ALFONSO MONTEBON vs.

THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS

Facts: This is a petition for habeas corpus by Alfonso Montebon on behalf of Elpidio S. Cruz, a
prisoner at the Iwahig Penal Colony. A similar petition was filed with this Court by
Felicisima Santiago in the name of the same prisoner (Santiago vs. Director of Prisons,
77 Phil., 927), a petition which was denied by us in a decision promulgated on January
30, 1947. The ground of the first petition was the alleged illegality of one of the prisoner's
three convictions for estafa. The present application contests the validity of the
prisoner's recommitment decreed by the Commissioner of Justice of the Philippine
Executive Commission under date of June 3, 1943, for the unexpired portion of his
(prisoner's) maximum aggregate sentences in three cases in which he had been paroled
by the Board of Indeterminate Sentence on June 26, 1941, when he still had over five
years to serve. The commissioner of Justice's recommitment order was made by virtue of
Administrative Order No. 21, dated June 21, 1942, and approved by the Chairman of the
Executive Commission, which read: "The Board of Indeterminate Sentence and the
Board of Pardons having been abolished, the powers, duties and functions thereof shall
henceforth be assumed and exercised by the Commissioner of Justice.

Issue: Won the recommitment order valid during the Japanese Occupation?

Held: The petition is denied without costs.

Ruling: Enforcement of the criminal law by the forces of occupation is not only valid and
binding; it is imposed on them as a high obligation by the Hague Convention and the
theory of jus postlimitinii on the international Law. That the legal truism in political and
international law that all acts and proceedings of the legislative, executive and judicial
departments of a de facto government are good and valid." The reason underlying
requirement is thus stated in William vs. Bruffy (96 U.S., 176, 192), cited in Co Kim
Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, supra:

"The existence of a state of insurrection and war did not loosen the bonds of society, or
do away with civil government or the regular administration of the laws. Order was to be
preserved, police regulations maintained, crime prosecuted, property protected, contracts
enforced, marriages celebrated, estates settled, and the transfer and descent of property
regulated, precisely as in the time of peace. No one, that we are aware of, seriously questions the
validity of judicial or legislative Acts in the
ROMANA LOCQUIAO VALENCIA and CONSTANCIA L. VALENCIA,
petitioners, vs. BENITO A. LOCQUIAO, now deceased and substituted by
JIMMY LOCQUIAO, TOMASA MARA and the REGISTRAR OF DEEDS OF
PANGASINAN, respondents.
CONSTANCIA L. VALENCIA, petitioner, vs. BENITO A. LOCQUIAO, now
deceased and substituted by JIMMY LOCQUIAO, respondent.

Facts: Locquiao spouses executed a deed of donation propter nuptias written in Ilocano in
favor of their son, Benito and his soon-to-be bride, Tomasa Mara. By the terms of the
agreement, the donation consist of 4 parcels of land, one male cow and 1/3 of the conjugal house
of the spouses Locquiao. The marriage took place on 1944. The spouses died on 1962 and 1968,
respectively leaving their 6 children as heirs. With the permission of Benito, Romana, one of the
heirs took over the possession of the donated lands and cultivated it. When her husband got
sick, her daughter, Constancia took over the position in cultivating the land.

Meanwhie Benito and Tomasa registered the Inventario Ti Sagut leaving the old title cancelled.

Later, the heirs of the Locquiao spouses, including respondent Benito and petitioner Romana,
executed a Deed of Partition with Recognition of Rights, wherein they distributed among 3 out
of the 12 parcels of land left by their common progenitors, excluding the land in question and
other lots disposed of by the Locquiao spouses earlier. Contained in the deed is a statement
that respondent Benito and Marciano Locquiao, along with the heirs of Lucio Locquiao,
“have already received our shares in the estates of our parents, by virtue of previous donations
and conveyances,” and that for that reason the heirs of Lucio Locquaio were not made parties to
the deed. All the living children of the Locquaio spouses at the time, including petitioner
Romana, confirmed the previous dispositions and waived their rights to whomsoever the
properties covered by the deed of partition were adjudicated.

Subsequently, disagreements among the heirs surfaced leading to execution of deed of

compromise agreement. Benito, although not directly involved, signed the agreement. Sometime
in 1983, Constancia filed for the annulment of the agreement. The lower court dismissed
the petition. This lead an ejectment case raised by Benito in favor of Constancia. Petitioners
Romana and Constancia countered with a Complaint for the annulment of the donated and
registered land against respondents Benito and Tomasa. Petitioners alleged that the issuance
of the transfer certificate of title was fraudulent; that the Inventario Ti Sagut is spurious; that
the notary public who notarized the document had no authority to do so, and; that the donation
did not observe the form required by law as there was no written acceptance on the document
itself or in a separate public instrument.

Issue: (1) whether the donation propter nuptias is authentic; (2) whether acceptance
of the donation by the donees is required; (3) if so, in what form should the acceptance
appear, and; (4) whether the action is barred by prescription and laches.

Held:
- 1st Issue: To buttress their claim that the document was falsified, the petitioners
rely mainly on the Certification that there was no notarial record for the year 1944 of Cipriano V.
Abenojar who notarized the document on May 22, 1944 and that therefore a copy of
the document was not available. The certification is not sufficient to prove the alleged
inexistence or spuriousness of the challenged document. The mere absence of the notarial
record does not prove that the notary public does not have a valid notarial commission and
neither does the absence of a file copy of the document with the archives effect evidence
of the falsification of the document. The failure of the notary public to furnish a copy of the
deed to the appropriate office is a ground for disciplining him, but certainly not for invalidating
the document or for setting aside the transaction therein involved.

Moreover, the heirs of the Locquaio spouses, including petitioner Romana, made reference
in the deed of partition and the compromise agreement to the previous donations
made by the spouses in favor of some of the heirs. Benito was not allotted any share in the
deed of partition precisely because he received his share by virtue of previous donations. His
name was mentioned in the deed of partition only with respect to one parcel of land which is the
eleventh (11th) parcel in the deed but that is the same one-third (1/3) portion of conjugal lot
of their progenitors included in the donation propter nuptias. Similarly, Marciano
Locquiao and the heirs of Lucio Locquiao were not allocated any more share in the deed of
partition since they received theirs by virtue of prior donations or conveyances.

