.
(56.) For brief assessments by contemporary historians, see Aoyama Tadamasa, Meiji
Ishin to kokka keisei (The Meiji Revolution and Nation Building) (Tokyo: Yoshikawa
kobunkan, 2000), ch.1; Sasaki Kanji, Meiji Ishinron e no apurooch (Approaches Toward
Meiji Revolution, 2015), ch. 4; and Mitani Hiroshi, Meiji Ishin o kangaeru, ch. 5.
(57.) Niwa Kunio, Meiji Ishin no tochi henkaku (Changes in Land Ownership During the
Meiji Revolution) (Tokyo: Ochanomizu Shobō, 1978). Another fine achievement was
Nakamura Satoru, Meiji Ishin no kiso kōzō: Nihon shihonshugi keisei no kiten (The
Fundamental Structure of the Meiji Revolution: the Beginnings of Japanese Capitalism)
(Tokyo: Miraisha, 1968).
(58.) For a recent achievement of this school, see Takeshi Abe, Osamu Saitō, and Yuzo
Yamamoto, eds., Economic History of Japan: 1600–1990. vol. 2: Economic History of Japan
1860–1914 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).
(59.) Satō Seizaburō, Shi no chōyaku o koete.
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Meiji Revolution
(60.) Haraguchi Kiyoshi, Haraguchi Kiyoshi Chosakushu (Complete Works of Haraguchi

Kiyoshi), 5 vols. (Tokyo: Iwata shoin, 2007–2009).
(61.) Inoue Katsuo, Bakumatsu Ishin seijishi no kenkyū (A Study of the Political History of
the Meiji Revolution) (Tokyo: Hanawa Shobō, 1994).
(62.) Miyachi Masato, Bakumatsu ishinki no shakaiteki seijishi kenkyū; and Miyachi
Masato, Bakumatsu ishin henkakushi (Radical Movements During the Late Tokugawa and
Early Meiji Period), 2 vols. (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2012).
(63.) Irokawa Daikichi, Meiji seishinshi (Essays on Meiji Intellectual History) (Tokyo: Kōga
Shobō, 1964); Irokawa Daikichi, The Culture of the Meiji Period, trans. Marius Jansen
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985); and Kano Masanao, Shihonshugi
keiseiki no chitsujyo ishiki (Order Consciousness in the Formation of Capitalism) (Tokyo:
Chikuma shobo, 1969).
(64.) Yoshio Yasumaru, Kamigami no Meiji Ishin: Yasumaru Yoshio shū (Complete
Collection of Yasumaru Yoshio’s writings) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2013).
(65.) Marius B. Jansen, Changing Japanese Attitudes toward Modernization, (Princeton,

NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965); Harry D. Harootunian, Things Seen and Unseen:
Discourse and Ideology in Tokugawa Nativism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1988); Ann Walthall, The Weak Body of a Useless Woman: Matsuo Taseko and the Meiji
Restoration (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998); Kären Wigen, The Making of a
Japanese Periphery: 1750–1920 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1995);
Daniel Botsman, Punishment and Power in the Making of Modern Japan (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2005); and David Howell, Geographies of Identity in
Nineteenth Century Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005).
(66.) Park Hun, “Higashi Ajia seijishi ni okeru Bakumatsu ishin seijishi to ‘shidaifu teki
seiji bunka’ no Chōsen” (The Challenge of “Literati Political Culture” to the Meiji
Revolution) in Shimizu Mitsuaki, ed., “Kinseika” ron to Nihon (Japan from the Perspective
of the “East Asian Early Modernization” Thesis) (Tokyo: Bensei shuppan, 2015).
(67.) Bitō Masahide, Nihon no kokkashugi; Matsuura Rei, Yokoi Shōnan; and Watanabe
Hiroshi, History of Japanese Political Thought, 1600–1901.
(68.) Miwa Ryoichi and Hara Akira, eds., Kingendai Nihon Keizai-shi yoran (Handbook of
Documents and Statistics of Modern Japanese Modern Economic History) (Tokyo: Tokyo
daigaku shuppankai, 2007).
(69.) Miyachi Masato, Sato Yoshimaru, and Sakurai Yoshiki, eds., Meiji Jidai-shi Dai jiten,
4 vols. (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 2011–2013).
(70.) Monbushō, ed., Ishinshi, furoku (A History of the Meiji Revolution, supplemental)
(Tokyo: Meiji shoin, 1941).
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(71.) Nihon Ginkō, ed., Meiji ikō Honpō shuyō keizai tōkei (Japanese Basic Economic
Statistics After the Meiji Era) (Tokyo: Nihon keizai shinbun-sha, 2001).
(72.) Ohkawa Kazushi et al., eds. Chōki keizai tokei (Long-term Economic Statistics), 14
vols. (Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Shinpo-sha, 1967–1989). Available in online database: http://
www.ier.hit-u.ac.jp/histatdb/stats/view/4?lang=ja.
(73.) Ishin shiryō hensan jimukyoku, Dai Nihon ishin shiryō kōhon, 4180 vols. (1931), kept
at the Shiryō hensansho (Historiographical Institute of the University of Tokyo).
(74.) Ishin shiryō hensan jimukyoku, ed., Ishin shiryō kōyō, 10 vols. (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku
Shiryō Hensan-sho, 1937–1939).
(75.) Nihon Shiseki Kyōkai, Nihon Shiseki Kyōkai sōsho, 187 vols. (Tokyo: Nihon Shiseki
Kyōkai, 1915–1935).
(76.) Shidankai, ed., Shidankai sokkiroku (Tokyo: Shidankai, 1892–1932).
(77.) Kuroita Katsumi, ed., “Zoku Tokugawa jikki,” in Shintei zōho kokushi taikei (Tokyo:
Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 2007).
(78.) Tokyo Daigaku Shiryo Hensan-sho, Dai Nihon Ishin Shiryo Ruisan no bu: Ii-ke
Shiryo, vols. 1– (Tokyo: Tokyo daigajku shupan-kai, 1959–).
(79.) Katsube Masanaga, Oguchi Yujiro, and Matsumoto Sannosuke, eds., Katsu kaishū
zenshu, 23 vols. (Tokyo: Keiso Shobō, 1970–1982).
(80.) Kunaisho, ed., Kōmei tennō ki, 5 vols. (Tokyo: Kunaisho, 1906–).
(81.) Tokugawa-ke, ed., Mito-han shiryō, 5 vols. (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 1970).
(82.) Keigakukai, ed., Hashimoto Sanai zenshū, 2 vols. (Tokyo: Keigakukai, 1939).
(83.) Kagoshima-ken, ed., Kagoshima-ken shiryō: Nariakira-kō shiryō (Records from

Kagoshima Prefecture: Records of Shimazu Nariakira), 7 vols. (Kagoshima: Kagoshima-
ken, 1973–1979).
(84.) Kagoshima-ken, ed., Kagoshima-ken shiryō: Tadayoshi-kō shiryō (Records from

Kagoshima Prefecture: Records of Shimazu Tadayoshi), 4 vols. (Kagoshima: Kagoshima-
ken, 1980–1983).
(85.) Kagoshima-ken, ed., Kagoshima-ken shiryō: Tamasato Shimazu ke shiryō (Records

from Kagoshima Prefecture: Records of the Tamasato Shimazu House), 10 vols.
(Kagoshima: Kagoshima-ken, 1992–2011).
(86.) Yamaguchi-ken, ed., Yamaguchi kenshi: shiryōhen Bakumatsu Ishin, 7 vols.

(Yamaguchi: Yamaguchi-ken, 2002–2014).
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(87.) Ikimi Kenkichi, ed., Kaitei Higo-han kokuji shiryō, 10 vols. (Kumamoto: Koshaku
Hosokawa-ken Hensansho, 1932).
(88.) W. G. Beasley, Select Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy, 1853–1868 (London:

