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DAS, S.L. - Bureaucracy - and - Development - Administration PDF
DAS, S.L. - Bureaucracy - and - Development - Administration PDF
and
Development Administration
"This page is Intentionally Left Blank"
BUREAUCRACY
AND
DEVEWPMENf
ADMINISTRATION
SWASTIK
SWASTIK PUBLICATIONS
DELHI (India)
BUREAUCRA.CY AND DEVEWPMENT ADMINISTRATION
© Reserved
First Published 2010
ISBN-978-93-80 1~8-1 0-7
Published in India by
SWASTIKPUBLICATIONS
31, Gali No. 1,A-Block, Pocket-5,
eRP Water Tank, Sonia Vihar
Delhi-l 10094 (India)
email: swastik_books@yahoo.com
Preface v
1. Bureaucracy, Organisation & Political Change 1
2. The Management of Change at the Bureaucracy 25
3. The Great Wall of Bureaucracy 41
4. Political Culture, Development Administration 45
5. The Bureaucracy and Governance in
Developing Countries 50
6. Leading the Future of the Public Sector 80
7. The Challenge of Governance in a
Large Bureaucracy 103
8. Governance and Public Bureaucracy 107
9. Coercive and Enabling Bureaucracy 123
10. The Mother of All Bureaucracy 138
11. Perfection of Meritocracy or Ritual of
Bureaucracy 150
12. Bureaucrats or Politicians 190
13. The Future of Bureaucracy 217
14. The Revolution is Today:
Bureaucracy is Forever 257
Bibliography 261
Index 263
"This page is Intentionally Left Blank"
1
Introduction
Comment on the end of bureaucracy is derived from
the view that bureaucratic rationalisation can no longer
provide a viable basis for organising in the current context
of radical uncertainty and turbulent change. Advocates of
post bureaucracy argue that organisations are becoming
more decentralised, loosely coupled and likely to foster the
empowerment of employees. The overview provided by
shows that there is a very considerable overlap between
the "post bureaucratic turn" and "the new public
management" (NPM). The latter emphasises cost control,
financial transparency, the atomisation of organizational
sub-units, the decentralisation of management autonomy,
the creation of market and quasi-market mechanisms
andthe creation of performance indicators.
Post bureaucracy promises new forms of strategic action
which will assume a more creative and open form.
Comment on "hybrid political regimes" and "democratic
hierarchies" is centred on the long-standing question of how
organisations combine centralised control and co-ordination
of resources with the need for more flexible forms. The
notion of organisational hybridity has a particular relevance
26 Bureaucracy and Development Administration
account of this shift. The White Paper argued the need for
UK broadcasters to embrace the cultural and economic
opportunities provided by digital technologies but it also
stated that public service broadcasting should be central to
the UK's digital economy. The BBC response was predicated
on the view that there was a need to provide increasingly
fragmented and pluralised UK audiences with access to a
range of formats in digital television (DTV) and other new
media. The cost savings produced by the Birt reforms had
helped to fund the earliest digital services but the cost of
establishing a more comprehensive range of complementary
digital channels was such that Birt and his senior executives
sought an increase in the level of the licence fee in their
submissions to the Davies Committee of 1998. Born notes
that three factors distinguished the BBC's approach to DTV
first, that all digital channels would be free to air and
without advertising; second that a high proportion of
material would be originated in the UK, with programme
budgets higher than the norm for DTV; third, that each of
the new channels would contain a range of genres in
contrast to the niche broadcasting favoured by pay-
television operators.
Dyke and the demise of producer choice
Greg Dyke continued the Birtist policy of lobbying the
Blair government to support the BBC's digital ambitions,
whilst amending or reversing many of the organisational
changes imposed during the Birt period. The internal
market was curtailed, with approximately 200 trading units
reduced to around 50. Dyke rejected the doctrine of internal
markets, reasserted the strategic importance of in house
production and increased spending on programming by
£450M between 2000 and 2002. Dyke stated in 2000 that
his intention was to.
