ARTICLE 777 .................................................................................................
77
WILLS and SUCCESSION (2019) Part 1
WILLS and SUCCESSION (2019) Part 1............................................................ 1
SUCCESSION IN GENERAL .............................................................................. 3
Ramirez vs. Ramirez (111 SCRA 82)............................................................ 3
ARTICLE 728 ................................................................................................... 7
Cuevas vs. Cuevas (G.R. No. L-8327, December 14, 1955) ......................... 7
Jutic vs. CA (August 27, 1987) .................................................................... 9
Maglasang vs. Cabatingan (G.R. No. 131953, June 5, 2002) .................... 13
Ganuelas vs. Cawed (401 SCRA 447, April 24, 2003) ................................ 16
Del Rosario vs. Ferrer (G.R. No. 187056, September 20, 2010) ............... 19
Villanueva vs. Spouses Branoco (G.R. No. 172804, January 24, 2011) ..... 21
ARTICLE 774 ................................................................................................. 25
Coronel vs. CA (G.R. NO. 103577, October 7, 1996) ................................ 25
Balus vs. Balus (G.R. No. 168970, January 15, 2010)................................ 33
ARTICLE 774 ................................................................................................. 36
Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc. vs. Valbueco, Incorporated ................................ 36
Liu vs. Loy (G.R. No. 145982, September 13, 2004) ................................. 43
Conde vs. Abaya (13 Phil 240) .................................................................. 46
Junio vs. Collector 34 Phil 433 ................................................................. 51
Great Pacific Life Assurance Corp. vs. CA (G.R. No. 113899, October 13,
1999)........................................................................................................ 52
Robles vs. Batacan (154 SCRA 644) .......................................................... 55
San Agustin vs. CA (371 SCRA 348, December 4, 2001) ........................... 57
Rabadilla vs. CA (June 29, 2000) .............................................................. 61
Alvarez vs. IAC (G.R. No. 68053, May 7, 1990) ......................................... 66
Pamplona vs. Moreto (96 SCRA 775) ....................................................... 71
Ledesma vs. McLachlin (66 Phil 547) ....................................................... 75
Ining, et. al. vs. Vega (G.R. No. 174727, August 12, 2013) ....................... 77
Rioferio vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 129008, January 13, 2004) ......... 82
Heirs of Tomas Calpatura, Sr., vs. Prado (G.R. No. 156879, January 20,
2004) ........................................................................................................ 84
Felipe vs. Heirs of Aldon (February 16, 1983) .......................................... 87
Eastern vs. Lucero (124 SCRA 326) ........................................................... 90
Emnace vs. CA (370 SCRA 431, November 23, 2001) ............................... 93
In the matter of Guardianship of the Lavides’ vs. City Court of Lucena
(G.R. No. L-50261, May 31, 1982) ............................................................ 98
Bonilla vs. Barcena ................................................................................. 101
Borromeo-Herrera vs. Borromeo (152 SCRA 172).................................. 103
Dela Merced vs. Dela Merced (February 25, 1999) ................................ 107
Gayon vs. Gayon (November 26, 1970) ................................................. 110
Palicte vs. Ramolete (September 21, 1987) ........................................... 112
Locsin vs. CA (G.R. NO. 89783, February 19, 1992) ................................ 116
Llenares vs. CA (G.R. No. 98709, May 13, 1993) .................................... 121
Gevero vs. IAC (G.R. NO. 77029, August 30, 1990) ................................ 126
Suarez vs. CA (G.R. No. 94918, September 2, 1992) .............................. 129
Lorenzo vs. Posadas (64 PHIL 353) ......................................................... 131
ARTICLE 779 ............................................................................................... 137
Rodriguez vs. Borja (17 SCRA 41) ........................................................... 137
Balanay, Jr. vs. Martinez (64 SCRA 452) ................................................. 140
ARTICLE 780 ............................................................................................... 144
Balanay, Jr. vs. Martinez (64 SCRA 452) ................................................. 144
ARTICLE 781 ............................................................................................... 148
Heirs of vs. Mauricio-Natividad (G.R. No. 198434, February 29, 2016) .. 148
ARTICLE 783. .............................................................................................. 154
 Rabadilla vs. CA (June 29, 2000) ............................................................ 154
Herreros vs. Gil (88 Phil 260). ................................................................ 159
Montinola vs. Herbosa (Court of Appeals case) *not found* ................ 167
Merza vs. Porras (93 Phil 142) ............................................................... 168
Vitug vs. CA, 183 SCRA 755) ................................................................... 170
Seangio vs. Reyes (G.R. No. 149753, November 27, 2006) .................... 173
ARTICLE 784. .............................................................................................. 177
Castañeda vs. Alemany (3 Phil 426) ....................................................... 177
ARTICLE 788. .............................................................................................. 178
Dizon Rivera vs. Dizon (33 SCRA 554) .................................................... 178
Vda. De Villanueva vs. Juico (4 SCRA 550).............................................. 182
Del Rosario vs. Del Rosario (2 Phil 321) *not found* ............................. 184
Balanay, Jr. vs. Martinez (64 SCRA 452, G.R. No. L-39247 June 27, 1975)
*refer to ART. 779 .................................................................................. 185
ARTICLE 789. .............................................................................................. 186
Estate of Rigor vs. Rigor (89 S 493) ........................................................ 186
Del Rosario vs. Del Rosario (2 Phil 321) *not found* ............................. 191
Rabadilla vs. CA (June 29, 2000) *refer to ART. 783* ............................ 192
ARTICLE 791 ............................................................................................... 193
Dizon Rivera vs. Dizon (33 SCRA 554) .................................................... 193
Vda. De Villaflor vs. Juico (February 28, 1962) ....................................... 198
Yambao vs. Gonzales (1 SCRA 1157) ...................................................... 201
ARTICLE 792. .............................................................................................. 202
Balanay, Jr. vs. Martinez (64 SCRA 452, G.R. No. L-39247 June 27, 1975)
............................................................................................................... 202
SUCCESSION IN GENERAL de la 'Central Azucarera de la Carlota a P17.00

Ramirez vs. Ramirez (111 SCRA 82) por accion ................................................................................8,347.00

G.R. No. L-27952 February 15, 1982 Diez mil ochocientos seize (10,806) acciones

TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE EUGENIO RAMIREZ, MARIA LUISA PALACIOS, de la 'Central Luzon Milling Co.', disuelta y en
Administratrix, petitioner-appellee,
vs. liquidacion a P0.15 por accion ..............................................1,620.90
MARCELLE D. VDA. DE RAMIREZ, ET AL., oppositors, JORGE and ROBERTO
RAMIREZ, legatees, oppositors- appellants.
Cuenta de Ahorros en el Philippine Trust
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
Co.............................................................................................. 2,350.73
The main issue in this appeal is the manner of partitioning the testate estate of Jose
TOTAL.............................................................. P512,976.97
Eugenio Ramirez among the principal beneficiaries, namely: his widow Marcelle
Demoron de Ramirez; his two grandnephews Roberto and Jorge Ramirez; and his
companion Wanda de Wrobleski. MENOS:

The task is not trouble-free because the widow Marcelle is a French who lives in Paris, Deuda al Banco de las Islas Filipinas, garan-
while the companion Wanda is an Austrian who lives in Spain. Moreover, the testator
provided for substitutions. tizada con prenda de las acciones de La Carlota ......... P 5,000,00

Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain on December 11, 1964, with
only his widow as compulsory heir. His will was admitted to probate by the Court of
First Instance of Manila, Branch X, on July 27, 1965. Maria Luisa Palacios was appointed
administratrix of the estate. In due time she submitted an inventory of the estate as
follows:
INVENTARIO
Una sexta parte (1/6) proindiviso de un te
rreno, con sus mejoras y edificaciones, situadoen
la Escolta, Manila............................................................. P500,000.00
VALOR LIQUIDO........................................... P507,976.97
The testamentary dispositions are as follows:
A.—En nuda propiedad, a D. Roberto y D. Jorge Ramirez, ambas menores de edad,
residentes en Manila, I.F., calle 'Alright, No. 1818, Malate, hijos de su sobrino D. Jose
Ma. Ramirez, con sustitucion vulgar a favor de sus respectivos descendientes, y, en su
defecto, con sustitucion vulgar reciprocal entre ambos.
El precedente legado en nuda propiedad de la participacion indivisa de la finca Santa
Cruz Building, lo ordena el testador a favor de los legatarios nombrados, en atencion
a que dicha propiedad fue creacion del querido padre del otorgante y por ser aquellos
continuadores del apellido Ramirez,

Una sexta parte (1/6) proindiviso de dos B.—Y en usufructo a saber: —

parcelas de terreno situadas en Antipolo, Rizal................... 658.34 a. En cuanto a una tercera parte, a favor de la esposa del testador, Da. Marcelle
Ramirez, domiciliada en IE PECO, calle del General Gallieni No. 33, Seine Francia, con
Cuatrocientos noventa y uno (491) acciones
sustitucion vulgar u fideicomisaria a favor de Da. Wanda de Wrobleski, de Palma de
Mallorca, Son Rapina Avenida de los Reyes 13,
b.—Y en cuanto a las dos terceras partes restantes, a favor de la nombrada Da. Wanda
de Nrobleski con sustitucion vulgar v fideicomisaria a saber:—
En cuanto a la mitad de dichas dos terceras partes, a favor de D. Juan Pablo Jankowski,
de Son Rapina Palma de Mallorca; y encuanto a la mitad restante, a favor de su
sobrino, D. Horace V. Ramirez, San Luis Building, Florida St. Ermita, Manila, I.F.
A pesar de las sustituciones fideiconiisarias precedentemente ordinadas, las
usufiructuarias nombradas conjuntamente con los nudo propietarios, podran en
cualquier memento vender a tercero los bienes objeto delegado, sin intervencion
alguna de los titulares fideicomisaarios.
On June 23, 1966, the administratrix submitted a project of partition as follows: the
property of the deceased is to be divided into two parts. One part shall go to the widow
'en pleno dominio" in satisfaction of her legitime; the other part or "free portion" shall
go to Jorge and Roberto Ramirez "en nuda propriedad." Furthermore, one third (1/3)
of the free portion is charged with the widow's usufruct and the remaining two-thirds
(2/3) with a usufruct in favor of Wanda.
Jorge and Roberto opposed the project of partition on the grounds: (a) that the
provisions for vulgar substitution in favor of Wanda de Wrobleski with respect to the
widow's usufruct and in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horacio V. Ramirez, with
respect to Wanda's usufruct are invalid because the first heirs Marcelle and Wanda)
survived the testator; (b) that the provisions for fideicommissary substitutions are also
invalid because the first heirs are not related to the second heirs or substitutes within
the first degree, as provided in Article 863 of the Civil Code; (c) that the grant of a
usufruct over real property in the Philippines in favor of Wanda Wrobleski, who is an
alien, violates Section 5, Article III of the Philippine Constitution; and that (d) the
proposed partition of the testator's interest in the Santa Cruz (Escolta) Building
between the widow Marcelle and the appellants, violates the testator's express win to
give this property to them Nonetheless, the lower court approved the project of
partition in its order dated May 3, 1967. It is this order which Jorge and Roberto have
appealed to this Court.
1. The widow's legitime.
The appellant's do not question the legality of giving Marcelle one-half of the estate
in full ownership. They admit that the testator's dispositions impaired his widow's
legitime. Indeed, under Art. 900 of the Civil Code "If the only survivor is the widow or
widower, she or he shall be entitled to one-half of the hereditary estate." And since
Marcelle alone survived the deceased, she is entitled to one-half of his estate over
which he could impose no burden, encumbrance, condition or substitution of any kind
whatsoever. (Art. 904, par. 2, Civil Code.)
It is the one-third usufruct over the free portion which the appellants question and
justifiably so. It appears that the court a quo approved the usufruct in favor of
Marcelle because the testament provides for a usufruct in her favor of one-third of
the estate. The court a quo erred for Marcelle who is entitled to one-half of the estate
"en pleno dominio" as her legitime and which is more than what she is given under
the will is not entitled to have any additional share in the estate. To give Marcelle more
than her legitime will run counter to the testator's intention for as stated above his
dispositions even impaired her legitime and tended to favor Wanda.
2. The substitutions.
It may be useful to recall that "Substitution is the appoint- judgment of another heir
so that he may enter into the inheritance in default of the heir originally instituted."
(Art. 857, Civil Code. And that there are several kinds of substitutions, namely: simple
or common, brief or compendious, reciprocal, and fideicommissary (Art. 858, Civil
Code.) According to Tolentino, "Although the Code enumerates four classes, there are
really only two principal classes of substitutions: the simple and the fideicommissary.
The others are merely variations of these two." (111 Civil Code, p. 185 [1973].)
The simple or vulgar is that provided in Art. 859 of the Civil Code which reads:
ART. 859. The testator may designate one or more persons to substitute the heir or
heirs instituted in case such heir or heirs should die before him, or should not wish, or
should be incapacitated to accept the inheritance.
A simple substitution, without a statement of the cases to which it refers, shall
comprise the three mentioned in the preceding paragraph, unless the testator has
otherwise provided.
The fideicommissary substitution is described in the Civil Code as follows:
ART. 863. A fideicommissary substitution by virtue of which the fiduciary or first heir
instituted is entrusted with the obligation to preserve and to transmit to a second heir
the whole or part of inheritance, shall be valid and shall take effect, provided such
substitution does not go beyond one degree from the heir originally instituted, and
provided further that the fiduciary or first heir and the second heir are living at time
of the death of the testator.

It will be noted that the testator provided for a vulgar substitution in respect of the
legacies of Roberto and Jorge Ramirez, the appellants, thus: con sustitucion vulgar a
favor de sus respectivos descendientes, y, en su defecto, con substitution vulgar
reciprocal entre ambos.
The appellants do not question the legality of the substitution so provided. The
appellants question the sustitucion vulgar y fideicomisaria a favor de Da. Wanda de
Wrobleski" in connection with the one-third usufruct over the estate given to the
widow Marcelle However, this question has become moot because as We have ruled
above, the widow is not entitled to any usufruct.
The appellants also question the sustitucion vulgar y fideicomisaria in connection with
Wanda's usufruct over two thirds of the estate in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and
Horace v. Ramirez.
They allege that the substitution in its vulgar aspect as void because Wanda survived
the testator or stated differently because she did not predecease the testator. But
dying before the testator is not the only case for vulgar substitution for it also includes
NOTE refusal or incapacity to accept the inheritance as provided in Art. 859 of the Civil Code,
supra. Hence, the vulgar substitution is valid.
As regards the substitution in its fideicommissary aspect, the appellants are correct in
their claim that it is void for the following reasons:
(a) The substitutes (Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez) are not related to
Wanda, the heir originally instituted. Art. 863 of the Civil Code validates a
fideicommissary substitution "provided such substitution does not go beyond one
degree from the heir originally instituted."
What is meant by "one degree" from the first heir is explained by Tolentino as follows:
Scaevola Maura, and Traviesas construe "degree" as designation, substitution, or
transmission. The Supreme Court of Spain has decidedly adopted this construction.
From this point of view, there can be only one tranmission or substitution, and the
substitute need not be related to the first heir. Manresa, Morell and Sanchez Roman,
however, construe the word "degree" as generation, and the present Code has
obviously followed this interpretation. by providing that the substitution shall not go
beyond one degree "from the heir originally instituted." The Code thus clearly
indicates that the second heir must be related to and be one generation from the first
heir.
Doctrine
From this, it follows that the fideicommissary can only be either a child or a parent of
the first heir. These are the only relatives who are one generation or degree from the
fiduciary (Op. cit., pp. 193-194.)
(b) There is no absolute duty imposed on Wanda to transmit the usufruct to the
substitutes as required by Arts. 865 and 867 of the Civil Code. In fact, the appellee
admits "that the testator contradicts the establishment of a fideicommissary
substitution when he permits the properties subject of the usufruct to be sold upon
mutual agreement of the usufructuaries and the naked owners." (Brief, p. 26.)
3. The usufruct of Wanda.
The appellants claim that the usufruct over real properties of the estate in favor of
Wanda is void because it violates the constitutional prohibition against the acquisition
of lands by aliens.
The 1935 Constitution which is controlling provides as follows:
SEC. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be
transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines. (Art. XIII.)
The court a quo upheld the validity of the usufruct given to Wanda on the ground that
the Constitution covers not only succession by operation of law but also testamentary
succession. We are of the opinion that the Constitutional provision which enables
aliens to acquire private lands does not extend to testamentary succession for
Doctrine
otherwise the prohibition will be for naught and meaningless. Any alien would be able
to circumvent the prohibition by paying money to a Philippine landowner in exchange
for a devise of a piece of land.
This opinion notwithstanding, We uphold the usufruct in favor of Wanda because a
usufruct, albeit a real right, does not vest title to the land in the usufructuary and it is
the vesting of title to land in favor of aliens which is proscribed by the Constitution.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez is hereby ordered
distributed as follows:
One-half (1/2) thereof to his widow as her legitime;
One-half (1/2) thereof which is the free portion to Roberto and Jorge Ramirez in naked
ownership and the usufruct to Wanda de Wrobleski with a simple substitution in favor
of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez.
The distribution herein ordered supersedes that of the court a quo. No special
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
 ARTICLE 728
Cuevas vs. Cuevas (G.R. No. L-8327, December 14, 1955)
A donation inter vivos
G.R. No. L-8327 December 14, 1955
ANTONINA CUEVAS, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
CRISPULO CUEVAS, defendant-appellee.
Pedro D. Maldia for appellant.
Teodoro P. Santiago for appellee.
REYES, J. B. L., J.:
On September 18, 1950, Antonina Cuevas executed a notarized conveyance entitled
"Donacin Mortis Causa," ceding to her nephew Crispulo Cuevas the northern half of a
parcel of unregistered land in barrio Sinasajan, municipality of Penaranda, Province of
Nueva Ecija (Exhibit A). In the same instrument appears the acceptance of Crispulo
Cuevas.
"Subsequently, on May 26, 1952, the donor executed another notarial instrument
entitled "Revocacion de Donacion Mortis Causa" (Exhibit B) purporting to set aside the
Action preceding conveyance; and on August 26, 1952, she brought action in the Court of
for First Instance to recover the land conveyed, on the ground (1) that the donation
recovery
of land being mortis causa, it had been lawfully revoked by the donor; and (2) even it if were
a donation inter vivos, the same was invalidated because (a) it was not properly
accepted; (b) because the donor did not reserve sufficient property for her own
maintenance, and (c) because the donee was guilty of ingratitute, for having refused
to support the donor.
Issues having been joined, and trial had, the Court of First Instance denied the recovery
sought, and Antonina Cuevas thereupon appealed. The Court of Appeals forwarded
the case to this Court because, the case having been submitted on a stipulation of
facts, the appellant raised only questions of law.
The first issue tendered converns the true nature of the deed "Exhibit A"; whether it
embodies a donation inter vivos, or a disposition of property mortis causa revocable
freely by the transferor at any time before death. 1
It has been rules that neither the designation mortis causa, nor the provision that a
donation is "to take effect at the death of the donor", is a controlling criterion in
defining the true nature of donations (Laureta vs. Mata, 44 Phil., 668; Concepcion vs.
Concepcion, 91 Phil., 823). Hence, the crux of the controversy revolves around the
following provisions of the deed of donation:
Dapat maalaman ni Crispulo Cuevas na samantalang ako ay nabubuhay, and
lupa na ipinagkakaloob ko sa kaniya ay ako pa rin and patuloy na
mamomosecion, makapagparatrabaho, makikinabang at ang iba pang
karapatan sa pagmamayari ay sa akin pa rin hanggang hindo ko binabawian
ny buhay ng Maykapal at ito naman ay hindi ko nga iya-alis pagkat kung ako
ay mamatay na ay inilalaan ko sa kaniya.
There is an apparent conflict in the expression above quoted, in that the donor
reserves to herself "the right of possession, cultivation, harvesting and other rights
and attributes of ownership while I am not deprived of life by the Almighty"; but right
after, the same donor states that she "will not takle away" (the property) "because I
reserve it for him (the donee) when I die."
The question to be decided is whetehr the donor intended to part with the title to the
property immediately upon the execution of the deed, or only later, when she had
died. If the first, the donation is operative inter vivos; if the second, we would be
confronted with a disposition mortis causa, void from the beginning because the
formalities of testaments were not observed (new Civil Code, Arts. 728 and 828; heirs
of Bonsato vs. Court of Appeals, 250 Off. Gaz. (8), p. 3568; Tuason vs. Posadas, 54 Phil.,
289; Sent. Trib. Sup. of Spain, 8 July 1943).
We agree with the Court below that the decisive proof that the present donation is
operative inter vivor lies in the final phrase to the effect that the donor will not dispose
or take away ("hindi ko nga iya-alis" in the original) the land "because I am reserving
it to him upon my death." By these words the donor expressly renounced the right to
freely dispose of the property in favor of another (a right essential to full ownership)
and manifested the irrevocability of the conveyance of the naked title to the property
in favor of the donee. As stated in our decision in Bonsato vs. Court of Appeals, ante,
such irrevocability is characteristic of donations inter vivos, because it is incompatible
with the idea of a disposition post mortem. Witness article 828 of the New Civil Code,
that provides:
ART. 828. A will may be revoked by the testator at any time before his death.
Any waiver or restriction of this right is void.
It is apparent from the entire context of the deed of donation that the donor intended
that she should retain the entire beneficial ownership during her lifetime, but that the
naked title should irrevocably pass to the donee. It is only thus that all the expressions which he had to support himself, his wife and his two children. Evidently his means did
heretofore discussed can be given full effect; and when the donor stated that she not allow him to add the donor's support to his own burdens.
would continue to retain the "possession, cultivation, harvesting and all other rights
and attributes of ownership," she meant only the dominium utile, not the full Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed. No costs in this instance, appellant
ownership. As the Court below correctly observed, the words "rights and attributes of having obtained leave to litigate as a pauper. So ordered.
ownership" should be construed ejusdem generis with the preceding rights of
"possession, cultivation and harvesting" expressly enumerated in the deed. Had the
donor meant to retain full or absolute ownership she had no need to specify
possession, cultivation and harvesting, since all these rights are embodied in full or
absolute ownership; nor would she then have excluded the right of free disposition
from the "rights and attributes of ownership" that she reserved for herself.lawphi1.net

Hence, the Court below rightly concluded that the deed Exhibit A was a valid
donation inter vivos, with reservation of beneficial title during the lifetime of the
donor. We may add that it is highly desirable that all those who are called to prepare
or notarize deeds of donation should call the attention of the donors to the necessity
of clearly specifying whether, notwithstanding the donation, they wish to retain the
right to control and dispose at will of the property before their death, without need of
the consent or intervention of the beneficiary, since the express reservation of such
right would be conclusive indication that the liberality is to exist only at the donor's
death, and therefore, the formalities of testaments should be observed; while,
a converso, the express waiver of the right of free disposition would place the inter
vivos character of the donation beyond dispute (Heirs of Bonsato vs. Court of Appeals,
50 Off. Gaz. (8), p. 3568).

The argument that there was no sufficient acceptance, because the deed "merely
recites that (1) the donee has duly read all the contents of this donation; (2) that he
'shall fully respect all its terms'; and (3) that 'for the act of benevolence' he is
expressing his gratitude" but there is no show of acceptance (Appellant's brief, p. 7),
is without basis. To respect the terms of the donation, and at the same time express
gratitude for the donor's benevolence, constitutes sufficient acceptance, If the donee
did not accept, what had he to be grateful about? We are no longer under the
formulary system of the Roman law, when specific expressions had to be used under
paid of nullity.

Also unmeritoriious is the contention that the donation is void because the donor
failed to reserve enough for ther own support. As we have seen, she expressly
reserved to herself all the benefits derivable from the donated property as long as she
lived. During that time, she suffered no diminution of income. If that was not enough
to support her, the deficiency was not dur to the donation.

Finally, the donee is not rightfully chargeaboe with ingratitude, because it was
expressly stipulated that the donee had a total income of only P30 a month, out of
Jutic vs. CA (August 27, 1987)
No donation, it was merely a desire to donate the property
G.R. No. L-44628 August 27, 1987
CONSUELO SEVILLE JUTIC, JUAN JUTIC, CELESTINO SEVILLE, TIBURCIO SEVILLE, RAVELLO
SEVILLE, SONITA SEVILLE, LUCY SEVILLE, EPIFANIA SEVILLE, NARACY SEVILLE,
EMMANUEL SEVILLE, ORLANDO MANICAN, and PACIFICO MANICAN, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, MANILA, VICENTE SULLAN, TRINIDAD SULLAN, TERESITA
SULLAN, ULYSSES SULLAN, ALEJANDRINO SULLAN, BUENAVENTURA SEVILLE, and ZOILO
SEVILLE, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition to review on appeal by certiorari the decision of the Court of Appeals
which affirmed the decision of the then Court of First Instance of Davao del Norte,
Branch 9. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed and
this case is remanded to the court a quo for implementation of, and
compliance with Rule 69, Revised Rules of Court, and to partition
the property in accordance with the rights as herein determined,
defined and declared, with costs against defendants-appellants. (p.
48, Petitioner's brief)
Vicente Sullan and the other respondents filed a complaint with the then Court of First
Instance at Tagum, Davao del Norte against the petitioners for partition and
accounting of the properties of Arsenio Seville, alleging they are heirs of the decedent.
The petitioners, averred the following in their answer:
xxx xxx xxx
7. That the defendants are the owners of Lots 170 and 172 and
improvements thereon, containing an area of 11.9499 and 9.6862
hectares, respectively, both covered by Original Certificates of Title
No. P-15964 .
8. That defendants are the surviving heirs of Melquiades Seville.
Melquiades Seville in turn is the brother of the deceased Arsenio
Seville. Arsenio Seville died ahead. Melquiades Seville died later.
During the lifetime of Arsenio Seville he executed an instrument ... .
xxx xxx xxx
9. That Melquiades Seville and his family have been in actual
possession, occupation and cultivation of Lots Nos. 170 and 172,
Cad-283, since 1954 continuously and peacefully in concept of
owner, up to the time of his death, and had introduced valuable
improvements thereon. After his demise his heirs, the defendants
herein, succeeded to the occupation and possession of the said
parcel of land and improvements with the knowledge of the
plaintiffs and with the acquiescence of Arsenio Seville during his
lifetime.
10. That even during the lifetime of the deceased Arsenio Seville it
had been his desire, intention and his wish that Lots 170 and 172
shall be owned by Melquiades Seville, the father of the herein
defendants.
11. That the ownership over the said Lots l7O and l72, Cad-283 and
improvements had been vested, transmitted, conveyed and/or
descended unto the defendants by virtue of Exhibit "1" of this
answer and through continuous possession and cultivation of the
land since 1954 continuously up to the present, in concept of owner
as alleged under paragraph "9" hereof.
12. That by reason of this unfounded action by the plaintiffs,
defendants have been compelled to engage services of counsel for
which they bound themselves to pay P3,000.00 as attomey's fees.
13. That Melquiades Seville during his lifetime had taken legal steps
to perfect titles to these parcels of land in his name." (pp. 11, 14-15,
Record on Appeal).
On September 19, 1972, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the private
respondents. The petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court's decision.
Involved in this appeal is the issue of whether or not there was a valid donation from
Arsenio Seville to Melquiades Seville.
The facts of the case are briefly stated as follows — xxx xxx xxx

During his lifetime, Arsenio Seville owned — (1) a parcel of agricultural land described
as Lot No. 170 situated at Anquibit, Asuncion (Saug), Davao del Norte containing an
area of 11-9499 hectares, more or less; (2) a parcel of agricultural land described as
Lot No. 172 likewise situated at Anquibit, Asuncion (Saug), Davao del Norte with an
area of 9.6862 hectares; (3) a residential house erected on Lot 172; (4) rice and corn
mills and their respective paraphernalia valued at P5,000.00; and (5) five (5) carabaos
in the possession of the then defendants (pp. 6-9, Petitioners' brief).

On March 4, 1963, Arsenio Seville executed an affidavit in favor of Melquiades Seville,

which reads:

AFFIDAVIT

I, ARSENIO SEVILLE, of legal age, WIDOWER, Filipino, and a resident

of Anquibit, Cambanogoy, Saug, Davao, Philippines, after having
been duly sworn to in accordance with law do hereby depose and
say, as follows:

That I am the declared and legal owner of a certain parcel of land

otherwise known as Lot Nos. 172 and 170 Cad- 283, containing an
area of 21.6361 has., and situated at Cambanogoy, Saug, Davao and
covered by HA No. V-77791 (E-69793) and approved by the Director
of Lands as per Order issued on March 5, 1954;

That I am a widower as indicated above and that I have no one to

inherit all my properties except my brother Melquiades Seville who
appears to be the only and rightful person upon whom I have the
most sympathy since I have no wife and children;
(p. 7. Appellees' brief; Exh. 4, p. 52, Folder of Exhibits).
That it is my desire that in case I will die I will assign all my rights,
interest, share and participation over the above- mentioned
On May 24, 1968, Arsenio Seville mortgaged said properties to the Philippine National
property and that he shall succeed to me in case of my death,
Bank in consideration of a loan. This was done with the knowledge and acquiescence
however, as long as I am alive I will be the one to possess, enjoy and
of Melquiades Seville.
benefit from the produce of my said land and that whatever benefits
it will give me in the future I shall be the one to enjoy it;
On May 15, 1970, Arsenio Seville died intestate, single, without issue, and without any
debt. He was survived by his brothers, Buenaventura Seville and Zoilo Seville who are
That I make this affidavit to make manifest my intention and desire
included as respondents; brother Melquiades Seville; and sisters Encarnacion Seville
as to the way the above-mentioned property shall be dispose of and
and Petra Seville. Thereafter, Melquiades died and is survived by his children
for whatever purpose it may serve.
Consuelo, Celestino, Tiburcio, Ravelo, Sonita, Lucy, Epifania, Naracy and Emmanuel, all
surnamed Seville. Sisters Encarnacion and Petra died later. Encarnacion is survived by
her children Trinidad, Teresita, Ulysses and Alejandrino, all surnamed Sullan and her
husband Vicente Sullan while Petra Seville is survived by her children Orlando Manican
and Pacifico Manican.
The children of Melquiades Seville are now claiming exclusive ownership of the
properties and improvements thereon on the basis of the instrument executed by
Arsenio Seville in favor of Melquiades Seville and on their alleged actual possession,
occupation, and cultivation of Lots Nos. 170 and 172 since 1954 continuously and
peacefully in the concept of owner up to the time of Arsenio Seville's death.
The petitioners assign the following alleged errors of the respondent court:
I If the property was only intended for petitioners then, at the time
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE AFFIDAVIT IN QUESTION A
DEED OR INSTRUMENT OF DONATION INTER VIVOS:
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING CATEGORICALLY THAT ARSENIO
SEVILLE COULD VALIDLY DISPOSE OR DONATE THE PROPERTIES IN QUESTION.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT VACATING THE JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER
COURT AND ENTERED (SIC) A NEW ONE HOLDING THAT THE AFFIDAVIT IN QUESTION
IS A DEED OF DONATION AND THAT THE DONATION IS A DONATION INTER
VIVOS THUS VALIDLY CONVEYING THE LAND UNTO THE DONEE MELQUIADES SEVILLE.
(p. 10, Petitioners' brief).
All the above assigned errors discuss the issues as relating to a donation. The trial court
was correct in stating that "a close reading reveals that Exhibit 4 is not a donation inter
vivos or mortis causa but a mere declaration of an intention and a desire. Certainly, it
is not a concrete and formal act of giving or donating. The form and contents of said
Exhibit 4 amply support this conclusion." (p. 3 7, Record on Appeal).
A discussion of the different kinds of donations and the requisites for their effectivity
is irrelevant in the case at bar. There clearly was no intention to transfer ownership
from Arsenio Seville to Melquiades Seville at the time of the instrument's execution.
It was a mere intention or a desire on the part of Arsenio Seville that in the event of
his death at some future time, his properties should go to Melquiades Seville.
In Aldaba v. Court of Appeals (27 SCRA 263, 269-270) we ruled on a similar expression
of an intention, as follows:
The question to be resolved in the instant case is: Was there a
disposition of the property in question made by the deceased Belen
Aldaba in favor of herein petitioners? The note, Exhibit 6,
considered alone, was, as held by the Court of Appeals, confirming
the opinion of the lower court, only an indication of the intention of
Belen Aldaba to donate to the petitioners the property occupied by
the latter. We agree with this conclusion of the trial court and the
Court of Appeals. The note, in fact, expressed that the property was
really intended for the petitioners, "talagang iyan ay para sa inyo."
of its writing, the property had not yet been disposed of in their
favor. There is no evidence in the record that such intention was
effectively carried out after the writing of the note. Inasmuch as the
mere expression of an intention is not a promise, because a promise
is an undertaking to carry the intention into effect, (17 American
Jurisprudence, 2d p. 334) We cannot, considering Exhibit 6 alone,
conclude that the deceased promised, much less did convey, the
property in question to the petitioners. ... .
It is quite apparent that Arsenio Seville was thinking of succession ("... in case I win die,
I will assign all my rights, share and participation over the above-mentioned properties
and that he shall succeed to me in case of my death ..."). Donations which are to take
effect upon the death of the donor partake of the nature of testamentary provisions
and shall be governed by the rules established in the title on succession (Art. 728, Civil
Code).
The petitioners likewise contend that the document was a valid donation as only
donations are accepted by the donees. However, the petitioners could not have
accepted something, which by the terms of the supposed "donation" was not given to
them at the time. The affidavit could not transmit ownership except in clear and
express terms.
Furthermore, the homestead application was later prosecuted in the name of Arsenio
Seville and the land, much later, was mortgaged by him to the Philippine National Bank
(Annex 1, p. 100, Rollo) in consideration of a loan. Arsenio dealt with the land and
entered into transactions as its owner. All these happened with the knowledge and
acquiescence of the supposed donee, Melquiades Seville. Contrary to the petitioners'
allegations in their brief, there was no immediate transfer of title upon the execution
of Exhibit 4.
Contrary to what the petitioners aver, private respondents as legal heirs of Arsenio
Seville have actual and substantial interests in the subject of litigation thus qualifying
them as real parties-in-interest.

Common ownership is shown by the records. Therefore, any claim of ownership of the
petitioners is not based on Exhibit 4 but on the fact that they are heirs of Arsenio
Seville together with the private respondents.

It is likewise significant to note the respondents' assertion that the signed affidavit is
a forgery because Arsenio Seville was illiterate during his lifetime. He could not write
his name. He executed documents by affixing his thumbmark as shown in the Real
Estate Mortgage (Exhibit A-4), which he executed on May 24, 1968 in favor of the
Philippine National Bank. The real estate mortgage came much later or more than five
years after the supposed donation (Exhibit 4) to Melquiades Seville where Arsenio
Seville allegedly affixed his signature. This fact was not disputed by the petitioners.

Moreover, the petitioners' actions do not support their claim of ownership. During the
lifetime of Arsenio Seville, he paid the PNB amortization out of his personal funds and
out of the income on his property. The payments were not continued by the
petitioners when Arsenio Seville died so much so that the property was extrajudicially
foreclosed and had to be repurchased by Zoilo Seville, one of the respondents,
through installment arrangements. (Deed of Promise to Sell appended as Annex 4 to
respondents' brief). The actions of the respondents are in consonance with their claim
of co-ownership.

