Wolfensberger 2000 - Congress & The People (Sunshine, TV & Referendum Chapters) (HELMS KNEW WHAT HE WAS DOING)

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© 2000 by Donald R. Wolfcnsbcrgcr

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Primed in the United States of America on acid- free paper €9
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Library of Congress Car-dloging·in·Publication Data
Wolfcnsbcrgcr, Donald R.
Congress nnd the people : dcliber.ltive democracy on trial/ Donald R.
Wolfensbcrgcr.
p. em.
Includes bibliographical referc:nces and index.
ISBN 0-8018-6307·4 (hardcover}
I. United States. Congress-History. 2. United States.
Congress-Reform- History.
J. Democracy-United States. I. Tttle.
JKI021 .W64 1999
328.73'09-dcZI
Contents
Acknowledgments xi
Introduction 1
1 I Making a Constitution 9
2 I The Bill of Rights: Madison Gets Religion 21
3 / The Right to Petition: The Long Drive 28
4 I Congress and the Progressive Era 41
5 I The Initiative and Referendum Movement 56
6 I National Referendum Proposals and the
Isolationist Impulse 71
7 / The Dawning of the Sunshine Seventies 86
8 I A Window on Congress: Televising Floor Debates 103
9 I The Revival of Direct Democracy Proposals 129
10 / The Road to the Republican Revolution 147
11 I The Road to Governance: Revolution, Reform,
and Reality 175
12 / Coming Full Circle: The Complete Revolution? 192
13 I Term Limits and the Scarlet Letter 211
14 I The Electronic Congress 229
15 I The Curtain Falls Twice on the House 249
16 I The Future of Deliberative Democracy 267
IX
•••
The Dawning of the

Sunshine Seventies
Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and indu.mial diseases.

Sunlight is said tO be rhe besr of disinfecrants; electric light the most efficient
tmliceman.
Lo uis D. Bra ndeis
Harper's Weekly
HRO U G HOUT its history the Congress has reformed itself for a wide
T variery of reasons: to right an imbalance with the executive branch, to

restore public confidence in the wake of scanda ls or legislative gridlock,
to become more adaptable to changing domestic and interna tional conditions,
ro renew its accountability to the people, to increase its abiliry to make in-
. .
formed and responsible decisions based on greater knowledge and deliberation,
or to redistribute internal power ro achieve more desirable legislative out·
comes. Most significant reform efforts are pursued with a combination of these
goals in mind, even though members and scholars alike have recognized their
conflicting nature. 1 That which promotes greater responsibility and delibera-
tion, for instance, may undermine the institution's ability to be more respon·
sive, represemative, or efficient. Increasing Congress's independence and co·
equal status with the executive branch may make it more difficult to break
legislative gridlock through cooperation and compromise.
Speaker Thomas Reed's rules against an obstructionist minority in 1890 and
the revolt against a more conservative Speaker, joe Cannon, in 1910 were both
86
The Dawning of theSunshine Seventies
aimed at unclogging legislative arteries to speed the flow of legislation favored

by a congressional majority. BO£h were couched in renns oflening the people's
representatives implement the will of the people.
The congressional reform revolution of the 1970s was the culmination of ef-
forts begun in the previous decade to modernize the Congress and restore it as
a coequal branch with the executive. Three main obstacles had blocked reform
and a more responsive Congress in the early and mid- 1960s: the seni ori ty sys-
tem that entrenched conservative southern Democrats in committee chair·
manships, the Senate filibuster, and the House Rules Committee.
By the end of the 1970s, tho:: reformers had succeeded beyond their wildest
dreams. Committee chaim1anships were elective positions, fewer votes were
required to end filibusters, and the House Rul es Committee was firmly under
d1e control of the majority leadersh ip. Moreover, power had been dispersed
with the growth of a semiautonomous subcommirtee system. Congress created
a new congressional budget process, budget off1ce, and war powers limits to
counter executive branch dominance. And it opened committee meetings and
hearings to the people, publicized committee and floor votes, and welcomed
television cameras into committee and House floor sessions.
The Origins and Effects of Reform

This chapter focuses on the origins and effects of the reforms of the 1970s. They
are usually categorized under the rubric of "sunshine" or "antisecrecy" reforms
or "government in the sunshine." Their roots are traceable ro the good gov·
em ment reforms propounded during the Progressive Era in American politics.
But it was not until the 1970s that substantial steps were taken to open con-
gressional proceedi ngs to the public. While most o( the changes Congress made
""' . .... . ...... .....
during this period were not in response to any grea t ourpouring of public sen-
timent- more than one observer has noted that "congressional refonn has no
constiruency"- they did h ave the support of various interest groups as well as
of editorial writers and columnists. But more imporrant, they were seen by their
supporters within the Congress as a necessa ry step ro keep the Congress close
ro the people and thereby to enhance public understanding of rhe institution
and its decisions.
Congress and Secrecy

N othing in rhe Constitution requires public sessions of Congress, let alone
public hearings of its committees or public votes. In fact, the Constituti on
makes n o mention of committees at all. O ne of the first decisions of the First
Continental Congress in September of 1774 was to keep its proceedings se-
cre t, the custom of the colonial assemblies. Likewise, the Constitu tional Con-
vention's proceedings in 1787 were secret. However, one of th e rules proposed
87
The Dawning of rhe Sunshine Seventies
for the Convention would have permitted any member to call for the yeas and
nays on any matter voted and the printing in the minutes of the names for
and against. According to james Madison's notes, Rufus King of Massachu-
setts objected to the rule on grounds that it was unnecessary since acts of the
Convention were not binding on constituents. Moreover, he argued that such
a record of votes would be "improper as changes of opinion would be frequent
in the course of the business and would fill the minutes with contradictions."
George Mason seconded King's objection. A record of the opinion of mem-
bers "would be an obstacle to a change of them on conviction," and, when
promulgated in the future, "must furnish handles to the adversaries of the
Result of the Meeting."2 The rule was subsequently dropped by unanimous
consent.
The House of Representatives in the First Congress did not open its doors
to the public until April 8, 1789, a full week after the session began. The Sen-
ate, however, did not open its meetings to the public until December of 1795,
and then only for legislative business.3 Jt was not until June of 1929, at the sug-
gestion ofSen. Robert LaFollette, Jr., of Wisconsin, that Senate sessions for so-
called executive business (namely, the consideration of presidential nomina-
tions and treaties) were opened as well.4
The House did retain one curious relic from the British House of Com-
mons-the "committee of the whole House" (see Chapter 1). This committee
is a procedural convenience whereby the entire membership of the lower house
first considered and amended legislation before finally reporting it back to the
House for final action. The device had been created in the British House of
Commons in the seventeenth century to permit discussion in secrecy of the
king's budget requests, with a chairman presiding other than the Speaker, since
the latter was considered an agent of the Crown. The device was attractive in
the American colonial assemblies for much the same reason, and it was adopted
by the Continental Congresses. the Congress of Confederation. and the Con-
stitutional Convention.
The Constitution (Article I, section 5, clause 3) requires each house to keep
a journal of its proceedings and publish it from time to time (except such pans
as are determined to require secrecy). "The Yeas and Nays of the Members of
either House on any question shall, at the desire of one fifth of those Present,
be entered on the journal." While the Constitution does not provide for a
Committee of the Whole House, its establishment was among the first four
rules adopted by the House of Representatives in April of 1789.
Although secrecy from the Crown was no longer a factor in the new Amer-
ican Republic, and the Committee of the Whole operated in public view, it did
retain the practice from the Commons of taking nonrecordcd votes by
"tellers"-persons who counted members as they filed down the aisles in the
88
chamber (one aisle for proponents and one for opponents of the pending
proposition). 1l1e constitutional provision for obtaining a recorded vote by a
demand for the "yeas" and "nays" is not construed as applying to the commit·
tees of the House, even to one consisting of all House members (the Commit·
tee of the Whole). The policy of nonrecorded votes in the Committee of the
Whole remained parr of House rules untill971. even though the British House
of Commons had changed its rules in the 1830s to permit recorded votes in its
committees of the whole. 5
House and Senate committees conducted most of their hearings and all of
their meetings in private during the first century of the Republic based on the
parliamentary concept that the work of committees was advisory in nature and
was not to be discussed elsewhere, especially by the parem chamber, umil the
committee had filed a formal report. In the early twentieth century, with the
construction of new House and Senate office buildings, more space became
available for committees ro hold public hearings, and many began the practice
on a selective basis. But committee meetings to "mark up" or amend pending
bills continued to be held in closed, executive sessions.
Progressivism and Publicity

Part of the Progressive Era's legacy was its emphasis on "publicity" as a prereq-
uisite of good and effective government at all levels. This was based on the no-
tion that most decisions were made behind closed doors by the party bosses and
big money interests. If such decision making occurred in the open, officials pre-
sumably would have to pay attention to public opinion and act accordingly.
In a presidential campaign speech in 191 Z titled "Let There Be Light,"
Woodrow Wilson said that in order to put government back on its "right ba-
- - -
sis, substituting popular will for the rule of guardians," a first necessity "is to
open the doors and let in the light on all affairs which the people have a right
to know about" and which have been "too secret, too complicated, and too
round-about." Wilson believed "government ought to be all outside and not
inside," and he called publicity "one of the purifying elements of polirics."6
Unlike his conversion to the initiative and referendum, which came late in
his public life, Wilson's oppositio n to secrecy in government began in his early
years as a political science studcnt.ln his 1885 book Congressional Government,
written as his doctoral thesis while at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore,
Wilson made these observations:
The House sits, not for serious discussion, but to sanction the conclu·
sions of its Committees as rapidly as possible. lr legislates in its commit·
tee-rooms; not by the determinations of majorities but by the resolu·
tions of specially-commissioned minorities; so that it is not far from the
89
The Dawning of the Sunshine Seventies
rruth ro say thar Congress in session is Congress on public ex hibition.

whilst Congress in irs commitree-rooms is Congress at work. 7
But Wilson wamed that such committee deliberations "cannot take the
place or fulfill the uses of amendment and debate by Congress in open session"
because "the proceedings of the Commirrces arc private and their discussions
unpublished," thereby thwarting "the most essential object of all public dis-
cussion of public business [which] is the enlightenment of public opinion."8
Republican representative Vicror Murdock of Kansas echoed the need for
greater openness in House proceedings in 1908, two years before the success-
ful revolt against Speaker Joseph Cannon of lllinois by insurgent Republicans
and reform-minded Democrats (see C hapter 4 ). During debate on a postal ap·
propriarions bill on March 3, Murdock expressed frustration over how a com-
mittee chairman can often override the decisions of his own committee or of
rhe House when a bill goes to conference with the Sen ate. Such unfair leg-
islative procedures, however, would soon be corrected, h e predicted:
How it will come I do not know bur I believe that its firsr manifesrarion
will be a public demand for simplification of the rules, for the election
of the Committee on Rules by rhe House, and for a larger membership
of rhe committee, and eventually a demand that the doors of all com-
mittee rooms be opened. that all proceedings in committee and all votes
in commitree be recorded and be made accessible to the membership of
the House and the public. [Applause.] 9
Murdock was prescient on all counts, though fulfillment of some of his pre·
dictions took longer than others. Two years later the Spe;1ker no longer chaired
the Rules Committee or had the authority to appoint its members. But more
than sixty years would pass before committee meetings and hearings were
opened to the public and committee votes publicized. For wh:u evcr reasons,
the progressives' good government push for greater publicity in Congress did
not become a central factor in the rules refonns adopted when Cannon was
overthrown in 1910, or when the Democrats took over the House the follow-
ing yea r.
In fact, real decision making on major legislation moved from closed com-
mittee rooms to the closed meetings of the Democratic Caucus deftly led by
House Majority Leader Oscar Underwood ( 1911 - 15). Underwood would ham-
mer out the legislative details in secret caucus sessions and then force the cau·
cus product through committee (especially the Ways and Means Committee,
which he chaired). The House, under strict rules of party instruction and dis·
cipline, usually jumped to Underwood's rune.
This is exactly the type of system Wilson considered ideal a quarter of a cen·
90
The Dawning of rite Sunshine Seventies
rury earlier. In Congressiona.l Government he praised behind-the-scenes delib-

erations in caucus and committees:
Rather than imprudently expose to the world the diffe rences of opinion
threatened or developed among its members, each party hastens to re-
move disrupting debate from the floor of Congress, where rhe speakers
might too hastily commit themselves to insubordination, to quiet con-
ferences behind closed doors, where frightened scruples may be reas-
sured and every disagreement healed with a salve of compromise or sub-
dued with the whip of political expediency.
To Wilson, "the silvern speech spent in caucus secures the golden silence main-
tained on the floor of Congress, making each parry rich in concord and happy
in cooperation." 1o
Wilson's complaint, then, was not so much about secrecy as it was about
where and by whom the secret decisions were made. On the one hand, he ad-
vocated greater public deliberation as essential to public enlightenment and
education; on the other hand, he supported secret, legislative policy making in
the caucus as essential ro parry cohesion and discipline. Therein lay the cen-
tral contradiction of his thesis. 11
Once they gained control of the House in the 62d Congress ( 1911-13), d1e
Democrats may have realized that openness was not necessarily their best av-
enue for governing effectively as a new majority. When complaints were raised
against the secret rule of "King Caucus" in 1913, Wilson's fi rst year as presi-
dent, Speaker Champ Clark had the following rebuttal:
All this talk of secrecy is of no avail. . .. The people of rhe Un ited
Srates want to know what the Congress does. Titey are much more
interested in results than in the methods by which those results are
obrained. 12
The Progressive Party platform of 1912 maintained its commitment to open
government, including the Congress, notwithstanding the more progressive
nature of Speaker C lark's House. In a section titled "Publicity and Public Ser-
vice," the Progressive platform pledged the party "to legislation compelling the
registration of lobbyists; publicity of committee hearings except on foreign af-
fairs, and recording of all votes in commirtee." 13
Renewed Pressures for Reform

Following the demise of "King Caucus" during President Wilson's second tenn,
the Congress serried back into a system of commirtee government with power
devolving from party leaders to committee chairmen who held their positions
based on their se niority in Congress. Even the House Rules Committee, which
91
The Dawning of the Sunshine Seventie.s
had continued to cooperate with the majority leadership in scheduling legis-

lation through President Franklin Roosevelt's first term, became an independ-
ent power unto itself beginning in 1937, dominated by a conservative coali-
tion of southern Democrats and Republicans. President John E Kennedy and
Speaker Sam Rayburn attempted to change this conservative tilt in 1961 by
enlarging the Rules Committee from twelve to fifteen members, adding two
more liberal Democrats and one Republican. The rules change was narrowly
adopted on January 31, 1961, 217-212. But even this move did not produce in-
stant results in terms of expediting Kennedy's New Frontier legislation.
Pressures continued to build both inside and outside the Congress for more
comprehensive refonns of the legislative branch. The titles of books published
during this period reflect the growing frustration with Congress: The Deadlock
of Democracy ( 1963 ); ObsiLICle Course on Capiro! Hill (1964 ); Congress: The Sap-
less Branch (1964 ); HollSe Out ofOrder (1965); and Congre.ss in Crisis (1966).1 4
Although there was a break in the legislative logjam between 1964 and 1966,
as President Lyndon B. Johnson scored multiple successes in steering his Great
Society program through Congress, the demand for systemic reforms of Con-
gress persisted in the 1970s. These demands increased as Congress became wary
of an "imperial presidency" and more vulnerable to charges of being a mere
"rubber stamp" of the president.
Bipartisan support for congressional reform led to the formation of the Joint
Committee on the Organization of Congress, headed by Democratic senator
Mike Monroney of Oklahoma and Rep. Ray Madden of Indiana. It was pat-
terned after a successful 1945-46 joint committee effort cochaired by Sen.
Robert LaFollette, Jr., and then-representative Mike Monroney. In its final re·
port to Congress on July 28, 1966, the joint committee cited the need for its
proposed reforms:
The Congress of the United States is the only branch of the Federal
Government regularly and entirely accounrable to the American peo-
ple. Indeed, it is the people's branch. Our constitutional system is based
on the principle that Congress must effectively bring to bear the will of
the people on all phases of the formulation and execution of public pol-
icy. However, it is becoming more and more difficult for any collective
decision-making entity like Congress to meet its responsibilities. 15
The report went on to pinpoint the lack of"organizational effectiveness" as
the reason for Congress's inability to carry out well its basic modem functions
of legislation, oversight, and representation. Many of the joint committee's rec·
ommendations were embodied in the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970.
This landmark legislation launched the congressional reforms of the seventies,
transforming the institution more than any event or series of events since the
92
overthrow of Speaker Cannon. The joint committee recommended opening

committee meetings and hearings ro the public, making committee chairmen
more responsive to committee members, publishing roll call votes in legisla-
tive reports, increasing committee staff resources, strengthening fiscal controls,
and reorganizing the congressional research ann of the Library of Congress.
Five sets of supplemental views were filed by various members of the joint
committee to its final report. One of the additions was made by Democratic
representative Ken Hechler of West Virginia, a political science professor and
former official in the Franklin Roosevelt and Truman administrations. He rec-
ommended providing more information to visitors to the nation's capital and
to congressional galleries, electronic voting on certain major issues, closed-cir-
cuit-television broadcasting of floor sessions ro members' offices, and publicly
televising selected debates on the House and Senate floors. All three House
Republican members of the joi nt committee concurred in the latter recom·
mendation for public televising of floor proceedings. 16
After the joint committee issued its report on July 28, 1966, a special Sen-
ate committee (composed of the Senate members of the former joint commit·
tee) reported a modified bill to the Senate. The bill was drafted following a
hearing llt which committee chairmen ;~nd r;~nking minority members were
pemtitted to offer their views. However, no further action was taken by either
house in the 89th Congress due to the lateness of the session. Early in the 90th
Congress Senator Monroney reintroduced the modified Senate bill. l,t easily
passed the Senate on March 7, 1967, by a vote of 75 to 9 after six weeks of de-
bate and the consideration of seventy-nine amendments, only thirty-nine of
which were adopted. Most of them dealt with committee procedures. Many of
the amendments that addressed contentious issues, such as the filibuster, the
selection of commiuee chairmen , and the Senate's rulemaking powers, were
defeated. 17
The Senate-passed bill was referred to the House Rules Committee, which
held a hearing on it but took no funher action in the 90th Congress. Speaker
john McConnack of Massachusetts and senior committee chainnen opposed
the "committee bill of rights," even the version watered down by Senate
amendments. Efforts to reach an accommodation with the Speaker and his
committee allies produced seven subsequent versions-all to no avail. The De·
mocratic leadership's partisan efforts to block and gut the bipartisan refonn bill
incensed minority House Republicans, who rebelled with various attention·
getting tactics on and off the House floor through the rest of 1967 and 1968.
These Republican guerillas, known as "Rumsfe\d's Raiders" after their leader,
Illinois representative Donald Rumsfeld, even tried to block the final adjourn·
ment of the 90th Congress by stalling tactics late into the evening. Again their
efforts were futile and hardly noticed outside the Capitol's environs. It was
93
Rumsfcld, in frustration, who coined the saying "congressional reform is an is-