- 2nd Issue: No. Unlike ordinary donations, donations propter nuptias or donations by reason
of marriage are those “made before its celebration, in consideration of the same and in
favor of one or both of the future spouses.” The distinction is crucial because the two
classes of donations are not governed by exactly the same rules, especially as regards the
formal essential requisites. Under the Old Civil Code, donations propter nuptias must be made
in a public instrument in which the property donated must be specifically described.
However, Article 1330 of the same Code provides that “acceptance is not necessary to the
validity of such gifts”. In other words, the celebration of the marriage between the beneficiary
couple, in tandem with compliance with the prescribed form, was enough to effectuate the
donation propter nuptias under the Old Civil Code.

Under the New Civil Code, the rules are different. Article 127 thereof provides that the
form of donations propter nuptias are regulated by the Statute of Frauds. Article 1403,
paragraph 2, which contains the Statute of Frauds requires that the contracts mentioned
thereunder need be in writing only to be enforceable. However, as provided in Article 129,
express acceptance “is not necessary for the validity of these donations.” Thus, implied
acceptance is sufficient.

It is settled that only laws existing at the time of the execution of a contract are applicable
thereto and not later statutes, unless the latter are specifically intended to have
retroactive effect.

Consequently, it is the Old Civil Code which applies in this case since the donation propter
nuptias was executed in 1944 and the New Civil Code took effect only on August 30, 1950. The
fact that in 1944 the Philippines was still under Japanese occupation is of no consequence. It is a
well-known rule of the Law of Nations that municipal laws, as contra-distinguished from laws of
political nature, are not abrogated by a change of sovereignty. Thus, the Old Civil Code was in
force. As a consequence, applying Article 1330 of the Old Civil Code in the determination of the
validity of the questioned donation, it does not matter whether or not the donees had accepted
the donation. The validity of the donation is unaffected in either case. Even if the provisions of
the New Civil Code were to be applied, the case of the petitioners would collapse just the same.
As earlier shown, even implied acceptance of a donation propter nuptias suffices under
the New Civil Code.

- 3rd Issue: It is barred by prescription. Under the Old Code of Civil Procedure, an action for
recovery of the title to, or possession of, real property, or an interest therein, can only be
brought within ten years after the cause of such action accrues. Thus, petitioners’ action, which
was filed on December 23, 1985, or more than forty (40) years from the execution of the deed of
donation on May 22, 1944, was clearly time-barred. Even following petitioners’ theory that the
prescriptive period should commence from the time of discovery of the alleged fraud, the
conclusion would still be the same. As early as May 15, 1970, when the deed of donation was
registered and the transfer certificate of title was issued, petitioners were considered to have
constructive knowledge of the alleged fraud, following the jurisprudential rule that
registration of a deed in the public real estate registry is constructive notice to the whole world
of its contents, as well as all interests, legal and equitable, included therein. As it is now settled
that the prescriptive period for the reconveyance of property allegedly registered through
fraud is ten (10) years, reckoned from the date of the issuance of the certificate of title, the
action filed on December 23, 1985 has clearly prescribed.

The elements of laches are present in this case, viz:

(1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or one under whom he claims, giving rise to the
situation that led to the complaint and for which the complainant seeks a remedy;
(2) delay in asserting the complainant’s rights, having had knowledge or notice of
defendant’s conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit;
(3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert
the right on which he bases his suit, and
(4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the
suit is not held barred Of the facts which support the finding of laches, stress should be made of
the following: (a) the petitioners Romana unquestionably gained actual knowledge of the
donation propter nuptias when the deed of partition was executed in 1973 and the information
must have surfaced again when the compromise agreement was forged in 1976, and; (b) as
petitioner Romana was a party-signatory to the two documents, she definitely had the
opportunity to question the donation propter nuptias on both occasions, and she should have
done so if she were of the mindset, given the fact that she was still in possession of the land in
dispute at the time. But she did not make any move. She tarried for 11 more years from the
execution of the deed of partition until she, together with petitioner Constancia, filed the
annulment case in 1985.

in their purpose or mode of enforcement to the authority of the National Government, and did
not impair the rights of citizens under the Constitution." The same doctrine has been
asserted in numerous other cases.
LAWYER’S LEAGUE vs AQUINO

Facts:
On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing
that she and Vice President Laurel were taking power.

On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino
government assumption of power by stating that the "new government was installed through a
direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of
the Philippines.

The petitioners claim that her government is illegal because it was not established
pursuant to the 1973 Constitution. Thus, the legitimacy of the government of President Cory
Aquino is being questioned.

Issue:
W/N the government of Aquino is legitimate

Held:
Petitioners had no personality to sue and petition states no cause of action.

Ruling:
a.)Legitimacy of Aquino gov’t belongs to realm of politics where only the people of the
Philippines are the judge (not a justiciable matter)
b.) The people have made the judgment, accepting the Aquino gov’t w/c is in effective
control of the entire country.
c.) Aquino gov’t is not merely a de facto gov’t but in fact and law a de jure gov’t..
d.) Community of nations has recognized its legitimacy.
e.) All 11 members of SC have sworn to uphold the fundamental law of the Republic
under Aquino gov’t.

The legitimacy of the Aquino admimistration is not a justiciable matter but a political
one. It is political because it belongs to the realm of politics where only the people of the
Philippines are the judge.

The Aquino government is a de jure and a de facto government for the people have made
the judgment and have accepted the government of President Aquino which is in effective
control of the entire country.

The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present government and
all the 11 members of the Supreme Court have sworn to uphold the fundamental law of the
Republic under her government.
LETTER OF ASSOCIATE JUSTICE PUNO

Facts:
Petitioner Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno, a member of the Court of Appeals, wrote a letter
dated 14 November 1990 addressed to this Court, seeking the correction of his seniority ranking
in the Court of Appeals.

The aftermath of the EDSA Revolution in February 1986 brought about a reorganization of the
entire government, including the Judiciary. To effect the reorganization of the Intermediate
Appellate Court and other lower courts, a Screening Committee was created. President Corazon
C. Aquino, exercising legislative powers by virtue of the revolution, issued Executive Order No.
33 to govern the aforementioned reorganization of the Judiciary. When the appointments were
signed by President Aquino on 28 July 1986, petitioner’s seniority ranking changed, however,
from number eleven (11) to number twenty six (26).

Petitioner now alleges that the change in his seniority ranking could only be attributed to
inadvertence for, otherwise, it would run counter to the provisions of Section 2 of Executive
Order No. 33, which reads:
"SEC. 2. Organization. — There is hereby created a Court of Appeals which shall consist
of a Presiding Justice and fifty Associate Justices who shall be appointed by the
President of the Philippines”…

A motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the Court en banc dated 29 November 1990
was later filed by Associate Justices Jose C. Campos, Jr. and Luis A. Javellana, two (2) of the
Associate Justices affected by the ordered correction. They contend that the present Court of
Appeals is a new Court with fifty one (51) members and that petitioner could not claim a
reappointment to a prior court; neither can he claim that he was returning to his former court,
for the courts where he had previously been appointed ceased to exist at the date of his last
appointment.