Finally, it is a well-established rule that the factual findings of the trial court are
generally not disturbed except where there is a clear cause or a strong reason
appearing in the record to warrant a departure from such findings (Alcaraz v. Racimo,
125 SCRA 328; People v. Tala, 141 SCRA 240; and People v. Alcid, 135 SCRA 280). There
is no such clear cause or strong reason in this case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The judgment of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 3 characteristics of mortis causa
Maglasang vs. Cabatingan (G.R. No. 131953, June 5, 2002)
FACTS: failed to comply with the
formalities of will. Petitioner asserts that
it is inter vivos kay ang consideration
daw kay love and affection
[G.R. No. 131953. June 5, 2002] SC: it doesnt matter, mortis causa can also
be funded on love and affection
Contention of
repondents No. MAN-2599, seeking the annulment of said four (4) deeds of donation executed on
MA. ESTELA MAGLASANG, NICOLAS CABATINGAN and MERLY S.
CABATINGAN, petitioners, vs. THE HEIRS OF CORAZON CABATINGAN, namely, LUZ M.
BOQUIA, PERLA M. ABELLA, ESTRELLA M. CAETE, LOURDES M. YUSON, and JULIA L.
MAYOL, HEIRS OF GENOVIVA C. NATIVIDAD namely, OSCAR C. NATIVIDAD, OLGA
NATIVIDAD, ODETTE NATIVIDAD, OPHELIA NATIVIDAD, RICHARD NATIVIDAD, RAYMUND
NATIVIDAD, RICHIE NATIVIDAD, SONIA NATIVIDAD and ENCARNACION CABATINGAN
VDA. DE TRINIDAD, ALFREDO CABATINGAN and JESUSA C. NAVADA, respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Posed for resolution before the Court in this petition for review on certiorari filed
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the sole issue of whether the donations made
by the late Conchita Cabatingan are donations inter vivos or mortis causa.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On February 17, 1992, Conchita Cabatingan executed in favor of her brother,
petitioner Nicolas Cabatingan, a Deed of Conditional of Donation (sic) Inter Vivos for
House and Lot covering one-half () portion of the formers house and lot located at
Cot-cot, Liloan, Cebu.[1] Four (4) other deeds of donation were subsequently executed
by Conchita Cabatingan on January 14, 1995, bestowing upon: (a) petitioner Estela C.
Maglasang, two (2) parcels of land - one located in Cogon, Cebu (307 sq. m.) and the
other, a portion of a parcel of land in Masbate (50,232 sq. m.); (b) petitioner Nicolas
Cabatingan, a portion of a parcel of land located in Masbate (80,000 sq. m.); and (c)
petitioner Merly S. Cabatingan, a portion of the Masbate property (80,000 sq.
m.).[2] These deeds of donation contain similar provisions, to wit:
That for and in consideration of the love and affection of the DONOR for the DONEE,
x x x the DONOR does hereby, by these presents, transfer, convey, by way of donation,
unto the DONEE the above-described property, together with the buildings and all
improvements existing thereon, to become effective upon the death of the
DONOR; PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that in the event that the DONEE should die before the
DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed automatically rescinded and of no
further force and effect; x x x[3] (Emphasis Ours)
On May 9, 1995, Conchita Cabatingan died.
Upon learning of the existence of the foregoing donations, respondents filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue, Branch 55, an action for Annulment And/Or
Declaration of Nullity of Deeds of Donations and Accounting, docketed as Civil Case
January 14, 1995.Respondents allege, inter alia, that petitioners, through their sinister
machinations and strategies and taking advantage of Conchita Cabatingans fragile
condition, caused the execution of the deeds of donation, and, that the documents
are void for failing to comply with the provisions of the Civil Code regarding formalities
of wills and testaments, considering that these are donations mortis
causa.[4] Respondents prayed that a receiver be appointed in order to preserve the
disputed properties, and, that they be declared as co-owners of the properties in equal
shares, together with petitioner Nicolas Cabatingan.[5]
Petitioners in their Amended Answer, deny respondents allegations contending
that Conchita Cabatingan freely, knowingly and voluntarily caused the preparation of
the instruments. [6]
On respondents motion, the court a quo rendered a partial judgment on the
pleadings on December 2, 1997 in favor of respondents, with the following dispositive
portion: RTC: void for failure to comply with the formalities of wills
WHEREREFORE, and in consideration of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered
in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant and unwilling co-plaintiff with
regards (sic) to the four Deeds of Donation Annexes A, A-1, B and Annex C which is the
subject of this partial decision by:
Declaring the four Deeds of Donation as null and void ab initio for being a donation
Mortis Causa and for failure to comply with formal and solemn requisite under Art. 806
of the New Civil Code;
b) To declare the plaintiffs and defendants as well as unwilling co-plaintiff
as the heirs of the deceased Conchita Cabatingan and therefore hereditary
co-owners of the properties subject of this partial decision, as mandated
under Art. 777 of the New Civil Code;
SO ORDERED.[7]
The court a quo ruled that the donations are donations mortis causa and therefore
the four (4) deeds in question executed on January 14, 1995 are null and void for
failure to comply with the requisites of Article 806 of the Civil Code on solemnities of
wills and testaments.[8]
Raising questions of law, petitioners elevated the court a quos decision to this
Court,[9] alleging that:
THE LOWER COURT PALPABLY DISREGARDED THE LONG-AND-WELL-ESTABLISHED
RULINGS OF THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT ON THE CHARACTERIZATION OF
DONATIONS AS INTER VIVOS OR MORTIS CAUSA AND, INSTEAD, PROCEEDED TO
INTERPRET THE DONATIONS IN QUESTION IN A MANNER CONTRARY THERETO.[10]
Petitioners insist that the donations are inter vivos donations as these
were made by the late Conchita Cabatingan in consideration of the love and affection
of the donor for the donee, and there is nothing in the deeds which indicate that the
donations were made in consideration of Cabatingans death.[11] In addition,
petitioners contend that the stipulation on rescission in case petitioners die ahead of
Cabatingan is a resolutory condition that confirms the nature of the donation as inter
vivos. SC: a donation mortis causa
Petitioners arguments are bereft of merit.
In a donation mortis causa, the right of disposition is not transferred to the
donee while the donor is still alive.[12] In determining whether a donation is one
of mortis causa, the following characteristics must be taken into account:
(1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the
transferor; or what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the
ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive;
(2) That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad
nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power
in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed;
and
(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.[13]
In the present case, the nature of the donations as mortis causa is confirmed by
the fact that the donations do not contain any clear provision that intends to pass
proprietary rights to petitioners prior to Cabatingans death.[14] The phrase to become
effective upon the death of the DONOR admits of no other interpretation but that
Cabatingan did not intend to transfer the ownership of the properties to petitioners
during her lifetime. Petitioners themselves expressly confirmed the donations
as mortis causa in the following Acceptance and Attestation clauses, uniformly found
in the subject deeds of donation, to wit:
That the DONEE does hereby accept the foregoing donation mortis causa under the
terms and conditions set forth therein, and avail herself of this occasion to express her
profound gratitude for the kindness and generosity of the DONOR.
xxx
SIGNED by the above-named DONOR and DONEE at the foot of this Deed of
Donation mortis causa, which consists of two (2) pages x x x.[15]
That the donations were made in consideration of the love and affection of the
donor does not qualify the donations as inter vivos because transfers mortis
causa may also be made for the same reason. [16]
Well in point is National Treasurer of the Phils. v. Vda. de Meimban. [17] In said
case, the questioned donation contained the provision:
"That for and in consideration of the love and affection which the DONOR has for the
DONEE, the said Donor by these presents does hereby give, transfer, and convey unto
the DONEE, her heirs and assigns a portion of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND (100,000)
SQUARE METERS, on the southeastern part Pro-indiviso of the above described
property. (The portion herein donated is within Lot 2-B of the proposed amendment
Plan Subdivision of Lots Nos. 1 and 2, Psu-109393), with all the buildings and
improvements thereon, to become effective upon the death of the DONOR. (italics
supplied.)" [18]
Notably, the foregoing provision is similar to that contained in the donation executed
by Cabatingan. We held in Meimban case that the donation is a mortis
causa donation, and that the above quoted provision establishes the donors intention
to transfer the ownership and possession of the donated property to the donee only
after the formers death. Further:
As the donation is in the nature of a mortis causa disposition, the formalities of a will
should have been complied with under Article 728 of the Civil Code, otherwise, the
donation is void and would produce no effect. As we have held in Alejandro v. Geraldez
(78 SCRA 245,253), If the donation is made in contemplation of the donors death,
meaning that the full or naked ownership of the donated properties will pass to the
donee because of the donors death, then it is at that time that the donation takes
effect, and it is a donation mortis causa which should be embodied in a last will and
testament. (Citing Bonsato v. Court of Appeals, 95 Phil. 481).[19]
 We apply the above rulings to the present case. The herein subject deeds WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
expressly provide that the donation shall be rescinded in case petitioners predecease
SO ORDERED.
Conchita Cabatingan.As stated in Reyes v. Mosqueda,[20] one of the decisive
characteristics of a donation mortis causa is that the transfer should be considered
void if the donor should survive the donee.This is exactly what Cabatingan provided
for in her donations. If she really intended that the donation should take effect during
her lifetime and that the ownership of the properties donated be transferrred to the
donee or independently of, and not by reason of her death, she would have not
expressed such proviso in the subject deeds.
Considering that the disputed donations are donations mortis causa, the same
partake of the nature of testamentary provisions[21] and as such, said deeds must be
executed in accordance with the requisites on solemnities of wills and testaments
under Articles 805 and 806 of the Civil Code, to wit:

ART. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end
thereof by the testator himself or by the testators name written by some other person
in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or
more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.

The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental
witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except
the last, on the left margin, and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters
placed on the upper part of each page.

The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written ,
and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some
other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of the
instrumental witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and signed the will and all the
pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.

If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be

interpreted to them. (n)

ART. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and
the witnesses. The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or
file another with the office of the Clerk of Court. (n)

The deeds in question although acknowledged before a notary public of the

donor and the donee, the documents were not executed in the manner provided for
under the above-quoted provisions of law.
Thus, the trial court did not commit any reversible error in declaring the subject
deeds of donation null and void.
Ganuelas vs. Cawed (401 SCRA 447, April 24, 2003)
G.R. No. 123968 April 24, 2003
URSULINA GANUELAS, METODIO GANUELAS and ANTONIO GANUELAS, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ROBERT T. CAWED, Judge of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, La Union
(Branch 29), LEOCADIA G. FLORES, FELICITACION G. AGTARAP, CORAZON G. SIPALAY and
ESTATE OF ROMANA GANUELAS DE LA ROSA, represented by GREGORIO DELA ROSA,
Administrator, respondents.
To classify the donation as inter vivos simply because it is
CARPIO MORALES, J.: founded on considerations of love and affection is
erroneous
The present petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails, on a
question of law, the February 22, 1996 decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court of San
Fernando, La Union, Branch 29, in Civil Case No. 3947, an action for declaration of
nullity of a deed of donation.
The facts, as culled from the records of the case, are as follows:
On April 11, 1958, Celestina Ganuelas Vda. de Valin (Celestina) executed a Deed of
Donation of Real Property 2 covering seven parcels of land in favor of her niece
Ursulina Ganuelas (Ursulina), one of herein petitioners.
The pertinent provision of the deed of donation reads, quoted verbatim:
xxx xxx xxx
That, for and in consideration of the love and affection which the DONOR has
for the DONEE, and of the faithful services the latter has rendered in the past
to the former, the said DONOR does by these presents transfer and convey,
by way of DONATION, unto the DONEE the property above, described, to
become effective upon the death of the DONOR; but in the event that the
DONEE should die before the DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed
rescinded and of no further force and effect.
xxx xxx xxx.3
On June 10, 1967, Celestina executed a document denominated as Revocation of
Donation4 purporting to set aside the deed of donation. More than a month later or
on August 18, 1967, Celestina died without issue and any surviving ascendants and
siblings.
After Celestina's death, Ursulina had been sharing the produce of the donated
properties with private respondents Leocadia G. Flores, et al., nieces of Celestina.
In 1982, or twenty-four years after the execution of the Deed of Donation, Ursulina
secured the corresponding tax declarations, in her name, over the donated properties,
to wit: Tax Declarations Nos. 18108, 18109, 18110, 18111, 18112, 18113 and 18114,
and since then, she refused to give private respondents any share in the produce of
the properties despite repeated demands.
Private respondents were thus prompted to file on May 26, 1986 with the RTC of San
Fernando, La Union a complaint5 against Ursulina, along with Metodio Ganuelas and
Antonio Ganuelas who were alleged to be unwilling plaintiffs. The complaint alleged
that the Deed of Donation executed by Celestina in favor of Ursulina was void for lack
of acknowledgment by the attesting witnesses thereto before notary public Atty.
Henry Valmonte, and the donation was a disposition mortis causa which failed to
comply with the provisions of the Civil Code regarding formalities of wills and
testaments, hence, it was void. The plaintiffs-herein private respondents thus prayed
that judgment be rendered ordering Ursulina to return to them as intestate heirs the
possession and ownership of the properties. They likewise prayed for the cancellation
of the tax declarations secured in the name of Ursulina, the partition of the properties
among the intestate heirs of Celestina, and the rendering by Ursulina of an accounting
of all the fruits of the properties since 1982 and for her to return or pay the value of
their shares.
Petitioner: it is intervivos
The defendants-herein petitioners alleged in their Answer6 that the donation in favor
of Ursulina was inter vivos as contemplated under Article 729 of the Civil Code,7 hence,
the deed did not have to comply with the requirements for the execution of a valid
will; the Revocation of Donation is null and void as the ground mentioned therein is
not among those provided by law to be the basis thereof; and at any rate, the
revocation could only be legally enforced upon filing of the appropriate complaint in
court within the prescriptive period provided by law, which period had, at the time the
complaint was filed, already lapsed.
RTC: it is mortis causa
By Decision of February 22, 1996, the trial court, holding that the provision in the Deed
of Donation that in the event that the DONEE should predecease the DONOR, the
"donation shall be deemed rescinded and of no further force and effect" is an explicit
indication that the deed is a donation mortis causa,8 found for the plaintiffs-herein
private respondents, thus:
WHEREFORE the Court renders judgment declaring null and void the Deed of
Donation of Real Property executed by Celestina Ganuelas, and orders the
partition of the estate of Celestina among the intestate heirs.
 SO ORDERED.9
The trial court also held that the absence of a reservation clause in the deed implied
that Celestina retained complete dominion over her properties, thus supporting the
conclusion that the donation is mortis causa,10 and that while the deed contained an
attestation clause and an acknowledgment showing the intent of the donor to effect
a postmortem disposition, the acknowledgment was defective as only the donor and
donee appear to have acknowledged the deed before the notary public, thereby
rendering the entire document void.11
Issue
Lastly, the trial court held that the subsequent execution by Celestina of the
Revocation of Donation showed that the donor intended the revocability of the
donation ad nutum, thus sustaining its finding that the conveyance was mortis
causa.12
On herein petitioners' argument that the Revocation of Donation was void as the
ground mentioned therein is not one of those allowed by law to be a basis for
revocation, the trial court held that the legal grounds for such revocation as provided
under the Civil Code arise only in cases of donations inter vivos, but not in
donations mortis causa which are revocable at will during the lifetime of the donor.
The trial court held, in any event, that given the nullity of the disposition mortis
causa in view of a failure to comply with the formalities required therefor, the Deed
of Revocation was a superfluity.13
Hence, the instant petition for review, petitioners contending that the trial court
erred:
I. . . . WHEN IT DECLARED NULL AND VOID THE DONATION EXECUTED BY
CELESTINA GANUELAS;
II. . . . WHEN IT UPHELD THE REVOCATION OF DONATION;
III. . . . IN RENDERING ITS DECISION ADVERSE TO PETITIONER URSULINA
GANUELAS.14
same argument with last case: love and affection, inter vivos daw
Petitioners argue that the donation contained in the deed is inter vivos as the main
consideration for its execution was the donor's affection for the donee rather than the
donor's death;15 that the provision on the effectivity of the donation — after the
donor's death — simply meant that absolute ownership would pertain to the donee
on the donor's death;16 and that since the donation is inter vivos, it may be revoked
only for the reasons provided in Articles 760,17 76418 and 76519 of the Civil Code.
In a letter of March 16, 1998,20 private respondent Corazon Sipalay, reacting to this
Court's January 28, 1998 Resolution requiring private respondents "to SHOW CAUSE
why they should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt" for failure to
submit the name and address of their new counsel, explains that they are no longer
interested in pursuing the case and are "willing and ready to waive whatever rights"
they have over the properties subject of the donation. Petitioners, who were required
to comment on the letter, by Comment of October 28, 1998, 21 welcome private
respondents' gesture but pray that "for the sake of enriching jurisprudence, their
[p]etition be given due course and resolved."
The issue is thus whether the donation is inter vivos or mortis causa.
Crucial in the resolution of the issue is the determination of whether the donor
intended to transfer the ownership over the properties upon the execution of the
deed.22
Inter vivos vs Mortis Causa
Donation inter vivos differs from donation mortis causa in that in the former, the act
is immediately operative even if the actual execution may be deferred until the death
of the donor, while in the latter, nothing is conveyed to or acquired by the donee until
the death of the donor-testator.23 The following ruling of this Court in Alejandro v.
Geraldez is illuminating:24
If the donation is made in contemplation of the donor's death, meaning that
the full or naked ownership of the donated properties will pass to the donee
only because of the donor's death, then it is at that time that the donation
takes effect, and it is a donation mortis causa which should be embodied in
a last will and testament.
But if the donation takes effect during the donor's lifetime or independently
of the donor's death, meaning that the full or naked ownership (nuda
proprietas) of the donated properties passes to the donee during the donor's
lifetime, not by reason of his death but because of the deed of donation, then
the donation is inter vivos.
The distinction between a transfer inter vivos and mortis causa is important as the
validity or revocation of the donation depends upon its nature. If the donation is inter
vivos, it must be executed and accepted with the formalities prescribed by Articles
74825 and 74926 of the Civil Code, except when it is onerous in which case the rules on
contracts will apply. If it is mortis causa, the donation must be in the form of a will,
with all the formalities for the validity of wills, otherwise it is void and cannot transfer
ownership.27
The distinguishing characteristics of a donation mortis causa are the following:
 1. It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the
transferor; or, what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should
retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive;
2. That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor
at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of
a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed;
3. That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the
transferee.28
RULING
In the donation subject of the present case, there is nothing therein which indicates
that any right, title or interest in the donated properties was to be transferred to
Ursulina prior to the death of Celestina.
The phrase "to become effective upon the death of the DONOR" admits of no other
interpretation but that Celestina intended to transfer the ownership of the properties
to Ursulina on her death, not during her lifetime.29
More importantly, the provision in the deed stating that if the donee should die before
the donor, the donation shall be deemed rescinded and of no further force and effect
shows that the donation is a postmortem disposition.
Failed to comply with this form
As stated in a long line of cases, one of the decisive characteristics of a donation mortis
causa is that the transfer should be considered void if the donor should survive the
donee.30
More. The deed contains an attestation clause expressly confirming the donation
as mortis causa:
SIGNED by the above-named donor, Celestina Ganuelas, at the foot of this
deed of donation mortis causa, consisting of two (2) pages and on the left
margin of each and every page thereof in the joint presence of all of us who
at her request and in her presence and that of each other have in like manner
subscribed our names as witnesses.31 (Emphasis supplied)
DOCTRINE
To classify the donation as inter vivos simply because it is founded on considerations
of love and affection is erroneous. That the donation was prompted by the affection
of the donor for the donee and the services rendered by the latter is of no particular
significance in determining whether the deed constitutes a transfer inter vivos or not,
because a legacy may have an identical motivation.32 In other words, love and
affection may also underline transfers mortis causa.33
In Maglasang v. Heirs of Cabatingan,34 the deeds of donation contained provisions
almost identical to those found in the deed subject of the present case:
That for and in consideration of the love and affection of the DONOR for the
DONEE, x x x. the DONOR does hereby, by these presents, transfer, convey,
by way of donation, unto the DONEE the above-described property, together
with the buildings and all improvements existing thereon, to become
effective upon the death of the DONOR; PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that in the
event that the DONEE should die before the DONOR, the present donation
shall be deemed automatically rescinded and of no further force and effect.
(Emphasis supplied)
In that case, this Court held that the donations were mortis causa, for the above-
quoted provision conclusively establishes the donor's intention to transfer the
ownership and possession of the donated property to the donee only after the
former's death. Like in the present case, the deeds therein did not contain any clear
provision that purports to pass proprietary rights to the donee prior to the donor's
death.
As the subject deed then is in the nature of a mortis causa disposition, the formalities
of a will under Article 728 of the Civil Code should have been complied with, failing
which the donation is void and produces no effect.35
As noted by the trial court, the attesting witnesses failed to acknowledge the deed
before the notary public, thus violating Article 806 of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the
testator and the witnesses. The notary public shall not be required to retain
a copy of the will, or file another with the office of the Clerk of Court.
(Emphasis supplied)
The trial court did not thus commit any reversible error in declaring the Deed of
Donation to be mortis causa.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Del Rosario vs. Ferrer (G.R. No. 187056, September 20, 2010) Although denominated as a donation mortis causa, which in law is the equivalent of a
will, the deed had no attestation clause and was witnessed by only two persons. The
SC: inter vivos
named donees, however, signified their acceptance of the donation on the face of the
G.R. No. 187056 September 20, 2010
document.
W died. H assigned the properties to Asuncion(one of their children)
JARABINI G. DEL ROSARIO, Petitioner,
Guadalupe, the donor wife, died in September 1968. A few months later or on
vs.
December 19, 1968, Leopoldo, the donor husband, executed a deed of assignment of
ASUNCION G. FERRER, substituted by her heirs, VICENTE, PILAR, ANGELITO,
his rights and interests in subject property to their daughter Asuncion. Leopoldo died
FELIXBERTO, JR., all surnamed G. FERRER, and MIGUELA FERRER ALTEZA, Respondents.
in June 1972.
This Court has held that an acceptance
clause indicates that the donation is inter
DECISION vivos, since acceptance is a requirement In 1998 Jarabini filed a "petition for the probate of the August 27, 1968 deed of
only for such kind of donations
donation mortis causa" before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila in Sp. Proc. 98-
ABAD, J.: 90589.4 Asuncion opposed the petition, invoking his father Leopoldo’s assignment of
his rights and interests in the property to her.
This case pertains to a gift, otherwise denominated as a donation mortis causa, which RTC: it is inter vivos
in reality is a donation inter vivos made effective upon its execution by the donors and After trial, the RTC rendered a decision dated June 20, 2003,5 finding that the donation
acceptance thereof by the donees, and immediately transmitting ownership of the was in fact one made inter vivos, the donors’ intention being to transfer title over the
donated property to the latter, thus precluding a subsequent assignment thereof by property to the donees during the donors’ lifetime, given its irrevocability.
one of the donors. Consequently, said the RTC, Leopoldo’s subsequent assignment of his rights and
interest in the property was void since he had nothing to assign. The RTC thus directed
The Facts and the Case the registration of the property in the name of the donees in equal shares.6

On August 27, 1968 the spouses Leopoldo and Guadalupe Gonzales executed a
document entitled "Donation Mortis Causa"1 in favor of their two children, Asuncion
and Emiliano, and their granddaughter, Jarabini (daughter of their predeceased son,
Zoilo) covering the spouses’ 126-square meter lot and the house on it in Pandacan,
Manila2in equal shares. The deed of donation reads:
It is our will that this Donation Mortis Causa shall be irrevocable and shall be respected
by the surviving spouse.
It is our will that Jarabini Gonzales-del Rosario and Emiliano Gonzales will continue to
occupy the portions now occupied by them.
On Asuncion’s appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), the latter rendered a decision on
December 23, 2008,7reversing that of the RTC. The CA held that Jarabini cannot,
through her petition for the probate of the deed of donation mortis causa, collaterally
attack Leopoldo’s deed of assignment in Asuncion’s favor. The CA further held that,
since no proceeding exists for the allowance of what Jarabini claimed was actually a
donation inter vivos, the RTC erred in deciding the case the way it did. Finally, the CA
held that the donation, being one given mortis causa, did not comply with the
requirements of a notarial will,8 rendering the same void. Following the CA’s denial of
Jarabini’s motion for reconsideration,9 she filed the present petition with this Court.
Issue Presented

It is further our will that this DONATION MORTIS CAUSA shall not in any way affect any The key issue in this case is whether or not the spouses Leopoldo and Guadalupe’s
other distribution of other properties belonging to any of us donors whether testate donation to Asuncion, Emiliano, and Jarabini was a donation mortis causa, as it was
or intestate and where ever situated. denominated, or in fact a donation inter vivos.

It is our further will that any one surviving spouse reserves the right, ownership,
possession and administration of this property herein donated and accepted and this
Disposition and Donation shall be operative and effective upon the death of the
DONORS.3
The Court’s Ruling
Doctrine
That the document in question in this case was captioned "Donation Mortis Causa" is
not controlling. This Court has held that, if a donation by its terms is inter vivos, this
character is not altered by the fact that the donor styles it mortis causa.10
In Austria-Magat v. Court of Appeals,11 the Court held that "irrevocability" is a quality
absolutely incompatible with the idea of conveyances mortis causa, where
"revocability" is precisely the essence of the act. A donation mortis causa has the
following characteristics:
1. It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the
transferor; or, what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should
retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive;
2. That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor
at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of
a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; and
3. That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the
transferee.12 (Underscoring supplied)
The Court thus said in Austria-Magat that the express "irrevocability" of the donation
is the "distinctive standard that identifies the document as a donation inter vivos."
Here, the donors plainly said that it is "our will that this Donation Mortis Causa shall
be irrevocable and shall be respected by the surviving spouse." The intent to make the
donation irrevocable becomes even clearer by the proviso that a surviving donor shall
respect the irrevocability of the donation. Consequently, the donation was in reality a
donation inter vivos.
moment the donor learned of the donee’s acceptance of the donation. The
acceptance makes the donee the absolute owner of the property donated.17
Given that the donation in this case was irrevocable or one given inter vivos,
Leopoldo’s subsequent assignment of his rights and interests in the property to
Asuncion should be regarded as void for, by then, he had no more rights to assign. He
could not give what he no longer had. Nemo dat quod non habet.18
The trial court cannot be faulted for passing upon, in a petition for probate of what
was initially supposed to be a donation mortis causa, the validity of the document as
a donation inter vivos and the nullity of one of the donor’s subsequent assignment of
his rights and interests in the property. The Court has held before that the rule on
probate is not inflexible and absolute.19 Moreover, in opposing the petition for
probate and in putting the validity of the deed of assignment squarely in issue,
Asuncion or those who substituted her may not now claim that the trial court
improperly allowed a collateral attack on such assignment.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition, SETS ASIDE the assailed December 23,
2008 Decision and March 6, 2009 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
80549, and REINSTATES in toto the June 20, 2003 Decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch 19, in Sp. Proc. 98-90589.
SO ORDERED.

The donors in this case of course reserved the "right, ownership, possession, and
administration of the property" and made the donation operative upon their death.
But this Court has consistently held that such reservation (reddendum) in the context
of an irrevocable donation simply means that the donors parted with their naked title,
maintaining only beneficial ownership of the donated property while they lived.13

Notably, the three donees signed their acceptance of the donation, which acceptance
the deed required.14 This Court has held that an acceptance clause indicates that the
donation is inter vivos, since acceptance is a requirement only for such kind of
donations.1awphi1 Donations mortis causa, being in the form of a will, need not be
accepted by the donee during the donor’s lifetime. 15

Finally, as Justice J. B. L. Reyes said in Puig v. Peñaflorida,16 in case of doubt, the In case of doubt, in favor of inter vivos
conveyance should be deemed a donation inter vivos rather than mortis causa, in
order to avoid uncertainty as to the ownership of the property subject of the deed.

Since the donation in this case was one made inter vivos, it was immediately operative
and final. The reason is that such kind of donation is deemed perfected from the
 Additional Characteristics
Villanueva vs. Spouses Branoco (G.R. No. 172804, January 24, reason of poverty which I suffered while our children were still young; and because
my husband Juan Arcillas aware as he was with our destitution separated us [sic] and
2011) left for Cebu; and from then on never cared what happened to his family; and because
SC: it is intervivos of that one EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ, one of my nieces who also suffered with our
G.R. No. 172804 January 24, 2011 poverty, obedient as she was to all the works in our house, and because of the love
and affection which I feel [for] her, I have one parcel of land located at Sitio
GONZALO VILLANUEVA, represented by his heirs, Petitioner, Amambajag, Culaba, Leyte bearing Tax Decl. No. 1878 declared in the name of Alvegia
vs. Rodrigo, I give (devise) said land in favor of EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ, her heirs,
SPOUSES FROILAN and LEONILA BRANOCO, Respondents. successors, and assigns together with all the improvements existing thereon, which
parcel of land is more or less described and bounded as follows:
DECISION
1. Bounded North by Amambajag River; East, Benito Picao; South, Teofilo Uyvico; and
CARPIO, J.: West, by Public land; 2. It has an area of 3,492 square meters more or less; 3. It is
planted to coconuts now bearing fruits; 4. Having an assessed value of ₱240.00; 5. It
The Case is now in the possession of EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ since May 21, 1962 in the concept
of an owner, but the Deed of Donation or that ownership be vested on her upon my
demise.
This resolves the petition for review1 of the ruling2 of the Court of Appeals dismissing
a suit to recover a realty.
That I FURTHER DECLARE, and I reiterate that the land above described, I already
devise in favor of EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ since May 21, 1962, her heirs, assigns, and
The Facts
that if the herein Donee predeceases me, the same land will not be reverted to the
Donor, but will be inherited by the heirs of EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ;
Petitioner Gonzalo Villanueva (petitioner), here represented by his heirs, 3 sued
respondents, spouses Froilan and Leonila Branoco (respondents), in the Regional Trial
That I EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ, hereby accept the land above described from Inay
Court of Naval, Biliran (trial court) to recover a 3,492 square-meter parcel of land in
Alvegia Rodrigo and I am much grateful to her and praying further for a longer life;
Amambajag, Culaba, Leyte (Property) and collect damages. Petitioner claimed
however, I will give one half (1/2) of the produce of the land to Apoy Alve during her
ownership over the Property through purchase in July 1971 from Casimiro Vere (Vere),
lifetime.4
who, in turn, bought the Property from Alvegia Rodrigo (Rodrigo) in August 1970.
Petitioner declared the Property in his name for tax purposes soon after acquiring it.
Respondents entered the Property in 1983 and paid taxes afterwards.
In their Answer, respondents similarly claimed ownership over the Property through RTC: mortis cause which is cancelled by
purchase in July 1983 from Eufracia Rodriguez (Rodriguez) to whom Rodrigo donated The Ruling of the Trial Court Rodrigo when she sold it to the Petitioner
the Property in May 1965. The two-page deed of donation (Deed), signed at the
bottom by the parties and two witnesses, reads in full: The trial court ruled for petitioner, declared him owner of the Property, and ordered
respondents to surrender possession to petitioner, and to pay damages, the value of
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: the Property’s produce since 1982 until petitioner’s repossession and the costs. 5 The
trial court rejected respondents’ claim of ownership after treating the Deed as a
donation mortis causa which Rodrigo effectively cancelled by selling the Property to
That I, ALVEGIA RODRIGO, Filipino, of legal age, widow of the late Juan Arcillas, a
Vere in 1970.6 Thus, by the time Rodriguez sold the Property to respondents in 1983,
resident of Barrio Bool, municipality of Culaba, subprovince of Biliran, Leyte del Norte,
she had no title to transfer.
Philippines, hereby depose and say:
Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), imputing error in the trial court’s
That as we live[d] together as husband and wife with Juan Arcillas, we begot children,
interpretation of the Deed as a testamentary disposition instead of an inter
namely: LUCIO, VICENTA, SEGUNDINA, and ADELAIDA, all surnamed ARCILLAS, and by
vivos donation, passing title to Rodriguez upon its execution.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals CA: inter vivos
The CA granted respondents’ appeal and set aside the trial court’s ruling. While
conceding that the "language of the [Deed is] x x x confusing and which could admit
of possible different interpretations,"7 the CA found the following factors pivotal to its
reading of the Deed as donation inter vivos: (1) Rodriguez had been in possession of
the Property as owner since 21 May 1962, subject to the delivery of part of the
produce to Apoy Alve; (2) the Deed’s consideration was not Rodrigo’s death but her
"love and affection" for Rodriguez, considering the services the latter rendered; (3)
Rodrigo waived dominion over the Property in case Rodriguez predeceases her,
implying its inclusion in Rodriguez’s estate; and (4) Rodriguez accepted the donation
in the Deed itself, an act necessary to effectuate donations inter vivos, not
devises.8 Accordingly, the CA upheld the sale between Rodriguez and respondents,
and, conversely found the sale between Rodrigo and petitioner’s predecessor-in-
interest, Vere, void for Rodrigo’s lack of title.
In this petition, petitioner seeks the reinstatement of the trial court’s ruling.
Alternatively, petitioner claims ownership over the Property through acquisitive
prescription, having allegedly occupied it for more than 10 years.9
Respondents see no reversible error in the CA’s ruling and pray for its affirmance.
The Issue
The threshold question is whether petitioner’s title over the Property is superior to
respondents’. The resolution of this issue rests, in turn, on whether the contract
between the parties’ predecessors-in-interest, Rodrigo and Rodriguez, was a donation
or a devise. If the former, respondents hold superior title, having bought the Property
from Rodriguez. If the latter, petitioner prevails, having obtained title from Rodrigo
under a deed of sale the execution of which impliedly revoked the earlier devise to
Rodriguez.
The Ruling of the Court
We find respondents’ title superior, and thus, affirm the CA.
Naked Title Passed from Rodrigo to Rodriguez Under a Perfected Donation
We examine the juridical nature of the Deed – whether it passed title to Rodriguez
upon its execution or is effective only upon Rodrigo’s death – using principles distilled
from relevant jurisprudence. Post-mortem dispositions typically –
(1) Convey no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor;
or, what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership
(full or naked) and control of the property while alive;
(2) That before the [donor’s] death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor
at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a
reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed;
(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.10
Further – Additional Characteristics
[4] [T]he specification in a deed of the causes whereby the act may be revoked by the
donor indicates that the donation is inter vivos, rather than a disposition mortis
causa[;]
[5] That the designation of the donation as mortis causa, or a provision in the deed to
the effect that the donation is "to take effect at the death of the donor" are not
controlling criteria; such statements are to be construed together with the rest of the
instrument, in order to give effect to the real intent of the transferor[;] [and]
(6) That in case of doubt, the conveyance should be deemed donation inter
vivos rather than mortis causa, in order to avoid uncertainty as to the ownership of
the property subject of the deed.11
RULING
It is immediately apparent that Rodrigo passed naked title to Rodriguez under a
perfected donation inter vivos. First. Rodrigo stipulated that "if the herein Donee
predeceases me, the [Property] will not be reverted to the Donor, but will be inherited
by the heirs of x x x Rodriguez," signaling the irrevocability of the passage of title to
Rodriguez’s estate, waiving Rodrigo’s right to reclaim title. This transfer of title was
perfected the moment Rodrigo learned of Rodriguez’s acceptance of the
disposition12 which, being reflected in the Deed, took place on the day of its execution
on 3 May 1965. Rodrigo’s acceptance of the transfer underscores its essence as a
gift in presenti, not in futuro, as only donations inter vivos need acceptance by the
recipient.13 Indeed, had Rodrigo wished to retain full title over the Property, she could
have easily stipulated, as the testator did in another case, that "the donor, may
transfer, sell, or encumber to any person or entity the properties here donated x x
x"14 or used words to that effect. Instead, Rodrigo expressly waived title over the
Property in case Rodriguez predeceases her.
In a bid to diffuse the non-reversion stipulation’s damning effect on his case, petitioner
tries to profit from it, contending it is a fideicommissary substitution
clause.15 Petitioner assumes the fact he is laboring to prove. The question of the
Deed’s juridical nature, whether it is a will or a donation, is the crux of the present
controversy. By treating the clause in question as mandating fideicommissary
substitution, a mode of testamentary disposition by which the first heir instituted is
entrusted with the obligation to preserve and to transmit to a second heir the whole
or part of the inheritance,16 petitioner assumes that the Deed is a will. Neither the
Deed’s text nor the import of the contested clause supports petitioner’s theory.
Second. What Rodrigo reserved for herself was only the beneficial title to the Property,
evident from Rodriguez’s undertaking to "give one [half] x x x of the produce of the
land to Apoy Alve during her lifetime."17 Thus, the Deed’s stipulation that "the
ownership shall be vested on [Rodriguez] upon my demise," taking into account the
non-reversion clause, could only refer to Rodrigo’s beneficial title. We arrived at the
same conclusion in Balaqui v. Dongso18 where, as here, the donor, while "b[inding]
herself to answer to the [donor] and her heirs x x x that none shall question or disturb
[the donee’s] right," also stipulated that the donation "does not pass title to [the
donee] during my lifetime; but when I die, [the donee] shall be the true owner" of the
donated parcels of land. In finding the disposition as a gift inter vivos, the Court
reasoned:
Taking the deed x x x as a whole, x x x x it is noted that in the same deed [the donor]
guaranteed to [the donee] and her heirs and successors, the right to said property
thus conferred. From the moment [the donor] guaranteed the right granted by her to
[the donee] to the two parcels of land by virtue of the deed of gift, she surrendered
such right; otherwise there would be no need to guarantee said right. Therefore, when
[the donor] used the words upon which the appellants base their contention that the
gift in question is a donation mortis causa [that the gift "does not pass title during my
lifetime; but when I die, she shall be the true owner of the two aforementioned
parcels"] the donor meant nothing else than that she reserved of herself the possession
and usufruct of said two parcels of land until her death, at which time the donee would
be able to dispose of them freely.19 (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, if Rodrigo still retained full ownership over the Property, it was unnecessary
for her to reserve partial usufructuary right over it. 20
Third. The existence of consideration other than the donor’s death, such as the
donor’s love and affection to the donee and the services the latter rendered, while
also true of devises, nevertheless "corroborates the express irrevocability of x x x [inter
vivos] transfers."21 Thus, the CA committed no error in giving weight to Rodrigo’s
statement of "love and affection" for Rodriguez, her niece, as consideration for the
gift, to underscore its finding.
It will not do, therefore, for petitioner to cherry-pick stipulations from the Deed
tending to serve his cause (e.g. "the ownership shall be vested on [Rodriguez] upon
my demise" and "devise"). Dispositions bearing contradictory stipulations are
interpreted wholistically, to give effect to the donor’s intent. In no less than seven
cases featuring deeds of donations styled as "mortis causa" dispositions, the Court,
after going over the deeds, eventually considered the transfers inter
vivos,22 consistent with the principle that "the designation of the donation as mortis
causa, or a provision in the deed to the effect that the donation is ‘to take effect at
the death of the donor’ are not controlling criteria [but] x x x are to be construed
together with the rest of the instrument, in order to give effect to the real intent of
the transferor."23 Indeed, doubts on the nature of dispositions are resolved to
favor inter vivos transfers "to avoid uncertainty as to the ownership of the property
subject of the deed."24
Nor can petitioner capitalize on Rodrigo’s post-donation transfer of the Property to
Vere as proof of her retention of ownership. If such were the barometer in interpreting
deeds of donation, not only will great legal uncertainty be visited on gratuitous
dispositions, this will give license to rogue property owners to set at naught perfected
transfers of titles, which, while founded on liberality, is a valid mode of passing
ownership. The interest of settled property dispositions counsels against licensing
such practice.25
Effect
Accordingly, having irrevocably transferred naked title over the Property to Rodriguez
in 1965, Rodrigo "cannot afterwards revoke the donation nor dispose of the said
property in favor of another."26 Thus, Rodrigo’s post-donation sale of the Property
vested no title to Vere. As Vere’s successor-in-interest, petitioner acquired no better
right than him. On the other hand, respondents bought the Property from Rodriguez,
thus acquiring the latter’s title which they may invoke against all adverse claimants,
including petitioner.
Petitioner Acquired No Title Over the Property
Alternatively, petitioner grounds his claim of ownership over the Property through his
and Vere’s combined possession of the Property for more than ten years, counted
from Vere’s purchase of the Property from Rodrigo in 1970 until petitioner initiated
his suit in the trial court in February 1986.27 Petitioner anchors his contention on an
unfounded legal assumption. The ten year ordinary prescriptive period to acquire title
through possession of real property in the concept of an owner requires uninterrupted
possession coupled with just title and good faith.28 There is just title when the adverse
claimant came into possession of the property through one of the modes recognized
by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the grantor was not
the owner or could not transmit any right.29 Good faith, on the other hand, consists in
the reasonable belief that the person from whom the possessor received the thing
was the owner thereof, and could transmit his ownership.30
Although Vere and petitioner arguably had just title having successively acquired the
Property through sale, neither was a good faith possessor. As Rodrigo herself disclosed
in the Deed, Rodriguez already occupied and possessed the Property "in the concept
of an owner" ("como tag-iya"31) since 21 May 1962, nearly three years before
Rodrigo’s donation in 3 May 1965 and seven years before Vere bought the Property
from Rodrigo. This admission against interest binds Rodrigo and all those tracing title
to the Property through her, including Vere and petitioner. Indeed, petitioner’s
insistent claim that Rodriguez occupied the Property only in 1982, when she started
paying taxes, finds no basis in the records. In short, when Vere bought the Property
from Rodrigo in 1970, Rodriguez was in possession of the Property, a fact that
prevented Vere from being a buyer in good faith.

