VOL. 476, NOVEMBER 29, 2005 305 court. The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts.
Thus, it is
Manotok Realty, Inc. vs. CLT Realty Development
Corporation
G.R. No. 123346. November 29, 2005. *
MANOTOK REALTY, INC. and MANOTOK ESTATE
CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. CLT REALTY
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondent.
G.R. No. 134385. November 29, 2005. *
ARANETA INSTITUTE OF AGRICULTURE, INC.,
petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF JOSE B. DIMSON,
represented by his Compulsory Heirs: His surviving
spouse, ROQUETA R. DIMSON and their children,
NORMA and CELSO TIRADO, ALSON and VIRGINIA
DIMSON, LINDA and CARLOS LAGMAN, LERMA
and RENE POLICAR, and ESPERANZA R. DIMSON;
REGISTRY OF DEEDS OF MALABON, respondents.
G.R. No. 148767. November 29, 2005. *
STO. NIÑO KAPITBAHAYAN ASSOCIATION, INC.,
petitioner, vs. CLT REALTY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, respondent.
Actions; Appeals; The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
over cases brought to it from the Court of Appeals under Rule
45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, is
limited to reviewing and correcting errors of law committed
by said court; Where the findings of fact of the trial courts are
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, the same are accorded the
highest degree of respect and, generally, will not be disturbed
on appeal.—It bears stressing that under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, our jurisdiction over
cases brought to us from the Court of Appeals is limited to
reviewing and correcting errors of lawcommitted by said
not our function to review factual issues and examine,
evaluate or weigh the probative value of the evidence
presented by the parties. We are not bound to analyze and
weigh all over again the evidence already considered in
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
306
306 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Manotok Realty, Inc. vs. CLT Realty Development
Corporation
the proceedings below. Here, the paramount question
being raised in the three petitions is whether TCT No.
15169 issued in the name of Jose B. Dimson and TCT
No. 177013 issued in the name of CLT are valid.
Undoubtedly, such issue is a pure question of fact—a matter
beyond our power to determine. Where, as here, the findings
of fact of the trial courts are affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
the same are accorded the highest degree of respect and,
generally, will not be disturbed on appeal. Such findings are
binding and conclusive on this Court.
Same; Land Titles; Commissioners; Given their
background, expertise and experience, the commissioners are
in a better position to determine which of the titles is valid.—
As regards G.R. No. 123346 (Manotok Corporations vs. CLT
Realty, involving Lot 26), the trial court acted properly when
it adopted the Majority Report of the commissioners as part
and parcel of its Decision. That is allowed in Section 11, Rule
32 of the Revised Rules of Court (now the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended), quoted below: “SEC. 11. Hearing
upon report.—Upon the expiration of the period of ten (10)
days referred to in the preceding section, the report shall be
set for hearing, after which the court shall render
judgment by adopting, modifying, or rejecting the report in
whole or in part or it may receive further evidence or may
recommit it with instructions.” (italics supplied) The case of
overlapping of titles necessitates the assistance of experts in
the field of geodetic engineering. The very reason why
commissioners were appointed by the trial court, upon
agreement of the parties, was precisely to make an
evaluation and analysis of the titles in conflict with each
other. Given their background, expertise and experience,
these commissioners are in a better position to determine
which of the titles is valid. Thus, the trial court may rely on
their findings and conclusions.
Same; Judgments; Doctrine of Finality of
Judgments; Nothing is more settled in law than that once a
judgment attains finality it becomes immutable and
unalterable.—We cannot delve anymore into the correctness
of the Decision of this Court in MWSS. The said Decision,
confirming the validity of OCT No. 994 issued on April 19,
1917 from which the titles of the respondents in the cases at
bar were derived, has long become final and executory.
Nothing is more settled in law than that once a judgment
attains finality it becomes immutable and unalterable. It
may no longer be modified in any
307
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respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what
is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and
regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be
made by the court rendering it or by the highest court of the
land. The doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on
fundamental considerations of public policy and sound
practice, and that, at the risk of occasional errors, the
judgments or orders of courts must become final at some
definite time fixed by law; otherwise, there would be no end
to litigations, thus setting to naught the main role of courts
of justice which is to assist in the enforcement of the rule of
law and the maintenance of peace and order by settling
justiciable controversies with finality.
Same; Same; Same; Vested Rights; A final judgment
vests in the prevailing party a right recognized and protected
by law under the due process clause of the Constitution—it is
a vested interest which it is right and equitable that the
government should recognize and protect, and of which the
individual could not be deprived arbitrarily without
injustice.—Just as the losing party has the right to file an
appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party
likewise has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the
resolution of his case. We held that “a final judgment vests
in the prevailing party a right recognized and protected by
law under the due process clause of the Constitution. . . . A
final judgment is ‘a vested interest which it is right and
equitable that the government should recognize and protect,
and of which the individual could not be deprived arbitrarily
without injustice.’ ” In the present cases, the winning parties,
respondents herein, must not be deprived of the fruits of a
final verdict.
Same; Same; Separation of Powers; The courts have the
307 constitutional duty to adjudicate legal disputes properly
brought before them while the Department of Justice and the
Senate, or any other agencies of the Government for that
matter, have clearly distinguishable roles from that of the
Judiciary; Just as overlapping of titles of lands is abhorred,
so is the overlapping of findings of facts among the different
branches and agencies of the Government.—We cannot
consider the alleged newly-discovered evidence consisting of
the DOJ and Senate Fact-Finding Committee Reports
invoked by petitioners herein. Certainly, such committee
reports cannot override the Decisions of the trial courts and
the Court of Appeals upholding the validity of respondents’
titles in these cases. The said Decisions were rendered after
the opposing parties have been accorded due process. It bears
stressing that the
308
308 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Manotok Realty, Inc. vs. CLT Realty Development
Corporation
courts have the constitutional duty to adjudicate legal
disputes properly brought before them. The DOJ and Senate,
or any other agencies of the Government for that matter,
have clearly distinguishable roles from that of the Judiciary.
Just as overlapping of titles of lands is abhorred, so is the
overlapping of findings of facts among the different branches
and agencies of the Government.
PETITIONS for review on certiorari of the decisions
and resolutions of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Felix B. Lerio for petitioner Manotok Realty.
Ponce Enrile, Cayetano, Reyes & The petition was filed by Araneta Institute of
Manalastascollaborating counsel for petitioners.
Emmanuel Pelaez and Vicente Gregorio for
petitioner Araneta Institute.
Benjamin Formoso co-counsel for petitioner
Araneta Institute.
Martinez, Caparroso & Villasis Law Office, Felix
Mendiola and Gutierrez, Sundiam & Villanueva for
heirs of Jose B. Dimson.
Villaraza & Angangco Law Offices for respondent
CLT Realty Dev’t. Corp.
Ernesto Pineda for intervenors F. David, et al.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Before us for resolution are three petitions for review on
certiorari: 1
1. G.R. No. 123346
The petition in this case was filed by Manotok Realty,
Inc. and Manotok Estate Corporation against CLT
Realty Devel-
_______________
1These petitions were filed under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended.
309
VOL. 476, NOVEMBER 29, 2005 309
Manotok Realty, Inc. vs. CLT Realty Development
Corporation
opment Corporation assailing the Decision dated 2
September 28, 1995 and Resolution dated January 8,
1996 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 45255;
2. G.R. No. 134385
Agriculture, Inc. against Jose B. Dimson (now
deceased), represented by his surviving spouse and
children, and the Registry of Deeds of Malabon,
challenging the Joint Decision dated May 30, 1997 and
3
Resolution dated July 16, 1998 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 41883 and CA-G.R. SP No. 34819;
and
3. G.R. No. 148767
 The petition here was filed by Sto. Niño
Kapitbahayan Association, Inc. against CLT Realty
Development Corporation questioning the Decision of 4 Corporation,respondents)
the Court of Appeals dated March 23, 2001 in CA-G.R.
CV No. 52549.
On March 6, 2002, these petitions were
consolidated as the issue involved is the validity of the
5
parties’ titles over portions of land known as
the Maysilo Estate located at Caloocan City and
Malabon, Metro Manila, covered by Original Certificate
of Title (OCT) No. 994 of the Registry of Deeds of
Caloocan City. It is this same OCT No. 994from which
the titles of the parties were purportedly derived.
_______________
2 Penned by Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria and concurred in by
Presiding Justice Nathanael P. de Pano, Jr. (retired) and Justice
Cancio C. Garcia (now a member of this Court).
3 Penned by Justice Eduardo G. Montenegro and concurred in by
Justice Pedro A. Ramirez (both retired) and Justice Maximiano C.
Asuncion (deceased).
4 Penned by Justice Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos and concurred in
by Justice Fermin A. Martin, Jr. (retired) and Justice Mercedes Gozo-
Dadole.
5 Pursuant to Resolutions of this Court dated April 21, 1999 and
March 6, 2002.
310
310 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Manotok Realty, Inc. vs. CLT Realty Development
Corporation
We shall state the antecedents of these cases separately
considering their peculiar circumstances.
1. G.R. No. 123346
(Manotok Realty, Inc. and Manotok Estate
Corporation, petitioners, vs. CLT Realty Development
On August 10, 1992, CLT Realty Development
Corporation (CLT Realty) filed with the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 129, Caloocan City a complaint for
annulment of Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT),
recovery of possession, and damages against Manotok
Realty, Inc. and Manotok Estate Corporation (Manotok
Corporations) and the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan
City, docketed as Civil Case No. C-15539.
The complaint alleges inter alia that CLT Realty
(plaintiff) is the registered owner of Lot 26 of
the Maysilo Estate located in Caloocan City, covered
by TCT No. T-177013 of the Registry of Deeds of said
city; that this TCT was originally derived from OCT No.
994; that on December 10, 1988, CLT Realty acquired
Lot 26 from its former registered owner, Estelita I.
Hipolito, by virtue of a Deed of Sale with Real Estate
Mortgage; that she, in turn, purchased the same lot
from Jose B. Dimson; that Manotok Corporations
(defendants) illegally took possession of 20 parcels of
land (covered by 20 separate titles ) within said Lot 26
6
owned by CLT Realty; that based on the technical
descriptions of Manotok Corporations’ titles, their
property overlap or embrace Lot 26 of CLT Realty; and
that the titles of Manotok Corporations constitute a
cloud of doubt over the title of CLT Realty. The latter
thus prays that
_______________
 6TCT Nos. 7528, 7762, 8012, 9866, C-17272, 21107, 21485, 26405,
26406, 26407, 33904, 34255, C-33267, 41956, 53268, 55897, T-121428,
163902 and 165119 in the name of Manotok Realty, Inc., and TCT No.
T-23568 in the name of Manotok Estate Corporation of the Registry of
Deeds of Caloocan City (Annexes “D,” “D-1” through “D-19” of the
complaint).
311
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the 20 titles of Manotok Corporations be cancelled for
being void; and that Manotok Corporations be ordered
to vacate the disputed portions of Lot 26 and turn over
possession thereof to CLT Realty, and to pay damages.
In their answer with counterclaim, Manotok
Corporations denied the material allegations of the
complaint, alleging that Jose B. Dimson’s title (TCT No.
R-15166) was irregularly issued, hence void; and that
consequently, the titles of Estelita Hipolito (TCT No. R-
17994) and CLT Realty (TCT No. 177013) derived
therefrom are likewise void. By way of affirmative
defense, Manotok Corporations assert ownership of the
parcel of land being claimed by CLT Realty, alleging
that they acquired the same from the awardees or
vendees of the National Housing Authority.
During the pre-trial conference, the trial court, upon
agreement of the parties, approved the creation of a
commission composed of three commissioners tasked to
resolve the conflict in their respective titles. On July 2,
1993, the trial court issued an Order defining the issues
7
to be resolved by the commissioners, thus:
1. “1.Whether or not the property covered by the
Transfer Certificates of Title of defendants
(Manotok Realty, Inc. and Manotok Estate
Corporation) pertain to or involved Lot No. 26 of
the Maysilo Estate presently titled in the name
of the plaintiff (CLT Realty Development
311 Corporation); and
2. “2.Whether or not the property covered by the
title of the plaintiff and the property covered by
the titles of the defendants overlap.” 8
The commissioners chosen were Engr. Avelino L. San
Buenaventura (nominated by CLT Realty), Engr.
Teodoro I. Victorino (nominated by Manotok
Corporations), and Engr. Ernesto S. Erive (chosen by
the two commissioners and the
_______________
7 Rollo of G.R. No. 123346, Vol. I at pp. 245-246.
8 Id., at p. 138.
312
312 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Manotok Realty, Inc. vs. CLT Realty Development
Corporation
parties). Significantly, Engr. Ernesto Erive is the Chief
of the Surveys Division, Land Management Bureau,
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), Quezon City. On July 2, 1993, the three took
9
their oaths of office in open court.
On October 8, 1993, Ernesto Erive and Avelino San
Buenaventura submitted an exhaustive Joint Final
Report (Majority Report) with the following conclusion:
10
 1. “h.Based on the foregoing, it is the conclusion of
the undersigned Commissioners that
defendants’ (Manotok Realty, Inc. and Manotok
Estate Corporation) titles overlap portions of
plaintiff’s (CLT Realty Development
Corporation) title, which overlapping is due to
the irregular and questionable issuance of TCT
Nos. 4211 (also of TCT No. 4210), 5261, 35486,
1368 to 1374. The inherent technical defects on
TCT No. 4211 (from where defendants derive
their titles) and TCT No. 4210 which were
exhaustively elucidated above, point to the fact
that there was no approved subdivision of Lot
26 which served as legal basis for the regular
issuance of TCT Nos. 4210 and 4211. Thus, as
between plaintiff’s title, which was derived from
regularly issued titles, and defendants’ titles,
which were derived from irregularly issued
titles, plaintiff’s title which pertains to the
entire Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate should
prevail over defen-dants’ titles.”
On the other hand, Teodoro Victoriano submitted his
Individual Final Report (Minority Report) dated
11
October 23, 1993 with the following findings:
1. “f.That viewed in the light of the foregoing
considerations, there is no question that the
different parcels of land which are covered by
defendants’ transfer certificates of title in
question are parts of Lot 26 of then Maysilo
Estate;
2. “g.That on the basis of the technical descriptions
appearing on the certificates of titles of the
defendants, it is ascertained that
_______________
9 Id., at pp. 137-138.
10 Id., at pp. 265-275.
11 Id., at pp. 254-265.
313
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Manotok Realty, Inc. vs. CLT Realty Development
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the parcels of land covered therein overlap portions of
the parcel of land which is covered by the plaintiff’s
certificate of title.”
The trial court then scheduled the hearing of the two
Reports. CLT Realty filed its objections to the Minority
Report. For its part, Manotok Corporations submitted
their comment/objections to the Majority Report.
On February 8, 1994, the trial court issued an Order
directing the parties to file their respective memoranda
“to enable this court to adopt wholly or partially the
memorandum for either as the judgment herein, x x x.”
12
On April 6, 1994, Manotok Corporations submitted
their Memorandum praying that the trial court approve
the Minority Report and render judgment in their favor.
CLT Realty likewise filed its Memorandum on April
15, 1994 praying that “the Majority Report be
approved in toto, and that judgment be rendered
pursuant thereto.” In its Order of April 22, 1994, the
trial court considered the case submitted for decision. 13
 On May 10, 1994, the trial court rendered its
Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of plaintiff (CLT Realty) and against
defendants (Manotok Corporations) as follows:
1. “1.Ordering the annulment and cancellation of
defendants’ Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 4210
and 4211 of the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City
which encroach on plaintiff’s 201,288 square meters
of Lot No. 26 of the Maysilo Estate, Caloocan City;
_______________
12 Decision dated September 28, 1995 of the Court of Appeals (Annex
“A” of Petition in the Manotok Case) at p. 10; Decision dated 10 May 1994
of the Regional Trial Court (Annex “C” of Petition in the Manotok Case) at
p. 5.
13 Annex “H” of Petition in the Manotok Case; Decision dated May 10,
1994 of the Regional Trial Court (Annex “C” of Petition in
the Manotok Case), at p. 5.
314
314 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Manotok Realty, Inc. vs. CLT Realty Development
Corporation
1. “2.Ordering defendants to vacate said 201,288 square
meters of Lot No. 26 registered in the name of
plaintiff;
2. “3.Ordering defendants jointly and severally to pay
plaintiff the sum of P201,288.00 annually from
March 15, 1989, as reasonable compensation for
defendants’ occupancy and use of the 201,288 square
meters involved in this case until the area is
vacated;
3. “4.Ordering defendants jointly and severally to pay
plaintiff’s counsel (Villaraza & Cruz Law Office) the
sum of P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees; and
4. “5.Ordering defendants jointly and severally to pay
the costs of suit.
“Defendants’ Counterclaim is dismissed for lack of merit.
“SO ORDERED.”
The findings of fact and conclusions contained in the
Majority Report, which the trial court adopted in its
Decision, are quoted as follows:
1. “7.That the following facts were established by
the undersigned Commissioners:
1. “a.Records show that Maysilo Estate was
surveyed under Plan No. Psu-2345 on
September 8 to 27, October 4 to 21 and
November 17 to 18, 1991;
2. “b.That on the basis of the Decision
rendered on December 3, 1912 by Hon.
Norberto Romualdez in Land Registration
Case No. 4429 pursuant to which the
Decree No. 36455 was issued and the
approved plan Psu-2345,the Maysilo
Estate was registered under Republic Act No.
496 and Original Certificate of Title No.
994, OCT-994, was issued by the Registry of
Deeds of Rizal, covering 34 parcels of land, Lots
1 to 6, 7-A, 8 to 15, 17 to 22, 23-A, 24, 25-A, 25-
D and 26 to 33, all of Psu-2345.
 3. “c.The original copy of OCT-994 in its original
form although dilapidated is on file at the
Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City;
4. “d.That according to the documents submitted by
the plaintiff, TCT-177013 in the name of
plaintiff CLT Realty Development
Corporation specifically describes the parcel
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1. of land covered by its title as ‘Lot 26, Maysilo
Estate.’ TCT-177013 was a transfer from TCT-
R-17994 registered in the name of Estelita
Hipolitowhich in turn is a transfer from TCT-
R-15166registered in the name of Jose B.
Dimson which also is a transfer from OCT-
994. TCT-R-17994 and TCT-R-15166 also
specifically describe the parcel of land covered
by the titles as ‘Lot 26, Maysilo Estate’;
2. “e.That defendant Manotok Realty Inc.’s
properties are covered by TCT Nos. 7528, 7762,
8012, 9866, C-17272, 21107, 21485, 26405,
26406, 26407, 33904, 34255, C-35267, 41956,
53268, 55896, T-1214528, 163902 and 165119,
while defendant Manotok Estate Corporation’s
property is covered by TCT No. T-232568, all of
the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City.
3. “f.That on the basis of the technical descriptions
on the titles of defendants, the parcels of land
covered therein overlap portions of the parcel of
land covered by plaintiff’s title;
4. “g.That according to the documents of
defendants, Lot 26 was apparently subdivided
which led to the issuance of Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 4210 and 4211 which
were registered on September 9, 1918 in the
names of Messrs. Alejandro Ruiz and Mariano
Leuterio. All of defendants’ titles are derived
315 from TCT No. 4211.
5. “h.The original copy of OCT-994 does not contain
the pages where Lot 26 and some other lots are
supposedly inscribed;
6. “i.TCT No. 4211 was later cancelled by TCT No.
5261 in the name of Francisco J. Gonzales which
was later cancelled by TCT No. 35486 in the
names of Jose Leon Gonzales, Consuelo Susana
Gonzales, Juana Francisca Gonzales, Maria
Clara Gonzales, Francisco Felipe Gonzales and
Concepcion Maria Gonzales;
7. “j.Upon examination of the original copy of
OCT-994, it can be seen that the technical
descriptions of the lots and the certificate
itself are entirely written in the English
language. On the other hand, it was
noticed that the technical descriptions on
TCT Nos. 4211 (as well as TCT No. 4210)
5261 and 35486 are inscribed in the
Spanish language in these certificates;
316
316 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
 Manotok Realty, Inc. vs. CLT Realty Development
Corporation
1. “k.The dates of the original survey of the
mother title OCT-994 (September 8-27,
October 4-21 and November 17-18, 1911)
are not indicated on TCT Nos. 4211 (also on
TCT No. 4210), 5261 and 35486. Rather, an
entirely different date, December 22, 1917,
is indicated at the end of the Spanish
technical descriptions on TCT No. 4211
(also on TCT No. 4210), 5261 and 35486;
2. “l.The parcel of land covered by the
successive titles TCT Nos. 4211, 5261 and
35486 is not identified by a lot number.
There is no reference or mention of Lot 26
of the Maysilo Estate in the technical
description of said titles.
3. “m.That there is no subdivision survey plan
number indicated on TCT No. 4211 (also on
TCT No. 4210), 5261 and 35486 covering the
purported subdivision of Lot 26. Upon
verification with the Bureau of Lands or in
the Land Registration Authority, which
are the official depositories of all approved
survey plans, no survey plan covering said
subdivision could be found;
4. “n.The three (3) separate lots covered by
TCT Nos. 4210 and 4211 which allegedly
were the result of the subdivision of Lot 26
were not designated or identified as Lot
26-A, Lot 26-B and Lot 26-C to conform with
existing practice;
5. “o.That it appears that the parcel of land covered
by the successive titles TCT No. 4211, then 5261
and lastly 35486 was again subdivided under
Plan Psu-21154. The alleged subdivision plan
Psd-21154 had seven (7) resultant lots which
are issued individuals certificates, TCT Nos.
1368 thru 1374, six of which are in the names of
each of the six children of Francisco J. Gonzales;
6. “p.Plan Psd-21154 appears to have been
prepared on September 15, 21, 29 and
October 5-6, 1946 according to the
technical descriptions appearing on TCT
Nos. 1368 thru 1374;
7. “q.TCT Nos. 1368 thru 1374 are written in
the English language and the technical
descriptions of the lots covered therein
indicate the original survey of the mother
title as ‘September 8-27, October 4-21 and
No-
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1. vember 17-18, 1911’ which dates are not
found in the mother title TCT No. 35486 or
the antecedent titles TCT No. 5261 and
4211;
2. “r.It appears that these seven (7) properties
covered by TCT Nos. 1368 thru 1374 were later
expropriated by the Republic of the Philippines
through the People’s Homesite and Housing
Corporation (now the National Housing
Authority) after which they were consolidated
and subdivided into 77 lots under (LRC) Pcs-
1828 for resale to tenants. Manotok Realty, Inc.
appears to be one of the original vendees of said
lots having acquired Lot 11-B covered by TCT
No. 34255. It appears that some of the tenants
later sold their lots to various vendees some of
whom are the defendants, Manotok Realty, Inc.
and Manotok Estate Corporation;
3. “s.That Psd-21154, the plan which allegedly
subdivided the lot covered by TCT No.
35486 (formerly covered by TCT No. 4211,
then TCT No. 5261), could not be traced at
the official depository of plans which is the
Bureau of Lands. According to the EDPS
Listings of the Records Management
Division of the Lands Management Bureau
(formerly the Bureau of Lands), there is no
record of the alleged plan Psd-21154.
Accordingly, said EDPS listings indicate
those survey plans which were salvaged
after the fire that gutted the Philippines
from the Japanese forces. It appears,
however, from TCT Nos. 1368 thru 1374
that psd-21154 was done after the war on
September 15, 21, 29 and October 5-6, 1946;
4. “t.Upon examination of the technical
descriptions inscribed on TCT Nos. 1368
thru 1374, it was noticed that the tie lines
deviated from the mother lot’s tie point
which is Bureau of Lands Location
Monument No. 1, Caloocan City. Instead
different location monuments of adjoining
Piedad Estate were used. The tie point
used in TCT No. 1368 is B.M. 10, Piedad
Estate while TCT Nos. 1369 and 1370 used
B.M. No. 9, Piedad Estate; and TCT Nos.
1371, 1372, 1373 and 1374 used B.M. No. 7,
Piedad Estate. The changing of the tie
points resulted in the shifting of the
position of the seven (7) lots do not fall
exactly inside the boundary of the mother
lot. The same is true when the lots
described on the titles of the de-
318
318 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Manotok Realty, Inc. vs. CLT Realty Development
Corporation
1. fendants are plotted on the basis of their
technical descriptions inscribed on said
titles.
1. “8.In the light of the foregoing facts, the
undersigned Commissioners have come to
the following conclusions:
1. “a.There are inherent technical infirmities
or defects on the face of TCT Nos. 4211
(also on TCT No. 4210), 5261 and 35486. The
fact that the technical descriptions in TCT
Nos. 4211, 5261 and 35486 are written in
Spanish while those on the alleged mother
title, OCT-994, were already in English is
abnormal and contrary to the usual
practice in the issuance of titles. If OCT-
994 is the mother title of TCT Nos. 4211,
5261 and 35486, then said titles should also
be written in English because OCT-994 is
already in English. It is possible that an
ascendant title be written in Spanish and
the descendant title in English, the
language now officially used, but the
reverse is highly improbable and
irregular.
2. “b.Also, the fact that the original survey
dates of OCT-994 (September 8-27, October
4-21 and November 17-18, 1911) are not
indicated on the technical descriptions on
TCT Nos. 4211, 5261 and 35486 but an
entirely different date, December 22, 1917,
is instead indicated likewise leads to the
conclusion that TCT Nos. 4211, 5261 and
35486 could not have been derived from
OCT-994. It is the established procedure to
always indicate in the certificate of title,
whether original or transfer certificates,
the date of the original survey of the
mother title together with the succeeding
date of subdivision or consolidation. Thus,
the absence of the original survey dates of
OCT-994 on TCT Nos. 4211, 5261 and 35486
is the original survey date of the mother
title, then OCT-994 is not the mother title
of TCT Nos. 4211, 5261 and 35486 not only
because the original survey dates are
different but because the date of original
survey is always earlier than the date of
the issuance of the original title. OCT-994
was issued on May 3, 1917 and this is much
ahead of the date of survey indicated on
TCT Nos. 4210 and 4211 which is December
22, 1917;
319
VOL. 476, NOVEMBER 29, 2005 319
Manotok Realty, Inc. vs. CLT Realty Development
Corporation
1. “c.Granting that the date December 22, 1917
is the date of a subdivision survey leading
to the issuance of TCT Nos. 4210 and 4211,
there are, however, no indications on the
face of the titles themselves which show
that a verified and approved subdivision
of Lot 26 took place. In subdividing a lot, the
resulting parcels are always designated by the
lot number of the subdivided lot followed by
letters of the alphabet starting from the letter
‘A’ to designate the first resultant lot, etc., for
example, if Lot 26 is subdivided into three (3)
 lots, these lots will be referred to as Lot 26-A,
Lot 26-N and Lot 26-C followed by a survey
number such as ‘Psd-_____’ or ‘(LRC) Psd-
_____’. However, the lots on TCT Nos. 4210
and 4211 do not contain such descriptions.
In fact, the parcels of land covered by TCT
Nos. 4210 and 4211 are not even described
by lot number and this is again technically
irregular and defective because the
designation of lots by Lot Number was
already a practice at that time as
exemplified by the technical descriptions
of some sub-lots covered by OCT-994, i.e.,
23-A, 25-A, 25-D, etc.;
2. “d.That TCT Nos. 4210 and 4211 which
allegedly was the result of a subdivision of
Lot 26 should not have been issued without
a subdivision plan approved by the
Director of Lands or the Chief of the
General Land Registration Office.
Republic Act No. 496 which took effect on
November 6, 1902, particularly Section 58
thereof, provided that the Registry of
Deeds shall not enter the transfer
certificate to the grantee until a plan of
such land showing all the portions or lots
into which it has been subdivided, and the
technical description of each portion or
lot, have been verified and approved by
the Director of Lands. . .’ and as
corroborated by Section 44, Paragraph 2,
and that the plan has been approved by the
Chief of the General Land Registration
Office, or by the Director of Lands as
provided in Section fifty-eight of this Act,
the Registry of Deeds may issue new
certificates of title for any lot in
accordance with said subdivision plan’;
3. “e.The absence of a lot number and survey
plan number in the technical description
inscribed on TCT
320
320 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Manotok Realty, Inc. vs. CLT Realty Development
Corporation
1. Nos. 4210 and 4211 and the absence of a
subdivision survey plan for Lot 26 at the
records of the Bureau of Lands or the Land
Registration Authority leads to the
conclusion that there was no verified and
approved subdivision survey plan of Lot 26
which is a compulsory requirement
needed in the issuance of said titles;
2. “f.Similarly, the absence of plan Psd-21154
from the files of the Bureau of Lands, the
official depository of survey plans, is
another indication that the titles covered
by TCT Nos. 1368 thru 1374 which were
derived from TCT No. 4211 are again
doubtful and questionable;
3. “g.Moreover, the changing of the tie points in the
technical descriptions on TCT Nos. 1368 thru
 1374 from that of the mother lot’s tie point
which is BLLM No. 1, Caloocan City to different
location monuments of adjoining Piedad Estate
which resulted in the shifting of the position of
the seven (7) lots in relation to the mother lot
defeats the very purpose of tie points and tie
lines since the accepted practice is to adopt the
mother lot’s tie point in order to fix the location
of the parcels of land being surveyed on the
earth’s surface.” 14
Manotok Corporations then interposed an appeal to the
Court of Appeals. For its part, CLT Realty filed a motion
to amend/correct the dispositive portion of the above
Decision alleging that “TCT Nos. 4210 and 4211”
mentioned therein are mistakenly referred to as the
titles of Manotok Corporations; and that to conform to
the body of the Decision, the correct numbers of the
titles ordered to be cancelled should be indicated. In its
Order dated May 30, 1994, the trial court granted the
motion, thus:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion to Amend/
Correct Judgment dated May 23, 1994 filed by counsel for
plaintiff is granted. Accordingly, the first paragraph of the
dispositive portion of the Decision of this Court dated May
10, 1994 is amended as follows:
xxx
_______________
14 Records of G.R. No. 123346 at pp. 268-275.
321
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Manotok Realty, Inc. vs. CLT Realty Development
Corporation
“1. Ordering the annulment and cancellation of Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 7528, 7762, 8012, 9866, C-17272,
21107, 21485, 26405, 26406, 26407, 33904, 34255, C-35267,
41956, 53268, 55897, T-121428, 163902 and 165119 in the
name of defendant Manotok Realty, Inc. and Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-232568 in the name of defendant
Manotok Estate Corporation of the Registry of Deeds of
Caloocan City which encroach on plaintiff’s 201,288 square
meters of Lot No. 26 of the Maysilo Estate, Caloocan City.
x x x.
“SO ORDERED.”
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated September
28, 1995 in CA-G.R. CV No. 45255, affirmed the
Decision of the trial court, except as to the award of
damages which was ordered deleted, thus:
“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered AFFIRMING the Decision dated May 10, 1994, as
corrected by the Order dated May 30, 1994, rendered by the
trial court, with the modification that the award of damages
in favor of plaintiff-appellee is hereby DELETED.
“No costs.
“SO ORDERED.”
Manotok Corporations’ motion for reconsideration was
denied by the Appellate Court in its Resolution dated
January 8, 1996.
Hence, the present petition of Manotok
Corporations. They allege in essence that the Court of
Appeals erred:
321
 1. “1.In upholding the trial court’s Decision which
decided the case on the basis of the
Commissioners’ Report; and
2. “2.In giving imprimatur to the trial court’s
Decision even though the latter overlooked
relevant facts recited in the Minority Report of
Commissioner Victorino and in the comment of
petitioners on the Majority Report of
Commissioners San Buenaventura and Erive,
detailing the legal and factual basis which
positively support the validity of petitioners’
title and ownership of the disputed parcels of
land.”
322
322 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Manotok Realty, Inc. vs. CLT Realty Development
Corporation
2. G.R. No. 134385
(Araneta Institute of Agriculture, Inc., petitioner, vs. Heirs of
Jose B. Dimson, represented by his compulsory heirs: his
surviving spouse, Roqueta R. Dimson and their children,
Norma and Celso Tirado, Alson and Virginia Dimson, Linda
and Carlos Lagman, Lerma and Rene Policar, and
Esperanza R. Dimson; and Registry of Deeds of Malabon,
respondents)
Records show that on December 18, 1979, Jose B.
Dimsonfiled with the then Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Branch 33, Caloocan City a complaint for
recovery of possession and damages against Araneta
Institute of Agriculture, Inc.(Araneta Institute),
docketed as Civil Case No. C-8050. Dimson alleged in
his amended complaint that he is the absolute owner of
a parcel of land located at Barrio Potrero, Malabon,
Metro Manila with an area of 50 hectares of the Maysilo
Estate, covered by TCT No. R-15169 of the Registry of
Deeds of Caloocan City; that he discovered that his land
has been illegally occupied by Araneta Institute; that
the latter has no legal and valid title to the land; and
that Araneta Institute refused to vacate the land and
remove its improvements thereon despite his repeated
demands.
In its answer, Araneta Institute admitted occupying
the disputed land by constructing some buildings
thereon and subdividing portions thereof, claiming that
it is the absolute owner of the land by virtue of TCT No.
737 and TCT No. 13574. It further alleged that
15 16
Dimson’s title of the subject land is void, hence, his
complaint has no cause of action.
_______________
15 Issued on March 4, 1948, Pasig, Rizal and derived from TCT No.
26538 in the name of Jose Ma. Rato with an area of 592,606.90 sq.m;
Annex “10,” Records at p. 515.
16 Issued on May 20, 1949 and derived from TCT No. 26539 in the
name of Jose Ma. Rato with an area of 581,872.00 sq.m Annex “10,”
Records at p. 515.
323
VOL. 476, NOVEMBER 29, 2005 323
Manotok Realty, Inc. vs. CLT Realty Development
Corporation
On May 28, 1993, the trial court rendered a Decision in 17
favor of Dimson, thus:
“WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is
hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff Jose B. Dimson and
against defendant Araneta Institute of Agriculture,
ordering—
1. “1)defendant Araneta Institute of Agriculture and all
those claiming rights and authority under the said
defendant Araneta, to vacate the parcel of land
covered by plaintiff Dimson’s title TCT No. R-15169
of the Registry of Deeds of Metro Manila, District III,
Caloocan City, with a land area of 500,000 square
meters, more or less; to remove all the improvements
thereon; and to return full possession thereof to the
said plaintiff Dimson.
2. “2)defendant Araneta Institute of Agriculture to pay
plaintiff Dimson the amount of P20,000.00 as and
for attorney’s fees; and
3. “3)defendant Araneta Institute of Agriculture to pay
costs. “Defendant Araneta’s counterclaim is hereby
dismissed for lack of merit.
“All other counterclaim against plaintiff Dimson are,
likewise, hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
“All claims of all the intervenors claiming rights against
the title of plaintiff Dimson TCT R-15169 are hereby
dismissed for lack of merit.
“This is without prejudice on the part of the intervenors
Heirs of Pascual David, Florentina David and Crisanta
Santos to file the proper case against the proper
party/parties in the proper forum, if they so desire.
“The claim of Virgilio L. Enriquez as co-plaintiff in the
instant case is dismissed for lack of merit.
“SO ORDERED.” 18
Araneta Institute interposed an appeal to the Court of
Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 41883.
_______________
17Penned by B.A. Adefuin-De La Cruz (retired).
18Rollo, G.R. No. 134385, RTC Decision, Civil Case No. C-8050 at
p. 140.
324
324 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Manotok Realty, Inc. vs. CLT Realty Development
Corporation
On May 30, 1997, the Court of Appeals rendered the
assailed Decision affirming the Decision of the trial
court in favor of Dimson.
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, in CA-G.R. CV No.
41883(Civil Case No. C-8050 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 122, Caloocan City), with MODIFICATION deleting
the award for attorney’s fees, the decision appealed from is
AFFIRMED, with costs against defendant-appellant. CA-
G.R. SP No. 34819 is DENIED DUE COURSE and
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
“SO ORDERED.”
In its Decision, the Appellate Court ruled that the title
of Araneta Institute to the disputed land is a nullity,
holding that:
“We now proceed to CA-G.R. CV No. 41883.
“In its first assignment of error, defendant-appellant
(Araneta Institute of Agriculture, Inc.) contends that the
trial court erred in giving more weight to plaintiff’s transfer
certificate of title over the land in question notwithstanding
the highly dubious circumstances in which it was procured.
“This validity of plaintiff-appellee’s (Jose B. Dimson) title
is actually the meat of the controversy.
 “It was in the pursuit of this objective to nullify plaintiff-
appellee’s title that CA-G.R. SP No. 34819 was belatedly
filed on August 10, 1994, long after plaintiff-appellee’s TCT
No. R-15169 was issued on June 8, 1978.
“Unfortunately for defendant-appellant, in the light of
applicable law and jurisprudence, plaintiff-appellee’s title
must be sustained.
“Plaintiff-appellee’s TCT No. R-15169 covers Lot 25- A-2
with an area of 500,000 square meters. This was derived
from OCT No. 994 registered on April 19, 1917. TCT No. R-
15169 was obtained by plaintiff-appellee Jose B. Dimson
simultaneously with other titles, viz.: TCT Nos. 15166,
15167, and 15168 by virtue of the Decision dated October 13,
1977 and Order dated October 18, 1977, in Special
Proceedings No. C-732. The Order dated October 18, 1977
directed the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City to issue in
the name of Jose
325
VOL. 476, NOVEMBER 29, 2005
Manotok Realty, Inc. vs. CLT Realty Development
Corporation
B. Dimson separate transfer certificate of titles for the lot
covered by plan (LRC) SWO-5268 and for the lots covered by
the plans, Exhibits “H,” “I” and “J.”
“Upon the other hand, defendant-appellant Araneta
Institute of Agriculture’s TCT No. 13574 was derived from
TCT No. 26539, while TCT No. 7784 (now TCT No. 21343)
was derived from TCT No. 26538. TCT No. 26538 and TCT
No. 26539 were both issued in the name of Jose Rato. TCT
No. 26538 and TCT No. 26539 both show Decree No. 4429
and Record No. 4429.
“Decree No. 4429 was issued by the Court of First
Instance of Isabela. On the other hand, Record No. 4429 was
issued for ordinary Land Registration Case on March 31,
1911 in CLR No. 5898, Laguna (Exhs. “8,” “8-A Rivera”). The
trial court ruled defendant-appellant Araneta Institute of
Agriculture’s TCT No. 13574 spurious because this title
refers to a property in the Province of Isabela (RTC Decision,
p. 19).
“Another point, Araneta’s TCT No. 13574 (Exh. “6”) and
21343 are both derived from OCT No. 994 registered on May
3, 1917, which was declared null and void by the Supreme
Court in Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System vs.
Court of Appeals, 215 SCRA 783 (1992). The Supreme Court
ruled: ‘Where two certificates of title purport to include the
same land, the earlier in date prevails x x x. Since the land
in question has already been registered under OCT No. 994
dated April 19, 1917, the subsequent registration of the same
land on May 3, 1919 is null and void.’
“In sum, the foregoing discussions unmistakably show
two independent reasons why the title of defendant-
appellant Araneta Institute of Agriculture is a nullity, to wit:
the factual finding that the property in Isabela, and the
325 decision of the Supreme Court in the MWSS case.” 19
Araneta Institute then filed the present petition,
ascribing to the Court of Appeals a long list
of factual errors which may be stated substantially as
follows:
_______________
19 Rollo, G.R. No. 134385, CA Decision, CV No. 41883 at pp. 122-
124.
326
326 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Manotok Realty, Inc. vs. CLT Realty Development
Corporation
In CA-G.R. CV No. 41883
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not holding that the
evidence presented by petitioner Araneta Institute clearly
establish the fact that it has the better right of possession
over the subject property than respondent Jose B. Dimson.
1. A.)There is only one Original Certificate of Title No.
994covering the Maysilo Estate issued on May 3,
1917pursuant to the Decree No. 36455 issued by the
Court of Land Registration on April 17, 1917.
2. B.)Certifications of responsible government officials
tasked to preserve the integrity of the Torrens
System categorically confirm and certify that there
is only one OCT 994 issued on May 3, 1917.
3. C.)The Government in the exercise of its
governmental function of preserving the integrity of
the torrens system initiated a fact-finding inquiry to
determine the circumstances surrounding the
issuance of OCT No. 994 and its derivative titles.
4. D.)The Government fact-finding committee correctly
found and concluded that there is only one OCT No.
994 issued on May 3, 1917.
5. E.)The Senate Committee on Justice and Human
Rights and the Senate Committee on Urban
Planning, Housing and Resettlement conducted an
Investigation and concluded that there is only one
OCT 994 that was issued on May 3, 1917.
6. F.)The certifications issued by the government
officials, notably from the Land Registration
Authority, the Department of Justice Committee
Report and the Senate Committees’ Joint Report are
all newly-discovered evidence that would warrant
the holding of a new trial.”
20
3. G.R. No. 148767
(Sto. Niño Kapitbahayan Association, Inc., petitioner, vs.
CLT Realty Development Corporation, respondent)
_______________
20 Rollo, G.R. No. 134385, Petition at pp. 25-28.
327
VOL. 476, NOVEMBER 29, 2005 327
Manotok Realty, Inc. vs. CLT Realty Development
Corporation
CLT Realty is the registered owner of a parcel of land
known as Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate in Caloocan City,
covered by TCT No. T-177013. It acquired the property
21
on December 10, 1998 from the former registered owner
Estelita I. Hipolito under TCT No. R-17994, who in
turn, acquired it from Jose B. Dimson.
On the other hand, Sto. Niño Kapitbahayan
Association, Inc. (Sto. Niño Association), petitioner, is
the registered owner of two parcels of land likewise
located in Caloocan City, covered by TCT Nos. T-
158373 and T-158374. By virtue of these titles, Sto.
Niño Association occupied and claimed ownership over
a portion of Lot 26.
Thus, on July 9, 1992, CLT Realty filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 121, Caloocan City a
complaint for annulment of titles and recovery of 22
possession with damages against Sto. Niño Association,
docketed as Civil Case No. C-15491. In its complaint,
CLT Realty alleged that based on the technical
descriptions on the titles of Sto. Niño Association, an
overlapping exists between their respective titles; and
that the titles of Sto. Niño Association are void as they
are derived from TCT No. 4211, a forged and fictitious
23
title.
In its answer, Sto. Niño Association denied the
material allegations of the complaint and asserted that
its members have been in possession of the disputed lots
prior to 1987. The area had been identified by the
government as slum and blighted.
At the pre-trial conference, the parties entered into a
stipulation of facts, thus:
1. “(1)Both parties admit that the defendant (Sto.
Niño Association) is presently occupying the
property covered by TCT Nos. 158373 and
158374 located at Barrio Baesa, Caloocan City;
and
_______________
21Record I, G.R. No. 123346 at p. 14.
22TCT Nos. T-158373 and T-158374, both registered in the name of
SNKAI.
23 Annex “A,” Record, G.R. No. 123346 at pp. 74-75.
328
328 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Manotok Realty, Inc. vs. CLT Realty Development
Corporation
1. (2)Both parties admit that the plaintiff (CLT) is
also the registered owner of the same properties
being occupied by the defendant and covered by
TCT No. 177013 of the Registry of Deeds of
Caloocan City.”
Resolving the issue of whose title to the disputed land
is valid, the trial court, on September 28, 1995,
rendered a Decision in favor of Sto. Niño Association
and ordered the cancellation of TCT No. T-177013 in the
name of CLT Realty.
However, upon motion for reconsideration by CLT
Realty, the trial court, in its Amended Decision dated
February 12, 1996, granted the motion, rendered
judgment in favor of CLT Realty, and ordered the
cancellation of TCT Nos. T-158373 and T-158374, both
in the name of Sto. Niño Association, thus:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for
Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED and judgment is
accordingly rendered in favor of the plaintiff CLT REALTY
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and against the
defendant STO. NIÑO KAPITBAHAYAN ASSOCIATION,
INC., ordering the cancellation of TCT Nos. T-158373 and T-
158374, both in the name of the defendant. The defendants’
counterclaim is hereby dismissed for utter lack of merit.
“SO ORDERED.” 24
The Amended Decision is anchored on the trial court’s
finding that, based on the evidence, there was fraud in
the issuance of TCT No. 4211 from which Sto. Niño
Association’s titles were derived. The irregularities
which attended such issuance were discussed lengthily
by the court a quo as follows:
“The court finds the motion meritorious.
“The conflict stems from the fact that the plaintiff’s and
defendants’ titles overlap each other, hence, a determination
of the respective origins of such titles is of utmost
importance.
_______________
 24 Id., at pp. 34-46.
329
VOL. 476, NOVEMBER 29, 2005
Manotok Realty, Inc. vs. CLT Realty Development
Corporation
“TCT No. T-177013 in the name of the plaintiff was derived
from R-17994 T-89 in the name of Estelita Hipolito which
title can trace its origin from OCT 994. The boundaries of
OCT 994 known as Lot No. 26 of the Maysilo Estate are the
same as that of the plaintiff’s titles.
“On the other hand, TCT Nos. T-158373 and T-158374,
both in the name of the defendants, are the latest in a series
of titles which descend from TCT No. 4211. A trace of the
history of TCT No. 4211 reveals that it was succeeded by TCT
No. 5261 which was in turn succeeded by TCT No. 35486.
TCT No. 35486 was allegedly subdivided into seven lots
covered by TCT Nos. 1368 to 1374. One or two of these
subdivided lots were the predecessors of the defendants’
titles.
“It behooves this court to address the issue of
whether or not TCT No. 4211 from which the
defendants’ titles were originally derived can validly
trace its origin from OCT 994.
“There is pervasive evidence that TCT No. 4211
could not have been a true derivative of OCT No. 994.
“Firstly, the survey dates indicated in OCT No. 994
are September 8-27, October 8-21 and November 17-18,
all in the year 1911. On the other hand, these dates of
original survey are conspicuously missing in TCT No.
4211 contrary to established procedure that the
original survey dates of the mother title should be
indicated in succeeding titles. Instead, an
examination of TCT No. 4211 reveals a different date
on its face. This date, December 22, 1971, could not be
an original survey date because it differs from those
indicated in the mother title. Of equal importance is
329 the fact that the date of original survey always comes
earlier than the date of the issuance of the mother
title. Since OCT No. 994 was issued on April 19, 1917,
it is highly irregular that the original survey was
made only several months later or only on December
22, 1917.
“Neither is the Court inclined to consider this date as the
date a subdivision survey was made. The regular procedure
is to identify the subdivided lots by their respective survey
or lot numbers, on the contrary, no such lot number is found
in TCT No. 4211, pointing to the inevitable conclusion that
OCT No. 994 was never validly subdi-
330
330 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Manotok Realty, Inc. vs. CLT Realty Development
Corporation
vided into smaller lots, of which one of them is covered by
TCT No. 4211.
“Secondly, the assertion that TCT Nos. 1368 to 1374
which preceded the defendants’ titles were issued
pursuant to subdivision plan PSD 21154 is not
supported by the evidence. The Land Management
Bureau which handles survey plans has no records of
the said PSD 21154. The Registry of Deeds of Rizal has
a copy of the plan but the court finds such possession
questionable since the Land Registration Authority
which supervises the Registry of Deeds does not have
a copy of the same. The court therefore believes that
the issuance of TCT Nos. 1368 to 1374 is attended by a
serious irregularity which cannot be ignored as it
affects the very validity of the alleged subdivisions of
the land covered by TCT No. 35486.
 “Thirdly, the language of the technical descriptions
of the land covered by OCT No. 994 is already in
English, while its alleged derivative titles TCT Nos.
4211, 5261 and 35486 are still in Spanish. This is in
direct violation of the practice that the language used
in the mother title is adopted by all its derivative
titles. The reversion to Spanish in the derivative titles
is highly intriguing and casts a cloud of doubt to the
genuineness of such titles.
“Fourthly, the tie points used in the mother lot were
not adopted by the alleged derivative titles
particularly TCT Nos. 1368 to 1374, the immediate
predecessors of the defendants’ titles. The pivotal role of
tie points cannot be brushed aside as a change thereof could
result to the shifting of positions of the derivative lots in
relation to the mother lot. Consequently, overlapping could
take place as in fact it did when the defendants’ titles
overlapped that of CLT at the northwestern portion of the
latter’s property.
“Fifthly, the results of laboratory analysis
conducted by a Forensic Chemist of the NBI revealed
that TCT Nos. 4210 and 4211 were estimated to be fifty
(50) years old as of March 1993 when the examination
was conducted. Hence, the documents could have
been prepared only in 1940 and not in 1918 as
appearing on the face of TCT No. 4211.
331
VOL. 476, NOVEMBER 29, 2005
Manotok Realty, Inc. vs. CLT Realty Development
Corporation
“Based on the foregoing patent irregularities, the
court finds the attendance of fraud in the issuance of
TCT No. 4211 and all its derivative titles which
preceded the defendants’ titles. Evidently, TCT No.
4211 cannot be validly traced from OCT No. 994. Being
void ab initio, it did not give rise to any transmissible
rights with respect to the land purportedly invalid,
and resultantly, the defendants, being the holders of
the latest derivatives, cannot assert any right of
ownership over the lands in question. ‘The void ab
initio land titles issued cannot ripen into private
ownership.’ (Republic vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 209 SCRA 90)
xxx
“The court’s findings are consistent with a ruling of the
Court of Appeals in CA-GR No. 45255 entitled ‘CLT Realty
Development Corp. vs. Manotok Realty, Inc., et al.’
promulgated on September 28, 1995, affirming the decision
of the mother branch of this court ordering the cancellation
of TCT Nos. 4210 and 4211 which encroached on a specific
area of Lot No. 26 of the Maysilo Estate, Caloocan City. This
court is also aware that on January 8, 1996, the Court of
Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration of the
defendants in the aforementioned case for lack of
merit.” (italics supplied)
25
The above Amended Decision was affirmed by the Court
of Appeals in its Decision dated May 23, 2001 in CA-
G.R. CV No. 52549, thus:
“WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the appealed
Decision, We AFFIRM the same. Without pronouncement as
to costs.
331 “SO ORDERED.” 26
Hence, the present petition based on the following
assigned errors:
1. “1.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN AFFIRMING IN TOTO THE
 AMENDED DECISION OF THE COURT A No. T-177013 of the same Registry of Deeds in the name
QUO. of CLT Development Corporation, covering Lot 26, also
of the Maysilo Estate. 29

