Plotinus on the Structure of Self-Intellection

Author(s): Ian Crystal

Source: Phronesis, Vol. 43, No. 3 (Aug., 1998), pp. 264-286
Published by: Brill
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/4182591
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 Plotinus on the Structure of Self-Intellection'

IAN CRYSTAL

ABSTRACT

In this paper, I argue that Plotinus offers us a new and interesting account of
self-intellection. It is an account which is informed to some extent by a dilemma
that Sextus Empincus raised about the intellect being to apprehend itself. The
significance of Sextus' dilemma is that it sets out the framework within which
such a cognitive activity is to be dealt with, namely the intellect must apprehend
itself qua part or qua whole, both of which according to him are impossible.
Plotinus, I think, successfully gets around this dilemma and is able to explain
how the intellect can think itself qua whole. In the process of doing so, he offers
an account of self-intellection in which the thinking subject or thinker becomes
active in terms of generating its intellectual content, namely itself; a move which
is a break from the traditional Platonic/Aristotelian account of the intellect. The
paper itself is set up as follows. I start by mentioning the dilemma which Sextus
raises about self-intellection. Then I attempt, through an analysis of the noetic
intellect's structure, to show how Plotinus is able to offer an account of self-
intellection in terms of whole apprehending whole. I conclude with Plotinus'
analysis of the light analogy as a means of explaining how this intellectual
process works.

Much of Plotinus' epistemology was influenced by Sextus Empiricus.2 One

of the ways in which this influence can be discerned is through the man-
ner in which the intellect, Plotinus' second hypostasis, apprehends itself.

AcceDted December 1997

I I would like to thank M.M. McCabe, Richard Sorabji, Christopher Gill and Gerard
O'Daly for their invaluable comments on earlier versions of this paper. I would also
like to thank the editors, Keimpe Algra and Christopher Rowe, for their extremely
helpful comments. Any errors are solely those of the author.
2 This claim is by no means novel. For comments on the influence of the sceptical
arguments, in particular those of Sextus, on Plotinus, cf. J. P6pin, "Elements pour une
histoire de la relation entre l'intelligence et l'intelligible chez Platon et dans le n6o-
platonisme," Revue Philosophique 146 (1956), pp. 54-5, Richard T. Wallis, "Scepti-
cism and Neoplatonism," Aufstieg und Niedergang der romischen Welt H. 32.2 (1987),
pp. 922-25, E.K. Emilsson, "Plotinus on the Objects of Thought," Archiv fur Ge-
schichte der Philosophie Band 77 (1995), pp. 32-3, 36 and Lloyd P. Gerson, Plotinus
(London: Routledge Publishers, 1994), p. 248, n. 46, E.K. Emilsson, "Cognition and
its Objects," The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1996), pp. 217-49 and Sarah Rappe, "Self-knowledge and Subjectivity
in the Enneads," The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996), pp. 250-74.

C Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 1998 Phronesis XL11113

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 PLOTINUS ON THE STRUCTURE OF SELF-INTELLECTION 265

According to Plotinus, the intellect, if it is to think itself properly, must

do so qua whole not qua part.3 The nature of this account is, at least in
part, informed by a dilemma that Sextus Empiricus articulated.4 For Sextus
maintained that the intellect, if it were to know itself, it must do so either
qua whole or qua part.

For if the mind apprehends itself, either it as a whole will apprehend itself, or it
will do so not as a whole but employing for the purpose a part of itself. Adv.
Mathematicos, VII 310-311

Both positions, according to Sextus, were untenable. In the case of the

intellect apprehending itself in terms one part grasping another part, one
falls into an infinite regress because the subject-part will become identi-
cal with its object when it apprehends it. As a result, another epistemic
subject will be needed and so on ad infinitum:

... while if with a part, how will that part [sc. of the intellecti in turn discern
itself? And so on to infinity. Adv. Mathematicos, VII 312

If, on the other hand, the epistemic subject apprehends itself qua whole,
then, according to Sextus, there will be no object for the subject to apprehend:

Now it will not be able as a whole to apprehend itself. For if as a whole it ap-
prehends itself, it will be as a whole apprehension and apprehending, and, the
apprehending subject being the whole, the apprehended object will no longer be
anything; . . . If as a whole, the object sought (8Tou(pEvov) will be nothing. Adv.
Mathematicos, VII 311-312

Thus the whole/whole reading rules out satisfying both the subject-slot
and the object-slot of the intellectual act, rendering that act vacuous.
Now Plotinus also rejects the part/part model as an adequate structure
upon which to base self-intellection. To illustrate this, he explains that an
awareness or apprehension which we might have of our historical self
does not qualify as self-intellection precisely because in that context it is
a matter of one part of ourselves thinking or perceiving another part:

For it would not be the whole which was known in these circumstances, if that
thing which thought the others which were with it did not also think itself, and
this will be, not what we are looking for (4iyro{>iEvov),5 a thing which thinks
itself, but one thing thinking another. 5.3 [49].1.9-136

I See 5.3 [491.6.6-8 and 5.8 [311.4.22-25 quoted below.

I I say at least in part because Sextus was not the only influence on Plotinus. Obviously,
Plato and Aristotle also had an enormous influence on the development of Plotinus'
account of the intellect and self-intellection.
I Even some of Plotinus' phraseology is strikingly similar to Sextus'. So we read
in Sextus: OO&v &,tat tO ~Tol4tRVOV, while in Plotinus we find: `a&at? t oi tO nToliREvOV.
6 Also 5.3 [49].6.6-8 quoted below. Text and translations, unless otherwise stated,

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 266 IAN CRYSTAL

However, as I shall argue, Plotinus challenges the second horn of Sextus'

dilemma and argues that the whole/whole model is the appropriate struc-
ture upon which to base self-intellection. For Plotinus will take the view
that the intellect does grasp itself qua whole in a such a way that the
subject-object distinction is not lost. Thus, Sextus' dilemma, in particular
the second part, informs Plotinus' account of self-intellection in that it sets
out the framework within which Plotinus operates. Of course, Plotinus dis-
agrees with Sextus' objection to the whole/whole reading but in doing so
he reworks the relation between the epistemic subject and its intelligible
object(s), thereby developing a new structure upon which to base self-
intellection.

I. The Discursive Intellect's Relation to Objects

To understand the Plotinian account of the intellect (and, consequently,

self-intellection), it must be viewed in the larger Plotinian psychological/
epistemological context. For Plotinus held there to be two, not one, intel-
lectual activities, the discursive or the dianoetic (Btavota)8 and the noetic.
Let me begin, however, by stressing a central point which is common
to both of these intellectual activities. According to Plotinus, any sort of
intellectual act, discursive or otherwise, is a process in which the think-
ing subject comes to think some kind of object:

It is necessary to know and understand that all thinking (v6icat; xicoa) comes
from something (Ebz ctv0';) and is of something ('rtvo6). 6.7 (38].40.5-69

All thinking (v6ict;) must have some sort of object or content about which
to think (ntv6;). If not, the act itself will be rendered vacuous. Thus, under-
standing the differences between these intellectual acts will lie in the type

are based upon A.H. Armstrong's Loeb edition. The Enneads, 7 vols., trans. A.H.
Armstrong (London: Loeb Classical Library. William Heinemann Ltd., 1966-88).
7 E.K. Emilsson in "Plotinus on the Objects of Thought" also developed this point.
However, I think Emilsson's interpretation is incorrect in that he takes the notion of
"wholes" and the subject-object distinction to be incompatible. In this sense, Emilsson
regards Plotinus as having accepted the force of Sextus' claim that the intellect can-
not know itself qua whole and still have an intelligible object.
8 Cf. 5.3 [49].3.35. For a discussion of the terms Plotinus employs when discuss-
ing discursive reason such as so 8&avolrticov, Xoytawrcv or Xorago'6, cf. John Rist
"Integration and Undescended Soul in Plotinus," American Journal of Philology 88
(1967), p. 416 and L. Gerson, Plotinus, p. 250, n. 63.
9 The fact that Plotinus thinks that all thinking is of something, which presumably
includes self-intellection, does not help Emilsson's thesis as discussed in n. 7.