Lacking good faith possession, petitioner’s only other recourse to maintain his claim
of ownership by prescription is to show open, continuous and adverse possession of
the Property for 30 years.32 Undeniably, petitioner is unable to meet this
requirement.1avvphil

Ancillary Matters Petitioner Raises Irrelevant

Petitioner brings to the Court’s attention facts which, according to him, support his
theory that Rodrigo never passed ownership over the Property to Rodriguez, namely,
that Rodriguez registered the Deed and paid taxes on the Property only in 1982 and
Rodriguez obtained from Vere in 1981 a waiver of the latter’s "right of ownership"
over the Property. None of these facts detract from our conclusion that under the text
of the Deed and based on the contemporaneous acts of Rodrigo and Rodriguez, the
latter, already in possession of the Property since 1962 as Rodrigo admitted, obtained
naked title over it upon the Deed’s execution in 1965. Neither registration nor tax
payment is required to perfect donations. On the relevance of the waiver agreement,
suffice it to say that Vere had nothing to waive to Rodriguez, having obtained no title
from Rodrigo. Irrespective of Rodriguez’s motivation in obtaining the waiver, that
document, legally a scrap of paper, added nothing to the title Rodriguez obtained from
Rodrigo under the Deed.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 6 June 2005 and
the Resolution dated 5 May 2006 of the Court of Appeals.

SO ORDERED.
ARTICLE 774
Coronel vs. CA (G.R. NO. 103577, October 7, 1996)
[G.R. No. 103577. October 7, 1996]
Received from Miss Ramona Patricia Alcaraz of 146 Timog, Quezon City, the sum of
Fifty Thousand Pesos purchase price of our inherited house and lot, covered by TCT No.
119627 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City, in the total amount of P1,240,000.00.
FACTS:
entered a conditional contract of sale.
We bind ourselves to effect the transfer in our names from our deceased father,
at the time they entered, patay na ilahang papa, pero ang title sa property kay sa ilaha papa gihapon
Petitioner: no perfected contract kay dili pa daw ilaha.
Constancio P. Coronel, the transfer certificate of title immediately upon receipt of the
SC: Not correct. citing 774; the moment namatay ilahang papa, na
down payment above-stated.
inherent na nila ang rights and obligation sa property, thus, binding
and effective na tanan sa ilaha

ROMULO A. CORONEL, ALARICO A. CORONEL, ANNETTE A. CORONEL, ANNABELLE C.
GONZALES (for herself and on behalf of Floraida C. Tupper, as attorney-in-fact),
CIELITO A. CORONEL, FLORAIDA A. ALMONTE, and CATALINA BALAIS
MABANAG, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, CONCEPCION D. ALCARAZ
and RAMONA PATRICIA ALCARAZ, assisted by GLORIA F. NOEL as attorney-in-
fact, respondents.
DECISION
MELO, J.:
The petition before us has its roots in a complaint for specific performance to
compel herein petitioners (except the last named, Catalina Balais Mabanag) to
consummate the sale of a parcel of land with its improvements located along
Roosevelt Avenue in Quezon City entered into by the parties sometime in January
1985 for the price of P1,240,000.00.
The undisputed facts of the case were summarized by respondent court in this
wise:
On January 19, 1985, defendants-appellants Romulo Coronel, et. al. (hereinafter
referred to as Coronels) executed a document entitled Receipt of Down Payment (Exh.
A) in favor of plaintiff Ramona Patricia Alcaraz (hereinafter referred to as Ramona)
which is reproduced hereunder:
RECEIPT OF DOWN PAYMENT
P1,240,000.00 - Total amount
On our presentation of the TCT already in or name, We will immediately execute the
deed of absolute sale of said property and Miss Ramona Patricia Alcaraz shall
immediately pay the balance of the P1,190,000.00.
Clearly, the conditions appurtenant to the sale are the following:
1. Ramona will make a down payment of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) pesos upon
execution of the document aforestated;
2. The Coronels will cause the transfer in their names of the title of the property
registered in the name of their deceased father upon receipt of the Fifty Thousand
(P50,000.00) Pesos down payment;
3. Upon the transfer in their names of the subject property, the Coronels will execute
the deed of absolute sale in favor of Ramona and the latter will pay the former the
whole balance of One Million One Hundred Ninety Thousand (P1,190,000.00) Pesos.
On the same date (January 15, 1985), plaintiff-appellee Concepcion D. Alcaraz
(hereinafter referred to as Concepcion), mother of Ramona, paid the down payment
of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos (Exh. B, Exh. 2).
On February 6, 1985, the property originally registered in the name of the Coronels
father was transferred in their names under TCT No. 327043 (Exh. D; Exh 4)
On February 18, 1985, the Coronels sold the property covered by TCT No. 327043 to
intervenor-appellant Catalina B. Mabanag (hereinafter referred to as Catalina) for One
Million Five Hundred Eighty Thousand (P1,580,000.00) Pesos after the latter has paid
Three Hundred Thousand (P300,000.00) Pesos (Exhs. F-3; Exh. 6-C)

For this reason, Coronels canceled and rescinded the contract (Exh. A) with Ramona
50,000.00 - Down payment
by depositing the down payment paid by Concepcion in the bank in trust for Ramona
Patricia Alcaraz.
------------------------------------------

P1,190,000.00 - Balance
On February 22, 1985, Concepcion, et. al., filed a complaint for a specific performance
against the Coronels and caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens at the back
of TCT No. 327403 (Exh. E; Exh. 5).
On April 2, 1985, Catalina caused the annotation of a notice of adverse claim covering
the same property with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City (Exh. F; Exh. 6).
On April 25, 1985, the Coronels executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the subject
property in favor of Catalina (Exh. G; Exh. 7).
On June 5, 1985, a new title over the subject property was issued in the name of
Catalina under TCT No. 351582 (Exh. H; Exh. 8).
(Rollo, pp. 134-136)
In the course of the proceedings before the trial court (Branch 83, RTC, Quezon
City) the parties agreed to submit the case for decision solely on the basis of
documentary exhibits. Thus, plaintiffs therein (now private respondents) proffered
their documentary evidence accordingly marked as Exhibits A through J, inclusive of
their corresponding submarkings. Adopting these same exhibits as their own, then
defendants (now petitioners) accordingly offered and marked them as Exhibits 1
through 10, likewise inclusive of their corresponding submarkings. Upon motion of the
parties, the trial court gave them thirty (30) days within which to simultaneously
submit their respective memoranda, and an additional 15 days within which to submit
their corresponding comment or reply thereto, after which, the case would be
deemed submitted for resolution.
On April 14, 1988, the case was submitted for resolution before Judge Reynaldo
Roura, who was then temporarily detailed to preside over Branch 82 of the RTC of
Quezon City. On March 1, 1989, judgment was handed down by Judge Roura from his
regular bench at Macabebe, Pampanga for the Quezon City branch, disposing as
follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment for specific performance is hereby rendered ordering
defendant to execute in favor of plaintiffs a deed of absolute sale covering that parcel
of land embraced in and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 327403 (now TCT
No. 331582) of the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City, together with all the
improvements existing thereon free from all liens and encumbrances, and once
accomplished, to immediately deliver the said document of sale to plaintiffs and upon
receipt thereof, the plaintiffs are ordered to pay defendants the whole balance of the
purchase price amounting to P1,190,000.00 in cash. Transfer Certificate of Title No.
331582 of the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City in the name of intervenor is hereby
canceled and declared to be without force and effect. Defendants and intervenor and
all other persons claiming under them are hereby ordered to vacate the subject
property and deliver possession thereof to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs claim for damages and
attorneys fees, as well as the counterclaims of defendants and intervenors are hereby
dismissed.
No pronouncement as to costs.
So Ordered.
Macabebe, Pampanga for Quezon City, March 1, 1989.
(Rollo, p. 106)
A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioners before the new presiding
judge of the Quezon City RTC but the same was denied by Judge Estrella T. Estrada,
thusly:
The prayer contained in the instant motion, i.e., to annul the decision and to render
anew decision by the undersigned Presiding Judge should be denied for the following
reasons: (1) The instant case became submitted for decision as of April 14, 1988 when
the parties terminated the presentation of their respective documentary evidence and
when the Presiding Judge at that time was Judge Reynaldo Roura. The fact that they
were allowed to file memoranda at some future date did not change the fact that the
hearing of the case was terminated before Judge Roura and therefore the same should
be submitted to him for decision; (2) When the defendants and intervenor did not
object to the authority of Judge Reynaldo Roura to decide the case prior to the
rendition of the decision, when they met for the first time before the undersigned
Presiding Judge at the hearing of a pending incident in Civil Case No. Q-46145 on
November 11, 1988, they were deemed to have acquiesced thereto and they are now
estopped from questioning said authority of Judge Roura after they received the
decision in question which happens to be adverse to them; (3) While it is true that
Judge Reynaldo Roura was merely a Judge-on-detail at this Branch of the Court, he
was in all respects the Presiding Judge with full authority to act on any pending
incident submitted before this Court during his incumbency. When he returned to his
Official Station at Macabebe, Pampanga, he did not lose his authority to decide or
resolve cases submitted to him for decision or resolution because he continued as
Judge of the Regional Trial Court and is of co-equal rank with the undersigned
Presiding Judge. The standing rule and supported by jurisprudence is that a Judge to
whom a case is submitted for decision has the authority to decide the case
notwithstanding his transfer to another branch or region of the same court (Sec. 9,
Rule 135, Rule of Court).

Coming now to the twin prayer for reconsideration of the Decision dated March 1,
1989 rendered in the instant case, resolution of which now pertains to the
undersigned Presiding Judge, after a meticulous examination of the documentary
evidence presented by the parties, she is convinced that the Decision of March 1, 1989
is supported by evidence and, therefore, should not be disturbed.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Motion for Reconsideration and/or to Annul
Decision and Render Anew Decision by the Incumbent Presiding Judge dated March
20, 1989 is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Quezon City, Philippines, July 12, 1989.
(Rollo, pp. 108-109)
Petitioners thereupon interposed an appeal, but on December 16, 1991, the
Court of Appeals (Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Abad-Santos (P), JJ.) rendered its decision
fully agreeing with the trial court.
Hence, the instant petition which was filed on March 5, 1992. The last pleading,
private respondents Reply Memorandum, was filed on September 15, 1993. The case
was, however, re-raffled to undersigned ponente only on August 28, 1996, due to the
voluntary inhibition of the Justice to whom the case was last assigned.
While we deem it necessary to introduce certain refinements in the disquisition
of respondent court in the affirmance of the trial courts decision, we definitely find
the instant petition bereft of merit.
The heart of the controversy which is the ultimate key in the resolution of the
other issues in the case at bar is the precise determination of the legal significance of
the document entitled Receipt of Down Payment which was offered in evidence by
both parties. There is no dispute as to the fact that the said document embodied the
binding contract between Ramona Patricia Alcaraz on the one hand, and the heirs of
Constancio P. Coronel on the other, pertaining to a particular house and lot covered
by TCT No. 119627, as defined in Article 1305 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which
reads as follows:
Art. 1305. A contract is a meeting of minds between two persons whereby one binds
himself, with respect to the other, to give something or to render some service.
While, it is the position of private respondents that the Receipt of Down Payment
embodied a perfected contract of sale, which perforce, they seek to enforce by means
of an action for specific performance, petitioners on their part insist that what the
Petitioner: contract to sell
document signified was a mere executory contract to sell, subject to certain
suspensive conditions, and because of the absence of Ramona P. Alcaraz, who left for
the United States of America, said contract could not possibly ripen into a contract of
absolute sale.
Plainly, such variance in the contending parties contention is brought about by
the way each interprets the terms and/or conditions set forth in said private
instrument. Withal, based on whatever relevant and admissible evidence may be
available on record, this Court, as were the courts below, is now called upon to
adjudge what the real intent of the parties was at the time the said document was
executed.
The Civil Code defines a contract of sale, thus:
Art. 1458. By the contract of sale one of the contracting parties obligates himself to
transfer the ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing, and the other to pay
therefor a price certain in money or its equivalent.
Sale, by its very nature, is a consensual contract because it is perfected by mere
consent. The essential elements of a contract of sale are the following:
a) Consent or meeting of the minds, that is, consent to transfer ownership in exchange
for the price;
b) Determinate subject matter; and
c) Price certain in money or its equivalent.
Under this definition, a Contract to Sell may not be considered as a
Contract of Sale because the first essential element is lacking. In a contract to sell, the
prospective seller explicitly reserves the transfer of title to the prospective buyer,
meaning, the prospective seller does not as yet agree or consent to transfer ownership
of the property subject of the contract to sell until the happening of an event, which
for present purposes we shall take as the full payment of the purchase price. What the
seller agrees or obliges himself to do is to fulfill his promise to sell the subject property
when the entire amount of the purchase price is delivered to him. In other words the
full payment of the purchase price partakes of a suspensive condition, the non-
fulfillment of which prevents the obligation to sell from arising and thus, ownership is
retained by the prospective seller without further remedies by the prospective
buyer. In Roque vs. Lapuz (96 SCRA 741 [1980]), this Court had occasion to rule:
Hence, We hold that the contract between the petitioner and the respondent was a
contract to sell where the ownership or title is retained by the seller and is not to pass
until the full payment of the price, such payment being a positive suspensive condition
and failure of which is not a breach, casual or serious, but simply an event that
prevented the obligation of the vendor to convey title from acquiring binding force.
Stated positively, upon the fulfillment of the suspensive condition which is the
full payment of the purchase price, the prospective sellers obligation to sell the subject
property by entering into a contract of sale with the prospective buyer becomes
demandable as provided in Article 1479 of the Civil Code which states:
Art. 1479. A promise to buy and sell a determinate thing for a price certain is
reciprocally demandable.
An accepted unilateral promise to buy or to sell a determinate thing for a price certain
is binding upon the promissor of the promise is supported by a consideration distinct
from the price.
A contract to sell may thus be defined as a bilateral contract whereby the
prospective seller, while expressly reserving the ownership of the subject property
despite delivery thereof to the prospective buyer, binds himself to sell the said
property exclusively to the prospective buyer upon fulfillment of the condition agreed
upon, that is, full payment of the purchase price.
A contract to sell as defined hereinabove, may not even be considered as a
conditional contract of sale where the seller may likewise reserve title to the property
subject of the sale until the fulfillment of a suspensive condition, because in a
conditional contract of sale, the first element of consent is present, although it is
conditioned upon the happening of a contingent event which may or may not occur. If
the suspensive condition is not fulfilled, the perfection of the contract of sale is
completely abated (cf. Homesite and Housing Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 777
[1984]). However, if the suspensive condition is fulfilled, the contract of sale is thereby
perfected, such that if there had already been previous delivery of the property
subject of the sale to the buyer, ownership thereto automatically transfers to the
buyer by operation of law without any further act having to be performed by the seller.
In a contract to sell, upon the fulfillment of the suspensive condition which is the
full payment of the purchase price, ownership will not automatically transfer to the
buyer although the property may have been previously delivered to him. The
prospective seller still has to convey title to the prospective buyer by entering into a
contract of absolute sale.
It is essential to distinguish between a contract to sell and a conditional contract
of sale specially in cases where the subject property is sold by the owner not to the
party the seller contracted with, but to a third person, as in the case at bench. In a
contract to sell, there being no previous sale of the property, a third person buying
such property despite the fulfillment of the suspensive condition such as the full
Contract to sell: 3rd person who buys is buyer in good faith
payment of the purchase price, for instance, cannot be deemed a buyer in bad faith
and the prospective buyer cannot seek the relief of reconveyance of the
property. There is no double sale in such case. Title to the property will transfer to the
buyer after registration because there is no defect in the owner-sellers title per se, but
the latter, of course, may be sued for damages by the intending buyer.
In a conditional contract of sale, however, upon the fulfillment of the suspensive
condition, the sale becomes absolute and this will definitely affect the sellers title
thereto. In fact, if there had been previous delivery of the subject property, the sellers
ownership or title to the property is automatically transferred to the buyer such that,
the seller will no longer have any title to transfer to any third person. Applying Article
1544 of the Civil Code, such second buyer of the property who may have had actual
or constructive knowledge of such defect in the sellers title, or at least was charged
with the obligation to discover such defect, cannot be a registrant in good faith. Such
second buyer cannot defeat the first buyers title. In case a title is issued to the second
buyer, the first buyer may seek reconveyance of the property subject of the sale.
With the above postulates as guidelines, we now proceed to the task of
deciphering the real nature of the contract entered into by petitioners and private
respondents.
It is a canon in the interpretation of contracts that the words used therein should
be given their natural and ordinary meaning unless a technical meaning was intended
(Tan vs. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 586 [1992]). Thus, when petitioners declared in
the said Receipt of Down Payment that they --
Received from Miss Ramona Patricia Alcaraz of 146 Timog, Quezon City, the sum of
Fifty Thousand Pesos purchase price of our inherited house and lot, covered by TCT No.
1199627 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City, in the total amount
of P1,240,000.00.
without any reservation of title until full payment of the entire purchase price, the
natural and ordinary idea conveyed is that they sold their property.
When the Receipt of Down payment is considered in its entirety, it becomes
more manifest that there was a clear intent on the part of petitioners to transfer title
to the buyer, but since the transfer certificate of title was still in the name of
petitioners father, they could not fully effect such transfer although the buyer was
then willing and able to immediately pay the purchase price. Therefore, petitioners-
sellers undertook upon receipt of the down payment from private respondent
Ramona P. Alcaraz, to cause the issuance of a new certificate of title in their names
from that of their father, after which, they promised to present said title, now in their
names, to the latter and to execute the deed of absolute sale whereupon, the latter
shall, in turn, pay the entire balance of the purchase price.
 The agreement could not have been a contract to sell because the sellers herein
made no express reservation of ownership or title to the subject parcel of
land.Furthermore, the circumstance which prevented the parties from entering into
an absolute contract of sale pertained to the sellers themselves (the certificate of title
was not in their names) and not the full payment of the purchase price. Under the
established facts and circumstances of the case, the Court may safely presume that,
had the certificate of title been in the names of petitioners-sellers at that time, there
would have been no reason why an absolute contract of sale could not have been
executed and consummated right there and then.
Moreover, unlike in a contract to sell, petitioners in the case at bar did not merely
promise to sell the property to private respondent upon the fulfillment of the
suspensive condition. On the contrary, having already agreed to sell the subject
property, they undertook to have the certificate of title change to their names and
immediately thereafter, to execute the written deed of absolute sale.
Thus, the parties did not merely enter into a contract to sell where the sellers,
after compliance by the buyer with certain terms and conditions, promised to sell the
property to the latter. What may be perceived from the respective undertakings of
the parties to the contract is that petitioners had already agreed to sell the house and
lot they inherited from their father, completely willing to transfer ownership of the
subject house and lot to the buyer if the documents were then in order. It just so
happened, however, that the transfer certificate of title was then still in the name of
their father. It was more expedient to first effect the change in the certificate of title
so as to bear their names. That is why they undertook to cause the issuance of a new
transfer of the certificate of title in their names upon receipt of the down payment in
the amount of P50,000.00. As soon as the new certificate of title is issued in their
names, petitioners were committed to immediately execute the deed of absolute
sale. Only then will the obligation of the buyer to pay the remainder of the purchase
price arise.
There is no doubt that unlike in a contract to sell which is most commonly
entered into so as to protect the seller against a buyer who intends to buy the property
in installment by withholding ownership over the property until the buyer effects full
payment therefor, in the contract entered into in the case at bar, the sellers were the
ones who were unable to enter into a contract of absolute sale by reason of the fact
that the certificate of title to the property was still in the name of their father. It was
the sellers in this case who, as it were, had the impediment which prevented, so to
speak, the execution of an contract of absolute sale.
What is clearly established by the plain language of the subject document is that
when the said Receipt of Down Payment was prepared and signed by petitioners
Romulo A. Coronel, et. al., the parties had agreed to a conditional contract of sale,
consummation of which is subject only to the successful transfer of the certificate of
title from the name of petitioners father, Constancio P. Coronel, to their names.
The Court significantly notes that this suspensive condition was, in fact, fulfilled
on February 6, 1985 (Exh. D; Exh. 4). Thus, on said date, the conditional contract of
sale between petitioners and private respondent Ramona P. Alcaraz became
obligatory, the only act required for the consummation thereof being the delivery of
the property by means of the execution of the deed of absolute sale in a public
instrument, which petitioners unequivocally committed themselves to do as
evidenced by the Receipt of Down Payment.
Article 1475, in correlation with Article 1181, both of the Civil Code, plainly
applies to the case at bench. Thus,
Art. 1475. The contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of minds
upon the thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price.
From that moment, the parties may reciprocally demand performance, subject to the
provisions of the law governing the form of contracts.
Art. 1181. In conditional obligations, the acquisition of rights, as well as the
extinguishment or loss of those already acquired, shall depend upon the happening of
the event which constitutes the condition.
Since the condition contemplated by the parties which is the issuance of a
certificate of title in petitioners names was fulfilled on February 6, 1985, the respective
obligations of the parties under the contract of sale became mutually demandable,
that is, petitioners, as sellers, were obliged to present the transfer certificate of title
already in their names to private respondent Ramona P. Alcaraz, the buyer, and to
immediately execute the deed of absolute sale, while the buyer on her part, was
obliged to forthwith pay the balance of the purchase price amounting
to P1,190,000.00.
It is also significant to note that in the first paragraph in page 9 of their petition,
petitioners conclusively admitted that:
3. The petitioners-sellers Coronel bound themselves to effect the transfer
in our names from our deceased father Constancio P. Coronel, the
transfer certificate of title immediately upon receipt of the
downpayment above-stated". The sale was still subject to this
suspensive condition. (Emphasis supplied.)
(Rollo, p. 16)
Petitioners themselves recognized that they entered into a contract of sale
subject to a suspensive condition. Only, they contend, continuing in the same
paragraph, that:
 . . . Had petitioners-sellers not complied with this condition of first transferring the title
to the property under their names, there could be no perfected contract of
sale. (Emphasis supplied.)
(Ibid.)
not aware that they have set their own trap for themselves, for Article 1186 of the
Civil Code expressly provides that:
Art. 1186. The condition shall be deemed fulfilled when the obligor voluntarily
prevents its fulfillment.
Besides, it should be stressed and emphasized that what is more controlling than
these mere hypothetical arguments is the fact that the condition herein referred to
was actually and indisputably fulfilled on February 6, 1985, when a new title was issued
in the names of petitioners as evidenced by TCT No. 327403 (Exh. D; Exh. 4).
The inevitable conclusion is that on January 19, 1985, as evidenced by the
document denominated as Receipt of Down Payment (Exh. A; Exh. 1), the parties
entered into a contract of sale subject to the suspensive condition that the sellers shall
effect the issuance of new certificate title from that of their fathers name to their
names and that, on February 6, 1985, this condition was fulfilled (Exh. D; Exh. 4).
We, therefore, hold that, in accordance with Article 1187 which pertinently
provides -
Art. 1187. The effects of conditional obligation to give, once the condition has been
fulfilled, shall retroact to the day of the constitution of the obligation . . .
In obligations to do or not to do, the courts shall determine, in each case, the
retroactive effect of the condition that has been complied with.
the rights and obligations of the parties with respect to the perfected contract of sale
became mutually due and demandable as of the time of fulfillment or occurrence of
the suspensive condition on February 6, 1985. As of that point in time, reciprocal
obligations of both seller and buyer arose.
Petitioners: they were then not yet the absolute owner of the inherited property, THUS NO PERFECTED CONTRACT
Petitioners also argue there could been no perfected contract on January 19,
1985 because they were then not yet the absolute owners of the inherited property.
We cannot sustain this argument.
Article 774 of the Civil Code defines Succession as a mode of transferring
ownership as follows:
Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights
and obligations to the extent and value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted
through his death to another or others by his will or by operation of law.
Petitioners-sellers in the case at bar being the sons and daughters of the
decedent Constancio P. Coronel are compulsory heirs who were called to succession
by operation of law. Thus, at the point their father drew his last breath, petitioners
stepped into his shoes insofar as the subject property is concerned, such that any
rights or obligations pertaining thereto became binding and enforceable upon them. It
is expressly provided that rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment
of death of the decedent (Article 777, Civil Code; Cuison vs. Villanueva, 90 Phil. 850
[1952]).
Be it also noted that petitioners claim that succession may not be declared unless
the creditors have been paid is rendered moot by the fact that they were able to effect
the transfer of the title to the property from the decedents name to their names on
February 6, 1985.
Aside from this, petitioners are precluded from raising their supposed lack of
capacity to enter into an agreement at that time and they cannot be allowed to now
take a posture contrary to that which they took when they entered into the agreement
with private respondent Ramona P. Alcaraz. The Civil Code expressly states that:
Art. 1431. Through estoppel an admission or representation is rendered conclusive
upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person
relying thereon.
Having represented themselves as the true owners of the subject property at the time
of sale, petitioners cannot claim now that they were not yet the absolute owners
thereof at that time.
Petitioners also contend that although there was in fact a perfected contract of
sale between them and Ramona P. Alcaraz, the latter breach her reciprocal obligation
when she rendered impossible the consummation thereof by going to the United
States of America, without leaving her address, telephone number, and Special Power
of Attorney (Paragraphs 14 and 15, Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim to the
Amended Complaint, p. 2; Rollo, p. 43), for which reason, so petitioners conclude, they
were correct in unilaterally rescinding the contract of sale.
We do not agree with petitioners that there was a valid rescission of the contract
of sale in the instant case. We note that these supposed grounds for petitioners
rescission, are mere allegations found only in their responsive pleadings, which by
express provision of the rules, are deemed controverted even if no reply is filed by the
plaintiffs (Sec. 11, Rule 6, Revised Rules of Court). The records are absolutely bereft of
any supporting evidence to substantiate petitioners allegations. We have stressed
time and again that allegations must be proven by sufficient evidence (Ng Cho Cio vs.
Ng Diong, 110 Phil. 882 [1961]; Recaro vs. Embisan, 2 SCRA 598 [1961]). Mere
allegation is not an evidence (Lagasca vs. De Vera, 79 Phil. 376 [1947]).
Even assuming arguendo that Ramona P. Alcaraz was in the United States of
America on February 6, 1985, we cannot justify petitioners-sellers act of unilaterally
and extrajudicially rescinding the contract of sale, there being no express stipulation
authorizing the sellers to extrajudicially rescind the contract of sale. (cf. Dignos vs. CA,
158 SCRA 375 [1988]; Taguba vs. Vda. De Leon, 132 SCRA 722 [1984])
Moreover, petitioners are estopped from raising the alleged absence of Ramona
P. Alcaraz because although the evidence on record shows that the sale was in the
name of Ramona P. Alcaraz as the buyer, the sellers had been dealing with Concepcion
D. Alcaraz, Ramonas mother, who had acted for and in behalf of her daughter, if not
also in her own behalf. Indeed, the down payment was made by Concepcion D. Alcaraz
with her own personal Check (Exh. B; Exh. 2) for and in behalf of Ramona P.
Alcaraz. There is no evidence showing that petitioners ever questioned Concepcions
authority to represent Ramona P. Alcaraz when they accepted her personal
check. Neither did they raise any objection as regards payment being effected by a
third person. Accordingly, as far as petitioners are concerned, the physical absence of
Ramona P. Alcaraz is not a ground to rescind the contract of sale.
Corollarily, Ramona P. Alcaraz cannot even be deemed to be in default, insofar
as her obligation to pay the full purchase price is concerned. Petitioners who are
precluded from setting up the defense of the physical absence of Ramona P. Alcaraz
as above-explained offered no proof whatsoever to show that they actually presented
the new transfer certificate of title in their names and signified their willingness and
readiness to execute the deed of absolute sale in accordance with their
agreement. Ramonas corresponding obligation to pay the balance of the purchase
price in the amount of P1,190,000.00 (as buyer) never became due and demandable
and, therefore, she cannot be deemed to have been in default.
Article 1169 of the Civil Code defines when a party in a contract involving
reciprocal obligations may be considered in default, to wit:
Art. 1169. Those obliged to deliver or to do something, incur in delay from the time
the obligee judicially or extrajudicially demands from them the fulfillment of their
obligation.
xxx
In reciprocal obligations, neither party incurs in delay if the other does not comply or
is not ready to comply in a proper manner with what is incumbent upon him. From the
moment one of the parties fulfill his obligation, delay by the other begins. (Emphasis
supplied.)
There is thus neither factual nor legal basis to rescind the contract of sale
between petitioners and respondents.
With the foregoing conclusions, the sale to the other petitioner, Catalina B.
Mabanag, gave rise to a case of double sale where Article 1544 of the Civil Code will
apply, to wit:
Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership
shall be transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good
faith, if it should be movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring
it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good
faith was first in the possession; and, in the absence thereof to the person who
presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith.
The record of the case shows that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 25, 1985
as proof of the second contract of sale was registered with the Registry of Deeds of
Quezon City giving rise to the issuance of a new certificate of title in the name of
Catalina B. Mabanag on June 5, 1985. Thus, the second paragraph of Article 1544 shall
apply.
The above-cited provision on double sale presumes title or ownership to pass to
the buyer, the exceptions being: (a) when the second buyer, in good faith, registers
the sale ahead of the first buyer, and (b) should there be no inscription by either of
the two buyers, when the second buyer, in good faith, acquires possession of the
property ahead of the first buyer. Unless, the second buyer satisfies these
requirements, title or ownership will not transfer to him to the prejudice of the first
buyer.
In his commentaries on the Civil Code, an accepted authority on the subject, now
a distinguished member of the Court, Justice Jose C. Vitug, explains:
The governing principle is prius tempore, potior jure (first in time, stronger in
right). Knowledge by the first buyer of the second sale cannot defeat the first buyers
rights except when the second buyer first registers in good faith the second sale
(Olivares vs. Gonzales, 159 SCRA 33). Conversely, knowledge gained by the second
buyer of the first sale defeats his rights even if he is first to register, since knowledge
taints his registration with bad faith (see also Astorga vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
58530, 26 December 1984). In Cruz vs. Cabana (G.R. No. 56232, 22 June 1984, 129
SCRA 656), it was held that it is essential, to merit the protection of Art. 1544, second
paragraph, that the second realty buyer must act in good faith in registering his deed
of sale (citing Carbonell vs. Court of Appeals, 69 SCRA 99, Crisostomo vs. CA, G.R. No. acting in her own behalf as a co-buyer is not squarely raised in the instant petition, nor
95843, 02 September 1992). in such assumption disputed between mother and daughter. Thus, We will not touch
(J. Vitug, Compendium of Civil Law and Jurisprudence, 1993 Edition, p. 604). this issue and no longer disturb the lower courts ruling on this point.
Petitioners point out that the notice of lis pendens in the case at bar was WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and
annotated on the title of the subject property only on February 22, 1985, whereas, the the appealed judgment AFFIRMED.
second sale between petitioners Coronels and petitioner Mabanag was supposedly
SO ORDERED.
perfected prior thereto or on February 18, 1985. The idea conveyed is that at the time
petitioner Mabanag, the second buyer, bought the property under a clean title, she
was unaware of any adverse claim or previous sale, for which reason she is a buyer in
good faith.
We are not persuaded by such argument.
In a case of double sale, what finds relevance and materiality is not whether or
not the second buyer in good faith but whether or not said second buyer registers
such second sale in good faith, that is, without knowledge of any defect in the title of
the property sold.
As clearly borne out by the evidence in this case, petitioner Mabanag could not
have in good faith, registered the sale entered into on February 18, 1985 because as
early as February 22, 1985, a notice of lis pendens had been annotated on the transfer
certificate of title in the names of petitioners, whereas petitioner Mabanag registered
the said sale sometime in April, 1985. At the time of registration, therefore, petitioner
Mabanag knew that the same property had already been previously sold to private
respondents, or, at least, she was charged with knowledge that a previous buyer is
claiming title to the same property. Petitioner Mabanag cannot close her eyes to the
defect in petitioners title to the property at the time of the registration of the
property.
This Court had occasions to rule that:

If a vendee in a double sale registers the sale after he has acquired knowledge that
there was a previous sale of the same property to a third party or that another person
claims said property in a previous sale, the registration will constitute a registration in
bad faith and will not confer upon him any right. (Salvoro vs. Tanega, 87 SCRA 349
[1978]; citing Palarca vs. Director of Land, 43 Phil. 146; Cagaoan vs. Cagaoan, 43 Phil.
554; Fernandez vs. Mercader, 43 Phil. 581.)

