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Christoph Brützel
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The overlap between the customer segments will continue to increase and, accordingly, the
networks and O&Ds offered (true origin true destination itineraries) and, finally, the services
and service combinations offered will increasingly converge. Business models will continue
to hybridize accordingly.
The consolidation of the airline industry, already at an advanced stage in the USA and
Australia, will continue globally, initially in Europe and South America, but ultimately also in
China, India, Southeast Asia and even in the Middle East. This will lead to extended coverage
of the networks of each individual provider, but not to reduced competition if liberalization
continues.
The growth forecasts for the market published by manufacturers and industry associations
are rather at the upper end of realistic developments, especially for the economically
mature regions of the world (North America, Europe). In view of the order lists of aircraft
manufacturers and the well-known longevity of active fleets, it is foreseeable that capacity in
the market as a whole will continue to advance demand in the future.
In the absence of effective differentiation of service products from the customer's point of
view, competition in the event of sustained overcapacity in the market (see third point) will
continue to be conducted via price and thus via costs.
The cross-industry networking of production planning and control systems tends to lead to a
further flattening of vertical value chains and thus potentially to a decoupling of product
management (network management) and production.
(1) Global networks, primarily for business travelers, for long-haul networks also for private
travelers, who, beyond the classic models for organizing transfer connections
(interlining, alliances), organize a frequent and comprehensive range of airport-to-
airport connections and, at best, door-to-door connections.
(2) Point-to-point networks, primarily for private travellers who prefer to operate beyond
the hubs of global network providers. These networks do not focus on the number of
frequencies, but on the price.
(3) Network capacities offered at regional airports for airline customers (ACMI) and for tour
operators (charter), at daytime as hub feeders and during the day for the presentation
of tourist offers for LCC, holiday airlines and tour operators.
The "Airport-to-Airport" section has so far been a proprietary core competence of the
airlines, especially when it comes to the presentation of transfer connections (airline
internal, code sharing, interlining).
The decoupling of network management and production will provide space on the market
side for customer group-specific business models in order to optimally meet the different
needs of business and private travelers.
NDC and One Order are messengers of a development that will ultimately allow not only
airlines but also virtual integrators to organize networks that enable seamless travel for
customers - for themselves and for their baggage, from the airport of embarkation to the
airport of destination and beyond - without the need for airline internal transfer
connections, interlining or code sharing. Global network providers are thus increasingly
becoming "tour operators" for business travelers and, on long-haul routes, also for private
travelers.
Global alliances and coordinated hub schedules will continue to offer significant competitive
advantages for the business travel market and for long-haul connections. Where "in-house
production", e.g. to display feeder flights at the shoulder of the day (overnight costs for
aircraft and crews at the spoke), is not cost-efficient, it is advisable to integrate flights or
partial capacities at the spoke of airline operations into one's own network, whether in the
form of a single ticket from the point of embarkation to the point of disembarkation or also
by combining two or more tickets and organizing the transfer processes separately.
Outsourcing operations of flights in the form of ACMI has already established itself in the
management of regional aircraft. However, the example of Lufthansa Cityline shows that the
Group's internal ACMI regional fleet operation is also positioned at the hubs in terms of
synergies and cost efficiency. Full or partial capacities are being sought from third parties for
the management of day-trip connections from regional spokes. In the case of BMI Regional,
however, it recently emerged that the stationing of individual aircraft to serve such
connections is ultimately neither stable nor economically viable.
If the traffic volume permits a sufficiently frequent offer between the spokes of global
network carriers through appropriate catchment areas, global network providers will
integrate point-to-point airline capacities into their offer over long or short distances,
especially if the point-to-point networks are produced in parallel in the group. A Eurowings
offer from Düsseldorf to Barcelona should not compete in the Lufthansa Group's network
management with the connecting offers via Frankfurt, Munich, Vienna or Zurich. From the
customer's point of view, Eurowings' flights to European spokes of non-European alliance
partners (e.g. DUS-LHR) should be connected to their long-haul flights in the Star Alliance.
Due to the existing joint ventures, this would also improve the network quality for the
Lufthansa Group itself.
It is pointless to discuss whether global network management should better be integrated or
isolated from the customer's point of view - there is enough external competition anyway. In
the first article on network management, it was already stated that the offerings of the
point-to-point airlines in an airline group, such as the Lufthansa Group, Air France/KLM or
IAG, ultimately do not serve any independent market segments and should therefore be
offered and controlled integrated on the market side. For the business travel market, this
means that they should be offered as part of a global network.
