Introduction

Emile Durkheim and Clifford Geertz shape their theory of religion by highlighting its significance
within a certain society or group. Nevertheless, their approaches differ considerably. While
Durkheim argues that religion and the sacred represent the society we live in and that we are
compelled to bend to its rules and to internalize them, Geertz supports the idea of religion as a
cultural system; that is, a cluster of symbols which hold meaning and help us construct our
reality.

Onwards, this essay will examine both theories. Both Durkheim and Geertz have support from
ethnographic evidence and nether is completely devoid of criticism. The essay will start by
approaching Durkheim’s arguments and by bringing forward relevant evidence. It has been
claimed that Durkheim’s theory is incomplete, for it fails to consider religion as a means of
power and also takes freedom from the individual. The essay will also approach the problems
that appear in this sense. It will then continue by examining Geertz’s hypothesis. The same
method will be utilised. First, it will account for its validity when compared with different
ethnographic evidence and then it will try to approach the problems that might arise from its
inconsistencies.

Religion as a social phenomenon

Functionalist writings on religion have as a main concern the way in which society and moral
values are influenced and shaped by religious ideas and rituals. In Durkheim’s view, the key
purpose of religion is to reinforce social solidarity. He argues that “A religion is a unified system
of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden --
beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community called a Church, all those
who adhere to them” (Durkheim 1995: 44). Thus, society can come into existence only
through shared ideals and moral values; religion makes that possible by providing beliefs and
practices that unify members and also by offering a way of interpreting the world. Moreover,
Radcliffe-Brown affirms that “religion is [...] an expression [...] of a sense of dependence on a
power outside ourselves” (Radcliffe-Brown 1945: 35). In other words, in order to make sense of
their world and their identity within society, people are willingly submitting to a form of control
outside their reach (1945: 43). Evidence to support this theory can be found in Fortes’
ethnography of the Tallensi of Ghana. He argues that among the Tallensi, “la personne est
créée par la société et la culture” (Fortes 1973: 283). To reach the full stage of personhood and
become an ancestor after death, one must abide by the society rules throughout life. The
society decides whether one becomes a full person or not, depending on how well he fulfilled
his responsibilities while alive. The individual does not truly exist without the society to define
him as such (1973: 295-299). This belief is incessantly reinforced through taboos, religious
rituals and “totemistic observances”; these act to constantly remind the members of the group
who they are and who they should be (1973: 313). In this way, religion strengthens collective
conscience; the attitude of respect towards all things sacred becomes a form of social duty. The
breaking of the rules, such as sacrilege, can endanger personhood and the possibility to become
an ancestor (1973: 294). Correspondingly, this comes as a confirmation of Durkheim’s theory.
Religion, in his view, was not only created by society but is in fact society deified; the sacred
symbols are actually representations of society and the relationship between the humans and
the gods (in this case, of dependence) is actually the same as the relationship between the
humans and the society in which he resides (Durkheim 1995: 208). As seen among the Tallensi,
it is not actually God that controls and shapes our behaviour but society.

Certainly, there is no shortage of disagreement when it comes to this particular hypothesis.

When studying the Australian tribes, Durkheim focused on totems and their value for connoting
different groups. He compared the totem with a flag whose function is to reflect and represent
the intricate realities of a certain group (Durkheim, 1995: 222). The totem is a permanent
symbol, unchanging over time, passed down through generations. It is important however not
to assume the applicability of this theory in all cases. Many ethnographers bring evidence
against it and consider it, if not flawed, then at least lacking. Radcliffe-Brown, for instance,
affirms that some of Durkheim’s sources are unreliable and even though the social function of
the totems is accurate, it still requires some revision (Radcliffe-Brown 1945: 38). Furthermore,
Evans-Pritchard argues that there can be “peoples with clans and no totems, and peoples with
totems and no clans” (Evans-Pritchard cited in Wallwork 1984: 49). Maurice Bloch’s fieldwork
among the Merina of Madagascar explains power legitimised through religion (Bloch 1989: 65),
a notion Durkheim failed to approach. Moreover, Durkheim’s theory seems to favour the idea
of the individual’s total dependency on society, without free choice and autonomy and without
regard to the fact that between people and society there is an interrelationship- they rely on
each other.
Religion as a cultural system

In one of his major works, "Religion as a Cultural System" (1965), Clifford Geertz devised a new
way of understanding religion in a social scientific way, a definition often borrowed or adapted
when studying religious creeds. His theory suggests that individuals and groups of individuals
can have religion even in the absence of a god or any of the other characteristics of organized
religion (afterlife, rituals, etc.). Religion is common to all groups because all groups have a
certain overall system which they use to make sense of their life and which is shared in
common by its members (Chernus)

In this manner, Geertz theorises that one’s culture is used to understand and construct reality
through various symbols and meanings and that religion is a cultural system because it acts in
the same fashion. According to Geertz, religion is ‘a system of symbols which acts to establish
powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in men by formulating
conceptions of a general order of existence and clothing these conceptions with such an aura of
factuality that the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic’ (Geertz 2004: 4).

The sentiment expressed in the quotation, embodies the view that religion is constructed of
symbols which have a meaning, a power to transmit certain messages about the essence of our
world. They order our reality in a certain way that it seems impossible for members to ever
doubt of its validity. The value of the religious symbols comes from given meaning and the
religious systems are made from such symbols. They act by establishing a certain code of moral
values and realities where “proper conduct […] is only common sense” (Geertz, 1973: 129).
Moreover, even though the all symbols teach man ‘to live realistically’, the realities they
construct are very often different or even opposed (1973: 130).

Geertz’s study on the Balinese cockfights brings evidence in support of his theory. He describes
the rituals that take place at these settings as well as the rules of betting and argues that the
cockfight is actually a symbol of Bali life, “a story they tell themselves about themselves” (Geertz
1973: 448). Moreover, it reflects the social relations in the network of kinship and power in the
village, concepts that shape Balinese daily life. ‘Court trials, wars, political contests, inheritance
disputes, and street arguments are all compared to cockfights. Even the very island itself is
perceived from its shape as a small, proud cock[…]” (Geertz 1973: 418).
However, there is a further point to be considered. Even though Geertz’s ideas incorporate the
notion of power, it is clear from his writings that he does not regard religious experiences as
being convincing or true. This stance can be regarded as being unfair to the studied society.
Fernandez, in his essay on the Fang people from Gabon, contests Geertz’s theory. He argues
that a common interpretation of the symbols is not present in all societies, nor does it need to
be so (Fernandez 1965: 907-909). In his study, symbols often have different meanings for
different members of the group, the true understanding of it being held only by the leader
(Fernandez 1965: 907). Furthermore, in another study of the Balinese with regard to rituals
concerning illness, Unni Wikan states that Geertz’s analysis “de-individualises emotional
events”; it emphasises the collective while forgetting the individual and taking this freedom
from him, leaving us unable to interpret members’ feelings. He claims that the reality is quite
opposite; that the basis of people’s reasoning and “inner life” is in fact emotion (Unni Wikan
1989: 31-32)

Conclusion

In conclusion, both Geertz and Durkheim’s theories are validated in some senses by

ethnographic evidence. Despite this, neither seem to have found a true, irrefutable means of

explaining religion as each theory has flaws which need addressed. It would seem that a

consensus must be found in which neglected aspects are taken into account and those

mistaken viewpoints are altered. It also seems a greater understanding of the purpose and use

of symbols must be gotten for a new, more applicable theory of religion to be applied.

Ambiguous meanings of symbols especially must be accounted for in a personal and cultural

sense, allowing symbols to be understood within different contexts rather than as structural

facts as Geertz would claim.