sue without a constituency." 18
Ironically, the moribund reform bill was resuscitated in the 9lst Congress by
Democrats. Dissatisfied with their aging party and committee leadership and
the lack of opportunities to make a mark, young Democrats urged their senior
colleagues to rake a fresh look at the joint committee's recommendations. One
of the concessions they won from Speaker McCorm11ck and Rules Comrniuee
chairman William Colmer of Mississippi was to bring the congressional reform
bill to the House floor. As one of the Speaker's aides put it, "Congressional re-
form has become a symbolic thing w many members, and it's awfully difficult
to resist under those circumstances. I think the Speaker has become reconciled
to havi11g a bill.'"9
On April 22, 1969, Colmer appointed a five-member special subcommittee
of the Rules Committee to study and redraft the joint committee's legislation.
Rep. B. F. Sisk of California, one of the two new Democrats added to the Rules
Committee in 196 1, chaired the subcommittee. In late October the subcom·
mittee presented a draft to the House for furth er comments, which were re-
ceived during eight days of hearings.
But it was not until June 17, 1970, that the Rules Committee finally reported
a bill to the floor, H.R. 17654, the Legislati ve Reorganization Act of 1970. The
comminee also reported an open rule on the bill. This meam that any mem-
ber of the House could offer germane amendments to the bill following six
hours of geneml debate. All told, some si)(ty·five amendments would be offered
during eleven days of consideration between mid-July and mid-September
(with Au~:ust off for the summer recess).
~
The House Rules Committee's bill was more faithful to many of the joint
committee's procedural reforms than were earlier compromise versions floated
in the previous Congress. According to the Rules Committee's report, the bill
artempts to "write into the rules of the House democ r:uic and equitable com-
mince practices, many of them followed now by most committees.'' The report
said the bill would "open more committee proceedings to the public" and "un-
der stringent regulation, permit broadcasting of committee hearings.''20 The
Rules Committee had avoided "a number of controversies that bogged down
the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1967," such as changes in committee ju·
risdictions or proposals dealing with seniority. Those issues are more properly
related to "party practices and customs than ro formal rules, structure, and re-
sources of Congress." 21
Specifically, the Rules Committee's bill required committees to fix a regular
meeting day at least once a month; provided a means by which a committee
majority could call a special meeting on a specified matter if a chairman re-
94
The Dauming of the Sunshine Seventies
fused; required business meetings and hearings m be open ro the public unless
a committee majority voted otherwise; permitted the minority party on a com-
mittee to call its own witnesses during one day of hearings; authorized com-
mittees to adopt rules permitting the televised broadcasting and photograph-
ing of th eir hearings by majority vote; and required committees to announce
and publish in their reports on public bills the results of recorded votes (mean-
ing the total number of votes cast for and against) to order the measure reported
to the House.
The Bipartisan Sunshine Coalition

The bill reported by the House Rules Committee was extensively amended. At
the cenrer of the amendment process was a bipartisan reform coalition headed
by fourth-term Democrat Sam Gibbons of Florida, chairman of the Democra-
tic Study Group (DSG) Task Force on Congressional Reform, and third-term
Republican Barber Conable of New York. The group decided to confine its ef-
forts to 10 floor amendments (out of some 200 submitted). at the hearr of which
were several antisecrecy reforms. When unveiling the package on July 8, 1970,
Gibbons and Conable observed that "secrecy undermines the democratic
process and saps public confidence in the House as a responsive ;md effective
legislative body. "22
The idea of making antisec recy refonns the centerpiece of the bipartisan
package was the brainchild of DSG staff director Rich;ud P. Conlon, a former
newspaper reporter who sensed that the antisecrecy theme would appeal to
journalists. It did. The subsequent full-court lobbying campaign attracted the
support of the AFL-CIO . National Educa tion Association, Americans for De·
mocratic Action, the N ational Commi!tee for an Effective Congress, the Na-
tional Fanners Union, and the Anti-Defamation League. And it generated
dozens of editorials around the country, many of which were later inserted in
the Congressional Record. 23 As rwo political scientists would later observe:
Probably not since the revolt against Speaker Cannon in 1910 had the
nation's press taken such an interest in congressional procedures.
Whether or not the general public evinced any dec::p interest in the
question is doubtfuL Rumsfcld's remark abou1 the lack of a reform con-
stituency must be recalled. But this time, at least, a few influential out-
side voices were heard. 24
The most important of the sunshine amendments was offered by Democra-
tic representative Thomas P. "Tlp" O'Neill, Jr., of Massachusetts and Republi-
can representative Charles Gubser of California. It provided for recorded teller
votes in the Committee of the Whole (where most House floor amendments
95
are offered and disposed oO. O'Neill and Gubser were both elected ro the
House in 1952, but that is when any similarity ended until their joint sunshine
effort. Gubser, a hawkish member of the Armed Services Committee, was as
conservative as O'Neill was liberaL O'Neill, a former speaker of the Massa-
chusetts House, was well along on the leadership track, having served on the
Rules Committee since his sophomore term in 1955-56.
O'Neill first presented the recorded teller vote amendment during the Rules
Committee's markup of the reform bill. It was defeated on a 6-6 tie vote. On
july 27, 1970, O'Neill offered the amendment on the House floor on behalf of
himself, Gubser, and their 180 cosponsors. He explained that most of the im-
portant votes of the House are taken in the Committee of the Whole. He cited
the recent examples of votes on the antiballistic missile system, the supersonic
transport plane, and the invasion of Cambodia-all of which were non-
recorded votes in the Committee of the Whole. He went on:
The secrecy of the Committee of the Whole has allowed too many
Members to duck issues, to avoid the perils of controversial votes. But
that is not in the spirit of this Nation, nor of this Congress. Our duties
to the Nation and to the people we represent make this amendment
necessary. We are primarily and most importantly legislators. And if the
work of legislation can be done shrouded in secrecy and hidden from
the public, then we are eroding the confidence of the public in ourselves
and in our institutions.25
Representative Gubser called the non recorded teller vote "a relic of a pass-
ing era where the Federal Govemmem was limited, and did not entwine itself
so intricately with each individual citizen and his welfare." And he continued:
Those days are gone and they will never return. Today we deal in a
highly complex relationship between the people and their
government.. .. We should and we can take the time to let the public
know how we vote on each and every issue. 26
One of the big boosts for the amendment during debate came from Major·
ity Whip Hale Boggs of Louisiana. Noting that the British House of Commons
had permitted recorded votes in the Committee of the Whole l38 years ago,
Boggs said:
Unfortunately, with never a King to fear and only the public to serve,
the rule has been retained in the House of Representatives. We did so
because we said it helped expedite the often slow legislative process.
Unfortunately, it has also been used [as] a shelter from the public eye.
96
I do not believe representative government can afford the luxury of a

shelter from the public eye. The American people are entirled to know
the recorded judgment of each Member on the great issues of our time.
We cannot ask our people to respect our institutions unless the institu-
tions themselves are self-critical and self-rcforming.H
After a lengthy debate and the rejection of several amendments, the House
adopted the O'Neiii-Gubser amendment by voice vote. As amended, it also
authorized the future use of electronic voting ro replace calling the roll of mem-
bers orally. Tite House began taking roll call votes on amendments in the Com-
mittee of the Whole beginning in January of 1971. By the beginning of the fol-
lowing Congress, the electronic voting system had been installed and tested.
Use on a regular basis began on January 23, 1973. 28
Sunshine Rules Governing Committees

Although the bill reported by the Rules Committee provided for open com-
mittee meetings and hearings in the House unless a committee by majority vote
determined otherwise, the bipartisan coalition identified several loopholes that
could easily be exploited by committees. There was nothing to prevent a com-
mittee from voting to close meetings or hearings for the rest of a Congress. And
there was no requirement that a quorum be present when a committee voted,
or that the vote be recorded. To remedy this, on July 14, 1970, Rep. William
Hathaway, a third-term Democrat. from Maine, received unanimous consenr to
offer rwo amendments. Both amendments would require that a committee ma-
jority quomm be present when it voted to close a meeting or hearing, that the
vote could apply only to that day's meeting or hearing and not to future ones,
and that the vote be conducted by roll call in public session.
. .
The proposals ran into a buzz-saw of opposition from more senior members,
especially committee chairmen who recounted how difficult it was to round up
a majority of committee members to do anything, but e.specially for a hearing
where only two members could constitute a quorum. Rep. Wayne Hays of
Ohio, a Democrat in his eleventh term, concurred with an Education and La·
bor Committee member on the difficulty of writing legislation in public ses·
sion: "What the gentleman is saying in effect is that you cannot write legisla·
tion with a lobbyist sitting at every Member's elbow, and that is exactly what
would happen here." To this, Hathaway responded: "On the contrary, that is
just the situation that prevails when you have a secret meeting, because only
the lobbyists have access to the Members." 29 ,
Rep. George Mahon of Texas, chairman of the Appropriations Committee,
agreed with Hays's assessment:
97
The DaWiting of the Sunshine Sevemies
The silent majority is not going to be present at the open markups of

the bills; they are going to be too busy and too occupied otherwise. But
if you have open markup on bills . .. do you not think that the special
interests will be there/ The silent majorit y will not be there, but the
special interests will be well represented. 30
After extensive debate the !-louse adopted an amendment to delete the re-
quirements for a majority quorum and roll call vote ro close committee hear-
ings and meetings. The amended Hathaway amendment was then rejected by
a teller vote of 102 to 132. Three years later, on March 7, 1973, the House
amended its rules along the lines of Hathaway's amendment. In order to close
a meeti ng or hearing, a majority of the committee must be present and a roll
call vote raken. The reasons for closing a hearing were limited to national se-
curity or personal privacy matters. (The Senate adopted a similar rule in 1975.)
At the beginning of the 104th Congress on January 4, 1995, the House rule
was further amended to apply the same conditions w the dosing of committee
meetings (that is, for national security and personal privacy reasons only).
Broadcast coverage of any public hearing or meeting became an automatic
right rather than a matter to be determined
.
by committee
.
vote. 31
On the same day in 1970 that the Hathaway amendment was rejected by the
House, another sunshine amendment affecting committees succeeded. It was
offered by Rep. Dante Fascell, a Democrat from Florida. Whereas the bill re·
ported from the Rules Committee requi red that a committee report contain
only the numerical results of any record vote to report a measure, the Fascell
amendmem required that the results of each roll call vore taken by a commit·
tee be made available for public inspection in the offices of the committees. In
concluding his explanation of the amendmem, Fascell said, "This is an impor·
tant and vital reform in the rules of this House and will instill knowledge and
confidence in the American people whom we serve and further a great demo-
cratic tradition of an open society.''32
Fascell's amendment was adopted by voice vote after one modification. Rep.
H. Allen Smith of California, the ranking Republican on the Rules Commit·
tee, offered an amendment to reinsert the original committee language requir·
ing inclusion in the committee report of the numerical results of a roll call vote
to report a bill.
The Senate to its credit in 1970 retained the language from the original joint
committee recommendation that all roll call votes taken in committee on a
measure be published in the committee report. It was not until 1995 that the
House adopted a similar rule requiring that committee ro ll call votes on any
amendmentS offered during markup, as well as on motions ro report a measure,
be published in the committee report on that measure.33
98
Televised Proceedings: Pro and Con

The bill repon ed by the House Ru les Committee in 1970 authorized televised
committee hearings, something Rep. David Worrh Dennis, a freshman Re-
publ ican from Indian a, adamantly opposed. O n July 20 he offered an amend-
ment that would strike that authorization from the bill.
Up unr il l 970, neither house had a rule either permitting or prohibiting tel-
evised committee h earings. The Scmne had been allowing TV broadcasting as
a matter of practice since the late 1940s. In 1952 and again in 1955, Speaker
Sam Rayburn ruled that committees could not televise their hearings since it
was not specifically authorized by any House rule, though the ban was briefly
lifted by Republican Speaker Joe Marrin of Massachusetts in 1953-54.34
Dennis said he believed in "adequate publicity" but not in television in com-
mittee hearings because of the "physical disruption" it would cause:
I certainly do not want to sit for a couple of hours in a committee room
with those bright lights in my eyes. I do not like photogrAphers stepping
in between the committee and the witness during the testimony of the
wimcss, and all the rest of the physical disruption that you are necessar-
ily goi ng to have in d1e committee.35
Dennis foresaw another problem with televised commince hearings. Tele-
vision "overemphasizes because it cannot get all of the action, and it is bound
to .. . emphllsize a rnther small pan,'' h e argued. Moreover, said Dennis, some
members, "perhaps all of us," are in varying degrees "prima donnas" who "will
be spending more time making h ay on the television camera th an in doing the
business that we are sent there to transact."36
A Harvard law school graduate, Dennis likened congressional hearings and
courtroom tri als. Although the Constitution "h as always provided that trials
in courts shall be public . . . almost universally the coun:s have rejected the tel-
evision broadcasting ... because it interferes wi th the orderly transaction of
the public business in the coum." 37 Rep. j ames C leveland. a N ew Hampshire
Republican , disagreed with the ;malog}'· Al though "proceedings in the courts
are adversary proceedings ... in many of our h earings they are for the purpose
of getting information nor only for th e members of the committees but for the
people of the country, who are after all our ultimate court, certainly our jury." 18
The Dennis amendment was narrowly rejected by a teller vote, 93-96. Iron-
ically, the most important hearings Dennis would participate in as a member
of C ongress, the House Judiciary C ommittee's impeachment hearings involv-
ing President Richard M. Nixon, were closed not only to broadcast coverage,
but to the public as well our of deference ro the righ ts and reputations of wit-
n esses. However, on july 22, 1974, just two days before the comminee began
its public deliberations on three articles of impeachment, the House voted
99
346-40 to extend the authority for television, radio, and photographic cov-
erage ro meetings as well as hearings. Nor surprisingly, Dennis voted against
the resolution. That same afternoon the judiciary Committee took advantage
of the new rule and voted 31-7 to open its impeachment deba tes to broadcast
coverage.39
Moreover, on August 7, 1974, the House adopted another resolution from
the Rules Committee ro permit the broadcast coverage of House floor debates
on the arricles of impeachment. This time the vote was 385-25. with Dennis
and three mher Judiciary Committee Republicans voting against:10 The fol-
lowing evening Nixon announced his resignation as president.
Other Significant Reform Efforts