Issue:
- WON the Executive Order No. 33 is questionable regarding the reappointment and
reconsideration of the ranking of Associate Justice Reynato Puno.
- WON the the B.P Blg 129 is effective in the time of the new regime of President Corazon
Aquino.

Ruling:
The Court GRANTS the Motion for Reconsideration and the seniority rankings of members of
the Court of Appeals, including that of the petitioner, at the time the appointments were made
by the President in 1986, are recognized and upheld.

Rationale:
The Court holds that the Court of Appeals and Intermediate Appellate Court existing prior to
Executive Order No. 33 phased out as part of the legal system abolished by the revolution and
that the Court of Appeals established under Executive Order No. 33 was an entirely new court
with appointments thereto having no relation to earlier appointments to the abolished courts,
and that the reference to precedence in rank contained in the last sentence of Sec. 2, BP Blg. No.
129 as amended by Executive Order No. 33 refers to prospective situations as distinguished from
retroactive ones.
It is to be noted that, at the time of the issuance of Executive Order No. 33, President Aquino
was still exercising the powers of a revolutionary government, encompassing both executive and
legislative powers, such that she could, if she so desired, amend, modify or repeal any part of
B.P. Blg. 129 or her own Executive Order No. 33. It should also be remembered that the same
situation was still in force when she issued the 1986 appointments to the Court of Appeals. In
other words, President Aquino, at the time of the issuance of the 1986 appointments, modified
or disregarded the rule embodied in B.P. Blg. 129 as amended by Executive Order No. 33, on
precedence or seniority in the case of the petitioner, for reasons known only to her. Since the
appointment extended by the President to the petitioner in 1986 for membership in the new
Court of Appeals with its implicit ranking in the roster of justices, was a valid appointment
anchored on the President’s exercise of her then revolutionary powers, it is not for the Court at
this time to question or correct that exercise.
Tañada vs. Tuvera
G.R. No. L-63915 (146 SCRA 446) April 24, 1985

FACTS: Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure or a
number of presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative
orders, invoking the right to be informed on matters of public concern as
recognized by the 1973 constitution, which they claimed had not been published
as required by law. The government argued that while publication was necessary
as a rule, it was not so when it was "otherwise provided," as when the decrees
themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their
approval. The Court held that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to
the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which
cannot in any event be omitted. The Court noted the conclusive presumption that
every person knows the law, which presupposes that the law has been published
if the presumption is to have any legal justification.

ISSUE: Whether or not all laws shall be published in the official gazette.

RULING: The court held that all statute including those of local application shall be
published as condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after
publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

The publication must be full or no publication at all since its purpose is to inform
the public of the content of the laws. The clause “unless otherwise provided” in
Article 2 of the new Civil Code meant that the publication required therein was
not always imperative, that the publication when necessary, did not have to be
made in the official gazette.

RATIONALE: The clear object of the necessity of publication is to give the general public
adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and
conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis
for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the
height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of
a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general
applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for
fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or
the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other
presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons
such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the
assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned.
Tanada, et al. versus Angara, et al., G.R. No. 118295. May 2, 1997
272 SCRA 18

EN BANC

THE FACTS

On April 15, 1994, the Secretary of the Department of Trade and Industry (Rizalino
Navarro), representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in the Final
Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations. By signing the
Final Act, the Philippines, among other countries, was put into WTO Agreement requiring the
Philippines to place nationals and products of member-countries on the same footing as
Filipinos and local products. As a consequence, the President sought for a Senate concurrence
pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution. However, the petitioners assailed the
WTO Agreement for violating the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to develop a self-reliant and
independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos, to give preference to qualified
Filipinos and to promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally
produced goods.

THE ISSUES
(1) DOES THE PETITION PRESENT A JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY?
OTHERWISE STATED, DOES THE PETITION INVOLVE A POLITICAL
QUESTION OVER WHICH THIS COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION?
(2) DO THE PROVISIONS OF THE WTO AGREEMENT AND ITS THREE
ANNEXES CONTRAVENE SEC. 19, ARTICLE II, AND SECS. 10 AND 12,
ARTICLE XII, OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION?
(3) DO THE PROVISIONS OF SAID AGREEMENT AND ITS ANNEXES LIMIT,
RESTRICT, OR IMPAIR THE EXERCISE OF LEGISLATIVE POWER BY
CONGRESS?
(4) DO SAID PROVISIONS UNDULY IMPAIR OR INTERFERE WITH THE
EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL POWER BY THIS COURT IN PROMULGATING
RULES ON EVIDENCE?
(5) WAS THE CONCURRENCE OF THE SENATE IN THE WTO AGREEMENT
AND ITS ANNEXES SUFFICIENT AND/OR VALID, CONSIDERING THAT
IT DID NOT INCLUDE THE FINAL ACT, MINISTERIAL DECLARATIONS
AND DECISIONS, AND THE UNDERSTANDING ON COMMITMENTS IN
FINANCIAL SERVICES?

First Issue: JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY

The Court responded that “in deciding to take jurisdiction over this petition, this Court
will not review the wisdom of the decision of the President and the Senate in enlisting the
country into the WTO, or pass upon the merits of trade liberalization as a policy espoused by
said international body. Neither will it rule on the propriety of the governments economic policy
of reducing/removing tariffs, taxes, subsidies, quantitative restrictions, and other import/trade
barriers. Rather, it will only exercise its constitutional duty to determine whether or not there
had been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
the Senate in ratifying the WTO Agreement and its three annexes.”

Second Issue: WHETHER OR NOT THE CONSTITUTION CONTRAVENES

There was no contravention of the Constitution specifically on the provisions in Section 19,
Article II, and Sections 10 and 12, Article XII. These provisions read as follows:
Article II, Sec. 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy
effectively controlled by Filipinos.

Article XII, Sec. 10. x x x. The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the formation
and operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.

In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony,
the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.

Article 12, Sec. 12. The State shall promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic
materials and locally produced goods, and adopt measures that help make them competitive.
Article II of the Constitution is a declaration of principles and state policies. The principles in
Article II are not intended to be self-executing principles ready for enforcement through the
courts. They do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for
legislation.