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 PLOTINUS ON THE STRUCTURE OF SELF-INTELLECTION 267

of objects each faculty has and in the type of relations the thinking sub-
ject has with that object.
According to Plotinus, the part of the soul that reasons discursively
combines (;ouvayov), divides (Btatpouv) and compares incoming impres-
sions (ru'xot or e!8wXa) which it receives from both sensory and noetic
worlds with ones which it had previously received.'" So, for example, one
recognises an individual, say Socrates, by comparing an incoming impres-
sion of that individual with an earlier impression of him." In the case of
normative judgements, such as Socrates is good, one can pass this type
of judgement in virtue of what Plotinus calls the rules (cav&v6q) embed-
ded in the rational part of the soul. However, these rules too, like the
images, do not have their point of origin in the rational part of the soul.
Rather, the discursive subject acquires them through the intellect's illu-
mination."2 The soul "is written upon by the intellect."'3 So the cavovE;
can also be grouped with the tmicot inasmuch as they form part of the
overall body of content which is given to the rational part of the soul, dif-
fering only in function: the soul employs them as a means of passing
judgement on other things.
What conclusions can be drawn from the discursive activity as out-
lined? The fact that the dianoetic faculty or subject is receptive of vu6iot
or Et6o)aX is crucial. For it implies that this faculty focuses upon objects
which enjoy a separate, independent and external existence. The discursive
subject's relation to its objects is mediated by the images which resonate
from these objects. The discursive subject does not have direct contact
with the objects themselves.'4 Even the lcavove4 which reside in this fac-
ulty are only images, images of that which, strictly speaking, exists in the
noetic world.'5 Now as the faculty requires external data in order to per-
form its discursive function, it can be inferred that the faculty itself is not
generative of its own content but rather is structured in such a way as to
look outwards, away from itself:

Does then this reasoning part (8tavonrtwCov) of the soul return upon itself? No it
does not. Rather it has understanding of the impressions (Miirwv) which it receives
from both sides. 5.3 [49].2.23-26

'? 5.3 [491.2.7-14 and 5.3 [49].3.35-40.

11 5.3 [49].3.3-7.
12 5.3 [491.3.10-12 and 4.15-19.
'3 5.3 [49].4.22. No doubt Plotinus has Aristotle's De Anima 3.4 in mind here.
14 Cf. E.K. Emilsson, "Cognition and its Objects," The Cambridge Companion to
Plotinus, p. 225.
IN 5.3 [491.4.21-23.

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 268 IAN CRYSTAL

In virtue of this relation, the discursive subject directs its gaze exclusively
towards external objects.
Two very important consequences follow from discursive reason being
disposed in this way: Firstly, it is fallible because its relation to its objects
is mediated by impressions. Here Plotinus is incorporating the Sceptic's
attack on impressions and their unreliability. However, he limits fallibil-
ity to the discursive intellect. His incorporation of the Sceptic's claim
about the fallibility of impressions will inform his account of the struc-
ture of the noetic intellect to the extent that at the latter level he effec-
tively derives a way in which to eliminate impressions from that realm
entirely.'6 A direct consequence of such a move, i.e. the elimination of im-
pressions, is that the noetic intellect is infallible. The manner in which he
is able to rid the noetic intellect of impressions, as we shall see, is through
the thesis that intellect's objects are internal to it. And this thesis - call
it the "internality thesis" - will in turn have a direct effect on how Plotinus
is able to circumvent the second horn of Sextus' dilemma. That is, the
"internality thesis" will play a pivotal role in his account of how it is that
the intellect is able to apprehend itself qua whole.'7
The second conclusion to be drawn from the disposition of the discur-
sive intellect is that the type of relation in which the subject has itself as
an object of intellection does not occur at the discursive level. For the
relation between the subject and object at this level does not involve an
identity relation. It is only at the noetic level that the identity relation
becomes an issue and, along with it, self-intellection:

But why do we not give self-thinking to this part, and finish with the subject?
Because we gave this part the task of observing what is outside it (ta&Ew aicone-tGoa)
and busying itself with it, but we think that it is proper to Intellect to observe
what belongs to itself and what is within itself (vi) &? &ttoi6v rniXpXetv 'X atuo
ra;t tit Ev autuC aiconEitaOal 5.3 [49].3.16-19"8

16 Emilsson, I think, states the matter well: "So, rather than attempting to show
where the sceptic goes wrong, Plotinus sees it as his task to find adequate assump-
tions that provide a foundation of knowledge that is immune to sceptical attacks." E.K.
Emilsson, "Plotinus on the Objects of Thought," p. 36.
17 See the final section.
18 Also cf. 5.3 [49].7.25-26. In this passage, the part of the soul directed inwards
does not affect my argument because, for all intents and purposes, it is the intellect.
This has its origins in the Plotinian doctrine that the entire soul does not descend from
intellect; a doctrine which subsequent Neoplatonists go on to reject, cf. Proclus,
Elements of Theology, ?? 211.

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 PLOTINUS ON THE STRUCTURE OF SELF-INTELLECTION 269

So with a view to developing this notion of self-intellection, let me now

turn to the noetic intellect.'9

II. The Noetic Intellect's Relation to Itself

The noetic activity, if it is to qualify as an intellectual activity, must also

think about something.20 It must have some intellectual content. Now, in
order to appreciate Plotinus' account of the intellect and its relation to
what it thinks, the formal structure of the intellect's activity must first be
set out. There are two phases or stages.2" The first is that of an inchoate
and undefined intellect which has not yet turned towards its source, the
One. Plotinus compares this stage to that of unformed sight.22 The second
phase is both the act of conversion (itcatpEpe1tv) itself and what results
from such an act. It is in this second phase that the intellect's true form
is realised:

This, when it has come into being, turns back upon the One and is filled, and
becomes intellect by looking towards it. Its halt and turning towards the One
constitutes being, its gaze upon the One, intellect. Since it halts and turns to-
wards the One that it may see, it becomes at once intellect and being. 5.2
[IIt.1-10-1423

19 However, it would be wrong to infer from this account that the dianoetic faculty
is unreflexive simpliciter. It does have some sort of self-knowledge. For instance, it
knows that it is discursive reason and that it has a grasp of the world around it which
acts upon it. As Plotinus puts it, it thinks itself as belonging to another (cf. 5.3
[491.6.3-6, quoted below), and thus is not direcfly self-reflexive. Cf. E.K. Emilsson,
"Plotinus on the Objects of Thought," p. 32.
20 See n. 9.

21 Cf. 5.9 [51.8.20-22. Here Plotinus explicitly remarks that it is our thinking which
places these stages in temporal succession, when strictly speaking they should not be.
Rather, they are the structure of the intellectual activity, an activity which is eternal.
Also cf. Lloyd P. Gerson, Plotinus, p. 45.
22 5.3 [49].11.10-13. For a discussion of the inchoate intellect, see J. Bussanich, The
One and its Relation to the Intellect in Plotinus (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1988), pp. 11-14.
23 Also cf. 5.1 [10].5.18-19, 5.3 [491.11.26-31. and. 5.6 [24].1.5-6. However, it
should be noted that the last of these passages has proved most troublesome for mod-
em commentators. The difficulty centres around whether the proper subject of ?xbpa is
the One or voi;. I follow Armstrong, O'Daly and Schroeder who take it to be voi;u
instead of the One because the One is beyond any sort of activity, including self-
intellection or awareness. See Armstrong, Plotinus: Enneads, vol. 5 (London: William
Heinemann Ltd., 1984), pp. 34-5, n. 1, G.J.P. O'Daly, Plotinus' Philosophy of the Self
(Shannon: Irish University Press, 1973) p. 72 and F.M. Schroeder, "Conversion and
Consciousness in Plotinus, 'Enneads"' 5.1 [10), 7 Hermes 114 (1986), p. 187.