_______________ In the meantime, petitioners Manotok filed with this

25 Amended Decision dated February 12, 1996, Rollo of G.R. No.
Court two separate Manifestations stating that a (1)
148767 at pp. 11-13. Report of the Fact-Finding Committee dated August 28,
26 Rollo, G.R. No. 148767 at pp. 33-45. 1997 composed of the Department of Justice (DOJ),
332
Land Registration Authority and the Office of the
332 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Solicitor General, and (2) Senate Committee Report No.
1031 dated May 25, 1998 were issued by the DOJ and
Manotok Realty, Inc. vs. CLT Realty Development
the Senate. Both reports conclude that there is only
Corporation
one OCT No. 994 issued, transcribed and registered
on May 3, 1917.
1. “2.THE JUDGMENT OF THE HONORABLE
The respondents in these cases vehemently opposed
COURT OF APPEALS IS PREMISED ON THE
the said Manifestations alleging, among others, that the
MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS OF THE
same are “nothing but a crude attempt to circumvent
COURT A QUO.
and ignore time-honored judicial procedures and
2. “3.ASSUMING ARGUENDO, WITHOUT
sabotage the orderly administration of justice by using
NECESSARILY ADMITTING THAT THE
alleged findings in the alleged
ARGUMENTS OF APPELLANT ARE _______________
UNAVAILING, THERE ARE SUPERVENING
FACTS AND EVENTS, SHOULD THIS 27 Rollo, G.R. No. 148767, Petition at p. 17.
HONORABLE COURT CONSIDER THE 28 In G.R. No. 134385 filed by Araneta Institute of Agriculture, Inc.
29 In G.R. Nos. 123346 and 148767 filed by Manotok Realty, Inc.

