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The FMLN Electoral Implosion in El Salvador: A Fiasco Foretold?
The FMLN Electoral Implosion in El Salvador: A Fiasco Foretold?
May 2017
September
2016
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votes with respect to the previous presidential ballot. Ten years earlier, the FMLN
became Latin America’s first non-triumphant former guerrilla movement to take
power by the ballot. After FMLN candidate Mauricio Funes defeated the long-time Teaching Tools
governing anti-communists from the Alianza Republicana Nacionalist (ARENA),
scholars of Salvadoran politics viewed his first-ever left-wing government as the ^
dawning of a new democratic era, echoing the Salvadoran left’s high hopes that change
was afoot. Hence, foremost among the questions raised by the FMLN’s electoral
implosion is: what went wrong?
In 2009-10 I conducted ethnographic research on former Salvadoran rebels, The Role of Anthropology in Brenneis on Translating
documenting part of what in retrospect foreshadowed problems to come. My first Public Debates on Value and Emergent
observation was that different FMLN offices were flooded with people looking for Climate Transformations Academic Futures
work. Job seekers waited around for hours to buttonhole one of the leaders entering or
leaving the office, hoping the party now in government would reward them for
previous service. Many had been guerrilla fighters before and believed the FMLN owed
them.
General view during the Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberacion Nacional Party event at Cuscatlan
Stadium on September 09, 2018 in San Salvador, El Salvador. Hugo Martinez and Karina Sosa were
proclaimed on Sunday as candidates for the presidency and vice presidency of the Republic of El Salvador
by the Frente Farabundo Marti para Liberacion Nacional (FMLN), in the XXXVI National Ordinary
Convention. (Photo by Alex Peña / Getty Images)
The veterans’ representatives in turn emphasized that those who obtained a job
contract had a moral obligation to continue participating in the FMLN meetings.
Furthermore, all employed veterans were required to pay the “party quota”–a monthly
fee recollected by a designated FMLN representative. Ainhoa Montoya (2018)
identified similar interactions when researching political activism in one of El
Salvador’s smaller cities. Echoing the well-known Salvadoran poet Roque Dalton,
FMLN supporters repeatedly argued that after decades of state capture by ARENA,
now ‘the turn of those offended’ had finally come.
Beyond clientelism, the FMLN’s internal political culture was also laden with distrust
and authoritarianism. “The price for treason is blood!” I read on the bathroom door
inside a FMLN office. Many FMLN supporters combined a profound distrust for their
right-wing ‘enemies’ with suspicion regarding alleged ‘traitors’ in their ranks. Sectarian
strife, internal purges, and other grim experiences of clandestine armed struggle had
left deep marks within the FMLN. The post-war implementation of democratic debate
and procedures had proven tumultuous. In a controversial 2005 move, the leadership
reined in factional strife by replacing democratic procedures with Leninist ‘democratic
centralism’, the same principle of unity and control used during armed struggle
(Sprenkels 2018, 257). Two decades after the war, a tiny group of former ‘comandantes’
rotated through key leadership positions, popularly known as the ‘merry-go-round’.
Paradoxically, firm hierarchical control strengthened the FMLN’s electoral chances at
first, as it allowed the party leadership to negotiate electoral pacts and other trade-offs.
The comandantes also benefitted from Venezuela’s generous sponsorship–which eased
competing with ARENA, traditionally a much better-funded party.
Unsurprisingly, many critical activists abandoned the FMLN. During the 1990s,
movement participants already commonly expressed disenchantment, both with party
affairs as well as with what they viewed as the limited gains of democratic transition
(Silber 2011). While revolutionary ties were closely-knit during the harsh years of the
war, the peace process had accentuated the differences between leaders and rank-and-
file, between urbanites and peasants, between men and women, and among the
different guerrilla groups. These divides placed pressures on the movement’s internal
solidarity and gradually fueled more utilitarian forms of interaction. Longtime
revolutionaries explained to me they had disengaged from party activities because the
atmosphere was “insufferable.” The problem–as explained to me by an experienced
FMLN organizer–was that the leadership, rather than adopting democratic practices,
had internalized the vices of traditional politics: caudillismo, compadrazgo (a form of
nepotism), and the appropriation of state resources.
Some of the accused in the case of former Salvadoran president (2009-2014), Mauricio Funes’ graft
scandal, await under custody, at the court in San Salvador on June 8, 2018. El Salvador called for the arrest
of ex-president Mauricio Funes, accusing his administration of the ‘outrageous’ embezzlement of $351
million before he was granted asylum in Nicaragua. Attorney General Douglas Melendez said he had also
ordered the arrest of around 30 former Funes cabinet officials and other close associates, though he
admitted that some, like Funes, were abroad. (Photo by Oscar Rivera / AFP / Getty Images)
WORKS CITED
Montoya, Ainhoa. 2018. The Violence of Democracy: Political Life in Postwar El Salvador.
New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Silber, Irina Carlota. 2011. Everyday Revolutionaries. Gender, Violence and Disillusionment
in )Postwar El Salvador. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.
Sprenkels, Ralph. 2018. After Insurgency. Revolution and Electoral Politics in El Salvador.
Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
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