Thus, the sale of the subject parcel of land between petitioners and Ramona P.
Alcaraz, perfected on February 6, 1985, prior to that between petitioners and Catalina
B. Mabanag on February 18, 1985, was correctly upheld by both the courts below.
Although there may be ample indications that there was in fact an agency
between Ramona as principal and Concepcion, her mother, as agent insofar as the
subject contract of sale is concerned, the issue of whether or not Concepcion was also
Balus vs. Balus (G.R. No. 168970, January 15, 2010) father mortgaged the subject property to the Bank and that they intended to redeem
the same at the soonest possible time.
CELESTINO BALUS, Petitioner,
Three years after the execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement, herein respondents
vs.
bought the subject property from the Bank. On October 12, 1992, a Deed of Sale of
SATURNINO BALUS and LEONARDA BALUS VDA. DE CALUNOD, Respondents.
Registered Land[6] was executed by the Bank in favor of respondents. Subsequently,
D E C I S I O N Since Rufo lost ownership of the subject property during
his lifetime, it only follows that at the time of his death, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-39,484(a.f.)[7] was issued in the name of
the disputed parcel of land no longer formed part of his
estate to which his heirs may lay claim
respondents. Meanwhile, petitioner continued possession of the subject lot.
PERALTA, J.:
On June 27, 1995, respondents filed a Complaint[8] for Recovery of Possession and
Damages against petitioner, contending that they had already informed petitioner of
Assailed in the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
the fact that they were the new owners of the disputed property, but the petitioner
Court is the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated May 31, 2005 in CA-G.R. CV
still refused to surrender possession of the same to them. Respondents claimed that
No. 58041 which set aside the February 7, 1997 Decision of the Regional Trial Court
they had exhausted all remedies for the amicable settlement of the case, but to no
(RTC) of Lanao del Norte, Branch 4 in Civil Case No. 3263.
avail.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Herein petitioner and respondents are the children of the spouses Rufo and On February 7, 1997, the RTC rendered a Decision[9] disposing as follows:
Sebastiana Balus. Sebastiana died on September 6, 1978, while Rufo died on July 6,
1984. WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, ordering the plaintiffs to execute a Deed
On January 3, 1979, Rufo mortgaged a parcel of land, which he owns, as security for a of Sale in favor of the defendant, the one-third share of the property in question,
loan he obtained from the Rural Bank of Maigo, Lanao del Norte (Bank). The said presently possessed by him, and described in the deed of partition, as follows:
property was originally covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-439(788) and
more particularly described as follows: A one-third portion of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-39,484 (a.f.), formerly
Original Certificate of Title No. P-788, now in the name of Saturnino Balus and
A parcel of land with all the improvements thereon, containing an Leonarda B. Vda. de Calunod, situated at Lagundang, Bunawan, Iligan City, bounded
area of 3.0740 hectares, more or less, situated in the Barrio of on the North by Lot 5122; East by shares of Saturnino Balus and Leonarda Balus-
Calunod; South by Lot 4649, Dodiongan River; West by Lot 4661, consisting of 10,246
Lagundang, Bunawan, Iligan City, and bounded as follows: Bounded
square meters, including improvements thereon.
on the NE., along line 1-2, by Lot 5122, Csd-292; along line 2-12, by
Dodiongan River; along line 12-13 by Lot 4649, Csd-292; and along
and dismissing all other claims of the parties.
line 12-1, by Lot 4661, Csd-292. x x x [2]
The amount of P6,733.33 consigned by the defendant with the Clerk
Rufo failed to pay his loan. As a result, the mortgaged property was foreclosed and
of Court is hereby ordered delivered to the plaintiffs, as purchase
was subsequently sold to the Bank as the sole bidder at a public auction held for that
price of the one-third portion of the land in question.
purpose. On November 20, 1981, a Certificate of Sale[3] was executed by the sheriff in
favor of the Bank. The property was not redeemed within the period allowed by
Plaintiffs are ordered to pay the costs.
law. More than two years after the auction, or on January 25, 1984, the sheriff
executed a Definite Deed of Sale[4] in the Bank's favor. Thereafter, a new title was
SO ORDERED.[10]
issued in the name of the Bank.
The RTC held that the right of petitioner to purchase from the respondents his share
On October 10, 1989, herein petitioner and respondents executed an Extrajudicial
in the disputed property was recognized by the provisions of the Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate[5] adjudicating to each of them a specific one-third portion of the
Settlement of Estate, which the parties had executed before the respondents bought
subject property consisting of 10,246 square meters. The Extrajudicial Settlement also
the subject lot from the Bank.
contained provisions wherein the parties admitted knowledge of the fact that their
Aggrieved by the Decision of the RTC, herein respondents filed an appeal with the CA.
On May 31, 2005, the CA promulgated the presently assailed Decision, reversing and
setting aside the Decision of the RTC and ordering petitioner to immediately surrender
possession of the subject property to the respondents. The CA ruled that when
petitioner and respondents did not redeem the subject property within the
redemption period and allowed the consolidation of ownership and the issuance of a
new title in the name of the Bank, their co-ownership was extinguished.
Hence, the instant petition raising a sole issue, to wit:
WHETHER OR NOT CO-OWNERSHIP AMONG THE PETITIONER AND THE
RESPONDENTS OVER THE PROPERTY PERSISTED/CONTINUED TO EXIST (EVEN AFTER
THE TRANSFER OF TITLE TO THE BANK) BY VIRTUE OF THE PARTIES' AGREEMENT
PRIOR TO THE REPURCHASE THEREOF BY THE RESPONDENTS; THUS, WARRANTING
THE PETITIONER'S ACT OF ENFORCING THE AGREEMENT BY REIMBURSING THE
RESPONDENTS OF HIS (PETITIONER'S) JUST SHARE OF THE REPURCHASE PRICE. [11]
The main issue raised by petitioner is whether co-ownership by him and respondents
over the subject property persisted even after the lot was purchased by the Bank and
title thereto transferred to its name, and even after it was eventually bought back by
the respondents from the Bank.
Petitioner insists that despite respondents' full knowledge of the fact that the title over
the disputed property was already in the name of the Bank, they still proceeded to
execute the subject Extrajudicial Settlement, having in mind the intention of
purchasing back the property together with petitioner and of continuing their co-
ownership thereof.
Petitioner posits that the subject Extrajudicial Settlement is, in and by itself, a contract
between him and respondents, because it contains a provision whereby the parties
agreed to continue their co-ownership of the subject property by redeeming or
repurchasing the same from the Bank. This agreement, petitioner contends, is the law
between the parties and, as such, binds the respondents. As a result, petitioner asserts
that respondents' act of buying the disputed property from the Bank without notifying
him inures to his benefit as to give him the right to claim his rightful portion of the
property, comprising 1/3 thereof, by reimbursing respondents the equivalent 1/3 of
the sum they paid to the Bank.
The Court is not persuaded.
Petitioner and respondents are arguing on the wrong premise that, at the time of the
execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement, the subject property formed part of the
estate of their deceased father to which they may lay claim as his heirs.
At the outset, it bears to emphasize that there is no dispute with respect to the fact
that the subject property was exclusively owned by petitioner and respondents'
father, Rufo, at the time that it was mortgaged in 1979. This was stipulated by the
parties during the hearing conducted by the trial court on October 28,
1996.[12] Evidence shows that a Definite Deed of Sale[13] was issued in favor of the Bank
on January 25, 1984, after the period of redemption expired. There is neither any
dispute that a new title was issued in the Bank's name before Rufo died on July 6,
1984. Hence, there is no question that the Bank acquired exclusive ownership of the
contested lot during the lifetime of Rufo.
Article 774
The rights to a person's succession are transmitted from the moment of his
death.[14] In addition, the inheritance of a person consists of the property and
transmissible rights and obligations existing at the time of his death, as well as those
which have accrued thereto since the opening of the succession.[15] In the present
Ruling case, since Rufo lost ownership of the subject property during his lifetime, it only
follows that at the time of his death, the disputed parcel of land no longer formed part
of his estate to which his heirs may lay claim. Stated differently, petitioner and
respondents never inherited the subject lot from their father.
Petitioner and respondents, therefore, were wrong in assuming that they became co-
owners of the subject lot. Thus, any issue arising from the supposed right of petitioner
as co-owner of the contested parcel of land is negated by the fact that, in the eyes of
the law, the disputed lot did not pass into the hands of petitioner and respondents as
compulsory heirs of Rufo at any given point in time.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court finds a necessity for a complete
determination of the issues raised in the instant case to look into petitioner's
argument that the Extrajudicial Settlement is an independent contract which gives him
the right to enforce his right to claim a portion of the disputed lot bought by
respondents.
It is true that under Article 1315 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, contracts are
perfected by mere consent; and from that moment, the parties are bound not only to
the fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated but also to all the consequences
which, according to their nature, may be in keeping with good faith, usage and law.
Article 1306 of the same Code also provides that the contracting parties may establish
such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient,
provided these are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public
policy.
In the present case, however, there is nothing in the subject Extrajudicial Settlement
to indicate any express stipulation for petitioner and respondents to continue with
their supposed co-ownership of the contested lot.

On the contrary, a plain reading of the provisions of the Extrajudicial Settlement would
not, in any way, support petitioner's contention that it was his and his sibling's
intention to buy the subject property from the Bank and continue what they believed
to be co-ownership thereof. It is a cardinal rule in the interpretation of contracts that
the intention of the parties shall be accorded primordial consideration.[16] It is the duty
of the courts to place a practical and realistic construction upon it, giving due
consideration to the context in which it is negotiated and the purpose which it is
intended to serve.[17] Such intention is determined from the express terms of their
agreement, as well as their contemporaneous and subsequent acts.[18] Absurd and
illogical interpretations should also be avoided.[19]
For petitioner to claim that the Extrajudicial Settlement is an agreement between him
and his siblings to continue what they thought was their ownership of the subject
property, even after the same had been bought by the Bank, is stretching the
interpretation of the said Extrajudicial Settlement too far.
petitioner and respondents a specific 1/3 portion of the same. Partition calls for the
segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the property owned in
common. It seeks a severance of the individual interests of each co-owner, vesting in
each of them a sole estate in a specific property and giving each one a right to enjoy
his estate without supervision or interference from the other.[20] In other words, the
purpose of partition is to put an end to co-ownership,[21] an objective which negates
petitioner's claims in the present case.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals, dated May 31, 2005 in CA-G.R. CV No. 58041, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

In the first place, as earlier discussed, there is no co-ownership to talk about and no
property to partition, as the disputed lot never formed part of the estate of their
deceased father.

Moreover, petitioner's asseveration of his and respondents' intention of continuing

with their supposed co-ownership is negated by no less than his assertions in the
present petition that on several occasions he had the chance to purchase the subject
property back, but he refused to do so. In fact, he claims that after the Bank acquired
the disputed lot, it offered to re-sell the same to him but he ignored such offer. How
then can petitioner now claim that it was also his intention to purchase the subject
property from the Bank, when he admitted that he refused the Bank's offer to re-sell
the subject property to him?

In addition, it appears from the recitals in the Extrajudicial Settlement that, at the time
of the execution thereof, the parties were not yet aware that the subject property was
already exclusively owned by the Bank. Nonetheless, the lack of knowledge on the part
of petitioner and respondents that the mortgage was already foreclosed and title to
the property was already transferred to the Bank does not give them the right or the
authority to unilaterally declare themselves as co-owners of the disputed property;
otherwise, the disposition of the case would be made to depend on the belief and
conviction of the party-litigants and not on the evidence adduced and the law and
jurisprudence applicable thereto.

Furthermore, petitioner's contention that he and his siblings intended to continue

their supposed co-ownership of the subject property contradicts the provisions of the
subject Extrajudicial Settlement where they clearly manifested their intention of
having the subject property divided or partitioned by assigning to each of the
ARTICLE 774 776
Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc. vs. Valbueco, Incorporated
G.R. No. 179594 September 11, 2013
MANUEL UY & SONS, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
VALBUECO, INCORPORATED, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 of the Court of Appeals’ Decision2 dated
December 11, 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 85877, and its Resolution dated September 4,
2007, denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the Decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila, Branch 1, dismissing the Complaint for specific performance and
damages. The Court of Appeals reinstated the Complaint and directed petitioner to
execute deeds of absolute sale in favor of respondent after payment of the purchase
price of the subject lots.
The facts, as stated by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
Petitioner Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc. is the registered owner of parcels of land located in
Teresa, Rizal covered by Transfer Certificate of Title(TCT) No. 59534, covering an area
of about 6,119 square meters; TCT No.59445, covering an area of about 6,838 square
meters; TCT No. 59446,covering an area of about 12,389 square meters; and TCT No.
59444,covering an area of about 32,047 square meters.
On November 29, 1973, two Conditional Deeds of Sale were executed by petitioner,
as vendor, in favor of respondent Valbueco, Incorporated, as vendee. The first
Conditional Deed of Sale4 covered TCT Nos. 59534, 59445 and 59446, and contained
the following terms and conditions:
That for and in consideration of the sum of ONE HUNDREDSIXTY-FOUR THOUSAND
SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY-NINE(Php164,749.00) PESOS, Philippine currency, the
VENDOR hereby agrees to SELL, CEDE, TRANSFER and CONVEY unto the VENDEE xx x
the aforementioned properties, payable under the following terms and conditions:
1. The sum of FORTY-ONE THOUSAND ONE HUNDREDEIGHTY-SEVEN and 25/100 (Php
41,187.25) PESOS shall be paid upon signing of this conditional deed of sale; and
2. The balance of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY-THREETHOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED SIXTY-
ONE and 75/100 (Php123,561.75) PESOS shall be paid within a period of one (1) year
from November 15, 1973, with interest of 12% per annum based on the balance, in
the mode and manner specified below:
a) January 4, 1974 – ₱16,474.90 plus interest
b) On or before May 15, 1974 – ₱53,543.43 plus interest
c) On or before November 15, 1974 – ₱53,543.32 plus interest
3. That the vendee shall be given a grace period of thirty (30)days from the due date
of any installment with corresponding interest to be added, but should the VENDEE
fail to make such payment within the grace period this contract shall be deemed
rescinded and without force and effect after notice in writing by VENDOR to VENDEE.
4. That the VENDOR agrees to have the existing Mortgages on the properties subject
of this sale released on or before May 20, 1974.
5. That the VENDOR agrees to have the above-described properties freed and cleared
of all lessees, tenants, adverse occupants or squatters within 100 days from the
execution of this conditional deed of sale. In case of failure by the VENDOR to comply
with the undertaking provided in this paragraph and the VENDEE shall find it necessary
to file a case or cases in court to eject the said lessees, tenants, occupants and/or
squatters from the land, subject of this sale, the VENDOR agrees to answer and pay
for all the expenses incurred and to be incurred in connection with said cases until the
same are fully and finally terminated.
6. That the VENDOR and the VENDEE agree that during the existence of this Contract
and without previous expressed written permission from the other, they shall not sell,
cede, assign, transfer or mortgage, or in any way encumber unto another person or
party any right, interest or equity that they may have in and to said parcels of land. x
xxx
8. That it is understood that ownership of the properties herein conveyed shall not
pass to the VENDEE until after payment of the full purchase price; provided, however,
that the VENDOR shall allow the annotation of this Conditional Deed of Sale at the
back of the titles of the above-described parcels of land in the corresponding Registry
of Deeds x xx.
9. That upon full payment of the total purchase price, a Deed of Absolute Sale shall be
executed in favor of the VENDEE and the VENDOR agrees to pay the documentary
stamps and the science stamp tax of the Deed of Sale; while the VENDEE agrees to pay
the registration and other expenses for the issuance of a new title.
10. That it is mutually agreed that in case of litigation, the venue of the case shall be
in the courts of Manila, having competent jurisdiction, any other venue being
expressly waived.5
On the other hand, the second Conditional Deed of Sale 6 covering Lot No. 59444
provides, thus:
1. The sum of FIFTY-TWO THOUSAND SEVENTY-SIXAND 37/100 (Php 52,076.37)
PESOS, shall be paid upon signing of this conditional deed of sale; and
2. The balance of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY-SIXTHOUSAND TWO HUNDRED TWENTY-NINE
and 13/100 (Php156,229.13) PESOS shall be paid within a period of one (1) year from
November 15, 1973, with interest of 12% per annum based on the balance, in the
mode and manner specified below:
a) January 4, 1974 – ₱20,830.55 plus interest
b) On or before May 15, 1974 – ₱67,699.29 plus interest
c) On or before November 15, 1974, ₱67,699.29 plus interest
3. That the VENDEE shall be given a grace period of thirty (30) days from the due date
of any installment with corresponding interest to be added, but should the VENDEE
fail to make such payment within the grace period, this contract shall be deemed
rescinded and without force and effect after notice in writing by VENDOR to VENDEE.
4. That the VENDOR agrees and acknowledges that any and all payments to be made
by the VENDEE by reason of this presents unless hereafter advised by VENDOR to the
contrary, shall be made in favor of and to the Philippine Trust Company by way of
liquidation and payment of the existing mortgage on the property subject of this sale.
5. That after each payment adverted to above the VENDOR shall issue the
corresponding receipt for the amount paid by the VENDOR to the Philippine Trust
Company.
6. That the VENDOR agrees to have the above-described property freed and cleared
of all lessees, tenants, adverse occupants or squatters within 100 days from the
execution of this conditional deed of sale. In case of failure by the VENDOR to comply
with this undertaking provided in this paragraph and the VENDEE shall find it necessary
to file a case or cases in court to eject the said lessees, tenants, occupants and/or
squatters from the land, subject of this sale, the VENDOR agrees to answer and pay
for all the expenses incurred and to be incurred in connection with said cases until the
same are fully and finally terminated.
7. That the VENDOR and the VENDEE agree that during the existence of this Contract
and without previous expressed written permission from the other, they shall not sell,
cede, assign, transfer or mortgage, or in any way encumber unto another person or
party any right, interest or equity that they may have in and to said parcel of land.
xxxx
9. That it is understood that ownership of the property herein conveyed shall not pass
to the VENDEE until after payment of the full purchase price, provided, however, that
the VENDOR shall allow the annotation of the Conditional Deed of Sale at the back of
the Title of the above-described parcel of land in the corresponding Registry of Deeds;
x xx.
10. That upon full payment of the total purchase price, a Deed of Absolute Sale shall
be executed in favor of the VENDEE and the VENDOR agrees to pay the documentary
stamps and the science stamp tax of the Deed of Sale; while the VENDEE agrees to pay
the registration and other expenses for the issuance of a new title.
11. That it is mutually agreed that in case of litigation, the venue of the case shall be
in the courts of Manila, having competent jurisdiction, any other venue being
expressly waived.7
Respondent was able to pay petitioner the amount of ₱275,055.558 as partial payment
for the two properties corresponding to the initial payments and the first installments
of the said properties.
At the same time, petitioner complied with its obligation under the conditional deeds
of sale, as follows: (1) the mortgage for TCT No. 59446 was released on May 18, 1984,
while the mortgages for TCT Nos. 59445and 59534 were released on July 19, 1974; (2)
the unlawful occupants of the lots covered by TCT Nos. 59444, 59534, 59445 and
59446 surrendered their possession and use of the said lots in consideration of the
amount of ₱6,000.00 in a document9 dated November 19, 1973, and they agreed to
demolish their shanties on or before December 7, 1973; and (3) the mortgage with
Philippine Trust Company covering TCT No. 59444 was discharged10 in 1984.
However, respondent suspended further payment as it was not satisfied with the
manner petitioner complied with its obligations under the conditional deeds of sale.
Consequently, on March 17, 1978, petitioner sent respondent a letter 11 informing
respondent of its intention to rescind the conditional deeds of sale and attaching
therewith the original copy of the respective notarial rescission.
On November 28, 1994, respondent filed a Complaint12 for specific performance and
damages against petitioner with the RTC of Antipolo City. However, on January 15,
1996, the case was dismissed without prejudice13 for lack of interest, as respondent's
counsel failed to attend the pre-trial conference.
Five years later, or on March 16, 2001, respondent again filed with the RTC of Manila,
Branch 1 (trial court) a Complaint14 for specific performance and damages, seeking to
compel petitioner to accept the balance of the purchase price for the two conditional
deeds of sale and to execute the corresponding deeds of absolute sale. Respondent
contended that its non-payment of the installments was due to the following
reasons:(1) Petitioner refused to receive the balance of the purchase price as the
properties were mortgaged and had to be redeemed first before a deed of absolute
sale could be executed; (2) Petitioner assured that the existing mortgages on the
properties would be discharged on or before May 20,1974, or that petitioner did not
inform it (respondent) that the mortgages on the properties were already released;
and (3) Petitioner failed to fully eject the unlawful occupants in the area.
In its Answer,15 petitioner argued that the case should be dismissed, as it was barred
by prior judgment. Moreover, petitioner contended that it could not be compelled to
execute any deed of absolute sale, because respondent failed to pay in full the
purchase price of the subject lots. Petitioner claimed that it gave respondent a notice
of notarial rescission of both conditional deeds of sale that would take effect 30 days
from receipt thereof. The notice of notarial rescission was allegedly received by
respondent on March 17,1978. Petitioner asserted that since respondent failed to pay
the full purchase price of the subject lots, both conditional deeds of sale were
rescinded as of April 16, 1978; hence, respondent had no cause of action against it.
In its Reply,16 respondent denied that it received the alleged notice of notarial
rescission. Respondent also denied that the alleged recipient (one Wenna
Laurenciana)17 of the letter dated March 17, 1978, which was attached to the notice
of notarial rescission, was its employee. Respondent stated that assuming arguendo
that the notice was sent to it, the address (6th Floor, SGC Bldg., Salcedo Street, Legaspi
Village, Makati, Metro Manila) was not the given address of respondent. Respondent
contended that its address on the conditional deeds of sale and the receipts issued by
it and petitioner showed that its principal business address was the 7th Floor, Bank of
P.I. Bldg, Ayala Avenue, Makati, Rizal.
On August 1, 2005, the trial court rendered a Decision,18 dismissing the complaint, as
petitioner had exercised its right to rescind the contracts. The dispositive portion of
the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the complaint is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Claims and counterclaims for damages are also dismissed.19
The trial court stated that the issues before it were: (1) Did petitioner unlawfully evade
its obligation to execute the final deed of sale and to eject the squatters/occupants on
the properties; (2) Is the case barred by prior judgment; and (3) Does respondent have
a cause of action against petitioner.
The trial court said that both conditional deeds of sale clearly provided that
"ownership x x x shall not pass to the VENDEE until after full payment of the purchase
price." Respondent admitted that it has not yet fully paid the purchase price. The trial
court held that the conditions in the conditional deeds of sale being suspensive, that
is, its fulfillment gives rise to the obligation, the reasons for the inability of respondent
to fulfill its own obligations is material, in order that the obligation of petitioner to
execute the final deeds of absolute sale will arise. The trial court stated that the
evidence showed that petitioner had exercised its right to rescind the contract by a
written notice dated March 17, 1978 and notarial acts both dated March15, 1978. The
trial court noted that respondent denied having received the notice and disclaimed
knowing the recipient, Wenna Laurenciana. However, on cross-examination,
respondent's witness, Gaudencio Juan, who used to be respondent's Personnel
Manager and Forester at the same time, admitted knowing Laurenciana because she
was the secretary of Mr. Valeriano Bueno, respondent's president at that time,
although Laurenciana was not employed by respondent, but she was employed by
Mahogany Products Corporation, presumably one of the 14 other companies being
controlled by Mr. Bueno.20
The trial court held that the conditional deeds of sale were executed on November 29,
1973 and were already covered by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6552, otherwise known as
the Realty Installment Buyer Act. Under Section 4 of the law, if the buyer fails to pay
the installments due at the expiration of the grace period, which is not less than 60
days from the date the installment became due, the seller may cancel the contract
after 30 days from receipt of the buyer of the notice of cancellation or the demand for
rescission of the contracts by notarial act. The trial court found no lawful ground to
grant the relief prayed for and dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.
Respondent appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals, and made
these assignments of error: (1) the trial court erred in holding that petitioner did not
unlawfully evade executing a final deed of sale, since respondent's failure to fulfill its
own obligation is material; (2) the trial court erred in holding that it is unbelievable
and a self-contradiction that respondent was informed of the mortgage only when it
was paying the balance of the properties; and (3) the trial court erred in holding that
as early as November 19, 1973, petitioner had already taken necessary steps to evict
the squatters/occupants through the intercession of the agrarian reform officer.
On December 11, 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision, reversing and
setting aside the Decision of the trial court. It reinstated the complaint of respondent,
and directed petitioner to execute deeds of absolute sale in favor of respondent after
payment of the balance of the purchase price of the subject lots. The dispositive
portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the August 1, 2005Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 1, in Civil Case No. 01-100411, is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.
A new one is hereby entered: REINSTATING the complaint and defendant-appellee
MANUEL UY & SONS INC. is hereby DIRECTED, pursuant to Sec. 4, R. A. No. 6552,
otherwise known as the Maceda Law, to EXECUTE and DELIVER:
(1) Deeds of Absolute Sale in favor of VALBUECO, INC.; and
(2) Transfer Certificates of Title pertaining to Nos. 59534, 59445,59446 and
59444, in the name of plaintiff-appellant VALBUECO, INC., after VALBUECO
pays MANUEL UY & SONS, without additional interest, within thirty days from
finality of this judgment, the balance of the contract price.
If MANUEL UY & SONS refuses to deliver the Deeds of Absolute Sale and the co-
owner's copy of the TCTs, the Register of Deeds of Antipolo, Rizal is hereby DIRECTED
to CANCEL the latest TCTs issued derived from TCT Nos. 59534, 59445, 59446 and
59444, and to
ISSUE new TCTS in the name of VALBUECO.
Only if VALBUECO fails in the payment directed above, then defendant-appellee
MANUEL UY & SONS INC. has the opportunity to serve a valid notice of notarial
rescission.
SO ORDERED.21
The Court of Appeals held that the two conditional deeds of sale in this case are
contracts to sell. It stated that the law applicable to the said contracts to sell on
installments is R.A. No. 6552, specifically Section 4thereof, as respondent paid less
than two years in installments. It held that upon repeated defaults in payment by
respondent, petitioner had the right to cancel the said contracts, but subject to the
proper receipt of respondent of the notice of cancellation or the demand for the
rescission of the contracts by notarial act.
However, the Court of Appeals found that petitioner sent the notice of notarial
rescission to the wrong address. The business address of respondent, as used in all its
transactions with petitioner, was the 7th Floor, Bank of the Philippine Islands Building,
Ayala Avenue, Makati City, but the notice of notarial rescission was sent to the wrong
address at the 6th Floor, SGC Building, Salcedo Street, Legaspi Village, Makati, Metro
Manila. Petitioner served the notice to the address of Mahogany Products
Corporation. It was established that the person who received the notice, one Wenna
Laurenciana, was an employee of Mahogany Products Corporation and not an
employee of respondent or Mr. Valeriano Bueno, the alleged president of Mahogany
Products Corporation and respondent company.22 The appellate court stated that this
cannot be construed as to have been contructively received by respondent as the two
corporations are two separate entities with a distinct personality independent from
each other. Thus, the Court of Appeals held that the notarial rescission was in validly
served. It stated that it is a general rule that when service of notice is an issue, the
person alleging that the notice was served must prove the fact of service by a
preponderance of evidence. In this case, the Court of Appeals held that there was no
evidence that the notice of cancellation by notarial act was actually received by
respondent. Thus, for petitioner's failure to cancel the contract in accordance with the
procedure provided by law, the Court of Appeals held that the contracts to sell on
installment were valid and subsisting, and respondent has the right to offer to pay for
the balance of the purchase price before actual cancellation.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit by the Court of
Appeals in a Resolution23 dated September 4, 2007.
Petitioner filed this petition raising the following issues:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED INREVERSING THE RTC
DECISION AND REINSTATING THECOMPLAINT WHEN ON ITS FACE IT HAS LONG
BEENPRESCRIBED, AS IT WAS FILED AFTER 27 YEARS AND HAS NOJURISDICTION (SIC).
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED ANDGRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN COMPELLINGPETITIONER TO EXECUTE A FINAL DEED OF ABSOLUTE
SALE EVEN IF RESPONDENT JUDICIALLY ADMITTED ITS NON-PAYMENT OF THE
BALANCE OF THE DEEDS OF CONDITIONALSALE DUE SINCE 1974.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED INGRANTING THE RELIEFS
PRAYED BY RESPONDENT IN ITSCOMPLAINT FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE WHEN IT
WASRESPONDENT WHO BREACHED THE CONTRACT.
IV
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVEINJUSTICE WHEN IT
PENALIZED PETITIONER FOR EXERCISINGITS LEGAL RIGHT AND DID NOT COMMIT AN
ACTIONABLEWRONG WHILE IT HEFTILY REWARDED RESPONDENT, WHOBREACHED
THE CONTRACT, AND ORDERED TO PAY WITHOUTINTEREST PHP 97,998.95, WHICH IS
DUE SINCE 1974 UNDER THECONTRACT, FOR FOUR (4) PARCELS OF LAND (57,393
SQUAREMETERS), NOW WORTH HUNDRED MILLIONS.
V (a) To pay, without additional interest, the unpaid installments due within the total
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED INANNULING THE NOTARIAL
RESCISSION WHEN THE COMPLAINT IS ONLY FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE AND WAS
NOT AN ISSUE RAISED IN THE PLEADINGS OR DURING THETRIAL.24
The main issue is whether respondent is entitled to the relief granted by the Court of
Appeals. Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in directing it to execute
deeds of absolute sale over the subject lots even if respondent admitted non-payment
of the balance of the purchase price.
As found by the Court of Appeals, the two conditional deeds of sale entered into by
the parties are contracts to sell, as they both contained a stipulation that ownership
of the properties shall not pass to the vendee until after full payment of the purchase
price. In a conditional sale, as in a contract to sell, ownership remains with the vendor
and does not pass to the vendee until full payment of the purchase price. 25 The full
payment of the purchase price partakes of a suspensive condition, and non-fulfillment
of the condition prevents the obligation to sell from arising.26To differentiate, a deed
of sale is absolute when there is no stipulation in the contract that title to the property
remains with the seller until full payment of the purchase price.
Ramos v. Heruela27 held that Articles 1191 and 1592 of the Civil Code28 are applicable
to contracts of sale, while R.A. No. 6552 applies to contracts to sell.
The Court of Appeals correctly held that R.A. No. 6552, otherwise known as the Realty
Installment Buyer Act, applies to the subject contracts to sell. R.A. No. 6552 recognizes
in conditional sales of all kinds of real estate (industrial, commercial, residential) the
right of the seller to cancel the contract upon non-payment of an installment by the
buyer, which is simply an event that prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey
title from acquiring binding force.29
It also provides the right of the buyer on installments in case he defaults in the
payment of succeeding installments30 as follows:
Section 3. In all transactions or contracts involving the sale or financing of real estate
on installment payments, including residential condominium apartments but
excluding industrial lots, commercial buildings and sales to tenants under Republic Act
Numbered Thirty-eight hundred forty-four, as amended by Republic Act Numbered
Sixty-three hundred eighty-nine, where the buyer has paid at least two years of
installments, the buyer is entitled to the following rights in case he defaults in the
payment of succeeding installments:
grace period earned by him which is hereby fixed at the rate of one month grace
period for every one year of installment payments made: Provided, That this right shall
be exercised by the buyer only once in every five years of the life of the contract and
its extensions, if any.
(b) If the contract is canceled, the seller shall refund to the buyer the cash surrender
value of the payments on the property equivalent to fifty per cent of the total
payments made, and, after five years of installments, an additional five per cent every
year but not to exceed ninety per cent of the total payments made: Provided, That the
actual cancellation of the contract shall take place after thirty days from receipt by the
buyer of the notice of cancellation or the demand for rescission of the contract by a
notarial act and upon full payment of the cash surrender value to the buyer.
Down payments, deposits or options on the contract shall be included in the
computation of the total number of installment payments made. chanrobles a law
library
Sec. 4. In case where less than two years of installments were paid, the seller shall give
the buyer a grace period of not less than sixty days from the date the installment
became due.
If the buyer fails to pay the installments due at the expiration of the grace period, the
seller may cancel the contract after thirty days from receipt by the buyer of the notice
of cancellation or the demand for rescission of the contract by a notarial act.31
In this case, respondent has paid less than two years of installments; therefore,
Section 4 of R.A. No. 6552 applies.
The Court of Appeals held that even if respondent defaulted in its full payment of the
purchase price of the subject lots, the conditional deeds of sale remain valid and
subsisting, because there was no valid notice of notarial rescission to respondent, as
the notice was sent to the wrong address, that is, to Mahogany Products Corporation,
and it was received by a person employed by Mahogany Products Corporation and not
the respondent. The Court of Appeals stated that the allegation that Mahogany
Products Corporation and respondent have the same President, one Valeriano Bueno,
is irrelevant and has not been actually proven or borne by evidence. The appellate
court held that there was insufficient proof that respondent actually received the
notice of notarial rescission of the conditional deeds of sale; hence, the unilateral
rescission of the conditional deeds of sale cannot be given credence.
However, upon review of the records of this case, the Court finds that respondent had
been served a notice of the notarial rescission of the conditional deeds of sale when it
was furnished with the petitioner's Answer, dated February 16, 1995, to its first
Complaint filed on November 28, 1994with the RTC of Antipolo City, which case was
docketed as Civil Case No.94-3426, but the complaint was later dismissed without
prejudice on January15, 1996.32
CA: there was notice
It appears that after respondent filed its first Complaint for specific performance and
damages with the RTC of Antipolo City on November 28,1994, petitioner filed an
Answer and attached thereto a copy of the written notice dated March 17, 1978 and
copies of the notarial acts of rescission dated March 15, 1978, and that respondent
received a copy of the said Answer with the attached notices of notarial rescission.
However, to reiterate, the first Complaint was dismissed without prejudice.
Five years after the dismissal of the first Complaint, respondent again filed this case
for specific performance and damages, this time, with the RTC of Manila. Petitioner
filed an Answer, and alleged, among others, that the case was barred by prior
judgment, since respondent filed a complaint on November 28, 1994 before the RTC
of Antipolo City, Branch 73, against it (petitioner) involving the same issues and that
the case, docketed as Civil Case No. 94-3426, was dismissed on January 15, 1996 for
lack of interest. Respondent filed a Reply33 dated July 18, 2001, asserting that
petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the first case filed on November 28, 1994 (Civil
Case No. 94-3426) on the ground of improper venue as the parties agreed in the deeds
of conditional sale that in case of litigation, the venue shall be in the courts of Manila.
To prove its assertion, respondent attached to its Reply a copy of petitioner’s Answer
to the first Complaint in Civil Case No. 94-3426, which Answer included the written
notice dated March 17, 1978 and two notarial acts of rescission, both dated March 15,
1978, of the two conditional deeds of sale. Hence, respondent is deemed to have had
notice of the notarial rescission of the two conditional deeds of sale when it received
petitioner’s Answer to its first complaint filed with the RTC of Antipolo, since
petitioner’s Answer included notices of notarial rescission of the two conditional
deeds of sale. The first complaint was filed six years earlier before this complaint was
filed. As stated earlier, the first complaint was dismissed without prejudice, because
respondent’s counsel failed to appear at the pre-trial. Since respondent already
received notices of the notarial rescission of the conditional deeds of sale, together
with petitioner’s Answer to the first Complaint five years before it filed this case, it can
no longer deny having received notices of the notarial rescission in this case, as
respondent admitted the same when it attached the notices of notarial rescission to
its Reply in this case. Consequently, respondent is not entitled to the relief granted by
the Court of Appeals.
Under R.A. No. 6552, the right of the buyer to refund accrues only when he has paid
at least two years of installments.34 In this case, respondent has paid less than two
years of installments; hence, it is not entitled to a refund.35
Moreover, petitioner raises the issue of improper venue and lack of jurisdiction of the
RTC of Manila over the case. It contends that the complaint involved real properties in
Antipolo City and cancellation of titles; hence, it was improperly filed in the RTC of
Manila.
Petitioner's contention lacks merit, as petitioner and respondent stipulated in both
Conditional Deeds of Sale that they mutually agreed that in case of litigation, the case
shall be filed in the courts of Manila.36
Further, petitioner contends that the action has prescribed. Petitioner points out that
the cause of action is based on a written contract; hence, the complaint should have
been brought within 10 years from the time the right of action accrues under Article
1144 of the Civil Code. Petitioner argues that it is evident on the face of the complaint
and the two contracts of conditional sale that the cause of action accrued in 1974; yet,
the complaint for specific performance was filed after 27 years. Petitioner asserts that
the action has prescribed.
The contention is meritorious.
Section 1, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Section 1. Defense and objections not pleaded. - Defenses and objections not pleaded
whether in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when
it appears from the pleadings that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter, that there is another action pending between the same parties for the same
cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the
court shall dismiss the claim.37
In Gicano v. Gegato,38 the Court held:
x x x (T)rial courts have authority and discretion to dismiss an action on the ground of
prescription when the parties' pleadings or other facts on record show it to be indeed
time-barred; (Francisco v. Robles, Feb, 15,1954; Sison v. Mc Quaid, 50 O.G. 97;
Bambao v. Lednicky, Jan. 28, 1961;Cordova v. Cordova, Jan. 14, 1958; Convets, Inc. v.
NDC, Feb. 28, 1958;32 SCRA 529; Sinaon v. Sorongan, 136 SCRA 408); and it may do
so on the basis of a motion to dismiss (Sec. 1,f, Rule 16, Rules of Court), or an answer
which sets up such ground as an affirmative defense (Sec. 5, Rule16), or even if the
ground is alleged after judgment on the merits, as in a motion for reconsideration
(Ferrer v. Ericta, 84 SCRA 705); or even if the defense has not been asserted at all, as
where no statement thereof is found in the pleadings (Garcia v. Mathis, 100 SCRA
250;PNB v. Pacific Commission House, 27 SCRA 766; Chua Lamco v.Dioso, et al., 97
Phil. 821);
accrues. Non-fulfillment of the obligation to pay on the last due date, that is, on
November 15, 1974, would give rise to an action by the vendor, which date of
reckoning may also apply to any action by the vendee to determine his right under
R.A. No. 6552. The vendee, respondent herein, filed this case on March 16, 2001,
which is clearly beyond the 10-year prescriptive period; hence, the action has
prescribed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated
December 11, 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 85877 and its Resolution dated September 4,
2007 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch I, dated August 1, 2005 in Civil Case No. 01-100411, dismissing the case for lack
of merit, is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

or where a defendant has been declared in default (PNB v. Perez, 16 SCRA 270). What
is essential only, to repeat, is that the facts demonstrating the lapse of the prescriptive
period, be otherwise sufficiently and satisfactorily apparent on the record; either in
the averments of the plaintiff's complaint, or otherwise established by the evidence.39

Moreover, Dino v. Court of Appeals40 held:

Even if the defense of prescription was raised for the first time on appeal in
respondent's Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration of the appellate court's
decision, this does not militate against the due process right of the petitioners. On
appeal, there was no new issue of fact that arose in connection with the question of
prescription, thus it cannot be said that petitioners were not given the opportunity to
present evidence in the trial court to meet a factual issue. Equally important,
petitioners had the opportunity to oppose the defense of prescription in their
Opposition to the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration filed in the appellate
court and in their Petition for Review in this Court. 41