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 270 IAN CRYSTAL

and, as a result, self-intellection occurs:

- so that if it [sc. intellect] is in itself (?v iaxzU) and with itself (aiv Eiauvr),
and that which it is, is intellect (there could not even be an unintelligent intel-
lect), its knowledge of itself must necessarily accompany it (&vy ouveival
acxep tiv vuitv iat)tob) - 5.3 [49].6.32-3424

For thinking itself is, at least in part, the function (ro i?pyov) of the intel-
lect.25 Unlike the discursive intellect, the noetic intellect is entirely oriented
towards itself, with the result that the noetic subject always has itself as
its object of intellection:

For the soul thought itself as belonging to another (ivO6E aEaUtiV Ort &aXou), but
intellect did so as itself (o 8E voiq 0X1 autTo), and as what and who it is and [it
started its thinking] from its own nature and thought reverting back upon itself
(?it1otp?po)v E'i4 aro6v). 5.3 [49].6.3-6

The noetic intellect cannot intelligise without intelligising itself. The con-
tent of its thought is itself. The thinker and the object are in some sense
identical with one another.26 Thus, prima facie, self-intellection is secured
because the subject is the same as its object, since that object is itself.
However, this is an over-simplification. At the outset of this section, it
was said the realisation of intellect came about through its directing its
attention towards the One. The One is that in virtue of which the intel-
lect is what it is. It would seem, therefore, somewhat misguided to say
that the intellect is exclusively self-directed, i.e. only has itself as an object
of intellection. For such a claim would seem to be incompatible with the
claim that the intellect gazes upon the One, i.e. has it as an object, assum-
ing, of course, that we do not equate the One with the intellect. Plotinus
does not.27 So there would seem to be a case for saying that the activity
of the intellect is not exclusively self-directed. Plotinus' response to such
a claim would, I think, be the following: The intellect never strictly appre-
hends the One.28 Even in its inchoate state, the intellect only has some
kind of image or impression (qpaivraaj?& ti) of the One.29 Keeping to the
sight imagery, Plotinus does not say that the intellect, when fully articu-
lated, sees an independent external object different from itself, something

24 Also cf. 5.3 [491.6.39-42.

25 5.3 [49].6.35.
26 Cf. 3.8 [301.3.19.
27 Cf. 6.7 [381.41.12-22.
28 Cf. 5.3 [49].11.10-12 and J. Bussanich, The One and its Relation to the Intellect
in Plotinus, p. 14.
29 5.3 [491.11.7.

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 PLOTINUS ON THE STRUCTURE OF SELF-INTELLECTION 271

which one might expect if it saw the One. But rather, he says, it sees the
seeing itself, i.e. its own activity: xart yap il v6onot; paot; o6p(ia a`g?xp
TE EV.2 The purpose of the One in this context is to cause the intellect
to turn towards itself; to take itself as an object, thereby attaining its
proper intellectual self-directed relation. The intellect's apprehension of
the One is really the intellect's apprehension of itself.3' It sees the One
qua intellect:

Because what it contemplates is not the One. For when it contemplates the One,
it does not do as one: If it did, it would not become intellect (E; 8'? i'i, 0oi ytVETat
voi;). 3.8 [30].8.30-2

The intellect's relation to itself, therefore, is not in any way hindered or

made opaque by the One in this context but instead is realised with the
help of the One. The intellect still has itself as an object of intellection:

The being of intellect, therefore, is activity, and there is nothing towards which
that activity is directed (np'o acxir &apa); so it is self-directed. Thinking itself, it
is thus with itself and holds its activity directed to itself (Eit; EauTOV TImV pVEpyEtaV
icFXF-t). 5.3 [49].7.18-213"

30 5.1 [101.5.19-20. It should be noted that there is some question about the "X'" in
the manuscripts. I follow Armstrong and Henry and Schwyzer in retaining the "TE."
See A. Armstrong, Enneads, vol. 5, p. 28, n. 1 and Henry and Schwyzer, Plotini Opera,
vol. II (Brussels: L'Edition Universelle, S.A., 1959), p. 272. As for the "seeing
the seeing," I shall return to this notion at the end of my study, since it is of pivotal
importance.
3' It might be said that the intellect sees the One inasmuch as it sees the effect of
the One on itself, its intellectual or epistemic unity.
32 As will become apparent in the next section, there is another very good reason
why the intellect cannot have the One as a proper object of thought. Namely, all the
objects of the intellect are intemal to it. Consequently, the One would have to be within
the intellect itself, a point which Plotinus is aware of and rules out: ROvov yiap iEv
?KE7tVO' KA ei ?1y naivma, v T4 oucFtv av 'v. &a TO-UTo EKEtO Ol)&V REV 'DTOV EV TM,
vqp,... 5.1 [101.7.21-23. Having said this, I must make some mention of 5.6
[241.5.16-17, a passage in which Plotinus speaks of the intellect thinking the One first
and foremost and itself only incidentally (icacar 4v0EPqKo;). Does this undermine all
that has been said and entail that the intellect is not directly reflexive? I would say no
it does not. Two points must be made to defend this claim: First, it could be argued
that in this middle Ennead, [24], Plotinus was still under the sway of Alexander of
Aphrodisias much more than by the time he came to write 5.3 [49], his last Ennead.
For as O'Daly has pointed out (Plotinus' Philosophy of the Self, pp. 79-80) Plotinus
gets this notion of caTa&a Ca)ehKO; from Alexander's Commentary of Aristotle's De
Anima (Alexander of Aphrodisias, De Anima, 86, 17ff. Bruns). For there Alexander,
developing Aristotle's doctrine of the intellect, also speaks of the thinker knowing
itself incidentally (ixcaa avgePr3ic0'). Secondly, there is the issue of topic. 5.6 is

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 272 IAN CRYSTAL

The sketch thus far of Plotinus' position is such that the intellectual sub-
ject is clearly identical with its object, given that that object is itself. How-
ever, having said this, it is still very unclear as to how such an account
of the intellect has been reworked so that the relation between the subject
and its object is one of whole apprehending whole. For the claim that the
intellectual subject is identical with its object and thus thinks itself does
not explain the whole/whole relation. In order to achieve this end, the
nature of the intellect's content and how it relates to that content must be
explored.

III. The Noetic Intellect's Relation to its Objects

To begin, that we are not dealing with an entity which is absolutely simple
and self-identical is clear from the fact that Plotinus speaks of the intel-
lect as a one-many (?V noX0X), as opposed to the One which is just one,
i.e. is absolutely simple.33 The intellect, if its self-relation is not to be jeop-
ardised, must see itself transparently in the "many." If not, Plotinus' claim
that the intellect is directly self-reflexive, i.e. has itself as a transparent
object of knowledge in all of its acts, will go unfounded.
The way Plotinus deals with the intellect having many objects and yet
remaining self-directed is to locate the objects within the intellect. They,
the objects, are somehow part of the intellect: ... vx 6? 4tobgiv bna'pxetv
'ca aiiroli xata tev aivr axonitaOatY. The intellect's thinking is focused

specifically about how and why the intellect must focus on the first principle. Whereas,
5.3 is specifically about self-intellection. So if one had to chose, 5.3 would be the safer
of the two as far as self-intellection is concerned. As Emilsson says, with 5.3 we have
Plotinus' most thorough and authoritative account of self-intellection. Thus, the worst
case scenario for me is that Plotinus did not hold the intellect to be directly self-
reflexive early on in his philosophical career (although even in the early Enneads there
is evidence to the contrary). Whereas on the best case scenario, given the difference
in topic between the two Enneads, one should be cautious with 5.6 when it comes to
how the intellect's self-relation should be understood.
33 In this regard, Plotinus sees himself as adhering to the second hypothesis of
Plato's dialogue, the Parmenides (144e5; 145a2). Cf. 4.8 [61.3.11, 5.1 [10].8.27, 5.3
[49].15.11ff., 6.2 [431.2.2, 6.2 [431.10.12, 6.2 [431.15.14-15, 6.2 (431.21.7, 6.2
[43].22.10, 6.5 [231.6.1-2, 6.6 [341.8.23, 6.6 [34].13.52-4, 6.7 [38].14.11-12 and 6.7
[381.39.11-14. Also cf. M. Atkinson, Ennead V.l: On the Three Principal Hypostases:
A Commentary with Translation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), pp. 196-8
and L. Gerson, Plotinus, pp. 44-5.
-u 5.3 [49].3.18-19. This epistemological reason, i.e. the intellect being self-directed,
is by no means meant to be the only reason why Plotinus would want to locate the
objects of the intellect within it. There are several other reasons (epistemological,