The 1970 bipartisan reform group had decided to stay away from changing rules
affecting the internal distribution of power within the House, such as the prac-
tice of choosing the most senior member of a committee as its chairman. As
the Rules Committee report had pointed out, such matters were best left to the
party caucuses. However, some members of both parties disagreed. On July 28,
1970, Rep. Henry Reuss, a Wisconsin Democrat. offered an amendment to end
seniority as the sole consideration in the selection of committee chairmen. Re-
publican representative Fred Schwengel of Iowa then offered a substitute to
permit the majority party members of each committee to select a chairman
from among their three most senior members on the committee. The Schwen-
gel amendment was rejected on a 28-196 teller vote, and the Reuss amendment
was subsequently defeated, 73-160. 41
~ .
The House Democratic Caucus adopted the Reuss amendment the follow-
ing January as part of its rules, together with a provision allowing any ten mem-
bers of the caucus to force a separ,lte vote on any nominee for chairman. The
caucus rule was further revised in 1973 to penn it one-fifth of the caucus to force
separate votes on each nominee for chairman; and in 1975 to provide for au-
tomatic separate votes on chair nominees. Three committee chairmen were
subsequently rejected by the caucus.
The Democrats also adopted a caucus rule change in I 97 I to allow Demo-
crats on each committee to select subcommittee chairmen. And in 1973 the
caucus established a bidding procedure within committee caucuses for choos-
ing subcommittee chairmen, set subcommittee jurisdictions and budgets, and
gave subcommittee chairmen semiautonomous authority from their full com-
mince chairmen to select staff and set subcommittee agendas-the so-called
subcommittee bill of rights.
This democratization and dispersal of power within the House, coupled with
a large influx of Democratic freshmen in 1975 (the "Waterg-<~te Babies"), pro-
vided new opportunities for policy innovation and participation by junior
100
The Dawning of rlte Stmshine Seventies
H ouse members. The refo rms also presented party leaders with new chal-
lenges-namely, how to maintain some semblance o f party discipline and pol-
icy cohe re nce.
l11e reform revolution of the mid-1 970s set the s tage for future c hanges that
opened the Congress to the people even more. The most significant o f those
reforms, televising H ouse and Senate floor proceedings, a re examined in rhe
next chapter.
Notes
I. See, for instance Leroy N. Rieselbach, Congressionnl Reform: The Chllnging
Modem Congress (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1994).
2. Documents Illturrariw of rhe Fornuuion of the Union of the American Sra1es , ed.
Charles C. Tansill, H. Doc. 398, 68th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Govcmmem Priming Office, 1927), Ill.
3. Donald A. Ritchie, "Galleries," in The Encyc/cpedia of the United States Congress,
ed. Donald C. Bacon, Roger H. Davidson, and Morton Keller (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1995), vol. 2, 897.
4. Paul S. Rundquist, "Secrecy of Congress," in ibid., vol. 4, 1775.
5. For a more detailed discussion of the origins, development, and operation of the
Committee of the Whole, see Don Wolfcnsberger, "Commiuecs o f the Whole: Their
Evolution and Functions," Congressional Record. 103d Cong., 1st sess., Jan. 5, 1993,
HZ7-31.
6. Woodrow Wilson, "Let There Be Light," in The New Freedom : A Cnll for rhe
Emancipation of rhe Gener01u Energies of rhe People (New York: Doubleday, Page & Co.,
1913), 111- 15.
7. Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Gownnnenr: A Study in American Politics ( 1885;
reprint, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), 69.
8. Ibid., 71.
9. Congressional Record, March 3, 1908, 2837.
10. Wilson, Congressional Govemmetll, 211-12.
11. For a more detailed discussion of these contradictions, see Gerald B.H. Solomon
and Don Wolfensberger, "Tl1e Decline of Deliberative Democracy in the House and
Proposals for Reform," Haroard]oumal on Legis/arion 31 (Summer 1994): 329-33.
12. Ibid., 338.
13. National Parry Platfonns, Volume J, 1840-1956, comp. Donald Bwcc Johnson
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1978), "Progressive Platform of 1912," 176.
14. james MacGregor Bums, Deadlock of Democracy (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice·
Hall, 1963); Robert Bcndiner, Obstacle Course on Capiro! Hill (New York: McGraw-Hill,
1964); Joseph S. Clark, Congress: The Saj1less Branch (New York: Harper & Row, 1964 );
Richard Walker Bolling, House Out of Order (New York: Dutton, 1965); and Roger H.
Davidson, David M. Kovcenock, Michael K. O'Leary, Congress in Crisis: Politics and
Congressional Reform (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1966).
I5. "Organization of Congress," Final Report of the Joinr Committee on the
101
Orgac\ization of the Congress, S. Repr. 1414, 89th Cong., 2d sess., July 28, 1966
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Priming Office, 1966), I.
16. Ibid., "Supplemental Views of Mr. Hechler," 80--8 1.
17. John F. Bibby and Roger H. Davidson, On Capiro! Hill: Studies in rhe Legislative
Process , 2d ed. (Hinsdale, Ill.: The Dryden Press, 1972), 256.
!8. Ibid., 259.
19. Ibid., 260-61.
20. "Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970," H. Rcpt. 9 1- 1215 of the Comminee
on Rules on H.R. 17654, "To improve chc operations of the Legislative Branch of the
Federal Government, and for other purposes," 3.
21. Ibid.
22. Bibby ;md O;cvidson, On Capitol Hill, 265.
23. Ibid., 264, 269-70.
24. Ibid., 270.
25. Congressional Recard, July 27, 1970, 25796.
26. Ibid., 25799.
27. Ibid., 25800.
28. House Rules and Manual, One Htrndred Fourth Congress , H. Doc. 103-342, 103d
Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govenunent Printing Office, 1995), sec.
774(b) foomorc, 552.
29. Congressional Recard, July 14. 1970, 24049.
30. Ibid.
3 I. House Rules and Mantwl, One Hundred Fourth Congress. sec. 708, House Rule XI.
clause 2(g), 461-65. The history of the rule is cited in a footnote at 464-65.
32. Ccmgressimud Record. July 14, 1970, 24054.
33. H. Res. 6, sec. 209, 104th Cong., adopted Jan. 4, 1995. See House Rule XI, clause
2(1}(2)(8), House Rules and Manual, One Hundred Fourth Con& 'YeSS, sec. 713(d), 472.
34. Ronald Garay, Congressional Television: A Legi.llative History (WestpOrt, Conn.:
Greenwood Press, 1984), 50-52.
35. Congressional Record , July 20, 1970, 24971.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid., 24974.
38. Ibid.
-..... .. . . .....
39. On H. Res. 110 7, ;'Broadcasting o( Commiuce Meetings," sec Congressional
Quarterly Almanac, 1974, vol. 31 (Wash ington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly. 1975),
878.
40. O n H. Res. 802, "Broadcasting o ( Impeachment Proceedings." see ibid., 892.
41. Congressionllf Qullrrerl)' AlmallllC, 1970, vol. 26 (Wash ington , D.C.: Con!:res-
sional Quarterly, 1971 ), 455.
102
•••
A Window on Congress:
Televising Floor Debates
By agreeing to the resolution [to televise ics floor debates], the House
reaffirmed ics commitment to open government and to a fundamental. tenet of
democracy-that the success of popular, representative go11ernment depends
upan an informed electorate. Since the American electorate gees a good deal
of ics information via radio and television, giving the broadcast media access to
the complete proceedings of the House will gi11e the people a majar means for
acquiring significant information about public affairs, about decisions of the
House of Representatives, and about the institutional role and responsibilities
of the House.
House Report
HESE words, contained in a 1978 report giving the Speaker final au
thority to move forward on televising House floor debates, seem a self
evident enough justification today for bringing Congress into the tele
vision age. 1 But getting the House to that point had been a major battle
spanning three Congresses and involving multiple committees and subcom
mittees and numerous studies and reports. Key House leaders had to be dragged
kicking and screaming into the twentieth century so that the people's house
might be seen and heard in the people's houses. The Senate took even longer
to cross that bridge-seven more years to be precise.
The·temporary bump in congressional approval ratings resulting from tele
vision coverage of the 1973 Senate Watergate committee hearings and the
1974 House Judiciary Co,nmittee's itnpeachment proceedings gave new impe-
103
A Window on Congress: Televising Floor Debates
tus to calls for televising House and Senate floor sessions. But the initial in
terest i.n televising Congress came earlier in the decade. Congressional De
mocrats, frustrated with President Richard Nixon's mastery of the airwaves in
defending his policies, had objected to the relatively minor exposure their op
posing views received. In short, the interest in television's influence on gov
ernment and public opinion was a natural extension of concern over the per
ceived imbalance between the legislative and executive branches and what
might be done about it. With Nixon's resignation in 1974 and the weakening
of the presidency, that rationale lost much of its force.
The Joint Committee on Congressional Operations

The Joint Committee on Congressional Operations was authorized by the Leg
islative Reorganization Act of 1970 for the purpose of"strengthening Congress,
simplifying its operations, improving its relationships with other branches of
the United States Government, and enabling it better to meet its responsibil
ities under the Constitution of the United States."2 Its chairman was Democ
ratic representative Jack Brooks of Texas, a former member of the 1965-66 Joint
Committee on the Organization of the Congress. In December of 1972 he re
quested the Congressional Research Service (CRS) to prepare a study of how
Congress could use the com.munications media more effectively to communi
cate with che American people. The resulting study was released in early 1974
as a joint committee print titled "Congress and Mass Communications: An In
stitutional Perspective." It had been prepared under a CRS contract with John
G. Stewart, a political scientist, a former aide to Senator and Vice President
Huben Humphrey, and, most recently, the director of communications for the
Democratic National Committee (1970-72).3
The preface to the 1974 report was written by Joint Committee chairman
Lee Metcalfe of Montana and Vice Chairman Brooks. (The chairmanship of
the joint com.mittee rotated between the houses \Vith each new Congress.) As
the reason for the study they cite Congress's "substantial stake in being able to
communicate with the American people effectively" as a "co-equal and inde
pendent branch of the Federal Government."4 The stakes had been raised con
siderably by the "massive and highly sophisticated use of mass communications
by the President and the Executive branch." Each new administration con
tributed "to the growing imbalance between executive and legislative power."
This gave the president "a unique potential for dominating the communica
tions media and, ultimately, public discussion of critical policy issues." Indeed,
the president can appear on prime-time television on all three networks by sim
ple request. But Congress, "even if it is controlled by the party which does not
control the White House, is given no such routine access."5
The preface goes on to note survey findings that the people have only the
104
A Windotv on Congress: Televising Floor Debates
vaguest notions of the constitutional role play ed by Congress or how it car

ries out its legislative responsibilities. Yet the same findings show that Amer
icans favor"a shift i. n influence in our democratic system toward their national
legislature. "6 ,
The report documents this case made in the preface. Harris polls from 1965
through 1971 are cited. They show that the public's assessment of Congress's
performance reverses from positive (excellent, very good) to negative (fair,
poor): with 64 percent positive and 26 percent negative in 1965 (the height of
President Lyndon Johnson's Great Society legislative juggernaut), to just 26
perc ent positive and 63 percent negative in 1971. 7
The report also cites the differences i.n public support for a policy before and
after a president appears on network telev ision to defend it. The effects of ap
pearances by Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon are captured in Harris
surveys from 1963 to 1970. For instance, public support for Nixon's announced
incursion into Cambodia in 1970 rose from 7 percent to 50 percent after he
explained his policy on net\vork television. President Nixon's television ap
pearances in 1973 relating to Watergate "would seem to provide an exception
to this pattern," the report adds. "The mass communications media cannot au
tomatically generate popular support for any position a President chooses to
adopt." According to the report, the president's explanations of Watergate
were offset in part by the televised hearings of the Senate Watergate commit
tee. The hearings ,vould "bring to popular attention a version of the facts that
often conflicted with the President's version." Indeed, "the opportunity for
Congress to go directly to the people in this instance was one factor in Presi
dent Nixon's relative lack of success in his telev ised appearances."8
Coverage of the Watergate crisis was an exception to the usual imbalance
between presidential and congressional exposure on television. Much of the
report addresses how Congress can equalize its treatment by broadcasters. A
chapter titled "Legislative Initiatives" gives considerable attention to 1970
hearings by the Commerce Committee's Subcommittee on Communications.
Sen. J. William Fulbright favored amending the Communications Act to re
quire broadcasters to carry the views of authorized represe ntatives of the House
and Senate on important p ublic issues at least four times a year.9
The chapter "Congress and Broadcast Acc ess" discusses fairness and equal
time doctrines of the Federal Communications Commission and how Cong ress
might gain access to the airwaves using them as a legal basis. The report pre
dicts that the imbalance in access between the Congress and the president
"eventually ... will be corrected, at least in part, by legislation or by reaching
some kind of voluntary agreement with the broadcast nerworks.1110
In the final chapter, "Choices for Change," the report revisits Senator Ful
bright's proposal for mandatory network carriage of congressional responses or
105
A Winaow on Congress: Televising Floor Debates
programs, and variations thereon. The concern is expressed that if Congress

allows for some broadcast coverage of its floor debates, this would be used by
networks " as evidence under the fairness doctrine for refusing congressiona l
spokesmen an opportunity to reply directly to broadcast appearances by the
President."11 The ability of Congress to respond to the president "is guaran
teed only if Congress amends the Communications Act." Barring some kind of
voluntary a .rrangement on a trial basis, "it would seem that legislative action is
necessary. " 12 The final chapter also discusses the various arguments for, and
means of, broadcasting House and Senate floor proceedings.
From February to April of 1974. the Joint Committee on Congressional Op
erations conducted six follo\v-up hearings on the topic of "Congress and Mass
Communications." Fifty-one witnesses appeared, including twelve House and
Senate Members (eight Democrats and four Republicans), and t\venty-four
representatives of the broadcast and print media. Most of th. e testimony focused
on the proposal to provide broadcast cover age of House and Senate floor de
bates. Support was almost unanimous, with differences only on how best it
could be accomplished.
However, some cautionary \VOrds ,vere offered, especially by members of the
joint committee themselves in their opening statements. Vice Chairman
Brooks, for instance, questioned whether broadcast coverage "would increase
or decrease the public's understanding" since "such coverage for the most part
would be confusing and of no interest at all." Moreover, he questioned whether
there was an imbalance of television coverage between the president and Con
gress since Congress consists of 539 "independent individuals," and "although
there is the leadership in both Houses, it is obvious that no one person can
speak for all of the Members and rarely for the majority." 13
Rep. James Cleveland of New Hampshire, the top House Republican on the
joint committee, observed that "the best way for Congress to improve its pub
lic image is to improve its public performance." He called communications a
"mediu1n" that "cannot consistently manufacture facts" nor "for long distort or
suppress them." 14
Sen. Edmund S. Muskie of Maine, while supporting some 1neans of unfiltered
public exposure of Congress to the public through television, called attention
to shortcomings in network coverage of committee hearings. "We all know that
conflict makes news," he said. "We also know that a televised shouting 1natch
usually concentrates more on the exchange of insults than the exchange of
ideas." In fact, "a congressional investigation receives more attention \vhen im
portant voices--but not necessarily significant questions--are raised." More
over, "the bulk of our productive \vork in the Senate," what Muskie called "the
actual exercise of legislating," receives little attention from the media. In com
mittees \Vith open markup sessions, "private interests have been well repre-
106
sented in the audience-as lobbyisrs--while the public interest-in the fonn

of journalists-has been noticeably absent." He concluded on this point that
"a clash of opinion is innately more newsworthy than the resolution of those
differences."15
Sen. Walter F. Mondale of Minnesota, also a supponer of televising Con
gress, \varned that "no reforms in structure or exposure of the Congress will to
tally cure the widespread feeling chat Government is no longer responsive or
accountable to the people." Televised proceedings cannot "eliminate the feel
ing of distrust from \vbich the Congress is now suffering," which is due in part
to "the inevitable fallout of a climate of Watergate, of energy shortages, and of
soaring inflation." Nevertheless, Congress should move ahead ,vith reforms
"which will at least make the American public a\vare of honest attempts the
Congress is making to deal with the problems that affect Americans most
deeply." 16
Rep. John B. Anderson of Illinois, chairman of the House Republican Con
ference and a proponent of televising Congress, cautioned against "expecting
too much of any reforms" and attributing "coo much po,ver and potential to
the media in the power struggle bet\veen the branches." In so doing, said An
derson, \Ve may mistake the media for the message with the inevitable result
bei.ng "a tendency to shape the rnessage, in this case the legislative process, to
fie the media." Anderson concluded that "the media is not the message nor the
ans\ver." In short, the "way for Congress to make the ne\VS is co make news.
The way to redress the balance is to redress it-by action." 17
One of the media \Vitnesses \Vas Neil MacNeill, congressional correspondent
for Time magazine. In comparing broadcast coverage of the president and Con
gress, MacNeill observed that "the closed political branch of the Government
receives greater press attention than the open branch, the Congress." This par
adox "suggests that you will look in vain for public popularity and approval by
opening still further your proceedings-by, for exatnple, allo\ving the televis
ing of floor debates in the Senate and House of Representatives." 1 8 He then
made the essential argument for opening Congress:
In an open society, openriess is a virtue in itself. In a free society, the
public business is the public's business-and the public should know all
there is to kno\v about it. Openness in itself \viii bring public under
standing-but it \viii not necessarily bring Congress either public ap·
proval or popularity. 19
The nenvorks' representatives naturally opposed any statutorily mandated
access by Congress to respond to the President or othenvise present a congres
sional perspective on national problems. Instead they argued strongly for Con,
gress to open some or all of its debates to the broadcast media. By the time the
107
joint committee's hearings ended on April 10, 1974, Chairman Metcalfe felt
it necessary to clarify in his closing statement their purpose. "It has been inac
curately perceived by some observers that the primary motivation of the Joint
Committee and other Members of Congress during these hearings is somehow
co gain for Congress a1nounts of television and radio air time equal to that
granted by the networks to the President and his spokesmen," Metcalfe said.
Although the restoration of the balance of p0\\ er between the Congress and
1
the executive branch "is of prime concern to many Members of Congress and
American citizens, the gaining of equal air time by Congre.ss is certainly low
on the list of priorities motivating these hearings."20
Metcalfe also refuted the charge that Congress \Vas trying to "use the media
co increase [its] public popularity and approval of voters." That line of thought,
he said, was "off-target, for Congress is not seeking a journalistic facelift."
Rather, the joint committee was trying to find ways to make "the more impor
tant functions of Congress better understood by the people through improved
coverage by the press and broadcast media.'' Any evaluation of members' work
"should continue to be based on the substantive performance of Congress."2 1
The following fall, on October 10, 1974, the joint committee filed an "in
terim report" titled "Broadcasting House and Senate Proceedings." Based on
its hearings and studies, the joint com.mittee found that the potential for bring
ing more information to the people through broadcast coverage was substan
tial, that the experience of other legislatures permitting such coverage had
been favorable, and that the technology of communications was sufficiently
advanced to provide for televising without disrupting floor proceedings. The
interim report urged Congress to "move forward with a carefully designed but
limited test co determine the ultimate feasibility and desi.rability of a perma
nent system for broadcasting activities in the House and Senate Chambers."
The test was to be conducted in a nonpartisan manner during the first session
of the 94th Congress ( 1975 ). 22
The only person on the ten-member joint committee filing a dissenting view
to the report was Republican senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina. He warned
of "the radical concept of democracy that is inherent in this proposal" to tele
vise congressional sessions, and said this concept "ofdirect or plebiscitary democ
racy'' had been \Visely rejected by the Framers of the Constitution. Accordi.ng co
Helms, the proposal for congressional television "seeks co impose upon the leg
islative process an aspect of direct democracy that undermines representative
government" because it would "seriously impair the ability of Members to per
form their legislative duties in an atmosphere of free, open, and robust debate"
and would "ace as a deterrent to the exercise of individual judgment."13
How did Helms see the prospect of congressional television transforming
represe.ntative democracy into direct democracy? In his words:
108
It is not difficult to envision Members scrambling co the floor to get be