Take out internal trading look again at how much money
we're spending hiring outside resources when we've got
36 Bureaucracy and Development Administration
Political Culture,
Development Administration
have caused the variance. And from my title, you will know
I shall pay special attention to the varying political cultures
and to the varying performance of the development
administrations that all countries have attempted to build.
There are, of course, many complex conditions that have
interacted to produce the varying outcomes of the quality
of life that we see in the region. Initial resource endowments
are important and the varying patterns of intrusion of the
outside world have also played a critical role. I shall note
some of these as we go along. Yet, important as these things
are, I have the sense that something underlying each society,
which I shall refer to as the political culture, has been of
especial importance. And one of the ways this condition
has been manifested and worked itself out is through the
specific organizations that each society has created to
promote economic development and social welfare. These
organizations are what we collectively refer to as the
development administration.
Changing Quality of Life I: The Population
Here we can best begin with a view of population
changes in the region, since these show us some
fundamental aspects of both the quality of life and how it
is affected. Population has grown rapidly from 178 million
in 1950 to 522 million in 2000, and is projected to grow to
661 million by the year 2020. In this, the region is similar to
the entire Less Developed Regions, which showed rapid
population growth in the past half century, and led to fears
of a "population bomb."
As is well known, and illustrated in the two lower panels
of Figure I, the rapid population growth resulted from a
dramatic decline in mortality. Mortality fell quickly, while
fertility remained at higher traditional levels, giving rise to
a great increase in the growth rate of the population. At its
highest in 1965-70, Southeast Asia's popUlation was
growing at a rate of 2.5 percent per year, implying a
Political Culture, Development Administration 47
Introduction
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has stated that good
governance is perhaps the single most important factor in
eradicating poverty and promoting development. If
governance matters, so does the need for more reliable and
valid data on key governance processes. Many analysts
believe, however, that current indicators provide
inadequate measures of key governance processes. Based
on the perceptions of experts within each country,
governance assessments were undertaken in 16 developing
and transitional societies, representing 51 per cent of the
world.s population. The aim of the World Governance
Survey (WGS) was to generate new, systematic data on
governance processes.
To facilitate cohesive data collection and analysis, the
governance realm was disaggregated into six arenas:
(i) Civil Society, or the way citizens become aware of
and raise political issues;
(ii) Political Society, or the way societal interests are
aggregated in politics;
(iii) Executive, or the rules for stewardship of the system
The Bureaucracy and Governance in Developing Countries 51
as a whole;
(iv) Bureaucracy, or the rules guiding how policies are
implemented;
(v) Economic Society, or how state-market relations are
structured; and,
(vi) Judiciary, or the rules for how disputes are settled.
The project identified 30 indicators based on widely held
principles of good governance, participation, fairness,
decency, accountability, transparency and efficiency with
five indicators in each arena. In each country, a national
coordinator selected a small panel of experts 35-40
wellinformed persons (WIPs) to complete the assessment.
The panel included, amongst others, government officials,
parliamentarians, entrepreneurs, researchers, NGO
representatives, lawyers and civil servants. Respondents
were asked to rank each answer on a scale from 1 to 5; the
higher the score, the better.
In addition, respondents were invited to provide
qualitative comments. The total governance scores have a
very robust correlation with the country scores in Kaufmann
et al.s aggregate governance indicators, indicating the
validity of the results. Previous discussion papers looked at
the issues of Governance and Development and Assessing
Governance: Methodological Challenges. This paper focuses
on the bureaucracy arena.
Bureaucracy Arena
The bureaucratic arena refers to all state organizations
engaged in formulating and implementing policy as well
as in regulating and delivering services. While issues of
bureaucratic governance are not constitutive of
development per se, they are seen as crucial determinants
of the degree to which a country makes social and economic
progress or fails to do so. This set of issues has been of
52 Bureaucracy and Development Administration
our study is that urban residents are favored over their rural
counterparts. This is no surprise given the cost of extending
infrastructure to' the countryside as compared to urban
areas. Respondents in the Philippines, for example, note
that residents of the metropolitan areas, especially Manila,
are much better served than other parts of the country. By
and large, therefore, these people have easier access than
those in the villages, especially on the outlying islands.
