Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-49831 June 27, 1990

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ERNESTO GA Y ESPLANADA, ALFREDO ENDENCIO Y SALVADOR and REYNALDO RUGA Y
RESURRECCION alias REYNALDO BUSTAMANTE Y MUTAS, defendants. ERNESTO GA Y ESPLANADA,
defendant-appellant.

GANCAYCO, J.:

This case involves the dastardly killing of an old couple in Forbes Park and their
housemate and serious injury to a daughter in the course of a robbery of a
wristwatch worth P100.00 and a transistor radio worth P60.00. It reached this Court
on mandatory review of the judgment promulgated on 10 August 1977 by the Circuit
Criminal Court of the Seventh Judicial District, Pasig, 1 convicting the accused of
the crime of Robbery with Triple Homicide and Frustrated Homicide and imposing the
penalties of three death sentences for each of the accused.

In a Resolution dated 27 August 1987 this Court en banc directed that all pending
death penalty cases be remanded for adjudication to the respective division of the
Court to which the member to whom they have been preliminarily assigned for
reporting purposes pertains, considering that under Section 19(1), Article III of
the Constitution, any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion
perpetua. 2 On 21 April 1988 the Clerk of Court notified the accused in this case
and gave them 30 days within which to file a written statement personally signed by
them with the assistance of counsel or in the presence of prison authorities on
whether or not they wished to continue with the case as an appealed case, with the
caveat that failure to do so will cause the dismissal of the case which shall
thereafter be remanded to the trial court for execution of judgment. 3

Accused Alfredo Endencio and Reynaldo Ruga complied and in a letter received by the
Court on 18 May 1988 manifested that they were willing to accept the sentence of
reclusion perpetua. 4 In a Resolution dated 1 June 1988 the First Division of this
Court noted the manifestation of the two accused and remanded the case to the lower
court for execution ofjudgment as to them, while the appeal of Ernesto Ga
continued. 5

Appellant Ga does not dispute the findings of fact of the trial court. In his
appeal, appellant questions only the application of certain aggravating
circumstances and the exclusion of some mitigating circumstances by the court a
quo, which found the facts attendant to the commission of the crime charged as
follows:

... That at about 8:00 A-M. of July 29, 1977, the above-named accused met at the
residence of Reynaldo Ruga at Project 7, Quezon City, and planned to buy a
motorcycle to rob the residence of the Gonzaga family. That they borrowed a
travelling bag from a friend of Ruga, and they proceeded to Cubao, where Emesto Ga
withdrew from the Savings Bank of Manila, Cubao Branch, the sum of P55.00 out of
his savings deposit, and they bought a kitchen knife and a dagger (Exhs. Y and Z).
Then, the three went to the Ocean Theater, and inside said theater, they planned to
rob the said residence, wherein they planned to hogtie all the occupants and would
kill who ever (sic) will stop them. At about 7:30 in the evening of July 29, 1977,
the three accused went out of the movie house and bought a bottle of White Castle
whiskey; boarded a taxi and proceeded to the residence of the Gonzaga family in
Forbes Park, where they invited Bonifacio Marteja, Andres Laxion and Francisco
Melorin to a drinking spree in the servants' quarters of the Gonzaga residence.
While in that quarter (sic), Ruga brought [ouil another bottle of liquor, this
time, gin, and they continued drinldng up to midnight of July 29. At this time,
Andres Larion, who was heavily drunk already became unruly and boisterous. At this
juncture, Endencio kicked the feet of Ga making a sign of their plan,
simultaneously stood up, pulled out the kitchen knife from the bag, and stated,
"hold-up ito" (sic). Alfredo Endencio took some pieces of cord and torn clothes and
hog-tied Larion, Marteja and Melorin, and the accused went out to proceed to the
main door of the entrance of said residence. Due to their failure to open the
entrance, they went back to the servants' quarters and took Bonifacio Marteja with
them to lead them in entering inside (sic) the Gonzaga residence. Inside the
servants'quarters, they saw Larion being unruly and scandalous, and fearing that
neighbors would hear them, they gagged him, and then, Endencio kicked Larion on his
body, and when Ernesto Ga saw blood coming out from (sic) the mouth of Andres
Larion, he stabbed Larion on his stomach with the use of the dagger (Exh. Z) which
they bought from Farmers Market. Endencio got the key from Marteja and he managed
to enter inside (sic) the residence thru the back door. Later on, the three
accused, together with Bonifacio Marteja, who was stin hog-tied, entered the room
of Ester Gonzaga, but upon seeing that she is [a] cripple, they did not harm her.
Then, they entered the masters' bedroom, leaving Ruga behind to guard Ester
Gonzaga; that when Alfredo Endencio saw that Dona Juliana Gonzaga was awake, he
shouted to Ga that she was awake, and then Endencio approached Doiia Juliana and
stabbed her mercilessly with the kitchen knife (Exh. Y). Don Julio Gonzaga, who was
sleeping on the other bed inside the masters' bedroom, was awakened by the violence
near him and stood up, but he was met by Ernesto Ga and was told to calm down. But
Rogelia Gonzaga came rushing towards her parent's room, shouting. Because of that
reaction, Ernesto Ga stabbed Don Julio with a dagger and after stabbing him, rushed
to the door where accused Endencio, who also met Don Juho, who was then going out
of the bedroom, stabbed Juho Gonzaga also. The accused Endencio and Ga met Rogelia
Gonzaga [by] the door and they also stabbed her on the face and several parts of
her body. Rogelia Gonzaga, though wounded, managed to call the Forbes Park security
guards for help. Lt. Lope Celestial and Victorino Sindayon and Cesario Pabillaran
called the Makati Medical Center ambulance that took Rogelia Gonzaga and Dofia
Juliana Gonzaga to the said hospital.