This market-side consolidation of the Group's offering corresponds to the existing product
management qualifications and distribution channel structures. In particular, the scheduling,
pricing and handling of transfer connections is undoubtedly a core qualification of network
airlines. As is well known, the business travel market prefers indirect distribution channels
even for non-stop connections for a variety of reasons. The systems and competencies
required to serve and control transfer connections and indirect distribution channels (in
particular GDS) are also core qualifications of the global network airlines.
It would also be logistically simpler to treat the customers of the global network airlines in
the front part of the cabin of a point-to-point airline uniformly as "business class" and to
concentrate on à la carte offers in the direct sales of the point-to-point airlines and to
entertain the customers thus acquired in the rear part of the cabin accordingly.
Supply chain management for a global network not only requires the technical networking of
flight services but also needs highly competent active operations control, especially if
individual services in the process chain are delayed and/or not available. The possibilities of
virtual network operators (platforms) to fill in the learned airline competencies for "event
management", especially for transfer connections, are likely to be limited for the time being.
If, however, the leading global network carriers do not succeed in freeing themselves from
the limited view of their own resources and those of their alliance and interlining partners
and understand their network management as an independent value creation level at tour
operator level, one or the other digital market leader will find a way to build up the
necessary airline specific competencies, for example by acquiring a qualified network carrier.
decentralized home bases, especially if the supply is in direct competition at the airport or in
indirect competition at other airports near the home base.
At airports where Ryanair operates without competition (e.g. Hahn, Weeze), bases for
smaller fleets have also been maintained to date. The more recent past shows, however,
that Ryanair is also increasingly employing its own line maintenance staff at bases in the
interests of reliability and that small bases are gradually threatened with closure. The recent
bankruptcy of Germania also proves that the stationing of individual aircraft at regional
airports does not permit regular and efficient operation on a sustainable basis.
The LCCs will increasingly concentrate their home bases on large airports and increasingly
turn their backs on regional airports if they do not have a sufficiently attractive, overlap-free
catchment area.
For regional airports, this will mean that they will be connected as a "destination" from the
destinations of private travel – most probably for the holiday flight market. The latest
developments following the insolvency of Germania provide obvious evidence of this. The
new customers in Rostock, Erfurt or Muenster are all of Turkish or North African origin.
Eurowings and Lauda Motion also want to serve these airports from the destination, i.e.
Palma de Mallorca.
For LCC, network management and production resources can be decoupled, too. Ryanair
offers an example of this. The network management for Lauda Motion takes place in Dublin
and also includes production resources of Ryanair itself (e.g. OE2050, DUS-TFS, operated by
FR). Eurowings has its long haul services produced by Brussels Airlines and Sun Express.
However, while the network carriers, as shown above, can also have their homogeneous
product produced as a partial capacity in the cabin of a point-to-point carrier, the à la carte
offer of a low-cost carrier cannot reasonably be offered in parallel with other à la carte offers
in one cabin.
In the Lufthansa Group, on the other hand, it could be an option,
- as recommended above, to offer the products for business travelers integrated via indirect
distribution channels at "Lufthansa Passage", even if they are produced at Eurowings; and
- to have Eurowings market the products for private travelers in an integrated manner via
direct sales channels, even if they are produced by Lufthansa, Swiss or Austrian Airlines
from one of their hubs.
Here, too, this would go well with the system and yield management competence.
As described in the second part of the articles on network management, the holiday flight
takes us back in the direction of charter or split charter. The perception of network
management is shifted to the tour operator level, as is already the case at Tuifly. An
integrated airline is useful for the travel group as long as its designer enriches the options for
cooperation with other airlines. Thomas Cook seems no longer to be convinced of this and is
therefore bringing the sale of the airlines into discussion. For Condor, this would imply an
uncertain future in the area of tension between global network airlines and low-cost
carriers.
The Author: Prof. Dr. Christoph Brützel has been active in the aviation industry for over 30 years -
initially with Lufthansa, LTU and A.T. Kearney - currently as an independent consultant
and professor for aviation management at the IUBH International University - Campus
Studies in Bad Honnef. Contact: Christoph(ad)Brutzel.com