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 PLOTINUS ON THE STRUCTURE OF SELF-INTELLECTFION 273

within and not outside: xiat ak voiiv 'V E'amip icKa oiic &.3 Thus b
part of the intellect, the intellect in a sense is thinking them in thinking
itself. However, this is still insufficient to explain how the intellect can
have itself as a transparent object and yet relate to the many objects which
are supposed to be part of itself.
For a start, let me be clear what is intended by objects in this noetic
context. According to Plotinus, the objects of the intellect are the forms
or ideas:

If then the thought [of intellect] is of what is within it, that which is within it
is its immanent form, and this is the Idea. What then is this? Intellect and the
intelligent substance; each individual Idea is not other than intellect, but each is
intellect. And intellect as a whole is all the Forms,. . . 5.9 [5].8.1-436

As for the nature of the relation the intellectual subject has with these
object(s), there is evidence, I think, that shows that they enjoy a certain
sort of reciprocal relation. For the two sides entail one another in the

metaphysical and even cosmological) which are just as, if not more, central to his phi-
losophy which would motivate him to place the intellect's objects within it. For a start,
we have already seen that it is a way of circumventing the Sceptic on the issue of the
fallibility of impressions. There is also the following metaphysical motivation: As
the intellect is the most unified principle after the One, it should, after the One, be the
most unified. One way to accomplish this is to make its objects internal to it, thereby
making it more unified than, say, the soul whose objects are external to it. Cf. 5.4
[7].2.1-3. Placing the objects within the intellect is also conducive to his cosmologi-
cal account. For it is not the case in the Plotinian cosmos that the intellect transcends
the soul in the sense that it is outside of it. Rather, Plotinus speaks of voi; being a
circle around the One which in turn is contained by a larger circle, the soul (cf. 4.2
[1].1.25ff. and 5.1 [10].7.45). Thus, the noetic faculty is to be regarded as being inside
(EvuxOaca) or within the soul and discursive reason, affecting, i.e. illuminating, the
latter by flowing outwards. (Dillon draws our attention to this point, remarking that
"the intellect presides over soul and the world transcendently within." J. Dillon, "The
Mind of Plotinus," The Boston Colloquium on Ancient Philosophy (New York: The
American Press, 1987), p. 351.) Such a picture helps to explain why when Plotinus,
discussing the two intellectual processes, refers to the dianoetic process as a super-
structure (?x1KEipE0V) over or around the noetic (6.7 [38].40.5-19). However, as I am
looking at the intellect from the point of view of self-intellection, I shall not concern
myself either with the metaphysical problems which surround emmanation from the
One and how and why the three hypostases and the physical world have the hierar-
chical structure that they do.
35 6.2 [43].8.11-12.
36 Also cf. 5.9 [5].3.4-8. The Middle Platonists, such as Albinus, spoke of the forms
as the ideas of God. For a thorough study of the Middle Platonic tradition, see
J. Dillon, The Middle Platonists (London: Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd., 1977).

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 274 IAN CRYSTAL

following manner: The intellect, unlike its dianoetic counterpart, by its

very act of thinking establishes the existence of its objects: iS 6iXov 6o'ri
voi; (ov ovToK votr Ta ovTa cai biptaTqtv.7 It is generative of them.38 As
a consequence, these objects - the intelligibles - do not enjoy an inde-
pendent existence outside of the intellect. Their ontological status is de-
pendent on their being thought by vois;: [OXX' Cottv &aial 'a 6' ikntv
a&Xa, ?i vsv6'rat, 'robT' "Triv aVTroI% TO6 Jtvat.39 This, of course, is to be
expected given that these objects are internal to the intellect. However,
such an account, if taken out of context, eclipses what is, in fact, a recip-
rocal relation. For these objects by being thought confer existence upon
that which thinks them. In a sense, they make the intellect the intellect:

But each of them is intellect and being, and the whole is universal intellect and
being, intellect making being exist in thinking it (o EV voii icara To VOetv
W'ta'ra&;o ov ), and being giving intellect thinking and existence by being thought
(r6 6? 8" OV T voEtIoOat r v~ 6t66v rTO VOetV cai Tro Etvat). 5.1 [10].4.27-30'

and at 5.4 [7].2 we read:

Thinking, which sees the intelligible and tums towards it and is, in a way, being
perfected by it, is itself indefinite like seeing, but is defined by the intelligible.
5.4 [71.2.4-7 '

There are two reasons for Plotinus to place so much emphasis on the onto-
logical status of the intelligibles: Firstly, the objects which the intellect
thinks are intended to be real living entities, as opposed to what Plotinus
sometimes calls the lifeless abstractions of the Stoics ('a' atca)42 Sec-
ondly, Plotinus is a good Platonist in the sense that these objects are sup-
posed to be causes of the many particular instantiations of them in the
spatio-temporal realm.43 As for the nature of this reciprocal relation be-
tween the intellect and its objects (i.e. whether it is causal or logical), I
think the answer would have to be that it is stronger than simply a logical

3" Also cf. 6.7 [38].2.25-27.

31 Cf. 6.7 [381.40.11-15.
39 6.2 [431.8.4-5. Henry and Schwyzer delete &u' E'rtv &uXa. See Henry and
Schwyzer, Plotini Opera, vol. m, p. 65.
40 Also cf. 3.8 [30].8.7-9 and 6.7 [38].41.18-21.
41 Yet, by the same token, at 5.4 [7].2.44-47 Plotinus explicitly rules out the objects
of the intellect taking priority and coming first. For Plotinus is explicit in this matter:
voi'; &i icad ov xaluc,o'v. ov yap T(iCv ipaygat6v - 7oiEp 11 aldOatq Tdv aiaoT@iv -
npOOvThv, &XX' a&xok voi; ,r acpaiy1taa, E'L1Ep jl? ?Ei&q auGv Kogi4erat.
42 Cf. 5.4 [7].2.43 and 5.5 [32].1.38-9. Also cf. E.K. Emilsson, "Plotinus on the
Objects of Thought," p. 40.
4' Cf. 6.3.9.24-9. Also cf. L. Gerson, Plotinus, pp. 45-6.