The weapons used by Emesto Ga and Alfredo Endencio were thrown by them near the
concrete wall of the Gonzaga residence and at the servants'quarters, and they
managed to escape through Tamarind Road, passing Pih Road, where they spent the
night at the ground floor of the residence of Mr. Malulis, unnoticed by the
occupants; that at about 5:30 A.M. of July 30, 1977, they jumped off the wall of
that residence and they
fled. ... 6

The information filed on 3 August 1977 in the court a quo, charging Emesto Ga y
Esplanade, Alfredo Endencio y Salvador and Reynaldo Ruga y Resurreccion alias
Reynaldo Bustamante y Mutas, reads as follows:

That on or about the 30th day of July, 1977, in the municipality of Makati, Metro
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping and
aiding one another, at nighttime, a circtirngtance deliberately sought to insure
success in the commission of the crime, with intent of gain, and by means of force,
violence and intimidation upon the person of one Bonifacio Marteja y Juntilla, a
houseboy, while in bis dwelling, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, steal and carry away one (1) wristwatch worth P100.00 and one (1)
transistor radio worth P60.00, belonging to one Bonifacio Marteja y Juntilla,
thereby causing damage and prejudice to the latter in the aforesaid amount of
P160.00; "That by reason or on the occasion of said robbery and for the purpose of
enabling them (accused) to take, steal and carry away the aforesaid articles in
pursuance of their conspiracy and for the purpose of enabling (sic) the success of
their criminal act, with intent to kill, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault and stab with a kitchen knife and a dagger the
following, to wit: Juliana Gonzaga y de la Rama, Julio Gonzaga y Cuison, and Andres
Larion alias Jessica, thereby inflicting upon the aforesaid persons mortal stab
woun& which directly caused their death and inflicting stab wounds to one Rogelia
Gonzaga y de la Rama, thus performing all the acts of execution which would have
produced the crime of homicide as a consequence but nevertheless did not produce it
by reason of cause or causes independent of their will, that is, due to the timely
and able medical attendance rendered to said Rogelia Gonzaga y de la Rama which
prevented her death.

Contrary to law. 7

Upon arraigrunent, the above accused, being duly assisted by counsel de oficio,
pleaded guilty to the Information. 8 Evidence was presented to determine the degree
of culpability of the accused. 9 The defense submitted Ga's birth certificate (Exh.
1-Ga) and baptismal certificate (Exh. 5-Ga) to show that he was one day short of
his 17th birthday at the time of the commission of the offense. The lower court
appreciated against all accused the aggravating circumstances of superior strength,
insult or disregard of the respect due the victims on account of their ages,
nighttime and commission by a band. It also took into consideration their
intoxication, habitual delinquency and recidivism, based on records presented that
showed that they have been previously convicted of the crimes of serious physical
injuries and of theft. 10

On 10 August 1977 they were found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Robbery with Triple Homicide and Frustrated Homicide and sentenced to each suffer
the penalty of DEATH THRICE. They were also ordered to jointly and severally
indemnify the heirs of the victims in the amount of P200,000.00; to pay moral
damages in the amount of P10,000.00; and another P10,000.00 as exemplary damages,
jointly and severally; and to pay their proportionate shares of the costs. 11

In his appeal of the decision appellant Ernesto Ga through counsel raised the
following errors:

1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING COMMISSION OF A CRIME BY A BAND AS AN

AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE IN THIS CASE.

2. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING INSULT OR DISREGARD OF THE RESPECT DUE THE
VICTIMS ON ACCOUNT OF AGE AS AN AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE IN THIS CASE.

3. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING NIGHT-TIME AS AN AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE

IN THIS CASE.

4. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING INTOXICATION AS AN AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE

IN THIS CASE.

5. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING RECIDIVISM AND HABITUAL DELINQUENCY AS

AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES IN THIS CASE.

6. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER PLEA OF GUILTY AS A MITIGATING

CIRCUMSTANCE IN THIS CASE.

7. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE MINORITY OF APPELLANT GA AS A

PRIVILEGED MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE IN THIS CASE.

8. THEACCUSED GA AND ENDENCIO BEING MINORS AT THE TIME OF THE COMMISSION OF THE
CRIME, SHOULD HAVE BEEN ENTITLED TO THE BENEFITS UNDER PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 603,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE CHILD AND YOUTH WELFARE CODE.

9. THE TRUL COURT ERRED IN SENTENCING APPELLANTS TO DEATH. 12

Because the accused pleaded guilty to the crime charged, the only aspect of the
case properly subject to review is the correctness of the penalty imposed by the
court a quo. 13 In doing so We shall resolved the assigned errors in sequence.

As to the first assigned error, We find merit in appellant's contention that the
aggravating circumstance of commission of a crime by a band should not have been
appreciated against them. A band (en cuadrilla) consists of at least four
malefactors who are all armed. 14 In this case there were only three perpetrators
and two weapons, a kitchen knife (Exh. "Y") and a dagger (Exh. "Z"). Clearly, the
terrible threesome of the accused did not constitute a band.

Appellant next alleges that insult or disregard of the respect due the victims on
account of their ages was not present in the commission of the crime. The Solicitor
General agrees that this deserves consideration "because no evidence was presented
arxd nothing appears in the judgment to indicate that, in the commission of the
crime, the appellants deliberately intended to offend or insult the sex or age of
the victims," 15 citing People v. Mangsant. 16 While the conclusion reached is
correct, the applicable doctrine should be that enunciated in People v. Pagal 17
and reiterated in People v. Ang 18 and People v. Nabaluna, 19 that:

The aggravating circumstance that the crime was committed with insult or in
disregard of the respect due the offended party on account of his rank, age or sex
may be taken in account only in crimes against persons or honor, when in the
commission of the crime there is some insult or disrespect shown to rank, age, or
sex (Albert, Revised Penal Code, 1946 Ed., p. 109; Reyes, Revised Penal Code, 1974
Ed., Vol. I, p. 297). It is not proper to consider this aggravating circumstance in
crimes against property (Aquino, Revised Penal Code, 1976 Ed., Vol I, p. 286,
citing U.S. v. Samonte, 8 Phil. 286). Robbery with homicide is primarily a crime
against property and not against persons. Homicide is a mere incident of the
robbery, the latter being the main purpose and object of the criminal (Ibid., Vol.
III, 1976 Ed., p. 1434, citing U.S. v. Ipil, 27 Phil. 530, 535). The trial court
erred in taking into account this aggravating circumstance. 20

Note, further, that what was involved in Mangsant was a crime against persons: the
murder of a girl fourteen years of age. While it may be understandable that the
prosecution alleged the aggravating circumstance of insult or disregard of the sex
of the victim in the information, nevertheless, the Court finds that such
aggravating circumstance is not present in this case.

Appellant also assails the appreciation of nighttime as an aggravating circumstance

on the ground that, while nighttime may be the factual setting of the crime, it
does not appear to have been especially or deliberately sought by the accused in
order to facilitate its commission. Citing People v. Apduhan, Jr. 21 and People v.
Flores, 22 appellant argues that nocturnidad must concur with the intent and design
of the offender to capitalize on the intrinsic impunity afforded by the darkness of
the night. 23

Appellant's reliance on these two cases is misplaced. Rather, these two cases
support the correct position taken by the Solicitor General that a plea of guilty
is not only an admission of guilt but also of the material facts alleged in the
complaint or information. 24
In Flores, the ruling touched on nocturnity merely to illustrate that it was a term
with legal significance not ordinarily understandable by a layman unless explained
to him. 25 The case dwelt more on whether or not the accused, in pleading guilty,
fully understood the nature of the charges against him and the character of the
punishment provided by law before it is imposed. It was then ordered that a new
arraignment of the defendant with the assistance of counsel and with the
precautions therein indicated be conducted by the lower court.