Respondents in Chile, India, and Russia also make this
point. The rural population is seen as being at a
disadvantage when it comes to access to government
services, whether welfare provisions or extension advice.
,'" The third point regards differential access and social
stratification. There are surprisingly few references to
unequal access being the result of social or economic
inequalities in society. The observation that it matters,
however, comes out in the comments provided by Indian
and Pakistani respondents, in particular. Access to public
services among the poor in these countries is low. Thus,
even if the bureaucracy is meritocratic and civil servants
have an influence on policy, this seems to make little
difference on the ground for the poorer segments of the
population. Respondents in our study also suggest that the
better off in society often have privileged access to services
as a result of being able to pay bribes. In sum, the inclusion
of the access variable has convinced us that changes in the
governance of the bureaucratic arena are difficult to achieve
from within and may be more easily facilitated by thinking
of how its relations to other arenas, notably government
and civil society, are constituted.
The fourth point concerns the fact that even if there is
officially equal access, the quality of services differs from
one area to another. As indicated above, wherever demand
is high, such as in the urban areas, quality tends to be better
than in those places where demand is low. This type of
76 Bureaucracy and Development Administration
parliamentarians.
H8: There will be a positive relationship between
percentage of female civil servants at the sub-national
government level and countries with higher percentages of
female parliamentarians.
It is clear from the above findings that there remain more
questions than answers. This appears to be a reasonable
conclusion given that this is the first time any cross-national
study on representative bureaucracy has been undertaken.
From a practical standpoint, there further data collection
is required.
Data collection was hampered not by insufficient data
on my political or economic indicators, but on the fiscal
decentralization and the percentage of female civil servants.
Both of these data points require more intensive data
collection with more emphasis on record maintenance than
the other two variables. With voice and accountability
indexed based on what not just in-country, by external to
the country assessment, its reliance on local data collection
is less pronounced than the other variables. Even income
per capita is relatively simple to collect. Today, countries
have excellent notions of what their earned income was, is
and will be. Financial transactions, loans, exports, imports,
all rely on the same accounting techniques.
In contrast, fiscal decentralization requires more
complex data collection. Its primary units of data collection
occur at the sub-nationals levels where accounting
knowledge and expertise can vary widely or even, in some
cases, be little emphasized if there are few if any expenditure
or revenue responsibilities. Similar logics exist for collecting
gender data. Interestingly, this paper was originally
planned to be a discussion of ethnicity within civil services
around the world. However, to-date, I have yet to find one
reliable measure of ethnic representation and thus, turned
100 Bureaucracy and Development Administration
ABSTRACT
How do you manage governance in a large, unwieldy
bureaucracy the largest in the Philippine governmental
structure - that has been under-performing for years? How
do you manage quality outcomes in a structure that is largely
dispersed, relatively delinked, and of low-level managerial
talent? How do you ensure that standards of quality and
directions set by policy are uniformly understood and, more
importantly, implemented?
The new mantra in the Department of Education
(DepED) is "school-based management" (SBM). Yet the
way DepED is managed is largely central office-driven, not
from the ground-up (i.e. at the school and schools division
level). This is a result of decades of compliance with
centrally-mandated policy driven by centrally-provided
resources. 1bere are three contradictions that need to be
worked out given this new thinking.
The first contradiction: Structural rigidity versus a new
mandate. SBM has shown better results than centrally-
mandated policy in specific programs. Yet, there is a
structural rigidity in the bureaucracy that maintains central
control over processes despite these findings. This makes
104 Bureaucracy and Development Administration
A few years back, the New York Times ran a story about the
company I was working for. The story, based on an
interview with the president of my business unit, concerned
a change in the company's plans for developing a key
product. Employees weren't aware of the change before
the story appeared, so someone working for me made sure
to feature the article on our intranet. It was big news, and
it was already public. Where was the harm in keeping
employees informed?
As it turned out, the harm was hidden in the mind of
the unit president who was interviewed. He contended we
had always planned to pursue the development option he
had disclosed." The Times had erred in hailing his
/I
Levell
Happiness derived from material objects and the
pleasures they can provide.