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 PLOTINUS ON THE STRUCTURE OF SELF-INTELLECTION 275

relation. It is not mere coextensivity. However, one hesitates to spe

it in causal terms because both the intellect and its object are etern
coexistent.44 Yet each side acts upon or makes the other what it is.4
Given such a dynamic relation between the intellectual subject and its
object(s), how is this compatible with the identity condition which is sup-
posed to hold between both sides. To put it another way, how can Plotinus
hold these two apparently incompatible theses: The intellect and its objects
form a complex dynamic whole - what he refers to elsewhere as a-ognko
1cat atv0eOat - and yet they are identical.Y6
To be able to understand how the relation between the intellect and the
ideas can allow for both complexity and identity, it is necessary to have
a sense of how the intellect is occupied by these objects.47 According to
Plotinus' account, the intellect is not filled with discrete objects, like a
Trojan horse filled with a group of warriors. The ideas do not constitute
discrete parts within the intellect. For that matter, the notion of parts, in
this noetic context, is entirely misplaced:

Intellect there is not like this, but has all things and is all things, and is with
them when it is with itself and has all things without having them. For it is not
one thing and they another (o'U yap XkXa, bo ? a&o;); nor is each individual
thing in it separate (ov& XCopit ekaatov 'w.v ?V ain&); for each is the whole and
in all ways all (okov TE yfap artv iEcKaarov Kict navran- icav). 1.8 [51].2.15-20

Thus the intellect is not a nexus in which part "a" is external to part "b."
Rather each part - using the term very loosely - contains the whole.48

44 Cf. 1.1 [53].8.4-6, 3.7 [45].3.36-8 and 3.7 [451.5.25-8.

4S Perhaps, it might be more helpful just to speak of the two sides, the epistemic
subject and its objects, as having a dynamic relation and not a causal one, so as to
avoid confusion with the fact that the One is the cause of the intellect by way of
emmanation. Regardless of this, what is crucial for my purposes is that the reciprocal
relation between the two sides is understood as something which is not exclusively
logical.
46 6.2 [43].21.53ff.
47 Plotinus certainly does not intend us to take the noetic world in a literal spatial
sense. He is explicit that there is no place in that realm: icai o0S T6ico; EKce?: (6.2
[43].16.5). For what it is worth, Plotinus does actually use the term vonr6os T0o5o; twice
in 6.7. [38].35.5 and 41. However, on these occasions, he is using it for rhetorical pur-
poses, quoting from Plato's Republic, 508c and 517b. The closest Plotinus comes to
the notion of place is when he says that each intelligible is the same as its place
(Xopa), 5.8 [31].4.18.
4" Emilsson, I think, states this very obscure matter well when he remarks:
"Plotinus,. . . claims that the intellect and the ideas are not even two distinct parts or
aspects of a thing unified into one (as one might say that the hard disk and the screen

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 276 IAN CRYSTAL

Plotinus elsewhere employs the Anaxagorean phrase to express what he

means: a&X' bjoo ?v ?vI iuvta.49 It is not the case that one part of the intel-
lectual structure grasps another part of that same intellectual structure qua
part: ... 1 o? 4 0"SXob &ei 'E'aaTov ical 'aa ?Kaatov icat oXov- qxavT4 at
jev yap gepo;, evopaTat 8E, 5T 0tj l e dv 6,tv OXov.... I The reason Plotinus
will not tolerate a mereological account of the intellect, at least not an
exclusively discrete one, is because, if such were the case, then the intel-
lectual subject and the intelligible object would be vulnerable to the claim
that they did not entirely interpenetrate one another. And for Plotinus it
is crucial that they do. Otherwise, the intellect will stand in a similar rela-
tion to its objects as did discursive reason: two things which are external
to one another. And if that were the case, the intellect would rely upon
images. Accordingly, Plotinus remarks of the intellectual realm: o 68 X01105
?1c?; vorp&; o &X0 o EV avXXp.5' Essentially Plotinus is after intertwined
complexity (ast,tXoKdi cn moaVOeat;), along with complete interpenetration
and some kind of identity.

IV. The p yuxa a-vr

In order to come to grips with these relations which are pulling in differ-
ent directions, Plotinus' interpretation of the IL&tara yFviq of the Sophist
must be considered next. For he maintains that the intellect is constituted
out of them: 6 6 vo6; Ov vooiv icat ai vOetov eW aivXov, oux ev Tt 'Wv

of a computer are one); they are one in a much stronger sense so that each idea in all
of its parts is intellect and intellect is throughout ideas; thus, in Plotinus intellect with-
out ideas is an impossibility and likewise ideas without intellect." E.K. Emilsson,
"Plotinus on the Objects of Thought," p. 21. Gerson, I think wrongly, does speak of
the forms in this context in terms of being aspects of the intellect. The problem with
aspects, pace Emilsson, is that they do not allow for the required transparency which
is so crucial to Plotinus. L. Gerson, "Plotinus," pp. 50-1. Gerson actually does use the
term partial identity (p. 51) by which he means the ideas partially overlap. There
is an analogous problem in Plotinus about how the individual intellect, which we all
supposedly have, can contain the entire intellect, what Plotinus refers to as the sc,k.
For a discussion of this problem, see G.J.P. O'Daly, Plotinus' Philosophy of the Self,
pp. 62-3.
49 6.6 [34].7.4. The phrase "opo6 naivra" occurs in the beginning of Anaxagoras'
book, Fr. Bl D-K.
5 5.8 [311.4.22-25. Plotinus goes on to compare it to the legend of Lynceus, an
individual who was supposed to have looked into the inside of the earth, see Apollo-
nius Rhodius I 151-5.
51 5.9 [51.10.10. Elsewhere we are told that the two sides, the subject and object,
are fused together (auyyKpa0Evtaq a'roitq), 5.5 [32].2.1-9.

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 PLOTINUS ON THE STRUCTURE OF SELF-INTELLECTION 277

yEVWV:52 Thus it is in terms of being, motion, rest, sameness a

ness that Plotinus articulates the formal structure of the intelle
how it is that the intellect is a '?V noXX&.5 The geyta'ra 'Ev11 m
conceptual skeleton of the intellect's ivipyuta. Taking Ennead 6.2 as my
guide, according to Plotinus it is incorrect to speak of the being of the
intellect without concurrently (a`a) speaking of its movement (KIvIa;t).5I
For the latter is the activity (ivipyeta) of that which is actively actual.55
As Plotinus says elsewhere, if the intellect stands still, it does not think:
?i ' 'OMKEV, 0a VOCI.56 Rest (a'rat;) arises because Kivmn; is not a chang-
ing of being's nature but rather its perfection.57 Being throughout exists in
the same state and in the same way.58 Otherness enters into the account
when distinguishing being, motion and rest from one another;59 that is,
when the intellect is grasped in its conceptual diversity, i.e. as noUaX.60
And sameness when the three are grasped in their unity, i.e. as Cv.6' For
the intellect, despite being all three, is also one.62 The yevil, therefore, are
one way of seeing how the intellect is, to quote, a '?V noXX&.63
The epistemological motivation for such a move is clear: internal dif-
ferentiation that accounts for the intellect having itself as an object of
intellection. Internal differentiation of some sort is necessary if the intel-
lect is to have itself as an intellectual object, and yet simultaneously be
the subject of the intellectual act. The question is whether or not the
g&ytatra yFviq in their application to the intellect are sufficient to account
for such an epistemic relation. Do the Ji&'ytoa yev&l prevent the intellect
from being reduced to a simple inert entity, what Plotinus elsewhere refers

52 6.2 [431.18.11-12.
S3 6.2 [431.8.25-50 and 6.2 [43].15.1-19. Of course, the yE'" are not exclusive to
the intellect. They apply to everything, save the One.
-' 6.2 [431.15.11.
ss 6.2 [431.15.9.
56 6.7 [381.13.39-40.
57 6.2 [431.7.26-28.
58 6.2 [43].7.30-31.
59 6.2 [431.8.35-37.
60 6.2 [43].15.14-15.
61 6.2 [431.8.37-38. This is not the only delineation that Plotinus offers of the five
yvii. In 5.1 [10].4, he first discusses same and other and then introduces motion and
rest.
62 6.2 [431.15.14-15.
63 6.2 [431.15.15. Of course, one might object and say that the pytata ycvTi apply
to everything save the One and so are not unique to the intellect. They do but not in
the same way. When it comes to the intellect, we are looking at something strictly
from a self-relational perspective.

