Case #3:

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

AURELIO LAMAHANG, defendant-appellant.

G.R. No. L-43530

August 03, 1935

FACTS:

The defendant Aurelio Lamahang is on appeal from a decision finding him guilty of attempted
robbery. At early dawn on March 2, 1935, policeman Jose Tomambing, who was patrolling his
beat on Delgado and C.R. Fuentes streets of the City of Iloilo, caught the accused in the act of
making an opening with an iron bar on the wall of a store of cheap goods located on the last named
street. At that time the owner of the store, Tan Yu, was sleeping inside with another Chinaman.
The accused had only succeeded in breaking one board and in unfastening another from the wall,
when the policeman showed up, who instantly arrested him and placed him under custody.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused was erroneously declared guilty of attempted robbery

RULING:

YES, he was erroneously declared guilty of attempted robbery. The accused is then held guilty of
attempted trespass to dwelling, committed by means of force, with the aforesaid aggravating and
mitigating circumstances and sentenced to three months and one day of arresto mayor.
Case #4:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. MANOLITO PANCHO, appellant.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the Joint Decision dated June 19, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
15, Malolos, Bulacan, finding appellant Manolito Pancho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape
in Criminal Case No. 837-M-96 and attempted rape in Criminal Case No. 838-M-96. In Criminal
Case No. 837-M-96, the trial court sentenced him to suffer reclusion perpetua, while in Criminal
Case No. 838-M-96, the penalty of 10 years and 1 day, as minimum, to 12 years, as maximum of
prision mayor, was imposed upon him.

For Criminal Case No. 837-M-96 (For Rape):

On August 1, 1994, at around 6:00 o’clock in the morning, Michelle, who was then only ten years
old, went home after spending the night at her aunt’s house. While she was about to undress,
appellant suddenly dragged her and forced her to lie down on the floor. Although frightened, she
struggled by kicking and boxing him. However, he forcibly removed her clothes and underwear.
Then he took off his clothing. Appellant started kissing and holding her breast and eventually had
carnal knowledge of her. She felt pain when he inserted his organ into her vagina which bled. She
tried to resist but he held her both arms. He was on top of her making push and pull movements
for four (4) minutes. Then he dressed up, threatening to kill her should she complain or tell anyone
about the incident.

For Criminal Case No. 838-M-96 (For Attempted Rape):

Sometime in December, 1995 at the family’s new residence at Bayugo, Meycauayan, Bulacan,
appellant arrived from work. When Michelle opened the door and saw him, she got scared. While
he was approaching her, she managed to hit him. Then she attempted to jump out of the window,
but he dragged her by her feet. At that instance, her uncle (Tito Onio) suddenly arrived.
Immediately, appellant stopped, thus thwarting his bestial desire.

Upon arraignment, appellant, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the lower court erred in finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crimes of rape and attempted rape.

HELD:

The court explained that – Under Art. 6, in relation to Art. 335, of the Revised Penal Code, rape is
attempted when the offender commences the commission of rape directly by overt acts, but does
not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the crime of rape by reason of some
cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.

In this second case, the prosecution failed to prove that appellant started to rape the victim and had
commenced the performance of acts of carnal knowledge. He did not force her to lie down or
remove her garment. In short, there was no showing that he did commence at all the performance
of any act indicative of an intent or attempt to rape the victim. What he did was to drag her and
hold her feet. At this juncture, the court cannot safely conclude that he was attempting to rape her.

The court cited the case of People vs. Campuhan, that the thin line that separates attempted rape
from consummated rape is the entrance of the male organ into the labial threshold of the female
genitalia.

Wherefore, the decision dated June 19, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, Malolos,
Bulacan, in Criminal Case No. 837-M-96, convicting appellant Manolito Pancho of rape and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED, with the
MODIFICATION that he is ordered to pay the victim, Michelle dela Torre, P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, and P50,000.00 as moral damages.

In Criminal Case No. 838-M-96, the trial courts judgment convicting the appellant of attempted
rape is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE and a new one is entered ACQUITTING him of the crime
charged.
Case #5:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ARNULFO ORANDE y CHAVEZ, appellant.

FACTS:

Jessica Castro charged the plaintiff Arnulfo Orande for raping her four times between 1994
to 1996 while the former was still a minor (between 9-12 years old). The complainant contends
that all were executed by means of threat and intimidation, threatening her of feat if she resists.
RTC convicted Orande two counts of simple rape, one statutory and one frustrated. The accused
appealed that the court had a grave error on convicting him of frustrated rape despite the fact that
there is no such crime.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is a crime of frustrated rape?

HELD:

The court said no, there is no crime of frustrated rape. In People vs. Orita, it was reiterated
that in the crime of rape, the moment the offender has carnal knowledge of his victim, he actually
attains his purpose and from that moment, all the elements of the crime are consummated. Since
the offender has performed the last act necessary to the crime, there is nothing more left to be done
by the offender. Thus, it is consummated rape. Also, perfect penetration is not essential in
consummating rape, mere or any penetration of the female organ by the male organ is sufficient.
Necessarily, when there is no penetration of the female organ, the rape is considered attempted
because not all acts of execution were performed. Considering all the elements and manner of
execution of the crime of rape and all jurisprudence on the mater, it is hardly conceivable how the
frustrated stage can be committed. WHEREFORE, the court ruled that the RTC committed an error
on convicting Orande the crime of frustrated rape, for in fact, the rape was consummated. Hence,
Orande should be found guilty of consummated rape rather that frustrated.
Case #6:
Valenzuela v. People, GR No. 160188

FACTS:

While a security guard was manning his post the open parking area of a supermarket, he saw the
accused, Aristotel Valenzuela, hauling a push cart loaded with cases of detergent and unloaded
them where his co-accused, Jovy Calderon, was waiting. Valenzuela then returned inside the
supermarket, and later emerged with more cartons of detergent. Thereafter, Valenzuela hailed a
taxi and started loading the boxes of detergent inside. As the taxi was about to leave the security
guard asked Valenzuela for the receipt of the merchandise. The accused reacted by fleeing on foot,
but were subsequently apprehended at the scene. The trial court convicted both Valenzuela and
Calderon of the crime of consummated theft. Valenzuela appealed before the Court of Appeals,
arguing that he should only be convicted of frustrated theft since he was not able to freely dispose
of the articles stolen. The CA affirmed the trial court’s decision, thus the Petition for Review was
filed before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner Valenzuela is guilty of frustrated theft.