SAME, THAT WOULD WARRANT THE and Manotok Estate Corporation and Sto. Niño Kapitbahayan
REVERSAL OF THE CHALLENGED Association, Inc., respectively.
DECISION AND WILL IMPEL A DIFFERENT
333
CONCLUSION.” 27
VOL. 476, NOVEMBER 29, 2005 333
Manotok Realty, Inc. vs. CLT Realty Development
In sum, the three instant petitions assail the validity of:
(1) TCT No. R-15169 of the Registry of Deeds of Corporation
Caloocan City in the name of Jose B. Dimson, reports prepared by the DOJ and the Senate Committee
covering Lot 25-A-2 of the Maysilo Estate; and (2) TCT
28
that were never presented before the trial courts to
obtain a reversal of the questioned Decisions. At the
very least, said procedure is highly irregular, improper
and contrary to the dictates of due process.” 30
Summary of the Contentions of the Parties
I. G.R. No. 123346
Petitioners Manotok Corporations mainly contend that
the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the lower court’s
Decision which was rendered without conducting trial
for the reception of evidence. It merely relied on the
technical report of the commissioners appointed by the
court based on the parties’ nomination. They
(petitioners) were thus denied due process as they were
not able to present evidence in a full-blown trial.
Respondent CLT Realty, on the other hand,
maintains that the factual findings of the
commissioners are supported by evidence. The
contending parties were accorded due process because
they submitted their respective evidence to the
commissioners in the course of the proceedings. The
same evidence became the basis of their Majority and
Minority Reports. The two Reports were later heard and
passed upon by the trial court.
Respondent CLT Realty adds that the Decision of the
trial court, upheld by the Court of Appeals, complies
with the requirement of Section 14, Article VIII of the
Constitution since it clearly and distinctly expresses the
facts and the law upon which it is based.
II G.R. 134385
Petitioner Araneta Institute basically submits that the
case of MWSS vs. CA cited in the Decision dated May
31
30, 1997 of
_______________
30 Rollo of G.R. No. 123346 at p. 1578.
31 Supra.
334
334 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Manotok Realty, Inc. vs. CLT Realty Development
Corporation
the Court of Appeals is inapplicable to the present case.
In that case, it upheld TCT No. 15167 of Dimson derived
from OCT 994 issued and registered earlier, or on April
19, 1917. Whereas, the MWSS’ title was derived from
OCT 994 issued and registered later, or on May 3, 1917.
The Appellate Court erred when it relied on MWSS vs.
CA. 32
On the other hand, respondents heirs of Dimson
counter that the validity of Dimson’s title, TCT No.
15167, has been upheld by this Court in MWSS case.
III G.R. No. 148767
Like petitioner Araneta Institute in G.R. No.
134385 and petitioners Manotok Corporations in G.R.
No. 123346, petitioner Sto. Niño Association contends
that there are supervening facts and events that
transpired after the trial court rendered its Amended
Decision that if considered will result in a different
conclusion. These are the two Reports of the DOJ and
Senate Fact-Finding Committees that there is only one
OCT No. 994 issued on May 3, 1917. Thus, with a new
trial, and with the presentation of these Reports as
evidence, it could be shown that the titles of Jose
Dimson and CLT Realty are void.
Ruling of the Court
The present petitions must fail.
At the outset, it bears stressing that under Rule 45
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, our
jurisdiction over cases brought to us from the Court of
Appeals is limited to reviewing and correcting errors of
lawcommitted by said court. The Supreme Court is not
a trier of facts. Thus, it is not our function to
review factual issues and examine, evaluate or weigh
the probative value of the evidence presented by the
_______________
32 Supra.
335
VOL. 476, NOVEMBER 29, 2005
Manotok Realty, Inc. vs. CLT Realty Development
Corporation
parties. We are not bound to analyze and weigh all over
33
again the evidence already considered in the
proceedings below. 34
Here, the paramount question being raised in the
three petitions is whether TCT No. 15169 issued in the
name of Jose B. Dimson and TCT No. 177013 issued in
the name of CLT are valid. Undoubtedly, such issue is
a pure question of fact—a matter beyond our power to
determine. Where, as here, the findings of fact of the
trial courts are affirmed by the Court of Appeals, the
same are accorded the highest degree of respect and,
generally, will not be disturbed on appeal. Such findings
are binding and conclusive on this Court. 35
Be that as it may, to reinforce our conclusion, we
shall still proceed to discuss why the present petitions
have no merit.
As regards G.R. No. 123346 (Manotok Corporations
vs. CLT Realty, involving Lot 26), the trial court acted
properly when it adopted the Majority Report of the
commissioners as part and parcel of its Decision. That
is allowed in Section 11, Rule 32 of the Revised Rules of
Court (now the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended), quoted below:
“SEC. 11. Hearing upon report.—Upon the expiration of the
period of ten (10) days referred to in the preceding section,
the report shall be set for hearing, after which the court shall
render judgment by adopting, modifying, or rejecting the
report in whole or in part or it may receive further evidence
or may recommit it with instructions.” (italics supplied)
335 The case of overlapping of titles necessitates the
assistance of experts in the field of geodetic engineering.
The very reason why commissioners were appointed by
the trial court, upon
_______________
33 Asia Trust Development Bank vs. Concepts Trading
Corporation, G.R. No. 130759, June 20, 2003, 404 SCRA 449.
34 Omandam vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128750, January 18,
2001, 349 SCRA 483.
35 Duremdes vs. Duremdes, G.R. No. 138256, November 12,
2003, 415 SCRA 684.
336
336 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Manotok Realty, Inc. vs. CLT Realty Development
Corporation
agreement of the parties, was precisely to make an
evaluation and analysis of the titles in conflict with
each other. Given their background, expertise and
experience, these commissioners are in a better position
to determine which of the titles is valid. Thus, the trial
court may rely on their findings and conclusions.
 It bears stressing that the parties opted to submit
the case for decision on the bases, among others, of their
respective objections/comments on the commissioners’
reports.
Thus, petitioners Manotok Corporations, under the
doctrine of estoppel, cannot now be permitted to assail
the Decision of the trial court—which turned out to be
adverse to them—and insist that it should have
conducted further reception of evidence before
rendering its judgment on the case.
We note further that while petitioners assail the trial
court’s Decision as being premature, however, they also
assert that the said court should have adopted the
Minority Report which is favorable to them. Certainly,
we cannot countenance their act of adopting
inconsistent postures as this is a mockery of justice.
We noted in the beginning of this Decision that the
issue in all these three (3) cases involves the validity of
the parties’ overlapping titles. The titles of the
respondents in these cases were derived from OCT No.
994 of the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City registered
on April 19, 1917. The validity of such mother title has
already been upheld by this Court in G.R. No.
103558, MWSS vs. Court of Appeals, et al. dated
November 17, 1992 earlier cited in the assailed
36
Decisions. Significantly, the ruling in MWSS was
reiterated in G.R. No. 96259, Heirs of Luis J. Gonzaga
vs. Court of Appeals dated September 3, 1996. 37
We cannot delve anymore into the correctness of the
Decision of this Court in MWSS. The said Decision,
confirming the
_______________
36 215 SCRA 783 (1992).
261 SCRA 327 (1996).
37
337
VOL. 476, NOVEMBER 29, 2005 337
Manotok Realty, Inc. vs. CLT Realty Development
Corporation
validity of OCT No. 994 issued on April 19, 1917 from
which the titles of the respondents in the cases at bar
were derived, has long become final and executory.
Nothing is more settled in law than that once a
judgment attains finality it becomes immutable and
unalterable. It may no longer be modified in any
respect, even if the modification is meant to correct
what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact
or law, and regardless of whether the modification is
attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the
highest court of the land. 38
The doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on
fundamental considerations of public policy and sound
practice, and that, at the risk of occasional errors, the
judgments or orders of courts must become final at some
definite time fixed by law; otherwise, there would be no
end to litigations, thus setting to naught the main role
of courts of justice which is to assist in the enforcement
of the rule of law and the maintenance of peace and
order by settling justiciable controversies with finality. 39
Just as the losing party has the right to file an appeal
within the prescribed period, the winning party
likewise has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of
the resolution of his case. We held that “a final
judgment vests in the prevailing party a right recognized
and protected by law under the due process clause of the
Constitution. . . . A final judgment is ‘a vested interest
which it is right and equitable that the government
should recognize and protect, and of which the
individual could not be deprived arbitrarily without
injustice.’ ”40
_______________
38 Johnson & Johnson (Phils.), Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
102692, September 23, 1996, 262 SCRA 298.
39 Garbo vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 100474, September 10,
1993, 226 SCRA 250.
40 Insular Bank of Asia and America Employees’ Union (IBAAEU)
vs. Inciong, No. L-52415, October 23, 1984, 132 SCRA 663.
338
338 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Manotok Realty, Inc. vs. CLT Realty Development
Corporation
In the present cases, the winning parties, respondents
herein, must not be deprived of the fruits of a final
verdict.
Finally, we cannot consider the alleged newly-
discovered evidence consisting of the DOJ and Senate
Fact-Finding Committee Reports invoked by petitioners
herein. Certainly, such committee reports cannot
override the Decisions of the trial courts and the Court
of Appeals upholding the validity of respondents’ titles
in these cases. The said Decisions were rendered after
the opposing parties have been accorded due process. It
bears stressing that the courts have the constitutional
duty to adjudicate legal disputes properly brought
before them. The DOJ and Senate, or any other agencies
of the Government for that matter, have clearly
distinguishable roles from that of the Judiciary. Just as
overlapping of titles of lands is abhorred, so is the
overlapping of findings of facts among the different
branches and agencies of the Government. This we
unmistakably stressed in Agan, Jr., et al. vs. Philippine
International Air Terminals Co., Inc., et al, thus: 41
“Finally, the respondent Congressmen assert that at least
two (2) committee reports by the House of Representatives
found the PIATCO contracts valid and contend that this
Court, by taking cognizance of the cases at bar, reviewed an
action of a co-equal body. They insist that the Court must
respect the findings of the said committees of the House of
Representatives. With due respect, we cannot subscribe
to their submission. There is a fundamental difference
between a case in court and an investigation of a
congressional committee. The purpose of a judicial
proceeding is to settle the dispute in controversy by
adjudicating the legal rights and obligations of the
parties to the case. On the other hand, a congressional
investigation is conducted in aid of
legislation (Arnault vs. Nazareno, G.R. No. L-3820, July 18,
1950). Its aim is to assist and recommend to the legislature
a possible action that the body may take with regard to a
particular issue, specifically as to whether or not to enact a
new law or amend an
_______________
41 G.R. Nos. 155001, 155547 and 155661, January 21, 2004, 420 SCRA
575.
339
VOL. 476, NOVEMBER 29, 2005 339
Manotok Realty, Inc. vs. CLT Realty Development
Corporation
existing one. Consequently, this Court cannot treat the
findings in a congressional committee report as
binding because the facts elicited in congressional 340
hearings are not subject to the rigors of the Rules of © Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
Court on admissibility of evidence. The Court in reserved.
assuming jurisdiction over the petitions at bar simply
performed its constitutional duty as the arbiter of legal
disputes properly brought before it, especially in this
instance when public interest requires nothing less.” (Italics
supplied)

WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DENIED and

the assailed Decisions and Resolutions of the Court of
Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban (Chairman), Corona and Carpio-
Morales, JJ., concur.
Garcia, J., No Part.
Petitions denied, assailed decisions and resolutions
affirmed in toto.
Notes.—After a decision is declared final and
executory, vested rights are acquired by the winning
party. (Fortich vs. Corona, 298 SCRA 679 [1998])
It is basic that the findings of fact by the Court of
Appeals, when supported by substantial evidence, are
conclusive and binding upon the parties and are not
reviewable by the Supreme Court, unless the case falls
under any of the exceptions to the rule, such as when
the findings by the Appellate Court are not supported
by evidence. (Philthread Tire & Rubber Corporation vs.
Vicente, 441 SCRA 574 [2004])

——o0o——
 VOL. 451, FEBRUARY 17, 2005 735 2 of Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, “every action
Republic vs. Agunoy, Sr. must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party
in interest.” To qualify a person to be a real party in interest
G.R. No. 155394. February 17, 2005. *

in whose name an action must be prosecuted, he must appear

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
to be the present real owner of the right sought to enforced
petitioner, vs. GREGORIO AGUNOY, SR., et al., (Pioneer Insurance v. CA, 175 SCRA 668 [1989]). A real party
SPOUSES EDUARDO and ARCELITA MARQUEZ and in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured
RURAL BANK OF GAPAN, NUEVA ECIJA, by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails
respondents. of the suit. And by real interest is meant a present
Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Parties; Words and substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere
Phrases;Basic it is in the law of procedure that every action expectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate or
must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party- consequential interest.
in-interest, meaning “the party who stands to be benefited or Same; Laches; The law aids the vigilant, not those who
injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to sleep on their rights—vigilantibus, sed non dormientibus,
the avails of the suit.”—We agree with the Court of Appeals jura subveniunt.—From as early as October 24, 1960, when
that petitioner Republic is not the real party-in-interest in the aforequoted decision in LRC Case No. 430 was
this case. Basic it is in the law of procedure that every action promulgated, to as late as February 6, 1967, when OCT No.
must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party- P-4522 of Gregorio Agunoy, Sr. was issued, or a slumber
in-interest, meaning “the party who stands to be benefited or lasting for more than six (6) years, the heirs of Eusebio Perez
injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to had numerous opportunities to cause the implementation of
the avails of the suit,” a procedural rule reechoed in a long the said registration order. Inexplicably, they let this chance
line of cases decided by this Court. For sure, not too long ago, passed by. Vigilantibus, sed non dormientibus, jura
in Shipside, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, citing earlier cases, we subveniunt, the law aids the vigilant, not those who sleep on
wrote: x x x. Consequently, their rights. And speaking of rights, one may not sleep on a
right while expecting to preserve it in its pristine purity.
_______________ Same; Estoppel; Generally, the State cannot be put in
* THIRD DIVISION.
estoppel by mistakes or errors of its officials or agents, the
736 government must not be allowed to deal dishonorably or
736 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED capriciously with its citizens, and must not play an ignoble
part or do a shabby thing.—We are well aware of the rule
Republic vs. Agunoy, Sr.
reiterated in Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Santos, that,
the Republic is not a real party in interest and it may
generally, the State cannot be put in estoppel by the
not institute the instant action. Nor may it raise the defense
mistakes or errors of its officials or agents. In that very case,
of imprescriptibility, the same being applicable only in cases
however, citing 31 CJS 675-676, we went further by saying—
where the government is a party in interest. Under Section
“x x x. Nevertheless, the government must not be allowed to
deal dishonorably or capriciously with its citizens, and must
not play an ignoble part or do a shabby thing; and subject to
limitations x x x, the doctrine of equitable estoppel may be
invoked against public authorities as well as against private
individuals.”
737
VOL. 451, FEBRUARY 17, 2005
Republic vs. Agunoy, Sr.
Same; Land Registration; Doctrine of Fraus Et Jus
Nunquam Cohabitant; In those other cases where the doctrine
of fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant—which basically means
that no one may enjoy the fruits of fraud—was applied
against a patent and title procured thru fraud or
misrepresentation, the land covered thereby is either a part of
the forest zone which is definitely non-disposable, or that said
patent and title are still in the name of the person who
committed the fraud or misrepresentation.—There can be no
debate at all on petitioner’s submission that no amount of
legal technicality may serve as a solid foundation for the
enjoyment of the fruits of fraud. It is thus understandable
why petitioner chants the dogma of fraus et jus nunquam
cohabitant. Significantly, however, in the cases cited by
petitioner Republic, as well as in those other cases where the
doctrine of fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant was applied
against a patent and title procured thru fraud or
misrepresentation, we note that the land covered thereby is
either a part of the forest zone which is definitely non-
disposable, as in Animas, or that said patent and title are
still in the name of the person who committed the fraud or
misrepresentation, as in Acot, Animas, Republic vs. CA and
Del Mundo and Director of Lands vs. Abanilla, et al. and, in
either instance, there were yet no innocent third parties
standing in the way.
Same; Same; The properties in question are no longer
floating objects on a spring that cannot rise higher than its
source, as they are now very much ashore and firmly standing
on the high solid ground of the Torrens system of land
registration.—It bears stressing that, by petitioner’s own
judicial admission, the lots in dispute are no longer part of
the public domain, and there are numerous third, fourth,
fifth and more parties holding Torrens titles in their favor
737 and enjoying the presumption of good faith. This brings to
mind what we have reechoed in Pino vs. Court of
Appeals and the cases therein cited: [E]ven on the
supposition that the sale was void, the general rule that the
direct result of a previous illegal contract cannot be valid (on
the theory that the spring cannot rise higher than its source)
cannot apply here for We are confronted with the
functionings of the Torrens System of Registration. The
doctrine to follow is simple enough: a fraudulent or forged
document of sale may become the ROOT of a valid title if the
certificate of title has already been transferred from the
name of the true owner to the name of the forger or the name
indicated by the forger. It is even worse in this case because
here, there is no forger to speak of. The remark of Land
738
738 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Agunoy, Sr.
Inspector Jose Mendigoria about the abandonment by
Eusebio Perez and Valenciano Espiritu cannot, by itself, be
fraudulent. And, for all we know, that remark may even turn
out to be the truth. What petitioner perceives as fraud may
be nothing more than the differences of professional opinions
between Land Inspector Jose Mendigoria and Geodetic
Engineer Melencio Mangahas. But regardless of who
between the two is correct, the hard reality is that the
properties in question are no longer floating objects on
a spring that cannot rise higher than its source, as they are
now very much ashore and firmly standing on the high solid
ground of the Torrens system of land registration.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the
Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Cesar M. Cariño for respondents.
GARCIA, J.:
Interplaying in this case are two (2) counter-balancing
doctrines in the law of land titles: one, the doctrine
of fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant, which basically
means that no one may enjoy the fruits of fraud, and 1
the other, the doctrine that a fraudulent title may be
the root of valid title in the name of an innocent buyer
for value and in good faith. 2 On February 6, 1967, the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija
Invoking the first, petitioner Republic of the
Philippines in this petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeks to nullify and
set aside the decision
_______________
1 Acot, et al. v. Kempis, et al., 55 O.G. No. 16, p. 2907
(1959); Director of Lands v. Abanilla, et al., 124 SCRA
358 (1983); Republic v. Court of Appeals and Del Mundo, 183 SCRA
620 (1990).
2 Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 281 SCRA 491 (1997); Republic v. Court
of Appeals, 306 SCRA 81 (1999).
739
VOL. 451, FEBRUARY 17, 2005
Republic vs. Agunoy, Sr.
dated September 26, 2002 of the Court of Appeals
3
in CA-G.R. CV No. 55732, which reversed an earlier
decision of the Regional Trial Court at Cabanatuan
City, Branch 25, in its Civil Case No. 831-AF, an action
for cancellation of free patent, original certificate of title
and derivative transfer certificates of title, thereat filed
by the petitioner against, among others, the herein
respondents.
The facts are well laid out in the decision under
review:
On May 26, 1958, Gregorio Agunoy, Sr. filed his application
for Free Patent No. 5-1414 covering two parcels of land
identified as Lot Nos. 1341 and 1342, Cad 269, Sta. Rosa
Cadastre, Nueva Ecija, containing an aggregate area of
18.6486 hectares with the Bureau of Lands. On January 18,
1967, he was issued Free Patent No. 314450 by the Director
of Lands.
registered Free Patent No. 314450 and issued the
corresponding Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-
4522 in the name of Gregorio Agunoy, Sr.
On March 10, 1967, the heirs of Eusebio Perez,
represented by Francisca Perez, caused the annotation on
the said OCT of an adverse claim in their favor over a portion
of 15.1593 hectares of the property.
On July 30, 1975, the said heirs of Eusebio Perez filed a
formal protest docketed as B.L. Claim No. 760 (n) with the
Bureau of Lands alleging that Lot 1341 of the Sta. Rosa
Cadastre, Nueva Ecija, covered by Original Certificate of
Title No-P4522 is identical to Lots 1 and 2 of Plan Psu-47200
which had been adjudicated as private property of said
739 protestant pursuant to a decision promulgated on October
24, 1960 by the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija in
Land Registration Case No. 430, LRC Records No. 14876.
On May 3, 1976, the chief of the Legal Division, Bureau
of Lands, conducted a formal investigation and ocular
inspection of the premises and it was ascertained that Free
Patent No. 314450 and its
_______________
3 Penned by Associate Justice Eliezer R. De los Santos and concurred
in by Associate Justices Roberto A. Barrios and Danilo B. Pine of the 15th
Division.
740
740 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Agunoy, Sr.
corresponding OCT No. P-4522 were improperly and
fraudulently issued (Records, p.78)
On July 31, 1979, upon the death of the wife of Gregorio
Agunoy, Sr., the heirs, namely Gregorio Sr., Tomas, Lilian,
Angelito and Gregorio, Jr., executed a Deed of Extrajudicial
Partition with Sale in favor of Joaquin Sangabol for and in
consideration of the sum of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00).
The Original Certificate of Title No. P-4522 was cancelled
by the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija and Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 166270 was issued in favor of
the aforenamed heirs. Said TCT No. 166270 was again
cancelled by reason of the concurrent sale to Joaquin
Sangabol in whose favor TCT No. NT-166271 was issued.
On August 1, 1979, Joaquin Sangabol sold an undivided
portion of three (3) hectares of the property described as Lot
1341 in TCT No. NT-166271 to Fortunato Para for and in
consideration of the sum of Three Thousand Five Hundred
Pesos (3,500.00).
The following day, he sold the property described as Lot
1342 in TCT No. NT-166271 to Virginia P. Jimenez for and
in consideration of the sum of One Thousand Five Hundred
Pesos (P1,500.00) in whose favor TCT No. N-166287 was
issued.
On May 12, 1980, the adverse claim of Francisca Perez, et
al. annotated at the back of the OCT was cancelled by the
Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija (Exhibit “G”).
On January 16, 1981, Joaquin Sangabol subdivided the
property described as Lot 1341 in TCT No. NT-166271 into
three lots designated as Lot Nos. 1341-A, 1341-B, and 1341-
C of plan Psd-299875 duly approved by the Land
Registration Commission.
TCT No. NT-166271 was cancelled and TCT No. NT-
168972 covering Lot No. 1341-A was issued to spouses
Fortunato Para and Araceli Sena. TCT Nos. NT-168973 and
NT-168974 covering Lot Nos. 1341-B and 1341-C were issued
in favor of Joaquin Sangabol. On June 15, 1982, Virginia P.
Jimenez sold the property covered by TCT No. NT-166287 in
favor of spouses Blandino and Josefina A. Salva Cruz for
Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P11,500.00) where
TCT No. 174634 was issued in favor of said spouses. On June
17, 1982, Josefina A. Salva Cruz effected the subdivision of
the property into thirteen (13) lots designated as Lot Nos.
1342-A to 1342-M as per subdivision plan Psd-03-004756
thereby canceling TCT No.
741
VOL. 451, FEBRUARY 17, 2005 741
Republic vs. Agunoy, Sr.
NT-174634 and TCT Nos. NT-174635 to 174647 were issued
in lieu thereof.
On November 2, 1982, Fortunato Para, through his
attorney-in-fact Gloria Bergonia, mortgaged the property
covered by TCT No. NT-168972 in favor of the Perpetual
Finance and Investment, Inc. in the amount of One Hundred
Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P125,000.00). The mortgage
was foreclosed and the property was sold at public auction.
Thereafter, the corresponding certificate of sale was
executed in favor of Perpetual Finance and Credit, Inc.
 On March 3, 1983, the properties covered by TCT Nos.
NT-174643 and NT-174644 were mortgaged with the Rural
Bank of Gapan for Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00). On
February 25, 1985, the mortgage was likewise foreclosed and
the properties were sold at public auction in favor of the said
bank.
On December 16, 1986, Joaquin Sangabol sold the
property covered by TCT No. NT-168974 to Eduardo R. Dee
for and in consideration of the sum of One Hundred Twenty
[Thousand] Pesos (P120,000.00). Subsequently, TCT No. NT-
168974 was cancelled and TCT No. 196579 was issued in the
name of Eduardo R. Dee.
On January 5, 1988, the heirs of Ruperto Perez (oldest son
of Eusebio), now represented by Sabina P. Hernandez, filed
a supplemental protest alleging that:
1. a)Lot Nos. 1341 and 1342, Cad 269 of the Sta. Rosa
Cadatre have been exclusively occupied and
cultivated by them and their immediate
predecessors-in-interest who have introduced
permanent improvements thereon consisting of
irrigated ricelands, mango trees, bamboo groves and
other crops;
2. b)Gregorio Agunoy, Sr. never occupied and cultivated
said parcels of land in the manner and for the period
required by law;
3. c)Said parcels of land are identical to Lots 1, 3 and a
portion of 87,674 square meters of Lot 4 of the
amended plan-47200 Amd. as shown by the
relocation survey conducted by Geodetic Engineer
Deogracias L. Javier on July 29, 1977;
4. d)The patent and title issued to Gregorio Agunoy, Sr.
were obtained through fraud and misrepresentation.
(Records pp. 9-10)
742
742 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Agunoy, Sr.
The Bureau of Lands conducted anew an investigation and
ocular inspection of Lot 1342, Cad. 269 of Sta. Rosa Cadastre,
Nueva Ecija, and came out with the following findings, to
wit:
1. a)Lot 1342, Cad. 269 of Sta Rosa Cadastre, Nueva
Ecija is located at Barangay Imbunia (formerly
Marawa), Municipality of Jaen, Nueva Ecija;
2. b)Said lot was originally registered in the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Cabanatuan City on May 23,
1914 under OCT No. 125 issued in the name of
Valeriano Espiritu, pursuant to Decree No. 15733
issued on May 20, 1914 in Land Registration Case
No. 9552;
3. c)On May 13, 1952, said property was conveyed in
favor of Isaias Carlos under TCT No. 11554 and the
latter conveyed the same in favor of the spouses
Santiago Mateo and Leogarda Juliano;
4. d)TCT No. 11554 was cancelled and in lieu thereof,
TCT No. 17471 was issued in the name of Santiago
Mateo. (Records, pp. 13;78)
On May 10, 1988, the Chief of the Legal Division
recommended to the Director of Lands that court action be
instituted for the cancellation of Free Patent No. 314450 and
its corresponding Original Certificate of Title No. P-4522 in
the name Gregorio Agunoy, Sr., as well as other subsequent
transfer certificates of title issued therefrom based on the
foregoing findings (Italics supplied).
It was against the foregoing backdrop of events when,
on May 24, 1990, in the Regional Trial Court at Gapan,
Nueva Ecija petitioner Republic of the Philippines, thru corresponding Original Certificate of Title No. P-
the Office of the Solicitor General, filed the 4522 issued to defendant Gregorio Agunoy, Sr. are
complaint in this case against several defendants,
4 null and void and should be cancelled. Moreover,
among whom are the herein respondents Gregorio Gregorio Agunoy, Sr. has not occupied and
cultivated the land in the manner and for the length
Agunoy, Sr., his children, the spouses Eduardo Dee and
of time required by law (C.A. 141 as amended; see
Arcelita Marquez-Dee and the Rural Bank of Gapan,
also RA 782) (Emphasis supplied),
Nueva Ecija. In its complaint, docketed as Civil Case
No. 831-AF, petitioner Republic alleged, inter alia, as and accordingly prayed for a judgment—
follows:

_______________
1. 1.Declaring Free Patent No. 314450 and the
corresponding Original Certificate of Title No. P-
4Rollo, pp. 65-79. 4522 in the name of Gregorio Agunoy, as well as all
743 other subsequent transfer certificates of title
VOL. 451, FEBRUARY 17, 2005 743 emanating therefrom, i.e., Transfer Certificates of
Republic vs. Agunoy, Sr. Title Nos. NT-168972, NT-168973, NT-196579, NT-
174635 to NT-174647 (inclusive), including all liens
and encumbrances annotated thereon, null and void;
1. “30.Free Patent No. 314450 and its corresponding
2. 2.Ordering defendants to surrender their owner’s
Original Certificate of Title No. P-4522 were
duplicate copies of all subsequent transfer
procured by defendant Gregorio Agunoy, Sr.,
certificates of title emanating from Original
through fraud, deceit and misrepresentation
Certificate of Title No. P-4522 to the Register of
since the property in question (Lots 1341 and 1342)
Deeds of Nueva Ecija;
at the time the patent and the title were issued was
3. 3.Directing the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija to
already adjudicated as private property of the heirs
cancel the aforesaid certificates of title;
of Eusebio Perez and Valeriano Espiritu,
4. 4.Ordering defendants and all those claiming under
respectively. Consequently, the then Bureau of
them to desist from exercising or representing acts
Lands, now Lands Management Bureau, no longer
of ownership and/or possession in the premises
had any jurisdiction and control over the same. x x x
(Italics supplied).
x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
2. 31.The fraudulent acts and misrepresentation of
defendant Gregorio Agunoy, Sr. had misled the then
744
Bureau of Lands in issuing said patent. Since the
property in question was no longer a disposable
744 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
public land, Free Patent No. 314450 and its Republic vs. Agunoy, Sr.
Eventually, in a decision dated September 9, 1996, the 5 SO ORDERED” (Italics supplied).
trial court rendered judgment for the Republic, thus:
“PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered
in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants as follows:
1. 1.Declaring as null and void Free Patent No. 314450
and the corresponding Original Certificate of Title
No. P-4522 in the name of Gregorio Agunoy, as well
as all other subsequent transfer certificates of titles
emanating therefrom (TCT Nos. NT-166270, NT-
166271, NT-168972, NT-168973, NT-168974, NT-
166287 and NT-174634 to NT-174647, inclusive, of
the Registry of Deeds of Nueva Ecija) including all
liens and encumbrances annotated thereon;
2. 2.Ordering defendants to surrender their owner’s
duplicate copies of all the said subsequent transfer
certificates of titles emanating from Original
Certificate of Title No. P-4522 to the Register of
Deeds of Nueva Ecija, and ordering the Register of
Deeds to cancel the aforesaid certificates of titles;
3. 3.Ordering reversion of the pieces of land embraced in
Free Patent No. 314450 and OCT No. P-4522 of the
Registry of Deeds of Nueva Ecija, to the mass of
public domain except the pieces of land which were
already the subject of land registration proceedings;
4. 4.Ordering that henceforth the defendants and all
those claiming under them to desist from disturbing
the ownership of the government over the said pieces
of land, and
5. 5.To pay costs of suits.
For lack of evidence, the third-party complaint filed by the
Rural Bank of Gapan, Inc. against defendants-Spouses
Blandino Salva Cruz and Josefina Salva Cruz is hereby
dismissed without pronouncement as to costs.
Therefrom, the spouses Eduardo Dee and Arcelita
Marquez-Dee and the Rural Bank of Gapan, Nueva
Ecija
_______________
Rollo, pp. 81-101.
5
745
VOL. 451, FEBRUARY 17, 2005 745
Republic vs. Agunoy, Sr.
went to the Court of Appeals, whereat their recourse
was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 55732.
As earlier stated herein, the appellate court, in a
decision dated September 26, 2002, reversed and set
6
aside the appealed decision of the trial court, to wit:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal
is GRANTEDand the decision of the trial court
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new judgment is hereby
rendered to read as follows:
1. 1.Defendant Gregorio Agunoy, Sr. is declared to have
validly and properly acquired Free Patent No.
314450 and the corresponding Original Certificate of
Title No. P-4522 over Lot Nos. 1341 and 1342, Cad
269, Sta. Rosa Cadastre, Nueva Ecija; and
2. 2.The title over the portion of Lot No. 1342, now
covered by TCT No. 196579 in the name of
defendants-appellants Spouses Dee is likewise
declared valid for having acquired in good faith and
for value.
SO ORDERED.”
Hence, this recourse by the petitioner, submitting for Basic it is in the law of procedure that every action
our resolution the following issues: 7 must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real
party-in-interest, meaning “the party who stands to be
“I. benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the
party entitled to the avails of the suit,” a procedural8

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED

IN DECLARING THAT PETITIONER IS NOT THE REAL
PARTY-IN-INTEREST IN THIS CASE AND THAT
GREGORIO AGUNOY, SR. HAD VALIDLY ACQUIRED
rule reechoed in a long line of cases decided by this
Court. For sure, not too long ago, in Shipside, Inc. vs.
Court of Appeals, citing earlier cases, we wrote:
9

FREE PATENT NO. 314450 AND ORIGINAL x x x. Consequently, the Republic is not a real party in
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. P-4522 OVER LOT NOS. interest and it may not institute the instant action. Nor may
1341 AND 1342, CAD. 269, STA. ROSA CADASTRE, it raise the defense of imprescriptibility, the same being
NUEVA ECIJA. applicable only in cases where the government is a party in
interest. Under Section 2 of Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
II. Procedure, “every action must be prosecuted or defended in
the name of the real party in interest.” To qualify a person to
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS be a real party in interest in whose name an action must be
ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE TITLE OVER THE prosecuted, he must appear to be the present real owner of
PORTION OF LOT NO. 1342, NOW COVERED BY TCT NO. the right sought to enforced (Pioneer Insurance v. CA, 175
196579 IN THE NAMES OF RESPONDENTS SPOUSES SCRA 668 [1989]). A real party in interest is the party who
EDUARDO DEE AND ARCELITA stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit,
or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. And by real
_______________ interest is meant a present substantial interest, as
distinguished from a mere expectancy, or a future,
6 Rollo, pp. 39-48.
7 Petitioner’s Memorandum, p. 14; Rollo, pp. 171-197.
contingent, subordinate or consequential interest.
746 The very complaint in this case, supra, filed by
746 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED petitioner Republic before the trial court unmistakably
Republic vs. Agunoy, Sr. alleges that at the time Free Patent No. 31445 and its
MARQUEZ IS VALID FOR HAVING BEEN ACQUIRED IN corresponding Original Certificate of Title No. P-45222
GOOD FAITH AND FOR VALUE.” were issued to Gregorio Agunoy, Sr., “the property in
We DENY. question (Lots 1341 and 1342)
To begin with, we agree with the Court of Appeals
_______________
that petitioner Republic is not the real party-in-interest
in this case. 8 Section 2, Rule 3, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
 9352 SCRA 334 (2001).
747
VOL. 451, FEBRUARY 17, 2005
Republic vs. Agunoy, Sr.
x x x was already adjudicated as private property of
the heirs of Eusebio Perez and Valeriano Espiritu,” and
that at that time, “the property in question was no
longer a disposable public land.” In fact, in
paragraph 27(f) of the same complaint, petitioner
further alleged:
f) Furthermore, it was found that prior to the issuance of
Free Patent No. 314450 on January 18, 1967, Lot 1341 of Sta.
Rosa Cadastre, Nueva Ecija, which was one of the two (2)
parcels of land applied for by Gregorio Agunoy, Sr., was
already the subject of an application for registration filed by
the heirs of Eusebio Perez in 1958 before the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija, docketed as LRC Case No. 430, LRC
Record No. 14876, and wherein a Decision was promulgated
on October 24, 1960 adjudicating Lots 1 and 2 of Plan Psu-
47200 as private propertiesof said heirs-claimants. The
aforesaid Decision was already final and executory at the
time the patent was issued to defendant Gregorio Agunoy,
Sr.” (Except for the underscoring on “as private properties,”
the rest are of the petitioner itself).
With the very admissions by the petitioner itself in its
basic pleading that Lots No. 1341 and 1342 are
already private properties of the heirs of Eusebio
Perez and Valeriano Espiritu, and are, therefore, “no
longer disposable public land” over which the then
Bureau of Lands, now Lands Management Bureau, “no
longer had any jurisdiction and control,” we are
simply at a loss to understand how petitioner Republic
can still profess to be the real party-in-interest in this
case, and insists that the disputed properties are still
part of the public domain. If ever, the real party-in-
747 interest could be none other than the heirs of Eusebio
Perez and Valeriano Espiritu, but certainly not the
petitioner.
Then, too, it is striking to note that even as the
complaint is basically one for reversion of private
property to the mass of public domain, petitioner did not
implead either the heirs of Eusebio Perez or that of
Valeriano Espiritu. Without doubt, if our decision
hereon were to be in favor of petitioner, the real
beneficiary thereof is not the State. And because, as no
less
748
748 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Agunoy, Sr.
admitted by the petitioner, the lands subject of this case
are no longer part of the public domain, the nullification
of Agunoy’s Free Patent P-314450 and OCT No. P-4522
would not result in the reversion of the lands subject
thereof to the mass of public land. And the government,
not being the real party-in-interest, is without
personality to institute reversion proceedings. So it is
that in an earlier case, we had an occasion to say:
10
There is no merit in petitioners’ contention that only the
State may bring an action for reconveyance of the lots in
dispute. To reiterate, Lot 2344 is a private property in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the
Santiago family. The nullification of its free patent and title
would not therefore result in its reversion to the public
domain. Hence, the State, represented by the Solicitor
General, is not the real party in interest.
We could have, at this point, already written finis to
this decision. Nonetheless, for the peace of mind of those
concerned, we have opted to address the second issue
raised in the petition: whether the appellate court erred
in declaring as valid for having been acquired for value
and in good faith the title over the portion of Lot No.
1342, covered by TCT No. 196579 in the name of the
respondent spouses Eduardo Dee and Arcelita
Marquez-Dee.
After sleeping for an unreasonably long period of
time lasting for decades, the heirs of Eusebio Perez can
longer defeat the better right arising from the Torrens
titles in the names of the present transferees of the
properties, unless and until anyone succeeds in
overcoming the presumption of good faith in securing
their respective titles.
For one, even granting as true the petitioner’s
allegation of a prior cadastral case—LRC Case No. 430,
LRC Rec. No. 148—involving a portion of the lots
subject of Agunoy’s Free
_______________
10Heirs of Simplicio Santiago v. Heirs of Mariano Santiago, 404
SCRA 193 (2003).
749
VOL. 451, FEBRUARY 17, 2005
Republic vs. Agunoy, Sr.
Patent, wherein a decision was allegedly promulgated
on October 24, 1960 in favor of the heirs of Eusebio
Perez, which decision, according to petitioner, was
already final and executory, we are greatly bothered by
the fact that none of the heirs of Eusebio Perez could
show having exerted due diligence towards at least
attempting to accomplish the registration of the
properties involved in the said cadastral case, which
properties, according to petitioner and the Perezes, are
identical to Lot Nos. 1341 and 1342. Verily, were we to
believe the allegations of the heirs of Eusebio Perez in
their own protest with the Bureau of Lands dated July
30, 1975, there is an express order for registration in
11
LRC Case No. 430, as follows:
“WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered affirming the
order of general default heretofore entered and ordering the
registration of Lots Nos. 1 and 2 of Plan Psu-47200, situated
in the Barrio of Marawa, Municipality of Jaen, Nueva Ecija,
containing a total area of 21.9284 hectares in the following
manner:
xxx xxx xxx
From as early as October 24, 1960, when the
aforequoted decision in LRC Case No. 430 was
promulgated, to as late as February 6, 1967, when OCT
No. P-4522 of Gregorio Agunoy, Sr. was issued, or a
slumber lasting for more than six (6) years, the heirs of
Eusebio Perez had numerous opportunities to cause the
implementation of the said registration order.
Inexplicably, they let this chance passed
by. Vigilantibus, sed non dormientibus, jura
749 subveniunt, the law aids the vigilant, not those who
sleep on their rights. And speaking of rights, one may
12
not sleep on a right while expecting to preserve it in its
pristine purity.
13
_______________
11 Rollo, pp. 56-57.
 Soliva v. Villaba, 417 SCRA 277 (2003).
12
surveyed and approved on January 21, 1966 in the name of
Alonso v. Cebu Country Club, 417 SCRA 115 (2003).
13
Eusebio Perez. It was verified likewise that Lot 1341 is
750
within Barrio Marawa, Jaen, Nueva Ecija.
750 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED As between the February 28, 1966 certification of Jose
Republic vs. Agunoy, Sr. Mendigoria, supra, which led to the issuance of
For another, Jose Mendigoria, Public Lands Inspector Agunoy’s OCT No. P-4522 and numerous derivative
and Investigator of the Bureau of Lands, made the titles descending there-
following remarks in his certification dated February
28, 1966: 14 _______________
10. Remarks: Attached hereto is the certification of the
Exh. “D”; Annex “C”, Petition; Rollo, pp. 51.52.
Clerk of Court and the Register of Deeds, Cabanatuan
14

751
City for ready references in connection with the
speedy issuance of patent in favor of the applicant.
VOL. 451, FEBRUARY 17, 2005 751
It is informed in this connection that the survey Republic vs. Agunoy, Sr.
claimants of these Lots, 1341 for Eusebio Perez and from, and the February 15, 1988 verification survey of
1342 for Valenciano Espiritu could not be located in Geodetic Engineer Melencio Mangahas, cited in the
the locality. The lots were already abandoned by them aforequoted paragraph of petitioner’s complaint, which
so that in the year 1941, the present applicant took led to nothing, suffice it to quote herein what this Court
possession of the land thru his tenants. has said in PEZA vs. Fernandez: 15

Countering the foregoing certification, petitioner
Republic claims that a more recent verification survey
conducted on February 15, 1988 by Geodetic Engineer
Melencio Mangahas, also of the Bureau of Lands,
reveals an anomaly in the issuance of Agunoy, Sr.’s Free
x x x. Indeed, the inevitable consequences of the Torrens
system of land registration must be upheld in order to give
stability to it and provide finality to land disputes,
and in Heirs of Brusas vs. Court of Appeals: 16

Patent No. 314450. Again, we quote from petitioner’s

The real purpose of the Torrens System of land registration
complaint, particularly paragraph 27 (c) thereof, to wit:
is to quiet title to land and stop forever any question as to its
c) The results of the verification survey conducted by
legality. Once a title is registered the owner may rest secure
Geodetic Engineer Melencio Mangahas of the Bureau of
without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court,
Lands on February 15, 1988 on the premises confirmed the
or sitting on the mirador de su casa, to avoid the possibility
earlier findings of said Office that Lot 1341 Cad. 269 of Sta.
of losing his land. Indeed, titles over lands under the Torrens
Rosa Cadastre, Nueva Ecija, covered by Free Patent No.
system should be given stability for on it greatly depends the
314450 and OCT No. P-4522 in the name of Gregorio Agunoy,
stability of the country’s economy. Interest reipublicae ut sit
Sr., is identical to Lots 1, 3 and a portion of 87,674 square
finis litium.
meters of Lot 4 of the amended Plan Psu-47200 which was
If at all, the discrepancy in the two (2) separate survey
reports of Mendigoria and Mangahas can only be
imputable to either the past or more recent officials of
the Bureau of Lands.
Of course, we are well aware of the rule reiterated
in Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Santos, that, 17
generally, the State cannot be put in estoppel by the
mistakes or errors of its officials or agents. In that very
case, however, citing 31 CJS 675-676, we went further
by saying—
“x x x. Nevertheless, the government must not be allowed to
deal dishonorably or capriciously with its citizens, and must
not play an ignoble part or do a shabby thing; and subject to
limitations x x x, the doctrine of equitable estoppel may be
invoked against public authorities as well as against private
individuals”
_______________
15 358 SCRA 489, 500 (2001).
313 SCRA 176, 183 (1999).
16
17 301 SCRA 366 (1999).
752
752 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Agunoy, Sr.
In any event, the verification survey conducted by
Geodetic Engineer Melencio Mangahas on February 15,
1988 came almost twenty-two (22) years after the
February 28, 1966 certification of Jose Mendigoria;
more than twenty-one (21) years after the issuance of
Agunoy, Sr.’s Free Patent No. 314450 on January 18,
1967 and its registration as Original Certificate of Title
No. P-4522 on February 6, 1967; and more than eight
(8) years reckoned from July 31, 1979 when, upon the
death of the wife of Gregorio Agunoy, Sr., the heirs
executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with Sale in
favor of Joaquin Sangabol. In the meanwhile, for about
half a decade thereafter, ownership over the properties
transferred from one buyer to another, with each and
every transferee enjoying the presumption of good faith.
If only on this score alone that the present petition must
fall.
There can be no debate at all on petitioner’s
submission that no amount of legal technicality may
serve as a solid foundation for the enjoyment of the
fruits of fraud. It is thus understandable why petitioner
chants the dogma of fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant.
Significantly, however, in the cases cited by
petitioner Republic, as well as in those other
18
cases where the doctrine of fraus et jus nunquam
19
cohabitant was applied against a patent and title
procured thru fraud or misrepresentation, we note that
the land covered thereby is either a part of the forest
zone which is definitely non-disposable, as in Animas,
or that said patent and title are still in the name of the
person who committed the fraud or misrepresentation,
as in Acot, Animas, Republic vs. CA and Del
Mundo and Director of Lands vs. Abanilla, et al. and, in
either instance, there were yet no innocent third parties
standing in the way.
_______________
18 Acot, et al. v. Kempis, et al., supra, note 1; Republic v. Animas, 56
SCRA 499 (1974).
19 Republic v. Court of Appeals and Del Mundo, supra, note,
1; Director of Lands v. Abanilla, et al., supra, note 1.
753
 VOL. 451, FEBRUARY 17, 2005
Republic vs. Agunoy, Sr.
Here, it bears stressing that, by petitioner’s own judicial
admission, the lots in dispute are no longer part of the
public domain, and there are numerous third, fourth,
fifth and more parties holding Torrens titles in their
favor and enjoying the presumption of good faith. This
brings to mind what we have reechoed in Pino vs. Court
of Appeals and the cases therein cited:
20 21
[E]ven on the supposition that the sale was void, the general
rule that the direct result of a previous illegal contract
cannot be valid (on the theory that the spring cannot rise
higher than its source) cannot apply here for We are
confronted with the functionings of the Torrens System of
Registration. The doctrine to follow is simple enough: a
fraudulent or forged document of sale may become the ROOT
of a valid title if the certificate of title has already been
transferred from the name of the true owner to the name of
the forger or the name indicated by the forger.
It is even worse in this case because here, there is no
forger to speak of. The remark of Land Inspector Jose
Mendigoria about the abandonment by Eusebio Perez
and Valenciano Espiritu cannot, by itself, be
fraudulent. And, for all we know, that remark may even
turn out to be the truth. What petitioner perceives as
fraud may be nothing more than the differences of
professional opinions between Land Inspector Jose
Mendigoria and Geodetic Engineer Melencio
Mangahas. But regardless of who between the two is
correct, the hard reality is that the properties in
question are no longer floating objects on a spring that
cannot rise higher than its source, as they are now very
753 much ashore and firmly standing on the high solid
ground of the Torrens system of land registration.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED and this petition
DENIED.
_______________
20198 SCRA 434, 445 (1991).
21Duran v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 138 SCRA 489, 494
(1985) reiterated in Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, 187
SCRA 735, 741 (1990).
754
754 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Dela Cruz vs. Sison
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban (Chairman), Sandoval-
Gutierrez, Corona and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
Petition denied, assailed decision affirmed.
Notes.—Laches is based upon grounds of public
policy which requires, for the peace of society, the
discouragement of stale claims, and is principally a
question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a
right or claim to be enforced or asserted. (Jison vs.
Court of Appeals, 286 SCRA 495[1998])
Laches is the negligence or omission to assert a right
within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption
that the party entitled to assert it has abandoned it or
declined to assert it—it does not involve mere lapse or
passage of time, but is principally an impediment to the
assertion or enforcement of a right, which has become
under the circumstances inequitable or unfair to
permit. (Lopez vs. Court of Appeals, 398 SCRA
550 [2003])

——o0o——

© Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

 G.R. No. 205065. June 4, 2014.*
VERGEL PAULINO and CIREMIA PAULINO,
petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the
ADMINISTRATOR of the LAND REGISTRATION
AUTHORITY, respondents.
G.R. No. 207533. June 4, 2014.*
SPOUSES DR. VERGEL L. PAULINO & DR.
CIREMIA G. PAULINO, petitioners, vs. REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the
ADMINISTRATOR of the LAND
REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, respondent.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Annulment
of Judgments; Actions; Under Section 2 of Rule 47, the only
grounds for annulment of judgment are extrinsic fraud and
lack of jurisdiction.—Under Section 2 of Rule 47, the only
grounds for annulment of judgment are extrinsic fraud and
lack of jurisdiction. Lack of jurisdiction as a ground for
annulment of judgment refers to either lack of jurisdiction
over the person of the defending party or over the subject
matter of the claim. In case of absence, or lack, of
jurisdiction, a court should not take cognizance of the case.
Same; Same; Same; Void Judgments; A void judgment
is in legal effect no judgment, by which no rights are divested,
from which no right can be obtained, which neither binds nor
bars any one, and under which all acts performed and all
claims flowing out are void.—The rule is that where there is
want of jurisdiction over a subject matter, the judgment is
rendered null and void. A void judgment is in legal effect no
judgment, by which no rights are divested, from which no
right can be obtained, which neither binds nor bars any one,
and under which all acts performed and all claims flowing
out are void. It is not a decision in contemplation of law and,
hence, it can never become executory. It also follows that
such a void judgment cannot constitute a bar to another case
by reason of res judicata.
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
274
Civil Law; Land Registration; Land Titles;
Reconstitution of Titles; Reconstitution can be validly made
only in case of loss of the original certificate.—As early as the
case of Strait Times, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 294 SCRA 714
(1998), the Court has held that when the owner’s duplicate
certificate of title has not been lost, but is, in fact, in the
possession of another person, then the reconstituted
certificate is void, because the court that rendered the
decision had no jurisdiction. Reconstitution can be validly
made only in case of loss of the original certificate. This rule
was reiterated in the cases of Villamayor v. Arante, 687
SCRA 520 (2012), Rexlon Realty Group, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, 379 SCRA 306 (2002), Eastworld Motor Industries
Corporation v. Skunac Corporation, 478 SCRA 420
(2005), Rodriguez v. Lim, 509 SCRA 113 (2006), Villanueva
v. Viloria, 548 SCRA 401 (2008),and Camitan v. Fidelity
Investment Corporation, 551 SCRA 540 (2008). Thus, with
evidence that the original copy of the TCT was not lost during
the conflagration that hit the Quezon City Hall and that the
owner’s duplicate copy of the title was actually in the
possession of another, the RTC decision was null and void for
lack of jurisdiction.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Factors that Must be Present
in Order for Reconstitution to Issue.—The following must be
present for an order for reconstitution to issue: (a) that the
certificate of title had been lost or destroyed; (b) that the
documents presented by petitioner are sufficient and proper
to warrant the reconstitution of the lost or destroyed
certificate of title; (c) that the petitioner is the registered
owner of the property or had an interest therein; (d) that the
certificate of title was in force at the time it was lost and
destroyed; and (e) that the description, area and boundaries
of the property are substantially the same as those contained
in the lost or destroyed certificate of title.
Same; Same; Same; Same; In reconstitution
proceedings, the Court has repeatedly ruled that before
jurisdiction over the case can be validly acquired, it is a
condition sine quo non that the certificate of title has not been
issued to another person.—In reconstitution proceedings, the
Court has repeatedly ruled that before jurisdiction over the
case can be validly acquired, it is a condition sine quo
non that the certificate of title has not been issued to another
person. If a certificate of title has not been lost but is in fact
in the possession of another person, the reconstituted title is
void and the court render-
275
ing the decision has not acquired jurisdiction over the
petition for issuance of new title. The courts simply have no
jurisdiction over petitions by (such) third parties for
reconstitution of allegedly lost or destroyed titles over lands
that are already covered by duly issued subsisting titles in
the names of their duly registered owners. The existence of a
prior title ipso facto nullifies the reconstitution proceedings.
The proper recourse is to assail directly in a proceeding
before the regional trial court the validity of the Torrens title
already issued to the other person.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The reconstitution of a
certificate of title denotes restoration in the original form and
condition of a lost or destroyed instrument attesting the title
of a person to a piece of land.—It must be remembered that
the reconstitution of a certificate of title denotes restoration
in the original form and condition of a lost or destroyed
instrument attesting the title of a person to a piece of land.
The purpose of the reconstitution of title is to have, after
observing the procedures prescribed by law, the title
reproduced in exactly the same way it has been when the loss
or destruction occurred. Reconstitution apparently
presupposes the existence of an original certificate of title
which was lost or destroyed. If there was no loss or
destruction like in the case at bench, there is actually
nothing to reconstitute. The same rule applies if in fact there
is an earlier valid certificate of title in the name and in the
possession of another person and said title is existing.
Accordingly, the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over the
same, and its judgment rendered thereafter is null and void,
which may be attacked anytime.
Same; Same; Same; Collateral Attack; It is a well-settled
rule that a certificate of title, once registered, cannot be
impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged or
diminished except in a direct proceeding permitted by law.—
Spouses Paulino also raised the irregularity in the issuance
of TCT No. RT-558969 (42532), arguing that a reconstitution
would not constitute a collateral attack on a title that was
irregularly and illegally issued in the first place. They
argued that it was an error on the part of the CA to deny
their right to have their title reconstituted based on the fake
title of Antonino. They assert that the rule, that a title issued
under the Torrens System is presumed valid and, hence, is
the best proof of ownership of a piece of land, does not apply MENDOZA, J.:
where the certificate itself is faulty as to its purported origin.
The Court, however, finds the argument of Spouses These consolidated petitions assail 1] the September
24, 2012 Resolution1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) ordering the issuance of a writ of
276 preliminary injunction restraining the execution of the
Paulino specious and misplaced. It is a well-settled rule July 20, 2010 Decision2 of the Regional Trial
that a certificate of title, once registered, cannot be _______________
impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged or
diminished except in a direct proceeding permitted by law. 1 Rollo (G.R. No. 205065), pp. 19-26, penned by Associate Justice
Ramon R. Garcia with Associate Justices Amelia G. Tolentino, and
The validity of the certificate of title can be threshed out only
Danton Q. Bueser, concurring.
in a direct proceeding filed for the purpose. A Torrens title 2 Id., at pp. 60-62. Penned by Presiding Judge Ralph S. Lee.
cannot be attacked collaterally.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Actions; A Torrens title can
be attacked only for fraud, within one year after the date of
the issuance of the decree of registration. Such attack must be 277Court, Branch 83, Quezon City, (RTC), Judge Ralph
direct, and not by a collateral proceeding.—It is also a well- Lee presiding, which ordered the reconstitution of a
known doctrine that the issue as to whether the title was supposedly lost title; and 2] its March 5, 2013
procured by falsification or fraud as advanced by Spouses
Decision3 annulling the said RTC decision.
Paulino can only be raised in an action expressly instituted
Specifically, G.R. No. 205065 is a petition
for the purpose. A Torrens title can be attacked only for
fraud, within one year after the date of the issuance of the for certiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
decree of registration. Such attack must be direct, and not by seeking to annul the September 24, 2012 and December
a collateral proceeding. The title represented by the 20, 2012 Resolutions issued by the respondent CA,
certificate cannot be changed, altered, modified, enlarged, or granting the public respondent’s prayer for the issuance
diminished in a collateral proceeding. of a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the RTC
from enforcing and implementing its July 20, 2010
PETITIONS for review on certiorari of the decision and
decision, which ordered the Land Registration
resolutions of the Court of Appeals.
Authority (LRA) to reconstitute the petitioners’
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
certificate of title, Transfer of Certificate
Romeo S. Gonzales for petitioners.
Title (TCT) No. 301617 of the Registry of Deeds of
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.
Quezon City (QCRD).
 On the other hand, G.R. No. 207533 is a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court seeking to reverse and set aside the March 5,
2013 Decision and June 6, 2013 Resolution of the CA,
which granted the petition for annulment and setting
aside of the July 20, 2010 RTC Decision, which ordered
the LRA to reconstitute petitioners’ certificate of title.
The Facts
On December 14, 2007, the late Celso Fernandez
purchased, in a public auction conducted by the Quezon
City government, a real property owned and registered
in the name of Lolita G. Javier (Javier), married to
Pedro Javier, as evidenced by a certificate of sale of
delinquent property. The subject property appeared to
be covered by an owner’s duplicate of TCT No. 301617
of the QCRD.
After his death, the surviving heirs of Celso
Fernandez executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement of
Estate with Absolute Sale covering the subject
property, selling it in favor of
_______________
3 Rollo (G.R. No. 207533), pp. 7-17.
278the petitioners, spouses Vergel L. Paulino and
Ciremia Paulino (Spouses Paulino), for a consideration
of P1,805,000.00.
On June 11, 1988, a fire broke out in the Quezon City
Hall which burned a portion thereof which included the
office of the QCRD.
Consequently, on March 9, 2010, Spouses Paulino
filed a petition for reconstitution of the original copy of
TCT No. 301617 with the RTC, alleging that its original
copy was among those titles that were razed during the
fire. Upon receipt, the RTC directed the publication and
posting of the scheduled hearing of case. After the
jurisdictional facts were established, a hearing officer
was designated to receive the evidence ex parte.
On June 20, 2010, the RTC directed the LRA to
submit a report within five (5) days from
notice. Without awaiting the LRA Report, the RTC
rendered the assailed July 20, 2010 Decision, granting
the petition for reconstitution and ordering the
Registrar of Deeds of the QCRD to reconstitute the
original copy of TCT No. 301617. The dispositive portion
of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Register of Deeds for Quezon City is
hereby directed to reconstitute in the files of his office the
original copy of Transfer Certificate Title No. 301617 in
exactly the same terms and conditions on the basis of
Owner’s Duplicate Certificate of said Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 301617 and other available supporting documents
submitted to your office and once accomplished, the said
Register of Deeds is further ordered to issue new owner’s
duplicate copy of the said Certificate of Title after payment
of the prescribed fees.
SO ORDERED.4
_______________
4 Rollo (G.R. No. 205065), p. 62.