fore cameras in order to impress the voters back home instead of per
suading other Members, producing much oration and little debate.
In short, Helms thought television \vould force a member to reflect public opin
ion rather than "exercise his own judgment, even when it may not be popular
to do so." If a member \Vere si1nply to reflect public opinion, said Helms, "there
would be no need of a legislative body" since "public policy could then be es
tablished through public opinion polls." Helms went on to undermine his ar
gument, however, by making another criticism-namely that televising floor
sessions would not accurately reflect the legislative process since, "to a great
extent, floor activities are often a pro fonna condensation and summation of
councless days and weeks of committee hearings, executive sessions, confer
ences and reports."24
In the first session of the 94th Congress, on October 7, 1975, the Joint Com
mittee on Congressional Operations, chaired by Representative Brooks, issued
its fi.nal report on Congress and mass communications titled "A Clear Message
to the People. " In the report the joint committee reiterated its recommenda
tion that "both Houses move as rapidly as possible to begin this experiment"
of a "carefully conceived test" of broadcasting House and Senate floor pro
ceedings. The report termed the broadcast proposal "the most practical, im
mediate, and direct \vay to enhance public understanding of congressional ac
tivities." The report also recommended chat "all committees and conference
committees open their hearings to broadcast coverage whenever such cover
age \Viii not detract fro1n the legislative business at hand."25
Senator Helms again filed "separate vie\vs" in which he termed as naive the
assumption that broadcas ting \vould enhance public understanding of Con
gress. He questioned whether the public possessed "the sophisticated kno\vl
edge of parliamentary procedure" or "necessary background infonnation on
legislation to acquire a proper understanding of floor proceedings." Instead, he
suggested that "broadcasting of floor proceedings might create more confusion
than understanding. 1126
Earlier in the session, on March 3, 1975, Chairman Brooks and the seven
other House members of the joint committee reintroduced a resolution to im
plement their proposal co televise House floor proceedings. Identical resolu
tions were cosponsored by 100 House members. Other resolutions ,vere intro
duced by Representative Anderson, a member of the Rules Committee. On
April 16 and June 17, 1975, the Rules Committee held hearings on the Brooks
resoluti on.27
To explore the methods and procedures to be used in a test program, the
Rules Committee established an Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Broadcasting,
109
chaired by Democratic representative Bernie Sisk of California. Other mem

bers included Democrats Morgan F. Murphy of Illinois, Andrew Young of Geor
gia, and Claude Pepper of Florida; and Republicans John B. Anderson and Del
Clawson of California. There follo,ved a long and drawn-out struggle between
the ad hoc subcommittee and Speaker Carl Albert's negotiating agent, Major
ity Leader Thomas P. "Tip" O'Neill, Jr., over who should control the cameras
of the ne\v House system-the House itself or some private broadcast entity
such as a net\vork pool. The matter would not be finally resolved until the sec
ond session of the succeeding Congress in 1978, and House floor proceedings
would not be televised until early in the 96th Congress in 1979.
The Rules Committee Imbroglio

Representatives Sisk and Anderson cook their new responsibilities on the Ad
Hoc Subco1nmittee on Broadcasting quite seriously and immediately set co
work to prepare for further hearings and an eventual set of recommendations
for the full committee's consideration. Sisk assigned his administrative assis
tant, Tony Coelho (who would later succeed Sisk in Congress in 1979), co co
ordinate the staff effort, and Anderson assigned his Rules Committee associ
ate staffer, this author, to head the minority staff ,vork.
l e ,vas only much later that a Rules Committee majority staffer informed this
author that Speaker Albert and Majority Lea der O'Neill intended for the pro
posal to be "studied to deatl1" in the ad hoc subcomminee and never reported
to the full committee, let alone to the House. Neither had bothered to inform
Sisk of that intent, ac lease not until it was coo late, so he and Anderson plo,ved
ahead tenaciously.
On November 19, 1975, Sisk, Anderson, and tl1ree other subcommittee
members introduced House Resolution 875.28 The main differences between
this resolution and the Brooks proposal (House Resolution 269) were over who
,vould provide tl1e coverage and who would oversee its operation. The Sisk res
olution authorized a network pool to provide full coverage under a contract
with the House, ,vith appropriate fees charged to the House and other broad
cast entities for access to the coverage. The Rules Com1nittee ,vould retain
oversight authority of the system through a Broadcast Advisory Board ap
pointed by the chairman and consisting of members of the committee, plus the
majority and minority leaders as ad hoc, nonvoting members. The Brooks res
olution, on the other hand, gave control over the system to the House Com
mission on Information and Facilities, chaired by Brooks, under a United Na
tions-type arrangement whereby the cameras and equipment would be owned
and operated by the institution itself.
Based on several comments and suggestions presented at hearings in early
December, the subcommittee adopted additional amendments to the Sisk res-
1 10
olution and on February 4, 1976, voted to report the resolurion to rhe full com
mittee. The report \vas filed as a committee print on February 23.29
However, on February 24 the subcommittee 1nembers \vere called co a meet
ing with the Speaker and Majority Leader, both of \vhom expressed concerns
about the resolution. Their mai.n objections were that it infringed upon the
Speaker's prerogatives to control the House chamber by mandating that
the Clerk of the House enter into a contract \vith a specified party-the net
work pool. According to one staff source, O'Neill \Yarned members at the
meeting, "If you think the public's rating of Congress is low no\v, just wait till
we get TV."30
O'Neill's resistance to televising the House \Vas later confirmed in his mem
oir, Man ofthe House, in which he said many members' attitudes about TV were
shaped by coverage of the national conventions:
If a guy was reading a ne\vspaper, they'd always show a close-up of him.
If a delegate was picking his nose or scratching his ass, that's \vhac you'd
see. If somebody had a bald head, you could be sure of getting a close-up
vie\v of the shiny spot. No wonder so many of us \Vere skittish. After all,
why should the greatest legislative body in the world allow itself to be
demeaned and humiliated before millions of people?3 1
After several staff-level discussions between representatives of the Speaker
and the subcon1mittee, tentative agreement was reached on a package of
a1nendments chat was adopted by the subcornrnittee on March 4. Essentially
the amendments would transfer from the Rules Comrnittee to the Speaker the
responsibility for implementing the new broadcast rule, create a bipartisan
Broadcast Advisory Board to assist the Speaker in that responsibility, and
delete all references in the resolution to the net\vork pool arrangement. 32
Even though the subcommittee adopted these changes co accommodate all
of the leadership's expressed concerns, O'Neill reportedly approached Sisk on
the House floor the follo\ving \veek and urged hitn not to bring up the resolu
tion at the full committee's scheduled meeting on March 24. In remarks in
serted in the Congressional Record on March 22, Anderson said he \Vas "at a loss
to exp lain why the Democratic leadership might stilt be \vorking against open
ing our floor proceedings to broadcast coverage" since "a party which calls it
self Democratic can hardly be opposed to openness and letting the people par
ticipate more directly in their representative form of Government-especially
in our Bicentennial Year. " Anderson called on the Speaker "to renounce.t hese
reports of your opposition and announce your full support for House broad
casting so that this resolution can be cleared for a House vote by the Rules
Committee. 33 One subcommittee aide thus explained the leadership's contin
ued resistance despite the accommodations that had been made:
111
Our impression was that if we acceded to those changes, we'd be

okay. . . . I chink Albert and O'Neill were shocked when we gave in.
They thought they'd be major items with us and that a compromise
would break down over those issues.34
Despite O'Neill's reported pressures, the Rules Committee went ahead with
its March 24 meeting. After taking statements from both Sisk and Anderson
in support of the revised resolution, the committee debated its merits and ques
tioned the chairman on aspects of the proposal. One of the members of the sub
committee, Clawson, who up until then had remained largely silent on the is
sue, strongly opposed any televised coverage of House debates:
The temptations of television are seductive, but they may also be de
structive. The risks are many and serious. lnstead of informing our peo
ple, televised House proceedings may confuse them. Instead of educat
ing it may bore them and make them impatient. Instead of polishing the
image of the House, the consequences of broadcasting may further tar
nish it. Instead of maintaining the dignity of the House, television may
encourage circus antics. Instead of improving the legislative process, tel
evision may degrade it. And instead of enhancing the democratic
process , television may corrode and cheapen ic.35
Perhaps appropriately, the afternoon session of deliberations by the Rules
Committee was covered by a network pool of cameras. The concern most of
ten expressed by the members ,vas that tl1e proposal did not guarantee that
broadcasters would provide a fair and balanced treatment of the floor debates
in their ne,vs reports. One of those expressing that concern was Rep. John
Young of Texas, a Democrat, who offered a motion to recommit the resolu
tion to the subcommittee. Rep. Richard Bolling of Missouri offered a substi
tute that the resolution be recommitted to subcommittee with instructions
to report back more information on two alternative means of coverage-
"one by public television and the other [by) in-House procedures, and . . . a
specific target date for the beginning of the coverage and distribution." The
Bolling substitute was rejected, 4-11. At that point Anderson attempted to
offer a substitute motion co report the Sisk resolution co the House, but he
was ruled out of order. The Young motion was then adopted, 9-6, with seven
Democrats and two Republicans in support, and four Democrats and two Re
publ icans in opposition. Of the six Sisk subcommittee members, Represen
tatives Young and Clawson voted to recon1mic the resolution; Representa
tive Pepper, the only absentee, indicated for the record his support for the
Sisk resolution. 36
1 12
Prior co the two votes, Sisk informed his colleagues chat it \Vas his intention,
if the resolution was recommitted, to reconvene the subcommittee and report
back to the full comtnittee in a "reasonable time" so that it could still be passed
chat year. "We are not keeping it under the rug," he promised. "I still believe
in this cause and I am going to continue to fight for it."37
True to his word, Sisk \Vrote to all subcommittee members on April 5 to re
iterate his intention to take further action and he solicited their thoughts and
ideas "on possible approaches we might take on chis matter." In the meantime
subcommittee member Pepper had polled all House members on the proposi
tion of broadcasting. Of the 346 respondents, 68.7 percent favored broadcast
ing House debates. Nearly 60 percent favored coverage by a broadcast pool,
and only 30 percent favored an in-House broadcast system. Finally, a majority,
5 3.4 percent, favored gavel-co-gavel broadcast coverage as opposed to cover
age of only selected debates. 38
On May 27, the subcommittee met to consider concerns raised by the full
committee. Representative Anderson offered a package of amendments that
was adopted by voice vote. Three days later Sisk, Anderson, Pepper, Murphy,
and Andrew Young introduced the new version as H. Res. 1502.
One purpose of the resolution was "the enlightenment and information of
the public on the basis of accurate and impartial news coverage of the House
as a legislative and representative body." The resolution inserted new "sense of
the House" language c.hat a network pool should be used to provide the cover
age. It also included alternative language in the report that could be used as
substitute amendments on either an in-House broadcast system or one run by
the Public Broadcasting System. Finally, the new resolution called for the cov
erage co begin just before the 95th Congress began.
Notwithstanding the valiant efforts of the Sisk subcommittee co revive its
ailing proposal, the 94th Congress adjourned without further action on it.
''Back in Business''
When the 95th Congress convened on January 4, 1977, Tip O'Neill was
elected Speaker to succeed Carl Albert, who had retired. In his acceptance
speech O'Neill made no reference to any plans to introduce television into che
House chamber. The package of House rules changes recommended by the De
mocratic Caucus, H. Res. 5, was also silent on the issue.
During debate on the rules resolution, Anderson said he was "dismayed . . .
that the caucus failed to adopt a rule to provide for the continuous broadcast
coverage of our floor proceedings, despite a survey showing 2 71 Members of che
95th Congress in favor of broadcascing."39 The Republicans, unlike che silent
Democrats, presented a thirty-point House reform plan that included a new
113
broadcast rule proposed by Anderson.40 However, House procedures did not

allow for a direct vote on the Republican alternative, and the Democra(S'
House rules package ,va s adopted on a parry-line vote.
It therefore came as a surprise to most members when the new Speaker an
nounced in a press release on March 2, 1977, that a ninety-day live test of tel
evision coverag e of the House floor would begin as early as Tuesday, March 15.
According to the release, the test would be conducted by the Office of the Ar
chitect of the Capitol and the staff of the Join t Committee on Congressional
Operations using three remote-controlled, black-and-white security cameras.
The proceedings would be televised by closed circuit to offices in the Capitol
and the Rayburn House Office Building where there was already a capacity co
receive the signals. Coverage ,vould continue from the opening gavel each day
until the conclusion of legislative business; it ,vould no t include the end-of
the-day special order speeches. The experiment would evaluate "the feasibil
ity of using sma ll, fixed and remotely controlled cameras and related eq uipment
,vhich will not require significant or noticeable modifications to the House
Chamber," as well as "the usefulness of television coverage of House proceed
ings as an information source in each Member's office." In addition, "the his
torical value of establishing a video library of House proceedings" would be as
sessed.41
The Speaker sai d he hoped the test ,vould "form the basis for the eventual
video coverage of che House for dissemination co the public." Such video cov
erage should "be kept in perspective," ho,vever. The Speaker concluded on a
cautious note: "Television should be permitted to ,vitness t he oper. ations of the
House and not by its pres ence domina te the proceedings so as to affect the dis
charge of its constitutional duties.""2
In House floor remarks on March 8, Anderson questioned ,vhether the sys
tem was going to be primarily for the informational uses of members and per
haps only secondarily for the benefit of the public through the later dissemi
nation of capes. He concluded ,vith this warning: "We ,viii only be contributing
funher to public cynicism and distrust of the Congress if w e initia te broad
casting more as a self-service than a public service.''43
On March 15, the first day of the television test, the Speaker informed House
members of the nature and purpose of the test. O'Neill made clear that "House
rules do not permit television or radio broadcast coverage of House proceed
ings, or the use of audio and video excerp(S Ou(Side the Capitol." He explained
his "intention to seek authority fro1n the House if it is considered appropriate
to commence permanent broadcast-media coverage or to permit use of video
or live coverage of the House proceedings by the news media."44
Immediately follo,ving the Speaker's announcement, Anderson offered a
resolution, H. Res. 404, directing the Rules Committee "to investigate and
114
A Window on Congress: Televising Floor Debar.es
evaluate the full scope and impact of the House broadcast test as it affects the
safety, dignity and integrity of the proceedings of the House and the conduct
and convenience of Members, and to report back to the House . . . its findings
and such recommendations as it may deem appropriate, including ,vhether
such broadcast coverage should be made available co the public."45
Anderson again quoted from surveys sho,ving the support of members and
the general public forseeing House debates televised. "This is obviously an idea
whose time has come," he said, "and I am glad you [the Speaker) have taken
the first step to realize that goal. "46
Anderson went on to mention a Harris Poll that sho,ved 88 percent of the
people thought Congress should do more to inform the public about its activ
ities, and 76 perce11t thought Congress tries to hide a lot of things from the
news media. He then quoted from Lou Harris's s ummary of these findings: "lf
Congress did a better job of communicating its real business, its rating might
improve" since "this study sho,vs clearly that the greater a1nount of informa
tion the people have about Congress, the higher they rate Congress."47
In a rare move S peaker O'Neill took to the well of the House to comtnent
on the Anderson resolution. It "does nothing more than l had intended to do
anyway," and "I do not kno,v why it is before us." Anderson responded that he
had offered the resolution to congratulate the Speaker on his initiative and to
ensure that the Rules Committee ,viii become involved in drafting the neces
sary rules to permit the public dissemination of the broadcast materials. O'Neill
thanked Anderson and said:
I know that the resolution will be adopted. I urge its adoption. In the
same breath I laud the gentleman on this historical day for presenting
the first resolution that had been recorded for posterity on television. 48
The only dissenting voice during debate on the resolution was that of Rep.
Leo Ryan, a third-term Democrat fr om California. Ryan ,varned his colleagues
chat there ,vas no turning back on televising the House, "that unblinking eye
is there; it will be there fro1n no,v on." Television "no,v becomes part of the
problem of running the House." It '\vill have an effect upon everything else
chat we do as Meinbers."49
A nother California Democrat and a former broadcast journalise, Rep. Lionel
Van Deerlin, co1n1nended Anderson "for his diligence in pressing for the
telecasting of House proceedings." Van Deerlin said that Anderson, along with
S isk, "as much as anyone has kept this issue in full public vie\v when the in
clination of some among us may have been co let it slide out of sight and out
of mind." 50
When the vote was taken, Anderson's resolution was over,vhelmingly
adopted, 398- 1 0. Anderson to ld his homeco,vn newspaper afterward that he
115
.
was pleasantly surprised. He had expected "a ,vhirlwind of scorn and derision
from 'Tip' O'Neill, not to mention a majority of 'no' votes from the Democ
rats." Anderson went on, "I ,vouldn't have believed they'd let me get away with
this." And he concluded, "We're back in business."5 1
The Home Stretch