This is the most basic level of happiness, and it can come
from eating fine chocolate, driving a sports car, a cool swim
on a hot day, or other forms of physical gratification. Level
1 happiness is good but limited. The pleasure it provides is
immediate but short-lived and intermittent. It is also shallow;
it requires no reflection, and it doesn't extend beyond the
self in any meaningful way.
Level 2
Happiness derived from personal achievement and ego
gratification. You feel Level 2 happiness when people praise
you; when they acknowledge your popularity and
authority; when you win in sports or advance in your
career. Level 2 happiness is usually comparative because
the ego measures success in terms of advantage over others.
You're happy when you're seen as smarter, more attractive,
or more important than others, and you're unhappy when
you lose the comparison game. Level 2 happiness is
shortterm and tei1.Uous. You can be happy that you won
today, and then anxious you might lose tomorrow. Level 2
is not inherently bad because we all need success, self-
esteem, and respect to accomplish good things in life.
But when Level 2 happiness - self-promotion - becomes
your only goal, it leads to self-absorption, jealousy, fear of
failure, contempt, isolation, and cynicism.
Level 3
Happiness derived from doing good for others and
making the world a better place. Level 3 happiness is more
enduring because it is directed toward the human desire
for love, truth, goodness, beauty, and unity. It is capable of
inspiring great achievements because it unites people in
142 Bureaucracy and Development Administration
Decentralization
The HSGs agreed with the panel of experts'
recommendation to focus on decentralization for two
reasons:
• Decentralization, more than any other parts 9f State
bureaucracy reform, constitutes an act of democratic
consolidation because decentralization empowers
individual citizens to participate in politics, hold
politicians and State bureaucrats accountable for
their actions, and establishes a system of checks and
balances.
• The HSGs should focus on decentralization also
because if it is to succeed, HSGs need to move
simultaneously on greater coordination and tighter
monitoring. Decentralization serves as a catalyst
for systematically asking oneself how to organize
coordinating powers and what to monitor.
The HSGs also strongly agreed with the recommendation
made by the panel of experts for tying in together political
and fiscal decentralization, because only then will
decentralization result in bureaucratic efficiency,
accountability and transparency. As seen by both HSGs
and the panel 'pf experts, competitive elections at
subnational levels give political parties a strong incentive
to keep an eye on each other's political actions, thus
increasing efficiency, transparency, and accountability. By
contrast, transferring some tax authority to subnational
governments forces their leadership to accurately calculate
and consider costs when raising each additional unit of tax
and, in doing so, makes it politically responsible as well as
economically efficient.
In spite of such a broad agreement, the HSGs warned
against four dangers that they thought the panel of experts
did not take into account. The dangers are as follows:
146 Bureaucracy and Development Administration
Perfection of Meritocracy or
Ritual of Bureaucracy
Abstract
The paper addresses HRM systems and practices in a
large multinational management consultancy company.
The company invests a lot of resources in HRM tasks, and
is frequently praised by employees for its accomplishments
in hiring, developing and promotion in practice.
HRM as a belief system and as practices then do not
harmony particularly well. The paper critically interprets
the meaning and the functions of the HRM system and the
beliefs supporting it. The paper suggests are-interpretation
of HRM systems and practices based on a culturalsymbolic
perspective. It points at a) the limits and shortcomings of
HRM systems in terms of rationality, b) the significance of
organizational symbolism in accounting for the role of HRM
systems and practices - symbolizing rationality and
commitment to people improvement as well as a highly
competent work force and c) the various effects of these
systems and practices on employee compliance.
Introduction
It is common for people with an interest in people issues
in business to emphasize the crucial significance of
personnel - or human resources to use the nowadays most
Perfection of Meritocracy or Ritual of Bureaucracy 151
thought that the feed-back system was one one of the most
attractive features at Excellence. However, as is clearly
expressed in the quotation, the feedback mechanisms - as
complete, or excessive, as they seems to be - fails to provide
sufficient "real" feedback.