HELD:

No. Article 6 of the RPC provides that a felony is consummated when all the elements necessary
for its execution and accomplishment are present. In the crime of theft, the following elements
should be present –
(1) that there be taking of personal property;
(2) that said property belongs to another;
(3) that the taking be done with intent to gain;
(4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and
(5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidating of persons
or force upon things.

The court held that theft is produced when there is deprivation of personal property by one with
intent to gain. Thus, it is immaterial that the offender is able or unable to freely dispose the property
stolen since he has already committed all the acts of execution and the deprivation from the owner
has already ensued from such acts. Therefore, theft cannot have a frustrated stage, and can only be
attempted or consummated.
Case #7:
People of the Philippines vs Recones, Wahing, Degamo GR. No. 129535

FACTS:
Calixto Recones, Carlos Wahing and Pablo Degamo were charged with murder. That on or about
the 17th day of July 1993, in the municipality of Clarin, province of Bohol, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another, with intent to kill and without justifiable cause, with treachery by
suddenly attacking the victim without giving him the opportunity to defend himself, with evident
premeditation and abuse of superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and strike or hit with the use of the remaining broken portion of a
concrete land marker one Tranquilino L. Garate who was unarmed and unaware of the attack,
thereby inflicting mortal injuries on the victim’s body which resulted in the untimely death of the
said Tranquilino Garate; to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the victim in the amount to be
proved during trial.

Recones was arrested first and tried separately. He pleaded guilty to the charge and is now serving
sentence in Muntinlupa. Wahing remains at large. Degamo was arrested on December 8, 1994.
The instant appeal therefore pertains only to accused-appellant Degamo.

When brought before the court, Degamo entered a plea of not guilty.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the court of origin has committed a serious error in finding and concluding
that the accused-appellant is a co-conspirator in the murder of Tranquilino L. Garate.

HELD:
Yes, the court found that accused-appellant was a co-conspirator in the murder of Garate.
After carefully going over the pieces of evidence presented by both parties, the Court finds that
the trial court did not overlook any material point to justify his acquittal. On the contrary, the trial
court correctly found accused-appellant’s guilt to have been satisfactorily established beyond a
shadow of doubt.

The trial court correctly appreciated the presence of conspiracy among the malefactors. Conspiracy
exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony
and decide to commit it. Proof of a previous agreement to commit a felony is not necessary to
establish conspiracy, it being sufficient that the acts of the accused, before, during, and after the
commission of the felony, demonstrate its existence.

Conspiracy was appropriately inferred from the following circumstances:

accused-appellant was in the company of Recones and Wahing in the afternoon of July 7, 1993;
upon seeing Garate at the waiting shed, the trio alighted from the motorcycle and ganged up on
Garate with Recones and Wahing raining blows on Garate in the presence of accused-appellant
who did nothing to stop his companions;
when Garate attempted to flee, accused-appellant, together with Recones and Wahing, pursued
him;
when accused-appellant caught up with Garate, he gripped the latter tightly, thereby effectively
preventing any possible escape;
he, likewise, blocked the path of Garate when the latter attempted to flee towards the safety of his
house;
accused-appellant was holding Garate while Recones and Wahing were raining blows on the
victim;
accused-appellant did not stop Recones when the latter hit Garate on the head with a stone marker;
and finally,
accused- appellant fled from the crime scene together with the two assailants.

Taken collectively, these circumstances clearly and satisfactorily provide the bases for this Courts
finding that Recones, Wahing and accused-appellant acted in concert with each other in killing
Garate. Although accused-appellant did not deliver the fatal blow, he remains accountable for the
death of the latter on the principle that the act of one is the act of all.
Case #8:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
PIO CANTUBA & PEDRITO LALAGUNA, defendants-appellants.

FACTS:

That on or about December 23, 1981 in the municipality of Masbate, province of Masbate,
Philippines, the said accused, confederating with each other, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with evident premeditation and with night-time as a means to better
facilitate the commission of the crime, attack, assault and use personal violence upon one ATTY.
ADOLFO CELERA, by then and there shooting him at several parts of his body, thereby inflicting
upon the latter, mortal wounds which are the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter.

The accused Cantuba, Lalaguna, Versales, Gerbuela, Baco and Mayor Moises Espinosa pleaded
not guilty upon arraignment. Penales and Labuyo remained at large and were not arraigned.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused was correctly convicted as a co-conspirator in the murder of
Atty. Celera.

HELD:
The accused was correctly convicted as a co-conspirator. His knowledge of the plot to
assassinate the victim, the fact that he had been ordered to scout for a man who could do the
job and his knowledge of the place, date and time of the assault are sufficient to show unity of
purpose. At the very least, therefore, he had to know the plot and decided to join the execution.
From the legal viewpoint, conspiracy exists if, at the time of the commission of the offense,
the accused had the same purpose and were united in its execution. The degree of actual
participation in the commission of the crime is immaterial in conspiracy.
Case #9:

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. IRINEO TUMLOS, defendant-

appellant.
FACTS:
On or about November 21, 1937, eight cows belonging to Maximiano Sobrevega and five
belonging to his son-in-law, Ambrosio Pecasis, then grazing together in the barrio of Libong-
cogon, municipality of Sara, Province of Iloilo, were taken by the herein defendant without the
knowledge or consent of their respective owners. The deputy fiscal of Iloilo filed on July 11, 1938,
an information against the said defendant for the offense of theft of the eight cows belonging to
Maximiano Sobrevega, which resulted in his being sentenced on July 15, 1938, to an indeterminate
penalty of from one year, eight months and twenty-one days to five years, five months and eleven
days of prision correccional, with the accessories prescribed by law and costs. In the information
filed in the present case the same defendant is charged with the theft of five cows belonging to
Ambrosio Pecasis, committed on November 21, 1937, the date of the commission of the theft to
the eight cows of Maximiano Sobrevega charged to the previous information.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the conviction of the accused for the theft of the eight cows belonging to
Maximiano Sobrevega constitutes a bar to his conviction for the theft of the five cows belonging
to Ambrosio Pecasis, which were grazing together with the aforesaid eight cows belonging to
Maximiano Sobrevega in the same place from which they were stolen at the same time, under the
legal procedural principle of "autrefois convict" or double jeopardy.
HELD:
The theft of the thirteen (13) cows committed by the defendant took place at the same time
and in the same place. Consequently, he performed but one act. The fact that eight (8) of
the said cows belong to one owner and five (5) to another does not make him criminally
liable for two (2) distinct offenses for the reason that to be liable for two (2) distinct offenses,
the act must be divided into two (2). In this case, the act is not susceptible of division. The
intention was likewise one, namely, to take for the purpose of appropriating or selling the
thirteen (13) cows which he found grazing in the same place.
Wherefore, as he had already been put in jeopardy of being convicted of the theft of the five cows
in question when he was tried for and convicted of the theft of the eight which together with the
five from an integral part of the thirteen which were the subject matter of the offense, the
conviction of the herein defendant Irineo Tumlos for the said five cows in the present case would
be the second, in violation of his constitutional right not to be punished twice for the same offense;
hence, he is acquitted of the charge, which is dismissed,
Case #10:
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
ELIAS JARANILLA, RICARDO SUYO, FRANCO BRILLANTES and HEMAN GORRICETA,
accused. ELIAS JARANILLA, RICARDO SUYO, and FRANCO BRILLANTES, defendants-
appellants.

FACTS:

The accused went on their way to steal six (6) fighting cocks from the chicken coop of Valentin
Baylon. As they were trying to escape two policemen who were trying to apprehend them, Jaranilla
fired his gun hitting a policeman who eventually died at the hospital.

ISSUE:

Whether or not everyone who stole the fighting cocks should be charged with homicide for the
death of the policeman.

HELD:

The Supreme Court decided that the group conspired to steal the fighting cocks from the chicken
coop of Valentin Baylon but not for the killing the policeman. It is only Jaranilla who should be
liable for the crime of homicide but the other individuals should only be liable for stealing the six
(6) fighting cocks

The killing of the peace officer is characterized as homicide because the act was made during the
spur of the moment and the treacherous mode of attack was not consciously or deliberately adopted
by the offender. In addition, only persons who perpetrated the killing is responsible for such action.
Furthermore, mere presence in the crime scene does not necessarily make a person co-principal
thereof.

Hence, only the accused, Elias Jaranilla, who perpetrated the killing is responsible and liable for
robbery and homicide. The co-accused, Suyo and Brillantes, are convicted of theft. Therefore, the
decision of the lower court is reversed and sentenced the accused, Ricardo Suyo and Franco
Brillantes, as co-principals in the crime of theft.

No promulgation as to the accused, Elias Jaranilla, that being stated that the accused has escaped
from the provincial jail.
Case #11:
GERUNCIO H. ILAGAN, CLARO PIÑON and ROSENDO PIÑON, petitioners, vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ARTURO A. ROMERO, SALVADOR Q. QUIMPO and
HOMETRUST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.

FACTS:
The records show that on July 21, 1992, eight informations were filed and docketed as
Criminal Cases Nos. C-40482 to C-40489 in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 120, Kalookan City,
charging herein petitioners Geruncio H. Ilagan, Claro Piñon and Rosendo Piñon as co-conspirators
in the crime of estafa.
Petitioners allege that the informations are duplicitous and the trial court should have quashed
them. They contend that the complainants in Criminal Case No. 40482 and the individual
complainants in the seven other cases (Criminal Case No. 40483-40489) are one and the same and
that the acts alleged in the first case (No. 40482) to have been committed during the period July,
1990 to December, 1991 are the same acts charged individually in the other seven cases (Nos.
40483-40489) on dates covered by the same period alleged in the first case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the offenses separately charged in the eight informations actually constitute only
one offense or were correctly considered as eight separate crimes of estafa.

HELD:
The crime of estafa committed against respondent corporation, on the one hand, and those
committed against the lot buyers, on the other, are definitely separate felonies. They were dictated
by different criminal intents, committed under different modes of commission provided by the law
on estafa, perpetrated by different acts, consummated on different occasions, and caused injury to
different parties.
The series of acts committed against the seven (7) lot buyers were not the product of a
single criminal intent. The misrepresentation or deceit was employed against each lot buyer
on different dates and in separate places, hence, they originated from separate criminal intents
and consequently resulted in separate felonies.
Case # 12:
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
CELERINO CASTROMERO, accused-appellant.

FACTS:
The accused Celerino Castromero was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape
with Serious Physical Injuries sentencing him to reclusion perpetua. That on the February 26, 1993
at about 2am in the province of Batangas Philippines, the accused armed with a balisong wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the offended party, Josephine Baon,
against her will and consent and as a consequence thereof she suffered serious physical injuries,
by jumping down through the 2nd floor window of her house.
Castromero and Baon are relatives. Josephine Baon's husband is the second-cousin of Castromero.
They were neighbors wherein their houses are located a mere 50 meters apart. During the incident
Castromero's penis due to their movement sideways was able to touch Baon's private parts. When
Baon, noticed that Castromero was no longer holding the knife she tried to escape by pushing him
off and jumping through the 2nd flr window. Upon falling down she yelled for help wherein her
in-laws came out to help her and bring her to the hospital, as she was experiencing intense pain.
ISSUES:
Whether or not rape committed in this case.
Whether or not the accuse have other liabilities aside from rape.

HELD:
In determining if rape was consummated or merely attempted, we observe that there was NO
complete of perfect penetration of the complainant's organ. To consummate rape, perfect or
complete penetration of the complainant's private organ is NOT essential. Even the slightest or
mere touching of the lips of the female organ, or labia of the pudendum, is sufficient. The court
pointed in people vs. Dela Pena (233 SCRA 573) held that the mere touching of the external
genitalia of the penis capable of consummating a sexual act constitutes carnal knowledge. For this
case Rape was consummated, because sexual assault was perpetrated by force and intimidation.
The accused is liable for physical injury. The rape victim jumped from a window of her house
to escape from the accused; as a result, she suffered serious physical injuries specifically a
broken vertebra which required medical attention and surgery for more than ninety days.
Here, the rape was complexed with the crime of serious physical injuries, in accordance with
the settled principle that a person who creates in another’s mind an immediate sense of danger
that causes the latter to try to escape is responsible for whatever injuries the other person may
consequently suffer.
Case #13:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ANTONIO COMADRE, GEORGE COMADRE
and DANILO LOZANO, appellants.