There would be three more votes and three more reports over the next two
years before the House broadcasting system would finally go public on March
19, 1979, but Ryan had been correct in saying there ,vas "no turning back."
On September 2 7, 1977, Jack Brooks, chairman of the Select Committee on
Congressional Operations (successor to the joint committee of the same
name), filed a report on the results of the ninety-day test that had been com
pleted on September 15. (The ninety days had been interpreted as legislative
days rather than calendar days).
The report called the test of broadcast coverage "successful" and said "nei
ther technical nor policy considerations stand in the ,vay of early development
of a permanent system for broadcasting House proceedings." A majority of
members surveyed favored making complete and uninterrupted covera ge of
House proceedings available to the public. The report recommended that cam
eras focus only on the official actions of the House and not pan the chamber.
The system should be operated by the House and "should not be delegated or
contracted to groups outside the Congress." According to the report, only 18
of 150 members responding to its survey "preferred that a network pool pro
vide the coverage."52
The select committee's report went on to recommend that the House, be
fore the end of the first session of the 95th Congress, adopt a resolution au
thorizing the establishment of a permanent broadcast system that provided
"complete, continuous, and unedited" coverage of the daily legislative business
of the House to all members, officers, and co1nrnittees by closed-circuit trans
mission. Use of live and recorded broadcasts should be prohibited for com
mercial or political advertising purposes.53
On October 6 Rules Committee Democrat Gillis Long of Louisiana intro
duced H. Res. 821, with Sisk and Brooks as cosponsors. The resolution
amended House rules to authorize and direct the Speaker to "devise and im
plement a system subject to his direction and control for the complete and
unedited audio and video broadcasting and recording of the legislative pro
ceedings of the House. " The Speaker was also asked to provide for the distri
bution of the broadcasts and recordings to the public and the news media. The
Speaker could delegate his implementation responsibilities "to such legislative
entity as he deems appropriate."54
Following two days of hearings on the select committee's report and Long's
116
resolution, the Rules Co1nmittee met on October 25 and adopted, 8,7, a sub,
stitute. Rep. Trent Lott of Mississippi and Sisk introduced H. Res. 866 that
same day, and it ,vas reported by voice vote. 55
The new resolution reflected continued resistance by Anderson and broad
casters to a House-run system. Touted as a bipartisan compromise, it required
the Speaker to defer a decision on what entity should provide public coverage
until after a further report a nd recommendation from the Rules Committee by
March 15, 1978, on alternative broadcast systems. On October 27, the com
promise was adopted by the House, 342-44.
The responsibility for the final Rules Comtnittee report was entrusted to the
chairman of the newly formed Rules Committee Subcommittee on Rules and
Organization of the House, Gillis Long. This time Trent Lott \Vas the ranking
Republican 1nember and Anderson the other subcommittee Republican. Sub,
committee Democ rats included Bolling, Young of Texas, Shirley Chisholm of
Ne,v York, and, for the purpose of the report, Sisk as an ex officio member.
The subcommittee's report ,vas adopted by the full Rules Committee on a
9-6 vote and filed on February 15, 1978. The report reaffirmed the basic prin
ciples embodied in H. Res. 866: coverage should be gavel to gavel and made
available to the public and media both live and by recordings. The central ra
tionale for broadcast coverage is quoted in the epigraph of this chapter. The
central ne,v recommendation of the report was that "the House should oper
ate its own broadcast system follo,ving the example and building on the expe
rience of the Canadian Parliament," which had established its own system in
1977.56
Sisk filed supplemental views to the report and Anderson filed dissenting
views, both expressing a continued preference for allowing the networks to
provide and operate the cameras. Lott filed minority views objecting to an in
House system on the grounds that it would appear to be politically motivated
"another benefit to incumbents with the taxpayers footing the bill." Installing
our own system, "instead of improving our credibility with the public . . . may
very well be contributing to our less than popular image."
The filing of the report technically allowed the Speaker to proceed with
completing the system of his choice and making House debates public on it.
But the Speaker on at least two occasions had promised the House a final vote
on the matter before going public. On June 14, 1978, Representative Ander
son decided to hold the Speaker to his word by offering an amendment t o the
legislative branch appropriations bill. It prohibited any of the funds in the bill
from being used "to purchase new color television cameras and related equip
ment for the purpose of broadcasting the proceedings of the House except by
the prior approval of the House."57
After Anderson explained the Speaker's promised vote on a House-run
117
versus media-run system, Rep. Gillis Long joined the debate to suggest that
immediately follo\ving the disposition of the Anderson amendment, he or
someone else could offer an amendment to decide the issue once and for all as
to who should conrrol the cameras. 58 The Anderson amendment was subse-
quently rejected, 133-249.
The ranking Democrat on the Legislative Branch Appropriations Subcom
mittee, Adam Benjamin of Indiana, then offered an amendment that stipu
lated none of the funds in the bill could be used for implementing a House
television system "under \vhich the TV cameras in the Chamber are controlled
and operated by persons not in the employ of the House."59 During debate on
the amendment, Rep. Jim Wright of Texas took issue with Anderson's calling
the issue a matter of "journalistic integrity." I n Wright's words, "the question
at issue is the integrity of the House of Representatives. The matter at issue is
not the freedom of the press. The matter at issue is the responsibility of the
Congress and whether we shall asser t it."60
Another Democrat, Rep. Romano Mazzoli of Kentucky, disagreed: "What
we have fundamentally here is a question of freedom of the press" and "some
thing usually we ourselves [as Democrats] stand in favor of-openness, candor,
objectivity, let the chips fall where they may."6 1
W hen the chips finally fell on the Benjamin amendment, it was adopted,
235-150, and the Speaker had the final authority he needed to complete a
House-owned and -operated television system. The appropriate rules were
adopted by the House at the beginning of the 96th Congress in January of 1979.
The newly installed system \Vas given a final, thirty-day test, and on March 19,
the House was on the ait and so was the Cable-Satellite Public Affairs Net
\VOrk (C-SPAN), the new cable company that \Vould carry live, gavel-to-gavel
coverage of the House. 62
The Aftermath
Pressured from outside and inside the Congress, O'Neill agreed to televising
the House only once he becam e convinced tha t it could be done in a dignified
manner without embarrassing or humiliating individual me1nbers or the insti
tution. He considered House control ov er the cameras essential, the only \vay
to guarantee an exclusive focus on the n1embers speaking and to avoid shots
panning the chamber for reactions or views of members engaged in other ac
tivities. In his bestselling autobiography O'Neill discuss es this preferred alter
native to commercial coverage :
But \vhat if we allowed TV cameras on the floor of the House that were
conrrolled by us instead of the networks? And what if those cameras
sho,ved only the person who was actually at the microphone and no-
118
A Window on Congress: Televising Floor Debaces
body else? That struck me as a reasonable compromise, and that's ex-

actly what \Ve did in setting up the cable network kno\vn as C-Span. 63
While it may come as 11e\vS to Brian Larnb, the founder of C-SPAN, that Tip
O'Neill was the real founder of his nenvork, the point remains that C-SPAN
may only show the pictures of the chamber transmitted to it by the House
owned and -operated broadcast system as captured by the cameras controlled
by the Speaker. By only allowing close-ups of the persons speaking, the tele
casts were nothing more nor less than an audio and visual version of the Con
gressional Record (absent the ability of members to "revise and extend" their
remarks).
Televising House debates "turned out to be one of the best decisions 1 ever
made," O'Neill later wrote. "The results of our broadcasting experiment have
exceeded my wildest hopes." He was pleased because "Americans are better in
formed on the issues."64
On May 10, 1984, O'Neill made a radical departure from his commitment
to showing only close-up shots of those speaking. Shortly after 7 :00 P.M. on chat
day Rep. Robert Walker, a Republican from Pennsylvania, was in the middle
of delivering a special order speech on the subject of the integrity of the Con
gressiO'Tlal Record when he was handed a note by Republican whip Trent Lott.
Without missing a beat, Walker said:
l do want to take note of something that is evidencly happening right
no\v which is a change of procedure here. lt is my understanding that as
l deliver this special order this evening, the cameras are panning this
Chamber, demonstrating that there is no one here in the Chamber to
listen co these remarks.65
Walker called the change in camera coverage "one 1nore example of how
this body is run; the kind of arrogance of po\ver chat the Members are given
that kind of change with absolutely no warning." He then took notice of Rep.
Tony Coelho standing at the back of the chamber, someone \vho "has talked
in recent weeks about shutting off these special orders and not allowing the1n
to be seen in the countryside."66
At the next House session on May 14, 1984, Speaker O'Neill took the well
of the House to defend his new camera policy in a one-minute speech. "I took
the action that I took last Thursday," O'Neill said, "because I had so rnany com
plaints and so rnany people had asked tne to do \vhat l did." What had enraged
Democrats was a special order speech by Republican representative Newt Gin
grich of Georgia the previous week. O'Neill said Gingrich "took statements
that were made by 20 different Democrats going back to 1968," and suggested
"that Members of Congress were Un-An1erican." Gingrich then asked the ac-
1 19
cused members to respond, although they had not been notified that their
names would be used and were not present on the floor. "A more low thing I
have never seen," O'Neill said. No one challenged the Speaker' s characteriza
tion because, perhaps ironically, Gingrich had not been notified by the Speaker
and therefore was not there to defend himself.
O'Neill continued co explain that he had notified the chairman of his broad
cast advisory committee, Rep. Charlie Rose of North Carolina, around 3:00
P.M. the afternoon of the incident to make the camera coverage change during
special orders that evening. "The prerogative of the rules of this House give me
the right to stop that, gives me that right to say when there will be a wide lens
and when there should not be a wide lens," O'Neill explained. He did concede,
in a colloquy with Minority Leader Robert H. Michel, that as a matter of cour
tesy he should have notified the minority leader in advance of this change in
coverage policy.67
Tempers flared the following day when Representative Gingrich rose to a
question of personal priv ilege to defend h is actions and was recognized for one
hour. He explained that he had notified by mail, in advance, the members that
he would be referring to in his special order speech, but the mail apparently did
not get through on time. Speaker O'Neill was again drawn into the well, this
time to engage Gingrich directly on h is actions. After reiterating his charge
that affected members had not been properly notified and that their patriotism
had been questioned (in dated statements quoted out of context), O'Neill
said:
My personal opinion is this: You deliberately stood in that well before
an empty House and challenged these people, and you challenged their
Americanism, and it is the lowest thing that I have ever seen in my 32
years in Congress.68
With that, Minority Wh ip Lott leapt to his feet to "demand that the
Speaker's ,vords be taken down." Under House rules, if a member's words are
found by the Speaker to be unparliamentary, the offending words are stricken
from the record and the member is banned from speaking for the rest of the
day. Unparliamentary remarks include those that question another member's
motives or integrity. Rep. Joseph Moakely, chairman of the Rules Committee
and a Bay State crony of O'Neill's, was presiding as the Speaker pro tempore
at the time. On the advice of the parliamentarian, he was constrained to rule
that "that type of characterization should not be used in debate."
Lon then asked unanimous consent that "the Speaker be allowed to con
tinue in order," that is, that he not be ban ished from the floor for the rest of
the day.69 The House agreed to the request, and O'Neill was allowed to con-
120
ti.nue in order. Before he vacated the chamber, he engaged in one parting shot
at Gingrich and then at Moakley:
I am not questioning the gentleman's patriotism, I am questioning his
judgment. I also question the judgment of the Chair. I was expressing
my opinion. As a matter of fact, I was expressing my opinion very
mildly, because I think much worse than what I said. 70
The "Camscam" incident boosted the political fortunes of Gingrich's group
of back-benchers, known as the Conservative Opportunity Society. In part by
playing to C-SPAN cameras, they went on to engineer a Republican takeover
of the House in 1994. The incident also helped introduce a new era of politi
cization in the House. From then on both parties would exploit one-minute
and special order speech periods as well as carefully drawn legislative amend
ments to highlight their differences with the other political party.
At the time of the Camscam incident, Democrats \Vere tom between pulling
the TV plug on special order speeches or implementing their own partisan
propaganda campaign using the same techniques as the Republicans. In the
face of Republicans' stiff opposition to anything less than gavel-co-gavel cov
erage, the Democrats retreated on turning off the cameras during special or
ders. The Republicans viewed the proposal as a clear breach of the original in
tent of the television authorization and as an attempt to muzzle t.he minority's
one avenue for raising its issues. 71
The Senate Proceeds with Caution

The Camscam incident and the political uses of House television that triggered
it temporarily slowed momentum chat had been building in the Senate fo r tel
evised sessions of its own. Majority Leader Howard Baker (R-Tenn.) had in
troduced a resolution authorizing such coverage early in 1981, but he ran into
a filibuster buzz-saw of opposition from Democratic senator Russell Long of
Louisiana. Baker backed off rather than block other Senate business. Whereas
concern about the imbalance between the media exposure of the president and
Congress gave initial impetus to televising the House, concern about inordi
nate coverage of the House finally tilted the balance in favor of Senate TV. As
Baker put it in 1981, "If we don't open up the Senate to radio and television,
I predict that in a few years . . . in the public mind at least, the House will be
the dominant branch."72
Minority Leader Robert Byrd eventually came around to Baker's vie\v and
was instrumental in paving the way for a vote without a filibuster. On Febru
ary 27, 1986, the Senate voted 67-21 for a public trial period that began on
May 1. Follo,ving the six-week trial the Senate briefly tenninated video cov-
121
erage in July to debate whether to make the system permanent. And on July
29, the Senate voted 78,21 in favor of permanent coverage. 73
The Impact of TV on Congress

After nearly two decades of televised floor proceedings in the House and over
a decade in the Senate, the coverage has neither lived up to the highest ex
pectations of its proponents nor the worst fears of its opponents. Many propo,
nents thought the increased exposure would help co restore the balance be
tween the president and Congress. While most observers \vould agree that the
Congress has been strengthened relative to the presidency since the 1970s, few
would assert that congressional television had much, if anything, to do with it.
Instead, the presidency has been diminished by the perceived excesses of the
Vietnam War; impoundments by che chief executive of funds appropriated by
Congress; the Watergate and Iran-Contra scandals involving Presidents
Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan, respectively; and the end of the cold war,
a stage for presidential diplomacy. Congress, on the ocher hand, has strength,
ened its own hand by reasserting its prerogatives in the areas of war powers,
spending, impeachment, and investigations of executive branch wrongdoing.
That is not to say that Congress has now become the dominant branch of gov,
em1nent. Presidents continue to enjoy higher job approval and confidence rat,
ings than does Congress, even in the midst of a 1najor campaign fund-raising
scandal involving the White House.7" Ho\vever, in certain important areas,
such as the economy, the public perceives that the Congress is more influen
tial than the president today.75
Has television coverage of Congress increased public understanding of the
issues and operations of Congress and, as a result, increased public confidence
and trust in the institution? There is no hard evidence chat it has.
However, 65 percent of the respondents to a 1995 poll said they received
most of their ne\vs about Congress from local or network television newscasts,
compared with 20 percent from newspapers. 76 And according co another poll,
network news coverage ofCongress has been steadily declining rather than in,
creasi.ng since the advent of televised floor sessions.77 Therefore, it is highly
unlikely chat more Americans are better informed about Congress and its de
bates than they were during the pre,TV era. The exception, of course, are reg
ular C,SPAN viewers, but they comprise only a small fraction of the TV-view
ing public. Whereas 62 percent of the people in a Roper Poll said they watched
a TV news program daily, only 4 percent said they watched C-SPAN daily.78
As for public confidence in Congress, the trend, with the exception of mid,
1998, has been downward rather than upward since the introduction of con,
gressional television. According to Gallup Poll measures of public confidence
in major institutions, the percentage of people having a "great deal" or "quite
122
a lot" of confidence in Congress was 40 percent in 1975 and 1977 (before

House T V coverage began in 1979), averaged around 30 percent i.n 1979-84,
briefly jumped back to around 40 percent in 1 985-86, but hovered between
18 and 21 percent bet\veen 1991 and 1996.79 Perhaps not coincidentally, the
percentage of network ne\vs stories about Congress that ,vere positive between
1972 and 1992 declined from 2 6 to 11 percent, while the percentage of nega
tive stories increased from 74 percent to 89 percent.80 The same survey found
that the number of policy stories about Congress on the network ne,vs fro1n
1986 to 1992 dropped from nearly 80 percent to just over 50 percent, while
the percentage of stories on ethics and scandals increased from 7 percent to 1 7
percent.81
Moreover, the use of members and congressional staff as sources for com
mentary on Congress in net\vork news stories dropped from 60 percent in 1972
and 1982 to just 47 percent in 1992. The networks are relying more on persons
outside the Congress to comment on its actions- hardly a constructive use of
the increased avatlability of televised floor and committee dcbates.82 Those
who vie,v C-SPAN regularly and others who are kno,vledgeable about Con
gress tend to be even more negative about Congress than is the general pub
lic-at least in polls taken through 1994.83 This could stem from the fact that
such viewers tend to be more ideological and opinionated than the average
voter and therefore more likely to react negatively to most of ,vhat Congress
does.
As for the itnpact of congressional television on Congress itself, most mem
bers feel it has had an overall beneficial effect, as an internal informational de
vice and as a stimulus for improving the quality of legislative debates. The one
predictable result of televising the House and Senate floor is that it has pro
duced an increase in nonlegislative speeches (one-minute and special order
speeches) by members wishing to speak on subjects of their own choosing for
home or national consumption. Not only have these speaking venues resulted
in longer sessions each day, but they have been the source of coordinated po
litical attacks on the other parcy's policies as well as on individuals of the other
party-especially those accused of ethical proble1ns in the Congress and the
administration. The partisan ,vars \Vere fueled by sharp divisions over the Rea
gan administration's budget cuts in the early 1980s, its support for the
Nicaraguan Contras in the mid- l 980s, and later by Speaker Jim Wright's ethics
problems in the lace 1980s, the House post office and bank scandals in the early
1990s, and Speaker Gingrich's own ethics problems in the mid-1990s.
Both party leaderships have organized "theme teams" to deliver their parti
san message of the day during nonlegislative free speech periods (called "one,
minutes" and special orders) at the beginning and end of each daily session.
Most one-minute speeches are aimed at differentiating between the policies of
123
the t,vo parties, but some have deteriorated into bitter personal attacks,
prompting bipartisan calls for at least poscponing one-minutes until the end of
each day.
le is currently in vogue to blame the "sunshine" reforms of the seventies, es
pecially televised floor proceedings, for the public's sagging confidence in Con
gress. Increased public exposure is cited as a big reason for the loss of confidence.
As some observers have concluded, "Familiarity breeds contempt." Televising
Congress, they say, has not brought the expected benefit: "To kno,v us is to love
us." The "process is the problem," ,ve are cold, and not the product. 84
However, the facts seem co indicate that the public sees and learns less of
Congress today from television, its principal source of such news, than it did
in the pre-TV era-C-SPAN viewers, perhaps, excepted. That is not to say
that the people still do not have a general sense of the status and progress of
the most important national issues in play between the White House and the
Congress-they do. But public job-performance ratings of the president and
Congress still depend 1nore on perceived results than on process. Congressional
television is here co stay. Whether it will ever measure up to its perceived po
tential for better educating the public on the democratic process and national
issues remains to be seen.
Notes
1 . "Broadcasting the Proceedings of the House: A Report of the Committee on
Rules on Its Study of Alternative Methods of Providing Complete and Unedited Audio
and Visual Broadcasting of the Proceedings of the House of Representatives Pursuant
to Section 3 of House Resolution 866, Ninety-Fifth Congress," H. Rept. 95-881, Feb.
15, 1978, 2. This report gave the Speaker of the House final authority to devise and
implement a permanent House broadcasting system pursuant to H. Res. 866.
2. Public Law 91-510, "The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970," 91st Cong.,
H.R. 17654, Oct. 26, 1970, sec. 402 (a)( 1 ).
3. Who's Who in American Politics, 1975- 76, 5th ed., ed. Jacques Cattell Press (New
York: R.R. Bo,vkerCo., 1975 ), 893. No biographical information on Ste,vart is provided
in the CRS report he ,vrote or in the subsequent hearings based on it. Ste,vart ,vould
lacer be listed in the hearings and reports of the Joint Com1nittce on Congressional
Operations as a research consultant to the joint committee.
4. "Congress and Mass Communications: An Institutional Perspective," a study
conducted for the Joint Committee on Congressional Operations by the Congressional
Research Service, Committee Print, 93d Cong., 2d sess., 1974, v.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid., 5.
8. Ibid., 18-19.
9. Ibid., 28. H.J. Res. 209, 91st Cong.
124
10. Ibid., 42.