On the other hand, in Apduhan Jr. the Court ruled that:

While an unqualified plea of guilty is mitigating, it at the same time constitutes

an admission of all the material facts alleged in the information, including the
aggravating circumstances therein recited (People v. Egido, 90 Phil. 762; People v.
Santos and Vicente, 105 Phil. 40). ...

xxx xxx xxx

... The prosecution does not need to prove the said three circumstances (all
alleged in the second amended information) since the accused, by his plea of
guilty, has supplied the requisite proof (People v. Acosta, 98 Phil. 642; People v.
Rapirap, 102 Phil. 863). Hence we will not belabor our discussion of the attendant
aggravating circumstances. 26

It has been established that the accused pleaded guilty to the Information, which
reads in part that the crime was conunitted "at nighttime, a circumstance
deliberately sought to insure success in the commission of the crime, ... Further,
a claim of an improvident plea was never part of the defense strategy. Appellant
does not question the effect of his plea of guilty to the crime charged. He merely
disputes the appreciation against him of an aggravating circumstance duly alleged
in the information. Applying the aforestated general rule, therefore, there is no
need for the prosecution to prove the attendance of said circumstance.

The facts in the Formentera case are not obtaining here. In that case, We
considered the trial court as having committed certain lapses when it

... did not require the prosecuting fiscal to present evidence to determine the
exact degree of the accused's culpability. It merely relied on his plea of guilty
and the manifestation of his counsel de oficio that the only mitigating
circumstances (sic) was his plea of guilty. Thus, the court below took into account
the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, dwelling, abuse of superior strength
and recidivism, as "gathered" from the information. It did not require the fiscal
to prove that the 'wee" hours alleged in the information referred to nighttime, or
that the same was purposely sought by the accused to better accomplish their
purpose or to afford impunity. ... 27

Furthermore, in his brief appellant does not support Ms claim that nighttime is not
obtaining. On the contrary, aside from being alleged in the information, the facts
as found by the trial court clearly establish that the accused waited until
midnight to execute their designs and took advantage of the cover of darkness to
avoid discovery, minimize the risk of capture and facilitate their escape. The
application of nocturnity is proper. 28

The next assigned error is the appreciation against the accused of the alternative
circumstance of intoxication as aggravating. Appellant argues that, while the
evidence shows that prior to the commission of the crime the three accused drank
liquor, it has not been proven that they were in a state of intoxication at the
time the crime was actually committed. He cites the case of U.S. v. Dowdell, et
al., 29 where it was held that intoxication cannot be considered mitigating where
the accused were sufficiently sober to know what they were doing when committing
the unlawful act. He claims that his ability to give a detailed account of how the
crime was committed shows that he was not in a state of intoxication.

Intoxication is mitigating when it affects the mental faculties of the accused. 30

Appellant's line of argunfent therefore is supportive of not appreciating
drunkenness as a mitigating circumstance in his favor. Appellant should have
attempted to prove instead that the evidence presented is not sufficient to
indicate that his inebriated state was habitual or intentional, these being the
bases for the considering intoxication an aggravating circumstance. 31 On the other
hand, the records indicate that after they had planned the crime, the accused went
on a drinking spree � first with whiskey then with gin � with some of their would
be victims. In this instance, intoxication is aggravating because it was
intentional, i.e., it was subsequent to the plan to commit the crime. 32 The
accused drank to embolden themselves in the commission of the offense.

Appellant next contends that the trial court erred in appreciating recidivism and
habitual delinquency as aggravating circum stances against him. We agree with the
Solicitor General in the merit of this contention considering that the evidence for
the prosecution consisted merely of photo-copies of the NBI criminal records of
appellant which were neither certified nor Identified by a witness and no
explanation was given as to why the original copies were not produced. As we held
in People v. Ang:

To find recidivism against an accused, the same must be alleged in the Information
and certified copies of the sentences rendered must be adduced at the trial and
admitted as evidence with knowledge of the accused (People v. Hermosilla, 122 SCRA
905 [1983]; People v. Scott, 62 Phil. 553 [1935]). However, even if it is not
alleged, the same may be appreciated if proven by evidence (People v. Perez, 106
SCRA 436 [1981]), or if admitted by the accused during the trial (People v.
Carzano, 95 SCRA 146 [1980]). In this case, recidivism was not alleged in the
Information, much less was there any admission by the accused, nor was there
sufficient proof of the same. 33