Third Issue: THE WTO AGREEMENT AND LEGISLATIVE POWER

The Court stressed that, “as shown by the foregoing treaties, a portion of sovereignty may
be waived without violating the Constitution, based on the rationale that the Philippines adopts
the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres
to the policy of . . . cooperation and amity with all nations.”

Fourth Issue: The WTO AGREEMENT AND JUDICIAL POWER

The Court says that:
“The requirement of Article 34 to provide a disputable presumption applies only if (1) the
product obtained by the patented process is NEW or (2) there is a substantial likelihood that the
identical product was made by the process and the process owner has not been able through
reasonable effort to determine the process used. Where either of these two provisos does not
obtain, members shall be free to determine the appropriate method of implementing the
provisions of TRIPS within their own internal systems and processes.
By and large, the arguments adduced in connection with our disposition of the third issue
-- derogation of legislative power - will apply to this fourth issue also. Suffice it to say that the
reciprocity clause more than justifies such intrusion, if any actually exists. Besides, Article 34
does not contain an unreasonable burden, consistent as it is with due process and the concept of
adversarial dispute settlement inherent in our judicial system.
So too, since the Philippine is a signatory to most international conventions on patents,
trademarks and copyrights, the adjustment in legislation and rules of procedure will not be
substantial.”

Fifth Issue: CONCURRENCE ONLY IN THE WTO AGREEMENT AND NOT IN OTHER
DOCUMENTS CONTAINED IN THE FINAL ACT
Petitioners allege that the Senate concurrence in the WTO Agreement and its annexes --
but not in the other documents referred to in the Final Act, namely the Ministerial Declaration
and Decisions and the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services -- is defective and
insufficient and thus constitutes abuse of discretion. They submit that such concurrence in the
WTO Agreement alone is flawed because it is in effect a rejection of the Final Act, which in turn
was the document signed by Secretary Navarro, in representation of the Republic upon
authority of the President. They contend that the second letter of the President to the Senate
which enumerated what constitutes the Final Act should have been the subject of concurrence of
the Senate.
THE RULING
The Court DISMISSED the petition for LACK OF MERIT. The concurrence of the Philippine
Senate to the President’s ratification of the Agreement establishing the WTO is sustained.
DOMINO vs. COMELEC

FACTS:
On 25 March 1998, DOMINO filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative
of the Province of Sarangani indicating in his certificate that he had resided in the constituency
where he seeks to be elected for one (1) year and two (2) months immediately preceding the
election. On 6 May 1998, the COMELEC 2nd Division promulgated a resolution declaring
DOMINO disqualified as candidate for the position of representative of Sarangani for lack of the
one-year residence requirement and likewise ordered the cancellation of his certificate of
candidacy.

ISSUE/S:
1. WON a summary proceeding for the exclusion or inclusion of voters in the list of voters
declaring DOMINO a resident of the province of Sarangani and not of Quezon City acquire the
nature of res judicata.
2. WON DOMINO was a resident of the Province of Sarangani for at least one year immediately
preceding the election.
3. Whether the COMELEC or the HRET has jurisdiction over the present petition of DOMINO.
4. WON, the candidate who received the next highest number of votes can be proclaimed as the
winning candidate in the light of DOMINO’s disqualification?

RULING:
1.No. The contention of DOMINO that the decision in the exclusion proceedings declaring him a
resident of the Province of Sarangani and not of Quezon City is final and conclusive upon the
COMELEC cannot be sustained. It is not within the competence of the trial court, in an
exclusion proceeding, to declare the challenged voter a resident of another municipality. The
jurisdiction of the lower court over exclusion cases is limited only to determining the right of
voter to remain in the list of voters or to declare that the challenged voter is not qualified to vote
in the precinct in which he is registered, specifying the ground of the voter's disqualification.

Finally, the application of the rule on res judicata is unavailing.For the decision to be a basis for
the dismissal by reason of res judicata, it is essential that there must be between the first and
the second action identity of parties, identity of subject matter and identity of causes of action.

2. No. It is doctrinally settled that the term "residence," as used in the law prescribing the
qualifications for suffrage and for elective office, means the same thing as "domicile," which
imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place,
coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.

A person's "domicile" once established is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost
until a new one is established. 25 To successfully effect a change of domicile one must
demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of
abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which
correspond with the purpose. 26 In other words, there must basically
be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi.

3. The COMELEC, has jurisdiction over the present petition. The fact of obtaining the highest
number of votes in an election does not automatically vest the position in the winning
candidate. 41 A candidate must be proclaimed and must have taken his oath of office before he
can be considered a member of the House of Representatives. Considering that DOMINO has
not been proclaimed as Congressman-elect in the Lone Congressional District of the Province of
Sarangani he cannot be deemed a member of the House of Representatives. Hence, it is the
COMELEC and not the Electoral Tribunal which has jurisdiction over the issue of his
ineligibility as a candidate.

4. NO. The candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be proclaimed
winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified. It would be extremely repugnant to the
basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not
acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the
representative of a constituency, the majority of which have positively declared through their
ballots that they do not choose him.
TONDO MEDICAL CENTER EMPLOYEES V. CA

Facts:
President Estrada issued Executive Order No. 102, entitled “Redirecting the Functions and
Operations of the Department of Health,” which provided for the changes in the roles, functions,
and organizational processes of the DOH. Under the assailed executive order, the DOH
refocused its mandate from being the sole provider of health services to being a provider of
specific health services and technical assistance, as a result of the devolution of basic services to
local government units.

Petitioners questioned the first reform agenda involving the fiscal autonomy of government
hospitals, particularly the collection of socialized user fees and the corporate restructuring of
government hospitals. The said provision under the HSRA reads:
Provide fiscal autonomy to government hospitals. Government hospitals
must be allowed to collect socialized user fees so they can reduce the dependence
on direct subsidies from the government. Their critical capacities like diagnostic
equipment, laboratory facilities and medical staff capability must be upgraded to
effectively exercise fiscal autonomy. Such investment must be cognizant of
complimentary capacity provided by public-private networks. Moreover such
capacities will allow government hospitals to supplement priority public health
programs. Appropriate institutional arrangement must be introduced such as
allowing them autonomy towards converting them into government corporations
without compromising their social responsibilities. As a result, government
hospitals are expected to be more competitive and responsive to health needs.

Petitioners alleged that the implementation of the aforementioned reforms had resulted in
making free medicine and free medical services inaccessible to economically disadvantaged
Filipinos. Thus, they alleged that the HSRA is void for being in violation of the following
constitutional provisions:
ART. III, SEC. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without
due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the law.