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 278 IAN CRYSTAL

to as an inert lump ("o ;)?"

how it is that the intellect c
text of the intellect requires both self-identity (or, perhaps, self-sameness
is more correct) and self-otherness or difference,65 i.e. different intellectual
stages or intellectual moments which are not simply identical with one
another but rather that lend themselves to being distinguished:

Therefore he [Plato] rightly understands that there is otherness and sameness

where there is intellect and substance. For one must always understand intellect
as otherness and sameness if it is going to think (&6 y&p Tov voiv &Et ETpOwnr'a
ca rai xnxoMa Xaifparvev, ETMEp voi cEt). 6.7 [38].39.4-7*

If such distinctions were denied to the intellect, it would be impossible

to distinguish conceptually between that which thinks and that which is
thought. By ruling out the tc rtxa ycvn, it becomes impossible to appre-
hend how the intellect could have a relation in which it is simultaneously
the thinking subject and its own object of thought. For to do so, presup-
poses that the intellect is capable of having internal epistemic relations,
in particular having itself as an object of thought. Without the ge&ytata
-y?vTi, the intellect would be incapable of having itself as an object of
thought. It would be reduced to simple self-identity. And if that were the
case, Plotinus' account of the noetic intellect's activity would be vulner-
able to the objection that it is, at best, inconsistent and, at worst, contra-
dictory, given his earlier claim that all thinking is of something (ttv6;).67
It is essential, therefore, to have some way of understanding how the intel-
lect can become more than one when thinking itself:

But if he himself thinks he becomes many, intelligible, intelligent, in motion and

everything else appropriate to Intellect. 6.7 [38].39.14-I6"4

If not, the result is something which is in a state of utter simplicity and,

as a result, incapable of the intellectual process:

It is necessary therefore to be one and a pair - but if it is, on the other hand,
one and not two, it will have nothing to think: so that it will not even be a think-

i 6.7 [381.14.8-11.
65 It must be borne in mind that Plotinus' account of the intellect in this context of
self-identity and othemess draws heavily on Plato's Parmenides (in particular the sec-
ond hypothesis), a dialogue the dialectical exercise of which was not taken lightly by
Plotinus and the Neoplatonists. See n. 33 and also L. Gerson, Plotinus, p. 45, n. 9.
66 Also cf. 5.1 [10].4.34-35.
67 Cf. n. 9.
6 Similarly, at 5.6 [24].3.22ff. we read: 'ei oiuv Tr-) VoobVTI XA.XOo, &-i Ev ' (TO1)
nkhOEl T0 VOEIV 1?'l elvat'.

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 PLOTINUS ON THE STRUCTURE OF SELF-INTELLECTION 279

ing principle. Thus it is necessary for it to be simple and not simple (&iR
[sc. rO vo?v; cci OcaV orX ox6v &6 dtvaQ). 5.6 [241.1.12-14

Thus the g' tata yevin offer us a way of getting around the problem
ple identity without necessarily creating a plurality of existentially
ent entities, which is necessary for Plotinus' theory of self-intellection.

V. The Noetic Intellect's Relation to Itself Revisited

Having set out the formal structure of the intellect along with the need
for its internal differentiation, I now need to explain how that account -
an account which is the basis for the subject-object distinction - is com-
patible with the whole/whole account of the intellect. I need to show that
Plotinus' claim that when the intellect thinks itself, being one, it becomes
two (&po ozv yivvrat 'v 6v)69 can somehow be reconciled with Plotinus'
other claim:

But if it [intellect] has them [the intelligibles] themselves, it does not see them
as a result of dividing itself, but it was contemplator and possessor before it
divided itself. But if this is so, the contemplation must be the same as the con-
templated, and intellect the same as the intelligible (Ei t'roro, Srit 'V eEO)Ppiacv
rawTOV ElVat XX OEcop7rriC, ca& tOV VOiv tw r6V E Xvatrap Voijt4). 5.3 [49].5.20-23

The background to this argument from 5.3 [49].5 is that the intellect
always possesses its objects. If this were not the case, the intellect would
be vulnerable to the claim that it focused upon images.70 In virtue of hav-
ing its objects at each conceptual stage of its activity, Plotinus concludes
that the contemplator and the contemplated are the same (tar6ov). At this
point it might appear that the distinction between the epistemic subject
and the intelligible object is untenable.7' Disregarding the evidence from
the previous section about the need for the subject-object distinction, I
think that the passage just quoted is not incompatible with this distinction
once it is made clear how Plotinus understands such a distinction.
For a start, that the activity of the intellect is constitutive of multiplic-
ity within itself is clear. Plotinus speaks of there being a sort of internal
occurrence (olov iapejRaOOv) when the intellect thinks itself, and it is this
which makes it, the intellect, many: Ei omiv voi;, oSt iEokq 'Crrt1, wati lo voiv
cnoxo otov nape.ceaov6, iav c_ a&rov n1, X _t... .72 Now we know that the

69 5.6 [241.1.6.
70 5.3 [49].5.17-20.
7' For this view, see E.K. Emilsson, "Plotinus on the Objects of Thought," p. 33
72 5.3 [491.11.26-28. Cf. 6.9 [9].9.8 for another occurrence of ncap?lgnirro.

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 280 IAN CRYSTAL

intellect's multiplicity, a multiplicity which is due to the intellect gener-

ating a plurality of intelligible objects in its act of self-intellection, will
not be a plurality of parts." Yet neither does Plotinus regard the noetic
subject and its intelligible objects as different wholes qua substance; that
is, an epistemic subject separate and existentially independent from a plu-
rality of individuated objects: 6o [sc. voriv] &e o' icex6ptoTat tm ovat9c, a&Xa
ouvov ai)rjbpt o 'axyo.7 If he did, then he could not claim, as he so often does,
that the act of intellection entails self-intellection. Rather, for Plotinus
internal differentiation takes the form of different internal activities or dif-
ferent active states. Thus, immediately after speaking of self-intellection
as involving a sort of internal occurrence (otov napesjnoov), Plotinus
speaks of the multiplicity of ivipyctat within the intellect:

But what prevents it from being a multiplicity in this sense, as long as it is one
substance. For the multiplicity [of intellect] is not a plurality of compositions but
its activities are the multiplicity ([sc. oi vo?;]v o') oUvOC'et;, a&U' ai EvE'pyEtat
ausob,o' TXOo;8*). 5.3 [49].12. 1-3715

Now given that the part/part reading has been ruled out, these active states
must be wholes.76 Moreover, as the multiplicity within the conceptual
framework of the intellect is accounted for in the primary sense by the
duality of subject and objects, it follows that the subject and objects will

73 Now, although the present passage is talking about a plurality of intelligible

objects, it is still relevant to the subject-object distinction for two reasons: Firstly,
Plotinus is talking about self-intellection, i.e. the intellect's act of thinking itself. And
that act is premised upon the epistemic subject having itself as an object of thought.
Secondly, any time one is talking about an intelligible or intelligibles, one has to pre-
suppose the subject-object distinction. For what it is to be an intelligible only makes
sense within the context of the subject-object distinction, i.e. the thinker and that which
is thought. Thus, I must be careful here to stress that multiplicity within the intellect
can be spoken of in two ways which must be kept distinct from one another. Firstly,
there is the multiplicity of ideas. Secondly, there is the multiplicity in that there is the
thinker and the object or objects which that thinker thinks. However, as the plurality
of intelligibles already presupposes the distinction between the subject and its objects,
it is of derivative importance for my account of self-intellection.
74 5.6 [24].1.5-6.
75 Although the term "states" is not Plotinus' own, I do not think it unfair of me
to use it, since it does capture what, I think, Plotinus is getting at when he talks about
the intellect qua thinker, as opposed to object thought. I could just as easily use the
term "disposition" (or even "sense") and say the intellect has different dispositions
which amounts to the same thing, but again this is not Plotinus' own term. The impor-
tant point to get across is that intellect does have conceptual moments that differ from
one another connotationally.
76 See n. 3.