Mysteries of promotion
According to our informants at junior levels, it is
sometimes difficult to see a pattern or specific criteria that
apply for promotion to the partner level. This perception is
presumably not shared by senior people and may reflect
limited insights of those not having the entire picture of
people's qualifications, but the point of interest in this paper
is this perception about the uncertainty of the promotion
process among at least a proportion of the people in the
company.
There is even a widespread ~pinion that the meritocratic
character of the promotion structure is nullified, due to the
lack of fast advancement above the consultant level.. Several
of our informants claim, for example, that they didn't think
that it was the best people who made it to the partnership
level.
There is a lot of people here who is extremely good and
work like dogs. But they leave the firm. Those who are
considered to be the best people here, they won't stay until
they become partners.
Thus, the promotion procedures at the higher level of
the company is both is perceived as mysterious and, to some
degree, spurios. They are considered mysterious since less
senior people sometimes have difficulties in finding a pattern
in who will be promoted and who will not. They are
considered spurious since they will not include the best
people anyway, since thay have left the company long
before they qualify for promotion to the partner level.
Perfection of Meritocracy or Ritual of Bureaucracy 175
governing factor.
These examples highlight the incoherences and
contradictions of the meanings ascribed to the company's
HRM systems and policies on a general level and the specific
practices they seem to observe or experience closer to actual
operations. These incoherences and contradictions can thus
be located not just to different groups but also to specific
people. As they are fairly broadly shared, we can talk of
cultural manifestations rather than single, isolated
individual perceptions and sense-making processes.
Competence based ranking and promotion vs. other logics
Many of deviations from prescribed procedures and
inability to deliver all the promises of feedback provision,
people improvement and highly rational and fair screening
and promotion decisions do not come as a surprise for any,
but the most naIve believer in the perfections of
management rationality. In an complex, ambiguous world
calling for pragmatic behaviour, it makes sense that
banding and promotion may be loosely coupled to earlier
feedback and these may sometimes triggered by other
considerations than development and competence.
One reason for this is the difficulties in achieving any
high level of rationality in people issues it is difficult to
provide rich feedback due to the careful monitoring,
excellent judgement, language skills and time that this call
for. It is also diffi£ult to assess people and their potentials.
Other reasons concern other considerations than
competence and competence assessments as important
178 Bureaucracy and Development Administration
of the organization.
A closer look reveals many rusty parts in this machinery.
Quality checks of the outcomes are less than reassuring all
the time. The human products coming out of the production
process are sometimes not seen as up to standards. The HR
operators often is less committed to carefully scrutinize how
the machinery operates and unwilling to take the
consequences of their experiences of how things work when
assessing the company and its qualities as a whole as a
screening and people processing apparatus guaranteeing
a highly qualified workforce.
There are several interesting questions to raise here.
How to evaluate Excellence in terms of HRM practices?
Is the company performing far from "excellence" to such
an extent that its image appears to be badly supported by
substance? Or would it be unfair to claim this? Why do a
number of people hold up the view of the company as close
to perfect as an apparatus capable of gathering, improving
excellent HR products sorting away those that are not -
despite frequent instances of deviations from this. Why this
compartmentalized consciousness.
One reason is that the company, after all, is fairly
successful in attracting, selecting and keeping people that
are perceived as contributing to the effective production of
fairly reliable solutions for clients. So may be the case
irrespective of how well the HRM functions. One senior
manager, in resp~mding on a direct interviewee question,
said that it is not difficult to select those graduates suitable
for the employment, mainly based on their characters, and
the large majority, perhaps about 95 %, of these are
eventually promoted to managers, i.e. if they stay in the
company. As with all empirical material, we can't take this
at face value, but note a discrepancy between a highly
sophisticated and ambitious HRM system that far from fully
180 Bureaucracy and Development Administration
Bureaucrats or Politicians
Abstract
Policies are typically chosen by politicians and
bureaucrats. This paper investigates the normative criteria
with which to allocate policy tasks to elected policymakers
(politicians) or non elected bureaucrats. Politicians are
preferable if abili~ is less important than effort or there is ,
little uncertainty about whether the policymakers has the
required abilities; if there IS uncertainty about social
preferences and flexibility is valuable; if time inconsistency
is not an issue; if vested interests do not have large stakes in
the policy outcome; if policy complementarities and
compensation of losers is important.