The sixth assigned error is the failure of the trial court to consider the plea of
guilty as a mitigating circumstance in favor of appellant. In line with Our ruling
in People v. Crisostomo, 34 We find no reason to controvert the recommendation of
the Solicitor General 35 that the same be appreciated as the records show that
appellant spontaneously pleaded guilty to the crime charged in the Information
immediately upon arraignment before the competent court that is to try the case and
prior to the presentation of evidence for the prosecution. 36

As to the seventh assigned error, appellant assails the failure of the trial court
to consider his minority as a privileged mitigating circumstance inspire of the
presentation of his birth certificate (Exhibit 1-Ga) and baptismal certificate
(Exh. 5-Ga) indicating that he was born on 1 August 1960, and therefore one day
short of his 17th birthday at the time of the commission of the offense. While
appellant cites the Court of Appeals case of People v. Iba�ez Jr., 37 to show that
the birth certificate would be the best evidence of age, the Solicitor General
points out that the birth certificate was discredited by the trial court because it
was full of erasures and alterations. 38 We understand, then, why the trial court
had to resort to the Social Security System Identification card (Exh. "D"), the
driver's license (Exh. "N"), and the Medicare Identification card (Exh. "O") of
appellant, all of which show that he was bom on 1 August 1956. Therefore, as proven
by other equally admissible and more competent evidence indicating that when
appellant committed the crime he was 20 years, 11 months and 29 days old, minority
as a privileged mitigating circumstance under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code
should not be considered in his favor.
Regarding the penultimate assigned error on the entitlement of the appellant to the
benefits under Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as the Child and Youth
Welfare Code, suffice it to say that, in any event, recourse to the benefit of a
suspended sentence as a youthful offender in accordance with said law has become
moot and academic inasmuch as appellant is now above 21 years of age, and the rule
is that if an accused reaches the age of majority during appeal, he is no longer
entitled to a suspended sentence. 39 In People v. Casiguran, 40 We held that

The purpose of articles 189 and 192 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code is the same
as that of article 80 (of the Revised Penal Code) and that is to avoid a situation
where juvenile offenders would commingle with ordinary criminals in prison. So,
instead of imposing a condemnatory sentence on them, they are confined in a
beneficent institution for their care, correction and education (People v. Estefa,
86 Phil. 104, 110).

Article 192 should be interpreted in the Rqme manner as article 80. Under the
original provisions of Article 80 (before it was amended by Republic Act No. 47
wmch reduced the age of eighteen years to sixteen years), it was held that if at
the time the crime was committed the accused was below eighteen years but at the
time of the trial or conviction he was no longer a minor, he is not entitled
anymore to a suspended sentence because he is not a juvenile offender but already
an adult. The reason for the fiuspended sentence does not apply to him (People v.
Celespara, 82 Phil. 399; People v. Nunez, 85 Phil. 448; People v. Estefa, supra;
People v. Lingcuan, 93 Phil. 9; People v. Doria, L-26189 and two other cases,
January 31, 1974, 55 SCRA 435, 450; People v. Pedro, L-1 8997, January 31, 1966, 16
SCRA 57, 67).

Finally, appellant argues that the lower court erred in sentencing him to death.
Under the Revised Penal Code, when by reason or on the occasion of a robbery, the
crime of homicide shall have been committed, the penally of reclusion perpetua to
death is imposable. 41 Based on the foregoing disquisition, it is clear that the
imposition of the death penalty is correct 42 there being three aggravating
circumstances: abuse of superior strength 43 nighttime and intoxication, and only
one mitigating circumstance; the voluntary plea of guilty. However, consistent with
the Constitution and Our ruling in People v. Millora, et al., 44 to the effect that
Section 19(1), Article III of the Constitution does not declare the abolition of
the capital punishment but merely prohibits its imposition, the penalty to be
imposed on appellant Ga is reduced to reclusion perpetua.

The lower court, however, was in error when it convicted the accused of "the crimes
of Robbery with Triple Homicide, and Frustrated Homicide," and in imposing on each
of the accused the death penalty three times. We reiterate at this point Our ruling
in People v. Cari�o, 45 that there is no crime of Robbery with Homicide and
Frustrated Homicide. The term 'Homicide' in paragraph 1, Art. 294 is to be
understood in its generic sense. It includes murder and slight physical injuries
committed during the occasion of the robbery wmeh crimes are merged in the crime of
robbery with homicide as defined in paragraph 1 of Article 294 of the Revised Penal
Code (People v. Saquing, 30 SCRA 834)."