In this case, petitioner raised the defense of prescription for the first time before this
Court, and respondent had the opportunity to oppose the defense of prescription in
its Comment to the petition. Hence, the Court can resolve the issue of prescription as
both parties were afforded the opportunity to ventilate their respective positions on
the matter. The Complaint shows that the Conditional Deeds of Sale were executed
on November 29, 1973, and payments were due on both Conditional Deeds of Sale on
November 15, 1974. Article 114442 of the Civil Code provides that actions based upon
a written contract must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action
Liu vs. Loy (G.R. No. 145982, September 13, 2004)
[G.R. No. 145982. September 13, 2004]
FRANK N. LIU, deceased, substituted by his surviving spouse Diana Liu, and children,
namely: Walter, Milton, Frank, Jr., Henry and Jockson, all surnamed Liu,
Rebecca Liu Shui and Pearl Liu Rodriguez, petitioners, vs. ALFREDO LOY, JR.,
TERESITA A. LOY and ESTATE OF JOSE VAO, respondents.
RESOLUTION
CARPIO, J.:
The Loys seek a reconsideration of the Decision dated 3 July 2003 of this Court
declaring void the deeds of sale of Lot Nos. 5 and 6 executed by Teodoro Vao in favor
of Alfredo Loy, Jr. and Teresita Loy. We held that Lot Nos. 5 and 6 belong to Frank
Liu[1] since the probate court approved his deeds of sale in accordance with Section
8,[2] Rule 89 of the Rules of Court. The deeds of sale of the Loys lacked a valid probate
court approval. As a result, we ordered the Estate of Jose Vao to reimburse the Loys
the amounts they paid for Lot Nos. 5 and 6, with interest at 6% annually from 4 June
1976, the date of filing of the complaint, until finality of the decision, and 12% annually
thereafter until full payment.
The Court heard the parties on oral arguments on 10 March 2004 and granted
them time to submit their memoranda. Frank Liu filed his memorandum on 29 March
2004 while the Loys filed their memorandum on 25 March 2004 by registered mail.
The issues that the Loys raise in their motion for reconsideration are not new.
The Court already considered and discussed extensively these issues in the assailed
Decision. We find no compelling reason to reconsider the assailed Decision.
The Loys insist that the transaction between Teodoro Vao and Benito Liu, the
predecessor-in-interest of Frank Liu, is a contract to sell. In contrast, the transactions
between Teodoro Vao and Alfredo Loy, Jr. and Teresita A. Loy were contracts of sale.
According to the Loys, the contract to sell did not transfer ownership of Lot Nos. 5 and
6 to Benito Liu or Frank Liu because it was only a promise to sell subject to the full
payment of the consideration. On the other hand, the contracts of sale in favor of the
Loys transferred ownership, as the conveyances were absolute.[3]
As we held in our Decision, a prior contract to sell made by the decedent during
his lifetime prevails over a subsequent contract of sale made by the administrator
without probate court approval. It is immaterial if the prior contract is a mere contract
to sell and does not immediately convey ownership. Frank Lius contract to sell became
valid and effective upon its execution and bound the estate to convey the property
upon full payment of the consideration.
It is apparent from Teodoro Vaos letter[4] dated 16 October 1954 that the reason
why Frank Liu stopped further payments on the lots, leaving a balance of P1,000, was
because Teodoro Vao could not yet transfer the titles to Benito Liu, the predecessor-
in-interest of Frank Liu. It would appear that Frank Liu and Teodoro Vao lost contact
with each other thereafter and it was only on 25 January 1964 that Frank Liu wrote
Teodoro Vao informing the latter that he was ready to pay the balance of the purchase
price of the lots. Teodoro Vao did not reply to Frank Lius letter. On 22 April 1966,
Benito Liu sold to Frank Liu the lots, including Lot Nos. 5 and 6, which Benito Liu
purchased from Teodoro Vao on 13 January 1950. Frank Liu sent three letters dated
21 March 1968, 7 June 1968 and 29 July 1968 to Teodoro Vao reiterating his request
for the execution of the deed of sale covering the lots in his favor but to no avail. On
19 August 1968, Teodoro Vao sold Lot No. 6 to Teresita Loy and on 16 December 1969,
he sold Lot No. 5 to Alfredo Loy, Jr. The sales to the Loys were made after Frank Liu
offered to pay the balance of the purchase price of the lots and after he repeatedly
requested for the execution of the deeds of sale in his favor.
The sale of the lots by Teodoro Vao to Benito Liu was valid. The sale was made
by Teodoro Vao on 13 January 1950 in his capacity as attorney-in-fact of Jose Vao. The
sale to Benito Liu was made during the lifetime of Jose Vao, not after the death of Jose
Vao who died on 28 January 1950.[5]The power of attorney executed by Jose Vao in
favor of Teodoro Vao remained valid during the lifetime of Jose Vao. In his letter dated
16 October 1954, Teodoro Vao stated that on 30 June 1954, the Supreme Court
allowed the probate of the will of Jose Vao. Teodoro Vao likewise mentioned in the
letter that in July 1954, the Supreme Court held that all the sales made by Teodoro
Vao of the properties of his father were legal.[6] Thus, Benito Lius deed of sale in favor
of Frank Liu covering the lots sold to him by Teodoro Vao constitutes a valid charge or
claim against the estate of Jose Vao.
The Loys reiterate their contention that Teodoro Vao, as administrator and sole
heir to the properties, can sell the lots to them since the rights of an heir are
transmitted from the moment of death of the testator. Although a property under
estate proceedings cannot be sold without judicial approval, the Loys allege that in
their case, the probate court later approved the sales to them, thereby ratifying the
sales.[7]
Well-settled is the rule that an administrator needs court approval to sell estate
property, otherwise the sale is void.[8] Court approval of the sale of estate property is
clearly required under Rule 89 of the Rules of Court, which enumerates the instances
when the court may allow the sale or encumbrance of estate property. Section 7 of
Rule 89 of the Rules of Court even provides for the regulations for granting authority
to sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber estate property.[9]
More importantly, Section 91[10] of Act No. 496 (Land Registration Act) and
Section 88[11] of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree)
specifically require court approval for any sale of registered land by an executor or
administrator.
The laws, Rules of Court, jurisprudence and regulations explicitly require court
approval before any sale of estate property by an executor or administrator can take
effect. The purpose of requiring court approval is to protect creditors. In this case,
Frank Liu is a creditor, and he is the person the law seeks to protect.
The orders of the probate court dated 19 and 23 March 1976 approving the
contracts of the Loys are void. The orders did not ratify the sales because there was
already a prior order of the probate court dated 24 February 1976 approving the sale
of Lot Nos. 5 and 6 to Frank Liu. Hence, the probate court had already lost jurisdiction
over Lot Nos. 5 and 6 since the lots no longer formed part of the Estate of Jose Vao. In
fact, the administratrix of the estate filed a motion for reconsideration of the orders
of the probate court approving the contracts of the Loys because she already executed
a deed of sale covering Lot Nos. 5 and 6 in favor of Frank Liu.
The Loys impliedly admitted that their contracts of sale dated 19 August 1968
and 16 December 1969 were ineffective when they belatedly asked in 1976 for court
approval of the sales. If the Loys believed that their deeds of sale in 1968 and 1969
were valid, they would not have asked for court approval in 1976. By asking for court
approval, they necessarily admitted that without court approval, the sale to them was
ineffectual.
The Loys are not buyers and registrants in good faith considering that they
bought from a seller who was not a registered owner. Teodoro Vao signed both
contracts of sale but the titles to the lots sold were in the name of Estate of Jose Vao.
And since the titles to Lot Nos. 5 and 6 were in name of Estate of Jose Vao, the Loys
were on notice that court approval was needed for the sale of estate property. The ex-
parte motion for the court approval of the sales filed by the Loys some seven or eight
years after the sales transaction reveals a less than honest actuation, prompting the
administratrix to object to the courts approval.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the motion for reconsideration.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), see dissenting opinion.
SEC. 8. When court may authorize conveyance of realty which deceased contracted to
convey. Notice. Effect of deed. Where the deceased was in his lifetime under contract,
binding in law, to deed real property, or an interest therein, the court having
jurisdiction of the estate may, on application for that purpose, authorize the executor
or administrator to convey such property according to such contract, or with such
modifications as are agreed upon by the parties and approved by the court; and if the
contract is to convey real property to the executor or administrator, the clerk of court
shall execute the deed. The deed executed by such executor, administrator or clerk of
court shall be as effectual to convey the property as if executed by the deceased in his
lifetime; but no such conveyance shall be authorized until notice of the application for
that purpose has been given personally or by mail to all persons interested, and such
further notice has been given, by publication or otherwise, as the court deems proper;
nor if the assets in the hands of the executor or administrator will thereby be reduced
so as to prevent a creditor from receiving his full debt or diminish his dividend.
[3]
Rollo, pp. 373-374.
[4]
The letter reads (emphasis supplied):
Teodoro Vao
Juana Osmea Ext.
P.O. Box 61
Cebu City, Philippines
Oct. 16, 1954
Mr. Frank Liu
Southern Motors,
Davao Branch, Davao City
Dear Mr. Liu:
Some time last May, if I remember correctly, you offered to settle the whole balance of
your account if I can have the Titles transferred immediately in your brothers name, and
to that of Mr. Pangalos. I cannot blame you if you were disappointed then, to know that
I could not have the titles transferred, even should you have paid in full.
At that time however, without your knowledge, you were innocently being made the
tool of an intrigue, intended to put me in hot water, by inducing me to put in writing
what we have agreed verbally. I hope I have explained the matter to your satisfaction.
However, last June 30, of this year, the Supreme Court, unanimously concurred in the
reversal of the decision of the Court of First Instance, as regard the legality of the Will
of my father. Now that the Will of my Father has been declared legal, my opponents
have lost their personality in the case, and with it their power to harass me in
court. Also, sometime in the middle of July, also this year, the Supreme Court again
declared that all the sales I have made of the properties of my father were legal, and
that I should be empowered to have the titles transferred in the buyers names, should
they have paid in full. A few have already received their titles. And yours can be had
too in two days time from the time you have paid in full.
With the best of wishes for your continued good health and
prosperity and that of your familys, and hoping to hear from you soon, I
remain,
Yours very truly,
Teodoro Vao
(signed)
[5]
In the case of Vao v. Vda. de Garces, et al., 95 Phil. 333 (1954), involving the last will
and testament of Jose Vao, it was mentioned that Jose Vao died on 28
January 1950. The Supreme Court allowed probate of the last will and
testament of Jose Vao who bequeathed all his properties to his son, Teodoro
Ceblero Vao.
[6]
See Exhibit C, Records, p. 64.
[7]
Rollo, pp. 388-389.
[8]
Dillena v. Court of Appeals, No. L-77660, 28 July 1988, 163 SCRA 630; Manotok
Realty, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, No. L-35367, 9 April 1987, 149 SCRA 174;
Estate of Amadeo Matute Olave, et al. v. Hon. Reyes, et al., 208 Phil. 678
(1983); Godoy v. Orellano, 42 Phil. 347 (1921).
[9]
Section 7, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court reads:
SEC. 7. Regulations for granting authority to sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber
estate. The court having jurisdiction of the estate of the deceased may authorize the
executor or administrator to sell personal estate, or to sell, mortgage, or otherwise
encumber real estate, in cases provided by these rules and when it appears necessary
or beneficial, under the following regulations:
(a) The executor or administrator shall file a written petition setting forth the debts
due from the deceased, the expenses of administration, the legacies, the value of the
personal estate, the situation of the estate to be sold, mortgaged, or otherwise
encumbered, and such other facts as show that the sale, mortgage, or other
encumbrance is necessary or beneficial;
(b) The court shall thereupon fix a time and place for hearing such petition, and cause
notice stating the nature of the petition, the reason for the same, and the time and
place of hearing, to be given personally or by mail to the persons interested, and may
cause such further notice to be given, by publication or otherwise, as it shall deem
proper;
(c) If the court requires it, the executor or administrator shall give an additional bond,
in such sum as the court directs, conditioned that such executor or administrator will
account for the proceeds of the sale, mortgage, or other encumbrance;
(d) If the requirements in the preceding subdivisions of this section have been
complied with, the court, by order stating such compliance, may authorize the
executor or administrator to sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber, in proper cases,
such part of the estate as is deemed necessary, and in case of sale the court may
authorize it to be public or private, as would be most beneficial to all parties
concerned. The executor or administrator shall be furnished with a certified copy of
such order;
(e) If the estate is to be sold at auction, the mode of giving notice of the time and
place of the sale shall be governed by the provisions concerning notice of execution
sale;
(f) There shall be recorded in the registry of deeds of the province in which the real
estate thus sold, mortgaged, or otherwise encumbered is situated, a certified copy
of the order of the court, together with the deed of the executor or administrator for
such real estate, which shall be as valid as if the deed had been executed by the
deceased in his lifetime.
[10]
Section 91 of Act No. 496 reads:
SEC. 91. Except in case of a will devising the land to an executor to his own use or upon
some trust or giving to the executor power to sell, no sale or transfer of registered land
shall be made by an executor or by an administrator in the course of administration for
the payment of debts or for any other purpose, except in pursuance of an order of a court
of competent jurisdiction obtained as provided by law. (Emphasis supplied)
[11]
Section 88 of P.D. No. 1529 reads:
SEC. 88. Dealings by administrator subject to court approval. After a
memorandum of the will, if any, and order allowing the same, and letters
testamentary or letters of administration have been entered upon the
certificate of title as hereinabove provided, the executor or administrator may
alienate or encumber registered land belonging to the estate, or any interest
therein, upon approval of the court obtained as provided by the Rules of Court.
(Emphasis supplied)
 Right to claim child’s legitimacy: non transferrable
Right to be acknowledged as natural child: transferrable
Conde vs. Abaya (13 Phil 240)
G.R. No. L-4275 March 23, 1909
PAULA CONDE, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROMAN ABAYA, defendant-appellant.
C. Oben for appellant.
L. Joaquin for appellee.
ARELLANO, C.J.:
From the hearing of the appeal interposed by Roman Abaya in the special proceedings
brought in the Court of First Instance of La Laguna for the settlement of the intestate
estate and the distribution of the property of Casiano Abaya it appears:
I. As antecedents: that Casiano Abaya, unmarried, the son of Romualdo Abaya and
Sabrina Labadia, died on the 6th of April, 1899; that Paula Conde, as the mother of the
natural children Jose and Teopista Conde, whom the states she had by Casiano Abaya,
on the 6th of November, 1905, moved the settlement of the said intestate succession;
that an administrator having been appointed for the said estate on the 25th of
November, 1905, Roman Abaya, a son of the said Romualdo Abaya and Sabrina
Labadia, the parents of the late Casiano Abaya, came forward and opposed said
appointment and claimed it for himself as being the nearest relative of the deceased;
that this was granted by the court below on the 9th of January, 1906; that on the 17th
of November, 1906, Roman Abaya moved that, after due process of law, the court
declare him to be the sole heir of Casiano Abaya, to the exclusion of all other persons,
especially of Paula Conde, and to be therefore entitled to take possession of all the
property of said estate, and that it be adjudicated to him; and that on November 22,
1906, the court ordered the publication of notices for the declaration of heirs and
distribution of the property of the estate.
II. That on the 28th of November, 1906, Paula Conde, in replying to the foregoing
motion of Roman Abaya, filed a petition wherein she stated that she acknowledged
the relationship alleged by Roman Abaya, but that she considered that her right was
superior to his and moved for a hearing of the matter, and, in consequence of the
evidence that she intended to present she prayed that she be declared to have
preferential rights to the property left by Casiano Abaya, and that the same be
adjudicated to her together with the corresponding products thereof.
III. That the trial was held, both parties presenting documentary and oral evidence,
and the court below entered the following judgment:
That the administrator of the estate of Casiano Abaya should recognize Teopista and
Jose Conde as being natural children of Casiano Abaya; that the petitioner Paula Conde
should succeed to the hereditary rights of her children with respect to the inheritance
of their deceased natural father Casiano Abaya; and therefore, it is hereby declared
that she is the only heir to the property of the said intestate estate, to the exclusion
of the administrator, Roman Abaya.
IV. That Roman Abaya excepted to the foregoing judgment, appealed to this court,
and presented the following statement of errors:
1. The fact that the court below found that an ordinary action for the acknowledgment
of natural children under articles 135 and 137 of the Civil Code, might be brought in
special probate proceedings.
2. The finding that after the death of a person claimed to be an unacknowledged
natural child, the mother of such presumed natural child, as heir to the latter, may
bring an action to enforce the acknowledgment of her deceased child in accordance
with articles 135 and 137 of the Civil Code.
3. The finding in the judgment that the alleged continuos possession of the deceased
children of Paula Conde of the status of natural children of the late Casiano Abaya, has
been fully proven in these proceedings; and
4. On the hypothesis that it was proper to adjudicate the property of this intestate
estate to Paula Conde, as improperly found by the court below, the court erred in not
having declared that said property should be reserved in favor of relatives of Casiano
Abaya to the third degree, and in not having previously demanded securities from
Paula Conde to guarantee the transmission of the property to those who might fall
within the reservation.
As to the first error assigned, the question is set up as to whether in special
proceedings for the administration and distribution of an intestate estate, an action
might be brought to enforce the acknowledgment of the natural child of the person
from whom the inheritance is derived, that is to say, whether one might appear as heir
on the ground that he is a recognized natural child of the deceased, not having been
so recognized by the deceased either voluntarily or compulsorily by reason of a
preexisting judicial decision, but asking at the same time that, in the special
proceeding itself, he be recognized by the presumed legitimate heirs of the deceased
who claim to be entitled to the succession opened in the special proceeding.
According to section 782 of the Code of Civil Procedure —
If there shall be a controversy before the Court of First Instance as to who the lawful
heirs of the deceased person are, or as to the distributive share to which each person
is entitled under the law, the testimony as to such controversy shall be taken in writing
by the judge, under oath, and signed by the witness. Any party in interest whose
distributive share is affected by the determination of such controversy, may appeal
from the judgment of the Court of First Instance determining such controversy to the
Supreme Court, within the time and in the manner provided in the last preceding
section.
This court has decided the present question in the manner shown in the case of Juana
Pimentel vs. Engracio Palanca (5 Phil. Rep., 436.)
The main question with regard to the second error assigned, is whether or not the
mother of a natural child now deceased, but who survived the person who, it is
claimed, was his natural father, also deceased, may bring an action for the
acknowledgment of the natural filiation in favor of such child in order to appear in his
behalf to receive the inheritance from the person who is supposed to be his natural
father.
In order to decide in the affirmative the court below has assigned the following as the
only foundation:
In resolving a similar question Manresa says: "An acknowledgment can only be
demanded by the natural child and his descendants whom it shall benefit, and should
they be minors or otherwise incapacitated, such person as legally represents them;
the mother may ask it in behalf of her child so long as he is under her authority." On
this point no positive declaration has been made, undoubtedly because it was not
considered necessary. A private action is in question and the general rule must be
followed. Elsewhere the same author adds: "It may so happen that the child dies
before four years have expired after attaining majority, or that the document
supporting his petition for acknowledgment is discovered after his death, such death
perhaps occurring after his parents had died, as is supposed by article 137, or during
their lifetime. In any case such right of action shall pertain to the descendants of the
child whom the acknowledgment may interest." (See Commentaries to arts. 135 and
137, Civil Code, Vol. I.)
The above doctrine, advanced by one of the most eminent commentators of the Civil
Code, lacks legal and doctrinal foundation. The power to transmit the right of such
action by the natural child to his descendants can not be sustained under the law, and
still less to his mother.
It is without any support in law because the rule laid down in the code is most positive,
limiting in form, when establishing the exception for the exercise of such right of action
after the death of the presumed parents, as is shown hereafter. It is not supported by
any doctrine, because up to the present time no argument has been presented, upon
which even an approximate conclusion could be based.
Although the Civil Code considerably improved the condition of recognized natural
children, granting them rights and actions that they did not possess under the former
laws, they were not, however, placed upon the same place as legitimate ones. The
difference that separates these two classes of children is still great, as proven by so
many articles dealing with the rights of the family and the succession in relation to the
members thereof. It may be laid down as legal maxim, that whatever the code does
not grant to the legitimate children, or in connection with their rights, must still less
be understood as granted to recognized natural children or in connection with their
rights. There is not a single exception in its provisions.
If legitimacy is the attribute that constitutes the basis of the absolute family rights of
the child, the acknowledgment of the natural child is, among illegitimate ones, that
which unites him to the family of the father or the mother who recognized him, and
affords him a participation in the rights of the family, relatively advantageous
according to whether they are alone or whether they concur with other individuals of
the family of his purely natural father or mother.
Thus, in order to consider the spirit of the Civil Code, nothing is more logical than to
establish a comparison between an action to claim the legitimacy, and one to enforce
acknowledgment.
ART. 118. The action to claim its legitimacy may be brought by the child at any time of
its lifetime and shall be transmitted to its heirs, should it die during minority or in a
state of insanity. In such cases the heirs shall be allowed a period of five years in which
to institute the action.
The action already instituted by the child is transmitted by its death to the heirs, if it
has not lapsed before then.
presumed parents, except in the following cases:
1. If the father or mother died during the maturity of the child, in which case the
latter may institute the action before the expiration of the first four years of its
maturity.
2. If, after ART. 137. The actions for the acknowledgment of natural children can be
instituted only during the life of the the death of the father or mother, some
 instrument, before unknown, should be discovered in which the child is expressly
acknowledged.
In this case the action must be instituted with the six months following the discovery
of such instrument.
On this supposition the first difference that results between one action and the other
consists in that the right of action for legitimacy lasts during the whole lifetime of the
child, that is, it can always be brought against the presumed parents or their heirs by
the child itself, while the right of action for the acknowledgment of a natural child does
not last his whole lifetime, and, as a general rule, it can not be instituted against the
heirs of the presumed parents, inasmuch as it can be exercised only during the life of
the presumed parents.
With regard to the question at issue, that is, the transmission to the heirs of the
presumed parents of the obligation to admit the legitimate filiation, or to recognize
the natural filiation, there exists the most radical difference in that the former
continues during the life of the child who claims to be legitimate, and he may demand
it either directly and primarily from the said presumed parents, or indirectly and
secondarily from the heirs of the latter; while the second does not endure for life; as
a general rule, it only lasts during the life of the presumed parents. Hence the other
difference, derived as a consequence, that an action for legitimacy is always brought
Action foragainst the heirs of the presumed parents in case of the death of the latter, while the
legitimacy
action for acknowledgment is not brought against the heirs of such parents, with the
exception of the two cases prescribed by article 137 transcribed above.
So much for the passive transmission of the obligation to admit the legitimate filiation,
or to acknowledge the natural filiation.
As to the transmission to the heirs of the child of the latter's action to claim his
legitimacy, or to obtain the acknowledgment of his natural filiation, it is seen that the
code grants it in the first case, but not in the second. It contains provisions for the
transmission of the right of action which, for the purpose claiming his legitimacy
inheres in the child, but it does not say a word with regard to the transmission of the
right to obtain the acknowledgment of the natural filiation.
Therefore, the respective corollary of each of the two above-cited articles is: (1) That
the right of action which devolves upon the child to claim his legitimacy under article
118, may be transmitted to his heirs in certain cases designated in the said article; (2)
That the right of action for the acknowledgment of natural children to which article
137 refers, can never be transmitted, for the reason that the code makes no mention
of it in any case, not even as an exception.
It is most illogical and contrary to every rule of correct interpretation, that the right of
action to secure acknowledgment by the natural child should be presumed to be
transmitted, independently, as a rule, to his heirs, while the right of action to claim
legitimacy from his predecessor is not expressly, independently, or, as a general rule,
conceded to the heirs of the legitimate child, but only relatively and as an exception.
Consequently, the pretension that the right of action on the part of the child to obtain
the acknowledgment of his natural filiation is transmitted to his descendants is
altogether unfounded. No legal provision exists to sustain such pretension, nor can an
argument of presumption be based on the lesser claim when there is no basis for the
greater one, and when it is only given as an exception in well-defined cases. It is placing
the heirs of the natural child on a better footing than the heirs of the legitimate one,
when, as a matter of fact, the position of a natural child is no better than, no even
equal to, that of a legitimate child.
From the express and precise precepts of the code the following conclusions are
derived:
The right of action that devolves upon the child to claim his legitimacy lasts during his
whole life, while the right to claim the acknowledgment of a natural child lasts only
during the life of his presumed parents.
Inasmuch as the right of action accruing to the child to claim his legitimacy lasts during
his whole life, he may exercise it either against the presumed parents, or their heirs;
while the right of action to secure the acknowledgment of a natural child, since it does
not last during his whole life, but depends on that of the presumed parents, as a
general rule can only be exercised against the latter.
Usually the right of action for legitimacy devolving upon the child is of a personal
character and pertains exclusively to him, only the child may exercise it at any time
during his lifetime. As an exception, and in three cases only, it may be transmitted to
the heirs of the child, to wit, if he died during his minority, or while insane, or after
action had been already instituted.
An action for the acknowledgment of a natural child may, as an exception, be exercised
against the heirs of the presumed parents in two cases: first, in the event of the death
of the latter during the minority of the child, and second, upon the discovery of some
instrument of express acknowledgment of the child, executed by the father or mother,
the existence of which was unknown during the life of the latter.
But such action for the acknowledgment of a natural child can only be exercised
by him. It can not be transmitted to his descendants, or his ascendants.
In support of the foregoing the following authorities may be cited:
Sanchez Roman, in his Treatise of Civil Law, propounds the question as to whether said
action should be considered transmissive to the heirs or descendants of the natural
child, whether he had or had not exercised it up to the time of his death, and decides
it as follows:
There is an entire absence of legal provisions, and at most, it might be deemed
admissible as a solution, that the right of action to claim the acknowledgment of a
natural child is transmitted by the analogy to his heirs on the same conditions and
terms that it is transmitted to the descendants of a legitimate child, to claim his
legitimacy, under article 118, but nothing more; because on this point nothing
warrants placing the heirs of a natural child on a better footing than those of the
legitimate child, and even to compare them would not fail to be a strained and
questionable matter, and one of great difficulty for decision by the courts, for the
simple reason that for the heirs of the legitimate child, the said article 118 exists, while
for those of the natural child, as we have said, there is no provision in the code
authorizing the same, although on the other hand there is none that prohibits it. (Vol.
V.)
Diaz Guijarro and Martinez Ruiz in their work on "The Civil Code as construed by the
supreme court of Spain," commenting upon article 137, say:
Article 118, taking into account the privileges due to the legitimacy of children, grants
them the right to claim said legitimacy during their lifetime, and even authorizes the
transmission of said right for the space of five years to the heirs thereof, if the child
die during his minority or in a state of insanity. But as article 137 is based on the
consideration that in the case of a natural child, ties are less strong and sacred in the
eyes of the law, it does not fix such a long and indefinite period for the exercise of the
action; it limits it to the life of the parents, excepting in the two cases mentioned in
said article; and it does not allow, as does article 118, the action to pass on to the heirs,
inasmuch as, although it does not prohibit it, and for that reason it might be deemed
on general principles of law to consent to it, such a supposition is inadmissible for the
reason that a comparison of both articles shows that the silence of the law in the latter
case is not, nor it can be, an omission, but a deliberate intent to establish a wide
difference between the advantages granted to a legitimate child and to a natural one.
(Ibid., Vol. II, 171.)
Navarro Amandi (Cuestionario del Código Civil) raises the question: "Can the heirs of a
natural child claim the acknowledgment in those cases wherein the father or mother
are under obligation to acknowledge"? And says:
Opinions are widely divergent. The court of Rennes held (on April 13, 1844) that the
right of investigation forms a part of the estate of the child, and along with his
patrimony is transmitted to his heirs. The affirmation is altogether too categorical to
be admissible. If it were correct the same thing would happen as when the legitimacy
of a child is claimed, and as already seen, the right of action to demand the legitimacy
is not transmitted to the heirs in every case and as an absolute right, but under certain
limitations and circumstances. Now, were we to admit the doctrine of the court of
Rennes, the result would be that the claim for natural filiation would be more favored
than one for legitimate filiation. This would be absurd, because it can not be conceived
that the legislator should have granted a right of action to the heirs of the natural child,
which is only granted under great limitations and in very few cases to those of a
legitimate one. Some persons insist that the same rules that govern legitimate filiation
apply by analogy to natural child are entitled to claim it in the cases prescribed by the
article 118. The majority, however, are inclined to consider the right to claim
acknowledgment as a personal right, and consequently, not transmissive to the heirs.
Really there are no legal grounds to warrant the transmission. (Vol. 2, 229.)
In a decision like the present one it is impossible to bring forward the argument of
analogy for the purpose of considering that the heirs of the natural child are entitled
to the right of action which article 118 concedes to the heirs of the legitimate child.
The existence of a provision for the one case and the absence thereof for the other is
a conclusive argument that inclusio unius est exclusio alterius, and it can not be
understood that the provision of law should be the same when the same reason does
not hold in the one case as in the other.
The theory of law of transmission is also entirely inapplicable in this case. This theory,
which in the Roman Law expressed the general rule than an heir who did not accept
an inheritance during his lifetime was incapacitated from transmitting it to his own
heirs, included at the same time the idea that if the inheritance was not transmitted
because the heir did not possess it, there were, however, certain things which the heir
held and could transmit. Such was the law and the right to accept the inheritance, for
the existing reason that all rights, both real and personal, shall pass to the heir; quia
haeres representat defunctum in omnibus et per omnia. According to the article 659
of the Civil Code, "the inheritance includes all the property, rights, and obligations of
a person, which are not extinguished by his death." If the mother is the heir of her
natural child, and the latter, among other rights during his lifetime was entitled to
exercise an action of his acknowledgment against his father, during the life of the
latter, if after his death in some of the excepting cases of article 137, such right, which
is a portion of his inheritance, is transmitted to his mother as being his heir, and it was
so understood by the court of Rennes when it considered the right in question, not as
a personal and exclusive right of the child which is extinguished by his death, but a any
other right which might be transmitted after his death. This right of supposed
transmission is even less tenable than that sought to be sustained by the argument of
analogy.
The right of action pertaining to the child to claim his legitimacy is in all respects
superior to that of the child who claims acknowledgment as a natural child. And it is
evident that the right of action to claim his legitimacy is not one of those rights which
the legitimate child may transmit by inheritance to his heirs; it forms no part of the
component rights of his inheritance. If it were so, there would have been no necessity
to establish its transmissibility to heirs as an exception in the terms and conditions of
article 118 of the code. So that, in order that it may constitute a portion of the child's
inheritance, it is necessary that the conditions and the terms contained in article 118
shall be present, since without them, the right that the child held during his lifetime,
being personal and exclusive in principle, and therefore, as a general rule not
susceptible of transmission, would and should have been extinguished by his death.
Therefore, where no express provision like that of article 118 exists, the right of action
for the acknowledgment of a natural child is, in principle and without exception,
extinguished by his death, and can not be transmitted as a portion of the inheritance
of the deceased child.

On the other hand, if said right of action formed a part of the child's inheritance, it
would be necessary to establish the doctrine that the right to claim such an
acknowledgment from the presumed natural father and from his heirs is an absolute
right of the heirs of the child, not limited by certain circumstances as in the case of the
heirs of a natural child with a legitimate one to place the heirs of a natural child and
his inheritance on a better footing than those of a legitimate child would not only be
unreasonable, but, as stated in one of the above citations, most absurd and illegal in
the present state of the law and in accordance with the general principles thereof.

For all of the foregoing reasons we hereby reverse the judgment appealed from in all
its parts, without any special ruling as to the costs of this instance.

Mapa, Johnson, Carson, and Willard, JJ., concur.

Junio vs. Collector 34 Phil 433 Resident merchant at the time of his death, a resident Chinese merchant doing business in the Philippine
Islands, and that he died leaving property including a mercantile business. The
assumption of the appellant is that the mere fact of the death of a merchant makes
G.R. No. L-12379 March 14, 1917
his wife and children also merchants, as it leaves to them as heirs and next of kin a
mercantile business as a part of their inheritance. We do not believe that this
LAO HU NIU, petitioner-appellant, necessarily follows. But if it does, the fact remains that she is not a resident merchant.
vs. She is still outside of the Philippine Islands and has never held the status of
THE INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, respondent-appellee. a resident merchant. She must, therefore, establish her right to enter as a merchant
in the first instance. This she did not do. She did not present the section six certificate
Williams, Ferrier and SyCip for appellant. which is the only evidence upon which her right to enter can be based.
Attorney-General Avanceña for appellee.
From these observations it necessarily follows that the applicant is not entitled to
MORELAND, J.: enter the Philippine Islands upon the status of her deceased husband; and that when
she seeks to enter upon her own personal status she must produce the evidence which
This case involves the exclusion from the Philippine Islands of a Chinese woman and the law requires to establish that status. Not having done this her application to enter
her minor children. She claims to be the wife of a former resident Chinese merchant was properly denied.
who, prior to the attempt of the appellant to enter, died in the Philippine Islands
owning property therein and leaving as his only heirs at law and next of kin his widow, The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs. So ordered.
the appellant herein, and her minor children.

The board of special inquiry refused them permission to enter and that refusal was
affirmed by the Court of First Instance of Manila. This appeal is from the action taken
by the Court of First Instance.

Counsel for appellant says in his brief that: "The question involved here is a double
one: First, as to the right of the widow and the legitimate minor children of a deceased
resident Chinese merchant to enter the Philippine Islands as such widow and children;
and, second, the right of such widow, as a merchant and the successor to her husband,
to enter the said Islands and to bring her children with her."

Counsel then says: "It would appear that the first part of the foregoing questions has
been resolved by this honorable tribunal against such right of entrance." This
statement is true. We have held in the case of Ng Hian vs. Collector of Customs (34
Phil. Rep., 248) that the widow and minor children of a deceased Chinese merchant
resident and doing business in the Philippine Islands at the time of his death are not
entitled to enter the Philippine Islands solely by reason of such relationship. Counsel
for the appellant asks us to overrule that decision and admit the applicants in this case,
setting forth with ability arguments to that end. We must say, however, that, after a
careful consideration of such arguments, we are unable to see our way clear to
overrule the former decision and accordingly decline to do so.