Introduction
Policies are chosen and implemented by both elected
representatives (politicians) and non elected bureaucrats.
The view that politicians .For useful comments we thank
an anonymous referee, Philippe Aghion, Timothy Besley,
Alessandro Lizzeri, Oliver Hart, Tom Romer, Andrei
Shleifer, Charles Wyplosz and participants in seminars at
Harvard, Princeton, Geneva, the CIAR meeting in Toronto,
March 2003, and the Wallis Conference in Rochester in
October 2003. This project was initiated while Alesina was
visiting IGIER at Bocconi University; he is very grateful for
the hospitality. Tabellini thanks CIAR for financial support.
Bureaucrats or Politicians 191
Discussion
The model seeks to capture a key difference between
political and bureaucratic accountability. The politician is
held accountable by the voters who choose whether or not
to reelect him, based on their utility. The bureaucrat is held
accountable by his professional peers or by the public at
large, for how he fulfills the goals of his organization. These
different accountability mechanisms induce two behavioral
differences between a bureaucrat and a politician. First,
the form of the objective function differs: the politician strives
to achieve a threshold level of utility for the voters; the
bureaucrat wants to maximize his perceived talent. Second,
the relevant measure of performance is different: for the
politician it is the voters' utility; for the bureaucrat it is
whatever goals have been assigned to the bureaucratic
organization. In this introductory example only the first
difference plays a role, since both voters' utility and
bureaucratic performance are measured by the same
variable, y. Hence the only behavioral difference between
the two types of policymaker is that one maximizes an
expected value, the other maximizes a probability, both
defined over the same random variable. In later sections
we study richer policy environments, where the difference
over the relevant measure of performance also plays an
important role.
While the assumption that politicians maximize the
probability of victory at the election is now common, there
is not a standard model of bureaucratic behavior. Thus,
although we are not the first to use it, our career concerns"
II
their own f~thers. Thus, the feudal lord granted a fief to his
vassals in return for their personal "homage and fealty."
Unburdened by any concept of what we today would call
"conflict of interest," vassals often assumed that with their
fiefs included the right to pocket all, or at least a part, of
the fees and fines that they levied. With a different, but
similarly blatant, willingness to confound public office with
personal profit, elected officials in the United States and
Britain gave positions to their supporters as part of an
informal "spoils system" as late as the nineteenth century.
In fact, the identification of civil service jobs as economic
commodities, as opposed to the principle of hiring the best
qualified for a set salary, has been normal much more of
the time than it has been an exception. It has also been
normal that bureaucrats have been able to mold positions
to their own ambitions and abilities, converting them into
informal "fiefs" and even "empires."
The depersonalized bureaucracy can be traced to the
attempts by central governments to strengthen their power
by appointing new bureaucrats who, lacking their own
independent power base, would be much more tractable.
The commissars of Louis XIV in France, as well as the service
gentry of Ivan the Terrible in Russia and Frederick II in
Prussia, are famous examples of this tendency. However,
just as normal was the tendency of the new appointees
eventually to become entrenched themselves-a phenomenon
that led later rulers to appoint still other groups of
bureaucrats that would wield the real power and be more
personally loyal to the monarch. The cycle continued until
the late eighteenth century.
From that time through most of the twentieth century,
the governments themselves became less personal: States
replaced kings; prime ministers replaced "the King's first
ministers"; and industrial entrepreneurs became chairmen
of impersonal corporations.
224 Bureaucracy and Development Administration
that the signs really were public records and that I did have
to provide him with a sign-or at least a facsimile of a sign.
However, they also gave me a way out by stating that there
was no law that said I had to provide multiple copies of a
public record. So Harold received a sign. No matter how
just his cause.
Believe that this was appropriate, and that it was one
case when the bureaucrat-at least the bureaucrat's counsel-
knew best.