FACTS:
Robert Agbanlog, Jimmy Wabe, Gerry Bullanday, Rey Camat and Lorenzo Eugenio (drinking
grioup) were having a drinking spree on the terrace of the house of Robert’s father (Jaime). As the
drinking session went on, Robert and the others noticed appellants Antonio Comadre, George
Comadre and Danilo Lozano (appellants) walking. The three stopped in front of the house. While
his companions looked on, Antonio suddenly throw a hand grenade, ripping a hole in the roof of
the house. Drinking group were hit by shrapnel (fragments of the grenade) and slumped
unconscious on the floor. They were all rushed to the Hospital. However, Robert died before
reaching the hospital. Appellants were found guilty of complex crime of murder with multiple
attempted murder.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting the appellants.

HELD:
Only Antonio is liable for the crime. It was established that prior to the grenade explosion, Rey
Camat, Jaime Agbanlog, Jimmy Wabe and Gerry Bullanday were able to identify the culprits,
namely, appellants Antonio Comadre, George Comadre and Danilo Lozano because there was a
lamppost in front of the house and the moon was bright. No conspiracy. Only Antonio is liable
for the crime. When Antonio Comadre was in the act of throwing the hand grenade, George
Comadre and Danilo Lozano merely looked on without uttering a single word of encouragement
or performed any act to assist him.
The accused dropped a hand grenade inside a house, killing one and causing 4 others to
suffer shrapnel wounds on their bodies. The accused was found guilty of the complex crime
of murder with multiple attempted murder under Article 48, and the penalty for the most
serious crime (murder) shall be imposed.
Case #14:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. MELECIO ROBIOS y DOMINGO, appellant.

FACTS:

In an Information dated May 31, 1995, appellant was accused of killing his pregnant wife
and the fetus inside her. That on or about March 25, 1995 at around 7:00 a.m. in Brgy. San Isidro,
Municipality of Camiling, Province of Tarlac, the said accused Melecio Robinos, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously stab by means of a bladed knife 8 inches long, his
legitimate wife Lorenza Robinos, who was, then six (6) months pregnant causing the instantaneous
death of said Lorenza Robinos, and the fetus inside her womb. When arraigned on July 27, 1995,
appellant, with the assistance of his counsel, pleaded not guilty. After due trial, the RTC convicted
him.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting the appellant.

HELD:
The court affirmed the decision of the RTC. The accused stabbed his pregnant wife
with a knife, causing the instantaneous death of the latter and the fetus inside her womb.
He was convicted of the complex crime of parricide with unintentional abortion, and the
penalty to be imposed on him should be that for the graver offense which is parricide.
When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, the penalty for the
most serious crime shall be imposed.
Case #15:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ELADIO BALOTOL,Defendant-
Appellant.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from a sentence of the Court of First Instance of Samar convicting the
appellant of double murder and sentencing him to suffer life imprisonment and to indemnify the
heirs of the deceased Potenciano Sabasido and Bernardino Lacambra in the sum of P2,000,
respectively, and to pay the costs.
In 1941 the deceased Potenciano Sabasido wounded the appellant. He was prosecuted for
less serious physical injuries, pleaded guilty, and was sentenced to suffer fifteen days of
imprisonment.
On the afternoon of May 24, 1942, the appellant saw Potenciano Sabasido for the first time
since the latter was released from jail, at a cockpit in the barrio of Silaga, municipality of Santa
Rita, Samar. According to the witnesses for the prosecution Sabasido was standing outside the ring
close behind Bernardino Lacambra with his two hands holding the shoulders of the latter,
witnessing a cockfight. The appellant approached Sabasido from behind and stabbed him with a
bolo in the back. The weapon pierced through the body of Sabasido at the abdominal region and
wounded Lacambra also. Sabasido fell face downward and the appellant stabbed him again in the
back near the right shoulder, the bolo again piercing thru his body. Sabasido died instantaneously
and Lacambra, seven days later. The appellant admits having cause the death of Potenciano
Sabasido but denies having wounded of Bernardino Lacambra.
The accused called two witnesses, Celso Palo and Basillo Lacambra, to corroborate his
story. These two witnesses testified in substance to the same effect as the accused, except that they
added that it was the deceased Potenciano Sabasido who wounded Bernardino Lacambra
accidentally while the accused was running away and Sabasido was pursuing him. The trial court
did not believe the testimony of the accused and his witnesses and believed that of the witnesses
for the prosecution.

ISSUES:

Whether or not Eladio Balatol was guilty of double murder, which was the judgement of
the Court of First Instance of Samar; and whether or not he should suffer life imprisonment.

HELD:

The court affirmed the judgement of the Court of First Instance. The crime committed by
the appellant was double murder, defined and penalized in article 248, in relation to article 48, of
the Revised Penal Code. Article 48 provides that when a single act constitutes two or more grave
or less grave felonies, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be
applied in its maximum period. The penalty for murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum
period to death. Since under article 48 this penalty must be applied in its maximum period, the
appellant should be sentenced to death. However, in view of the lack of the necessary number of
votes to impose the death penalty, the court is constrained to apply the penalty next lower in degree,
which is life imprisonment.
Case #16:
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ERLINDO TALO, accused-
appellant.

FACTS:

That on or about the 12th day of May, 1995, at about 2:00 oclock dawn, in barangay Gata Daku,
municipality of Clarin, province of Misamis Occidental, the said accused ERLINDO TALO,
entered the dwelling by destroying some portion of the toilet of the offended party, armed with a
bolo and hunting knife, and by means of force, violence, intimidation and threats, did then and
there, with lewd and unchaste designs, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, take and carry away
MISS DORIS SAGUINDANG against her will from the house of her parents, and upon reaching
the rice field, by means of force, violence, intimidation and threats, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously had carnal knowledge of her against her will.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the accused is guilty of a complex crime.

HELD:

The trial court correctly appreciated other generic aggravating circumstances, namely,
dwelling and nighttime. Dwelling was correctly taken into account as an aggravating circumstance
as the evidence shows that complainant was forcibly taken from the house of her parents. Such
was the ruling in People v. Lacanieta, where, similar to the case at bar, the complainant was
forcibly taken from her house, brought to a nearby barangay, and then raped by the accused.