ART II, SEC. 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life,
liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for
the enjoyment of all the people of the blessings of democracy.

ART II, SEC. 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will
ensure the prosperity and independence of the nation and free the people from
poverty through policies that provide adequate social services, promote full
employment, a rising standard of living and an improved quality of life for all.

ART II, SEC. 10. The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national
development.

ART II, SEC. 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and
guarantees full respect for human rights.

ART II, SEC. 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-
building and shall promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual,
intellectual and social well-being x x x.
 ART II, SEC. 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It
shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare.

ART XV, SEC. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the
nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total
development.

ART XV, SEC. 3. The State shall defend:

(2) the right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and
special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other
conditions prejudicial to their development.

ART XIII, SEC. 14. The State shall protect working women by providing safe and
healthful working conditions, taking into account their maternal functions, and
such facilities and opportunities that will enhance their welfare and enable them
to realize their full potential in the service of the nation.

ART II, SEC. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the
people and instill health consciousness among them.

ART XIII, SEC. 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive
approach to health development which shall endeavor to make essential goods,
health and other social services available to all people at affordable cost. There
shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged sick, elderly, disabled,
women, and children. The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to
paupers.

Issue: Whether or not Executive Order 102 is constitutional?

Held:
Yes. Petitioners allege that the HSRA should be declared void, since it runs counter to the
aspiration and ideals of the Filipino people as embodied in the Constitution. They claim that the
HSRA’s policies of fiscal autonomy, income generation, and revenue enhancement violate
Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15 and 18 of Article II, Section 1 of Article III; Sections 11 and 14
of Article XIII; and Sections 1 and 3 of Article XV of the 1987Constitution. Such policies
allegedly resulted in making inaccessible free medicine and free medical services.

This contention is unfounded. As a general rule, the provisions of the Constitution

areconsidered self-executing, and do not require future legislationfor their enforcement. For if
they are not treated as self-executing, the mandate of the fundamental law can be easilynullified
by the inaction of Congress. However, some provisionshave already been categorically declared
by this Court as nonself-executing.

In Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation,this Court declared that Sections 11,
12, and 13 of Article II; Section 13 of Article XIII; and Section 2 of Article XIV of the1987
Constitution are not self-executing provisions.

In Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, the Court referred to Section 1 of Article XIII and Section 2
of Article XIV of the Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not as judicially enforceable
rights. These provisions, which merely lay down a general principle, are distinguished from
other constitutional provisions as non self-executing and, therefore, cannot give rise to a cause
of action in the courts; they do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights.

Some of the constitutional provisions invoked in the present case were taken from Article II of
the Constitution -- specifically, Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15 and 18 -- the provisions of which the
Court categorically ruled to be non self-executing in the aforecited case of Tañada v. Angara.
Moreover, the records are devoid of any explanation of how the HSRA supposedly violated the
equal protection and due process clauses that are embodied in Section 1 of Article III of the
Constitution. There were no allegations of discrimination or of the lack of due process in
connection with the HSRA. Since they failed to substantiate how these constitutional guarantees
were breached, petitioners are unsuccessful in establishing the relevance of this provision to the
petition, and consequently, in annulling the HSRA. In the remaining provisions, Sections 11 and
14 of Article XIII and Sections 1 and 3 of Article XV, the State accords recognition to the
protection of working women and the provision for safe and healthful working conditions; to the
adoption of an integrated and comprehensive approach to health; to the Filipino family; and to
the right of children to assistance and special protection, including proper care and nutrition.
Like the provisions that were declared as non self-executory in the cases of Basco v. Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation and Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, they are mere
statements of principles and policies. As such, they are mere directives addressed to the
executive and the legislative departments. If unheeded, the remedy will not lie with the courts;
but rather, the electorate’s displeasure may be manifested in their votes
ANTONIO M. SERRANO (Petitioner)
vs
GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES, INC. AND MARLOW NAVIGATION CO., INC.,
(Respondents)
G.R. No. 167614
March 24, 2009

FACTS:
Antonio Serrano (Petitioner), a Filipino seafarer, was hired by Gallant Maritime Services,
Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Ltd. (Respondents) under a Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA)-approved Contract of Employment with the following terms and
conditions:

Duration of contract 12 months

Position Chief Officer
Basic monthly salary US $1,400.00
Hours of work 48 hours/week
Overtime US $700.00/month
Vacation leave with pay 7 days/month

On March 19, 1998, the date of his departure, petitioner was constrained to accept a
downgraded employment contract for the position of Second Officer with a salary of US
$1,000.00/month upon the assurance and representation of respondents that he would be made
Chief Officer by the end of April 1998. However, the respondents did not deliver on their
promise to make the petitioner Chief Officer. The petitioner refused to stay on as Second Officer
and he returned to the Philippines on May 26, 1998.

Since the petitioner’s employment contract was for a period of 12 months (March 19,
1998 to March 19, 1999), he had served for only 2 months and 7 days of his contract, leaving an
unexpired portion of 9 months and 23 days. Petitioner filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a
complaint against respondents for constructive dismissal and for payment of his money claims.
LA rendered the dismissal of petitioner illegal and awarding him monetary benefits.
Respondents appealed to the NLRC to question the finding of the LA. On the other hand, the
petitioner also appealed to the NLRC on the sole issue that the LA erred in not applying the
ruling of the Court in Triple Integrated Services, Inc. vs NLRC that in case of illegal dismissal,
OFWs are entitled to their salaries for the unexpired portion of their contracts. Petitioner filed a
Motion for Partial Reconsideration. He questioned the constitutionality of the subject clause. CA
affirmed the NLRC ruling on the reduction of the applicable salary rate however, the CA skirted
the constitutional issue raised by petitioner. The last clause in the 5th par. Of Section 10, R.A. No.
8042 states that:

Sec. 10. Money Claims. – In case of termination of overseas employment without just,
valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the workers shall be entitled to the full
reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of 12% per annum, plus his salaries for the
unexpired portion of his employment contract or for 3 months for every year of the unexpired
term, whichever is less.

The NLRC and the CA computed the lump-sum salary of petitioner at the monthly rate of
US $1,400.00 covering the period of 3 months out of the 9 months and 23 days unexpired
portion of his contract or a total of US $4,200.00. Impugning the constitutionality of the subject
clause, petitioner contends that, in addition to the US $4,200, he is entitled to US $21,182.33
more or a total US $25,382.23 for his salaries for the entire 9 months and 23 days left of his said
contract.

ISSUES:

1. Is petitioner entitled to his monetary claim which is the lump-sum salary for the entire
unexpired portion of his employment contract (12 months) and not just for a period of 3
months?