Notwithstanding the fact that three persons were killed and one seriously injured
in the commission of the robbery, the charge should have been only for robbery with
homicide. 46

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with the modification that the
accused is hereby held guilty of a single offense of robbery with homicide and
imposed the corresponding penalty of reclusion perpetua. The civil indemnity for
each of the three victims is reduced to P30,000.00, to be paid to their heirs. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED,

Narvasa (Chairman), Cruz, Gri�o-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Judge Onofre A. Villaluz, presiding.

2 Page 219, Rollo.

3 Page 220, Rollo.

4 Page 221, Rollo.

5 Page 222, Rollo.

6 Pages 30 to 33, Rollo.

7 Pages 9 to 10, Rollo.

8 Page 12, Rollo.

9 Page 12, Rollo.

10 Page 36, Rollo.

11 Page 38, Rollo.

12 Pages 164 to 166, Rollo.

13 People v. Apduhan Jr., 24 SCRA 798, 805 (1968).

14 Article 14, par. 6, Revised Penal Code; People v. Apduhan Jr., Id., at page 814.

15 Page 7, Brief for the Appellee, Page 203, Rollo.

16 65 Phil. 548 (1938).

17 79 SCRA 570 (1977).

18 139 SCRA 115 (1985).

19 142 SCRA 446 (1986).

20 People v. Pagal, supra, note 17, at pages 576 to 577.

21 Supra.

22 40 SCRA 230 (1971).

23 Page 168, Rollo.

24 Pages 7 to 8, Brief for the Appellee, Page 203, Rollo. See also People v.
Formentera, 130 SCRA 114,128 (1984); People v. Retania y Rodelas, 95 SCRA 201, 220
(1980) and the cases cited therein.

25 Supra, note 22, at page 232.

26 Supra, at pages 814 to 815.

27 Supra, note 24, at pages 129 to 130.

28 People vs. Flores, supra; People vs. Boyles, 11 SCRA 88, 94 (1964).

29 11 Phil. 4 (1908).

30 People v. Noble, 77 Phil. 93, 102 (1946).

31 Art. 15, third paragraph, Revised Penal Code. See also People vs. Renejane, 158
SCRA 258, 269 (1988).

32 People v. Apduhan Jr., supra, at page 813.

33 Supra, note 18, at page 122.

34 160 SCRA 47, 56 (1988) and the cases cited therein.

35 Pages 12 to 13, Brief for the Appellee, page 203, Rollo.

36 Page 12, Rollo.

37 CA-G.R. No. 17077-R, 29 November 1957, Velayo, as cited in Aquino, The Revised
Penal Code 1987 Ed., vol. 1, p. 248. The decision itself, however, does not say
anything to this effect.

It only held that:

The certificate of birth of appellant Jose lbaiiez Jr., (Exhibit 6) shows that he
was born on May 17, 1937. At the time of the commission of the crime, therefore, he
was below 18 years of age and, contrary to the contention of the Solicitor General,
the mitigating circumstance of minority was correctly considered in his favor.

38 Pages 13 to 14, Brief for the Appellee, page 203, Rollo.

39 People v. Limosnero,147 SCRA 232, 235 [1987] citing People v. Millora, 119 SCRA
417, [1982]. See also People v. Sanchez, 132 SCRA 103, 107 [1984] citing People v.
Casiguran, infra, and the cases cited therein and reiterated in People v. Verano
Jr., 163 SCRA 614, 620 [1988].

40 94 SCRA 244, 249 (1979).

41 Article 294 (1). People v. Sobs, G.R. Nos. 78732-33, 14 February 1990.

42 Article 63 (4), Revised Penal Code.

43 The trial court has considered this against the accused (Page 36, Rollo). In his
brief, appellant acknowledges this finding of the trial court (Page 163, Rollo) but
does not contest its appreciation against him as one of the assigned errors (Pages
164 to 166, Rollo). Furthermore, the facts support the conclusion of the lower
court that the accused abused their superior strength in committing the crime.

44 G.R. No. L-38968-70, 9 February 1989 [captioned in 170 SCRA

107 as People v. Mu�oz], as cited in People v. Solis, supra.

45 165 SCRA 664 (1988). Also cited in People v. Repuela, et al., G.R. No. 85178, 15
March 1990.

46 People v. Qui�ones, et al., G.R. No. 80042, 28 March 1990. See also People v.
Cabuena, 98 Phil. 919, 923 (1956).

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