The aggravating circumstance of nighttime was also correctly held to be present. Accused-
appellant sought the cover of darkness to facilitate the commission of the crime. In People v.
Grefiel, it was held that forcible abduction with rape, committed at 2 oclock in the morning, was
attended by the aggravating circumstance of nighttime.

The crime was likewise attended by the aggravating circumstance of unlawful entry. The
barangay chairman of Gata Daku, Joven Japay, testified that when he went to the house of the
victim the day after the rape incident, he noticed that a baluster in the ceiling at the rear part of the
house had been forcibly removed and that there was a ladder propped nearby. There was thus entry
to complainants house through an opening which was one not intended for that purpose.
The accused was found guilty of the complex crime of forcible abduction with
rape, as the crime of forcible abduction was a necessary means for committing the crime of
rape.
Case #17:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JIMMY SABREDO y GARBO, accused-
appellant.

FACTS:
Imposing the penalty of death on accused-appellant, Jimmy Sabredo y Garbo, for the
complex crime of abduction with rape of complainant Judeliza Sabredo. Appellant is the uncle of
complainant. In 1993, Jimmy arrived from Masbate to reside with Judeliza's family in Cagtagong,
Caguyong, Borbon, Cebu, where he stayed with them for more than a year. On June 27, 1994,
Judeliza went to the well near their house, to take a bath. There, Jimmy grabbed and forcibly
dragged her at knife's point, to the highway where he made her board a truck for Bogo, Cebu.
Impelled by fear, she complied, since Jimmy continuously poked a knife under cover of his jacket
at her. From Bogo, he took her by passenger motorboat to Placer, Masbate. On July 4, 1994, at
around midnight, Jimmy, armed with a blade, sexually assaulted Judeliza. He covered her mouth
to prevent her from shouting. After satisfying his lust, Jimmy inserted three fingers into her vaginal
orifice and cruelly pinched it. Judeliza screamed and cried for help. Contention of accused: Jimmy
admitted having sexual relations with Judeliza, but insisted that it was consensual, he claimed that
they were lovers.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellant was guilty of a complex crime.

HELD:
It may appear at first blush that forcible abduction, as defined and penalized by Article 342
of the Revised Penal Code was also committed, we are not totally disposed to convict appellant
for the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape. It is note that while the information
sufficiently alleges the forcible taking of complainant from Cebu to Masbate, the same fails to
allege "lewd designs." When a complex crime under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code is
charged, such as forcible abduction with rape, it is axiomatic that the prosecution must allege and
prove the presence of all the elements of forcible abduction, as well as all the elements of the crime
of rape. When appellant, using a blade, forcibly took away complainant for the purpose of sexually
assaulting her, as in fact he did rape her, the rape may then absorb forcible abduction. Hence, the
crime committed by appellant is simple rape only.
Case #18:
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOSE BARBAS,
Defendant-Appellant.

FACTS:

The defendant, acting as a special deputy of the provincial treasurer, collected from two
individuals the amount of P2 each in payment of their cedula tax and delivered to them what he
represented to be the corresponding cedulas but, in fact, altered duplicates of cedulas. This money
was clearly received by the defendant in his capacity of a public officer, and constituted a valid
payment of the cedula tax of Palmares and Salazar, and the defendant who misappropriated it is
guilty of malversation of public funds.

The evidence shows that the defendant altered the duplicates of the cedulas in question as
alleged in the information. These duplicates are public documents, and the alterations made by the
defendant constituted falsification of public documents. The evidence shows that the duplicates of
the cedulas in question were falsified by the defendant in order that he might sell them to Palmares
and Salazar.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the defendant is guilty of a complex crime.

HELD:

The defendant, Jose Barbas is guilty of a complex crime. The falsification was the means
which the defendant availed himself of in committing the crime of malversation. As the acts of the
defendant constitute a complex crime, the penalty applicable thereto is that corresponding to the
more serious offense, or the falsification of a public document.
Case #19:

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FEDERICO ABRAZALDO y

PEDING, accused-appellant.
FACTS:
Mangaldan, Pangasinan, accused-appellant, then intoxicated, attempted to hack his uncle,
Bernabe Quinto, but instead, hit the post of the latters house. The incident was reported to the
barangay authorities, prompting Delfin Guban, Rosendo Fajardo, Sr., Alejandro Loceste (all are
members of the barangay tanod), and Cesar Manaois to rush to the scene. Upon reaching the place,
Fajardo heard accused-appellant shouting at his uncle, I will kill you! Thereafter, he saw accused-
appellant coming out of Quintos house with blood oozing from his forehead. At that time, the place
was well lighted by a flourescent lamp. Guban tried to assist accused-appellant. However, for
unknown reason, accused-apellant and Guban shouted at each other and grappled face to face.
Accused-appellant pulled out his knife, stabbed Guban at the abdomen and ran away. When
Fajardo got hold of Guban, the latter said, I was stabbed by Feding Abrazaldo. Fajardo, together
with the other barangay tanod, rushed Guban to the Gov. Teofilo Sison Memorial Hospital where
he was operated by Dr. Alberto Gonzales, a Medical Officer III. But after a few hours, Guban died.
Dr. Gonzales issued a Medico-Legal Certificate stating that the cause of death was stab wound,
epigastrium, massive hemothorax right.
Invoking self-defense, accused-appellant presented a different version. On July 15, 1995
at about 10:00 in the evening, he was making fans inside his house at Barangay Pogo, Mangaldan,
Pangasinan. His wife Lydia and children Mary Jane, Melvin and Christelle were with him.
Suddenly, Delfin Guban, who was then drunk, went to his house and shouted at him, saying, Get
out Feding I will kill you! When accused-appellant went out, Guban hit him with an iron pipe.
Accused-appellant ran towards his house and got his two children. Guban, now armed with a knife,
followed him and they grappled for its possession. In the course thereof, both fell down. It was
then that the knife held by Guban accidentally hit him. Accused-appellant did not know which part
of Gubans body was hit. Thereafter, he got the knife in order to surrender it to the police.

ISSUES:
 Whether or not the court erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstances of treachery,
nighttime or nocturnity, and the discharge of duties of the authorities.
 Whether or not self-defense plea may be justifiably entertained.