279
On August 16, 2010, the RTC issued the Certificate
of Finality,5 there being no motion for reconsideration
or appeal filed by any of the interested parties.
Meanwhile, on August 17, 2010, the RTC received
the LRA Report,6 stating that TCT No.
301617 was registered in the name of a certain
Emma B. Florendo (Florendo) and that it
was previously the subject of an application for
administrative reconstitution. It was
also discovered that the original copy of the title
on file in the Registry of Deeds was among
those saved titles from the fire that gutted the office
of QCRD on June 11, 1988. In addition, when the
technical description of the subject property was
plotted, it was identical with Lot 939, Piedad Estate
covered by TCT No. RT-55869 (42532), in the name of
Magnolia W. Antonino (Antonino).
On December 3, 2010, Spouses Paulino filed with the
QCRD an application for registration of the judicial
reconstitution of TCT No. 301617 based on the RTC
decision. The Registrar of Deeds, Atty. Elbert T.
Quilala (Atty. Quilala), and other officials of the QCRD
refused to reconstitute the original copy of the TCT.
Hence, Spouses Paulino filed a petition for indirect
contempt. Subsequently, the RTC found Atty. Quilala
guilty of indirect contempt in its Decision,7 dated
December 2, 2011.
On July 13, 2012, respondent Republic of the
Philippines, represented by the Administrator of the
LRA, filed its Petition for Annulment of Judgment with
Urgent Prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction8 assailing
1] the July 20, 2010 RTC decision granting the petition
for reconstitution of the original title; and 2] the
December 2, 2011 RTC decision, finding the offi-
_______________
5 Id., at p. 32.
6 Id., at pp. 80-81.
7 Rollo (G.R. No. 207533), pp. 115-128.
8 Rollo (G.R. No. 205065), pp. 42-59.
280cials of the QCRD guilty of indirect contempt for
failing to reconstitute TCT No. 301617.
On September 24, 2012, the CA issued the assailed
resolution, granting the prayer for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction. The decretal portion reads:
WHEREFORE, let a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction ISSUE enjoining public respondent Regional
Trial Court, Branch 83, Quezon City, or any person acting
under its authority, from enforcing and implementing the
Decisions dated July 20, 2010 and December 2, 2011. The
filing of a bond is not required pursuant to Section 22, Rule
141 of the Rules of Court.
SO ORDERED.9
Taking into account that the case was still in its
completion stage and it appearing that the immediate
execution and satisfaction of the assailed Decisions,
dated July 20, 2010 and December 2, 2011, would
probably result in manifest injustice and irreparable
injury against petitioner Republic of the Philippines
(now respondent LRA), the CA found merit in its prayer
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. It
explained that it was in the best interest of all the
parties to maintain the status quo until it had resolved
the merits of the issues raised in the petition, adding
that to deny the prayer would render ineffective any
judgment that may be rendered in the case.10
Spouses Paulino filed a motion for reconsideration of
the said resolution, but it was denied in the assailed
December 20, 2012 Resolution.
On January 17, 2013, Spouses Paulino filed the
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65,
docketed as G.R. No. 205065, seeking to annul the CA
resolutions, which granted
_______________
9 Id., at pp. 20-21.
10 Id., at p. 20.
281the preliminary injunction, citing the commission of
a grave abuse of discretion.
On March 5, 2013, the CA promulgated its decision
on the merits of the petition for annulment of judgment,
granting LRA’s petition, thereby annulling and setting
aside the RTC decisions, dated July 20, 2010 and
December 2, 2011. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
Petition for Annulment of Judgment is hereby GRANTED.
The assailed Decisions dated July 20, 2010 and December 2,
2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 83, Quezon City
are ANNULLEDand SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Petition
for Reconstitution of Original Copy of TCT No. 301617 and
the Petition for Indirect Contempt filed by private
respondent spouses Vergel Paulino and Ciremia G. Paulino
are DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.11
The CA ruled that the RTC lacked jurisdiction to
order the reconstitution of the original copy of TCT No.
301617, there being no lost or destroyed title. In fact, on
the basis of the LRA Report and other evidence on
record, the subject lot specified on TCT No. 301617 had
the same technical description and was identical to Lot
939, Piedad Estate covered by TCT No. RT-55869
(45532) in the name of Antonino, which title was
already cancelled by TCT Nos. 296725 to 296728 in the
name of Magnolia Antonino. Morever, TCT No. 301617
existed but it was registered in the name of a different
owner, Florendo, and pertained to a different real
property located in Quirino District, Quezon City,
registered in the year 1907. The records further reveal
that TCT No. 301617 was previously the subject of
another petition for reconstitution filed by
_______________
11 Rollo (G.R. No. 207533), p. 17.
282one Lolita Javier which was also dismissed by the
RTC, Branch 77, Quezon City.12
Spouses Paulino filed a motion for reconsideration,
but it was denied by the CA in its June 6, 2013
Resolution. Consequently, they filed a petition for
review on certiorariwith this Court under Rule 45,
docketed as G.R. No. 207533.
Eventually, the Court issued a resolution ordering
the consolidation of G.R. No. 207533 with G.R. No.
205065, as both cases essentially involve the same set
of facts, parties and issues.
Issues and Arguments
G.R. No. 205065
1. Whether the Court of Appeals committed an
error of law and grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.13
G.R. No. 207533
1. Whether the Court of Appeals committed
grave error of law in not dismissing the
petition for annulment of judgment
notwithstanding the fact that the
respondent failed to resort to the ordinary
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for
relief or other appropriate remedies despite
opportunity to do so.
2. Whether the Court of Appeals committed
grave error of law when it disregarded the
rule on evidence in giving credence to the
Report that was lately submitted by the
Land Registration Authority and obviously
executed for the interest
_______________
12 Id., at pp. 14-15.
13 Rollo (G.R. No. 205065), p. 10. [not verbatim]
283
of other persons and to protect a fake and
spurious title.
3. Whether the Court of Appeals committed
grave error of law in ruling that
reconstitution of TCT No. 301617 would
constitute collateral attack on the fake and
spurious TCT No. RT-55869 (42532) in the
name of Magnolia Antonino.
4. Whether the Court of Appeals committed
grave error of law in ruling that TCT No.
301617 in the name of Lolita Javier cannot be
reconstituted because TCT No. 301617
existed in the name of Emma Florendo and
pertained to a different property.
5. The Court of Appeals committed graver
error of law when it annulled the July 20,
2010 Decision of the Regional Trial Court
based on factual issues despite the fact that
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City has
jurisdiction over the reconstitution and that
it was proven that TCT No. 301617 existed
and the same was lost.14
Considering that the annulment case in the CA was
already decided and the petitions were consolidated, the
Court will just treat the cases as one case as they
essentially involve the same issues.
From the foregoing, it appears that the ruling of the
Court hinges on the resolution of these two key
issues: first, whether CA properly availed of Rule 47 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure to assail the final RTC
decision; and second, whether the RTC lacked
jurisdiction over the petition for reconstitution.
_______________
14 Rollo (G.R. No. 207533), pp. 31-32. [not verbatim]
284
Procedural Issue: Propriety of
for Annulment of Judgment
Spouses Paulino argue that under Rule 47 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, it is crystal clear that
annulment of judgments may only be availed of when
the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for
relief, or other appropriate remedies are no longer
available through no fault of the petitioner. They insist
on the dismissal of the petition for annulment on the
ground that the LRA is already in estoppel and not
entitled to the relief prayed for because the July 20,
2010 and December 2, 2011 RTC decisions became final
and executory through their fault as they failed to
resort to other remedies despite opportunities to do so.
In support thereof, Spouses Paulino cite Republic vs.
Castro,15 where the Court ruled that annulment of
judgment is never resorted to as a substitute for a
party’s own neglect in not promptly availing of the
ordinary or other appropriate remedies. In Republic vs.
TAFPA, Inc.,16it was held that, whether through
inadvertence or negligence of its deputized counsel or
the OSG itself, the decision had already become final
and executory and could not be annulled. To conclude
otherwise would run counter to the basic principles of
fair play. Besides, there would be no end to litigations if
the parties, who unsuccessfully availed themselves of
any of the appropriate remedies or lost them through
their fault or inadvertence, could have unfavorable
decisions annulled by simply bringing an action for
annulment of judgment.
The Court finds the petitions devoid of merit.
Petition Under Section 2 of Rule 47, the only grounds for
annulment of judgment are extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction. Lack of jurisdiction as a ground for
annulment of judgment refers to either lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the de-
_______________
15 G.R. No. 189724, February 7, 2011, 641 SCRA 584, 588-589.
16 G.R. No. 165333, February 9, 2010, 612 SCRA 76, 90.
285fending party or over the subject matter of the claim.
In case of absence, or lack, of jurisdiction, a court should
not take cognizance of the case.
In these cases, the petition for annulment was based
on lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. The rule
is that where there is want of jurisdiction over a subject
matter, the judgment is rendered null and void. A void
judgment is in legal effect no judgment, by which no
rights are divested, from which no right can be
obtained, which neither binds nor bars any one, and
under which all acts performed and all claims flowing
out are void. It is not a decision in contemplation of law
and, hence, it can never become executory. It also
follows that such a void judgment cannot constitute a
bar to another case by reason of res judicata.17
Accordingly, the Court agrees with the CA that LRA
was not estopped from assailing the July 20, 2011 RTC
Decision because it never attained finality for being null
and void, having been rendered by a court without
jurisdiction over the reconstitution proceedings.
As early as the case of Strait Times, Inc. v. CA,18 the
Court has held that when the owner’s duplicate
certificate of title has not been lost, but is, in fact, in the
possession of another person, then the reconstituted
certificate is void, because the court that rendered
the decision had no jurisdiction. Reconstitution can be
validly made only in case of loss of the original
certificate.19 This rule was reiterated in the cases
of Villamayor v. Arante,20 Rexlon Realty Group, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals,21 Eastworld Motor Industries
Corporation v. Skunac
_______________
17 Hilado v. Chavez, 482 Phil. 104, 133; 438 SCRA 623, 649 (2004).
18 356 Phil. 217, 227-228; 294 SCRA 714, 717 (1998).
19 Feliciano v. Zaldivar, 534 Phil. 280, 293-294; 503 SCRA 182,
192 (2006).
20 G.R. No. 177042, December 10, 2012, 687 SCRA 520.
21 429 Phil. 31, 44; 379 SCRA 306, 318 (2002).
286Corporation,22Rodriguez v. Lim,23 Villanueva v.
Viloria,24and Camitan v. Fidelity Investment
Corporation. Thus, with evidence that the original
25
copy of the TCT was not lost during the conflagration
that hit the Quezon City Hall and that the owner’s
duplicate copy of the title was actually in the possession
of another, the RTC decision was null and void for lack
of jurisdiction.
For the aforecited reason, the Court agrees that the
public respondent correctly availed of the remedy of
petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47
without need of exhausting other ordinary remedies of
new trial, appeal, petition for relief, or other
appropriate remedies because the RTC judgment was
null and void.
Indeed, where a petition for annulment of a
judgment or a final order of the RTC filed under Rule
47 of the Rules of Court is grounded on lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the respondent or over
the nature or subject of the action, the petitioner need
not allege in the petition that the ordinary remedy of
new trial or reconsideration of the final order or
judgment or appeal therefrom is no longer available
through no fault of his own, precisely because the
judgment rendered or the final order issued by the RTC
without jurisdiction is null and void and may be
assailed any time either collaterally or in a direct action
or by resisting such judgment or final order in any
action or proceeding whenever it is invoked, unless
barred by laches.26
_______________
22 514 Phil. 605, 612-613; 478 SCRA 420, 426-427 (2005).
23 538 Phil. 609, 629-630; 509 SCRA 113, 134 (2006).
24 572 Phil. 183, 189; 548 SCRA 401, 407 (2008).
25 574 Phil. 672, 685; 551 SCRA 540, 553 (2008).
 26 Ancheta v. Ancheta, 468 Phil. 900, 911; 424 SCRA 725, 735
(2004).
287Substantive Issue: Jurisdiction of RTC
in the Reconstitution Proceedings
The governing law for judicial reconstitution of title
is R.A. No. 26. Sec. 15 thereof provides when an order
for reconstitution should issue, as follows:
Section 15. If the court, after hearing, finds that the
documents presented, as supported by parole evidence or
otherwise, are sufficient and proper to warrant the
reconstitution of the lost or destroyed certificate of title,
and that petitioner is the registered owner of the
property or has an interest therein, that the said
certificate of title was in force at the time it was lost
or destroyed, and that the description, area and
boundaries of the property are substantially the same
as those contained in the lost or destroyed certificate
of title, an order of reconstitution shall be issued. The clerk
of court shall forward to the register of deeds a certified copy
of said order and all the documents which, pursuant to said
order, are to be sued as the basis of the reconstitution. If the
court finds that there is no sufficient evidence or basis to
justify the reconstitution, the petition shall be dismissed, but
such dismissal shall not preclude the right of the party or
parties entitled thereto to file an application for confirmation
of his or their title under the provisions of the Land
Registration Act. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
From the foregoing, the following must be present for
an order for reconstitution to issue: (a) that the
certificate of title had been lost or destroyed; (b) that the
documents presented by petitioner are sufficient and
proper to warrant the reconstitution of the lost or
destroyed certificate of title; (c) that the petitioner is the
registered owner of the property or had an interest
therein; (d) that the certificate of title was in force at
the time it was lost and destroyed; and (e) that the
description, area and boundaries of the property are
substantially
288the same as those contained in the lost or destroyed
certificate of title.27
In reconstitution proceedings, the Court has
repeatedly ruled that before jurisdiction over the case
can be validly acquired, it is a condition sine quo
non that the certificate of title has not been issued to
another person. If a certificate of title has not been lost
but is in fact in the possession of another person, the
reconstituted title is void and the court rendering the
decision has not acquired jurisdiction over the petition
for issuance of new title. The courts simply have no
jurisdiction over petitions by (such) third parties for
reconstitution of allegedly lost or destroyed titles over
lands that are already covered by duly issued subsisting
titles in the names of their duly registered owners. The
existence of a prior title ipso factonullifies the
reconstitution proceedings. The proper recourse is to
assail directly in a proceeding before the regional trial
court the validity of the Torrens title already issued to
the other person.28
 In the case at bench, the CA found that the RTC
lacked jurisdiction to order the reconstitution of the
original copy of TCT No. 301617, there being no lost or
destroyed title over the subject real property, the
respondent having duly proved that TCT No. 301617
was in the name of a different owner, Florendo, and the
technical description appearing on that TCT No. 301617
was similar to the technical description appearing in
Lot 939, Piedad Estate covered by TCT No. RT-55869
(42532) in the name of Antonino. In fact, TCT No. RT-
55869 (42532) was already cancelled by TCT Nos.
296725 to 296728 also in the name of Antonino.
Pertinent portions of the LRA Report, which the RTC
did not wait for, read:
_______________
27 Republic v. Tuastumban, 604 Phil. 491, 504; 586 SCRA 600,
613-614 (2009).
28 Alabang Development Corporation v. Valenzuela, 201 Phil. 727,
744; 116 SCRA 261, 278 (1982).
289
xxx
2.1 When the technical description of Lot No. 804-New-B,
Psd-2341, appearing on the reproduction of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 301617, was plotted on the Municipal
Index Map No. 5708, it appears that the aforesaid lot is
identical to Lot 939, Piedad Estate covered by TCT No. RT-
55869 (42532) in the name of Magnolia W. Antonino, which
title is already totally cancelled and issuing in lieu thereof
TCT Nos. 296725 to 296728 inclusive all in the name of
Magnolia Antonino, covering Lots 939-A to 939-D of
subdivision plan Psd-00-065898.
xxx
2.3. TCT No. 301617 was previously the subject of a
petition for judicial reconstitution under LRC Case No. Q-
3796 (90) in Regional Trial Court, Branch 77, wherein this
Authority rendered a Report dated August 20, 1991. The said
petition was dismissed on September 23, 1997 by then
Presiding Judge Normandie B. Pizarro, on the grounds that
the submitted basis for reconstitution are fabricated and that
an earlier title was issued covering the same property.
2.4 The real TCT No. 301617 covers Lot 17, Blk. 83 of the
subdivision plan Psd-57970, containing an area of 182.80
square meters, in the name of Emma B. Florendo. The same
was applied for administrative reconstitution but it was
found that the original copy of title on file in the Registry of
Deeds, is among the saved titles from the fire that gutted the
registry on June 11, 1988, reproduction of which is hereto
attached.
The Court, thus, finds no reversible error in the
findings of the CA. It is clear from the records that the
subject TCT No. 301617 is in the name of a different
owner, Florendo, and the technical description
appearing therein pertains to a parcel of land covered
by TCT No. RT-55869 (42532) in the name of one
Antonino.
It must be remembered that the reconstitution of a
certificate of title denotes restoration in the original
form and con-
290dition of a lost or destroyed instrument attesting the
title of a person to a piece of land. The purpose of the
reconstitution of title is to have, after observing the
procedures prescribed by law, the title reproduced in
exactly the same way it has been when the loss or
destruction occurred.29 Reconstitution apparently
presupposes the existence of an original certificate of
title which was lost or destroyed. If there was no loss or
destruction like in the case at bench, there is actually
nothing to reconstitute. The same rule applies if in fact
there is an earlier valid certificate of title in the name
and in the possession of another person and said title is
existing. Accordingly, the RTC never acquired
jurisdiction over the same, and its judgment rendered
thereafter is null and void, which may be attacked
anytime.
With respect to the contention of Spouses Paulino
that the LRA Report is inadmissible because it was not
presented and identified in open court and admitted in
evidence, suffice it is to say that they are estopped from
questioning it. The admissibility of the LRA report was
not challenged during the proceedings of the petition for
annulment in the CA. Its admissibility was only
questioned in these petitions. They are deemed to have
waived their right to question its genuineness and
authenticity.
Further, records show that the CA gave credence to
the LRA Report, which was submitted in compliance to
its resolution, dated July 26, 2012. The LRA Report is a
certified photocopy from the records duly signed by the
Branch Clerk of Court. Accordingly, the LRA report is
deemed to form part of the records which may be used
in resolving the present controversy. It need not be
emphasized that the RTC hastily acted on the petition
for reconstitution because it did not wait for the LRA
Report. If there was no haste, the LRA Report would
have shown that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the
case because there was already an existing title.
_______________
29 Supra note 27.
291
In addition, Spouses Paulino also raised the
irregularity in the issuance of TCT No. RT-558969
(42532), arguing that a reconstitution would not
constitute a collateral attack on a title that was
irregularly and illegally issued in the first place. They
argued that it was an error on the part of the CA to deny
their right to have their title reconstituted based on the
fake title of Antonino. They assert that the rule, that a
title issued under the Torrens System is presumed valid
and, hence, is the best proof of ownership of a piece of
land, does not apply where the certificate itself is faulty
as to its purported origin.
The Court, however, finds the argument of Spouses
Paulino specious and misplaced. It is a well-settled rule
that a certificate of title, once registered, cannot be
impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged or
diminished except in a direct proceeding permitted by
law.30 The validity of the certificate of title can be
threshed out only in a direct proceeding filed for the
purpose. A Torrens title cannot be attacked collaterally.
It is also a well-known doctrine that the issue as to
whether the title was procured by falsification or fraud
as advanced by Spouses Paulino can only be raised in
an action expressly instituted for the purpose. A
Torrens title can be attacked only for fraud, within one
year after the date of the issuance of the decree of
registration. Such attack must be direct, and not by a
collateral proceeding. The title represented by the
certificate cannot be changed, altered, modified,
enlarged, or diminished in a collateral proceeding.31
Indeed, the reconstitution proceeding constituted a
collateral attack on the Torrens title of Antonino. The
proper recourse of the Spouses Paulino to contest the
validity of the certificate of title is not through the
subject petition for recon-
_______________
30 De Pedro v. Romasan Development Corporation, 492 Phil. 643,
653; 452 SCRA 564, 575 (2005).
31 Lagrosa v. Court of Appeals, 371 Phil. 225, 238; 312 SCRA 298,
311 (1999).
292stitution,but in a proper proceeding instituted for
such purpose. Even if their arguments of fraud
surrounding the issuance of the title of Antonino is
correct, such allegation must be raised in a proper
proceeding which is expressly instituted for that
purpose.
Needless to state, the CA did not commit any grave
abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary
injunction questioned in G.R. No. 205065.
WHEREFORE, the petitions in both cases
are DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., Peralta, Villarama, Jr.** and Leonen,
JJ., concur.
Petitions denied.
Notes.—The remedy of petition for annulment of
judgment, final order or resolution under Rule 47 of the
Rules of Court is an extraordinary one inasmuch as it is
available only where the ordinary remedies of new trial,
appeal, petition for relief or other remedies can no
longer be availed of through no fault of the petitioner.
(Mandy Commodities Co., Inc. vs. International
Commercial Bank of China, 591 SCRA 579 [2009])
A party aggrieved by the decision of the Court of
Appeals in a petition filed with it for annulment of
judgment, final order or resolution is not a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65, but rather an ordinary
appeal under Rule 45 where only questions of law may
be raised. (Id.)
——o0o——
_______________
** Designated acting member in view of the vacancy in the Third
Division, per Special Order No. 1691 dated May 22, 2014.
© Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
reserved.
 G.R. No. 173289. February 17, 2010.*
ELAND PHILIPPINES, INC.,
petitioner, vs. AZUCENA GARCIA, ELINO FAJARDO,
and HEIR OF TIBURCIO MALABANAN named
TERESA MALABANAN, respondents.
Due Process; Due process, a constitutional precept, does
not always and in all situations a trial-type proceeding—its
essence is found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and
submit one’s evidence in support of his defense.—Petitioner
contended that the ten-day notice rule was violated, because
the copy of the motion for summary judgment was served
only on August 20, 1999 or on the same day it was set for
hearing. It also added that even if the petitioner received a
copy of the motion only on August 20, 1999, there was no
hearing conducted on that date because the trial court issued
an order giving petitioner 10 days within which to file its
comment or opposition. The above specific contention,
however, is misguided. The CA was correct in its observation
that there was substantial compliance with due process. The
CA ruled, as the records show, that the ten-day notice rule
was substantially complied with because when the
respondents filed the motion for summary judgment on
August 9, 1999, they furnished petitioner with a copy thereof
on the same day as shown in the registry receipt and that the
motion was set for hearing on August 20, 1999, or 10 days
from the date of the filing thereof. Due process, a
constitutional precept, does not, therefore, always and in all
situations a trial-type proceeding. The essence of due process
is found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and
submit one’s evidence in support of his defense. What the law
prohibits is not merely the absence of previous notice, but the
absence thereof and the lack of opportunity to be heard.
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
67
Summary Judgments; Any action can be the subject of a
summary judgment with the sole exception of actions for
annulment of marriage or declaration of its nullity or for
legal separation.—Petitioner further argues that summary
judgment is not proper in an action for quieting of title. This
particular argument, however, is misplaced. This Court has
already ruled that any action can be the subject of a
summary judgment with the sole exception of actions for
annulment of marriage or declaration of its nullity or for
legal separation.
Same; The non-existence of a genuine issue is the
determining factor in granting a motion for summary
judgment, and the movant has the burden of proving such
nonexistence.—Proceeding to the main issue, this Court finds
that the grant of summary judgment was not proper. A
summary judgment is permitted only if there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and a moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment is
proper if, while the pleadings on their face appear to raise
issues, the affidavits, depositions, and admissions presented
by the moving party show that such issues are not genuine.
It must be remembered that the non-existence of a
genuine issue is the determining factor in granting a
motion for summary judgment, and the movant has the
burden of proving such nonexistence. The trial court found
no genuine issue as to any material fact that would
necessitate conducting a full-blown trial. However, a careful
study of the case shows otherwise.
Same; Words and Phrases; When the facts as pleaded by
the parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for
summary judgment cannot take the place of trial; A “genuine
issue” is an issue of fact that requires the presentation of
evidence as distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived
or false claim.—The facts pleaded by the respondents in their
motion for summary judgment have been duly disputed and
contested by petitioner, raising genuine issues that must be
resolved only after a full-blown trial. When the facts as
pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested, proceedings
for summary judgment cannot take the place of trial. In the
present case, the petitioner was able to point out the genuine
issues. A “genuine issue” is an issue of fact that requires the
presentation of evidence as distinguished from a sham,
fictitious, contrived or false claim.
68
Same; The fact that the one party seeks to nullify the
original certificate of title issued to the other party on the
claim that the former was in possession of the same land for
a number of years, is a clear indicium that a genuine issue of
a material fact exists.—By granting the summary judgment,
the trial court has in effect annulled its former ruling based
on a claim of possession and ownership of the same land for
more than thirty years without the benefit of a full-blown
trial. The fact that the respondents seek to nullify the
original certificate of title issued to the petitioner on the
claim that the former were in possession of the same land for
a number of years, is already a clear indicium that a genuine
issue of a material fact exists. This, together with the failure
of the respondents to show that there were no genuine issues
involved, should have been enough for the trial court to give
the motion for summary judgment, filed by respondents,
scant consideration. Trial courts have limited authority to
render summary judgments and may do so only when there
is clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact.
Same; Quieting of Title; Quieting of title is a common
law remedy for the removal of any cloud upon or doubt or
uncertainty with respect to title to real property—originating
in equity jurisprudence, its purpose is to secure an
adjudication that a claim of title to or an interest in property,
adverse to that of the complainant, is invalid, so that the
complainant and those claiming under him may be forever
afterward free from any danger of hostile claim.—This Court
deems it necessary to delve briefly on the nature of the action
of quieting of title as applied in this case. This Court’s ruling
in Calacala, et al. v. Republic, et al., 464 SCRA 438 (2005) is
instructive on this matter, thus: To begin with, it bears
emphasis that an action for quieting of title is essentially a
common law remedy grounded on equity. As we held
in Baricuatro, Jr. vs. CA, 325 SCRA 137 (2000): Regarding
the nature of the action filed before the trial court, quieting
of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud
upon or doubt or uncertainty with respect to title to real
property. Originating in equity jurisprudence, its purpose is
to secure ‘x x x an adjudication that a claim of title to or an
interest in property, adverse to that of the complainant, is
invalid, so that the complainant and those claiming under
him may be forever afterward free from any danger of hostile
claim.’ In an action for quieting of title, the competent court
is tasked to determine the respective rights of the
complainant and other claimants, ‘x x x not only to place
things in their proper place,
69
to make the one who has no rights to said immovable
respect and not disturb the other, but also for the benefit of
both, so that he who has the right would see every cloud of
doubt over the property dissipated, and he could afterwards
without fear introduce the improvements he may desire, to
use, and even to abuse the property as he deems best xxx.
Verily, for an action to quiet title to prosper, two (2)
indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (1) the
plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable
title to or interest in the real property subject of the
action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or
proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title
must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative
despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal
efficacy.
Land Registration; Courts may reopen proceedings
already closed by final decision or decree when an application
for review is filed by the party aggrieved within one year from
the issuance of the decree of registration.—Courts may reopen
proceedings already closed by final decision or decree when
an application for review is filed by the party aggrieved
within one year from the issuance of the decree of
registration. However, the basis of the aggrieved party must
be anchored solely on actual fraud. Shedding light on the
matter is a discussion presented in one of the recognized
textbooks on property registration, citing decisions of this
Court, thus: The right of a person deprived of land or of any
estate or interest therein by adjudication or confirmation of
title obtained by actual fraud is recognized by law as a valid
and legal basis for reopening and revising a decree of
registration. One of the remedies available to him is a
petition for review. To avail of a petition for review, the
following requisites must be satisfied: (a) The petitioner
must have an estate or interest in the land; (b) He must show
actual fraud in the procurement of the decree of registration;
(c) The petition must be filed within one year from the
issuance of the decree by the Land Registration Authority;
and (d) The property has not yet passed to an innocent
purchaser for value. A mere claim of ownership is not
sufficient to avoid a certificate of title obtained under the
Torrens system. An important feature of a certificate of
title is its finality. The proceedings whereby such a title is
obtained are directed against all persons, known or
unknown, whether actually served with notice or not, and
includes all who have an interest in the land. If they do not
appear and oppose the registration of their own estate or
interest in the property in the name of another, judgment is
rendered against
70
them by default, and, in the absence of fraud, such
judgment is conclusive. If an interest in the land will not by
itself operate to vacate a decree of registration, a fortiori,
fraud is not alone sufficient to do so.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Ocampo & Ocampo for petitioner.
 Leachon, Leachon and Perez Law Firm and Angeles &
Associates for respondents.
PERALTA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, seeking to reverse and set aside the
decision1 dated February 28, 2006 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 67417, which dismissed the appeal
of petitioner Eland Philippines, Inc. and affirmed the
Resolutions dated November 3, 1999 and June 28, 2006 of
Branch 18, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tagaytay City.
The facts of the case, as shown in the records, are the
following:
Respondents Azucena Garcia, Elino Fajardo, and Teresa
Malabanan, the heir of Tiburcio Malabanan, filed a
Complaint2 dated March 2, 1998 for Quieting of Title with
Writ of Preliminary Injunction with the RTC, Branch XVIII,
Tagaytay City against petitioner Eland Philippines, Inc.
Respondents claimed that they are the owners, in fee simple
title, of a parcel of land identified as Lot 9250 Cad-355,
Tagaytay Cadastre, Plan Ap-04-008367, situated
in Barangay Iruhin, Tagaytay City, containing an area of
Two Hundred Forty-Four Thou-
_______________
1 Penned by Associate Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid, with
Associate Justices Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and Estela M.
Perlas-Bernabe, concurring; Rollo, pp. 77-92.
2 Records, p. 1.
71
sand One Hundred Twelve (244,112) square meters, by
occupation and possession under the provisions of Sec. 48
(b)3 of the Public Land Law or Commonwealth Act No. 141,
as amended.
For having been in continuous, public, and adverse
possession as owners of the said lot for at least thirty years,
respondents stated that they were not aware of any person
or entity who had a legal or equitable interest or claim on the
same lot until the time they were requesting that the lot be
declared for tax purposes. They found out that the lot was
the subject of a land registration proceeding that had already
been decided by the same court4 where their complaint was
filed. They also found out that Decree No. N-217313, LRC
Record No. N-62686, was already issued on August 20, 1997
to the petitioner pursuant to the Decision dated June 7, 1994
of the same court. They averred that they were not notified
of the said land registration case; thus, they claimed the
presence of misrepresentation amounting to actual or
extrinsic fraud. Thus, they argued that they were also
entitled to a writ of
_______________
3 Sec. 48. The following described-citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such
lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected
or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province
where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the
issuance of a certificate of title thereafter, under the Land Registration
Act, to wit:
 xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty
years immediately preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure.
Those shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this Chapter.
4 Land Registration Case No. TG-423.
72
preliminary injunction in order to restrain or enjoin
petitioner, its privies, agents, representatives, and all other
persons acting on its behalf, to refrain from committing acts
of dispossession on the subject lot.
Summons, together with a copy of the complaint, were
served on the petitioner on April 7, 1998. On April 29, 1998,
petitioner filed an Entry of Appearance with Motion for
Extension of Time,5 which the trial court granted6 for a
period of ten (10) days within which to file a responsive
pleading. Petitioner filed a Second Motion for Extension of
Time to File Answer7 dated April 29, 1998, which the trial
court likewise granted.8
Thereafter, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss9 dated
May 9, 1998, stating that the pleading asserting the claim of
respondents stated no cause of action, and that the latter
were not entitled to the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction, setting the same for hearing on May 21, 1998. On
the date of the hearing, the trial court issued an
Order,10 which granted the respondents ten (10) days from
that day to file a comment, and set the date of the hearing on
July 23, 1998. Respondents filed a Motion to Admit
Comment/Opposition to Defendant Eland,11 together with
the corresponding Comment/Opposition12 dated June 8,
1998.
On the scheduled hearing of September 23, 1998, the trial
court issued an Order,13 considering the Motion to Dismiss
submitted for resolution due to the non-appearance of the
parties and their respective counsels. The said motion was
_______________
5 Supra note 2 at 51.
6 Id., at p. 57.
7 Id., at p. 68.
8 Id., at p. 71.
9 Id., at p. 58.
10 Id., at p. 67.
11 Id., at p. 97.
12 Id., at p. 99.
13 Id., at p. 146.
73
eventually denied by the trial court in an Order14 dated
September 25, 1998, ruling that the allegations in the
complaint established a cause of action and enjoined
petitioner Eland to file its answer to the complaint within
ten (10) days from receipt of the same. Petitioner then filed
two Motions for Extension to File an Answer.15
Petitioner, on November 9, 1998, filed a Motion for
Reconsideration16 of the trial court’s Order dated September
25, 1998, denying the former’s Motion to Dismiss. Again,
petitioner filed a Motion for Final Extension of Time to File
Answer17 dated November 6, 1998. Respondents filed their
Comment/Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration dated
November 24, 1998. Subsequently, the trial court denied
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in an Order18 dated
January 11, 1999.
Meanwhile, respondents filed a Motion to Declare
Defendant Eland in Default19 dated November 17, 1998. On
December 4, 1998 Petitioner Eland filed its Comment (on
Plaintiff’s Motion to Declare Defendant Eland in
Default)20 dated December 2, 1998, while respondents filed a
Reply to Comment (on Plaintiff’s Motion to Declare
Defendant Eland in Default)21 dated December 29, 1998.
Thereafter, the trial court issued an Order22 dated January
11, 1999 declaring the petitioner in default and allowed the
respondents to present evidence ex parte. Petitioner filed a
Motion for Reconsideration
_______________
14 Id., at p. 147.
15 Motion for Extension to File Answer dated October 16, 1998 and
Second Motion for Extension to File Answer dated October 28, 1998.
16 Supra note 2 at 165.
17 Id., at p. 168.
18 Id., at p. 214.
19 Id., at p. 173.
20 Id., at p. 209.
21 Id., at p. 204.
22 Id., at p. 214.
74
(of the Order dated 11 January 1999)23 dated February 5,
1999 on the trial court’s denial of its motion to dismiss and
in declaring it in default. The trial court in an Order24dated
March 18, 1999, denied the former and granted the latter. In
the same Order, the trial court admitted petitioner’s
Answer Ad Cautelam.
Earlier, petitioner filed its Answer Ad Cautelam (With
Compulsory Counterclaim)25 dated November 12, 1998.
Respondents countered by filing a Motion to Expunge
Eland’s Answer from the Records26 dated December 2, 1998.
Petitioner filed its Opposition (to Plaintiff’s Motion to
Expunge Eland’s Answer from the Records)27 dated
December 21, 1998, as well as a Comment (on Plaintiff’s
Motion to Expunge Eland’s Answer from the Records)28dated
January 26, 1999.
Consequently, respondents filed a Motion to Set
Presentation of Evidence Ex Parte29 dated January 18, 1999,
which was granted in an Order30 dated January 22, 1999.
On January 28, 1999, respondents presented their
evidence before the Clerk of Court of the trial court which
ended on February 3, 1999; and, on February 10, 1999,
respondents filed their Formal Offer of Evidence.31However,
petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Suspend Plaintiff’s Ex
Parte Presentation of Evidence32 dated February 8, 1999. In
that regard, the trial court issued an Order33 dated February
11, 1999 directing the Clerk of Court to suspend the
proceedings.
_______________
23 Id., at p. 224.
24 Id., at p. 305.
25 Id., at p. 177.
26 Id., at p. 197.
27 Id., at p. 200.
28 Id., at p. 221.
29 Id., at p. 218.
 30 Id., at p. 220. Opposition43 to the Motion dated August 31, 1999. In its
31 Id., at p. 239. Reso-
32 Id., at p. 235.
33 Id., at p. 248. _______________