2. Should petitioner’s overtime and leave pay form part of the salary basis in the
computation of his monetary award, because these are fixed benefit that have been
stipulated into his contract?

HELD:

1. Yes, the petitioner is awarded his salaries for the entire unexpired portion of his contract
(9 months and 23 days) at the rate of US $1,400.00/month. The subject clause “or for
three months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less” in the 5th paragraph
of Sec. 10 R.A. 8042 is declared unconstitutional.

Prior to R.A. No. 8042, OFWs and local workers with fixed-term employment who were
illegally discharged were treated alike in terms of the computation of their money claims
since they were uniformly entitled to their salaries for the entire unexpired portions of
their contracts. But with the enactment of R.A. No. 8042, specifically the adoption of the
subject clause, illegally dismissed OFWs with an unexpired portion of 1 year or more in
their employment contract have since been differently treated in that their money claims
are subject to a 3-month cap, whereas no such limitation is imposed on local workers
with fixed-term employment. The subject clause singles out one classification of OFWs
and burdens it with a peculiar disadvantage.

The Court further holds that the subject clause violates petitioner's right to substantive
due process, for it deprives him of property, consisting of monetary benefits, without any
existing valid governmental purpose. The subject clause being unconstitutional,
petitioner is entitled to his salaries for the entire unexpired period of nine months and 23
days of his employment contract, pursuant to law and jurisprudence prior to the
enactment of R.A. No. 8042.

2. No, the word “salaries” in Section 10 (5) does not include overtime and leave pay. For
seafarers like the petitioner, DOLE Department Order No. 33 series 1996 provides a
Standard Employment Contract of Seafarers, in which salary is understood as the basic
wage, exclusive of overtime, leave pay and other bonuses; whereas overtime pay is
compensation for all work performed in excess of the regular 8 hours and holiday pay is
compensation for any work performed on designated rest days and holidays. With this
definition, there is no basis for the automatic inclusion of overtime and holiday pay in
the computation of petitioner’s monetary rewards unless there is evidence that he
performed during those periods.
ABAS KIDA VS SENATE

FACTS:

Several laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) were enacted
by Congress.

RA No. 6734 is the organic act that established the ARMM and scheduled the first regular
elections for the ARMM regional officials.

RA No. 9054 amended the ARMM Charter and reset the regular elections for the ARMM
regional officials to the second Monday of September 2001.

RA No. 9333 reset for the third time the ARMM regional elections for the 2nd Monday of August
2005 and on the same date every 3 years thereafter. Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM
regional elections should have been held on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations
for these elections and had accepted certificates of candidacies for various regional offices to be
elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the next ARMM regular
elections to May 2013 to coincide with the regular national and local elections of the country. In
these consolidated petitions filed directly with the Supreme Court, the petitioners assailed the
constitutionality of RA No. 10153.

ISSUE:

-WON the passage of RA No. 10153 violate the three-readings-on-separate-days rule under
Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution

-WON RA No. 10153 is unconstitutional

RULING:

No, the passage of RA No. 10153 does not violate the three-readings-on-separate-days
requirement in Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The general rule that before
bills passed by either the House or the Senate can become laws, they pass through three
readings on separate days, is subject to the exception when the President certifies to the
necessity of the bill’s immediate enactment. In the present case, the records show that the
President wrote to the speaker of the House of Representatives to certify the necessity of the
immediate enactment of a law synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and local
elections. The President’s certification exempted both the House and the Senate from having to
comply with the three separate readings requirement.

On the general claim that RA No. 10153 is unconstitutional, we can only reiterate the established
rule that every statute is presumed valid. Congress, thus, has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality of its acts, and the party challenging the validity of a statute has the onerous
task of rebutting this presumption. Any reasonable doubt about the validity of the law should be
resolved in favor of its constitutionality. As this Court declared in Garcia v. Executive
Secretary:94

The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to presume that the
acts of the political departments are valid in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing to
the contrary. To doubt is to sustain. This presumption is based on the doctrine of separation of
powers which enjoins upon each department a becoming respect for the acts of the other
departments. The theory is that as the joint act of Congress and the President of the Philippines,
a law has been carefully studied and determined to be in accordance with the fundamental law
before it was finally enacted.95 [Emphasis ours.]

Given the failure of the petitioners to rebut the presumption of constitutionality in favor of RA
No. 10153, we must support and confirm its validity.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the consolidated petitions assailing the

validity of RA No. 10153 for lack of merit, and UPHOLD the constitutionality of this law.
GR No. 177857-58 September 17, 2009
Philippine Coconut Producers Federationa,
Inc. (COCOFED), vs Republic of the Philippines

Facts:
The motion for reconsideration of the Resolution of the Court dated September 17, 2009, As
may be recalled, the Court, in its resolution adverted to, approved, upon motion of petitioner
Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED), the conversion of the sequestered
753,848,312 Class "A" and "B" common shares of San Miguel Corporation (SMC), registered in
the name of Coconut Industry Investment Fund (CIIF) Holding Companies (hereunder referred
to as SMC Common Shares), into 753,848,312 SMC Series 1 Preferred Shares.

Oppositors-intervenors Salonga, et al. anchor their plea for reconsideration on the submission
or issue that:

The honorable court overlooks the value of the fact that the government, as opposed to the
current administration, is the winning party in the case below and thus has no incentive to
convert.

In this recourse, it would appear that oppositors-intervenors seem unable to accept, in

particular, the soundness angle of the conversion. But as we have explained, the conversion of
the shares along with the safeguards attached thereto will ensure that the value of the shares will
be preserved. In effect, due to the nature of stocks in general and the prevailing business
conditions, the government, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG), chose not to speculate with the CIIF SMC shares, as prima facie public property, in the
hope that there would be a brighter economy in the future, and that the value of the shares
would increase. We must respect the decision of the executive department, absent a clear
showing of grave abuse of discretion.

Issue:
(1) WON the PCGG have the power to convert the sequestered shares of stock.

Held:
The PCGG thoroughly studied and considered the effects of conversion and, based upon such
study, concluded that it would best serve the purpose of maintaining and preserving the value of
the shares of stock to convert the same.

It was proved that the PCGG had exercised proper diligence in reviewing the pros and cons of
the conversion. The efforts PCGG have taken with respect to the desired stock conversion argue
against the notion of grave abuse of discretion.

Under the government established under the Constitution, it is the executive branch, either
pursuant to the residual power of the President or by force of her enumerated powers under the
laws, that has control over all matters pertaining to the disposition of government property or,
in this case, sequestered assets under the administration of the PCGG. Surely, such control is
neither legislative nor judicial.