1 1 . Ibid., 62.
12. Ibid., 64.
13. "Congress and Mass Communications: Hearings before the Joint Committee on
Congressional Operations, Ninety-Third Congress, Second Session," Feb. 20, 21;
March 7, 20; April 9 and 10, 1974, Opening statement of the Honorable Jack Brooks
on Feb. 20, 1974, 4.
14. Ibid., opening statement of the Honorable James C. Cleveland, Feb. 20, 1974, 5.
15. Ibid., statement of the Honorable Edmund S. Muskie, Feb. 20, 1974, 15-16.
16. Ibid., statement of the Honorable Walter E Mondale, Feb. 20, 1974, 32.
17. Ibid., state1nent of the Honorable John B. Anderson, Feb. 20, 1974, 5 5 -56.
18. "Congress and Mass Communications," statement of Neil MacNeill, Time,
March 20, 1974, 250-51.
19. Ibid., 251.
20. Ibid., 421.
21. Ibid., 422.
22. "Broadcasting House and Senate Proceedings: An Interim Report of the Joint
Committee on Congressional Operations on Congress and Mass Communications," H.
Rept. 93-1458, 93d Cong., 2d sess., 1-2.
23. Ibid., 57- 58.
24. Ibid., 58.
25. "A Clear Message to the Pe.ople: Report of the Joint Committee on
Congressional Operations on Congress and Mass Co1nmunications," H. Rept. 94-539,
94th Cong., 1st sess., 3.
26. Ibid., separate vie\vs of Sen. Jesse Hel.ms, 22.
27. "Broadcast Coverage of House Floor Proceedings: Report of the Ad Hoc
Subcommittee on Broadcasting co rhe Committee on Rules on H. Res. 875," Rules
Committee Print, Feb. 23, 1976, 3.
28. Ibid., 3-4.
29. Ibid., 4.
30. Bruce F. Freed, "House Leadership Opposes Broadcast Plan," Congressional
Quarterly Weekly Report, March 20, 1976, 623.
31. Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr., Man of the Howe: The Ufe and Political Memoirs ofSpeaker
Tip O'Neill, with William Novak (New York: Random House, 1987 ), 289.
32. "Broadcast Coverage of House Floor Proceedings: A Supplemental Report of the
Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Broadcasting to the Committee on Rules on H. Res. 875,"
Rules Comminee Print, March 9, 1976, 4.
33. Remarks of Rep. John B. Anderson, Congressional Record, March 22, 1976,
El 434.
34. Freed, "House Leadership," 623.
35. "Television and Radio Coverage of the House: Hearing before the Committee
on Rules," 94th Cong., 2d sess., March 24, 1976, statement of the Honorable Del
Clawson in opposition to broadcasting House floor proceedings, 22.
36. Ibid., 56-64.
125
. 37. Ibid., 59.

38. "Broadcast Coverage of House Floor Proceedings: A Second Supplemental
Report of the Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Broadcasting of the Co1nmittee on Rules on
H. Res. 1502," Committee Print (1976), 2 - 3.
39. Congressional Record, Jan. 4, 1977, remarks of Rep. John B. Anderson on H. Res.
s, 61.
40. Ibid., "GOP Proposals for Reform of House Rules," inserted ,vith remarks of Rep.
Willia1n Frenzel, 61-62.
41. Press release of House Speaker Thomas P. "Ttp" O'Neill, Jr. (D-Mass.), March 2,
1977, reprinted in remarks of Rep. John B. Anderson, Cong,-essional Record, daily ed.,
March 8, 1977, Hl852.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
44. Announcement by the Speaker, Congressional Record, March IS, 1977, 7608.
45. H. Res. 404, 95th Cong., 1st sess., "Privileges of the House-Television
Coverage of Proceedings of House," offered by Rep. John B. Anderson of Illinois,
Congressional Record, March 1 5 , 1977, 7608.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid., 7609.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid., 7611.
SO. Ibid., 7612.
51. "Some More Sunshine," editorial, Rockford Morning-Star, March 18, 1977, a-6.
52. "Televising the House," communication from the chairman, Select Committee
on Congressional Operations, to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, H. Doc.
95-231, Sept. 27, 1977, 3 5- .
53. Ibid., 7-8.
54. H. Res. 821, 95th Cong., 1st sess., introduced by Mr. Long of Louisiana, Oct. 6,
1977, amending House Rule l ("Duties of the Speaker").
55. "Providing for Radio and Television Coverage of House Proceedings: Report
of the Committee on Rules to Accompany H. Res. 866," H. Rept. 95-759, Oct. 26,
1977,3.
56. "Broadcasting the Proceedings of the House," 2 , 5.
57. Amendment offered by Mr. Anderson of Illinois to the legislative branch
appropriations bill for fiscal year 1979, Congressional Record, June 14, 1978, 17657.
58. Ibid., I 7659.
59. Atnendment offered by Mr. Benjamin to the legislative branch appropriations
bill for fiscal year 1979, Congressional Record, June 14, 1978, 17661.
60. Ibid., 17664.
61. Ibid., 17665.
62. For an excellent history of the development and evolution of C-SPAN, see
Stephen Frantzich and John Sullivan, The C-SPAN Revolution (Norman: Oklahoma
University Press, 1996).
63. O'Neill, Man of the House, 289.
64. Ibid., 288-89.
126
A Window on Congress: Televising Floor Debaces
65. Remarks of Rep. Robert Walker of Pennsylvania, Congressional Record, May l0,
1984, 1 1894.
66. Ibid.
67. Remarks of Rep. Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr., Congressional Record, May 14, 1984,
12042.
68. Ibid., May 15, 1984, 12201.
69. Ibid.
70. Ibid., 12202.
71. See especially the May 8, 1984, letter from the chief deputy majority whip, Bill
Alexander of Arkansas, to his Democratic colleagues, and three ne\vspaper articles on
a proposed telecommunications strategy, inserted in the May LO, 1984, Congressional
Record by Republican representative Bob McE\ven at 1 1895-97.
72. Frantzich and Sullivan, C-SPAN Revolution, 56, quoting Baker in Tom Shales,
"The Floor Show," Washington Post, Dec. l , 1981, Bl.
73. Ibid., 60-64.
74. For example, a Washingwn Pos e -ABC Ne\VS poll conducted by Chilton Research
in July of 1997 showed President Clinton \Vith a 65 percent job approval rating and
Congress \Yith a 40 percent approval rating (still relatively high for Congress). Dan Balz
and Ceci Connolly, "Voters Feeling Reinoved fro1n Issues in Capital," Washingwn Post,
July 10, 1997, Al, A6.
75. According to a September 1996 Gallup Poll, 48 percent of the public thinks the
goven1ment has n1ore influence over the performance of the economy than
nongovernmental sectors have (38 percent). Of those respondents, 59 percent think
Congress has more influence over the econon1y than the president has. The Gallup Poll
Monthly, Sept. 1996 (No. 372), 38.
76. Freedom Forutn/Roper Poll of the general public (Sept. 1995), published in
Elaine S. Povich, Partners and Adversaries: The Contentious Connection between Congress
and the Media (Arlington, Va.: The Freedom Forum, l 996), 149.
78. S. Robert Lichter and Daniel R. Amundson, "Less News Is Worse News:
Television Ne\YS Coverage of Congress, 1 9 7 2 -92," in Congress, the Press, and the Public,
ed. Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein (Washington, D.C.: The American
Enterprise Institute and the Brookings Institution, I994), 134. The authors surveyed
news stories about the Congress on the three major net\vork ne,vs programs during the
month of April each year from I 972 to 1992. Whereas the monthly average from I 972
through 1978 \Vas 124 stories a month, from 1986 to 1992 the number of congressional
stories averaged just 42 a month.
78. Freedom Forum/Roper Poll of the general public (Sept. 1995), in Povich,
Partners and Adversaries, 144-45.
79. Leslie McAneny, "Public Confidence in Major Institutions Little Changed from
1995," The Gallup Poll Monthly, June l 996, 7-9.
80. Lichter and Amundson, "Less News Is Worse News," 138.
81. Ibid., 135- 37.
82. Ibid., 137-38.
83. Frantzich and Sullivan, C-SPAN Revolution, 249-53. For further evidence that
127
those more knowledgeable about Congress are more critical of it, see Herb Asher and
Mike Barr, "Popular Support for Congress and Its Me1nbers," in Congress, the Press, and
the Public, 15-43; John R. Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse, "What the Public
Dislikes about Congress," in Congress Reconsidered, 6th ed., ed. La,vrence C. Dodd and
Bruce I. Oppenheimer (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1997), 61�0; and John R.
Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse, Congress as Public Enemy: Public Attitudes wward
A.merican Political Institutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995 ).
84. Frantzich and Sullivan, and Hibbing and Morse are the leading proponents of
this theory of the downside of overexposure.
128
•••
The Revival of Direct

Democracy Proposals
ETWEEN 1898 and 1918, eighteen states adopted some form of initia
-tive and referendum process for making their residents' views known on
-public issues (see Chapter 5). A four-decade lull followed. Until 1959 no
other states adopted these direct democracy devices. Since then eight addi
tional states and the District of Columbia have adopted some form of initia
tive and/or referendum (see Table 9.1). T\venty-six states now have one or both
of these processes. All states except Delaware provide for a popular referendum
to approve constitutional amendments recommended by the state legislatures.
The increase in the number of states joining the ranks of those with the ini
tiative and referendum over the past thirty years has been modest. More
significant and dra1natic is the increase in the use of those devices beginning
in the mid-1970s (see Table 9.2).
A similar survey of state initiatives and referendums on the ballot between
1900 and 1992 by David B. Magleby shows a steady decline in their number
from the 1930s, when there were 246, to a lo\v of 85 in the 1960s. But this num
ber began increasing steadily: in the 1970s co 120, to 193 in the 1980s, and to
a projected 353 in the 1990s based on the first three years of the decade. 1
This revival of interest in direct democracy has been attributed to the cli
mate for political reform in the wake of Vietnam, Watergate, and other polit
ical scandals that have fueled a growing crisis of confidence in government at
all levels. As the use of state initiatives and referendums grew and received na
tional attention, other states followed suit. Perhaps the biggest spur to the
129
Table 9.1
States with Some Form of Initiative and/or
Referendum Process by Year of Adoption
( 1 898-1992)
State Year
South Dakota 1898
Utah 1900
Oregon 1902
Montana 1906
Oklahoma 1907
Maine 1908
Missouri 1908
Arkansas 1910
Colorado 1910
Arizona 1912
California 1912
Idaho 1912
Nevada 1912
Ohio 1912
Washington 1912
Michigan 1913
Nebraska 1916
North Dakota 1918
Alaska 1959
Florida 1968
Wyoming 1968
Illinois 1970
District of Columbia 1977
Kentucky 1992
Maryland 1992
Mississippi 1992
New Mexico 1992
Sources:Th.01nas E. Cronin, Direct De,nocracy: The Policies of lnicialive , Ref
erendum, and Recall (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), 51; and
Lisa Oakley and Thomas H. Neale, "Citizen Initiative Proposals Appearing
on Seate Ballots, 1976-1992," Congressional Research Service Report 95-
288 GOV (Feb. 15, 1995).
130
The Revival of Direct Democracy Proposals
Table 9.2
State Initiatives and Their Passage Rates ( 1904-92)
Percentage of proposed
Years Number of initiatives initiatives that passed
1904-21 357 40.6
1922-39 386 33.7
1940-57 243 39.1
1958-75 186 44.6
1976-92 495 43.6
Source: Lisa Oakley and Tho1nas H. Neale, "Citizen Initiative Proposals Appearing on Scare Bal
lots, 1976-1992," Congressional Research Service Repon 95-288 GOV, Feb. 15, 1995, 6.
movement was passage of the property-tax-limiting Proposition 13 in Califor

nia in 1978, which will be discussed later in this chapter.
Congress Flirts with Direct Democracy

Bet,veen the 78th and 94th Congresses ( 1 943-77), no constitutional a,nend
ments had been introduced in either house of Congress to provide for a na
tional initiative process. During the 95th Congress that long streak was bro
ken, mainly because of the efforts of two t,vency-five-year-olds, Roger Telscho,v
and John Forster, ,vho were already campaign veterans in the newly resurgent
use of the state initiative process. One night i.n February of 1 977, while at
tending a Consumer Federation of America conference in Washington, D.C.,
the two concluded over a beer that ,vhat worked for state governments could
work at the national level. They consequently founded a national movement
for a constitutional initiative amendment, Initiative America. By that sun1mer
they had persuaded Democratic senator James Abourezk of South Dakota (the
first state to adopt the initiative process, in 1898) to introduce the constitu
tional amendment they had drafted, even though he planned to retire the fol
lo,ving year. Abourezk introduced the joint resolution, S. J. Res. 67, on July 1 1,
1977, together with Republican senator Mark Hatfield of Oregon (the third
state to adopt the initiative and referendum process, in 1 902).
Abourezk called the initiative process "unique among our democratic
rights," and he said it was "founded on the belief that the citizens of this coun
try are indeed as competent to enact legislation as we are to elect public officials
to represent us." Because of its "workability as a democratic tool" in t\vency
three states, "its extension to the Federal level [is] justified and long overdue."
131
T he Revival of Direct Democracy Proposals
Moreover, he asserted, "much of the alienation and helplessness that citizens

experience can be mitigated if avenues for constructive participation exist." He
praised the initiative procedure as "one means to provide direct citizen access
to our governmental decision tnaking process through a legal and democratic
method.112
These introductory remarks by Abourezk on the Senate floor included an as
surance that the proposal \vas not"antigovernment" but rather"a natural com
plement to our system of representative government." It "enhances accounta
bility and openness of our representative process " and serves as a '"safety valve'
for public concems"-echoes of Woodrow Wilson's embrace of the device. 3
Under the terms of the Abourezk resolution, voters could put a proposed fed
eral law (or the repeal o r amendment of an existing law) on the next general
election ballot by securing the signatures of3 percent of the voters nationally
in the last presidential election, including 3 percent from at least each of ten
states. The initiative process could not be used to amend the Constitution, de
clare war, or call out the National Guard. Signatures would have co be gath
ered within an eighteen-month time frame to be valid. They would be pre
sented to the attorney general who would then have ninety days in which to
validate the petition. At least 120 days would be allowed between the
certification and the election in which the ballot initiative would be voted.
Congress could not repeal or amend an initiative law within two years of its ef
fective date except by a two -thirds vote of both houses.4
Following the introduction of the resolution in the 95th Congress, the
founders of Initiative America took their campaign o n the road in a school bus
painted red, white, and blue and converted into living quarters and an office.
Their bold and low-budget tour of the Midwest attracted significant 1nedia at
tention. News articles and wire stories, editorials, and broadcas t commentaries
on the national initiative proposal filled more than forty-five pages of an ap
pendix to the Senate hearing record. Included were favorable pieces by Ralph
Nader, David Brinkley, Pat Buchanan, Nicholas von Hoffman, and Tom
Wicker. A few critical appraisals were inserted in the record as well, including
columns by conservatives James J. Kilpatrick, who called the proposal "re
markably silly," and George Will, who termed it "congruent with the vague
populist impulse of the day."5 But even the critical columns helped stir the pot
in the form of op-ed rebuttals and letters to the editor that \vere added to the
hearing record.
In addition to widespread media attention, the proposal drew support from
a few governors. Among them were Democrat J. J. Exon of Nebraska and Re
publicans Jay S. Hammond of Alaska and Tom McCall of Oregon. 6
In the House of Representatives Republican Guy Yander Jagt of Michigan
introduced his own variation on the Abourezk resolution, H. J. Res. 544, on
132
July 12, 1977. Yander Jagt provided a higher petition threshold of 8 percent of
the last presidential vote in each of at least three-fourths of the states, but with
no overall national percentage threshold. And on November 8, Democratic
representative James R. Jones of Oklahoma introduced a resolution identical
to Abourezk's, H. J. Res. 658. All told, fourteen House members, including
eight Republicans and six De1nocrats, had cosponsored either the Jones or Yan
der Jagt resolutions by December 1977.
In the Senate, Democrat Mike Gravel of Alaska would be the lone senator
to join Hatfield and Abourezk as a cosponsor of the resolution.Despite this slim
support, national media attention plus Abourezk's persistence sufficed to per
suade the chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee's Constitutional Sub
committee, Birch Bayh of Indiana, to hold hearings on the proposal. I t did not
hurt that Abourezk, one of only fo ur majority-party subcommittee members,
could chair the hearings for two days once Bayh had made his opening remarks.
In his opening statement on December 13, 1977, Bayh pointed out that
while most of the scheduled \Vitnesses were favorably disposed to the idea of a
national initiative process, "their views in no way reflect an intent upon the
part of this subcommittee to narrow the range of interested witnesses." He was
determined to have "a full and fair record on both the pros and cons of a na
tional initiative process." As for himself, Bayh admitted, " I have seriou s reser
vations abo ut the initiative proposal on the Federal level."7
Before turning the gavel over co Abourezk, Bayh inserted in the hearing
record a letter from Assistant Attorney General Patricia M. Wald dated De
cember 9, 1977. "While the proposed amendment certainly reflects the theory
of democratic government, it is the considered judgment ofthe Department of
Justice that it cannot be effectively implemented in the United States, at the
federal level, in the Twentieth Century," she wrote. The letter recounted how
the Founders had chosen "a representative or republican form of government"
as opposed to a"pure democracy" for "philosophic, historical, and practical rea
sons." These reasons, she insisted,"remain the same today." Wald said the prac
tical problems were even more compelling in modem times given the com
plexity of laws at the federal level and the increased chance of inconsistent,
contradictory, or overlapping laws and ocher errors. 8
In his prepared statement Abourezk said the initiative proposal is founded
"on the belief in the \visdom of the American people," and "politicians who
wish to oppose the initiative process place themselves in an especially difficult
position . . . [of] saying that they don't trust the people or that the people are
not educated enough to vote on issues." What such an argument ignores, said
Abourezk, is that "these very same 'untrustworthy and uneducated' people can
be trusted and are educated enough to elect politicians to office." Moreover, he
went on, "the people have proven themselves worthy of this direct democratic
133
process" through the responsible exercise of the device in twenty-three states