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 PLOTINUS ON THE STRUCTURE OF SELF-INTELLECTION 281

also have to be thought of as wholes. In short, this is how Plotinus reworks

the conceptual structure of the intellect and in doing so resolves the sec-
ond horn of Sextus' dilemma, save one qualification: The structure is not
dual in form but rather triadic. The framework of the intellect consists of
the intellectual subject (voi-;), the intelligible objects (vonra') and the act
of thinking (vO6rat;), all of which are to be understood as wholes. But as
they are not different wholes qua substance, their status as wholes will
have to be understood in some other manner, i.e. active states or Ev?pyetat,
all of which are of the same whole qua substance." Such an account, i.e.
attribution of different states to the whole, enables Plotinus to deal with
the second part of Sextus' dilemma because the necessary slots which are
required for self-intellection - subject and object - can be filled or satisfied
by this one whole, the intellect. For Plotinus could argue in response to
Sextus that intellect qua whole acts on itself qua whole, both being the
same whole qua substance but different qua states. Self-intellection, there-
fore, would consist in intellect qua St bringing itself against itself qua S2:

For in seeing the real beings it saw itself, and in seeing, it was in act, and its
actuality was itself (ta yap 6vra opwv ?aOTOv epa iccaz op6v wVepyeL9 Av cai
-v?pyeta awuro); for intellect and intellection are one; and it thinks as a whole
with the whole of itself and not one part of itself with another (voi yzap Kca
vOat; D ai Ao; Ao, oV gpept &Xo po). 5.3 [49].6.6-878

This would allow the intellect to be conceptually divided on one level,

while leaving its identity relation intact on another. Each active state is
the whole, just with a specific connotation that can be differentiated from
the other ones. So, for example, the intellect qua thinking subject is dif-
ferent from the intellect qua intelligible object. One thinks and the other
is thought. So too with the act of thinking, it is different from that which
has the power79 to think and that which can be thought. Such connota-
tional differences are what enables Plotinus to circumvent the second horn
of Sextus' dilemma:

... and the thought and this substance are not different things, and, again in that
the nature thinks itself, they are not different except in definition, what is thought

77 It should be noted that Plotinus is not always consistent in his use of these three
terms, cf. J. Bussanich, The One and its Relation to the Intellect in Plotinus, p. 58.
However, at 5.3 [49].5.44-50 it is clear that they do represent different states of the
intellectual whole.
78 Cf. 2.9 [33].1.33ff. and G.J.P. O'Daly, Plotinus' Philosophy of the Self, pp. 75-6
on the identity of subject and act.
79 Plotinus does sometimes refer to the intellect as having certain powers (uva&-
iet;), powers which are always actualised, cf. 6.7 [381.35.21.

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 282 IAN CRYSTAL

and what thinks, that is, a plurali

ro voovv, xikfio; oov), as has oft

Because of these connotational differences, Plotinus' account of self-

intellection avoids the pitfall of simple identity. For without them, the

intellect could not have itself as an object of intellection: XoA 6 X

an)oi6; y^lvetat vowv EaxuTov, a& & 86n tniv VOIiatv tiv iept arov ?tEpOi etivat,
'Rw n $vatro voeiv avxo. Yet, by the same token, Plotinus' notion of
wholes, while satisfying the subject and object requirement, allows for the
intellectual subject to have itself as an object in a completely transparent
manner. For, as Plotinus is keen to emphasis, the intellectual process is
a completely transparent one: 6taqpavil yap icavra icait aCOc?eov Ovi 8 a,v'ri-
twXov OM5?V, aXX& is&; navrt pavpEO; E; 'CO Ea(i) icat icav'a.T No whole -
be it voi;, vo6iit;, or vorlTa - eclipses any of the other wholes. For when
one comes up against another it sees itself. Accordingly, Plotinus con-
cludes 5.3 [49].5 by distinguishing these three states from one another,
while also asserting an identity thesis which binds them together:

All together are one, intellect, intellection, the intelligible ('v a&iA navTa eaTa,
vo6;, vo6att, rO voit'v). If therefore intellect's intellection is the intelligible, and
the intelligible is itself, it will itself think itself: for it will think with the intel-
lection which it is itself and will think the intelligible, which is itself (Li obv ij
vo6at; ai?roi X'0 voTrO6v, X0 0. vo'rObv ar6o;, akor; 'apa iavr6Ov V0?151- VOl?
yap mj VoTia1I, Oi?p iV aci'o;, ico IVOiEt T ' VOTo6V, XEp ijv aiT6;). In both ways,
then, it will think itself, in that intellection is itself and in that the intelligible is
itself which it thinks in its intellection and which is itself (icO' bcaKipov apa
% X % It % I I, v I 11 1
EMYTOxv VolEt,arOO
VOEtI T'j Vo'aEtI, 'O

Now, if my interpretation of Plotinus can be shown to hold, it would be

adequate to act as a basis for a coherent theory of self-intellection. For
wholes and transparency, if they can be combined, enable the subject to
have itself as an object of intellection. The account allows for a type of
identity thesis to hold between the subject and object, which is crucial for
any theory of self-intellection but it does so in a novel and unique way;
by allotting a pivotal role to vo6lt;, the act of the intellectual subject.
Through placing as much emphasis on v6raot; as Plotinus does, the sub-
ject never loses sight of itself in being identified with its object.82 For the
sake of clarity, let me call this new identity relation or thesis epistemic
identity, given that it is founded upon the epistemic subject's act. The

"o 6.7 [38].39.12-13.

81 5.8 [31].4.5-6. Cf. 5.8 [311.4.22-25.
82 Cf. n. 78.

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 PLOTINUS ON THE STRUCTURE OF SELF-INTELLECTION 283

reason the epistemic subject never loses sight of itself in this act - never
becomes opaque but always remains transparent to itself - is because this
act is generated by or from it. Plotinus, breaking from the Aristotelian
tradition, is actually allotting an active role to the intellectual subject in
its relation with its object, namely itself.83 In order to see how Plotinus
can successfully achieve such an identity relation, i.e. epistemic identity,
in which the intellectual subject and object are the same as one another,
yet connotationally differentiated but transparently so, I want to conclude
with an examination of the Plotinus' original reworking of the traditional
light analogy; an analogy which he employs to illustrate the noetic proc-
ess, and the identity thesis - what I call epistemic identity - around which
it operates.

VI. Light

If we return to the Staxpavij passage quoted above from 5.8 [31].4,

Plotinus, as he does elsewhere, employs the image of light illuminating
light: (p*q yap [sc. e'io tatpave];J qwrx&. By Plotinus' time, the light anal-
ogy had a very long tradition. The two most obvious instances being
Plato's Republic and Aristotle's De Anima.85 What both of these passages
have in common is that they are structured in such a way that the Sun
and the active intellect, respectively, are that in virtue of which the visi-
ble or intelligible objects are able to act upon the seer or the thinker. For
in both instances they actualise the medium in such a way that objects
become visible or intelligible. The Sun in the Republic does this by emit-
ting light and the active intellect by being in a certain state like light.86
Now there can be little doubt that Plotinus was very well aware of both
these passages and this traditional use of light.87 With this in mind, one
can appreciate what a significant shift there is in his reworking of this

8 Cf. E.K. Emilsson, "Plotinus on the Objects of Thought," p. 41.

84 5.8 [31].4.6. Also cf. 5.6 [24].1.16-22.
"' Republic 509b2-20 and D.A. 430al5-17.
16 Obviously, I am not trying to imply that the roles of the Sun and the active intel-
lect are identical in their respective analogies, since the role of the latter is both much
more complex and broader in scope. Nonetheless they do have somewhat similar roles
in the context of allowing for the epistemic subject to be acted upon by creating the
right conditions.
17 Plotinus would certainly have known of the discussion of D.A. 3.5, if by no other
means than through Alexander of Aphrodisias. We have already witnessed his lifting
of the writing tablet analogy from D.A. 3.4. We also know he was aware of Plato's
Sun analogy because he employs a very similar, if not identical, Sun analogy at 6.7
[38].16.25ff., when speaking of his first principle.