With regard to the second question, it may be said that it does not appear in the record
of this case that the applicant is a merchant. It appears simply that her husband was,
Great Pacific Life Assurance Corp. vs. CA (G.R. No. 113899,
October 13, 1999)
GREAT PACIFIC LIFE ASSURANCE CORP., petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND
MEDARDA V. LEUTERIO, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assails the
Decision[1] dated May 17, 1993, of the Court of Appeals and its Resolution [2] dated
January 4, 1994 in CA-G.R. CV No. 18341. The appellate court affirmed in toto the
judgment of the Misamis Oriental Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, in an insurance
claim filed by private respondent against Great Pacific Life Assurance Co. The
dispositive portion of the trial courts decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered adjudging the defendant GREAT PACIFIC LIFE
ASSURANCE CORPORATION as insurer under its Group policy No. G-1907, in relation
to Certification B-18558 liable and ordered to pay to the DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES as creditor of the insured Dr. Wilfredo Leuterio, the amount of EIGHTY
SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED PESOS (P86,200.00); dismissing the claims for
damages, attorneys fees and litigation expenses in the complaint and counterclaim,
with costs against the defendant and dismissing the complaint in respect to the
plaintiffs, other than the widow-beneficiary, for lack of cause of action.[3]
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
A contract of group life insurance was executed between petitioner Great Pacific
Life Assurance Corporation (hereinafter Grepalife) and Development Bank of the
Philippines (hereinafter DBP). Grepalife agreed to insure the lives of eligible housing
loan mortgagors of DBP.
On November 11, 1983, Dr. Wilfredo Leuterio, a physician and a housing debtor
of DBP applied for membership in the group life insurance plan. In an application form,
Dr. Leuterio answered questions concerning his health condition as follows:
7. Have you ever had, or consulted, a physician for a heart condition, high blood
pressure, cancer, diabetes, lung, kidney or stomach disorder or any other
physical impairment?
Answer: No. If so give details ___________.
8. Are you now, to the best of your knowledge, in good health?
Answer: [ x ] Yes [ ] No.[4]
On November 15, 1983, Grepalife issued Certificate No. B-18558, as insurance
coverage of Dr. Leuterio, to the extent of his DBP mortgage indebtedness amounting
to eighty-six thousand, two hundred (P86,200.00) pesos.
On August 6, 1984, Dr. Leuterio died due to massive cerebral hemorrhage.
Consequently, DBP submitted a death claim to Grepalife. Grepalife denied the claim
alleging that Dr. Leuterio was not physically healthy when he applied for an insurance
coverage on November 15, 1983. Grepalife insisted that Dr. Leuterio did not disclose
he had been suffering from hypertension, which caused his death. Allegedly, such non-
disclosure constituted concealment that justified the denial of the claim.
On October 20, 1986, the widow of the late Dr. Leuterio, respondent Medarda
V. Leuterio, filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch
18, against Grepalife for Specific Performance with Damages.[5] During the trial, Dr.
Hernando Mejia, who issued the death certificate, was called to testify.Dr. Mejias
findings, based partly from the information given by the respondent widow, stated
that Dr. Leuterio complained of headaches presumably due to high blood
pressure. The inference was not conclusive because Dr. Leuterio was not autopsied,
hence, other causes were not ruled out.
On February 22, 1988, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of respondent
widow and against Grepalife. On May 17, 1993, the Court of Appeals sustained the
trial courts decision. Hence, the present petition. Petitioners interposed the following
assigned errors:
"1. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING DEFENDANT-APPELLANT LIABLE
TO THE DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES (DBP) WHICH IS NOT
A PARTY TO THE CASE FOR PAYMENT OF THE PROCEEDS OF A
MORTGAGE REDEMPTION INSURANCE ON THE LIFE OF PLAINTIFFS
HUSBAND WILFREDO LEUTERIO ONE OF ITS LOAN BORROWERS,
INSTEAD OF DISMISSING THE CASE AGAINST DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
[Petitioner Grepalife] FOR LACK OF CAUSE OF ACTION.
2. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE CASE FOR WANT OF
JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT OR NATURE OF THE ACTION AND
OVER THE PERSON OF THE DEFENDANT.
3. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING DEFENDANT-APPELLANT TO
PAY TO DBP THE AMOUNT OF P86,200.00 IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY
EVIDENCE TO SHOW HOW MUCH WAS THE ACTUAL AMOUNT PAYABLE
TO DBP IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS GROUP INSURANCE CONTRACT
WITH DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
4. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN - HOLDING THAT THERE WAS NO
CONCEALMENT OF MATERIAL INFORMATION ON THE PART OF
WILFREDO LEUTERIO IN HIS APPLICATION FOR MEMBERSHIP IN THE
GROUP LIFE INSURANCE PLAN BETWEEN DEFENDANT-APPELLANT OF
 THE INSURANCE CLAIM ARISING FROM THE DEATH OF WILFREDO
LEUTERIO.[6]
Synthesized below are the assigned errors for our resolution:
1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding petitioner liable to DBP as
beneficiary in a group life insurance contract from a complaint filed by
the widow of the decedent/mortgagor?
2. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in not finding that Dr. Leuterio
concealed that he had hypertension, which would vitiate the insurance
contract?
3. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding Grepalife liable in the
amount of eighty six thousand, two hundred (P86,200.00) pesos
without proof of the actual outstanding mortgage payable by the
mortgagor to DBP.
Petitioner alleges that the complaint was instituted by the widow of Dr. Leuterio,
not the real party in interest, hence the trial court acquired no jurisdiction over the
case. It argues that when the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts judgment,
Grepalife was held liable to pay the proceeds of insurance contract in favor of DBP,
the indispensable party who was not joined in the suit.
To resolve the issue, we must consider the insurable interest in mortgaged
properties and the parties to this type of contract. The rationale of a group insurance
policy of mortgagors, otherwise known as the mortgage redemption insurance, is a
device for the protection of both the mortgagee and the mortgagor. On the part of
the mortgagee, it has to enter into such form of contract so that in the event of the
unexpected demise of the mortgagor during the subsistence of the mortgage contract,
the proceeds from such insurance will be applied to the payment of the mortgage
debt, thereby relieving the heirs of the mortgagor from paying the obligation. [7] In a
similar vein, ample protection is given to the mortgagor under such a concept so that
in the event of death; the mortgage obligation will be extinguished by the application
of the insurance proceeds to the mortgage indebtedness.[8] Consequently, where the
mortgagor pays the insurance premium under the group insurance policy, making the
loss payable to the mortgagee, the insurance is on the mortgagors interest, and the
mortgagor continues to be a party to the contract. In this type of policy insurance, the
mortgagee is simply an appointee of the insurance fund, such loss-payable clause does
not make the mortgagee a party to the contract.[9]
Section 8 of the Insurance Code provides:
Unless the policy provides, where a mortgagor of property effects insurance in his own
name providing that the loss shall be payable to the mortgagee, or assigns a policy of
insurance to a mortgagee, the insurance is deemed to be upon the interest of the
mortgagor, who does not cease to be a party to the original contract, and any act of
his, prior to the loss, which would otherwise avoid the insurance, will have the same
effect, although the property is in the hands of the mortgagee, but any act which,
under the contract of insurance, is to be performed by the mortgagor, may be
performed by the mortgagee therein named, with the same effect as if it had been
performed by the mortgagor.
The insured private respondent did not cede to the mortgagee all his rights or
interests in the insurance, the policy stating that: In the event of the debtors death
before his indebtedness with the Creditor [DBP] shall have been fully paid, an amount
to pay the outstanding indebtedness shall first be paid to the creditor and the balance
of sum assured, if there is any, shall then be paid to the beneficiary/ies designated by
the debtor.[10] When DBP submitted the insurance claim against petitioner, the latter
denied payment thereof, interposing the defense of concealment committed by the
insured. Thereafter, DBP collected the debt from the mortgagor and took the
necessary action of foreclosure on the residential lot of private
respondent.[11] In Gonzales La O vs. Yek Tong Lin Fire & Marine Ins. Co.[12]we held:
Insured, being the person with whom the contract was made, is primarily the proper
person to bring suit thereon. * * * Subject to some exceptions, insured may thus sue,
although the policy is taken wholly or in part for the benefit of another person named
or unnamed, and although it is expressly made payable to another as his interest may
appear or otherwise. * * * Although a policy issued to a mortgagor is taken out for the
benefit of the mortgagee and is made payable to him, yet the mortgagor may sue
thereon in his own name, especially where the mortgagees interest is less than the full
amount recoverable under the policy, * * *.
And in volume 33, page 82, of the same work, we read the following:
Insured may be regarded as the real party in interest, although he has assigned the
policy for the purpose of collection, or has assigned as collateral security any judgment
he may obtain.[13]
And since a policy of insurance upon life or health may pass by transfer, will or
succession to any person, whether he has an insurable interest or not, and such person
may recover it whatever the insured might have recovered,[14] the widow of the
decedent Dr. Leuterio may file the suit against the insurer, Grepalife.
The second assigned error refers to an alleged concealment that the petitioner
interposed as its defense to annul the insurance contract. Petitioner contends that Dr.
Leuterio failed to disclose that he had hypertension, which might have caused his
death. Concealment exists where the assured had knowledge of a fact material to the
risk, and honesty, good faith, and fair dealing requires that he should communicate it
to the assured, but he designedly and intentionally withholds the same.[15]
Petitioner merely relied on the testimony of the attending physician, Dr.
Hernando Mejia, as supported by the information given by the widow of the
decedent.Grepalife asserts that Dr. Mejias technical diagnosis of the cause of death of
Dr. Leuterio was a duly documented hospital record, and that the widows declaration
that her husband had possible hypertension several years ago should not be
considered as hearsay, but as part of res gestae.
On the contrary the medical findings were not conclusive because Dr. Mejia did
not conduct an autopsy on the body of the decedent. As the attending physician, Dr.
Mejia stated that he had no knowledge of Dr. Leuterios any previous hospital
confinement.[16] Dr. Leuterios death certificate stated that hypertension was only the
possible cause of death. The private respondents statement, as to the medical history
of her husband, was due to her unreliable recollection of events. Hence, the statement
of the physician was properly considered by the trial court as hearsay.
The question of whether there was concealment was aptly answered by the
appellate court, thus:
The insured, Dr. Leuterio, had answered in his insurance application that he was in
good health and that he had not consulted a doctor or any of the enumerated
ailments, including hypertension; when he died the attending physician had certified
in the death certificate that the former died of cerebral hemorrhage, probably
secondary to hypertension. From this report, the appellant insurance company
refused to pay the insurance claim. Appellant alleged that the insured had concealed
the fact that he had hypertension.
Contrary to appellants allegations, there was no sufficient proof that the insured had
suffered from hypertension. Aside from the statement of the insureds widow who was
not even sure if the medicines taken by Dr. Leuterio were for hypertension, the
appellant had not proven nor produced any witness who could attest to Dr. Leuterios
medical history...
xxx
Appellant insurance company had failed to establish that there was concealment
made by the insured, hence, it cannot refuse payment of the claim.[17]
The fraudulent intent on the part of the insured must be established to entitle
the insurer to rescind the contract.[18] Misrepresentation as a defense of the insurer
to avoid liability is an affirmative defense and the duty to establish such defense by
satisfactory and convincing evidence rests upon the insurer.[19] In the case at bar, the
petitioner failed to clearly and satisfactorily establish its defense, and is therefore
liable to pay the proceeds of the insurance.
And that brings us to the last point in the review of the case at bar. Petitioner
claims that there was no evidence as to the amount of Dr. Leuterios outstanding
indebtedness to DBP at the time of the mortgagors death. Hence, for private
respondents failure to establish the same, the action for specific performance should
be dismissed. Petitioners claim is without merit. A life insurance policy is a valued
policy.[20] Unless the interest of a person insured is susceptible of exact pecuniary
measurement, the measure of indemnity under a policy of insurance upon life or
health is the sum fixed in the policy.[21] The mortgagor paid the premium according to
the coverage of his insurance, which states that:
The policy states that upon receipt of due proof of the Debtors death during the terms
of this insurance, a death benefit in the amount of P86,200.00 shall be paid.
In the event of the debtors death before his indebtedness with the creditor shall have
been fully paid, an amount to pay the outstanding indebtedness shall first be paid to
the Creditor and the balance of the Sum Assured, if there is any shall then be paid to
the beneficiary/ies designated by the debtor.[22] (Emphasis omitted)
However, we noted that the Court of Appeals decision was promulgated on May
17, 1993. In private respondents memorandum, she states that DBP foreclosed in
1995 their residential lot, in satisfaction of mortgagors outstanding loan. Considering
this supervening event, the insurance proceeds shall inure to the benefit of the heirs
of the deceased person or his beneficiaries. Equity dictates that DBP should not
unjustly enrich itself at the expense of another (Nemo cum alterius detrimenio
protest). Hence, it cannot collect the insurance proceeds, after it already foreclosed
on the mortgage. The proceeds now rightly belong to Dr. Leuterios heirs represented
by his widow, herein private respondent Medarda Leuterio.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV 18341 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the
petitioner is ORDERED to pay the insurance proceeds amounting to Eighty-six
thousand, two hundred (P86,200.00) pesos to the heirs of the insured, Dr. Wilfredo
Leuterio (deceased), upon presentation of proof of prior settlement of mortgagors
indebtedness to Development Bank of the Philippines.Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Robles vs. Batacan (154 SCRA 644)
ERNESTO ROBLES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. DELFIN FL. BATACAN, HON. CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, HON. JOSE B. JIMENEZ.
ATANACIO GERONIMO and BENEDICTO GERONIMO, respondents.
Agricultural Tenant
CRUZ, J.:
The central figure in this case is Severino Geronimo, who worked in the petitioner's
land for twenty years until 1969 and died the following year at the age of 86. The
central question in this case is the nature of the work he performed and the
compensation he was supposed to receive.
After his death, an ejectment suit was filed against his two sons by the petitioner, who
claimed they had no right to remain in his land.1 Benedicto Geronimo did not choose
to answer and so was declared in default. 2 The other defendant. Atanacio Geronimo,
averred that he was entitled to succeed his father as the petitioner's agricultural
tenant in accordance with R.A. No. 1199 and Section 9 of R.A. No. 3844.
The private respondent's position is that his father was an agricultural tenant of the
petitioner during the twenty years the former worked in the latter"s land. Hence, in
accordance with the aforementioned laws, he could remain in the petitioner"s land
under the same terms and conditions of the original tenancy share arrangement
entered into between his father and the petitioner. His share should also be P100.00
more or less per harvest every forty days during the time he continued discharging his
father"s work as his statutory successor. 3
The petitioner, for his part, insists that Severino Geronimo was never an agricultural
tenant of his but worked merely as a watcher in his land. He did receive the sum of
P100.00 every harvest but not as his share therein for that amount was given to him
as a reward for his past services. The only work he did was watch over the petitioner"s
land and make brooms out of the fallen coconut leaves he would gather. He sold these
brooms and kept the proceeds for himself without sharing them with the petitioner. 4
After trial, the Court of Agrarian Relations * rendered judgment recognizing the
defendant as the agricultural tenant of the plaintiff and ordering the payment to him
of the sum of P12,000.00 as his tenancy share. 5 Not satisfied, the petitioner went to
the Court of Appeals, ** which affirmed the challenged decision in toto.6 The
petitioner is now before us and faults the respondent court with grave abuse of
discretion for upholding the trial court.
We do not agree that the respondent court erred. On the contrary, we find that its
findings are supported by the evidence of record and in accord with the applicable law
and doctrine.
Thus, on the nature of the work performed by Severino Geronimo, it quoted with
approval the conclusion of the trial court that he "was the tenant on the subject parcel
for quite a time and was recognized by Ernesto Robles as such," discharging such tasks
as supervising the harvest, cutting down bushes, clearing the land, picking up the fallen
nuts, and paying the laborers, like the coconut gatherers and huskers, from his 1/3
share.7 This was based on the declarations of several witnesses, 8 including the
petitioner himself, and the several documents presented by Atanacio in which his
father was described by the petitioner as his "kasama" to whom was being given his
"bahagui" or share. 9
As for the private respondent's right to succeed his father, the respondent court was
correct in affirming the ruling of the trial court that, as the son of Severino Geronimo,
Atanacio had the right to take over as agricultural tenant in the petitioner"s land in
accordance with R.A. No. 1199 and R.A. No. 3844.10 Obviously, Atanacio was the only
heir interested in succeeding his father as his brother, Benedicto, had not seen fit to
claim his right and in fact defaulted in resisting the petitioner"s claims in the ejectment
suit. Significantly, when in his prayer the petitioner asks for authority to appoint the
said Benedicto to succeed his father, it is presumably as his watcher only and not as
agricultural tenant. The petitioner"s consistent claim, it should be noted, is that
Severino Geronimo was not his tenant but only his watcher.
The Court gave cited due course to this petition to enable the parties to argue on the
amount of damages in view of the apparent lack of a credible basis therefor as
observed by the trial court. 11 In his memorandum, the petitioner says the basis
should be the weight of the coconut harvested and then, consistent with his main
thesis, urges that no damages should be awarded at all.12 The private respondent says
that the basis should be the number of nuts harvested and then asks that the damages
be doubled.13 In his reply, realizing probably that the matter may have gotten out of
hand, the petitioner now counters that the private respondent cannot claim an
increase in the amount of damages because he has not, providentially, appealed the
same. 14 This is correct and estops the private respondent.
In La Mallorca v. Court of Appeals,15 the Court said:
The increase of the award of damages from P3,000.00 to P6,000.00 by the Court of
Appeals, however, cannot be sustained. Generally, the Appellate Court can only pass
upon the consider questions or issues raised and argued in appellant"s brief, plaintiff
did not appeal from that portion of judgment of the trial court awarding them
damages. Neither does it appear that, as appellees to the Court of Appeals, plaintiffs
have pointed out in their brief inadequacy of the award or that the inclusion of the
figure P3,000.00 was merely a clerical error, in order that the matter may be treated
as an exception to the general rule. Thus, the court of Appeals committed error in
raising the amount for damages.

In Dy v. Kuizon, 16 we declared:

It is a well-settled rule in this jurisdiction that whenever an appeal is taken in a civil

case, an appellee who has not himself appealed cannot obtain from the appellate
court any affirmative relief other than the ones granted in the decision of the court
below. An appellee who is not appellant may assign errors in his brief where his
purpose is to maintain the judgment on other grounds, but he may not do so if this
purpose is to have the judgment modified or reversed for, in such a case, he must
appeal. Here, the respondent did not appeal and so it was error for the Court of
Appeals to award him a relief not granted by the lower court.

In Madrideo v. Hon. Court of Appeals, 17 our ruling was:

... whenever an appeal is taken in a civil case, an appellee who has not appealed cannot
obtain from the appellate court any affirmative relief other than the ones granted in
the decision of the court below.

The latest decision on this matter is Aguilar v. Chan,18 where the Court noted that
although the actual damages suffered by the plaintiff-appellee exceeded the amount
awarded to her by the lower court, this amount could not be increased because she
had not appealed.

The trial court had the opportunity to assess the evidence first-hand and so was in the
best position to determine the factual relationship between the parties as well as the
share to which the private respondent was entitled. We do not find that the
respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the decision of the
court a quo and see no reason to reverse it. We too affirm.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioner. This decision is
immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.
San Agustin vs. CA (371 SCRA 348, December 4, 2001)
JESUS SAN AGUSTIN, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MAXIMO MENEZ,
JR., respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks the reversal of the decision[1] of the
Court of Appeals dated May 19, 1995, affirming that of the Regional Trial Court in LRC
Case No. R-4659.
The relevant facts, as summarized by the CA, are as follows:
On February 11, 1974, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) sold to
a certain Macaria Vda. de Caiquep, a parcel of residential land with an area of 168
square meters located in Rosario, Pasig City and denominated as Lot 13, Block 7, Pcs-
5816 of the Government Service and Insurance System Low Cost Housing Project
(GSIS-LCHP). The sale is evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale.[2] On February 19, 1974,
the Register of Deeds of Rizal issued in the name of Macaria Vda. de Caiquep, Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 436465 with the following encumbrance annotated at the
back of the title:
This Deed of Absolute Sale is subject to the conditions enumerated below which shall
be permanent encumbrances on the property, the violation of any of which shall
entitle the vendor to cancel x x x this Deed of Absolute Sale and reenter the property;
The purpose of the sale be to aid the vendee in acquiring a lot for himself/themselves
and not to provide him/them with a means for speculation or profit by a future
assignment of his/their right herein acquired or the resale of the lot through rent,
lease or subletting to others of the lot and subject of this deed, and therefore, the
vendee shall not sell, convey, lease or sublease, or otherwise encumber the property
in favor of any other party within five (5) years from the date final and absolute
ownership thereof becomes vested in the vendee, except in cases of hereditary
succession or resale in favor of the vendor;
x x x (Underscoring supplied).[3]
A day after the issuance of TCT No. 436465, or on February 20, 1974, Macaria
Vda. de Caiquep sold the subject lot to private respondent, Maximo Menez, Jr.,as
evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale (Exhibit D).[4] This deed was notarized but was
not registered immediately upon its execution in 1974 because GSIS prohibited him
from registering the same in view of the five-year prohibition to sell during the period
ending in 1979.
Sometime in 1979, for being suspected as a subversive, an Arrest, Search and
Seizure Order (ASSO) was issued against private respondent. Military men ransacked
his house in Cainta, Rizal. Upon learning that he was wanted by the military, he
voluntarily surrendered and was detained for two (2) years. When released, another
order for his re-arrest was issued so he hid in Mindanao for another four (4) years or
until March 1984. In December of 1990, he discovered that the subject TCT was
missing. He consulted a lawyer but the latter did not act immediately on the
matter. Upon consulting a new counsel, an Affidavit of Loss[5] was filed with the
Register of Deeds of Pasig and a certified copy[6] of TCT No. 436465 was issued. Private
respondent also declared the property for tax purposes and obtained a certification
thereof from the Assessors Office.[7]
Private respondent sent notices to the registered owner at her address
appearing in the title and in the Deed of Sale. And, with his counsel, he searched for
the registered owner in Metro Manila and Rizal and as far as Samar, Leyte, Calbayog
City, Tacloban City, and in Eastern and Northern Samar. However, their search proved
futile.
On July 8, 1992, private respondent filed a petition docketed as LRC Case No. R-
4659 with the RTC, Branch 154, Pasig, Metro Manila for the issuance of owners
duplicate copy of TCT No. 436465 to replace the lost one. To show he was the owner
of the contested lot, he showed the Deed of Absolute Sale, Exhibit D.The petition was
set for hearing and the courts order dated July 10, 1992 was published once in Malaya,
a nationally circulated newspaper in the Philippines.[8]
During the hearing on September 3, 1992, only Menez and his counsel appeared.
The Register of Deeds who was not served notice, and the Office of the Solicitor
General and the Provincial Prosecutor who were notified did not attend.
On September 18, 1992, there being no opposition, Menez presented his
evidence ex-parte. The trial court granted his petition in its decision[9] dated
September 30, 1992, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the Registry of Deeds of Pasig,
Metro Manila, is hereby directed to issue a new Owners Duplicate Copy of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 436465 based on the original thereon filed in his office which
shall contain the memorandum of encumbrance and an additional memorandum of
the fact that it was issued in place of the lost duplicate and which shall, in all respect,
be entitled to like faith and credit as the original duplicate, for all legal intents and
purposes.
Issuance of new owners duplicate copy shall be made only after this decision shall
have become final and executory. The said lost owners duplicate is hereby declared
null and void.
Petitioner shall pay all legal fees in connection with the issuance of the new owners
copy.
Let copies of this Order be furnished the petitioner; the registered owner of his given
address in the title, in the deed of sale, and in the tax declaration; the Registry of Deeds
of Pasig; the Office of the Solicitor General; and the Provincial Fiscal of Pasig, Metro
Manila.
SO ORDERED.[10]
On October 13, 1992, herein petitioner, Jesus San Agustin, received a copy of the
abovecited decision. He claimed this was the first time he became aware of the case
of her aunt, Macaria Vda. de Caiquep who, according to him, died sometime in
1974. Claiming that he was the present occupant of the property and the heir of
Macaria, he filed his Motion to Reopen Reconstitution Proceedings[11] on October 27,
1992. On December 3, 1992, RTC issued an order denying said motion.[12]
Petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals which, as earlier stated, was
denied in its decision of May 19, 1995. Petitioner moved for a reconsideration, but it
was denied in a resolution dated September 11, 1995.[13]
Thus, the present petition, attributing the following errors to the court a quo:
A. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT LRC CASE NO. R-4659
BEING ONLY A PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A NEW OWNERS DUPLICATE OF TITLE,
THERE IS NO NEED OF PERSONAL NOTICE TO THE PETITIONER, THE ACTUAL
POSSESSOR [WHO HAS] AND ACTUALLY BEEN PAYING THE REAL ESTATE TAX, DESPITE
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS KNOWLEDGE OF ACTUAL POSSESSION OF AND INTEREST
OVER THE PROPERTY COVERED BY TCT NO. 436465.[14]
B. RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SALE BETWEEN THE
PRIVATE RESPONDENT AND MACARIA VDA. DE CAIQUEP IS NOT NULL AND VOID AND
UNDER ARTICLE 1409 OF THE CIVIL CODE SPECIFICALLY PARAGRAPH (7) THEREOF
WHICH REFERS TO CONTRACTS EXPRESSLY PROHIBITED OR DECLARED VOID BY
LAW.[15]
Considering the above assignment of errors, let us resolve the corresponding issues
raised by petitioner.
The first issue involves private respondents alleged failure to send notice to
petitioner who is the actual possessor of the disputed lot. Stated briefly, is petitioner
entitled to notice? Our finding is in the negative.
Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree is decisive. It provides:
Sec. 109. Notice and replacement of lost duplicate certificate. In case of loss or theft of
an owners duplicate certificate of title, due notice under oath shall be sent by the
owner or by someone in his behalf to the Register of Deeds of the province or city
where the land lies as soon as the loss or theft is discovered. If a duplicate certificate
is lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced by a person applying for the entry of a new
certificate to him or for the registration of any instrument, a sworn statement of the
fact of such loss or destruction may be filed by the registered owner or other person
in interest and registered.
Upon the petition of the registered owner or other person in interest, the court may,
after notice and due hearing, direct the issuance of a new duplicate certificate, which
shall contain a memorandum of the fact that it is issued in place of the lost duplicate
certificate, but shall in all respects be entitled to like faith and credit as the original
duplicate, and shall thereafter be regarded as such for all purposes of this decree.
In Office of Court Administrator vs. Matas, A.M. No. RTJ-92-836, 247 SCRA 9, 16-
17 (1995), we held:
In the case at bar, the respective certificate of title of the properties in question on file
with the Register of Deeds are existing, and it is the owners copy of the certificate of
title that was alleged to have been lost or destroyed. Thus, it is Section 109 of P.D.
1529 which was approved on June 11, 1978 that becomes effective and is applicable,
a reading of which shows that it is practically the same as Section 109 of Act No. 496,
governing reconstitution of a duplicate certificate of title lost or destroyed.
Consequently, it is sufficient that the notice under Section 109 is sent to the Register
of Deeds and to those persons who are known to have, or appear to have, an interest
in the property as shown in the Memorandum of encumbrances at the back of the
original or transfer certificate of title on file in the office of the Register of Deeds. From
a legal standpoint, there are no other interested parties who should be notified, except
those abovementioned since they are the only ones who may be deemed to have a
claim to the property involved. A person dealing with registered property is not charged
with notice of encumbrances not annotated on the back of the title. (Italics supplied.)
Here, petitioner does not appear to have an interest in the property based on
the memorandum of encumbrances annotated at the back of the title. His claim that
he is an heir (nephew) of the original owner of the lot covered by the disputed lot and
the present occupant thereof is not annotated in the said memorandum of
encumbrances. Neither was his claim entered on the Certificate of Titles in the name
of their original/former owners on file with the Register of Deeds at the time of the
filing or pendency of LRC Case No. R-4659. Clearly, petitioner is not entitled to notice.
 Noteworthy is the fact that there was compliance by private respondent of the
RTCs order of publication of the petition in a newspaper of general circulation.This is
sufficient notice of the petition to the public at large.
Petitioner contends that as possessor or actual occupant of the lot in
controversy, he is entitled under the law to be notified. He relies on Alabang
Development Corporation vs. Valenzuela, G.R. No. L-54094, 116 SCRA 261, 277 (1982),
which held that in reconstitution proceedings, courts must make sure that
indispensable parties, i.e., the actual owners and possessors of the lands involved, are
duly served with actual and personal notice of the petition. As pointed out by the
appellate court, his reliance on Alabang is misplaced because the cause of action in
that case is based on Republic Act No. 26, entitled An Act Providing A Special
Procedure for the Reconstitution of Torrens Certificate of Title Lost or Destroyed,
while the present case is based on Section 109 of P.D. 1529 as above explained.
Under Republic Act No. 26, reconstitution is validly made only in case
the original copy of the certificate of title with the Register of Deeds is lost or
destroyed. And if no notice of the date of hearing of a reconstitution case is served on
a possessor or one having interest in the property involved, he is deprived of his day
in court and the order of reconstitution is null and void.[16] The case at bar is not for
reconstitution, but merely for replacement of lost duplicate certificate.
On the second assigned error, petitioner contends that Exhibit D is null and void
under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, specifically paragraph (7),[17] because the deed of
sale was executed within the five-year prohibitory period under Commonwealth Act
No. 141, as amended, otherwise known as The Public Land Act.[18]
We find petitioners contention less than meritorious. We agree with respondent
court that the proscription under Com. Act No. 141 on sale within the 5-year restrictive
period refers to homestead lands only. Here the lot in dispute is not a homestead land,
as found by the trial and appellate courts. Said lot is owned by GSIS, under TCT No.
10028 in its proprietary capacity.
Moreover, as far as the violation of the 5-year restrictive condition imposed by
GSIS in its contract with petitioners predecessor-in-interest is concerned, it is the GSIS
and not petitioner who had a cause of action against private respondent. Vide the
instructive case of Sarmiento vs. Salud:
The condition that the appellees Sarmiento spouses could not resell the property
except to the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC for short) within the
next 25 years after appellees' purchasing the lot is manifestly a condition in favor of
the PHHC, and not one in favor of the Sarmiento spouses. The condition conferred no
actionable right on appellees herein, since it operated as a restriction upon their jus
disponendi of the property they bought, and thus limited their right of ownership. It
follows that on the assumption that the mortgage to appellee Salud and the
foreclosure sale violated the condition in the Sarmiento contract, only the PHHC was
entitled to invoke the condition aforementioned, and not the Sarmientos. The validity
or invalidity of the sheriff's foreclosure sale to appellant Salud thus depended
exclusively on the PHHC; the latter could attack the sale as violative of its right of
exclusive reacquisition; but it (PHHC) also could waive the condition and treat the sale
as good, in which event, the sale can not be assailed for breach of the condition
aforestated.[19]
In this case, the GSIS has not filed any action for the annulment of Exhibit D, nor
for the forfeiture of the lot in question. In our view, the contract of sale remains valid
between the parties, unless and until annulled in the proper suit filed by the rightful
party, the GSIS. For now, the said contract of sale is binding upon the heirs of Macaria
Vda. de Caiquep, including petitioner who alleges to be one of her heirs, in line with
the rule that heirs are bound by contracts entered into by their predecessors-in-
interest.[20]
We are not unmindful of the social justice policy of R.A. 8291 otherwise known
as Government Service Insurance Act of 1997 in granting housing assistance to
the less-privileged GSIS members and their dependents payable at an affordable
payment scheme. [21] This is the same policy which the 5-year restrictive clause in the
contract seeks to implement by stating in the encumbrance itself annotated at the
back of TCT No. 436465 that, The purpose of the sale is to aid the vendee in acquiring
a lot for himself/themselves and not to provide him/them with a means for
speculation or profit by a future assignment of his/their right herein acquired or the
resale of the lot through rent, lease or subletting to others of the lot and subject of
this deed, xxx within five (5) years from the date final and absolute ownership thereof
becomes vested in the vendee, except in cases of hereditary succession or resale in
favor of the vendor.[22] However, absent the proper action taken by the GSIS as the
original vendor referred to, the contract between petitioners predecessor-in-interest
and private respondent deserves to be upheld. For as pointed out by said private
respondent, it is protected by the Constitution under Section 10, Article III, of the Bill
of Rights stating that, No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be
passed. Much as we would like to see a salutary policy triumph, that provision of the
Constitution duly calls for compliance.
More in point, however, is the fact that, following Sarmiento v. Salud,[23] Even if
the transaction between the original awardee and herein petitioner were wrongful,
still, as between themselves, the purchaser and the seller were both in pari delicto,
being participes criminis as it were. As in Sarmiento, in this case both were aware of
the existence of the stipulated condition in favor of the original seller, GSIS, yet both
entered into an agreement violating said condition and nullifying its effects. Similarly,
as Acting Chief Justice JBL Reyes concluded in Sarmiento, Both parties being equally
guilty, neither is entitled to complain against the other. Having entered into the
transaction with open eyes, and having benefited from it, said parties should be held
in estoppel to assail and annul their own deliberate acts.
 WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED, and the decision of the respondent court is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Rabadilla vs. CA (June 29, 2000)
JOHNNY S. RABADILLA,[1] petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND MARIA
MARLENA[2] COSCOLUELLA Y BELLEZA VILLACARLOS, respondents.
DECISION
PURISIMA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals,[3] dated December
23, 1993, in CA-G.R. No. CV-35555, which set aside the decision of Branch 52 of the
Regional Trial Court in Bacolod City, and ordered the defendants-appellees (including
herein petitioner), as heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, to reconvey title over Lot No. 1392,
together with its fruits and interests, to the estate of Aleja Belleza.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla,
was instituted as a devisee of 511, 855 square meters of that parcel of land surveyed
as Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre. The said Codicil, which was duly probated
and admitted in Special Proceedings No. 4046 before the then Court of First Instance
of Negros Occidental, contained the following provisions:
"FIRST
I give, leave and bequeath the following property owned by me to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla
resident of 141 P. Villanueva, Pasay City:
(a) Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
RT-4002 (10942), which is registered in my name according to the records of the
Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental.
(b) That should Jorge Rabadilla die ahead of me, the aforementioned property and the
rights which I shall set forth hereinbelow, shall be inherited and acknowledged by the
children and spouse of Jorge Rabadilla.
xxx
FOURTH
(a)....It is also my command, in this my addition (Codicil), that should I die and Jorge
Rabadilla shall have already received the ownership of the said Lot No. 1392 of the
Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4002 (10942), and
also at the time that the lease of Balbinito G. Guanzon of the said lot shall expire, Jorge
Rabadilla shall have the obligation until he dies, every year to give to Maria Marlina
Coscolluela y Belleza, Seventy (75) (sic) piculs of Export sugar and Twenty Five (25)
piculs of Domestic sugar, until the said Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza dies.
FIFTH
(a) Should Jorge Rabadilla die, his heir to whom he shall give Lot No. 1392 of the
Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4002 (10492), shall
have the obligation to still give yearly, the sugar as specified in the Fourth paragraph
of his testament, to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza on the month of December of
each year.
SIXTH
I command, in this my addition (Codicil) that the Lot No. 1392, in the event that the
one to whom I have left and bequeathed, and his heir shall later sell, lease, mortgage
this said Lot, the buyer, lessee, mortgagee, shall have also the obligation to respect
and deliver yearly ONE HUNDRED (100) piculs of sugar to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y
Belleza, on each month of December, SEVENTY FIVE (75) piculs of Export and TWENTY
FIVE (25) piculs of Domestic, until Maria Marlina shall die, lastly should the buyer,
lessee or the mortgagee of this lot, not have respected my command in this my
addition (Codicil), Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, shall immediately seize this Lot
No. 1392 from my heir and the latter's heirs, and shall turn it over to my near
desendants, (sic) and the latter shall then have the obligation to give the ONE
HUNDRED (100) piculs of sugar until Maria Marlina shall die. I further command in this
my addition (Codicil) that my heir and his heirs of this Lot No. 1392, that they will obey
and follow that should they decide to sell, lease, mortgage, they cannot negotiate with
others than my near descendants and my sister."[4]
Pursuant to the same Codicil, Lot No. 1392 was transferred to the deceased, Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44498 thereto issued in his name.
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his wife Rufina and children
Johnny (petitioner), Aurora, Ofelia and Zenaida, all surnamed Rabadilla.
On August 21, 1989, Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza Villacarlos brought a
complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 5588, before Branch 52 of the Regional Trial
Court in Bacolod City, against the above-mentioned heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, to
enforce the provisions of subject Codicil. The Complaint alleged that the defendant-
heirs violated the conditions of the Codicil, in that:
1. Lot No. 1392 was mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank and the Republic
Planters Bank in disregard of the testatrix's specific instruction to sell, lease, or
mortgage only to the near descendants and sister of the testatrix.
2. Defendant-heirs failed to comply with their obligation to deliver one hundred (100)
piculs of sugar (75 piculs export sugar and 25 piculs domestic sugar) to plaintiff Maria
Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza from sugar crop years 1985 up to the filing of the
complaint as mandated by the Codicil, despite repeated demands for compliance.
3. The banks failed to comply with the 6th paragraph of the Codicil which provided
that in case of the sale, lease, or mortgage of the property, the buyer, lessee, or
mortgagee shall likewise have the obligation to deliver 100 piculs of sugar per crop
year to herein private respondent.
The plaintiff then prayed that judgment be rendered ordering defendant-heirs to
reconvey/return-Lot No. 1392 to the surviving heirs of the late Aleja Belleza, the
cancellation of TCT No. 44498 in the name of the deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, and
the issuance of a new certificate of title in the names of the surviving heirs of the late
Aleja Belleza.
On February 26, 1990, the defendant-heirs were declared in default but on March 28,
1990 the Order of Default was lifted, with respect to defendant Johnny S. Rabadilla,
who filed his Answer, accordingly.
During the pre-trial, the parties admitted that:
On November 15, 1998, the plaintiff (private respondent) and a certain Alan Azurin,
son-in-law of the herein petitioner who was lessee of the property and acting as
attorney-in-fact of defendant-heirs, arrived at an amicable settlement and entered
into a Memorandum of Agreement on the obligation to deliver one hundred piculs of
sugar, to the following effect:
"That for crop year 1988-89, the annuity mentioned in Entry No. 49074 of TCT No.
44489 will be delivered not later than January of 1989, more specifically, to wit:
75 piculs of 'A' sugar, and 25 piculs of 'B' sugar, or then existing in any of our names,
Mary Rose Rabadilla y Azurin or Alan Azurin, during December of each sugar crop year,
in Azucar Sugar Central; and, this is considered compliance of the annuity as
mentioned, and in the same manner will compliance of the annuity be in the next
succeeding crop years.
That the annuity above stated for crop year 1985-86, 1986-87, and 1987-88, will be
complied in cash equivalent of the number of piculs as mentioned therein and which
is as herein agreed upon, taking into consideration the composite price of sugar during
each sugar crop year, which is in the total amount of ONE HUNDRED FIVE THOUSAND
PESOS (P105,000.00).
That the above-mentioned amount will be paid or delivered on a staggered cash
installment, payable on or before the end of December of every sugar crop year, to
wit:
For 1985-86, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos,
payable on or before December of crop year 1988-89;
For 1986-87, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos,
payable on or before December of crop year 1989-90;
For 1987-88, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos,
payable on or before December of crop year 1990-91; and
For 1988-89, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos,
payable on or before December of crop year 1991-92."[5]
However, there was no compliance with the aforesaid Memorandum of Agreement
except for a partial delivery of 50.80 piculs of sugar corresponding to sugar crop year
1988 -1989.
On July 22, 1991, the Regional Trial Court came out with a decision, dismissing the
complaint and disposing as follows:
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the aforegoing findings, the Court finds that the action is
prematurely filed as no cause of action against the defendants has as yet arose in favor
of plaintiff. While there maybe the non-performance of the command as mandated
exaction from them simply because they are the children of Jorge Rabadilla, the title
holder/owner of the lot in question, does not warrant the filing of the present
complaint. The remedy at bar must fall. Incidentally, being in the category as creditor
of the left estate, it is opined that plaintiff may initiate the intestate proceedings, if
only to establish the heirs of Jorge Rabadilla and in order to give full meaning and
semblance to her claim under the Codicil.
In the light of the aforegoing findings, the Complaint being prematurely filed is
DISMISSED without prejudice.
SO ORDERED."[6]
On appeal by plaintiff, the First Division of the Court of Appeals reversed the decision
of the trial court; ratiocinating and ordering thus:
"Therefore, the evidence on record having established plaintiff-appellant's right to
receive 100 piculs of sugar annually out of the produce of Lot No. 1392; defendants-
appellee's obligation under Aleja Belleza's codicil, as heirs of the modal heir, Jorge
Rabadilla, to deliver such amount of sugar to plaintiff-appellant; defendants-appellee's
admitted non-compliance with said obligation since 1985; and, the punitive
consequences enjoined by both the codicil and the Civil Code, of seizure of Lot No.
1392 and its reversion to the estate of Aleja Belleza in case of such non-compliance,
this Court deems it proper to order the reconveyance of title over Lot No. 1392 from
the estates of Jorge Rabadilla to the estate of Aleja Belleza. However, plaintiff-
appellant must institute separate proceedings to re-open Aleja Belleza's estate, secure
the appointment of an administrator, and distribute Lot No. 1392 to Aleja Belleza's
legal heirs in order to enforce her right, reserved to her by the codicil, to receive her
legacy of 100 piculs of sugar per year out of the produce of Lot No. 1392 until she dies.
Accordingly, the decision appealed from is SET ASIDE and another one entered
ordering defendants-appellees, as heirs of Jorge Rabadilla, to reconvey title over Lot
No. 1392, together with its fruits and interests, to the estate of Aleja Belleza.
SO ORDERED."[7]
Dissatisfied with the aforesaid disposition by the Court of Appeals, petitioner found
his way to this Court via the present petition, contending that the Court of Appeals
erred in ordering the reversion of Lot 1392 to the estate of the testatrix Aleja Belleza
on the basis of paragraph 6 of the Codicil, and in ruling that the testamentary
institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla is a modal institution within the purview of Article 882
of the New Civil Code.
The petition is not impressed with merit.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in resolving the appeal in
accordance with Article 882 of the New Civil Code on modal institutions and in
deviating from the sole issue raised which is the absence or prematurity of the cause
of action. Petitioner maintains that Article 882 does not find application as there was
no modal institution and the testatrix intended a mere simple substitution - i.e. the
instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, was to be substituted by the testatrix's "near
descendants" should the obligation to deliver the fruits to herein private respondent
be not complied with. And since the testatrix died single and without issue, there can
be no valid substitution and such testamentary provision cannot be given any effect.
The petitioner theorizes further that there can be no valid substitution for the reason
that the substituted heirs are not definite, as the substituted heirs are merely referred
to as "near descendants" without a definite identity or reference as to who are the
"near descendants" and therefore, under Articles 843[8] and 845[9] of the New Civil
Code, the substitution should be deemed as not written.
The contentions of petitioner are untenable. Contrary to his supposition that the Court
of Appeals deviated from the issue posed before it, which was the propriety of the
dismissal of the complaint on the ground of prematurity of cause of action, there was
no such deviation. The Court of Appeals found that the private respondent had a cause
of action against the petitioner. The disquisition made on modal institution was,
precisely, to stress that the private respondent had a legally demandable right against
the petitioner pursuant to subject Codicil; on which issue the Court of Appeals ruled
in accordance with law.
It is a general rule under the law on succession that successional rights are transmitted
from the moment of death of the decedent[10] and compulsory heirs are called to
succeed by operation of law. The legitimate children and descendants, in relation to
their legitimate parents, and the widow or widower, are compulsory heirs.[11] Thus,
the petitioner, his mother and sisters, as compulsory heirs of the instituted heir, Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla, succeeded the latter by operation of law, without need of further
proceedings, and the successional rights were transmitted to them from the moment
of death of the decedent, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.
Under Article 776 of the New Civil Code, inheritance includes all the property, rights
and obligations of a person, not extinguished by his death. Conformably, whatever
rights Dr. Jorge Rabadilla had by virtue of subject Codicil were transmitted to his forced
heirs, at the time of his death. And since obligations not extinguished by death also
form part of the estate of the decedent; corollarily, the obligations imposed by the
Codicil on the deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to his
compulsory heirs upon his death.
In the said Codicil, testatrix Aleja Belleza devised Lot No. 1392 to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla,
subject to the condition that the usufruct thereof would be delivered to the herein
private respondent every year. Upon the death of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his compulsory
heirs succeeded to his rights and title over the said property, and they also assumed
his (decedent's) obligation to deliver the fruits of the lot involved to herein private
respondent. Such obligation of the instituted heir reciprocally corresponds to the right
of private respondent over the usufruct, the fulfillment or performance of which is
now being demanded by the latter through the institution of the case at bar.
Therefore, private respondent has a cause of action against petitioner and the trial
court erred in dismissing the complaint below.
Petitioner also theorizes that Article 882 of the New Civil Code on modal institutions
is not applicable because what the testatrix intended was a substitution - Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla was to be substituted by the testatrix's near descendants should there be
noncompliance with the obligation to deliver the piculs of sugar to private respondent.
Again, the contention is without merit.
Substitution is the designation by the testator of a person or persons to take the place
of the heir or heirs first instituted. Under substitutions in general, the testator may
either (1) provide for the designation of another heir to whom the property shall pass
in case the original heir should die before him/her, renounce the inheritance or be
incapacitated to inherit, as in a simple substitution,[12] or (2) leave his/her property to
one person with the express charge that it be transmitted subsequently to another or
others, as in a fideicommissary substitution.[13] The Codicil sued upon contemplates
neither of the two.
In simple substitutions, the second heir takes the inheritance in default of the first heir
by reason of incapacity, predecease or renunciation.[14] In the case under
consideration, the provisions of subject Codicil do not provide that should Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla default due to predecease, incapacity or renunciation, the testatrix's near
descendants would substitute him. What the Codicil provides is that, should Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the conditions imposed in the Codicil, the property
referred to shall be seized and turned over to the testatrix's near descendants.
Neither is there a fideicommissary substitution here and on this point, petitioner is
correct. In a fideicommissary substitution, the first heir is strictly mandated to
preserve the property and to transmit the same later to the second heir.[15] In the case
under consideration, the instituted heir is in fact allowed under the Codicil to alienate
the property provided the negotiation is with the near descendants or the sister of the
testatrix. Thus, a very important element of a fideicommissary substitution is lacking;
the obligation clearly imposing upon the first heir the preservation of the property and
its transmission to the second heir. "Without this obligation to preserve clearly
imposed by the testator in his will, there is no fideicommissary substitution."[16] Also,
the near descendants' right to inherit from the testatrix is not definite. The property
will only pass to them should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the obligation
to deliver part of the usufruct to private respondent.
Another important element of a fideicommissary substitution is also missing here.
Under Article 863, the second heir or the fideicommissary to whom the property is
transmitted must not be beyond one degree from the first heir or the fiduciary. A
fideicommissary substitution is therefore, void if the first heir is not related by first
degree to the second heir.[17] In the case under scrutiny, the near descendants are not
at all related to the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.
The Court of Appeals erred not in ruling that the institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under
subject Codicil is in the nature of a modal institution and therefore, Article 882 of the
New Civil Code is the provision of law in point. Articles 882 and 883 of the New Civil
Code provide:
Art. 882. The statement of the object of the institution or the application of the
property left by the testator, or the charge imposed on him, shall not be considered
as a condition unless it appears that such was his intention.
That which has been left in this manner may be claimed at once provided that the
instituted heir or his heirs give security for compliance with the wishes of the testator
and for the return of anything he or they may receive, together with its fruits and
interests, if he or they should disregard this obligation.
Art. 883. When without the fault of the heir, an institution referred to in the preceding
article cannot take effect in the exact manner stated by the testator, it shall be
complied with in a manner most analogous to and in conformity with his wishes.
The institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in Article 882 is what is known in
the law of succession as an institucion sub modo or a modal institution. In a modal
institution, the testator states (1) the object of the institution, (2) the purpose or
application of the property left by the testator, or (3) the charge imposed by the
testator upon the heir.[18] A "mode" imposes an obligation upon the heir or legatee
but it does not affect the efficacy of his rights to the succession.[19] On the other hand,
in a conditional testamentary disposition, the condition must happen or be fulfilled in
order for the heir to be entitled to succeed the testator. The condition suspends but
does not obligate; and the mode obligates but does not suspend.[20] To some extent,
it is similar to a resolutory condition.[21]
From the provisions of the Codicil litigated upon, it can be gleaned unerringly that the
testatrix intended that subject property be inherited by Dr. Jorge Rabadilla. It is
likewise clearly worded that the testatrix imposed an obligation on the said instituted
heir and his successors-in-interest to deliver one hundred piculs of sugar to the herein
private respondent, Marlena Coscolluela Belleza, during the lifetime of the latter.
However, the testatrix did not make Dr. Jorge Rabadilla's inheritance and the
effectivity of his institution as a devisee, dependent on the performance of the said
obligation. It is clear, though, that should the obligation be not complied with, the
property shall be turned over to the testatrix's near descendants. The manner of
institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil is evidently modal in nature
because it imposes a charge upon the instituted heir without, however, affecting the
efficacy of such institution.
Then too, since testamentary dispositions are generally acts of liberality, an obligation
imposed upon the heir should not be considered a condition unless it clearly appears
from the Will itself that such was the intention of the testator. In case of doubt, the
institution should be considered as modal and not conditional.[22]
Neither is there tenability in the other contention of petitioner that the private
respondent has only a right of usufruct but not the right to seize the property itself
from the instituted heir because the right to seize was expressly limited to violations
by the buyer, lessee or mortgagee.
Suffice it to state that a Will is a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a
person disposes of his property, to take effect after his death. [25] Since the Will
expresses the manner in which a person intends how his properties be disposed, the
wishes and desires of the testator must be strictly followed. Thus, a Will cannot be the
subject of a compromise agreement which would thereby defeat the very purpose of
making a Will.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the decision of the Court of
Appeals, dated December 23, 1993, in CA-G.R. No. CV-35555 AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs
SO ORDERED.