But what about the opinion of the "producers" -the
workers, teachers, planners, engineers, and staffs in other
functional areas. Do not those "in the trenches," "where
the action is," have a uniquely valuable perspective on the
processes involved?
Indeed, they are able-with uncanny immediacy and
accuracy-to identify those elements of a plan or procedural
revision that simply will not work well in practice, no matter
how wonderful it appears in theory. How many times have
I worked late at night to develop a profoundly intelligent
procedural solution, only to have my balloon of brilliance
and pride punctured with a tired, scowling, "I guess, but
what about. Usually, I just had not thought about that
critical consideration which inevitably invalidates my whole
solution.
On the other hand, it is possible to be so close to a given
process that one cannot imagine doing it any other way.
Such tunnel vision has led some of the practicing "experts
in the trenches" to overlook preferred alternatives that may
be more obvious to the bureaucrat somewhat distanced
from the task. Insecurity can also lead the producers to be
excessively loyal to traditional ways of doing things-partly
because what is familiar is comfortable, partly because new,
unknown procedures may threaten their sense of
competence and their job security. In an earlier column, I
The Future of Bureaucracy 233
,-
The Future of Bureaucracy 241
Stockmann's trucks.
In 1986, at the end of Mr. Gorbachev's first year, there
were 55 Soviet Government ministries and 23 state
committees eqUivalent to ministries: ministries for defense,
military production, internal affairs, health, justice, the
merchant marine, light industry, heavy industry, electricity
and electrification, metallurgy, chemicals, finance, trade,
communications, fisheries and production of chemical
fertilizer, committees for state security, state planning,
prices, labor, television and radio, and forestry - to name
only a few.
Now there are only 37 ministries and 19 state committees.
That does not mean all the old ones went away - just that
they were merged or their functions devolved to the
duplicate bureaucracies in the 15 constituent Soviet
260 Bureaucracy and Development Administration
A D
Accountability 70 Decentralization 145
An interpretive-cultural approach dopting a Common Sense 238
155
E
Anti bureaucracy 36
empires 223
B
Enabling Bureaucracy 128
Bureaucracy Arena 51 Enabling Bureaucracy's 129
Bureaucracy, Organisation &
F
Political Change 1
Bureaucracy's Defining Federal Express's Powership
Features 125 229
Bureaucratic Performance 57 Fiefs 223
Bureaucratic Rules, 54 Future of Bureaucracy 217
Bureaucrats or Politicians 190
G
c
Governance and Democracy
Challenge of Governance in a 115
Large Bureaucracy 103 Governance and Effectiveness
Changes over Time 64 119
Changing Quality of Life 46 Governance and Governing III
Coercive and Enabling Governance and Public
Bureaucracy 123 Bureaucracy 107
Compensation of losers 208 Governance Defined 105
Coordination 148
Cultures Generate Bureaucracy H
139 HRM and people processing
154
264 Bureaucracy and Development Administration
I Representative Bureaucracy 81
Impediments to Organizational s
Learning 247
Self-organising 113
Interpretation 178
Introducing Coercive T
Bureaucracy 126
The Bureaucracy and
L Governance in Developing
Count 50
Leading the Future of the Public
The bureaucrat 196
Sector 80
The Empirical Context 244
Legitimacy 114
The Management of Change at
Lining Up to Fill Out Forms 258
the Bureaucracy 25
Lobbying and bribing 211
The Mother of All Bureaucracy
M 138
The politician 197
Meritocracy 69
The Primacy of Bureaucracy
Monitoring 148
225
Mysteries of promotion 174
The Problem with Bureaucratic
o Rules 227
The reform of the State
Organizational 242 bureaucracy 143
p The Revolution is Today 257
The Vantage Point 45
Perfection of Meritocracy 150 Transparency 72
Policy tasks in an uncertain Two Kinds of Bureaucracy 125
world 204
Political Culture, Development w
Administration 45 WGS Data on the Bureaucracy
Post bureaucracy 34 60
Problems with a Permanent
Hierarchy 225
Process and outcome cracks
172
public-spirited 231