Apropos the separation of powers doctrine and its relevance to this case, it may well be
appropriate to again quote the following excerpts from the decision in JG Summit Holdings, Inc.
v. Court of Appeals,6 to wit:
The role of the Courts is to ascertain whether a branch or instrumentality of the Government has
transgressed its constitutional boundaries. But the Courts will not interfere with executive or
legislative discretion exercised within those boundaries. Otherwise, it strays into the realm of
policy decision-making.
Zenon R. Perez, petitioner vs. People of the Philippines and Sandiganbayan,
respondents
544 SCRA 532
February 12, 2008

Facts:

 The petitioner verbally admitted that part of the money from public funds was used to
pay for the loan of his late brother, a portion of it was spent for food and the remaining
was spent for medicines.
 An administrative case was filed against the petitioner. He filed an Answer reiterating his
verbal admission.
 Petitioner was charged before the Sandiganbayan with malversation of Public funds. The
petitioner, duly assisted by a counsel de parte entered a plea of “not guilty”.
 A pre-trial was set but the petitioner’s counsel moved for postponement. The
Sandiganbayan proceeded to hear the case due to the presence of witness Arlene R.
Mandin.
 Sandiganbayan dispensed the pre-trial and allowed the prosecution to present its
witness.
 The defense presented evidence through the petitioner himself. He denied the contents
of his first Answer to the administrative case. He claimed it was prepared without
assistance of his counsel, and at the time of his counsel and at the time of preparation, he
was not in peak mental and physical condition.
 Petitioner further alleged that the cash shortage was due to oversight and argued that the
government did not suffer any damage or prejudice since alleged cash shortage was
actually deposited with the Office of the Provincial Treasurer.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the law relied upon in convicting the petitioner and the sentence
imposed is cruel and therefore violates Section 19 Article III (Bill of Rights) of the
Constitution.

Ruling:

The law relied in convicting petitioner is not cruel and unusual. It does not
violate Section 19, Article III of the Bill of Rights

 There is strong presumption of Constitutionality accorded to statutes.

 It is established doctrine that a statute should be construed whenever possible in
harmony with, rather than in violation of, the Constitution. The presumption is that
the legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible and just law and one which operates
no further than may be necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the law. 83 It is
presumed that the legislature has acted within its constitutional powers. So, it is the
generally accepted rule that every statute, or regularly accepted act, is, or will be, or
should be, presumed to be valid and constitutional.
 He who attacks the constitutionality of a law has the onus probandi to show why
such law is repugnant to the Constitution. Failing to overcome its presumption of
constitutionality, a claim that a law is cruel, unusual, or inhuman, like the stance of
petitioner, must fail.
Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar Council,
G.R. No. 202242,
July 17, 2012

Facts: In 1994, instead of having only seven members, an eighth member was added to the JBC
as two representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from the House of
Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, the
JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the representatives
from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote each. At present, Senator
Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously
sit in the JBC as representatives of the legislature. It is this practice that petitioner has
questioned in this petition. Respondents argued that the crux of the controversy is the phrase “a
representative of Congress.” It is their theory that the two houses, the Senate and the House of
Representatives, are permanent and mandatory components of “Congress,” such that the
absence of either divests the term of its substantive meaning as expressed under the
Constitution. Bicameralism, as the system of choice by the Framers, requires that both houses
exercise their respective powers in the performance of its mandated duty which is to legislate.

Thus, when Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution speaks of “a representative from
Congress,” it should mean one representative each from both Houses which comprise the entire
Congress. Respondents further argue that petitioner has no “real interest” in questioning the
constitutionality of the JBC’s current composition. The respondents also question petitioner’s
belated filing of the petition.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not the conditions sine qua non for the exercise of the power of judicial
review have been met in this case; and
(2) Whether or not the current practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8)
members, two (2) of whom are members of Congress, runs counter to the letter and spirit of the
1987 Constitution.

Held:
(1) Yes. The Courts’ power of judicial review is subject to several limitations, namely: (a)
there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the
person challenging the act must have “standing” to challenge; he must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case, such that he has sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a
result of its enforcement; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
possible opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the
case. Generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when these conditions sine qua non are
present, especially when the constitutionality of an act by a co-equal branch of
government is put in issue. The Court disagrees with the respondents’ contention that petitioner
lost his standing to sue because he is not an official nominee for the post of Chief Justice.
While it is true that a “personal stake” on the case is imperative to have locus standi, this
is not to say that only official nominees for the post of Chief Justice can come to the Court and
question the JBC composition for being unconstitutional. The JBC likewise screens and
nominates other members of the Judiciary. Albeit heavily publicized in this regard, the JBC’s
duty is not at all limited to the nominations for the highest magistrate in the land. A vast
number of aspirants to judicial posts all over the country may be affected by the Court’s
ruling. More importantly, the legality of the very process of nominations to the positions in the
Judiciary is the nucleus of the controversy. The claim that the composition of the JBC is illegal
and unconstitutional is an object of concern, not just for a nominee to a judicial post, but
for all citizens who have the right to seek judicial intervention for rectification of legal
blunders.
(2) Yes. The word “Congress” used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used
in its generic sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the
House of Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular
representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC. The seven-member composition of the JBC
serves a practical purpose, that is, to provide a solution should there be a stalemate in voting. It
is evident that the definition of “Congress” as a bicameral body refers to its primary function in
government – to legislate. In the passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit in the distinction of
the role of each house in the process. The same holds true in Congress’ non-legislative powers.
An inter-play between the two houses is necessary in the realization of these powers causing a
vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot simply discount. This, however, cannot be said in the case
of JBC representation because no liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of the
JBC. Hence, the term “Congress” must be taken to mean the entire legislative department. The
Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only. Notwithstanding
its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC, all its prior official
actions are nonetheless valid. Under the doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to the
declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not nullified.
DELA LLANA VS THE CHAIRPERSON, COMMISSION ON AUDIT REYNATO A.
VILLAR
____________________________________________________________

PROVISION:
Conditions for the Exercise of Judicial Review
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. - Article VIII, 1987 Constitution.
____________________________________________________________
Sub topic: The following must be avoided:
 (i) political questions,
 (ii) advisory opinions,
 (iii) moot and academic issues, and
 (iv) no standing.
-FR. BERNAS
____________________________________________________________
THE CASE:
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with a prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order pursuant to Section 7, Article IX-D of the 1987
Constitution, seeking to annul and set aside Commission on Audit (COA) Circular No. 89-299,
which lifted its system of pre-audit of government financial transactions.