34 Id., at p. 376.
75 35 Id., at p. 379.
On May 14, 1999, respondents filed a Motion for 36 Id., at p. 370 for the respondents, p. 394 for petitioner.
37 Id., at p. 398.
Clarification34 as to whether or not the evidence presented ex
38 Id., at p. 486.
parte was nullified by the admission of petitioner’s 39 Id., at p. 491.
Answer Ad Cautelam. Petitioner filed its Comment35 dated 40 Id., at p. 492.
May 13, 1999 on the said motion for clarification. 41 Id., at p. 520.
A pre-trial conference was scheduled on May 27, 1999, 42 Id., at p. 506.
wherein the parties submitted their pre-trial 43 Id., at p. 513.
briefs. However, petitioner filed a Motion to Suspend
36

Proceedings37 dated May 24, 1999 on the ground that the

same petitioner had filed a petition for certiorari with the
CA, asking for the nullification of the Order dated March 18,
1999 of the trial court and for the affirmation of its earlier
Order denying petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss. The petition
for certiorari was subsequently denied; and a copy of the
Resolution38 dated June 14, 1999 was received by the trial
court. Hence, in an Order39 dated July 7, 1999, the trial court
ruled that the reception of evidence already presented by the
respondents before the Clerk of Court remained as part of
the records of the case, and that the petitioner had the right
to cross-examine the witness and to comment on the
documentary exhibits already presented. Consequently,
petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration40 dated July 19,
1999, but it was denied by the trial court in an Omnibus
Order41 dated September 14, 1999.
Eventually, respondents filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment42 dated August 5, 1999, while petitioner filed its
76
lution44 dated November 3, 1999, the trial court found favor
on the respondents. The dispositive portion of the Resolution
reads:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion for
summary judgment is hereby GRANTED and it is hereby
adjudged that:
1. Plaintiffs are the absolute owners and rightful
possessors of Lot 9250, CAD-355, Tagaytay Cadastre, subject
to the rights of occupancy of the farm workers on the one-
third area thereof;
2. The Judgment dated June 7, 1994 in Land
Registration Case No. TG-423 is set aside and the Decree No.
N-217313, LRC Record No. N-62686 dated August 20, 1997
is null and void;
 3. The Original Transfer Certificate of Title is ordered
to be canceled, as well as tax declaration covering Lot 9250,
Cad-355.
5.2 THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED IN A MANNER
SO ORDERED.”
NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND WITH THE
APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE
Petitioner appealed the Resolution of the trial court with
COURT WHEN IT RULED THAT A MOTION FOR
the CA, which dismissed it in a Decision dated February 28,
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS PROPER IN AN ACTION FOR
2006, which reads:
QUIETING OF TITLE.
“WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the appeal is
5.3 THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED IN A MANNER
DISMISSED. The assailed Resolution dated November 3,
NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND WITH THE
1999, of the RTC, Branch 18, Tagaytay City, in Civil Case
APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE
No. TG-1784, is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to cost.
COURT WHEN IT RULED THAT THERE ARE NO
SO ORDERED.”
GENUINE FACTUAL AND TRIABLE ISSUES IN CIVIL
CASE NO. TG-1784.
Hence, the present petition.
5.4 THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED IN A MANNER
The grounds relied upon by the petitioner are the
NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND WITH THE
following:
APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE
5.1 THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED IN A MANNER
COURT WHEN IT UPHELD THE RESOLUTION DATED
NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND WITH THE
NOVEMBER 03, 1999 OF THE COURT A QUO, BASED ON
APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE
TESTIMONIES OF RESPONDENTS’ WITNESSES TAKEN
COURT WHEN IT RULED THAT RESPONDENTS’
WITHOUT GRANTING HEREIN PETITIONER THE
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT DATED AUGUST
RIGHT TO CROSS-EXAMINE AND UPON
05, 1999 DID NOT VIOLATE THE TEN (10)-DAY NOTICE
DOCUMENTARY EXHIBITS PRESENTED BUT NOT
RULE UNDER SECTION 3, RULE 35 OF THE 1997 RULES
ADMITTED AS EVIDENCE.
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
5.5 THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED IN A MANNER
_______________ NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND WITH THE
APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE
44 Id., at p. 522. COURT WHEN IT UPHELD THE RESOLUTION DATED
NOVEMBER 03, 1999 OF THE COURT A QUO BASED ON
FALSIFIED “EVIDENCE.”
77
5.6 THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED IN A MANNER
NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND WITH THE
APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE
COURT WHEN IT FAILED TO RULE THAT THE
COURT A QUO PATENTLY DEPRIVED PETITIONER OF
ITS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS IN RENDERING ITS
SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
5.7 THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED IN A MANNER
NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND WITH THE
APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE
COURT WHEN IT HELD THAT THE COURT A QUO HAS
JURISDICTION TO CANCEL PETITIONER’S ORIGINAL
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE (OCT) NO. 0-660 IN AN ACTION
TO QUIET TITLE.
According to the petitioner, a motion for summary
judgment must be served at least ten (10) days before the
date set for hearing thereof, and that a hearing must be held
to hear
78
the parties on the propriety of a summary judgment, per Sec.
3 of Rule 35 of the Revised Rules of Court, which was not
observed because the petitioner received a copy of the
respondents’ motion for summary judgment only on August
20, 1999, or the very same day that the motion was set for
hearing. Petitioner further claims that the trial court never
conducted any hearing on the motion for summary judgment.
Petitioner also argued that a summary judgment is only
available to a claimant seeking to recover upon a claim,
counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief,
and does not include cases for quieting of title. Furthermore,
petitioner also averred that a summary judgment has no
place in a case where genuine factual and triable issues exist,
like in the present case. It added that the genuine and triable
issues were all raised in its Answer Ad Cautelam.
Another ground relied upon by petitioner is its failure to
cross-examine the witnesses for the respondents without
fault on its part. It also stated that the trial court did not
issue any order admitting in evidence the documentary
exhibits presented by the respondents. Hence, according to
the petitioner, the trial court gravely erred in relying upon
the testimonies of the witnesses for the respondents, without
having the latter cross-examined; and upon the documentary
exhibits presented but not admitted as evidence.
Petitioner further claimed that the trial court based its
Resolution dated November 3, 1999 on falsified evidence.
Lastly, petitioner raised the issue that by rendering
summary judgment, the trial court deprived the former of its
right to due process.
Respondents, in their Comment45 dated October 16,
2006, countered the first issue raised by the petitioner,
stating that their filing of the motion for summary judgment
fourteen (14)
_______________
45 Rollo, p. 469.
79
days before the requested hearing of the same motion was in
compliance with Sec. 3, Rule 35 of the Rules of Court.
As to the second and third issues, respondents argued
that petitioner had a constricted perception of the coverage
of the Rules of Summary Judgment, and that the latter’s
citation of cases decided by this Court showed the diverse
causes of action that could be the subject matters of
summary judgment. Respondents also posited that
petitioner’s statements in its Answer Ad Cautelam, although
denominated as Specific Denial, were really general denials
that did not comply with the provisions of Section 10, Rule 8
of the Rules of Court.
Anent the fourth and fifth issues, respondents claimed
that despite the opportunity, or the right allowed in the
Order dated July 17, 1999 of the trial court, for the petitioner
to cross-examine respondents’ witnesses and to comment on
the documentary evidence presented ex parteafter the
default order against the same petitioner, the latter
evasively moved to set aside respondents’ evidence in order
to suspend further proceedings that were intended to abort
the pre-trial conference. They added that petitioner
neglected to avail itself of, or to comply with, the prescription
of the rules found in Rule 35 of the Rules of Court by opting
not to avail itself of the hearing of its opposition to the
summary judgment after receiving the Order dated August
20, 1999; by failing to serve opposing affidavit, deposition or
admission in the records; and by not objecting to the decretal
portion of the said Order dated August 20, 1999, which
stated that the motion for summary judgment has been
submitted for resolution without further argument. With
regard to the contention of the petitioner that the trial court
wrongly appreciated falsified evidence, respondents asserted
that petitioner’s counsel failed to study carefully the records
of the proceedings for the presentation of the evidence ex
parte to be able to know that it was not only a single-day
proceeding, and that more than one witness had been
presented. They further averred that the trial court did
80
not only rely on the photographs of the houses of the
occupants of the property in question.
Finally, as to the sixth and seventh issues, respondents
asseverated that their complaint alleged joint causes of
action for quieting of title under Art. 476 of the New Civil
Code and for the review of the decree of registration
pursuant to Sec. 32 of the Property Registration Decree or
P.D. No. 1529, because they are complimentary with each
other.
The petition is impressed with merit.
The basic contention that must be resolved by this Court
is the propriety of the summary judgment in this particular
case of quieting of title.
Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
“SEC. 1. Summary judgment for claimant.—A party
seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim
or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time after the
pleading in answer thereto has been served, move with
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor
upon all or any part thereof.
SEC. 3. Motion and proceedings thereon.—The motion
shall be served at least ten (10) days before the time specified
for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the day of hearing
may serve opposing affidavits. After the hearing, the
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleading,
depositions, and admissions on file together with the
affidavits, show that, except as to the amount of damages,
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”46