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 284 IAN CRYSTAL

famous analogy. For Plotinus radically alters the relation between the intel-
lectual subject, the light and the object illuminated by the light:

But in the intelligible world, seeing is not through another [sc. medium], but
through itself, because it is not directed outside (?Ebit 8i oi &' 8 ?rpov, &a &'
aIxTi;, o"it pii& E`). Intellect therefore sees one light with another, not through
another (QXXp ouv pt &aXo (pCo; bp4, oB 5t' a&Xou). Light then sees another
light: it therefore itself sees itself (q* apall 9pX aX O'pc auro apa avkTr O'p0).
5.3 [49].8.21-248

In the noetic world (E;ici), seeing is not through another (&t' ETEpoi) but
through itself (5t' airi;). This is because the focus of the subject, the seer,
is not directed outwards (O5tlt ?il& ). The first sentence of this passage,
I think, implies that the intellect qua the subject of the perception, is its
own medium. For it sees 8t' abvi; and, consequently, it itself establishes
or generates the correct conditions for the occurrence of sight. In this con-
text, the 8ta is pivotal because it is indicative of what Plotinus considers
to be passive and active. For if the intellect were to see 8t' ?Tepov (the
traditional Platonic and Aristotelian usage), then there would be grounds
for taking the medium to be external to the intellectual subject, with the
result that when it, the medium, is in the proper state, i.e. activated, then
and only then can the subject be acted upon by the intelligible object. Thus
Plotinus, given his preference for &t' ai,ri; as opposed to 8t' irkpov,
clearly differs from both the Aristotelian and Platonic usage of light in
this epistemological context. For, according to their analogies, the source
of light was something independent of the subject. It is that which brought
about the right conditions which in turn enabled the objects to act upon
the epistemic subject.90 To make Plato and Aristotle conform to the
Plotinian usage, we would have to say that the seer and the passive intel-
lect themselves respectively activate the medium in such a way as to make
the visibles or intelligibles actually visible or intelligible. In other words,
they would have to make what they take to be passive active. That they
do not can be traced to the fact that they do not develop this doctrine of
noetic internality (o"rt 1gi& C%).

The Armstrong edition misprints this as 'ipa.

9 It should be noted that this sort of intellectual image of light meeting light can
be found in Plato's Timaeus as an account of how actual vision works, cf. 45b2-d3.
I thank Gerard O'Daly for pointing this out to me.
tx Recall that even with the Aristotelian usage from D.A. 3.5, it is only when the
active intellect is in a certain state that the intelligibles are able to act upon the intel-
lectual subject: . .. .o [sc. vo6;1 6? tz nicvTa ncotetv, & ?t ct;, olov T6O pk- Tpnov yTap
Tva cat to pi iooA ta 8uv6.4t WO`va Xp(dVtOa ivp'yciq XpdWxra.

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 PLOTINUS ON THE STRUCTURE OF SELF-INTELLECION 285

Plotinus concludes (ovv) from the first sentence that the int
light ((pk) sees another light (a&Xo (p&) with another light
not through another (5t' a&Xoi). Are we to infer from this sentence that
we are dealing with three different lights and, if so, exactly how are they
different? Moreover, when intellect sees one light with another, what is
the force of the "with"? Taking the questions in order, we know that the
lights are not different from one another as discrete parts of a whole dif-
fer from one another for two reasons: Plotinus has already rejected the
part/part reading and light, at least according to Plotinus, is an incorpo-
real entity,9" rendering it indivisible.92 Moreover, we also know that we
are not dealing with different separate independent substances (that is, dif-
ferent wholes qua substance), since he has already said in the opening
sentence that the intellect's attention is not directed outwards. The light
at which the intellect is looking must be itself. We are only examining
one numerical entity as far as substance is concerned. For the seer, the
seeing and the seen belong to the same thing. But the level of substance
is not the only one with which we are working. And this brings us to the
second question, the force of the "with."
I understand the "with" to mean that the intellect itself, in addition to
being the first light (pC;), i.e. the intellectual subject, is the other light
(a&XX yp'ri) qua vO6rjat93 and that light brings itself to bear on the other
light (QXXo yP) which is itself qua vonTov. For if one compares this sen-
tence to the sentence in the passage we had earlier, when discussing how
none of the wholes eclipsed one another (voifljE yap rn VOi1O, OIEEp i1V
alB,q, 1cat VOiaet X0r vonrov, O6icp I?jv ar6o;, 5.3 [49].5.43-50), one can see
that the "with" picks out the bringing of the intellect's self qualified in a
specific way against itself qualified in another way;94 what could be called
whole against whole. This interpretation of the sentence explains the
choice of "with" over "through" in that "with" in the present context, just
as 6t' airrij; in the previous sentence, renders the subject active, whereas
the "through" would make it passive.95 For the "with" articulates the con-

9' 2.1 [401.7.26-28 and 4.5 [29].6-7.

92 According to Plotinus at 6.4 [22].8.18-19 only corporeal bodies are divisible,
since they have magnitude.
9- Cf. 5.3 [491.6.7-8 and cf. n. 77.
94 The present passage which is under examination, much more than the one we
had previously, emphasises the transparency of the wholes in no uncertain terms.
9S Just as there were probable grounds for saying that Plotinus was consciously
altering the traditional light analogy, here it would seem as if he were consciously
inverting the through/with dichotomy which is central to Socrates' account of the epis-

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 286 IAN CRYSTAL

ceptual development or non-temp

the subject not just with the object but with the act as well.97 Yet it also
conceptually differentiates the subject and its act from the object.
However, Plotinus does not jump from saying intellect sees one light
with another to the final conclusion that intellect sees itself, i.e. self-intel-

lection. Rather he offers the interim conclusion: (p& aipa (pdS aAAo op9.
Plotinus arrives at this conclusion, on my interpretation, because of the
work the "with" reading has done. For we now know that we are not
dealing with something which is absolutely simple. There might only be
one substance as such but if it is not capable of internal differentiation,
then we are back to the simple identity claim. And if that is the case,
then we have undercut the entire intellectual process. Hence the intellect
being pl sees p&;2. The second light is different from the first in as
much as the first is the seeing seer and the second the seen, the intellec-
tual subject and object. This provides, along with the act, the necessary
internal differentiation for an intellectual process within one substance.
Accordingly, it is crucial that gpc see Tk2 qua aXXo. By the same token
however, since we are only dealing with one light, Plotinus is able to
reach his desired conclusion of self-intellection. For the lights might be
a.Xo connotationally but not substantially. Thus ai&ot &pa awro opq.
To conclude, we have an identity relation, which tolerates internal dif-
ferentiation. Moreover, it is a differentiation which takes the form of
whole against whole, allowing for the subject-object distinction and yet
not prohibiting the intellect from knowing itself. If anything, the whole/
whole relation, according to Plotinus, is the only way in which the intel-
lect could properly know itself.

Louisiana State University

temic subject in the icotv& passage of the Theaetetus. Plotinus either knows of the
Theaetetus directly or through Alexander. Plotinus, by using "with" in this context, it
would seem, is further emphasising the identity between the epistemic subject and the
medium against a backdrop in the Theaetetus in which the two were heterogeneous,
i.e. the epistemic subject and its sense organs. Cf. Myles Burnyeat, "Plato on the Grammar
of Perceiving," Classical Quarterly 26 (1976), p. 29.
96 Plotinus' use of light at 5.5 [32].7.13ff. does not contradict my argument, because
that context, again, is one of the intellect's inner light.
97 Cf. n. 78.

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