HELD:
The court finds that the trial court erred in concluding that treachery attended the
commission of the crime. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against
persons employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof, which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from defense which the offended
party might make. Treachery cannot be presumed, it must be proved by clear and convincing
evidence or as conclusively as the killing itself. Fajardo testified that accused-appellant and Guban
were grappling with each other and that prior to the stabbing, they were shouting at each other. In
this scenario, it cannot be said that Guban was unprepared to put up a defense, such as hitting
accused-appellant, or that the latters assault was sudden.
The trial court likewise erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity or
nighttime. For nocturnity to be properly appreciated, it must be shown that it facilitated the
commission of the crime and that it was purposely sought for by the offender. By and itself,
nighttime is not an aggravating circumstance. In the instant case, no sufficient evidence was
offered to prove that accused-appellant deliberately sought the cover of darkness to accomplish
his criminal design. In fact, Fajardo testified that there was a fluorescent lamp sufficiently
illuminating the scene of the crime.
Neither can we sustain the trial courts finding that the aggravating circumstance under
paragraph (5) of Article 14, Revised Penal Code, i.e., that the crime was committed in a place
where public authorities were engaged in the discharge of their duties, is present. It must be pointed
out that this aggravating circumstance is based on the greater perversity of the offender, as shown
by the place of the commission of the crime, which must be respected. In this case, the crime was
committed at the compound of the accused-appellant where no public function was being held.
The arrival of the barangay authorities was precisely due to the trouble that had commenced prior
to the stabbing incident. Clearly, the said aggravating circumstance cannot be considered.
While the accused admitted the commission of the crime in order to preserve his
own life, he maintained that the victim accidentally stabbed himself while they were grappling
for the knife. The justifying circumstance of self- defense cannot be appreciated considering the
accused- appellant’s flight from the crime scene, his failure to inform the authorities of the
incident and his failure to surrender the knife to the authorities. The aforesaid circumstances
are inconsistent with having a clean conscience and, instead, indicate his culpability to the
crime charged.
Therefore, in the absence of any circumstance that would qualify the crime at bar to murder,
accused-appellant can only be held liable for homicide defined and penalized under Article 249 of
the Revised Penal Code. The prescribed penalty is reclusion temporal. Considering that there was
neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstance that attended the commission of the crime, the
penalty has to be imposed in its medium period, ranging from 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17
years and 4 months.
Case #20:

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

RENATO TAC-AN Y HIPOS, accused-appellant.

FACTS:
Accused, without any justifiable cause and with intent to kill, evident premeditation,
treachery, while acting under the influence of drugs, with cruelty and deliberately augmenting the
suffering of the victim, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
shoot one Francis Ernest Escaño.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the crime was committed in contempt of or with insult to the public authorities.

RULING:
The trial court held that the shooting to death of Francis had been done "in contempt of or
with insult to the public authorities:

"Under Republic Act 1978, as amended, a teacher of a public or private school is considered a
person in authority. The fact that Mr. Damaso Pasilbas, the teacher in mathematics, was already
checking the attendance did not deter the accused from pursuing his evil act. The... accused ignored
his teacher's presence and pleas. Not yet satisfied with the crime and terror he had done to Francis
and the entire school, the accused entered the faculty room and held hostage the teachers and
students who were inside that room. To the court, this act of the accused was an insult to his
teachers and to the school, an act of callus disregard of others feelings and safety and completely
reprehensible."

We believe the trial court erred in so finding the presence of a generic aggravating
circumstance. Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 1978 and
Presidential Decree No. 299, provides as follows:

"Art. 152. Persons in authority and agents of persons in authority. Who shall be deemed as such.
In applying the provisions of the preceding and other articles of this Code, any person directly
vested with jurisdiction, whether as an individual or as a member of some court or government
corporation, board, or commission, shall be deemed a person in authority. A barrio captain and a
barangay chairman shall also be deemed a person in authority.”

A person who by direct provision of law or by election or by appointment by competent

authority, is charged with the maintenance of public order and the protection and security of life
and property, such as a barrio councilman, barrio policeman and barangay leader and any person
who comes to the aid of persons in authority, shall be deemed an agent of a person in authority.

In applying the provisions of Articles 148 and 151 of this Code, teachers, professors and
persons charged with the supervision of public or duly recognized private schools, colleges and
universities, and lawyers in the actual performance of their professional duties or on the occasion
of such performance, shall be deemed persons in authority.
Careful reading of the last paragraph of Article 152 will show that while a teacher or professor of
a public or recognized private school is deemed to be a "person in authority," such teacher or
professor is so deemed only for purposes of application of Articles 148 (direct assault upon a
person in authority), and 151 (resistance and disobedience to a person in authority or the agents of
such person) of the Revised Penal Code. In marked contrast, the first paragraph of Article 152 does
not identify specific articles of the Revised Penal Code for the application of which any person
"directly vested with jurisdiction, etc." is deemed "a person in authority." Because a penal statute
is not to be given a longer reach and broader scope than is called for by the ordinary meaning of
the ordinary words used by such statute, to the disadvantage of an accused, we do not believe that
a teacher or professor of a public or recognized private school may be regarded as a "public
authority" within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code the provision
the trial court applied in the case at bar.

(a) the aggravating circumstances of evident pre-meditation and of having acted with contempt of
or insult to the public authorities shall be DELETED and not taken into account; and

(b) the special aggravating circumstances of acting while under the influence of dangerous drugs
and with the use of an unlicensed firearm shall similarly be DELETED and not taken into account.
There being no generic aggravating nor mitigating circumstances present, the appellant shall suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Case #21:

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SERGIO PATOTOY and BONIFACIO

PATOTOY, accused, BONIFACIO PATOTOY, accused-appellant.

FACTS:

That on or about February 7, 1990 in the afternoon thereof, at Barangay Sawang,

Municipality of Uson, Province of Masbate, the said accused confederating together and helping
one another, with intent to kill, evident premeditation, treachery and superiority of strength, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with a knife one
Manuel Verano, hitting the latter on the different parts of the body, thereby inflicting wounds
which directly caused his instantaneous death.

Appellant admitted having killed Manuel; de denied however, that his father was with him
at the time. Appellant plead for self-defense because Manuel was drawing something from his
waist, which lead him to kill the victim.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court has erred in not sustaining appellant’s plea of self-defense.