In the present case, it was the respondents who moved for
a summary judgment.
Petitioner contended that the ten-day notice rule was
violated, because the copy of the motion for summary
judgment was served only on August 20, 1999 or on the same
day it was set for hearing. It also added that even if the
petitioner re-
_______________
46 Now Secs.1 and 3, Rule 35, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
81
ceived a copy of the motion only on August 20, 1999, there
was no hearing conducted on that date because the trial
court issued an order giving petitioner 10 days within which
to file its comment or opposition.
The above specific contention, however, is misguided. The
CA was correct in its observation that there was substantial
compliance with due process. The CA ruled, as the records
show, that the ten-day notice rule was substantially
complied with because when the respondents filed the
motion for summary judgment on August 9, 1999, they
furnished petitioner with a copy thereof on the same day as
shown in the registry receipt and that the motion was set for
hearing on August 20, 1999, or 10 days from the date of the
filing thereof.
Due process, a constitutional precept, does not, therefore,
always and in all situations a trial-type proceeding. The
essence of due process is found in the reasonable opportunity
to be heard and submit one’s evidence in support of his
defense. What the law prohibits is not merely the absence of
previous notice, but the absence thereof and the lack of
opportunity to be heard.47
Petitioner further argues that summary judgment is not
proper in an action for quieting of title. This particular
argument, however, is misplaced. This Court has already
ruled that any action can be the subject of a summary
judgment with the sole exception of actions for annulment of
marriage or declaration of its nullity or for legal separation.48
Proceeding to the main issue, this Court finds that the
grant of summary judgment was not proper. A summary
judgment is permitted only if there is no genuine issue as to
_______________
47 Mutuc v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 48108, September 26, 1990,
190 SCRA 43.
48 See Carlos v. Sandoval, et al., G.R. No. 179922, December 16,
2008, SCRA 574 116, citing Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
152154, November 18, 2003, 416 SCRA 133, citing Family Code, Arts.
48 & 60, and Roque v. Encarnacion, 96 Phil. 643 (1954).
82
any material fact and a moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment is proper
if, while the pleadings on their face appear to raise issues,
the affidavits, depositions, and admissions presented by the
moving party show that such issues are not genuine.49
It must be remembered that the non-existence of a
genuine issue is the determining factor in granting a
motion for summary judgment, and the movant has the
burden of proving such nonexistence. The trial court found
no genuine issue as to any material fact that would
necessitate conducting a full-blown trial. However, a careful
study of the case shows otherwise.
In their motion for summary judgment, the respondents
failed to clearly demonstrate the absence of any genuine
issue of fact. They merely reiterated their averments in the
complaint for quieting of title and opposed some issues raised
by the petitioner in its Answer Ad Cautelam, to wit:
“Nonetheless, going by the records of the admitted and
uncontroverted facts and facts established there is no more
litigious or genuine issue of basic fact to be the subject of
further trial on the merits.
The first defense as to the identity of the subject property,
the issue has already become nil because of not only the lack
of seriousness in the allegations but also because the identity
of the subject parcel of land Lot 9250 was proven by the
approved plan Ap-04-008367 that was already presented and
offered in evidence as Exhibit “B” for the plaintiffs.
The second defense that plaintiffs’ claim of the property
is barred by prior judgment rule is unavailing considering
that the vital documentary evidence they presented in Land
Registration Case No. TG-423 before this Honorable Court
the markings and
_______________
49 Mariano Nocom v. Oscar Camerino, et al., G.R. No. 182984,
February 10, 2009, 578 SCRA 390, citing Ong v. Roban Lending
Corporation, G.R. No. 172592, July 9, 2008, 557 SCRA 516.
83
descriptions of such documents are stated in the Judgment
quoted as follows:
(1) Tax Declaration No. 015224-A (Exhibit “Q”; x x x.
(2) Tax Declaration No. 05019-B (Exhibit “R”; x x x.
(3) Tax Declaration No. 01926-B (Exhibit “S”; x x x.
(4) Tax Declaration No. GR-007-0007 (Exhibit “T” x x
x.
are the very documentary evidence adopted and relied upon
by the plaintiffs in seeking the review and nullity of the
Decree No. 217313 issued on August 20, 1997 under LRC
Record No. N-62686 pursuant to the Judgment dated June
7, 1994 rendered by this Honorable Court penned by the
acting presiding Judge Eleuterio F. Guerrero in said Land
Registration Case No. TG-423.
On the other hand, as to the gravamen of the claims in
the complaint, the plaintiffs have presented clear and
convincing evidence as the well-nigh or almost
incontrovertible evidence of a registerable title to the subject
land in the proceedings conducted on the reception of
evidence ex parte for the plaintiffs establishing in detail the
specifications of continuous, open, exclusive possession as
aspects of acquisitive prescription as confirmed in the
affidavit herein attached as Annex “A”;”
In ruling that there was indeed no genuine issue involved,
the trial court merely stated that:
“This Court, going by the records, observed keenly that
plaintiffs’ cause of action for quieting of title on the
disputed parcel of land is based on the alleged fraud in the
substitutionof their landholdings of Lot 9250, Cad 355,
Tagaytay Cadastre containing only an area of 244,112
square meters with Lot 9121, Cad 335, Tagaytay Cadastre,
containing only an area of 19,356 square meters. While
defendant Eland in its answer practically and mainly
interposed the defenses of: (a) the parcel of land being
claimed by the plaintiffs is not the parcel of land subject
matter of Land Registration Case No. TG-423; (b) the claim
of the plaintiffs is barred by prior judgment of this Court in
said Land Registration Case; and (c) plaintiffs’ complaint is
barred by the Statute of Limitation since Original Certificate
of Title No. 0-660 has become incontrovertible.
Cross-reference of the above-cited Land Registration Case
No. TG-423 that was decided previously by this Court with
the case at
84
bench was imperatively made by this Court. Being minded
that the Court has and can take judicial notice of the said
land registration case, this Court observed that there is no
genuine issue of fact to be tried on the merits. Firstly,
because the supposed identity crisis of the controverted
parcel of land covered by the Land Registration Case No. TG-
423 with the subject parcel of land is established by Plan Ap-
04-006275 (Exhibit “N”) LRC Case No. 423 and by Plan A04
008367 (Exhibit “B” of the plaintiffs) and the Technical
Description of Lot 9250, Cad 355 (Exhibit “B-1” of the
plaintiffs). Secondly, the prior judgment rule cannot be
availed of by defendant Eland since not only intrinsic fraud
but extrinsic fraud were alleged in and established by the
records. (Heirs of Manuel Roxas v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
1184436, pro. March 21, 1997). Thirdly, it is incontrovertible
that the complaint in this case seeking to review the
judgment and annul the decree was filed on March 5, 1998
or within one (1) year from August 20, 1997 or the date of
issuance of Decree No. 217313, LRC Record No. N-62686,
hence, the Original Certificate of Title No. 0-660 issued to
defendant Eland has not attained incontrovertibility. (Heirs
of Manuel Roxas v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118436, prom.
March 21, 1997).
Notwithstanding, the issue of possession is a question
of fact by the interaction of the basic pleadings, the
observation of this Court is that the plaintiffs were able to
prove by the well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the aspects
of possession in accordance with Section 48 (b) of
Commonwealth Act 141, as amended, as hereinafter
illustrated.”
The CA, in affirming the above Resolution of the trial
court, propounded thus:
“The contention of defendant-appellant is untenable.
Summary judgment is not only limited to solving actions
involving money claims. Under Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of
Court, except as to the amount of damages, when there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, summary
judgment may be allowed. The term “genuine issue” has been
defined as an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of
evidence as distinguished from an issue which is sham,
fictitious, contrived, set up in bad faith and patently
unsubstantial so as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial.
85
Thus, under the aforecited rule, summary judgment is
appropriate when there are no genuine issues of fact, which
call for the presentation of evidence in a full-blown trial.
Thus, even if on their face the pleadings appear to raise
issues, but when the affidavits, depositions and admissions
show that such issues are not genuine, then summary
judgment as prescribed by the rules must ensue as a matter
of law.
It should be stressed that the court a quo which rendered
the assailed resolution in Civil Case No. TG-1784 was the
very court that decided the LRC Case No. TG-423. Such
being the case, the court a quo was privy to all relevant facts
and rulings pertaining to LRC Case No. TG-423 which it
considered and applied to this case. Thus, where all the facts
are within the judicial knowledge of the court, summary
judgment may be granted as a matter of right.”
On the contrary, in petitioner’s Answer Ad Cautelam,
genuine, factual and triable issues were raised, aside from
specifically denying all the allegations in the complaint,
thus:
“2. SPECIFIC DENIALS
2.1 Answering defendant specifically denies the
allegations contained in paragraphs 1 and 3 of the Complaint
insofar as it alleges the personal circumstances of the
plaintiff and one A. F. Development Corporation for lack of
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
truth thereof.
2.2 Answering defendant specifically denies the
allegations contained in paragraphs 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the
Complaint for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to the truth of said allegations. And if the
property referred to in said paragraphs is that parcel of land
which was the subject matter of Land Registration Case No.
TG-423 which was previously decided by this Honorable
Court with finality, said allegations are likewise specifically
denied for the obvious reason that the said property had
already been adjudged with finality by no less than this
Honorable Court as absolutely owned by herein answering
defendant as will be further discussed hereunder.
2.3 Answering defendant specifically denies the
allegations contained in paragraph 8 of the Complaint
insofar as it alleged that “(u)pon exercise of further
circumspection, counsel for the plaintiffs once followed-up in
writing the 1994 request of the plaintiffs to have
86
the subject parcel of land be declared for taxation purposes”
and insofar as it is made to appear that parcel of land being
claimed by the plaintiffs is the same parcel of land subject
matter of Land Registration Case No. TG-423 for lack of
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
truth thereof and for the reason that the names of the herein
plaintiffs were never mentioned during the entire
proceedings in said land registration case and by reason of
the Affirmative Allegations contained hereunder.
2.4 Answering defendant specifically denies the
allegations contained in paragraphs 9, 10, 10 (a), 10 (b), 10
(c), 10 (d), 10 (e), 10 (f), 10 (g), 10 (h), and 11 for the reason
that there is no showing that the parcel of land being claimed
by the plaintiff is the same parcel of land which was the
subject matter of Land Registration Case No. TG- 423, and
in the remote possibility that the parcel of land being claimed
by the plaintiffs is the same as that parcel of land subject of
Land Registration Case No. TG-423, the allegations
contained in said paragraphs are still specifically denied for
the reason that no less than the Honorable Court had
decided with finality that the parcel of land is absolutely
owned by herein defendant to the exclusion of all other
persons as attested to by the subsequent issuance of an
Original Certificate of Title in favor of answering defendant
and for reasons stated in the Affirmative Allegations.
2.5 Answering defendant specifically denies the
allegations contained in paragraph 12 of the Complaint for
the obvious reason that it was the plaintiffs who appear to
have been sleeping on their rights considering that up to the
present they still do not have any certificate of title covering
the parcel of land they are claiming in the instant case, while
on the part of herein defendant, no less than the Honorable
Court had adjudged with finality that the parcel of land
subject matter of Land Registration Case No. TG-423 is
absolutely owned by herein defendant.
2.6 Answering defendant specifically denies the
allegations contained in paragraph 13 of the complaint for
the reason that defendant has never landgrabbed any parcel
of land belonging to others, much less from the plaintiffs, and
further, answering defendant specifically denies the
allegations therein that plaintiffs engaged the services of a
lawyer for a fee for lack of knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof.
2.7 Answering defendant specifically denies the
allegations contained in paragraphs 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18 of
the Complaint for
87
lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief
as the truth thereof.
2.8 Answering defendant specifically denies the
allegations contained in paragraphs IV (a) to IV (c) for the
reason that, as above-stated, if the parcel of land being
claimed by the plaintiffs is the same as that parcel of land
subject matter of Land Registration Case No. TG-423, this
Honorable Court had already decided with finality that said
parcel of land is absolutely owned by herein answering
defendant and additionally, for those reasons stated in
defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.
2.9 Answering defendant specifically denies the
allegations contained in paragraph IV (d) of the Complaint
for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a
belief as to the truth thereof.”
Special and affirmative defenses were also raised in the
same Answer Ad Cautelam, to wit:
“x x x x
4.1 The pleading asserting the claim of the plaintiff
states no cause of action as asserted in the Motion To
Dismiss filed by herein answering defendant and for the
reason that there is no evidence whatsoever showing or
attesting to the fact that the parcel of land being claimed by
the plaintiffs in the Complaint is the same parcel of land
which was the subject matter of Land Registration Case No.
TG-423.
4.2 The complaint was barred by the prior judgment
rendered by this Honorable in Land Registration Case No.
TG-423.
4.3 The complaint is barred by the Statute of Limitation
in that OCT No. 0-660 had become incontrovertible by virtue
of the Torrens System of Registration; and to allow plaintiffs
to question the validity of answering defendant’s title
through the instant complaint would be a collateral of OCT
No. 0-660 which is not permissible under the law.
 4.4 Plaintiffs are barred by their own acts and/or
omission from filing the present complaint under the
principles of estoppel and laches.
4.5 Plaintiffs does not to the Court with clean hands as
they appear to be well aware of the proceedings in said Land
Registration
88
Case No. TG- 423 and inspite of such knowledge, plaintiffs
never bothered to present their alleged claims in the
proceedings.
4.6 Answering defendant has always acted with justice,
given everyone his due, and observed honesty and good faith
in his dealings.”
Clearly, the facts pleaded by the respondents in their
motion for summary judgment have been duly disputed and
contested by petitioner, raising genuine issues that must be
resolved only after a full-blown trial. When the facts as
pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested, proceedings
for summary judgment cannot take the place of trial.50 In the
present case, the petitioner was able to point out the genuine
issues. A “genuine issue” is an issue of fact that requires the
presentation of evidence as distinguished from a sham,
fictitious, contrived or false claim.51
It is of utmost importance to remember that petitioner is
already the registered owner (Original Certificate of Title
[OCT] No. 0-660 issued by the Register of Deeds) of the parcel
of land in question, pursuant to a decree of registration
(Decree No. N-217313, LRC Record No. 62686) based on the
ruling of the same court that granted the summary judgment
for the quieting of title.
Incidentally, the findings of the trial court contained in
the disputed summary judgment were obtained through
judicial notice of the facts and rulings pertaining to that
earlier case (LRC Case No. TG-423) wherein the same trial
court ruled in favor of the petitioner. It is, therefore,
disorienting that the same trial court reversed its earlier
ruling, which categorically stated that:
_______________
50 National Power Corporation v. Loro, et al., G.R. No. 175176,
October 17, 2008, 569 SCRA 648, citing Rivera v. Solidbank
Corporation, G.R. No. 163269, April 19, 2006, 487 SCRA 512, 535.
51 Id.
89
“x x x There is overwhelming evidence or proof on record
that the vendors listed in Exhibit “HH,” with submarkings,
are the previous owners of the parcel of land mentioned in
the same deed of sale and aside from the tax declarations
covering the same property (Exhibits “Q” to “T,” inclusive),
the uncontroverted testimony of Atty. Ruben Roxas
establishes beyond any shadow of doubt that applicant’s
(referring to herein defendant-appellant)
sellers/predecessors-in-interest are the grandchildren, great
grandchildren and great great grandchildren of the spouses
Lucio Petate and Maria Pobleta Petate, the former owners of
the same property, whose ownership is further bolstered by
tax receipts showing payments of realty taxes (Exhibits “U”
to “GG,” inclusive, with submarkings).
xxx
 On the basis of the foregoing facts and circumstances, and
considering that applicant is a domestic corporation not
otherwise disqualified from owning real properties in the
Philippines, this Court finds that applicant has satisfied all
the conditions/requirements essential to the grant of its
application pursuant to the provisions of the Land
Registration Law, as amended, inspite of the opposition filed
by the Heirs of the late Doroteo Miranda. Hence, the grant
of applicant’s petition appears to be inevitable.
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves the instant
petition for land registration and, thus, places under the
operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise
known as the Property Registration Law, the land described
in Plan Ap-04-006275 and containing an area of Two
Hundred Forty-Two Thousand Seven Hundred Ninety-Four
(242,794) square meters, as supported by its technical
description now forming part of the record of this case, in
addition to other proofs adduced in the name of the
applicant, ELAND PHILIPPINES, INC., with principal
office at No. 43 E. Rodriguez Ave. (España Extension),
Quezon City, Metro Manila.
Once this decision becomes final and executory, the
corresponding decree of registration shall forthwith issue.
SO ORDERED.”
By granting the summary judgment, the trial court has in
effect annulled its former ruling based on a claim of
possession and ownership of the same land for more than
thirty years without the benefit of a full-blown trial. The fact
that
90
the respondents seek to nullify the original certificate of title
issued to the petitioner on the claim that the former were in
possession of the same land for a number of years, is already
a clear indicium that a genuine issue of a material fact
exists. This, together with the failure of the respondents to
show that there were no genuine issues involved, should
have been enough for the trial court to give the motion for
summary judgment, filed by respondents, scant
consideration. Trial courts have limited authority to render
summary judgments and may do so only when there is
clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact.52
Based on the foregoing, this Court deems it necessary to
delve briefly on the nature of the action of quieting of title as
applied in this case. This Court’s ruling in Calacala, et al. v.
Republic, et al.53 is instructive on this matter, thus:
“To begin with, it bears emphasis that an action for
quieting of title is essentially a common law remedy
grounded on equity. As we held in Baricuatro, Jr. vs. CA:54
Regarding the nature of the action filed before the
trial court, quieting of title is a common law remedy for
the removal of any cloud upon or doubt or uncertainty
with respect to title to real property. Originating in
equity jurisprudence, its purpose is to secure ‘x x x an
adjudication that a claim of title to or an interest in
property, adverse to that of the complainant, is invalid,
so that the complainant and those claiming under him
may be forever afterward free from any danger of
hostile claim.’ In an action for quieting of title, the
competent court is
_______________
 52 Concrete Aggregates Corp. v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No.
117574, January 2, 1997, 266 SCRA 88, citing Archipelago Builders v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 75282, February 19, 1991, 194
SCRA 207, 212, citing Auman v. Estenzo, No. L-40500, 27 February
1976, 69 SCRA 524; Loreno v. Estenzo, No. L-43306, 29 October 1976,
73 SCRA 630; Viajar v. Estenzo, No. L-45321, 30 April 1979, 89 SCRA
684.
53 G.R. No. 154415, July 28, 2005, 464 SCRA 438.
54 382 Phil. 15, 25; 325 SCRA 137, 146-147 (2000).
91
tasked to determine the respective rights of the
complainant and other claimants, ‘x x x not only to
place things in their proper place, to make the one who
has no rights to said immovable respect and not
disturb the other, but also for the benefit of both, so
that he who has the right would see every cloud of
doubt over the property dissipated, and he could
afterwards without fear introduce the improvements
he may desire, to use, and even to abuse the property
as he deems best
x x x.
Under Article 476 of the New Civil Code, the remedy may
be availed of only when, by reason of any instrument, record,
claim, encumbrance or proceeding, which appears valid but
is, in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, a
cloud is thereby cast on the complainant’s title to real
property or any interest therein. The codal provision reads:
Article 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to
real property or any interest therein, by reason of any
instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding
which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth
and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or
unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an
action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet
the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from
being cast upon title to real property or any interest therein.
In turn, Article 477 of the same Code identifies the party
who may bring an action to quiet title, thus:
Article 477. The plaintiff must have legal or
equitable title to, or interest in the real property which
is the subject-matter of the action. He need not be in
possession of said property.
It can thus be seen that for an action for quieting of title
to prosper, the plaintiff must first have a legal, or, at least,
an equitable title on the real property subject of the action
and that the alleged cloud on his title must be shown to be in
fact invalid. So it is that in Robles, et al. vs. CA,55 we ruled:
_______________
55 384 Phil. 635, 647; 328 SCRA 97, 108 (2000).
92
It is essential for the plaintiff or complainant to
have a legal title or an equitable title to or interest in
the real property which is the subject matter of the
action. Also, the deed, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding that is being alleged as a cloud on plaintiff’s
title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative
despite its prima facieappearance of validity or legal
efficacy.
Verily, for an action to quiet title to prosper, two (2)
indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (1) the
plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable
title to or interest in the real property subject of the
action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or
proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title
must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative
despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal
efficacy.”
Respondents, in their Complaint, claim that they have
become the owners in fee-simple title of the subject land by
occupation and possession under the provisions of Sec. 48 (b)
of the Public Land Law or Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended. Thus, it appears that the first requisite has been
satisfied. Anent the second requisite, respondents
enumerated several facts that would tend to prove the
invalidity of the claim of the petitioner. All of these claims,
which would correspond to the two requisites for the quieting
of title, are factual; and, as discussed earlier, the petitioner
interposed its objections and duly disputed the said claims,
thus, presenting genuine issues that can only be resolved
through a full-blown trial.
Anent the propriety of the filing of an action for the
quieting of title, the indefeasibility and incontrovertibility of
the decree of registration come into question. Under Sec. 32
of P.D. No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree:
“Section 32. Review of decree of registration; Innocent
purchaser for value.—The decree of registration shall not be
reopened or revised by reason of absence, minority, or other
disability of any person adversely affected thereby, nor by
any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments, subject,
however, to the right of any person, including the
government and the branches thereof, deprived of land
93
or of any estate or interest therein by such adjudication or
confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud, to file in the
proper Court of First Instance a petition for reopening and
review of the decree of registration not later than one year
from and after the date of the entry of such decree of
registration, but in no case shall such petition be entertained
by the court where an innocent purchaser for value has
acquired the land or an interest therein, whose rights may
be prejudiced. Whenever the phrase “innocent purchaser for
value” or an equivalent phrase occurs in this Decree, it shall
be deemed to include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other
encumbrancer for value.
Upon the expiration of said period of one year, the
decree of registration and the certificate of title
issued shall become incontrovertible. Any person
aggrieved by such decree of registration in any case may
pursue his remedy by action for damages against the
applicant or any other persons responsible for the fraud.”
As borne out by the records and undisputed by the
parties, OCT No. 0-660 of petitioner was issued on August
29, 1997 pursuant to a Decree issued on August 20, 1997,
while the complaint for the quieting of title in Civil Case No.
TG-1784 was filed and docketed on March 5, 1998; hence,
applying the above provisions, it would seem that the period
of one (1) year from the issuance of the decree of registration
has not elapsed for the review thereof. However, a closer
examination of the above provisions would clearly indicate
that the action filed, which was for quieting of title, was not
the proper remedy.
Courts may reopen proceedings already closed by final
decision or decree when an application for review is filed by
the party aggrieved within one year from the issuance of the
decree of registration.56 However, the basis of the aggrieved
party must be anchored solely on actual fraud. Shedding
light on the matter is a discussion presented in one of the
recog-
_______________
56 Lopez v. Padilla, G.R. No. L-27559, May 18, 1972, 45 SCRA 44.
94
nized textbooks on property registration,57 citing decisions of
this Court, thus:
“The right of a person deprived of land or of any estate or
interest therein by adjudication or confirmation of title
obtained by actual fraud is recognized by law as a valid and
legal basis for reopening and revising a decree of
registration.58 One of the remedies available to him is a
petition for review. To avail of a petition for review, the
following requisites must be satisfied:
(a) The petitioner must have an estate or interest in the
land;
(b) He must show actual fraud in the procurement of the
decree of registration;
(c) The petition must be filed within one year from the
issuance of the decree by the Land Registration Authority;
and
(d) The property has not yet passed to an innocent
purchaser for value.59
A mere claim of ownership is not sufficient to avoid a
certificate of title obtained under the Torrens system. An
important feature of a certificate of title is its
finality. The proceedings whereby such a title is obtained
are directed against all persons, known or unknown, whether
actually served with notice or not, and includes all who have
an interest in the land. If they do not appear and oppose the
registration of their own estate or interest in the property in
the name of another, judgment is rendered against them by
default, and, in the absence of fraud, such judgment is
conclusive. If an interest in the land will not by itself operate
to vacate a decree of registration, a fortiori, fraud is not alone
sufficient to do so.”60
_______________
57 Justice Agcaoili (ed.), Property Registration Decree and Related
Laws (Land Titles and Deeds), 297-298 (2006).
58 Serna v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124605, June 18, 1999, 308
SCRA 527.
59 Walstrom v. Mapa, G.R. No. 38387, January 29, 1990, 181
SCRA 431; Cruz v. Navarro, G.R. No. L-27644, November 29, 1973, 54
SCRA 109; Libudan v. Palma Gil, G.R. No. L-21164, May 17, 1972, 45
SCRA 17.
60 26 Phil. 581 (1914).
95
As further pointed out in the same book,61 the petition for
review must be filed within one year from entry of the decree
of registration. As written:
 “As long as a final decree has not been entered by the
Land Registration Authority and period of one year has not
elapsed from the date of entry of such decree, the title is not
finally adjudicated and the decision in the registration case
continues to be under the control and sound discretion of the
registration court.62 After the lapse of said period, the decree
becomes incontrovertible and no longer subject to reopening
or review.
Section 32 provides that a petition for review of the
decree of registration may be filed “not later than one
year from and after the date of entry of such decree of
registration.” Giving this provision a literal interpretation,
it may at first blush seem that the petition for review cannot
be presented until the final decree has been entered.
However, it has been ruled that the petition may be filed
at any time after the rendition of the court’s decision
and before the expiration of one year from the entry
of the final decree of registration for, as noted in Rivera
v. Moran,63 there can be no possible reason requiring the
complaining party to wait until the final decree is entered
before urging his claim for fraud.
The one-year period stated in Sec. 32 within which a
petition to re-open and review the decree of registration
refers to the decree of registration described in Section 31,
which decree is prepared and issued by the Land
Registration Administrator.64
The provision of Section 31 that every decree of
registration shall bind the land, quiet title thereto, and be
conclusive upon and against all persons, including the
national government, and Sec. 32 that the decree shall not
be reopened or revised by reason of absence, minority or
other disability or by any proceeding in court, save only
_______________
61 Supra note 57 at 302-304.
62 Gomez v. CA, G.R. No. 77770, December 15, 1988, 168 SCRA
491.
63 48 Phil. 836 (1926).
64 Ramos v. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 94033, May 29, 1995, 244 SCRA
418.
96
in cases of actual fraud and then only for one year from the
entry of the decree, must be understood as referring to final
and unappealable decrees of registration. A decision or, as it
is sometimes called after entry, a decree of a registration
court, does not become final and unappealable until fifteen
days after the interested parties have been notified of its
entry, and during that period may be set aside by the trial
judge on motion for new trial, upon any of the grounds stated
in the Rules of Court.65 An appeal from the decision of the
trial court prevents the judgment from becoming final until
that decree is affirmed by the judgment of the appellate
court.66
A petition for review under Section 32 is a remedy
separate and distinct from a motion for new trial and
the right to the remedy is not affected by the denial of
such a motion irrespective of the grounds upon which
it may have been presented. Thus, where petitioners
acquired their interest in the land before any final decree had
been entered, the litigation was therefore in effect still
pending and, in these circumstances, they can hardly be
considered innocent purchasers in good faith.67
Where the petition for review of a decree of registration is
filed within the one-year period from entry of the decree, it
is error for the court to deny the petition without hearing the
evidence in support of the allegation of actual and extrinsic
fraud upon which the petition is predicated. The petitioner
should be afforded an opportunity to prove such allegation.”68
In the present case, the one-year period before the
Torrens title becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible has
not yet expired; thus, a review of the decree of registration
would have been the appropriate remedy.
Based on the above disquisitions, the other issues raised
by the petitioner are necessarily rendered inconsequential.
_______________
65 Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Sunico, 36 Phil. 279
(1917).
66 Supra note at 60.
67 Rivera v. Moran, 48 Phil. 863 (1926).
68 Republic v. Sioson, G.R. No. L-13687, November 29, 1963, 9
SCRA 533.
Corona (Chairperson), Carpio,** Nachura andMendoza,
JJ., concur.
Petition granted, judgment reversed and set aside.
Notes.—The rule on summary judgment does not vest in
the court summary jurisdiction to try issues on pleadings and
affidavits but gives the court limited authority to enter
summary judgment only if it clearly appears that there is no
genuine issue of material fact. (Velasco vs. Court of Appeals,
329 SCRA 392 [2000])
A genuine issue is an issue of fact which calls for the
presentation of evidence, as distinguished from an issue
which is sham, fictitious, contrived and patently
unsubstantiated so as not to constitute a genuine issue of
fact. (Equitable PCI Bank vs. Ong, 502 SCRA 119 [2006])
——o0o——
_______________
** Designated to sit as an additional Member, in lieu of Justice
Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., per Raffle dated February 10, 2010.