In the interpretation of Wills, when an uncertainty arises on the face of the Will, as to
the application of any of its provisions, the testator's intention is to be ascertained
from the words of the Will, taking into consideration the circumstances under which
it was made.[23] Such construction as will sustain and uphold the Will in all its parts
must be adopted.[24]

Subject Codicil provides that the instituted heir is under obligation to deliver One
Hundred (100) piculs of sugar yearly to Marlena Belleza Coscuella. Such obligation is
imposed on the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his heirs, and their buyer, lessee,
or mortgagee should they sell, lease, mortgage or otherwise negotiate the property
involved. The Codicil further provides that in the event that the obligation to deliver
the sugar is not respected, Marlena Belleza Coscuella shall seize the property and turn
it over to the testatrix's near descendants. The non-performance of the said obligation
is thus with the sanction of seizure of the property and reversion thereof to the
testatrix's near descendants. Since the said obligation is clearly imposed by the
testatrix, not only on the instituted heir but also on his successors-in-interest, the
sanction imposed by the testatrix in case of non-fulfillment of said obligation should
equally apply to the instituted heir and his successors-in-interest.

Similarly unsustainable is petitioner's submission that by virtue of the amicable

settlement, the said obligation imposed by the Codicil has been assumed by the lessee,
and whatever obligation petitioner had become the obligation of the lessee; that
petitioner is deemed to have made a substantial and constructive compliance of his
obligation through the consummated settlement between the lessee and the private
respondent, and having consummated a settlement with the petitioner, the recourse
of the private respondent is the fulfillment of the obligation under the amicable
settlement and not the seizure of subject property.
Alvarez vs. IAC (G.R. No. 68053, May 7, 1990)
LAURA ALVAREZ, FLORA ALVAREZ and RAYMUNDO ALVAREZ, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APELLATE COURT and JESUS YANES, ESTELITA YANES,
ANTONIO YANES, ROSARIO YANES, and ILUMINADO YANES, respondents.
Francisco G. Banzon for petitioner.
Renecio R. Espiritu for private respondents.
FERNAN, C.J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of: (a) the decision of the
Fourth Civil Cases Division of the Intermediate Appellate Court dated August 31, 1983
in AC-G.R. CV No. 56626 entitled "Jesus Yanes et al. v. Dr. Rodolfo Siason et
al." affirming the decision dated July 8, 1974 of the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental insofar as it ordered the petitioners to pay jointly and severally the private
respondents the sum of P20,000.00 representing the actual value of Lots Nos. 773-A
and 773-B of the cadastral survey of Murcia, Negros Occidental and reversing the
subject decision insofar as it awarded the sums of P2,000.00, P5,000.00 and P2,000.00
as actual damages, moral damages and attorney's fees, respectively and (b) the
resolution of said appellate court dated May 30, 1984, denying the motion for
reconsideration of its decision.
The real properties involved are two parcels of land identified as Lot 773-A and Lot
773-B which were originally known as Lot 773 of the cadastral survey of Murcia,
Negros Occidental. Lot 773, with an area of 156,549 square meters, was registered in
the name of the heirs of Aniceto Yanes under Original Certificate of Title No. RO-4858
(8804) issued on October 9, 1917 by the Register of Deeds of Occidental Negros (Exh.
A).
Aniceto Yanes was survived by his children, Rufino, Felipe and Teodora. Herein private
respondents, Estelita, Iluminado and Jesus, are the children of Rufino who died in 1962
while the other private respondents, Antonio and Rosario Yanes, are children of Felipe.
Teodora was survived by her child, Jovita (Jovito) Alib. 1 It is not clear why the latter is
not included as a party in this case.
Aniceto left his children Lots 773 and 823. Teodora cultivated only three hectares of
Lot 823 as she could not attend to the other portions of the two lots which had a total
area of around twenty-four hectares. The record does not show whether the children
of Felipe also cultivated some portions of the lots but it is established that Rufino and
his children left the province to settle in other places as a result of the outbreak of
World War II. According to Estelita, from the "Japanese time up to peace time", they
did not visit the parcels of land in question but "after liberation", when her brother
went there to get their share of the sugar produced therein, he was informed that
Fortunato Santiago, Fuentebella (Puentevella) and Alvarez were in possession of Lot
773. 2
It is on record that on May 19, 1938, Fortunato D. Santiago was issued Transfer
Certificate of Title No. RF 2694 (29797) covering Lot 773-A with an area of 37,818
square meters. 3 TCT No. RF 2694 describes Lot 773-A as a portion of Lot 773 of the
cadastral survey of Murcia and as originally registered under OCT No. 8804.
The bigger portion of Lot 773 with an area of 118,831 square meters was also
registered in the name of Fortunato D. Santiago on September 6, 1938 Under TCT No.
RT-2695 (28192 ). 4 Said transfer certificate of title also contains a certification to the
effect that Lot 773-B was originally registered under OCT No. 8804.
On May 30, 1955, Santiago sold Lots 773-A and 773-B to Monico B. Fuentebella, Jr. in
consideration of the sum of P7,000.00. 5 Consequently, on February 20, 1956, TCT
Nos. T-19291 and T-19292 were issued in Fuentebella's name. 6
After Fuentebella's death and during the settlement of his estate, the administratrix
thereof (Arsenia R. Vda. de Fuentebella, his wife) filed in Special Proceedings No. 4373
in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, a motion requesting authority to
sell Lots 773-A and 773-B. 7 By virtue of a court order granting said motion, 8 on March
24, 1958, Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella sold said lots for P6,000.00 to Rosendo
Alvarez. 9 Hence, on April 1, 1958 TCT Nos. T-23165 and T-23166 covering Lots 773-A
and 773-B were respectively issued to Rosendo Alvarez. 10
Two years later or on May 26, 1960, Teodora Yanes and the children of her brother
Rufino, namely, Estelita, Iluminado and Jesus, filed in the Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental a complaint against Fortunato Santiago, Arsenia Vda. de
Fuentebella, Alvarez and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental for the "return"
of the ownership and possession of Lots 773 and 823. They also prayed that an
accounting of the produce of the land from 1944 up to the filing of the complaint be
made by the defendants, that after court approval of said accounting, the share or
money equivalent due the plaintiffs be delivered to them, and that defendants be
ordered to pay plaintiffs P500.00 as damages in the form of attorney's fees. 11
During the pendency in court of said case or on November 13, 1961, Alvarez sold Lots
773-A, 773-B and another lot for P25,000.00 to Dr. Rodolfo Siason. 12 Accordingly, TCT
Nos. 30919 and 30920 were issued to Siason, 13 who thereafter, declared the two lots
in his name for assessment purposes. 14
Meanwhile, on November 6, 1962, Jesus Yanes, in his own behalf and in behalf of the
other plaintiffs, and assisted by their counsel, filed a manifestation in Civil Case No.
5022 stating that the therein plaintiffs "renounce, forfeit and quitclaims (sic) any claim,
monetary or otherwise, against the defendant Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella in
connection with the above-entitled case." 15
On October 11, 1963, a decision was rendered by the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental in Civil Case No. 5022, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered, ordering the defendant Rosendo Alvarez to
reconvey to the plaintiffs lots Nos. 773 and 823 of the Cadastral Survey of Murcia,
Negros Occidental, now covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-23165 and T-
23166 in the name of said defendant, and thereafter to deliver the possession of said
lots to the plaintiffs. No special pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 16
It will be noted that the above-mentioned manifestation of Jesus Yanes was not
mentioned in the aforesaid decision.
However, execution of said decision proved unsuccessful with respect to Lot 773. In
his return of service dated October 20, 1965, the sheriff stated that he discovered that
Lot 773 had been subdivided into Lots 773-A and 773-B; that they were "in the name"
of Rodolfo Siason who had purchased them from Alvarez, and that Lot 773 could not
be delivered to the plaintiffs as Siason was "not a party per writ of execution." 17
The execution of the decision in Civil Case No. 5022 having met a hindrance, herein
private respondents (the Yaneses) filed on July 31, 1965, in the Court of First Instance
of Negros Occidental a petition for the issuance of a new certificate of title and for a
declaration of nullity of TCT Nos. T-23165 and T-23166 issued to Rosendo
Alvarez. 18 Thereafter, the court required Rodolfo Siason to produce the certificates of
title covering Lots 773 and 823.
Expectedly, Siason filed a manifestation stating that he purchased Lots 773-A, 773-B
and 658, not Lots 773 and 823, "in good faith and for a valuable consideration without
any knowledge of any lien or encumbrances against said properties"; that the decision
in the cadastral proceeding 19 could not be enforced against him as he was not a party
thereto; and that the decision in Civil Case No. 5022 could neither be enforced against
him not only because he was not a party-litigant therein but also because it had long
become final and executory. 20 Finding said manifestation to be well-founded, the
cadastral court, in its order of September 4, 1965, nullified its previous order requiring
Siason to surrender the certificates of title mentioned therein. 21
In 1968, the Yaneses filed an ex-parte motion for the issuance of an alias writ of
execution in Civil Case No. 5022. Siason opposed it. 22 In its order of September 28,
1968 in Civil Case No. 5022, the lower court, noting that the Yaneses had instituted
another action for the recovery of the land in question, ruled that at the judgment
therein could not be enforced against Siason as he was not a party in the case. 23
The action filed by the Yaneses on February 21, 1968 was for recovery of real property
with damages. 24 Named defendants therein were Dr. Rodolfo Siason, Laura Alvarez,
Flora Alvarez, Raymundo Alvarez and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental. The
Yaneses prayed for the cancellation of TCT Nos. T-19291 and 19292 issued to Siason
(sic) for being null and void; the issuance of a new certificate of title in the name of
the Yaneses "in accordance with the sheriffs return of service dated October 20,
1965;" Siason's delivery of possession of Lot 773 to the Yaneses; and if, delivery
thereof could not be effected, or, if the issuance of a new title could not be made, that
the Alvarez and Siason jointly and severally pay the Yaneses the sum of P45,000.00.
They also prayed that Siason render an accounting of the fruits of Lot 773 from
November 13, 1961 until the filing of the complaint; and that the defendants jointly
and severally pay the Yaneses moral damages of P20,000.00 and exemplary damages
of P10,000.00 plus attorney's fees of P4, 000.00. 25
In his answer to the complaint, Siason alleged that the validity of his titles to Lots 773-
A and 773-B, having been passed upon by the court in its order of September 4, 1965,
had become res judicata and the Yaneses were estopped from questioning said
order. 26 On their part, the Alvarez stated in their answer that the Yaneses' cause of
action had been "barred by res judicata, statute of limitation and estoppel." 27
In its decision of July 8, 1974, the lower court found that Rodolfo Siason, who
purchased the properties in question thru an agent as he was then in Mexico pursuing
further medical studies, was a buyer in good faith for a valuable consideration.
Although the Yaneses were negligent in their failure to place a notice of lis
pendens "before the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental in order to protect their
rights over the property in question" in Civil Case No. 5022, equity demanded that
they recover the actual value of the land because the sale thereof executed between
Alvarez and Siason was without court approval. 28 The dispositive portion of the
decision states:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATION, judgment is hereby rendered in the
following manner:
A. The case against the defendant Dr. Rodolfo Siason and the Register of Deeds are
(sic) hereby dismmissed,
B. The defendants, Laura, Flora and Raymundo, all surnamed Alvarez being the
legitimate children of the deceased Rosendo Alvarez are hereby ordered to pay jointly
and severally the plaintiffs the sum of P20,000.00 representing the actual value of Lots
Nos. 773-A and 773-B of Murcia Cadastre, Negros Occidental; the sum of P2,000.00 as
actual damages suffered by the plaintiff; the sum of P5,000.00 representing moral
damages and the sum of P2.000 as attorney's fees, all with legal rate of interest from
date of the filing of this complaint up to final payment.
C. The cross-claim filed by the defendant Dr. Rodolfo Siason against the defendants,
Laura, Flora and Raymundo, all surnamed Alvarez is hereby dismissed.
D. Defendants, Laura, Flora and Raymundo, all surnamed Alvarez are hereby ordered
to pay the costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED. 29
The Alvarez appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court which in its decision
of August 31, 1983 30 affirmed the lower court's decision "insofar as it ordered
defendants-appellants to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs-appellees the sum of
P20,000.00 representing the actual value of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of the cadastral
survey of Murcia, Negros Occidental, and is reversed insofar as it awarded the sums
of P2,000.00, P5,000.00 and P2,000.00 as actual damages, moral damages and
attorney's fees, respectively." 31 The dispositive portion of said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed insofar as it ordered defendants-
appellants to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs- appellees the sum of P20,000.00
representing the actual value of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of the cadastral survey of
Murcia, Negros Occidental, and is reversed insofar as it awarded the sums of
P2,000.00, P5,000.00 and P2,000.00 as actual damages, moral damages and attorney's
fees, respectively. No costs.
SO ORDERED. 32
Finding no cogent reason to grant appellants motion for reconsideration, said
appellate court denied the same.
Hence, the instant petition. ln their memorandum petitioners raised the following
issues:
1. Whethere or not the defense of prescription and estoppel had been timely and
properly invoked and raised by the petitioners in the lower court.
2. Whether or not the cause and/or causes of action of the private respondents, if ever
there are any, as alleged in their complaint dated February 21, 1968 which has been
docketed in the trial court as Civil Case No. 8474 supra, are forever barred by statute
of limitation and/or prescription of action and estoppel.
3. Whether or not the late Rosendo Alvarez, a defendant in Civil Case No. 5022, supra
and father of the petitioners become a privy and/or party to the waiver (Exhibit 4-
defendant Siason) in Civil Case No. 8474, supra where the private respondents had
unqualifiedly and absolutely waived, renounced and quitclaimed all their alleged rights
and interests, if ever there is any, on Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of Murcia Cadastre as
appearing in their written manifestation dated November 6, 1962 (Exhibits "4" Siason)
which had not been controverted or even impliedly or indirectly denied by them.
4. Whether or not the liability or liabilities of Rosendo Alvarez arising from the sale of
Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of Murcia Cadastre to Dr. Rodolfo Siason, if ever there is
any, could be legally passed or transmitted by operations (sic) of law to the petitioners
without violation of law and due process . 33
The petition is devoid of merit.
As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, it is powerless and for that matter so is the
Supreme Court, to review the decision in Civil Case No. 5022 ordering Alvarez to
reconvey the lots in dispute to herein private respondents. Said decision had long
become final and executory and with the possible exception of Dr. Siason, who was
not a party to said case, the decision in Civil Case No. 5022 is the law of the case
between the parties thereto. It ended when Alvarez or his heirs failed to appeal the
decision against them. 34
Thus, it is axiomatic that when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined
by a court of competent jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed, it should be
conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate. 35 As
consistently ruled by this Court, every litigation must come to an end. Access to the
court is guaranteed. But there must be a limit to it. Once a litigant's right has been
adjudicated in a valid final judgment of a competent court, he should not be granted
an unbridled license to return for another try. The prevailing party should not be
harassed by subsequent suits. For, if endless litigation were to be allowed,
unscrupulous litigations will multiply in number to the detriment of the administration
of justice. 36
There is no dispute that the rights of the Yaneses to the properties in question have
been finally adjudicated in Civil Case No. 5022. As found by the lower court, from the
uncontroverted evidence presented, the Yaneses have been illegally deprived of
ownership and possession of the lots in question. 37 In fact, Civil Case No. 8474 now
under review, arose from the failure to execute Civil Case No. 5022, as subject lots can
no longer be reconveyed to private respondents Yaneses, the same having been sold
during the pendency of the case by the petitioners' father to Dr. Siason who did not
know about the controversy, there being no lis pendens annotated on the titles.
Hence, it was also settled beyond question that Dr. Siason is a purchaser in good faith.
Under the circumstances, the trial court did not annul the sale executed by Alvarez in
favor of Dr. Siason on November 11, 1961 but in fact sustained it. The trial court
ordered the heirs of Rosendo Alvarez who lost in Civil Case No. 5022 to pay the
plaintiffs (private respondents herein) the amount of P20,000.00 representing the
actual value of the subdivided lots in dispute. It did not order defendant Siason to pay
said amount. 38
As to the propriety of the present case, it has long been established that the sole
remedy of the landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously
registered in another's name is to bring an ordinary action in the ordinary court of
justice for reconveyance or, if the property has passed into the hands of an innocent
purchaser for value, for damages. 39 "It is one thing to protect an innocent third party;
it is entirely a different matter and one devoid of justification if deceit would be
rewarded by allowing the perpetrator to enjoy the fruits of his nefarious decided As
clearly revealed by the undeviating line of decisions coming from this Court, such an
undesirable eventuality is precisely sought to be guarded against." 40
The issue on the right to the properties in litigation having been finally adjudicated in
Civil Case No. 5022 in favor of private respondents, it cannot now be reopened in the
instant case on the pretext that the defenses of prescription and estoppel have not
been properly considered by the lower court. Petitioners could have appealed in the
former case but they did not. They have therefore foreclosed their rights, if any, and
they cannot now be heard to complain in another case in order to defeat the
enforcement of a judgment which has longing become final and executory.
Petitioners further contend that the liability arising from the sale of Lots No. 773-A
and 773-B made by Rosendo Alvarez to Dr. Rodolfo Siason should be the sole liability
of the late Rosendo Alvarez or of his estate, after his death.
Such contention is untenable for it overlooks the doctrine obtaining in this jurisdiction
on the general transmissibility of the rights and obligations of the deceased to his
legitimate children and heirs. Thus, the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code state:
Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights
and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are
transmitted through his death to another or others either by his will or by operation
of law.
Art. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person
which are not extinguished by his death.
Art. 1311. Contract stake effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs
except in case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not
transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law. The heir is not
liable beyond the value of the property received from the decedent.
As explained by this Court through Associate Justice J.B.L. Reyes in the case of Estate
of Hemady vs. Luzon Surety Co., Inc. 41
The binding effect of contracts upon the heirs of the deceased party is not altered by
the provision of our Rules of Court that money debts of a deceased must be liquidated
and paid from his estate before the residue is distributed among said heirs (Rule 89).
The reason is that whatever payment is thus made from the state is ultimately a
payment by the heirs or distributees, since the amount of the paid claim in fact
diminishes or reduces the shares that the heirs would have been entitled to receive.
Under our law, therefore. the general rule is that a party's contractual rights and
obligations are transmissible to the successors.
The rule is a consequence of the progressive "depersonalization" of patrimonial rights
and duties that, as observed by Victorio Polacco has characterized the history of these
institutions. From the Roman concept of a relation from person to person, the
obligation has evolved into a relation from patrimony to patrimony with the persons
occupying only a representative position, barring those rare cases where the
obligation is strictly personal, i.e., is contracted intuitu personae, in consideration of
its performance by a specific person and by no other.
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioners being the heirs of the late Rosendo Alvarez, they cannot escape the legal
consequences of their father's transaction, which gave rise to the present claim for
damages. That petitioners did not inherit the property involved herein is of no
moment because by legal fiction, the monetary equivalent thereof devolved into the
mass of their father's hereditary estate, and we have ruled that the hereditary assets
are always liable in their totality for the payment of the debts of the estate. 42
It must, however, be made clear that petitioners are liable only to the extent of the
value of their inheritance. With this clarification and considering petitioners'
admission that there are other properties left by the deceased which are sufficient to
cover the amount adjudged in favor of private respondents, we see no cogent reason
to disturb the findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals.

WHEREFORE, subject to the clarification herein above stated, the assailed decision of
the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
Pamplona vs. Moreto (96 SCRA 775)
CORNELIO PAMPLONA alias GEMINIANO PAMPLONA and APOLONIA
ONTE, petitioners,
vs.
VIVENCIO MORETO, VICTOR MORETO, ELIGIO MORETO, MARCELO MORETO, PAULINA
MORETO, ROSARIO MORETO, MARTA MORETO, SEVERINA MENDOZA, PABLO
MENDOZA, LAZARO MENDOZA, VICTORIA TUIZA, JOSEFINA MORETO, LEANDRO
MORETO and LORENZO MENDOZA, respondents.
E.P. Caguioa for petitioners.
Benjamin C. Yatco for respondents.
GUERRERO, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari by way of appeal from the decision of the Court of
Appeals 1 in CA-G.R. No. 35962-R, entitled "Vivencio Moreto, et al., Plaintiff-
Appellees vs. Cornelio Pamplona, et al., Defendants-Appellants," affirming the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch I at Biñan.
The facts, as stated in the decision appealed from, show that:
Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega were husband and wife. During their marriage,
they acquired adjacent lots Nos. 1495, 4545, and 1496 of the Calamba Friar Land
Estate, situated in Calamba, Laguna, containing 781-544 and 1,021 square meters
respectively and covered by certificates of title issued in the name of "Flaviano
Moreto, married to Monica Maniega."
The spouses Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega begot during their marriage six (6)
children, namely, Ursulo, Marta, La Paz, Alipio, Pablo, and Leandro, all surnamed
Moreto.
Ursulo Moreto died intestate on May 24, 1959 leaving as his heirs herein plaintiffs
Vivencio, Marcelo, Rosario, Victor, Paulina, Marta and Eligio, all surnamed Moreto.
Marta Moreto died also intestate on April 30, 1938 leaving as her heir plaintiff Victoria
Tuiza.
La Paz Moreto died intestate on July 17, 1954 leaving the following heirs, namely,
herein plaintiffs Pablo, Severina, Lazaro, and Lorenzo, all surnamed Mendoza.
Alipio Moreto died intestate on June 30, 1943 leaving as his heir herein plaintiff
Josefina Moreto.
Pablo Moreto died intestate on April 25, 1942 leaving no issue and as his heirs his
brother plaintiff Leandro Moreto and the other plaintiffs herein.
On May 6, 1946, Monica Maniega died intestate in Calamba, Laguna.
On July 30, 1952, or more than six (6) years after the death of his wife Monica Maniega,
Flaviano Moreto, without the consent of the heirs of his said deceased wife Monica,
and before any liquidation of the conjugal partnership of Monica and Flaviano could
be effected, executed in favor of Geminiano Pamplona, married to defendant Apolonia
Onte, the deed of absolute sale (Exh. "1") covering lot No. 1495 for P900.00. The deed
of sale (Exh. "1") contained a description of lot No. 1495 as having an area of 781
square meters and covered by transfer certificate of title No. 14570 issued in the name
of Flaviano Moreto, married to Monica Maniega, although the lot was acquired during
their marriage. As a result of the sale, the said certificate of title was cancelled and a
new transfer certificate of title No. T-5671 was issued in the name of Geminiano
Pamplona married to Apolonia Onte (Exh. "A").
After the execution of the above-mentioned deed of sale (Exh. "1"), the spouses
Geminiano Pamplona and Apolonia Onte constructed their house on the eastern part
of lot 1496 as Flaviano Moreto, at the time of the sale, pointed to it as the land which
he sold to Geminiano Pamplona. Shortly thereafter, Rafael Pamplona, son of the
spouses Geminiano Pamplona and Apolonia Onte, also built his house within lot 1496
about one meter from its boundary with the adjoining lot. The vendor Flaviano Moreto
and the vendee Geminiano Pamplona thought all the time that the portion of 781
square meters which was the subject matter of their sale transaction was No. 1495
and so lot No. 1495 appears to be the subject matter in the deed of sale (Exh. "1")
although the fact is that the said portion sold thought of by the parties to be lot No.
1495 is a part of lot No. 1496.
From 1956 to 1960, the spouses Geminiano Pamplona and Apolonio Onte enlarged
their house and they even constructed a piggery corral at the back of their said house
about one and one-half meters from the eastern boundary of lot 1496.
On August 12, 1956, Flaviano Moreto died intestate. In 1961, the plaintiffs demanded
on the defendants to vacate the premises where they had their house and piggery on
the ground that Flaviano Moreto had no right to sell the lot which he sold to
Geminiano Pamplona as the same belongs to the conjugal partnership of Flaviano and
his deceased wife and the latter was already dead when the sale was executed without
the consent of the plaintiffs who are the heirs of Monica. The spouses Geminiano
Pamplona and Apolonia Onte refused to vacate the premises occupied by them and
hence, this suit was instituted by the heirs of Monica Maniega seeking for the
declaration of the nullity of the deed of sale of July 30, 1952 above-mentioned as
regards one-half of the property subject matter of said deed; to declare the plaintiffs
as the rightful owners of the other half of said lot; to allow the plaintiffs to redeem the
one-half portion thereof sold to the defendants. "After payment of the other half of
the purchase price"; to order the defendants to vacate the portions occupied by them;
to order the defendants to pay actual and moral damages and attorney's fees to the
plaintiffs; to order the defendants to pay plaintiffs P120.00 a year from August 1958
until they have vacated the premises occupied by them for the use and occupancy of
the same.
The defendants claim that the sale made by Flaviano Moreto in their favor is valid as
the lot sold is registered in the name of Flaviano Moreto and they are purchasers
believing in good faith that the vendor was the sole owner of the lot sold.
After a relocation of lots 1495, 1496 and 4545 made by agreement of the parties, it
was found out that there was mutual error between Flaviano Moreto and the
defendants in the execution of the deed of sale because while the said deed recited
that the lot sold is lot No. 1495, the real intention of the parties is that it was a portion
consisting of 781 square meters of lot No. 1496 which was the subject matter of their
sale transaction.
After trial, the lower court rendered judgment, the dispositive part thereof being as
follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiffs declaring the deed of
absolute sale dated July 30, 1952 pertaining to the eastern portion of Lot 1496
covering an area of 781 square meters null and void as regards the 390.5 square
meters of which plaintiffs are hereby declared the rightful owners and entitled to its
possession.
The sale is ordered valid with respect to the eastern one-half (1/2) of 1781 square
meters of Lot 1496 measuring 390.5 square meters of which defendants are declared
lawful owners and entitled to its possession.
After proper survey segregating the eastern one-half portion with an area of 390.5
square meters of Lot 1496, the defendants shall be entitled to a certificate of title
covering said portion and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9843 of the office of the
Register of Deeds of Laguna shall be cancelled accordingly and new titles issued to the
plaintiffs and to the defendants covering their respective portions.
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 5671 of the office of the Register of Deeds of Laguna
covering Lot No. 1495 and registered in the name of Cornelio Pamplona, married to
Apolonia Onte, is by virtue of this decision ordered cancelled. The defendants are
ordered to surrender to the office of the Register of Deeds of Laguna the owner's
duplicate of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 5671 within thirty (30) days after this
decision shall have become final for cancellation in accordance with this decision.
Let copy of this decision be furnished the Register of Deeds for the province of Laguna
for his information and guidance.
With costs against the defendants. 2
The defendants-appellants, not being satisfied with said judgment, appealed to the
Court of Appeals, which affirmed the judgment, hence they now come to this Court.
The fundamental and crucial issue in the case at bar is whether under the facts and
circumstances duly established by the evidence, petitioners are entitled to the full
ownership of the property in litigation, or only one-half of the same.
There is no question that when the petitioners purchased the property on July 30,
1952 from Flaviano Moreto for the price of P900.00, his wife Monica Maniega had
already been dead six years before, Monica having died on May 6, 1946. Hence, the
conjugal partnership of the spouses Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega had already
been dissolved. (Article 175, (1) New Civil Code; Article 1417, Old Civil Code). The
records show that the conjugal estate had not been inventoried, liquidated, settled
and divided by the heirs thereto in accordance with law. The necessary proceedings
for the liquidation of the conjugal partnership were not instituted by the heirs either
in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse pursuant to Act 3176
amending Section 685 of Act 190. Neither was there an extra-judicial partition
between the surviving spouse and the heirs of the deceased spouse nor was an
ordinary action for partition brought for the purpose. Accordingly, the estate became
the property of a community between the surviving husband, Flaviano Moreto, and
his children with the deceased Monica Maniega in the concept of a co-ownership.
The community property of the marriage, at the dissolution of this bond by the death
of one of the spouses, ceases to belong to the legal partnership and becomes the
property of a community, by operation of law, between the surviving spouse and the
heirs of the deceased spouse, or the exclusive property of the widower or the widow,
it he or she be the heir of the deceased spouse. Every co-owner shall have full
ownership of his part and in the fruits and benefits derived therefrom, and he
therefore may alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in
its enjoyment, unless personal rights are in question. (Marigsa vs. Macabuntoc, 17 Phil.
107)
In Borja vs. Addision, 44 Phil. 895, 906, the Supreme Court said that "(t)here is no
reason in law why the heirs of the deceased wife may not form a partnership with the
surviving husband for the management and control of the community property of the
marriage and conceivably such a partnership, or rather community of property,
between the heirs and the surviving husband might be formed without a written
agreement." In Prades vs. Tecson, 49 Phil. 230, the Supreme Court held that
"(a)lthough, when the wife dies, the surviving husband, as administrator of the
community property, has authority to sell the property with•ut the concurrence of
the children of the marriage, nevertheless this power can be waived in favor of the
children, with the result of bringing about a conventional ownership in common
between the father and children as to such property; and any one purchasing with
knowledge of the changed status of the property will acquire only the undivided
interest of those members of the family who join in the act of conveyance.
It is also not disputed that immediately after the execution of the sale in 1952, the
vendees constructed their house on the eastern part of Lot 1496 which the vendor
pointed out to them as the area sold, and two weeks thereafter, Rafael who is a son
of the vendees, also built his house within Lot 1496. Subsequently, a cemented piggery
coral was constructed by the vendees at the back of their house about one and one-
half meters from the eastern boundary of Lot 1496. Both vendor and vendees believed
all the time that the area of 781 sq. meters subject of the sale was Lot No. 1495 which
according to its title (T.C.T. No. 14570) contains an area of 781 sq. meters so that the
deed of sale between the parties Identified and described the land sold as Lot 1495.
But actually, as verified later by a surveyor upon agreement of the parties during the
proceedings of the case below, the area sold was within Lot 1496.
Again, there is no dispute that the houses of the spouses Cornelio Pamplona and
Apolonia Onte as well as that of their son Rafael Pamplona, including the concrete
piggery coral adjacent thereto, stood on the land from 1952 up to the filing of the
complaint by the private respondents on July 25, 1961, or a period of over nine (9)
years. And during said period, the private respondents who are the heirs of Monica
Maniega as well as of Flaviano Moreto who also died intestate on August 12, 1956,
lived as neighbors to the petitioner-vendees, yet lifted no finger to question the
occupation, possession and ownership of the land purchased by the Pamplonas, so
that We are persuaded and convinced to rule that private respondents are in estoppel
by laches to claim half of the property, in dispute as null and void. Estoppel by laches
is a rule of equity which bars a claimant from presenting his claim when, by reason of
abandonment and negligence, he allowed a long time to elapse without presenting
the same. (International Banking Corporation vs. Yared, 59 Phil. 92)
We have ruled that at the time of the sale in 1952, the conjugal partnership was
already dissolved six years before and therefore, the estate became a co-ownership
between Flaviano Moreto, the surviving husband, and the heirs of his deceased wife,
Monica Maniega. Article 493 of the New Civil Code is applicable and it provides a
follows:
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and
benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and
even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are
involve. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-
owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division
upon the termination of the co-ownership.
We agree with the petitioner that there was a partial partition of the co-ownership
when at the time of the sale Flaviano Moreto pointed out the area and location of the
781 sq. meters sold by him to the petitioners-vendees on which the latter built their
house and also that whereon Rafael, the son of petitioners likewise erected his house
and an adjacent coral for piggery.
Petitioners point to the fact that spouses Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega owned
three parcels of land denominated as Lot 1495 having an area of 781 sq. meters, Lot
1496 with an area of 1,021 sq. meters, and Lot 4545 with an area of 544 sq. meters.
The three lots have a total area of 2,346 sq. meters. These three parcels of lots are
contiguous with one another as each is bounded on one side by the other, thus: Lot
4545 is bounded on the northeast by Lot 1495 and on the southeast by Lot 1496. Lot
1495 is bounded on the west by Lot 4545. Lot 1496 is bounded on the west by Lot
4545. It is therefore, clear that the three lots constitute one big land. They are not
separate properties located in different places but they abut each other. This is not
disputed by private respondents. Hence, at the time of the sale, the co-ownership
constituted or covered these three lots adjacent to each other. And since Flaviano
Moreto was entitled to one-half pro-indiviso of the entire land area or 1,173 sq.
meters as his share, he had a perfect legal and lawful right to dispose of 781 sq. meters
of his share to the Pamplona spouses. Indeed, there was still a remainder of some 392
sq. meters belonging to him at the time of the sale.
We reject respondent Court's ruling that the sale was valid as to one-half and invalid
as to the other half for the very simple reason that Flaviano Moreto, the vendor, had
the legal right to more than 781 sq. meters of the communal estate, a title which he
could dispose, alienate in favor of the vendees-petitioners. The title may be pro-
indiviso or inchoate but the moment the co-owner as vendor pointed out its location
and even indicated the boundaries over which the fences were to be erectd without
objection, protest or complaint by the other co-owners, on the contrary they
acquiesced and tolerated such alienation, occupation and possession, We rule that a
factual partition or termination of the co-ownership, although partial, was created,
and barred not only the vendor, Flaviano Moreto, but also his heirs, the private
respondents herein from asserting as against the vendees-petitioners any right or title
in derogation of the deed of sale executed by said vendor Flaiano Moreto.
Equity commands that the private respondents, the successors of both the deceased
spouses, Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega be not allowed to impugn the sale
executed by Flaviano Moreto who indisputably received the consideration of P900.00
and which he, including his children, benefitted from the same. Moreover, as the heirs
of both Monica Maniega and Flaviano Moreto, private respondents are duty-bound to
comply with the provisions of Articles 1458 and 1495, Civil Code, which is the
obligation of the vendor of the property of delivering and transfering the ownership
of the whole property sold, which is transmitted on his death to his heirs, the herein
private respondents. The articles cited provide, thus:
Petitioners are hereby declared owners in full ownership of the 781 sq. meters at the
eastern portion of Lot 1496 now occupied by said petitioners and whereon their
houses and piggery coral stand.
The Register of Deeds of Laguna is hereby ordered to segregate the area of 781 sq.
meters from Certificate of Title No. 9843 and to issue a new Transfer Certificate of
Title to the petitioners covering the segregated area of 781 sq. meters.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Art. 1458. By the contract of sale one of the contracting parties obligates himself to
transfer the ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing, and the other part to
pay therefore a price certain in money or its equivalent.