Oxford University Press, 1955).
(89.) Tsūshin zenran henshū iinkai, ed., Tsūshin zenran, 6 vols. (Tokyo: Yushodo, 1983);
and Tsūshin zenran henshū iinkai, ed., Zoku Tsūshin zenran 54 vols. (Tokyo: Yushodo,
1983–1988).
(90.) Tokyo daigaku shiryō-hensansho, ed., Dai Nihon komonjo: Bakumatsu gaikōku
kankei monjo (Tokyo: Tokyo Teikoku Daigaku, 1910–1960).
(91.) Yanai Kenji, ed., Tsūkō ichiran zokushū, 5 vols. (Osaka: Seibundo, 1968–1973).
(92.) Matsukata Fuyuko, ed., Betsudan Fusetu-gaki ga kataru 19 seiki: honyaku to kenkyū
(Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 2012).
(93.) Kunaichō, ed., Meiji Tennō ki, 12 vols. (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 1968–1977).
(94.) Naikaku kanpō-kyoku, ed., Hōrei zensho (Tokyo: Naikaku Kanpokyoku, 1867–).
Digital version available from http://dajokan.ndl.go.jp/SearchSys/search_top.pl.
(95.) Meiji bunka kenkyūkai, ed., Meiji bunka zenshū, 36 vols. (Tokyo: Nihon hyōron-sha,
1967–1974).
(96.) Ōuchi Hyōe, Meiji zenki zaisei keizai shiryō shūsei, ed. Tsuchiya Takao, 21 vols.
(Tokyo: Kaizōsha, 1931–1936).
(97.) Shibusawa Seien kinen zaidan Ryūmonsha, ed., Shibusawa Eiichi denki shiryō, 58
vols. with 10 supplements (Tokyo: Shibusawa Eiichi Denki Shiryō Kankōkai, 1955–1971).
The table of contents is available online: http://www.shibusawa.or.jp/eiichi/mokuji.html.
(98.) Tanikawa Kennichi et al., Nihon shomin seikatsu shūsei, 30 vols. (Tokyo: Sannichi
Shobō, 1968–1984).
(99.) Nakayama Yasumasa, ed., Shinbun shūsei Meiji hennenshi, 15 vols. (Tokyo: Zaisei
Keizai Gakkai, 1934).
(100.) Katō Shūichi et al., ed., Kindai Nihon shisō taikei, 24 vols. (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten,
1988–1992).
Hiroshi Mitani
Department of History, University of Tokyo
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Meiji Revolution

Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Asian History

Summary and Keywords

The Meiji Revolution (1853–1890) transformed Japan from a double-headed federation

Interesting characteristics distinguish the Meiji Revolution from other modern

date: 23 February 2019

Overview and Terminology

Structural Changes: Japan in 1858 and 1877

Changes in Polity: From a Double-Headed Federal State with a

date: 23 February 2019

Early modern Japan had

date: 23 February 2019

Political Changes during the Meiji Revolution:

date: 23 February 2019

Japan’s Opening toward the West and Its Technological Reforms

The Beginning of Political Disorder: The Emergence of Public

Criticism of Tokugawa foreign policy happened to be intertwined with another grave

date: 23 February 2019

The Efforts to Rebuild Political Order: Toward Two Ways of Imperial

date: 23 February 2019

Radical Reforms in Polity and Society by the Meiji Government

date: 23 February 2019

Toward a Constitutional Monarchy (1877–1890)

date: 23 February 2019

The Meiji Revolution in Comparative

The Role of the Monarchy

date: 23 February 2019

Symbol of Revolution: “Return to an Ideal Past”

date: 23 February 2019

date: 23 February 2019

Limited Death Toll

date: 23 February 2019

Initial Conditions: Double-Headed Federation State

date: 23 February 2019

A Side Effect of the Civil War in 1868

The Meiji Revolution in Global Context

date: 23 February 2019

Discussion of the Literature

date: 23 February 2019

date: 23 February 2019

In social history, scholars writing in the English language contributed much.65

date: 23 February 2019

(stenographic records of the Society of Reminiscences) offered the testimonies of

date: 23 February 2019

Links to Digital Materials

The table of contents of Shibusawa Eiichi denki shiryo is available at http://

Long term statistics are available at http://www.ier.hit-u.ac.jp/histatdb/stats/view/4?

Fukuzawa, Yukichi. The Autobiography of Yukichi Fukuzawa. Translated by Kiyooka

date: 23 February 2019

Shibusawa, Eiichi. The Autobiography of Shibusawa Eiichi: from Peasant to Entrepreneur.

Matsuura, Rei. Yokoi Shōnan. 3d ed. Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 2010.

Matsuzawa, Hiromichi. Kindai Nihon no keisei to Seiyo keiken (Japanese experience of

Miyachi, Masato. Bakumatsu ishinki no shakaiteki seijishi kenkyū (a study of sociopolitical

date: 23 February 2019

Ochiai, Hiroki. Chitsuroku shobun (the abolishment of hereditary stipends in Japan),

Howell, David. Geographies of Identity in Nineteenth Century Japan. Berkeley, CA:

Watanabe, Hiroshi. History of Japanese Political Thought, 1600–1901. Translated by David

date: 23 February 2019

date: 23 February 2019

Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy, 1853–1868 (London: Oxford University Press,

date: 23 February 2019

date: 23 February 2019

(38.) Mitani Hiroshi, Meiji Ishin wo kangaeru, introduction.