97
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari of
petitioner Eland Philippines, Inc. is hereby GRANTED, and
the decision dated February 28, 2006 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 67417, which dismissed the appeal
of petitioner Eland Philippines, Inc. and affirmed the © Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
resolution dated November 3, 1999 of Branch 18, RTC of
Tagaytay City, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Consequently, the resolution dated November 3, 1999 of
Branch 18, RTC of Tagaytay City in Civil Case No. TG-1784
is hereby declared NULL and VOID.
SO ORDERED.
 VOL. 90, MAY 31, 1979
Republic vs. Lozada
No, L-43852. May 31, 1979. *
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner-
appellee, vs. TEODOCIA LOZADA, applicant-
respondent-appellant.
Land Registration; Public Land; Failure of wife to
disclose in her application for land registration that her
husband had previously filed an application to purchase the
same parcels from the Bureau of Lands which was denied
because the same were reserved for schoolsite purposes is on
extrinsic fraud.—Appellant Lozada (and her husband Felix
Cristobal) were clearly guilty of fraud (1) in not disclosing in
her application for registration the vital facts that her
husband’s previous application for a revocable permit and to
purchase the lands in question from the Bureau of Lands had
been rejected,
______________
*FIRST DIVISION.
504
504 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Lozada
because the lands were already reserved as a site for
school purposes; (2) in thus concealing the fact that the lands
were part of the public domain and so known to them; (3) in
stating the deliberate falsehood that the lands were allegedly
inherited by her from her parents; and (4) in filing the
application for registration in the name of appellant Lozada
and not in that of her husband Felix Cristobal or two of them
jointly, thus suppressing the fact that Felix Cristobal already
had a record in the Bureau of Lands of having filed a rejected
application for the same lands, all of which misled the
503 Bureau of Lands into not filing an opposition to her
application, and as aptly observed by the lower Court
“effectively deprived (the Republic) of its day in court.” Such
fraud may well be deemed as “extrinsic or collateral fraud,
as distinguished from intrinsic fraud [which] connotes any
fraudulent scheme executed by a prevailing litigant outside
the trial of a case against the defeated party, or his agents,
attorneys or witnesses, whereby said defeated party is
prevented from presenting fully and fairly his side of the
case.’ ”
Same; Same; Even if act of applicant for registration of
not revealing that her husband’s application with the Bureau
of Lands to purchase the lands in question was previously
denied does not constitute extrinsic fraud, no Torrens Title
can be issued to her because same is not susceptible to
registration being reserved for a schoolsite.—But even
assuming that such fraud could be technically considered as
“intrinsic fraud [which] takes the form of ‘acts of a party in a
litigation during the trial, such as the use of forged
instruments or perjured testimony, which did not affect the
presentation of the case, but did prevent a fair and just
determination of the case,’ ” it would not alter the result,
because the mistake and error into which the officials of the
Bureau of Lands were misled by such a deliberately false
application, suppressing the facts known to the applicant
that the lands sought to be registered were lands of the
public domain (and not private property) and having been
reserved for a schoolsite were not susceptible of private
registration (as in fact her husband’s application to purchase
the same had been rejected) cannot operate to bar the
Republic’s timely petition to review and set aside the decree,
since the State cannot be estopped by the mistake or error of
its officials and agents.
Same; Same; Bed or foreshore of Las Piñas River is not
open to registration.—Besides, the registration decree was
properly voided by the lower court since it had no jurisdiction
over the lands of the public domain subject matter of the
proceedings which were portions
505
VOL. 90, MAY 31, 1979
Republic vs. Lozada
of the bed or foreshore of the Las Piñas river and were
not open to registration proceedings.
TEEHANKEE, J.:
The Court affirms on appeal the decision of the Pasay
City court of first instance granting the Republic’s
timely petition for review of the decree of registration
and cancelling the certificate of title issued in favor of
the applicant-appellant, since it clearly appears that
actual fraud had been employed by the applicant in
procuring the title over the lands in question which are
part of the public domain (and not private property as
falsely claimed by applicant) and the Republic is
entitled to their reversion to the public domain.
On October 26, 1966 applicant-appellant Teodocia
Lozada had filed an application in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal for the registration of, and
confirmation to, two parcels of land in Las Piñas, Rizal
(designated as Lots 2 and 3, Psu. 218933, SWO-40867
in the technical descriptions, with an area of about 390
square meters), asserting title thereto by right of
inheritance from her deceased parents, couple with
alleged continuous and exclusive possession. As related
in the Court of Appeals’ resolution of May 10, 1976
certifying applicant Lozada’s appeal to us as involving
only questions of law, said appellant originally
succeeded on ex-parte evidence in securing registration
of the property, as follows:
“Under date of November 16, 1966, the court a quo issued a
notice of initial hearing of the petition (Ibid., p. 19). The
505 petition was opposed by the Provincial Government of Rizal
and the Municipal Government of Las Piñas, Rizal (Ibid., p.
27). The Director of Lands did not deem it necessary at the
time to file an opposition to Teodocia Lozada’s petition (Ibid.,
p. 30) and returned the records of the case to the court a quo
through the Solicitor General (Ibid., p. 29). However, the
Director of Lands reserved the right to file his opposition
thereto should it be found upon investigation that applicant
Lozada is not entitled to the lots in question (Ibid., p. 30).
“On April 25, 1967, an order of general default was issued
by the court a quo, excepting therefrom the Provincial
Government of Rizal and the Municipal Government of Las
Piñas, Rizal (Amended Record
506
506 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Lozada
on Appeal, pp. 9-10). On the same date, the court a quo
referred the case to the Municipal Court of Las Piñas, Rizal
because the value of the contested lots does not exceed
P10,000.00, as shown in the tax declaration (Ibid., p. 10). On
June 26, 1967, upon the ex-parte evidence presented by
applicant Teodocia Lozada, the Municipal Court of Las
Piñas, Rizal, found applicant Lozada to have a registerable
title to the two parcels of land. The said court confirmed her
title thereto (Amended Record on Appeal, pp. 11-14). A
month later, the municipal court ordered the issuance of the
corresponding decree of registration (Ibid., pp. 14-15). On
September 7, 1967, Original Certificate of Title No. 6314
(Exhibit 7, Folder of Exhibits, p. 100) in the name of Teodocia
Lozada was issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal.”
The Solicitor General, however, well within one year
from entry of the decree filed a petition for review of the
decision and decree of registration on the ground that
applicant Lozada had procured the same by actual
fraud (1) because she deliberately concealed the fact
that the lots in question were covered by Revocable
Permit Application No. 15849 and Miscellaneous Sales
Application No. V-76845, both in the name of her
husband, Felix Cristobal, and that these applications
were rejected by the Bureau of Lands since these lots
were reserved for school site purposes pursuant to
Resolution No. 114, Series of 1963, of the Municipal
Council of Las Piñas, Rizal; and (2) these lots are
portions of the public domain and as such belong to the
State and are not subject to private appropriation and,
therefore, not registerable under the Torrens System.
The court of first instance gave due course to the
Republic’s petition notwithstanding appellant Lozada’s
opposition contending inter alia that the petition raises
the issue of ownership which should be brought up in a
separate civil action and that the lands were private
property. After reopening the case and holding several
hearings at which both the applicant and the Republic
presented their documentary and testimonial evidence,
it found that “actual fraud was employed by the
applicant in procuring title over the property subject of
this application which are portions of the public
domain.”
It found inter alia in its decision upon the petition for
review that before appellant Lozada’s petition for
registration, her
507
VOL. 90, MAY 31, 1979 507
Republic vs. Lozada
husband, Felix Cristobal, had filed with the Bureau of
Lands a revocable permit application and a sales
application which had been rejected on April 12, 1965
precisely because the lands had been reserved for school
purposes and that the husband “by not so filing the
application for registration of the property in question
and by allowing his wife, applicant Teodocia Lozada, to
file the application, the Bureau of Lands, representing
the Republic of the Philippines, was misled.” The Court
found that applicant Lozada and her husband had
deliberately deceived the State, as follows:
“The Court draws this conclusion from the very patent
improbability that a fair and unprejudiced mind will accept.
It is most improbable that the Bureau of Lands will not
oppose the registration of a piece of land, but will oppose any
application to purchase the same. These are two conflicting
actions. Moreover, in the first instance, the land registration
will result in the acquisition of the property without the
Republic of the Philippines being paid for it. In the second
instance, the approval of the sales application will result in
the acquisition of the property with the Republic of the
Philippines being paid for it. Why should the Bureau of
Lands not file its opposition in the first instance and, on the
other hand, reject the application for purchase in the second
instance? The truth of the matter, in the opinion of the Court,
is that had the application for registration been only filed by
FELIX CRISTOBAL, the husband, the Bureau of Lands,
representing the Republic of the Philippines, would have
acted uniformly, that is (1) oppose the registration and (2)
reject the sales application. Here again is clearly seen how
the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Bureau
of Lands, through the act of applicant Teodocia Lozada of
filing separately the application for registration and through
the act of FELIX CRISTOBAL of applying for approval of a
sales application for the same property, was effectively
deprived of its day in court. It bears repeating that had the
instant application for registration only been made by
‘FELIX CRISTOBAL, the husband, who had already a record
in the Bureau of Lands, as a person who had taken the initial
step for the purchase of a certain public land, then the
Bureau of Lands would have filed its opposition or would
have taken steps appropriate to stop the registration
thereof.”
The lower court accordingly rendered judgment on
March 30, 1973 in favor of the Republic, as follows:
508
508 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Lozada
1. “(1)Setting aside the decision of the Municipal Court
of Las Piñas, Rizal of June 26, 1967, subject of the
instant review proceedings, and the corresponding
decree issued pursuant thereto;
2. “(2)Declaring the property in question to be part of
the public domain belonging to the Republic of the
Philippines;
3. “(3)Dismissing the registration application of
Teodocia Lozada of October 16, 1962;
4. “(4)Ordering applicant Teodocia Lozada to surrender
Original Certificate of Title No. 6314 of the Province
of Rizal to the Register of Deeds of said Province and
that the same may be cancelled;
5. “(5)Ordering the Register of Deeds of the Province of
Rizal to cancel the aforementioned Original
Certificate of Title No. 6314; and
6. “(6)Ordering Felix Cristobal and Teodocia Lozada to
vacate immediately the property in question so that
the same may be used for the purpose it was
reserved, that is, as a school site.”
Applicant Lozada appealed to the Court of Appeals
which, however, certified the appeal to us as involving
only questions of law which it set forth in its resolution,
as follows:
“Applicant appealed to this Court and contends that the
court a quo erred in:
1. 1.Holding that there was actual and extrinsic fraud
in obtaining applicant’s original certificate of title
over the lots applied for; and
2. 2.Holding that the lots applied for by applicant form
part of the public domain.
‘It is not denied that the lots in question were the subject
of a revocable permit application and a miscellaneous sales
application filed with the Bureau of Lands by Felix Cristobal
(t.s.n., September 7, 1971, pp. 11, 12; June 22, 1972, pp. 4,
9), husband of applicant-appellant Teodocia Lozada, before
she filed a petition for registration and that Cristobal’s
applications were denied by the Bureau of Lands (t.s.n.,
September 7, 1971, p. 12; June 22, 1972, p. 4). And yet
applicant-appellant made it appear under her oath that she
had inherited the lots in question from her parents. There is
also no question that the application for registration was
filed in the name of Teodocia Lozada and not in the name of
Felix Cristobal (Amended Record on Appeal, p. 1).
“We note that these material facts were not disclosed in
the application for registration filed by Teodocia Lozada. Is
this conduct
 509
VOL. 90, MAY 31, 1979
Republic vs. Lozada
within the kind of fraud contemplated in Section 38 of Act
496, as amended, to warrant the review of the decision of the
Municipal Court of Las Piñas and the nullification of the
decree of registration?
“It is not also denied that the lots in question are portions
of the bed or foreshore of the Las Piñas river (t.s.n.,
September 7, 1971, pp. 3, 4, 10, 15; June 22, 1972, p. 11).
This, too, was not disclosed in the application for
registration. Do they then form part of the public domain or
not?”1
On the basis of the material facts above stated in the
Court of Appeals’ resolution which have not been
disputed by appellant, the Court affirms the appealed
judgment.
Appellant Lozada (and her husband Felix Cristobal)
were clearly guilty of fraud (1) in not disclosing in her
application for registration the vital facts that her
husband’s previous application for a revocable permit
and to purchase the lands in question from the Bureau
of Lands had been rejected, because the lands were
already reserved as a site for school purposes; (2) in
thus concealing the fact that the lands were part of the
public domain and so known to them; (3) in stating the
deliberate falsehood that the lands were allegedly
inherited by her from her parents; and (4) in filing the
application for registration in the name of appellant
Lozada and not in that of her husband Felix Cristobal
or the two of them jointly, thus suppressing the fact that
Felix Cristobal already had a record in the Bureau of
Lands of having filed a rejected application for the same
lands, all of which misled the Bureau of Lands into not
509 filing an opposition to her application, and as aptly
observed by the lower court “effectively deprived (the
Republic) of its day in court.”
Such fraud may well be deemed as “extrinsic or
collateral fraud, as distinguished from intrinsic fraud
[which] connotes any fraudulent scheme executed by a
prevailing litigant ‘outside the trial of a case against the
defeated party, or his agents, attorneys or witnesses,
whereby said defeated party is his agents, attorneys or
witnesses, whereby said defeated party is
______________
1 Emphasis supplied. The Court of Appeals’ Special Ninth Division
that certified the case was composed of Pascual, J. ponente, Bautista
and Santiago, Jr., JJ.
510
510 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Republic vs. Lozada
prevented from presenting fully and fairly his side of
the case.’ ” 2
But even assuming that such fraud could be
technically considered as “intrinsic fraud [which] takes
the form of ‘acts of a party in a litigation during the
trial, such as the use of forged instruments or perjured
testimony, which did not affect the presentation of the
case, but did prevent a fair and just determination of
the case.’ ” it would not alter the result, because the
3
mistake and error into which the officials of the Bureau
of Lands were misled by such a deliberately false
application, suppressing the facts known to the
applicant that the lands sought to be registered were
lands of the public domain (and not private property)
and having been reserved for a school site were not
susceptible of private registration (as in fact her
husband’s application to purchase the same had been
rejected) cannot operate to bar the Republic’s timely
petition to review and set aside the decree, since the
State cannot be estopped by the mistake or error of its
officials and agents. 4 of the land involved to the public domain, subject
Besides, the registration decree was properly voided
by the lower court since it had no jurisdiction over the
lands of the public domain subject matter of the
proceedings which were portions of the bed or foreshore
of the Las Piñas river and were not open to registration
proceedings.
Finally, as this Court unanimously stressed
in Piñero vs. Director of Lands “It is to the public
5 appropriate action for reversion may be filed by the
interest that one who succeeds in fraudulently
acquiring title to a public land should
_____________
2 Republic of the Phil. vs. Court of Appeals and Lastimado, L-
39473, Apr. 30, 1979, per Melencio-Herrera, J., citing Libudan vs.
Gil, 45 SCRA 17 (1972), note in brackets supplied.
3 Ibid, note in brackets supplied. The reason for the rule is to put
an end to litigations so that the losing party may not attack the
adverse judgment at any time by attributing imaginary falsehood to
his adversary’s proofs and it being the business of a party to meet and
repel his opponent’s perjured evidence in the trial of the case itself (De
Almeda vs. Cruz, 84 Phil. 636, 641, cited in Libudan vs. Gil, supra).
4 Ibid, citing Republic of the Phil. vs. Marcos, 52 SCRA 238 (1973).
5 57 SCRA 386, 392 (1974).
511
VOL. 90, MAY 31, 1979
Republic vs. Lozada
not be allowed to benefit therefrom, and the State
should, therefore, have an ever existing authority, thru
its duly authorized officers, to inquire into the
circumstances surrounding the issuance of any such
title, to the end that the Republic, thru the Solicitor
General or any other officer who may be authorized by
law, may file the corresponding action for the reversion
thereafter to disposal to other qualified persons in
accordance with law. In other words, the indefeasibility
of a title over land previously public is not a bar to an
investigation by the Director of Lands as to how such
title has been acquired, if the purpose of such
investigation is to determine whether or not fraud had
been committed in securing such title in order that the
Government.”
ACCORDINGLY, the appealed decision is
affirmed in toto.
Makasiar, Fernandez, Guerrero, De
Castro and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.
Decision affirmed.
Notes.—Titles issued over non-alienable public
lands are void ab initio. (Republic vs. Animas, 56 SCRA
499).
A sublessee is a “bona fide tenant or occupant” within
the meaning of Section 1, C.A. 539 and entitled to
acquire by purchase the property where his house is
located after acquisition thereof by the government for
resale. (Leongson vs. Court of Appeals, 49 SCRA 212).
511
 Courts may review a decision of the Director of Lands Lee, 1 SCRA 1166; Go Tian An vs. Republic, 17 SCRA
only in a direct proceeding therefor and not collaterally. 1053; United Christian Missionary Society vs. Social
(Firmalo vs. Tutaan, 53 SCRA 505). Security System, 30 SCRA 982; Republic vs. Philippine
Actions to nullify free patents may be filed only at Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc., 32 SCRA 211; Luciano vs.
the behest of the Director of Lands. (Kayaban vs. Estrella, 34 SCRA 769; Republic vs. Philippine Long
Republic, 52 SCRA 357). Distance Telephone Company, 26 SCRA 620).
The Government may bring an action for reversion
of public land fraudulently acquired. (Piñero, Jr. vs. ——o0o——
Director of Lands, 57 SCRA 386).
512 © Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
512 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
International Harvester Macleod, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
Estoppel has its origin in equity and, being based on
moral and natural justice, finds applicability whatever
and whenever the special circumstances of a case so
demand. (Castrillo vs. Court of Appeals, 10 SCRA
549; Beronilla vs. Government Service Insurance
System, 36 SCRA 44).
The essential element of estoppel in pais in relation
to the party sought to be estopped are: (1) conduct
amounting to false representation or concealment of
material facts, or at least calculated to convey the
impression that the facts are otherwise than, and
inconsistent with, those which the party subsequently
attempts to assert; (2) intent, or at least expectation
that this conduct shall be acted upon by, or at least
influence, the other party; and (3) knowledge, actual
and constructive, of the real facts. (Kalalo vs. Luz, 34
SCRA 337).
The doctrine of estoppel does not apply against the
Government suing in its capacity as sovereign or
asserting governmental rights. (Republic vs. Go Bon
 A.M. No. RTJ-15-2422. July 20, 2015.*
(formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 13-4129-RTJ)
FLOR GILBUENA RIVERA, complainant, vs. HON.
LEANDRO C. CATALO, Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 256, Muntinlupa City, respondent.
Administrative Law; Judges; Gross Ignorance of the
Law; Gross ignorance of the law by a judge presupposes an
appalling lack of familiarity with simple rules of law or
procedures and well-established jurisprudence that tends to
erode the public trust in the competence and fairness of the
court which he personifies.—Gross ignorance of the law by a
judge presupposes an appalling lack of
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
187
VOL. 763, JULY 20, 2015
Rivera vs. Catalo
familiarity with simple rules of law or procedures and
well-established jurisprudence that tends to erode the public
trust in the competence and fairness of the court which he
personifies. In this case, the Court is not at all convinced that
Judge Catalo committed gross ignorance of the law.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments;
Immutability of Judgments; Under the doctrine of finality of
judgment or immutability of judgment, a decision that has
acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and
may no longer be modified in any respect.—Indeed, under the
doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of judgment,
a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and
unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect.
Like any other rule, however, there are recognized
exceptions to this general rule such as (1) the correction of
clerical errors, the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which
cause no prejudice to any party, (2) void judgments,
and (3) whenever circumstances transpire after the
finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust
and inequitable.
Same; Same; Same; Void Judgments; A void judgment
for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It neither is a
source of any right nor the creator of any obligation. All acts
performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it
have no legal effect.—Under the second exception, a void
judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It
neither is a source of any right nor the creator of any
obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims
emanating from it have no legal effect. Hence, it can never
become final and any writ of execution based on it is void. It
may be said to be a lawless thing which can be treated as an
outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever
it exhibits its head.
187
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court.
Violation of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
188
188 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Rivera vs. Catalo
MENDOZA, J.:
“A void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment
at all. It neither is a source of any right nor the creator of any
obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims
emanating from it have no legal effect. Hence, it can never
become final and any writ of execution based on it is void. It
may be said to be a lawless thing which can be treated as an
outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever
it exhibits its head.”1
A judge who adheres to this principle cannot be
administratively held liable and be sanctioned.
Subject of this disposition is the petition2 filed on
September 10, 2013, by complainant Flor Gilbuena
Rivera (complainant), charging respondent Judge
Leandro C. Catalo (Judge Catalo), Presiding Judge of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 256, Muntinlupa City
(RTC), with a violation of Canon 3 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct3 when he flip-flopped by first setting
aside and then recalling a final and executory
judgment.
The Facts
On February 1, 2012, complainant filed her
Amended Petition4 before the RTC, praying for the
issuance of new owner’s duplicate copy of Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 3460, docketed as LRC
Case No. 12-005. The case was raffled to the branch
presided by Judge Catalo.
_______________
1 Secretary of the DAR v. Dumagpi, G.R. No. 195412, February 4,
2015, 749 SCRA 621, citing Leonor v. Court of Appeals, 326 Phil. 74,
88; 256 SCRA 69, 82 (1996).
2 Rollo, pp. 1-6.
3 Canon 3 – A judge should perform official duties honestly, and
with impartiality and diligence.
4 Rollo, pp. 7-9.
189
VOL. 763, JULY 20, 2015 189
Rivera vs. Catalo
The amended petition alleged that complainant was
one of the heirs of Juan Gilbuena (Gilbuena); that TCT
No. 3460 was registered under the name of Gilbuena;
and that the owner’s duplicate copy of the said title had
remained missing despite their diligent efforts to locate
the same. When the case was called for hearing, no
oppositor appeared before the RTC. Upon motion,
complainant was allowed to present evidence ex
parte on March 18, 2012.
On May 18, 2012, Judge Catalo rendered his
decision5granting the petition for issuance of new
owner’s duplicate copy on the basis of the evidence
presented by complainant, particularly the affidavit of
loss and the certification issued by the Register of Deeds
of Muntinlupa City (RD). The decretal portion thereof
reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be meritorious, the
same is hereby granted. Accordingly, the Owner’s Duplicate
Copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3460 that was lost is
hereby declared null and void. The Register of Deeds of
Muntinlupa City is hereby ordered to issue a new
Owners Duplicate Copy of Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 3460, which said title shall be entitled to full faith and
credit as the lost one.
SO ORDERED.6
[Emphasis supplied]
 The RTC decision became final and executory on July
3, 2012 and the Certificate of Finality7 was issued on
July 6, 2012.
In a Letter,8 dated August 16, 2012, the RD informed
complainant that the Affidavit of Loss, annotated on
TCT No. 3460, was being recalled considering that the
said title was
_______________
5 Id., at pp. 11-12.
6 Id., at p. 12.
7 Id., at pp. 13-14.
8 Id., at p. 14.
190
190 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Rivera vs. Catalo
already cancelled and being a cancelled title, it could
no longer be a subject of any transaction.
On October 15, 2012, RD Acting Records Officer
Vivian V. Dacanay (Dacanay), formally filed her
Manifestation9before the RTC stating, among others,
that upon examination of the documents submitted to
their office, it appeared that TCT No. 3460 had long
been cancelled as early as April 2, 1924; that on August
16, 2012, the RD issued a letter recalling the approval
of the annotation of the Affidavit of Loss on TCT No.
3460 after it was discovered that the said title was
already cancelled and, therefore, could no longer be the
subject of any transaction; that the discovery of the
cancellation of the title was sometime in August 2012,
when their office found out that several titles had
already originated from said title; that the truth was
that the title was not lost, rather, it was cancelled by
virtue of valid transactions and conveyance as early as
April 2, 1924; and that the basis of the petition for
issuance of new owner’s duplicate, which was an
affidavit of loss, was totally false, untrue and
fabricated.
Dacanay added that “[t]o allow, otherwise, would
result to reviving a dead title and double titling and
later on, spread spurious titles.”10
Acting thereon, Respondent Judge issued an order
requiring the complainant and all the parties concerned
to attend a hearing on November 7, 2012 on the
Manifestation filed by Dacanay. Despite being given 15
days to give his side, the complainant did not appear in
court.11
In the Order,12 dated June 21, 2013, Judge Catalo
recalled and set aside the May 18, 2012 decision of the
RTC.
_______________
9 Id., at pp. 17-19.
10 Id., at p. 18.
11 Id., at p. 20.
12 Id., at pp. 20-21.
191
VOL. 763, JULY 20, 2015 191
Rivera vs. Catalo
Aggrieved, complainant filed the subject
administrative complaint before the Court alleging that
Judge Catalo committed gross misconduct for recalling
a final and executory judgment.
Position of Complainant
Complainant avers that the act of Judge Catalo in
recalling and setting aside the final and executory
decision was of doubtful legal and moral basis.
Complainant adds that his act of flip-flopping was
considered a violation of the Canon on Judicial Conduct
as it flagrantly disregarded well-known legal rules and
constituted grave misconduct punishable by dismissal
from the service.
Accordingly, complainant prays that Judge Catalo be
dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all his
retirement benefits.
Position of Respondent Judge
In his Comment,13 Judge Catalo averred that on
October 15, 2012, after the RTC decision became final
and executory, Dacanay filed her
Manifestation, informing the trial court that TCT No.
14
3460 was already cancelled; that he then set it for
hearing on November 7, 2012 and required complainant
to present his stand; that during the scheduled hearing,
Dacanay testified that the subject title was already
cancelled and that the previous records officer, who
misinformed the RD on the status of the title, had been
sacked; that he even required the RD to submit the
English translation of the Spanish entries just to
confirm that the subject title was previously cancelled;
that complainant failed to present his stand despite
being given 15 days to do it; that because complainant
fraudulently filed the petition for issuance of new
owner’s duplicate
_______________
13 Id., at pp. 26-30.
14 Id., at pp. 17-19.
192
192 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Rivera vs. Catalo
with the use of spurious documents, the RTC decision
was void and could be recalled; and that, for said reason,
he recalled the said decision in his June 21, 2013 order.
Judge Catalo invokes the inherent power of the court
to amend and control its processes and orders to make
them conformable with the law and justice. The
respondent explained that although a final judgment is
immutable and unalterable, such rule is not absolute as
it admits exceptions such as those concerning void
judgments.
Report and Recommendation
In its Report,15 dated April 20, 2015, the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA) opined that Judge Catalo
was administratively liable, not for gross misconduct,
but for gross ignorance of the law.
When the May 18, 2012 decision became final and
executory on July 3, 2012, it became immutable and
unalterable. Thus, Judge Catalo inexcusably and
wrongfully ignored such basic principle when he
decided to motu proprio recall his own final decision.
The OCA also found that he overlooked the basic
principle that a final judgment, order or resolution
could only be annulled under Rule 47 of the Rules of
Court.
The OCA, thus, concluded that for exhibiting gross
ignorance of the law, Judge Catalo violated Rule 1.01
and Rule 3.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct as he
failed to conform to the high standards of competence
required of judges. It was the recommendation of the
OCA that Judge Catalo be found guilty of gross
ignorance of the law and be fined in the amount of
P21,000.00.
The Court’s Ruling
The Court declines the recommendation of the OCA.
_______________
15 Id., at pp. 33-37.
193
VOL. 763, JULY 20, 2015
Rivera vs. Catalo
Gross ignorance of the law by a judge presupposes an
appalling lack of familiarity with simple rules of law or
procedures and well-established jurisprudence that
tends to erode the public trust in the competence and
fairness of the court which he personifies.16 In this case,
the Court is not at all convinced that Judge Catalo
committed gross ignorance of the law.
Indeed, under the doctrine of finality of judgment or
immutability of judgment, a decision that has acquired
finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may
no longer be modified in any respect.17 Like any other
rule, however, there are recognized exceptions to this
general rule such as (1) the correction of clerical errors,
the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no
prejudice to any party, (2) void judgments, and (3)
whenever circumstances transpire after the
finality of the decision rendering its execution
unjust and inequitable.18
Under the second exception, a void judgment for
want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It neither is a
source of any right nor the creator of any obligation. All
acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating
from it have no legal effect. Hence, it can never become
final and any writ of execution based on it is void. It
may be said to be a lawless thing which can be treated
as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and
whenever it exhibits its head.19
In the case of Abalos v. Philex Mining
Corporation,20 the Court reiterated the third exception,
concerning unjust and inequitable judgments.
193 _______________
16 Beckett v. Sarmiento, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-12-2326, January 30,
2013, 689 SCRA 499, 502.
17 FGU Insurance v. RTC, G.R. No. 161282, February 23, 2011,
644 SCRA 50.
18 Hulst v. PR Builders, Inc., 558 Phil. 683; 532 SCRA 74 (2007).
19 Secretary of the DAR v. Dumagpi, supra note 1.
20 441 Phil. 386; 393 SCRA 134 (2002), citing Gallardo-Corro v.
Gallardo, 403 Phil. 498; 350 SCRA 568 (2001).
194
194 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
 Rivera vs. Catalo
Under the law, the court may modify or alter a
judgment even after the same has become executory
whenever circumstances transpire rendering its
execution unjust and inequitable, as where certain facts
and circumstances justifying or requiring such
modification or alteration transpired after the
judgment has become final and executory.21
In other words, if there are facts and circumstances
that would render a judgment void or unjust after its
finality, and render its execution a complete nullity,
such judgment cannot exude immutability.
In this case, the Court is of the considered view that
Judge Catalo correctly recalled the judgment because
the second and third exceptions on the doctrine of
finality of judgments were squarely applicable. After
the finality of the RTC decision on July 3, 2012, it was
discovered that TCT No. 3460 had been cancelled as
early as April 2, 1924. Complainant, when later asked
to present his stand, failed to contradict the allegation
that he falsified his affidavit of loss. Clearly, these
subsequent events raised a red flag and placed the
Respondent Judge on his toes. Judge Catalo realized an
execution of such judgment would definitely be unjust
and inequitable as it would be sanctioning fraud and
irregularity. It would judicially permit the issuance of a
new owner’s duplicate copy of a title which was no
longer in existence.
Where there is no original, there can be no duplicate.
Judge Catalo was correct in stating that the
judgment was void and could not have attained finality.
Citing the case of New Durawood Co., Inc. v. CA,22 he
stressed that a court had no jurisdiction to order the
issuance of a new owner’s duplicate copy of a certificate
of title when it was, in fact, not lost. Here, the original
title was not lost but officially cancelled. Hence, Judge
Catalo correctly exercised his judicial preroga-
_______________
21 Id., at pp. 392-393; p. 578.
22 324 Phil. 109; 253 SCRA 740 (1996).
195
VOL. 763, JULY 20, 2015 195
Rivera vs. Catalo
tive to amend and control his factually and legally
infirm decision.
The Court cannot agree with the OCA in ruling that
the respondent motu proprio recalled his own final
decision. It is not disputed that he required both
complainant and the RD to attend the November 7,
2012 hearing to shed light on the matter raised in the
manifestation filed by Dacanay. Yet, despite proper
notice giving him an opportunity to explain his side,
complainant failed to do so. It was only after due process
and hearing that Judge Catalo issued his June 21, 2013
order recalling the May 18, 2012 decision of the RTC.
Also, the Court does not share the view of the OCA
that the respondent should have waited for an action
under Rule 47 to assail the final judgment. First, it can
hardly be expected that the RD would itself file an
independent action to annul the final judgment before
the Court of Appeals. Second, an action under Rule 47
is not the only remedy to assail a final judgment.
In Arcelona v. CA,23 the Court cited the explanation of
Senator Vicente J. Francisco in his treatise regarding
the remedies against a void judgment in this manner:
The validity of a final judgment may be attacked on the
ground that the judgment or order is null and void, because
the court had no power or authority to grant the relief or no
jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the parties or
both. The aggrieved party may attack the validity of
the final judgment by a direct action or proceeding in
order to annul the same, as certiorari, which is not incidental
to, but is the main object of the proceeding. The validity of
a final judgment may also be attacked collaterally as
when a party files a motion for the execution of the
judgment and the adverse party resists the motion by
claiming that the court has no authority to pronounce
the judgment and that the same is null and void for
lack of
_______________
23 345 Phil. 250; 280 SCRA 20 (1997).
196
196 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Rivera vs. Catalo
jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the
parties.24
[Emphases and underscoring supplied]
In the LRC case, Dacanay filed a manifestation
moving for the recall of the final judgment. This
manifestation should have been considered as an
opposition to the execution of judgment as she declined
to implement the flawed court order.
Judge Catalo correctly rectified his questionable
decision. Had he not acted responsibly, the void
judgment would have spawned double and conflicting
titles and would have wreaked havoc on the revered
Torrens System of land registration.
Based on the foregoing, as the respondent complied
with the established procedural and substantial rules to
nullify a final judgment, no fault can be ascribed to his
actions.
Hence, Judge Catalo committed no gross ignorance
of the law.
WHEREFORE, the complaint against respondent
Judge Leandro C. Catalo, Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 256, Muntinlupa City,
is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio (Chairperson), Brion, Del
Castillo and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Complaint dismissed.
Notes.—The only recognized exceptions to the
general rule on the immutability of final judgments are
the correction of clerical errors, the so-called nunc pro
tuncentries which cause no prejudice to any party, void
judgments, and whenever circumstances transpire
after the finality of the decision ren
_______________
24 Id., at p. 285; p. 50.
 197
VOL. 763, JULY 20, 2015 197
Rivera vs. Catalo
dering its execution unjust and inequitable. (Hulst
vs. PR Builders, Inc., 532 SCRA 74 [2007])
A void judgment is in legal effect no judgment, by
which no rights are divested, from which no right can
be obtained, which neither binds nor bars any one, and
under which all acts performed and all claims flowing
out are void. (Paulino vs. Court of Appeals, 725
SCRA 273 [2014])

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