FACTS:
 The rationale for the circular was, first, to reaffirm the concept that fiscal responsibility
resides in management as embodied in the Government Auditing Code of the
Philippines; and,

 second, to contribute to accelerating the delivery of public services and improving

government operations by curbing undue bureaucratic red tape and ensuring facilitation
of government transactions, while continuing to preserve and protect the integrity of
these transactions.

 As a taxpayer, Petitioner filed this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65.

 He alleges that the pre-audit duty on the part of the COA cannot be lifted by a mere
circular, considering that pre-audit is a constitutional mandate enshrined in Section 2 of
Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution. He further claims that, because of the lack of pre-
audit by COA, serious irregularities in government transactions have been committed,
such as the P728- million fertilizer fund scam, irregularities in the P550-million call
center laboratory project of the Commission on Higher Education, and many others.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing to raise the constitutional issue.

HELD: Yes.
 This Petition has been filed as a taxpayer’s suit. A taxpayer is deemed to have the
standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is established that public
 funds from taxation have been disbursed in alleged contravention of the law
or the Constitution.

 Petitioner claims that the issuance of Circular No. 89-299 has led to the dissipation of
public funds through numerous irregularities in government financial transactions.
These transactions have allegedly been left unchecked by the lifting of the pre-audit
performed by COA, which, petitioner argues, is its Constitutional duty. Thus, petitioner
has standing to file this suit as a taxpayer, since he would be adversely affected by the
illegal use of public money.
DENNIS A. B. FUNA, Petitioner, vs. THE CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON AUDIT,
REYNALDO A. VILLAR,Respondent.
G.R. No. 192791 | 2012-04-24

FACTS:
Funa filed for a Petition for Certiorari that challenges the constitutionality of the appointment of
Reynaldo A. Villar as Chairman of the Commission on Audit and accordingly prays that a
judgment issue “declaring the unconstitutionality” of the appointment.

President Macapagal-Arroyo appointed Reynaldo A. Villar (Villar) as the third member of the
COA for a term of seven (7) years starting February 2, 2004 until February 2, 2011. Villar was
nominated and appointed as Chairman of the COA. Shortly thereafter, on June 11, 2008, the
Commission on Appointments confirmed his appointment. He was to serve as Chairman of
COA, as expressly indicated in the appointment papers, until the expiration of the original term
of his office as COA Commissioner or on February 2, 2011.

Challenged in this recourse, Villar, in an obvious bid to lend color of title to his hold on the
chairmanship, insists that his appointment as COA Chairman accorded him a fresh term of
seven (7) years which is yet to lapse. He would argue, in fine, that his term of office, as such
chairman, is up to February 2, 2015, or 7 years reckoned from February 2, 2008 when he was
appointed to that position.

Before the Court could resolve this petition, Villar, via a letter dated February 22, 2011
addressed to President Benigno S. Aquino III, signified his intention to step down from office
upon the appointment of his replacement.

ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the petition for certiorari that challenges the constitutionality of the
appointment of villar as chairman of the commission on has been moot and academic.

Held:
Yes. When Villar vacated his position and when President Aquino III named Ma. Gracia Pulido-
Tan as COA Chairman. This development has rendered this petition and the main issue
tendered therein moot and academic.

A case is considered moot and academic when its purpose has become stale,or when it ceases to
present a justiciable controversy owing to the onset of supervening events,so that a resolution of
the case or a declaration on the issue would be of no practical value or use. In such instance,
there is no actual substantial relief which a petitioner would be entitled to, and which will
anyway be negated by the dismissal of the basic petition.

ISSUE: 2. Whether or not the case at bar is an exception to the principle of moot and
academic which still needs for judicial review.

HELD:
Yes. As a general rule, it is not within the SC charge and function to act upon and decide a moot
case. However, in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,We acknowledged and accepted certain
exceptions to the issue of mootness, thus:

The “moot and academic” principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the
courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there
is a grave violation of the Constitution, second, the exceptional character of the situation and the
paramount public interest is involved, third, when constitutional issue raised requires
formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public, and fourth, the
case is capable of repetition yet evading review.

In the present case, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; the case involves a situation of
exceptional character and is of paramount public interest; the constitutional issue raised
requires the formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar and the public; and
the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.

The situation presently obtaining is definitely of such exceptional nature as to necessarily call
for the promulgation of principles that will henceforth “guide the bench, the bar and the public”
should like circumstance arise. Confusion in similar future situations would be smoothed out if
the contentious issues advanced in the instant case are resolved straightaway and settled
definitely. There are times when although the dispute has disappeared, as in this case, it
nevertheless cries out to be addressed.

WHEREFORE the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The appointment of then Commissioner

Reynaldo A. Villar to the position of Chairman of the Commission on Audit to replace Guillermo
N. Carague, whose term of office as such chairman has expired, is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL for violation of Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution.
SO ORDERED.
Ynot vs. IAC
G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987

Facts:
The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January
13, 1984, when they were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo,
for violation of Executive Order No. 626-A where the President has given orders prohibiting the
interprovincial movement of carabaos and the slaughtering of carabaos. Petitioner filed the
present case claiming that the above-mentioned executive order is unconstitutional insofar as it
authorizes outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported across provincial
boundaries. His claim is that the penalty is invalid because it is imposed without according the
owner a right to be heard before a competent and impartial court as guaranteed by due process.
RTC declined to resolve on the constitutionality of the executive order for lack of authority and
also for its presumed validity. IAC affirmed RTC decision.

Issue:
Whether or not RTC and IAC has the authority to declare a law unconstitutional?

Held:

This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in
examining constitutional questions, they are nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same
whenever warranted, subject only to review by the highest tribunal. 6 We have jurisdiction under
the Constitution to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law
or rules of court may provide," final judgments and orders of lower courts in, among others, all
cases involving the constitutionality of certain measures. 7 This simply means that the resolution
of such cases may be made in the first instance by these lower courts.

And while it is true that laws are presumed to be constitutional, that presumption is not by any
means conclusive and in fact may be rebutted. Indeed, if there be a clear showing of their
invalidity, and of the need to declare them so, then "will be the time to make the hammer fall,
and heavily," 8 to recall Justice Laurel's trenchant warning. Stated otherwise, courts should not
follow the path of least resistance by simply presuming the constitutionality of a law when it is
questioned. On the contrary, they should probe the issue more deeply, to relieve the abscess,
paraphrasing another distinguished jurist, 9 and so heal the wound or excise the affliction.