where "the people repeatedly have sho\vn restraint and good judgment."9
Abourezk concluded his testimony by saying that he had introduced the
amendment not because he sought to advance a particular issue or a set of lib
eral issues, "but because I think the American people deserve chis basic dem
ocratic right" that "will help restore the people's shattered faith in their abil
ity to effect [sic] the course of the government under which they live." 10
He inserted in the hearing record following his testimony the results of a
Cambridge Survey Research public opinion poll conducted in late November
of 1977. It was based on 750 telephone interviews across the nation. Fifty
seven percent of the persons polled favored a national initiative process, only
25 percent were opposed, and 18 percent were not sure. Otl1er results of the
survey showed 74 percent saying they were more likely to vote in an election
chat included ballot initiatives; 45 percent agreeing that an initiative process
would give them more control over their govem1nent ( with 8 percent saying
less control, and 42 percent saying no difference); and 77 percent saying the
process would make elected representatives more responsive to the will of the
people. On the ocher side of the ledger, 43 percent of the respondents thought
the new right \Vould result i n some unfair or poor laws being adopted, as op
posed to 36 percent \vho thought it would be exercised fairly. Sixty-one per
cent agreed there was a lot of crud1 or some truth co the statement that a na,
tional initiative process would actually weaken government because it would
encourage legislators not to make hard decisions. 1 1 A Gallup Poll printed in
the appendix to the hearing record reported results almost identical t o the
Cambridge survey: 57 percent ofthe respondents favored the Abourezk initia
tive proposal and 2 1 percent opposed i t. 12
Rep. Jim Jones, testifying on behalf of his House version of the Abourezk
amendment, recalled his days as an aide in the Johnson White House a decade
earlier when "the country was being tom apart by mounting popular opposi
tion to the Vietnam war" and a "growing feeling of frustration about the big
ness and the impersonality of Government." Jones speculated, "Had the Amer
ican people had a national initiative process available at that time, many of
the violent, wrenching aspects of our Vietnam experience could have been
avoided." Proponents and opponents of the war would have had at their dis
posal "a peaceful but forceful way to demonstrate their feelings and their
strength,'' and "those of us who \Vere here in Washington would have received
a clearer view- much sooner-of the people's will ." 1 3
Jones went on to testify chat the need for such an initiative process \Vas even
more co1npelling today given the greater sense that "Americans feel distant
from, and out of touch with, their government," because "our democratic in
stitutions . . . have gro\vn coo big or coo bureaucratic or too diffuse to deal with
13 4
The Revival of Direct Dernocracy Proposals
problems effectively and directly." Consequently, "today it is the individual

citizen who lacks sufficient po\ver to create national policy for the public
good." 14
One of the lone dissenting witnesses testifying on the Abourezk resolution
was Professor Peter Bachrach, a political scientist at Temple University.
Bachrach raised three arguments against the concept. First, "the political arena
which it creates will be pree1npted by the groups that have money, that have
organization, that have political skill, and that have power." He foresaw "a con
test among power groups, monied po\ver groups, over \vho is the tnost skilled
in manipulating the 1ninds of the people." Second, tl1e proposal "presupposes
that the people are in a position to n1ake good judgments" \vhen in fact "a
significant number of them . . . are apathetic, alienated, and cynical toward the
political system" and have "not had the opportunity to be politically educated."
And third, "the kind of issues the elites will present to the masses \viii be more
or less hate issues," in which there is "a strong feeling among the people, such
as busing, pornography, [and] Government supported abortion." The initiative
process may even make a significant group of educated voters more cynical "be
cause issues which are raised by the liberal, radical side of the policy \Viii be
overwhelmingly defeated."1 5
The wrap-up witness at the t\vo-day hearing, Initiative America co-director
Roger Telscho\v, took issue \Vith Bachrach's argument that citizens were not
ready co make decisions on complex social issues: "The same argument has
probably been used for blacks or any other segment of the public \vhich once
was nonvoting." In face, added Telschow, six of the last ten amendments to me
Constitution have extended the citizens' right to vote yet when each one was
considered, "opponents warned of disaster, a breakdown of our governmental
system, a tyranny by the majority, and so on." 16
Telschow urged Congress to take "a major step toward rene\ved trust be
tween the people and Government," because "when the Government puts
more trust in the people, people will put more trust in the Government." He
concluded, "ultimately, the decision to ratify mis amend1nent must be based
on trust-trust that the American people have the right and the ability to
make decisions for themselves when they deem it necessary." 17
During 1978 me list of supporters \vho either introduced their O\vn resolu
tions or cosponsored others' grew from fourteen sponsors and cosponsors to
nventy•eight, including t,venty-five House members and three senators, of
whom sixteen were Republicans and twelve were Democrats. One of the mem
bers \vho signed on as a cosponsor of the Jones resolution in the second session
was a thiny-seven-year-old freshman named Richard Gephardt of Missouri,
who would be elected Democratic Caucus chairman in 1985 and House tna
jority leader in 1989 upon the resignation of Speaker Jim Wright of Texas and
135
the elevation of Tom Foley of Washington to the Speakership. No funher ac

tion \Vas taken on the resolution in the 95th Congress.
In the 96th Congress (1979-81), interest in the initiative proposal began to
wane. With Abourezk's retirement, Senator Hatfield dutifully reintroduced the
proposal and collected three cosponsors: Senators Mike Gravel (D-Alaska),
Dennis DeConcini (D-Ariz.), and Larry Pressler (R-S. Oak.). In the House
Jones reintroduced the measure but did not bother to solicit cosponsors.
Fourth-term Republican Jack Kemp of New York introduced his own version
and collected five cosponsors, including Trent Lott of Mississippi who would be
elected House Republican whip in 1981, Senate Republican whip in 1995, and
Senate majority leader in June of 1996 upon the resignation of Sen. Bob Dole
of Kansas. Kemp also made the proposal one of the central planks in his bid for
the Republican presidential nomination in 1980 and of his campaign book. l 8
Nevertheless, only seventeen members of the House and Senate sponsored
or cosponsored initiative constitutional amendments in the 96th Congress, in
cluding twelve Republicans and five Democrats (but not including rising star
Gephardt who had temporarily latched onto an alternative device). By the fol
lowing Congress, the 97th (1 981-83), the total had dropped to just five House
members-all Republicans, including Kemp (but not Lott). In the 98th the
number of amendments introduced had dropped to just two (with no cospon
sors). And from the 99th through 101st Congresses (1985- 91 ), no general ini
tiative amendments were introduced.
In the 102d through the 105th Congresses there were never more than two
general initiative constitutional amendments introduced in any tw o-year pe
riod-the lone keepers of the flame being Republican representatives Gerald
B. Solomon of New York and Peter Hoekstra of Michigan. 19
Gephardt's Advisory Referendum Alternative

As the national initiative movement was losing steam, an alternative to di
rect democracy, a national advisory referendum, was gaining momentum. It
was championed by the Missouri Public Interest Research Group. On August
18, 1980, Representative Gephardt i.ntroduced H. R. 7934 "to provide that an
advisory referendum be conducted as part of each general election to give vot
ers an opportunity to express their views on certain issues of national impor
tance." ln a press release issued the same day Gephardt said the following of
his proposal:
There is a growing feeling among the American people that their votes
no longer count, that politicians fail to respond to legitimate concerns,
and that they have little or no impact on policy decisions. People are
frustrated. Voters stay home on election day and yearn for a clear choice
136
on issues. When people are given clear choices, the evidence points to
increased participation in the democratic process. A National Referen
dum will provide the vehicle for the re-expression of public sentiment
for or against critical issues facing the Nation. 20
The Gephardt bill called for a Joint Cotnmittee on the National Advisory
Referendum composed of seven members each from the House and Senate,
with the vice president participating only to break a tie vote. Not later than
January I of each general election year, after taking testimony from the public
on possible referendum items, the joint committee would report a concurrent
resolution to each house setting forth the text of proposals to be submitted to
the voters at the next election. The referendum proposals would be chosen
from among a list in the bill of twenty-one public policy issues, ranging alpha
betically from business regulation to worker health and safety.
The concurrent resolution \vould be subject to amendment in each house,
but the number of referendum proposals could not be increased beyond three
or decreased to less than one. Any differences between the versions passed by
the two houses would be resolved by the joint committee. If Congress had not
completed this process at least 120 days prior to an election, the president
\Vould have ninety days before the election to certify up to three referendum
proposals to state election officials for inclusion on the general election ballots.
The Congressional Research Service would prepare a voters' guide on the ref
erendum issues, which would be distributed to the print and broadcast media
for furtherpublic dissemination. Measures passed by the public but not enacted
by the Congress \Vithin four years would be replaced on the ballot of the next
general election.2 1
The idea of a national advisory referendum is not new (see Chapter 6). Sen.
Robert LaFollette (the senior) introduced a bill calling for an advisory refer
endum on war in 1916, and his son, Sen. Robert Lafollette, Jr. , forced a vote
on an advisory war referendum amendment to a neutrality bill in 1939 \vhen
the Senate refused to consider his tougher constitutional amendment.
In between the t\VO forays by the LaFollettes, the Department of Agriculture
utilized advisory referendums to determine market quotas for several basic
commodities in 1933 and 1936. A similar device \Vas used in 1963 when 1.2
million farmers participated in a referendum on wheat quotas.22 A Gallup Poll
commissioned by Direct Democracy author Thomas Cronin in 1987 showed 5 8
percent public support for a national advisory referendum and only 23 percent
opposition. 23
Gephardt's proposal for a Joint Committee on the National Advisory Ref
erendum went nowhere in the 96th Congress or in the 97th Congress
(1981-83) when h e reintroduced it.
137
National versus State Initiatives

At a time when state initiatives were growing in numbers, why did the national
initiative campaign falter? Initiative America remained active through 1980,
but went out of existence in 1981. According to Telschow:
We were never that optimistic we could get the national initiative
adopted. ln fact, we were really surprised that it got as much attention
and went as far as it did in 1977 and 1978. For a while it really \Vas
catching on. But after the 1980 election, interest seemed to \Vane, and
those of us involved in the campaign could only go on so long living off
our savings.24
Even though there had been no action in Congress on the proposals in 1979
and 1980 and the collapse of Initiative America looked imminent in April of
1981, tl1e Gallup organization posed its question in the same terms as it had in
1978:
The U.S. Senate will consider a proposal that \VOuld require a national
vote-that is, a referendum-on any issue when 3% of all voters \vho
voted in the most recent presidential election sign petitions asking for
such a nationwide vote. Do you favor or oppose such a plan?
Even dangling before respondents the false prospect of Set'\ate action the
Gallup organization received a weak response. Only 52 percent of respondents
expressed support--down from the 57 percent support in May of 1978-wich
23 percent opposition and 25 percent with no opinion. 25 By 1987, in the
Gallup Poll commissioned by Cronin, public support for a national initia
tive process had dwindled to 48 percent and opposition had grown to 41 per
cent. Cronin still concluded that "the idea plainly attracrs more support than
opposition."26
The decline in public and congressional interest was not me only factor in
me movement's demise. Telschow and Forster were reportedly discouraged by
the lack of support from their traditional allies in the public interest com
munity in Washington who, they said, perceived the idea as a threat to meir
interesrs.27
Commenting on this explanation, Megatren.ds author John Naisbitt wrote in
his 1984 book:
Perhaps. But what is a far greater barrier to the national initiative idea
is mat it is simply out of tune with the larger and far more powerful
trend to decentralization. A national initiative would be a highly cen
tralized process. Initiatives are much more appropriate to the state and
city level, where citizens are deciding by popular vote issues that only
mey will have CO [ive \Vtth. ZS
138
T he Revival of Direct Democracy Proposals
There is no better affirmation of Naisbict's observation than California's

Proposition 13, which passed by a two-to-one margin in June of 1978, nearly
a year after Abourezk introduced his national initiative constitutional amend
ment in the Senate. Proposition 13 garnered 100,000 more votes than all the
votes cast for governor in the same election. The initiative, pioneered by
Howard Jarvis and Paul Gann, cut California's property taxes by 57 percent co
just 1 percent of appraised value, resulting in a $?-billion revenue loss for the
state. Passage of the tax limitation proposition was a shot heard around the na
tion if not the world.
In the immediate aftermatl1 of the Proposition 13 victory, there was a flurry
of activity in many states for tax limiting or spending lid measures. Some were
initiated by state legislators and governors hoping to preempt voter "tax re
volts" at the polls, and others were sponsored as initiatives in states having such
a proce ss. However, as Naisbitt recounts, by inid- 1 979 "the movement for
spending lids was definitely cooling down." Voters seemed to realize that "most
states did not have a huge financial surplus to lean on." By late 1979 all exist
ing spending lids were in the South or West; eastern and midwestern states
were rejecting similar proposals. The real benchmark of this reversal \vas Cal
ifornia's rejection of Proposition 9 ("Jarvis II," as it was called), \vhich \vould
have cut state income tax more than 50 percent. Although the map of support
for tax limitation changed only slightly after Proposition 13, that measure \Vas
truly significant. According to Naisbitt, it signaled "the voters' discovery of the
awesome power of the initiative." In 1979 alone more than 300 initiatives ap
peared across the country on such issues as the disposal of nonreturnable bot
tles and cans, and nuclear power plants.29
A Congre ssional Research Service survey of state initiatives bet\veen 1976
and 1992 reveals that of 495 initiatives on the ballot, 216, or 43.5 percent,
p assed. The most popular initiatives \vere in the areas of budgets, spending. and
taxes ( 134); nuclear power, hazardous waste (37); lottery, gambling (31 ); crime
and punishment (27); terrn limitations (20); and redistricting and legislative
powers (20). 30
In the Congre ss the passage of Proposition 13 sparked new interest in budget
reforms, notwithstanding the relative infancy of the Congressional Budget and
lmpoundment Control Act of 1974. And the mood for 1naking government
more fiscally responsible and accountable did not fizzle nationally in 1980 as it
had in the states, perhaps in part because Ronald Reagan had made the seem
ingly anomalous positions of balancing the budget and cutting taxes a center
piece of his presidential campaign in that year.
The most popular of the budgetary reforms was a proposed constitutional
amendment to require a balanced budget. Whereas in the 94th Congress
( 1975-77). only thirty such constitutional amendments \Vere introduced, in
139
the 95th Congress ( 1977-79), seventy-six were introduced, twenty-five of

them after the passage of Proposition 13 in June of 1978. By the 96th Congress
( 1979-81), the number of balanced budget constitutional amendments intro
duced in the two houses had grown to 94. 31
President Reagan could not deliver on his promise of balancing the budget,
and federal deficits began to balloon in the 1980s. Public and congressional
support for budget balancing legislative devices, as well as a constitutional
amend1nent, grew proportionately. The Congress enacted one such process,
the Gramm-Rudman "Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act,"
in 1985 and another, the "Budget Enforcement Act," in 1990 as part of the
budget agreement between President George Bush and the Congress. Consti
tutional amendments to balance the budget were forced to House floor votes
by discharge petitions (requiring signatures of a majority of House members)
in 1982, 1990, 1992, and 1994, falling forty-six, seven, nine, and twelve votes
short of the necessary two-thirds majority for passage, respectively. The Sen
ate also rejected balanced budget constitutional amendments in 1994, 1995,
and 1997, falling short of the two-thirds requirement by four votes, one vote,
and one vote, respectively. In 1995 the House easily passed a constitutional
amendment for a balanced budget, one of the tenets of the new Republican
majority's 100-day Contract with America agenda for the 104th Congress. Two
years later the Congress struck an agreement with President Bill Clinton and
enacted a package of spending and tax cuts to achieve a balanced budget by
the year 2002.
Assessments of State Initiative Experiences