HELD:

The court said that the familiar rule in criminal cases that the burden of proof to show the
guilt of an accused is on the prosecution which must rely on the strength of its own evidence and
not on the weakness of the defense. Where, however, an accused charged with the killing of a
person admits having caused that death but invokes self-defense to escape from criminal liability,
it becomes incumbent upon him to prove by clear and convincing evidence the positiveness of that
justifying circumstance. Self-defense is an affirmative allegation that must be established with
certainty by sufficient and satisfactory proof and, coincidentally, the existence of the following
requisites: (a) unlawful aggression; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel it, and
(c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. All these conditions
must concur.
Case #22:

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES plaintiff and appellee, vs. MAXIMO GENEBLAZO, accused-
appellant.

FACTS:

Accused-appellant Maximino Geneblazo appeals the decision of the Regional Trial Court
at Calauag, Quezon, Branch 63 in Criminal Case No. 2151-C, entitled The People of the
Philippines versus Maximino Geneblazo, convicting him of murder and sentencing him to
reclusion perpetua.

That on or about the 15th day of January 1988, at Barangay Pinagtalyeran, Municipality of
Calauag, Province of Quezon, , the above-named accused, armed with a bladed weapon, with intent
to kill, and with treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault
and stab with the said weapon one Domingo Opalsa, thereby inflicting upon the latter wounds on
the different parts of his body which directly caused his death.

That the accused attacked and stabbed said Domingo Opalsa suddenly and unexpectedly
without giving the latter any opportunity to defend himself or to escape.

Alex Obien, the first witness for the prosecution, testified that on January 15, 1988, at
around 12:00 midnight he and Domingo Opalsa were walking along Quezon Street, Calauag,
Quezon, bound for home when Maximino Geneblazo and around six unknown companions stoned
them. Obien and Opalsa retaliated by also throwing stones at Geneblazo and company. However,
upon seeing that Geneblazo was about to draw his knife, they ran away.

Maximino Geneblazo caught up with Domingo Opalsa and stabbed the latter twice the first
stab landed on the left side of the body in the area of the armpit, while the second landed on the
left side of the face.

ISSUES:

 Whether or not the court erred in not considering the justifying circumstance of self-
defense.
 Whether or not treachery should be appreciated.

HELD:

Assuming that the version of the accused of the incidents is true, that unlawful
aggression emanated from the victim and his companion by throwing stones at him, the
aggression ceased to exist when the victim and his companion ran away. There was no longer any
real danger to the life or personal safety of the accused. When the perpetrator does not
persist in his purpose or when he discontinues his attitude to the extent that the object of his
attack is no longer in peril, an act of aggression is not unlawful aggression warranting self-
defense.
 The prosecution failed to prove that the qualifying circumstance of treachery was present
in this case. Treachery must be proven as clearly and as cogently as the crime itself. The essence
of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on an unsuspecting victim,
depriving the latter of any real chance to defend himself and thereby ensuring its commission
without risk to himself.

Based on the court’s findings that homicide, not murder, was committed, the penalty
imposed upon accused-appellant should correspondingly be lowered to reclusion temporal. There
being no aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, the proper imposable penalty should be
reclusion temporal in its medium period.
Case #23:

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. PEPE BAUTISTA y SABADO, appellant

FACTS:

The appellant together with the others had a drinking spree. Three other went home ahead
and left the appellant and the deceased, armed with a bolo, behind. Around 9 pm a neighbor saw
the appellant running after the deceased thought his window. At around midnight the accused went
to Hilario's house together with his brother and confessed that he killed the deceased and requested
if they can sleep in the house which was granted by Hilario. The accused and his brother left the
house in the morning. Hilario then wrapped the bolo and surrendered it to the authorities. He then
went to his friend Buyagan and confessed the incident, thus he was compelled to report the matter
to the police. The appellant interposed self-defense in his behalf. He narrated that during the
drinking spree the deceased told about the hacking of his uncle by the appellant's cousin. He
reacted saying that he is not like his cousin. After their companions went home the deceased
followed and bad mouthed him. Raising his bolo he embraced the deceased and grabbed the bolo.
The deceased however threw a stone at him as he ran. The deceased caught up with him and he
then confronted and struck him with his own bolo. He was found guilty by the lower court for the
crime of murder reasoning that there was treachery. The case was appealed. The appellant raised
the issue that the court should have decided that it was only homicide.

ISSUES:

 Whether or not there was treachery in killing.

 Whether or not the mitigating circumstances of drunkenness, sufficient provocation, and
unlawful aggression may be appreciated.

HELD:

The Court said that the allegation of treachery must be proven together with the crime
itself. The court further added that treachery is present if the two elements are present namely: (1)
the employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend
himself or retaliate; and (2) the deliberate or conscious adoption of the means of execution. What
is decisive is that the execution of the attack makes it impossible for the victim to defend himself
or retaliate. The records show that the deceased was totally aware of the impending danger, based
on the testimony that the appellant was running after the deceased and caught up with him. Such
circumstance negates that existence of treachery.

As for appellant’s appeal for the appreciation of the mitigating circumstances of

drunkenness, sufficient provocation, and unlawful aggression arising from the deceased alleged
utterance of provocative and insulting words about appellant’s cousins hacking of the deceased
uncle and the deceased following him and wanting to hack him, this Court denies the same.
For drunkenness to be mitigating, the state of intoxication should be proved or established by
sufficient evidence. It should be such that it would diminish or impair the exercise of willpower or
the capacity to know the injustice of the act. In the case at bar, what was merely established was
that appellant and his companions had a drinking spree. There was no showing that if appellant
was intoxicated, his willpower was diminished or impaired.

Neither was there a showing of sufficient provocation. Appellants claim that the deceased
uttered insulting and provocative words against appellant in the course of the drinking spree was
not, however, corroborated by any of their companions. In any event, it would appear that the
alleged utterance was made at the time or immediately before the commission of the crime.

