La Bugal-

B’laan Tribal Association, et al.

Vs Victor Ramos, et al. GR No. 127882 January 27, 2004 FACTS:

President Fidel Ramos approved RA No. 7942 to “govern the exploration, development, utilization and
processing of all mineral resources”. It defines the modes of mineral agreement for

mining operations, outlines the procedures for filing and approval and fixes their term. Similar
provisions govern financial or technical assistance agreements. Counsel for petitioner sent a letter to the
DENR Secretary demanding to stop the implementation of RA No. 7942. However the respondent
Secretary disregarded the said letter by not acting upon it. Petitioner contends that the statutre violates
the provisions of the Constitution, specifically Sec. 2(4) of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution.
Petitioners contend that, consistent with the provisions of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, the

President may enter into agreements involving “

either

technical

or

financial assistance” only.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA No. 7942 violates the Constitution. HELD:

Petitioners’ contention does not lie.

To adhere to the literal language of the Constitution would lead to absurd consequences.

[303]

As WMCP correctly put it: x x x such a theory of petitioners would compel the government (through the
President) to enter into contract with two (2) foreign-owned corporations, one for financial assistance
agreement and with the other, for technical assistance over one and the same mining area or land; or to
execute two (2) contracts with only one foreign-owned corporation which has the capability to provide
both financial and technical assistance, one for financial assistance and another for technical assistance,
over the same mining area. Such an absurd result is definitely not sanctioned under the canons of
constitutional construction.

[304]
[Underscoring in the original.] Surely, the framers of the 1987 Charter did not contemplate such an
absurd result from their use of

“either/or.” A constitution is not to be interpreted as demanding the impossible or the impracticable;

and unreasonable or absurd consequences, if possible, should be avoided.

[305]

Courts are not to give words a meaning that would lead to absurd or unreasonable consequences and a
literal interpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd results.

[306]

That is a strong argument against its adoption.

[307]

Accordingly, petitioners’ interpretation must be rejected