State governments are the laboratories of democracy, where some experiments
succeed, some fail, and others have mixed or uncertain results. Even success
ful democratic experiments will produce different results if conducted under
slightly different conditions, in different environments, or on a different scale.
The state initiative and referendum experiment has been relatively success
ful. It works reasonably well, it is still popular with most citizens in those states
that have it, and it has not produced any memorably disastrous results -at least
none that has survived court challenges.
However, as the use of state initiatives and referendums has gro\vn in recent
years, new questions have arisen as to their efficacy and desirability. They have
mutated from their original conception. No longer is the initiative and refer
endum viewed as a "reserve power" to be used only in limited circumstances
when state legislatures are not responsive to the will of the people. Today they
are often used as a weapon of first rather than last resort.
As David Magleby observes, the great surge in the use of the initiative
process since the mid- l 970s was due mainly to its rediscovery by issue activists
140
eager to further their policy objectives. They saw the initiative process not
merely as a means to pass new la,vs in particular states, but as a way co bring
national attention to their causes. At the outset of the renascent movement,
conservatives used the initiative move,nent to promote tax cutting and liber
als to spur interest in the nuclear freeze. Politicians used the device to bolster
their political careers, stimulate voters' interest, and raise money from like
minded activists. The movement was perpetuated by initiative industry pro
fessionals engaged in a multitude of activities chat beca1ne essential to success:
professional managers, petition circulators, media consultants, pollsters, litiga
tion lawyers, direct mail fund-raisers, and petition collectors. "The growth in
the initiative industry raises questions abou t whether the process is any longer
a grass-roots process," writes Magleby, noting "the initiative industry's efforts
to increase business by proposing its own measures."32
Large amounts of money are spent to pass or defeat various initiatives. In
1988, for instance, $101 million ,vas spent in California on five insurance ini
tiatives. (The California governor's race in 1990 cost only $29 million.) In
1988 the cigarette industry spent $21 million in California opposing a tobacco
tax increase proposition. Two-thirds of the money spent on propositions in
California was from business interests, while only 12 percent ,vas contributed
by individuals. An examination of the eighteen most expensive ballot initia
tives in California reveals that 83 percent of the money came from business in
terests and only 8 percent from individuals. In the 1992 election alone in Cal
ifornia, 67 percent of the money came in contributions of $100,000 or more,
and 37 percent in contributions of a million or more dollars.33
Most of this "big money" is spent on defeating ballot initiatives, and such ef
forts have yielded a 75 percent success rate for the ,vealthy interests involved.
On the ocher hand, "big money" has only about a 2 5 percent success rate in
promoting ballot initiatives. 34
The 1987 Gallup Poll commissioned by Cronin reveals that 63 percent of
the American people would favor limiting the amount such organized i.nter
ests and wealthy individuals could spend to support their side of a ballot issue. 35
Although eighteen states at one time had laws limiting or prohibiting corpo
rate contributions or spending in initiative campaigns, the Supreme Court has
since declared these limits unconstitutional. The most prominent case was The
First National Bank of Boston et. al. v. Bellotti in April of 1978. 36
Another criticism leveled at the initiative process is that it is often used to
target racial and other minorities, whether blacks, women, gays, immigrants,
or the non-English speaking. Is direct legislation a danger to the rights of mi
norities? "TI1e answer seems co be yes, unless the courts are able and willing to
protect these groups from attacks by direct legislation," writes Magleby. 37 Law
professor D errick Bell notes that the referendum has been the most effect fa-
141
cilitator of the bias, discrimination, and prejudice that have marred American
democracy from its beginning. 38 Barbara S. Gamble of the University of Michi
gan, in a survey of three decades of initiatives and referendums involving five
major civil rights areas, concludes that voters have approved over three-quar
ters of such measures that restrict civil rights, compared with a one-third ap
proval rate of all initiatives and referendums. 39
Another factor militating against more ballot initiatives is the length of the
ballots and the resulting confusion of voters. On a 1988 ballot San Francisco
voters were confronted \Vith fifty-t\vo separate questions--t\venty-nine state
wide propositions and twenty-three local questions. The pamphlet accompa
nying this state ballot ran 159 pages, a record broken two years later when
California voters were aided by a two-volume, 221-page ballot pamphlet. 40
Woodrow Wilson would probably have a difficult time today maintaining his
support for both the "short ballot" and initiatives and referendums since the
former was based on the premise that the more items on a ballot, the more cit
izens were discouraged from voting.
Many proponents of such direct legislation argue that i t increases the inter
est of voters and turnout at elections by giving them a greater stake in their
government. Magleby, ho\vever, concludes that "initiatives do not systemati
cally increase tum-out." He cites a study of initiatives in Maine, which pennies
initiatives when candidates are on the ballot in even-numbered years and
when there are no contested offices in odd-numbered years. The study found
turnout much lower in odd-numbered years. 4 1
A comparison of turnout of voting age populations in states that have ini
tiatives compared with states that do not suggests that initiatives may increase
turnout (see Table 9.3). The average voter turnout in the twenty-six initiative
states in 1992 and 1996 was roughly 60 percent and 52.5 percent, respectively,
\vhereas in noninitiative states it \Vas approximately 5 6.3 percent and 50.4 per
cent. Ho\vever, these statistics hide the wide disparity of turnout within each
category. For instance, the most publicized state having initiatives, California,
had a turnout of 49.l percent and 43.3 percent i n those two years, welt below
the national average, and welt below the average turnout in noninitiative
states. (See Appendix A for a breakdown of initiative and noninitiative state
turnout.)
Taking a closer look at California in 1996, one can see that the drop-off rate
bet\veen total turnout and chose voting on propositions roughly conforms to
that found in a survey of three states (California, Massachusetts, and Wash
ington) between 1970 and 1992. That survey showed a n average drop of be
tween 8 percent and 17 percent on propositions, compared with an average
drop-off rate of between 2 and 12 percent in candidate elections.42 Similarly,
in 1996, the drop-off rate on the two most controversial and most highly voted-
142
The Revival of Direct Dernocracy Proposals
Table 9.3
A Comparison of Voter Turnout in States with and without
an Initiative and/or Referendum Process, 1992 and 1996
Percentage of voting age population voting
Item 1992 1996
National average 55. 24 48.99
States with initiative and/or
referendum process 59.90 52.46
States without initiative
and/or referendum process 56.27 50.37
Difference between
states with and without
initiative/referendum - 3.63 -2.09
Sources: Voter turnout data provided by the Co1nmittee for the Study of the American Electorate;
list of states having an initiative and/or referendu1n process was provided by Congressional Re·
search Service.
on propositions in California, Proposition 215 ( to permit the medicinal use of

marijuana) and Proposition 209 (to prohibit affirmative action in state pro
grams), was nearly 13 percent. The highest drop-off rate for the fifteen propo
sitions \Vas 17.6 percent on Proposition 216 (relating to health fees; see Table
9.4). What all this consistently demonstrates is that the top candidate races
are a greater draw than even the most publicized and controversial ballot ini
tiatives, and not vice versa.
California is one of a fe\v states that permit direct legislation to be voted on
in special elections, usually in November of odd-numbered years \vhen many
local governments are electing their officials or deciding local measures. Ma
gleby cites special elections in 1973, when Governor Reagan put a tax-cut
measure on the ballot; 1979, when Governor Jerry Brown put a spending limit
on the ballot, and 1993, \vhen Governor Pete Wilson put a school voucher
measure on the ballot. According to Magleby, California's special election ex
perience demonstrates that only about one in four eligible voters vote in spe
cial elections. Special election voters are not very representative of voters in
general elections because they tend to be better informed and more politically
knowledgeable.43
Finally, the initiative process is criticized for not dealing with the issues chat
voters consider to be che 1nost important. In 1992, for instance, California vot•
ers were most concerned about the state's economy and unemployment, and yet
143
Table 9.4
Votes Cast for California Ballot Propositions in 1996
as a Percentage of Total Votes Cast in the State
Votes cast on
• •
proposition Percentage of
Proposition Subject of ballot and outcome: total votes cast
• •
number proposition Pass (P); Fail (F) in the state3
204 water bond 8,655,517 (P) 86.4
205 jail bond 8,528,635 (F) 85.1
206 veterans' bond 8,425,657 (P) 84.1
207 frivolous Lawsuits 8,471 ,078 (F) 84.5
208 Common Cause
limit 8,43 1,417 (P) 84.2
209 CCRI (affirmative
action) 8,724,015 (P) 87.1
210 m1ntmum wage 8,723,619 (P) 87.1
211 security fraud 8,504,007 (F) 84.9
212 CalPIRG limit 8,344,010 (F) 83.3
213 uninsured drivers 8,554,163 (P) 85.4
214 health care
regulation 8,354,818 (F) 83.4
215 ..
martJuana 8,746,721 (P) 87.3
216 health regulation
fees 8,257,51 1 (F) 82.4
217 top tax bracket 8,398,201 (F) 83.8
218 property tax limit 8,310,803 (P) 82.9
•Total number of votes cast was 10,019,484.
Sources: Data on voter tumour were from rhe Committee for the Study of the American Elec
torate; data on proposition results were fron\ the Web site of California's secretary of state, Bill
James (http://ss.ca.gov/vote96/hunl/vote/prop/page.96i l0607JJ 19 .html).
none of the initiatives on the ballot was ain1ed at either issue nor could it be ex
pected that such complex problems could be dealt with through such a process.44
One observer of California's initiative process, Eugene Lee, concludes that
the direct democracy device has contributed to the shortcomings of the leg
islature, the executive branch, and the electoral process: "The initiative is
144
part of the problem. Turned on its head, 'direct democracy' is no longer

democratic."45
While such an assessment may be overly harsh, it has an element of truth.
The modern-day operation ofthe initiative process would not be recognizable
to its progenitors of a century ago. They intended that it be used only selec
tively as a safety valve \vhen representative democracy is not functioning prop
erly. The proliferation of complex, confusing, and even conflicting initiatives
on the same ballot goes far beyond the safety valve category. Voters in initia
tive states are well aware ofthe shortcomings of the process, yet few would will
ingly relinquish the po\ver to exercise it. Similarily, few would enthusiastically
take on the additional responsibility of voting on national legislation as well.
Notes
l . David Magleby, "Direct Elections in the American Scates," in Referendums
around the World ed. David Butler and Austin Ranney (Washington, D.C.: The AEI
Press, 1994 ), 232.
2. Remarks of Sen. James Abourezk, Congressional Record, vol. 123, pt. 18,July l l ,
1977, 22276-77.
3. Ibid., 22277.
4. Ibid., from text ofH. J. Res. 67 inserted at 22279.
5. "Voter Initiative Constitutional Amendment: Hearings before the Sub,
committee on the Constitution, of the Committee on the Judiciary, United Stares
Senate, Ninety-Fifth Congress, First Session, on S. J. Res. 67, December 13 and 14,
1977" (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978), 632 and 620.
6. Rhodes Cook, "Debate Opens on Initiative System for Enacting Ne,v Federal
Laws," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, Dec. 24, 1977, 2655.
7. "Voter Initiative Constitutional Amendment: Hearings," 1-2.
8. Ibid., 3.
9. Ibid., 7-8.
10. Ibid., 8.
1 1 . Ibid., 17.
12. Ibid., 646. In the hearing record see George Gallup, "National Initiative Pro
cess Favored by 57 percent of Voters," Washington Posr, May 14, 1978.
13. Ibid., statement of the Honorable James R. Jones of Oklahoma, 19.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid., testimony of Professor Peter Bachrach, Department of Political Science,
Te,nple University, Philadelphia, Pa., 59-60.
16. Ibid., testimony of Roger Telschow, co-director, Initiative America, Dec. 14,
1977, 74.
17. Ibid., 75, 77.
18. Jack Kemp, An American Renaissance: A Strategy for the 1980s (Ne,v York:
Berkeley Publishing Co., 1981 ).
145
19. The data have been derived from searches of the Congressional Record indexes
for each of rhe Congresses named.
20. Thomas E. Cronin, Direct Democracy: The Po!irics of Initiative, Referendum, and
Recall (Cambridge: Harvard Unive.rsity Press, 1989), 177.
21. Sum1nary based on reading text of H. R. 7934, 96d, Cong., 2d sess., Aug. 18,
1980.
22. Cronin, Direct De1nocracy, 177.
23. Ibid., l 78.
24. Cronin, Direct Democracy , 187.
25. Ibid., l 75.
26. Ibid., l 7 5 -76.
27. John Naisbitt, Megatrends: Ten New Directions Transforming Our Lives (Ne\v
York: Warner Books, 1984), 170.
28. Ibid., I 70-7 l .
29. Ibid., l 66-70.
30. Oakley and Neale, "Citizen Initiative Proposals," 3.
31. Richard A. Davis, "Proposed Amend1nents to me Constitution of me United
States of America Introduced in Congress from the 91st Congress, 1st Session, through
me 98th Congress, 2nd Session, January 1969-December 1984," Congressional
Research Service Report 85-36 GOV, Feb. l , 1985, 91-143.
32. Magleby, "Direct Legislation," 234-35.
33. Ibid., 242-43.
34. Cronin, Direct Democracy, 109.
35. Ibid., 190.
36. Ibid., 101 - 2.
37. Magleby, "Direct Legislation," 241.
38. Cronin, Direct Democracy, 94.
39. Barbara S. Gan1ble, "Putting Civil Rights to a Popular Vote," American Journal
of Political Science 41 Uan. l 997): 245-69.
40. Magleby, "Direct Legislation," 248.
41. Ibid., 245.
42. Ibid., 246-47.
43. Ibid., 246.
44. Ibid., 240.
45. Eugene C. Lee, "Representative Government and me Initiative Process,'' in
California Policy Choices, ed. John Kirlin and Donald Winkler (Los Angeles: University
of Southern California, School of Public Administration, l990), vol. 6, 248, cited in
Magleby, "Direct Legislation," 256.
146
•••
The Road to the Republican

Revolution
N November 8, 1994, the American people wielded their ultimate

\veapon, their vote. Its power \Vas unmistakable, ending De1nocrats'
long-standing control of Congress and establishing Republican con
trol of both houses for the first time in forty years.
In the House of Representatives, Republicans gained fifty-t\VO seats, giving
them a 230-204 edge over Democrats. (Their number increased to 236 later in
1995 \Vith five members switching parties and a special election.) Thirty-four
Democratic incumbents lost, including Speaker Tom Foley, Ways and Means
Committee chairman Dan Rostenkowski, Judiciary Committee chairman Jack
Brooks, and sixteen freshmen. In the Senate the GOP added eight seats (in
cluding a party•S\Vitch the day after the election), giving them a 53-47 edge
over Democrats.
The Republicans' unexpected rout of the Democrats has been variously de
scribed as "historic," "revolutionary," and like a "tsunami" (the Japanese \vord
for a tidal \vave)., The 36.6 million votes cast for House Republicans i n 1994
did represent the largest surge in history of one party's vote from mid-_t erm to
mid-term election-a nine million vote increase over 1990, beating the pre
vious record of a 6.3 n1illion vote surge by the Democrats from the 1930 to the
1934 mid-term elections. 1
Several causes are cited-ranging from anti-Clinton sentiment to anti-De
mocratic-Congress, anti-big-government, and pro-Republican vie\VS-\Vith
each given varying importance depending on the analyst involved. Regardless
147

Wolfensberger 2000 - Congress & The People (Sunshine, TV & Referendum Chapters) (HELMS KNEW WHAT HE WAS DOING)

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Wolfensberger 2000 - Congress & The People (Sunshine, TV & Referendum Chapters) (HELMS KNEW WHAT HE WAS DOING)

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Ediwri~l offices:

The Woodrow Wilson Center Press

© 2000 by Donald R. Wolfcnsbcrgcr

The Dawning of the

Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and indu.mial diseases.

T variery of reasons: to right an imbalance with the executive branch, to

aimed at unclogging legislative arteries to speed the flow of legislation favored

The Origins and Effects of Reform

Congress and Secrecy

Progressivism and Publicity

rruth ro say thar Congress in session is Congress on public ex hibition.

rury earlier. In Congressiona.l Government he praised behind-the-scenes delib-

Renewed Pressures for Reform

had continued to cooperate with the majority leadership in scheduling legis-

overthrow of Speaker Cannon. The joint committee recommended opening

Rumsfcld, in frustration, who coined the saying "congressional reform is an is-

The Bipartisan Sunshine Coalition

I do not believe representative government can afford the luxury of a

Sunshine Rules Governing Committees

The silent majority is not going to be present at the open markups of

Televised Proceedings: Pro and Con

Other Significant Reform Efforts

The Joint Committee on Congressional Operations

vaguest notions of the constitutional role play ed by Congress or how it car­

programs, and variations thereon. The concern is expressed that if Congress

sented in the audience-as lobbyisrs--while the public interest-in the fonn

It is not difficult to envision Members scrambling co the floor to get be­

chaired by Democratic representative Bernie Sisk of California. Other mem­

The Rules Committee Imbroglio

Our impression was that if we acceded to those changes, we'd be

broadcast rule proposed by Anderson.40 However, House procedures did not

The Home Stretch

body else? That struck me as a reasonable compromise, and that's ex-

The Senate Proceeds with Caution

The Impact of TV on Congress

a lot" of confidence in Congress was 40 percent in 1975 and 1977 (before

10. Ibid., 42.

. 37. Ibid., 59.

The Revival of Direct

movement was passage of the property-tax-limiting Proposition 13 in Califor­

Congress Flirts with Direct Democracy

Moreover, he asserted, "much of the alienation and helplessness that citizens

process" through the responsible exercise of the device in twenty-three states

problems effectively and directly." Consequently, "today it is the individual

the elevation of Tom Foley of Washington to the Speakership. No funher ac­

Gephardt's Advisory Referendum Alternative

National versus State Initiatives

There is no better affirmation of Naisbict's observation than California's

the 95th Congress ( 1977-79), seventy-six were introduced, twenty-five of

Assessments of State Initiative Experiences

on propositions in California, Proposition 215 ( to permit the medicinal use of

part of the problem. Turned on its head, 'direct democracy' is no longer

The Road to the Republican

N November 8, 1994, the American people wielded their ultimate

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vaguest notions of the constitutional role play ed by Congress or how it car

It is not difficult to envision Members scrambling co the floor to get be

chaired by Democratic representative Bernie Sisk of California. Other mem

movement was passage of the property-tax-limiting Proposition 13 in Califor

the elevation of Tom Foley of Washington to the Speakership. No funher ac