Nor was there unlawful aggression on the part of the deceased. For, even if appellant
believed that the deceased did try to kill him when he saw him raise his bolo, such aggression
ceased when appellant succeeded in grabbing the bolo, and appellant was not hit by the stone
hurled at him. For at that juncture, appellant no longer faced any danger to his life and limb. When
an unlawful aggression which has begun no longer exists, one making a defense has no right to
kill or even injure the former aggressor

The commission of the crime not having been attended by any qualifying circumstance,
appellant is liable only for homicide, and absent any aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the
penalty therefor is reclusion temporal in its medium period, subject to the application of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law.
Case #24:

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. TIMOTEO ESCARLOS, alias Tomy, appellant.

FACTS:

Accused-Appellant: Timoteo Escarlos Victim: Antonio Balisacan

On the night of July 1, 2000, accused Timoteo Escarlos was watching a benefit dance.
While thereat, Kgd. Antonio Balisacan who was then drunk, passed in front of accused and told
him, 'You are here again to create trouble.' Escarlos was offended so he answered back saying
'Why do you say that to me when I am not doing any trouble here.' Antonio Balisacan told him,
'Okinnam ketdi' (vulva of your Mother) and without warning boxed him. Timoteo was hit on the
forehead. He intended to box back but he noticed that the victim was pulling out a kitchen knife,
so for fear of his life, he grabbed the weapon from Antonio Balisacan and used the knife in stabbing
the latter who was hit at the side below the left armpit. He stabbed him twice and when the victim
was about to fall down, he was able to hit him for the third time.

CRIME COMMITTED: Murder

CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSED: Appellant invokes self- defense.

Escarlos asserts that it was the victim who initially approached and assaulted him and he
had no choice but to defend himself. He argues that in the heat of the encounter, he was not in a
position to calculate or determine the effects of his blows, and that it was nevertheless necessary
for him to inflict them in order to save his own life.

CONTENTION OF THE STATE: Appellant had deliberately adopted a treacherous mode of attack
for the purpose of depriving the victim of a chance to fight or retreat.

ISSUE:

 Whether or not there was treachery.

 Whether or not there was unlawful aggression.

HELD:

The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor without the
slightest provocation on the part of the victim, thus depriving the latter of any real chance to put
up a defense, and thereby ensuring the commission of the attack without risk to the aggressor.
Treachery requires the concurrence of two conditions: (1) the employment of a means of execution
that gives the person attacked no opportunity for self-defense or retaliation; and (2) the deliberate
and conscious adoption of the means of execution. There is no treachery when the assault is
preceded by a heated exchange of words between the accused and the victim; or when the victim
is aware of the hostility of the assailant towards the former. In the instant case, the verbal and
physical squabble prior to the attack proves that there was no treachery, and that the victim was
aware of the imminent danger to his life. Moreover, the prosecution failed to establish that
appellant had deliberately adopted a treacherous mode of attack for the purpose of depriving the
victim of a chance to fight or retreat. Certainly, the victim knew that his scuffle with appellant
could eventually turn into a violent physical clash. The existence of a struggle before the fatal
blows were inflicted on the victim clearly shows that he was forewarned of the impending attack,
and that he was afforded the opportunity to put up a defense. Indeed, a killing done at the spur of
the moment is not treacherous. Moreover, any doubt as to the existence of treachery must be
resolved in favor of the accused.

Even assuming arguendo that there was an altercation before the stabbing incident
and that some danger did in fact exist, the imminence of that danger had already ceased the
moment the accused disarmed the victim by seizing the knife from the latter. After the accused
had successfully seized it, there was no longer any unlawful aggression to speak of that would
have necessitated the need to kill the victim. Hence, the accused became the unlawful
aggressor when he stabbed the victim.
Case #25:

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. APOLINAR

FACTS:

Midnight of December 22, 1936, the defendant and appellant Anastacio Apolinar alias
Atong was at that time the occupant of a parcel of land owned by Joaquin Gonzales in Papallasen,
La Paz, Umingan, Pangasinan.Armed with a shotgun, Atong was looking over said land when he
observed that there was a man carrying a bundle on his shoulder. Believing that he was a thief (of
palay), the defendant called his attention but he ignored him. The defendant fired in the air and
then at the person. The man, identified as Domingo Petras, was able to get back to his house and
consequently narrated to Angel Natividad, the barrio chief, that he had been wounded in the back
by a shotgun. He then showed the two wounds - one in each side of the spinal column - which
wounds were circular in form and a little bigger than a quarter of an inch, according to the medical
report of Dr. Mananquil, Petras died of the wounds he sustained. The defendant surrendered to the
authorities immediately after the incident and gave a sworn statement before the Justice of Peace
of Umingan on December 23, 1936.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the killing of Petras was justified by defense of property.

HELD:

No. The right to property is not of such importance as right to life, and defense of property
can be invoked as a justifying circumstance only when it is coupled with an attack on the person
of one entrusted with said property
Case #26:

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. MARIVIC GENOSA, appellant.

FACTS:

Marivic Genosa, the appellant, on November 15, 1995, attacked and wounded his husband
which ultimately led to his death. According to the appellant, she did not provoke her husband
when she got home that night and it was her husband who began the provocation. The appellant
said she was frightened that her husband would hurt her and she wanted to make sure she would
deliver her baby safely.

The appellant testified that during her marriage she had tried to leave her husband at least
five times, but that Ben would always follow her and they would reconcile. The appellant said that
the reason why Ben was violent and abusive towards her that night was because he was crazy about
his recent girlfriend, Lulu Rubillos. The appellant, after being interviewed by specialist, has been
shown to be suffering from Battered Woman Syndrome. The appellant with a plea of self-defense
admitted the killing of her husband. She was found guilty of the crime of parricide, with the
aggravating circumstance of treachery, for the husband was attacked while asleep.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not appellant acted in self-defense.

(2) Whether or not treachery attended the killing.

HELD:

For the first issue, the SC held that the defense failed to establish all the elements of self-
defense arising from battered woman syndrome, to wit: (a) Each of the phases of the cycle of
violence must be proven to have characterized at least two battering episodes between the appellant
and her intimated partner; (b) The final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer
must have produced in the battered person’s mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her
batterer and an honest belief that she needed to use force in order to save her life, and; (c) At the
time of the killing, the batterer must have posed probable – not necessarily immediate and actual
– grave harm to the accused based on the history of violence perpetuated by the former against the
latter.

For the second issue, the SC ruled out treachery as an aggravating circumstance because
the quarrel or argument that preceded the killing must have forewarned the victim of the assailant’s
aggression.