A contract of sale may be absolute or conditionial.

Art. 1495. The vendor is bound to transfer the ownership of and deliver, as well as
warrant the thing which is the object of the sale.

Under Article 776, New Civil Code, the inheritance which private respondents received
from their deceased parents and/or predecessors-in-interest included all the property
rights and obligations which were not extinguished by their parents' death. And under
Art. 1311, paragraph 1, New Civil Code, the contract of sale executed by the deceased
Flaviano Moreto took effect between the parties, their assigns and heirs, who are the
private respondents herein. Accordingly, to the private respondents is transmitted the
obligation to deliver in full ownership the whole area of 781 sq. meters to the
petitioners (which was the original obligation of their predecessor Flaviano Moreto)
and not only one-half thereof. Private respondents must comply with said obligation.

The records reveal that the area of 781 sq. meters sold to and occupied by petitioners
for more than 9 years already as of the filing of the complaint in 1961 had been re-
surveyed by private land surveyor Daniel Aranas. Petitioners are entitled to a
segregation of the area from Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-9843 covering Lot 1496
and they are also entitled to the issuance of a new Transfer Certificate of Title in their
name based on the relocation survey.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is hereby

AFFIRMED with modification in the sense that the sale made and executed by Flaviano
Moreto in favor of the petitioners-vendees is hereby declared legal and valid in its
entirely.
Ledesma vs. McLachlin (66 Phil 547)
SOCORRO LEDESMA and ANA QUITCO LEDESMA, plaintiffs-appellees, vs.
CONCHITA MCLACHLIN, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
This case is before us by virtue of an appeal taken by the defendants Conchita
McLachlin, Lorenzo Quitco, Jr., Sabina Quitco, Rafael Quitco and Marcela Quitco, from
the decision of the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros, the dispositive part of
which reads:
For the foregoing considerations, the court renders judgment in this case declaring
Ana Quitco Ledesma an acknowledged natural daughter of the deceased Lorenzo M.
Quitco, for legal purposes, but absolving the defendants as to the prayer in the first
cause of action that the said Ana Quitco Ledesma be declared entitled to share in the
properties left by the deceased Eusebio Quitco.
As to the second cause of action, the said defendants are ordered to pay to the plaintiff
Socorro Ledesma, jointly and severally, only the sum of one thousand five hundred
pesos(P1,500), with legal interest thereon from the filing of this complaint until fully
paid. No pronouncement is made as to the costs. So ordered.
In support of their appeal, the appellants assign the following errors allegedly
committed by the trial court in its aforesaid decision:
1. That the trial court erred in holding, that the action for the recovery of the sum of
P1,500, representing the last installment of the note Exhibit C has not yet prescribed.
2. That the trial court erred in holding that the property inherited by the defendants
from their deceased grandfather by the right of representation is subject to the debts
and obligations of their deceased father who died without any property
whatsoever.lawphi1.net
3. That the trial court erred in condemning the defendants to pay jointly and severally
the plaintiff Socorro Ledesma the sum of P1,500.
The only facts to be considered in the determination of the legal questions raised in
this appeal are those set out in the appealed decision, which have been established at
the trial, namely:
In the year 1916, the plaintiff Socorro Ledesma lived maritally with Lorenzo M. Quitco,
while the latter was still single, of which relation, lasting until the year 1921, was born
a daughter who is the other plaintiff Ana Quitco Ledesma. In 1921, it seems hat the
relation between Socorro Ledesma and Lorenzo M. Quitco came to an end, but the
latter executed a deed (Exhibit A), acknowledging the plaintiff Ana Quitco Ledesma as
his natural daughter and on January 21, 1922, he issued in favor of the plaintiff Socorro
Ledesma a promissory note (Exhibit C), of the following tenor:
P2,000. For value received I promise to pay Miss Socorro Ledesma the sum of two
thousand pesos (P2,000). Philippine currency under the following terms: Two hundred
and fifty pesos (P250) to be paid on the first day of March 1922; another two hundred
and fifty pesos (P250)to be paid on the first day of November 1922; the
remaining one thousand and five hundred (P1,500) to be paid two years from the date
of the execution of this note. San Enrique, Occ. Negros, P. I., Jan. 21, 1922.
Subsequently, Lorenzo M. Quitco married the defendant Conchita McLachlin, with
whom he had four children, who are the other defendants. On March 9, 1930, Lorenzo
M. Quitco died (Exhibit 5), and, still later, that is, on December 15, 1932, his father
Eusebio Quitco also died, and as the latter left real and personal properties upon his
death, administration proceedings of said properties were instituted in this court, the
said case being known as the "Intestate of the deceased Eusebio Quitco," civil case No.
6153 of this court.
Upon the institution of the intestate of the deceased Eusebio Quitco and the
appointment of the committee on claims and appraisal, the plaintiff Socorro Ledesma,
on August 26, 1935, filed before said committee the aforequoted promissory note for
payment, and the commissioners, upon receipt of said promissory note, instead of
passing upon it, elevated the same to this court en consulta (Exhibit F), and as the
Honorable Jose Lopez Vito, presiding over the First Branch, returned said consulta and
refrained from giving his opinion thereon (Exhibit C), the aforesaid commissioners on
claims and appraisal, alleging lack of jurisdiction to pass upon the claim, denied he
same (Exhibit H).
On November 14, 1933 (Exhibit I), the court issued an order of declaration of
heirs in the intestate of the deceased Eusebio Quitco, and as Ana Quitco Ledesma was
not included among the declared heirs, Socorro Ledesma, as mother of Ana Quitco
Ledesma, asked for the reconsideration of said order, a petition which the court
denied. From the order denying the said petition no appeal was taken, and in lieu
thereof there was filed the complaint which gives rise to this case.
The first question to be decided in this appeal, raised in the first assignment of alleged
error, is whether or not the action to recover the sum of P1,500, representing the last
installment for the payment of the promissory note Exhibit C, has prescribed.
According to the promissory note Exhibit C, executed by the deceased Lorenzo M. not suspend the prescriptive period of the judicial action for the recovery of said
Quitco, on January 21, 1922, the last installment of P1,500 should be paid two years indebtedness; (2) that the claim for the payment of an indebtedness contracted by a
from the date of the execution of said promissory note, that is, on January 21, 1924. deceased person cannot be filed for its collection before the committee on claims and
The complaint in the present case was filed on June 26, 1934, that is, more than ten appraisal, appointed in the intestate of his father, and the propertiesinherited from
years after he expiration of the said period. The fact that the plaintiff Socorro Ledesma the latter by the children of said deceased do not answer for the payment of the
filed her claim, on August 26, 1933, with the committee on claims and appraisal indebtedness contracted during the lifetime of said person.
appointed in the intestate of Eusebio Quitco, does not suspend the running of the
prescriptive period of the judicial action for the recovery of said debt, because the Wherefore, the appealed judgment is reversed, and the defendants are absolved from
claim for the unpaid balance of the amount of the promissory note should no have the complaint, with the costs to the appellees. So ordered.
been presented in the intestate of Eusebio Quitco, the said deceased not being the
one who executed the same, but in the intestate of Lorenzo M. Quitco, which should
have been instituted by the said Socorro Ledesma as provided in section 642 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, authorizing a creditor to institute said case through the
appointment of an administrator for the purpose of collecting his credit. More than
ten years having thus elapsed from the expiration of the period for the payment of
said debt of P1,500, the action for its recovery has prescribed under section 43, No. 1,
of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The first assignment of alleged error is, therefore, well-founded.

As to the second assignment of alleged error, consisting in that the trial court erred in
holding that the properties inherited by the defendants from their deceased
grandfather by representation are subject to the payment of debts and obligations of
their deceased father, who died without leaving any property, while it is true that
under the provisions of articles 924 to 927 of the Civil Code, a children presents his
father or mother who died before him in the properties of his grandfather or
grandmother, this right of representation does not make the said child answerable for
the obligations contracted by his deceased father or mother, because, as may be seen
from the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure referring to partition of
inheritances, the inheritance is received with the benefit of inventory, that is to say,
the heirs only answer with the properties received from their predecessor. The herein
defendants, as heirs of Eusebio Quitco, in representation of their father Lorenzo M.
Quitco, are not bound to pay the indebtedness of their said father from whom they
did not inherit anything.

The second assignment of alleged error is also well-founded.

Being a mere sequel of the first two assignments of alleged errors, the third
assignment of error is also well-founded.

For the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion and so hold: (1) That the filing
of a claim before the committee on claims and appraisal, appointed in the intestate of
the father, for a monetary obligation contracted by a son who died before him, does
ARTICLE 777
Ining, et. al. vs. Vega (G.R. No. 174727, August 12, 2013)
ANTIPOLO INING (DECEASED), SURVIVED BY MANUEL VILLANUEVA, TEODORA
VILLANUEVA-FRANCISCO, CAMILO FRANCISCO, ADOLFO FRANCISCO, LUCIMO
FRANCISCO, JR., MILAGROS FRANCISCO,* CELEDONIO FRANCISCO, HERMINIGILDO
FRANCISCO; RAMON TRESVALLES, ROBERTO TAJONERA, NATIVIDAD INING-IBEA
(DECEASED) SURVIVED BY EDILBERTO IBEA, JOSEFA IBEA, MARTHA IBEA, CARMEN IBEA,
AMPARO IBEA-FERNANDEZ, HENRY RUIZ, EUGENIO RUIZ AND PASTOR RUIZ; DOLORES
INING-RIMON (DECEASED) SURVIVED BY JESUS RIMON, CESARIA RIMON GONZALES
AND REMEDIOS RIMON CORDERO; AND PEDRO INING (DECEASED) SURVIVED BY ELISA
TAN INING (WIFE) AND PEDRO INING, JR., PETITIONERS,
vs.
LEONARDO R. VEGA, SUBSTITUTED BY LOURDES VEGA, RESTONILO I. VEGA, CRISPULO
M. VEGA, MILBUENA VEGA-RESTITUTO, AND LENARD VEGA, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
One who is merely related by affinity to the decedent does not inherit from the latter
and cannot become a co-owner of the decedent’s property. Consequently, he cannot
effect a repudiation of the co-ownership of the estate that was formed among the
decedent’s heirs.
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 are the March 14, 2006 Decision2 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 74687 and its September 7, 2006
Resolution3 denying petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration.4
Factual Antecedents
Leon Roldan (Leon), married to Rafaela Menez (Rafaela), is the owner of a 3,120-
square meter parcel of land (subject property) in Kalibo, Aklan covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. (24071) RO-6305 (OCT RO-630). Leon and Rafaela died without
issue. Leon was survived by his siblings Romana Roldan (Romana) and Gregoria Roldan
Ining (Gregoria), who are now both deceased.
Romana was survived by her daughter Anunciacion Vega and grandson, herein
respondent Leonardo R. Vega (Leonardo) (also both deceased). Leonardo in turn is
survived by his wife Lourdes and children Restonilo I. Vega, Crispulo M. Vega, Milbuena
Vega-Restituto and Lenard Vega, the substituted respondents.
Gregoria, on the other hand, was survived by her six children: petitioners Natividad
Ining-Ibea (Natividad), Dolores Ining-Rimon (Dolores), Antipolo, and Pedro; Jose; and
Amando. Natividad is survived by Edilberto Ibea, Josefa Ibea, Martha Ibea, Carmen
Ibea, Amparo Ibea-Fernandez, Henry Ruiz and Pastor Ruiz. Dolores is survived by Jesus
Rimon, Cesaria Rimon Gonzales and Remedios Rimon Cordero. Antipolo is survived by
Manuel Villanueva, daughter Teodora Villanueva-Francisco (Teodora), Camilo
Francisco (Camilo), Adolfo Francisco (Adolfo), Lucimo Francisco, Jr. (Lucimo Jr.),
Milagros Francisco, Celedonio Francisco, and Herminigildo Francisco (Herminigildo).
Pedro is survived by his wife, Elisa Tan Ining and Pedro Ining, Jr. Amando died without
issue. As for Jose, it is not clear from the records if he was made party to the
proceedings, or if he is alive at all.
In short, herein petitioners, except for Ramon Tresvalles (Tresvalles) and Roberto
Tajonera (Tajonera), are Gregoria’s grandchildren or spouses thereof (Gregoria’s
heirs).
In 1997, acting on the claim that one-half of subject property belonged to him as
Romana’s surviving heir, Leonardo filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kalibo,
Aklan Civil Case No. 52756 for partition, recovery of ownership and possession, with
damages, against Gregoria’s heirs. In his Amended Complaint,7 Leonardo alleged that
on several occasions, he demanded the partition of the property but Gregoria’s heirs
refused to heed his demands; that the matter reached the level of the Lupon
Tagapamayapa, which issued a certification to file a court action sometime in 1980;
that Gregoria’s heirs claimed sole ownership of the property; that portions of the
property were sold to Tresvalles and Tajonera, which portions must be collated and
included as part of the portion to be awarded to Gregoria’s heirs; that in 1979, Lucimo
Francisco, Sr. (Lucimo Sr.), husband of herein petitioner Teodora, illegally claimed
absolute ownership of the property and transferred in his name the tax declaration
covering the property; that from 1988, Lucimo Sr. and Teodora have deprived him
(Leonardo) of the fruits of the property estimated at ₱1,000.00 per year; that as a
result, he incurred expenses by way of attorney’s fees and litigation costs. Leonardo
thus prayed that he be declared the owner of half of the subject property; that the
same be partitioned after collation and determination of the portion to which he is
entitled; that Gregoria’s heirs be ordered to execute the necessary documents or
agreements; and that he (Leonardo) be awarded actual damages in the amount of
₱1,000.00 per year from 1988, attorney’s fees of ₱50,000.00, and lawyer’s
appearance fees of ₱500.00 per hearing.
In their Answer8 with counterclaim, Teodora, Camilo, Adolfo, Lucimo Jr. and
Herminigildo claimed that Leonardo had no cause of action against them; that they
have become the sole owners of the subject property through Lucimo Sr. who
acquired the same in good faith by sale from Juan Enriquez (Enriquez), who in turn
acquired the same from Leon, and Leonardo was aware of this fact; that they were in
continuous, actual, adverse, notorious and exclusive possession of the property with
a just title; that they have been paying the taxes on the property; that Leonardo’s claim
is barred by estoppel and laches; and that they have suffered damages and were
forced to litigate as a result of Leonardo’s malicious suit. They prayed that Civil Case
No. 5275 be dismissed; that Leonardo be declared to be without any right to the
property; that Leonardo be ordered to surrender the certificate of title to the
property; and that they be awarded ₱20,000.00 as moral damages, ₱10,000.00 as
temperate and nominal damages, ₱20,000.00 as attorney’s fees, and double costs.
The other Gregoria heirs, as well as Tresvalles and Tajonera were declared in default. 9
As agreed during pre-trial, the trial court commissioned Geodetic Engineer Rafael M.
Escabarte to identify the metes and bounds of the property.10 The resulting
Commissioner’s Report and Sketch,11 as well as the Supplementary Commissioner’s
Report,12 were duly approved by the parties. The parties then submitted the following
issues for resolution of the trial court:
Whether Leonardo is entitled to a share in Leon’s estate;
Whether Leon sold the subject property to Lucimo Sr.; and
Whether Leonardo’s claim has prescribed, or that he is barred by estoppel or laches.13
In the meantime, Leonardo passed away and was duly substituted by his heirs, the
respondents herein.14
During the course of the proceedings, the following additional relevant facts came to
light:
1. In 1995, Leonardo filed against petitioners Civil Case No. 4983 for partition with the
RTC Kalibo, but the case was dismissed and referred to the Kalibo Municipal Trial Court
(MTC), where the case was docketed as Civil Case No. 1366. However, on March 4,
1997, the MTC dismissed Civil Case No. 1366 for lack of jurisdiction and declared that
only the RTC can take cognizance of the partition case;15
2. The property was allegedly sold by Leon to Enriquez through an unnotarized
document dated April 4, 1943.16 Enriquez in turn allegedly sold the property to Lucimo
Sr. on November 25, 1943 via another private sale document;17
3. Petitioners were in sole possession of the property for more than 30 years, while
Leonardo acquired custody of OCT RO-630;18
4. On February 9, 1979, Lucimo Sr. executed an Affidavit of Ownership of
Land19 claiming sole ownership of the property which he utilized to secure in his name
Tax Declaration No. 16414 (TD 16414) over the property and to cancel Tax Declaration
No. 20102 in Leon’s name;20
5. Lucimo Sr. died in 1991; and
6. The property was partitioned among the petitioners, to the exclusion of Leonardo.21
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On November 19, 2001, the trial court rendered a Decision,22 which decreed as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
Dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiffs’ right of action has long
prescribed under Article 1141 of the New Civil Code;
Declaring Lot 1786 covered by OCT No. RO-630 (24071) to be the common property
of the heirs of Gregoria Roldan Ining and by virtue whereof, OCT No. RO-630 (24071)
is ordered cancelled and the Register of Deeds of the Province of Aklan is directed to
issue a transfer certificate of title to the heirs of Natividad Ining, one-fourth (1/4)
share; Heirs of Dolores Ining, one-fourth (1/4) share; Heirs of Antipolo Ining, one-
fourth (1/4) share; and Heirs of Pedro Ining, one-fourth (1/4) share.
For lack of sufficient evidence, the counterclaim is ordered dismissed.
With cost against the plaintiffs.
SO ORDERED.23
The trial court found the April 4, 1943 and November 25, 1943 deeds of sale to be
spurious. It concluded that Leon never sold the property to Enriquez, and in turn,
Enriquez never sold the property to Lucimo Sr., hence, the subject property remained
part of Leon’s estate at the time of his death in 1962. Leon’s siblings, Romana and
Gregoria, thus inherited the subject property in equal shares. Leonardo and the
respondents are entitled to Romana’s share as the latter’s successors.
However, the trial court held that Leonardo had only 30 years from Leon’s death in
1962 – or up to 1992 – within which to file the partition case. Since Leonardo instituted
the partition suit only in 1997, the same was already barred by prescription. It held
that under Article 1141 of the Civil Code,24 an action for partition and recovery of
ownership and possession of a parcel of land is a real action over immovable property
which prescribes in 30 years. In addition, the trial court held that for his long inaction,
Leonardo was guilty of laches as well. Consequently, the property should go to
Gregoria’s heirs exclusively.
Respondents moved for reconsideration25 but the same was denied by the RTC in its
February 7, 2002 Order.26
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Only respondents interposed an appeal with the CA. Docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
74687, the appeal questioned the propriety of the trial court’s dismissal of Civil Case
No. 5275, its application of Article 1141, and the award of the property to Gregoria’s
heirs exclusively.
On March 14, 2006, the CA issued the questioned Decision,27 which contained the
following decretal portion:
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, this appeal is GRANTED. The decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Br. 8, Kalibo, Aklan in Civil Case No. 5275 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. In lieu thereof, judgment is rendered as follows:
1. Declaring 1/2 portion of Lot 1786 as the share of the plaintiffs as successors-in-
interest of Romana Roldan;
2. Declaring 1/2 portion of Lot 1786 as the share of the defendants as successors-in-
interest of Gregoria Roldan Ining;
3. Ordering the defendants to deliver the possession of the portion described in
paragraphs 8 and 9 of the Commissioner’s Report (Supplementary) to the herein
plaintiffs;
4. Ordering the cancellation of OCT No. RO-630 (24071) in the name of Leon Roldan
and the Register of Deeds of Aklan is directed to issue transfer certificates of title to
the plaintiffs in accordance with paragraphs 8 and 9 of the sketch plan as embodied in
the Commissioner’s Report (Supplementary) and the remaining portion thereof be
adjudged to the defendants.
Other claims and counterclaims are dismissed.
Costs against the defendants-appellees.
SO ORDERED.28
The CA held that the trial court’s declaration of nullity of the April 4, 1943 and
November 25, 1943 deeds of sale in favor of Enriquez and Lucimo Sr., respectively,
became final and was settled by petitioners’ failure to appeal the same. Proceeding
from the premise that no valid prior disposition of the property was made by its owner
Leon and that the property – which remained part of his estate at the time of his death
– passed on by succession to his two siblings, Romana and Gregoria, which thus makes
the parties herein – who are Romana’s and Gregoria’s heirs – co-owners of the
property in equal shares, the appellate court held that only the issues of prescription
and laches were needed to be resolved.
The CA did not agree with the trial court’s pronouncement that Leonardo’s action for
partition was barred by prescription. The CA declared that prescription began to run
not from Leon’s death in 1962, but from Lucimo Sr.’s execution of the Affidavit of
Ownership of Land in 1979, which amounted to a repudiation of his co-ownership of
the property with Leonardo. Applying the fifth paragraph of Article 494 of the Civil
Code, which provides that "[n]o prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir
against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the
co-ownership," the CA held that it was only when Lucimo Sr. executed the Affidavit of
Ownership of Land in 1979 and obtained a new tax declaration over the property (TD
16414) solely in his name that a repudiation of his co-ownership with Leonardo was
made, which repudiation effectively commenced the running of the 30-year
prescriptive period under Article 1141.
The CA did not consider Lucimo Sr.’s sole possession of the property for more than 30
years to the exclusion of Leonardo and the respondents as a valid repudiation of the
co-ownership either, stating that his exclusive possession of the property and
appropriation of its fruits – even his continuous payment of the taxes thereon – while
adverse as against strangers, may not be deemed so as against Leonardo in the
absence of clear and conclusive evidence to the effect that the latter was ousted or
deprived of his rights as co-owner with the intention of assuming exclusive ownership
over the property, and absent a showing that this was effectively made known to
Leonardo. Citing Bargayo v. Camumot29 and Segura v. Segura,30 the appellate court
held that as a rule, possession by a co-owner will not be presumed to be adverse to
the other co-owners but will be held to benefit all, and that a co-owner or co-heir is in
possession of an inheritance pro-indiviso for himself and in representation of his co-
owners or co-heirs if he administers or takes care of the rest thereof with the
obligation to deliver the same to his co-owners or co-heirs, as is the case of a
depositary, lessee or trustee.
The CA added that the payment of taxes by Lucimo Sr. and the issuance of a new tax
declaration in his name do not prove ownership; they merely indicate a claim of
ownership. Moreover, petitioners’ act of partitioning the property among themselves
to the exclusion of Leonardo cannot affect the latter; nor may it be considered a
repudiation of the co-ownership as it has not been shown that the partition was made
known to Leonardo.
The CA held further that the principle of laches cannot apply as against Leonardo and
the respondents. It held that laches is controlled by equitable considerations and it
cannot be used to defeat justice or to perpetuate fraud; it cannot be utilized to deprive
the respondents of their rightful inheritance.
On the basis of the above pronouncements, the CA granted respondents’ prayer for
partition, directing that the manner of partitioning the property shall be governed by
the Commissioner’s Report and Sketch and the Supplementary Commissioner’s Report
which the parties did not contest.
Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration31 which the CA denied in its assailed
September 7, 2006 Resolution.32 Hence, the present Petition.
Issues
Petitioners raise the following arguments:
I of the Petitioner [sic] who sent [sic] by Registered mail to Court of Appeals, Twentieth
THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN REVERSING THE
DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT ON THE GROUND THAT LUCIMO FRANCISCO
REPUDIATED THE CO-OWNERSHIP ONLY ON FEBRUARY 9, 1979.
II
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN NOT UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL
COURT DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT ON THE GROUND OF PRESCRIPTION AND
LACHES.33
Petitioners’ Arguments
Petitioners insist in their Petition and Reply34 that Lucimo Sr.’s purchase of the
property in 1943 and his possession thereof amounted to a repudiation of the co-
ownership, and that Leonardo’s admission and acknowledgment of Lucimo Sr.’s
possession for such length of time operated to bestow upon petitioners – as Lucimo
Sr.’s successors-in-interest – the benefits of acquisitive prescription which proceeded
from the repudiation.
Petitioners contend that Leonardo’s inaction – from Lucimo Sr.’s taking possession in
1943, up to 1995, when Leonardo filed Civil Case No. 4983 for partition with the RTC
Kalibo – amounted to laches or neglect. They add that during the proceedings before
the Lupon Tagapamayapa in 1980, Leonardo was informed of Lucimo Sr.’s purchase of
the property in 1943; this notwithstanding, Leonardo did not take action then against
Lucimo Sr. and did so only in 1995, when he filed Civil Case No. 4983 – which was
eventually dismissed and referred to the MTC. They argue that, all this time, Leonardo
did nothing while Lucimo Sr. occupied the property and claimed all its fruits for
himself.
Respondents’ Arguments
Respondents, on the other hand, argue in their Comment35 that –
For purposes of clarity, if [sic] is respectfully submitted that eighteen (18) legible
copies has [sic] not been filed in this case for consideration in banc [sic] and nine (9)
copies in cases heard before a division in that [sic] all copies of pleadings served to the
offices concern [sic] where said order [sic] was issued were not furnished two (2)
copies each in violation to [sic] the adverse parties [sic] to the clerk of court, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 8, Kalibo, Aklan, Philippines; to the Honorable Court of Appeals so
that No [sic] action shall be taken on such pleadings, briefs, memoranda, motions, and
other papers as fail [sic] to comply with the requisites set out in this paragraph.
The foregoing is confirmed by affidavit of MERIDON F. OLANDESCA, the law secretary
Division, Cebu City; to Counsel for Respondent [sic] and to the Clerk of Court Supreme
Court Manila [sic].
These will show that Petitioner has [sic] violated all the requirements of furnishing two
(2) copies each concerned party [sic] under the Rule of Courts [sic].36
Our Ruling
The Court denies the Petition.
The finding that Leon did not sell the property to Lucimo Sr. had long been settled and
had become final for failure of petitioners to appeal. Thus, the property remained part
of Leon’s estate.
One issue submitted for resolution by the parties to the trial court is whether Leon
sold the property to Lucimo Sr.1âwphi1The trial court, examining the two deeds of
sale executed in favor of Enriquez and Lucimo Sr., found them to be spurious. It then
concluded that no such sale from Leon to Lucimo Sr. ever took place. Despite this
finding, petitioners did not appeal. Consequently, any doubts regarding this matter
should be considered settled. Thus, petitioners’ insistence on Lucimo Sr.’s 1943
purchase of the property to reinforce their claim over the property must be ignored.
Since no transfer from Leon to Lucimo Sr. took place, the subject property clearly
remained part of Leon’s estate upon his passing in 1962.
Leon died without issue; his heirs are his siblings Romana and Gregoria.
Since Leon died without issue, his heirs are his siblings, Romana and Gregoria, who
thus inherited the property in equal shares. In turn, Romana’s and Gregoria’s heirs –
the parties herein – became entitled to the property upon the sisters’ passing. Under
Article 777 of the Civil Code, the rights to the succession are transmitted from the
moment of death.
Gregoria’s and Romana’s heirs are co-owners of the subject property.
Thus, having succeeded to the property as heirs of Gregoria and Romana, petitioners
and respondents became co-owners thereof. As co-owners, they may use the property
owned in common, provided they do so in accordance with the purpose for which it is
intended and in such a way as not to injure the interest of the co-ownership or prevent
the other co-owners from using it according to their rights.37 They have the full
ownership of their parts and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and may
alienate, assign or mortgage them, and even substitute another person in their
enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved.38 Each co-owner may demand
at any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is
concerned.39 Finally, no prescription shall run in favor of one of the co-heirs against
the others so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.40
For prescription to set in, the repudiation must be done by a co-owner.
Time and again, it has been held that "a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the
share of the other co-owners, absent any clear repudiation of the co-ownership. In
order that the title may prescribe in favor of a co-owner, the following requisites must
concur: (1) the co-owner has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting
to an ouster of the other co-owners; (2) such positive acts of repudiation have been
made known to the other co-owners; and (3) the evidence thereof is clear and
convincing."41
From the foregoing pronouncements, it is clear that the trial court erred in reckoning
the prescriptive period within which Leonardo may seek partition from the death of
Leon in 1962. Article 1141 and Article 494 (fifth paragraph) provide that prescription
shall begin to run in favor of a co-owner and against the other co-owners only from
the time he positively renounces the co-ownership and makes known his repudiation
to the other co-owners.
Lucimo Sr. challenged Leonardo’s co-ownership of the property only sometime in
1979 and 1980, when the former executed the Affidavit of Ownership of Land,
obtained a new tax declaration exclusively in his name, and informed the latter –
before the Lupon Tagapamayapa – of his 1943 purchase of the property. These
apparent acts of repudiation were followed later on by Lucimo Sr.’s act of withholding
Leonardo’s share in the fruits of the property, beginning in 1988, as Leonardo himself
claims in his Amended Complaint. Considering these facts, the CA held that
prescription began to run against Leonardo only in 1979 – or even in 1980 – when it
has been made sufficiently clear to him that Lucimo Sr. has renounced the co-
ownership and has claimed sole ownership over the property. The CA thus concluded
that the filing of Civil Case No. 5275 in 1997, or just under 20 years counted from 1979,
is clearly within the period prescribed under Article 1141.
What escaped the trial and appellate courts’ notice, however, is that while it may be
argued that Lucimo Sr. performed acts that may be characterized as a repudiation of
the co-ownership, the fact is, he is not a co-owner of the property. Indeed, he is not
an heir of Gregoria; he is merely Antipolo’s son-in-law, being married to Antipolo’s
daughter Teodora.42 Under the Family Code, family relations, which is the primary
basis for succession, exclude relations by affinity.
Art. 150. Family relations include those:
(1) Between husband and wife;
(2) Between parents and children;
(3) Among other ascendants and descendants; and
(4) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood.
In point of law, therefore, Lucimo Sr. is not a co-owner of the property; Teodora is.
Consequently, he cannot validly effect a repudiation of the co-ownership, which he
was never part of. For this reason, prescription did not run adversely against Leonardo,
and his right to seek a partition of the property has not been lost.
Likewise, petitioners’ argument that Leonardo’s admission and acknowledgment in his
pleadings – that Lucimo Sr. was in possession of the property since 1943 – should be
taken against him, is unavailing. In 1943, Leon remained the rightful owner of the land,
and Lucimo Sr. knew this very well, being married to Teodora, daughter of Antipolo, a
nephew of Leon. More significantly, the property, which is registered under the
Torrens system and covered by OCT RO-630, is in Leon’s name. Leon’s ownership
ceased only in 1962, upon his death when the property passed on to his heirs by
operation of law.
In fine, since none of the co-owners made a valid repudiation of the existing co-
ownership, Leonardo could seek partition of the property at any time.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The assailed March 14, 2006 Decision and the
September 7, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74687are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Rioferio vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 129008, January 13, 2004)
TEODORA A. RIOFERIO, VERONICA O. EVANGELISTA assisted by her husband ZALDY
EVANGELISTA, ALBERTO ORFINADA, and ROWENA O. UNGOS, assisted by her husband
BEDA UNGOS, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ESPERANZA P. ORFINADA, LOURDES
P. ORFINADA, ALFONSO ORFINADA, NANCY P. ORFINADA, ALFONSO JAMES P.
ORFINADA, CHRISTOPHER P. ORFINADA and ANGELO P. ORFINADA, respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Whether the heirs may bring suit to recover property of the estate pending the
appointment of an administrator is the issue in this case.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeks to set
aside the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 42053 dated January 31,
1997, as well as its Resolution[2] dated March 26, 1997, denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
On May 13, 1995, Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. died without a will in Angeles City leaving
several personal and real properties located in Angeles City, Dagupan City and
Kalookan City.[3] He also left a widow, respondent Esperanza P. Orfinada, whom he
married on July 11, 1960 and with whom he had seven children who are the herein
respondents, namely: Lourdes P. Orfinada, Alfonso Clyde P. Orfinada, Nancy P.
Orfinada-Happenden, Alfonso James P. Orfinada, Christopher P. Orfinada, Alfonso
Mike P. Orfinada (deceased) and Angelo P. Orfinada.[4]
Apart from the respondents, the demise of the decedent left in mourning his
paramour and their children. They are petitioner Teodora Riofero, who became a part
of his life when he entered into an extra-marital relationship with her during the
subsistence of his marriage to Esperanza sometime in 1965, and co-petitioners
Veronica[5], Alberto and Rowena.[6]
On November 14, 1995, respondents Alfonso James and Lourdes Orfinada discovered
that on June 29, 1995, petitioner Teodora Rioferio
and herchildren executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of a Deceased Person
with Quitclaim involving the properties of the estate of the decedent located in
Dagupan City and that accordingly, the Registry of Deeds in Dagupan issued
Certificates of Titles Nos. 63983, 63984 and 63985 in favor of petitioners Teodora
Rioferio, Veronica Orfinada-Evangelista, Alberto Orfinada and Rowena Orfinada-
Ungos. Respondents also found out that petitioners were able to obtain a loan
of P700,000.00 from the Rural Bank of Mangaldan Inc. by executing a Real Estate
Mortgage over the properties subject of the extra-judicial settlement.[7]
On December 1, 1995, respondent Alfonso Clyde P. Orfinada III filed a Petition for
Letters of Administration docketed as S.P. Case No. 5118 before the Regional Trial
Court of Angeles City, praying that letters of administration encompassing the estate
of Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. be issued to him.[8]
On December 4, 1995, respondents filed a Complaint for the Annulment/Rescission of
Extra Judicial Settlement of Estate of a Deceased Person with Quitclaim, Real Estate
Mortgage and Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Titles with Nos. 63983, 63985 and
63984 and Other Related Documents with Damages against petitioners, the Rural Bank
of Mangaldan, Inc. and the Register of Deeds of Dagupan City before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 42, Dagupan City.[9]
On February 5, 1996, petitioners filed their Answer to the aforesaid complaint
interposing the defense that the property subject of the contested deed of extra-
judicial settlement pertained to the properties originally belonging to the parents of
Teodora Riofero[10] and that the titles thereof were delivered to her as an advance
inheritance but the decedent had managed to register them in his
name.[11] Petitioners also raised the affirmative defense that respondents are not the
real parties-in-interest but rather the Estate of Alfonso O. Orfinada, Jr. in view of the
pendency of the administration proceedings.[12] On April 29, 1996, petitioners filed
a Motion to Set Affirmative Defenses for Hearing[13] on the aforesaid ground.
The lower court denied the motion in its Order[14] dated June 27, 1996, on the ground
that respondents, as heirs, are the real parties-in-interest especially in the absence of
an administrator who is yet to be appointed in S.P. Case No. 5118. Petitioners moved
for its reconsideration[15] but the motion was likewise denied.[16]
This prompted petitioners to file before the Court of Appeals their Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court docketed as CA G.R. S.P. No.
42053.[17] Petitioners averred that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the assailed order which denied the dismissal of the case on the ground that
the proper party to file the complaint for the annulment of the extrajudicial settlement
of the estate of the deceased is the estate of the decedent and not the respondents.[18]
The Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision[19] dated January 31, 1997, stating
that it discerned no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction by the public respondent judge when he denied petitioners motion to set
affirmative defenses for hearing in view of its discretionary nature.
A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by petitioners but it was denied.[20] Hence, the
petition before this Court.
The issue presented by the petitioners before this Court is whether the heirs have legal
standing to prosecute the rights belonging to the deceased subsequent to the
commencement of the administration proceedings.[21]
Petitioners vehemently fault the lower court for denying their motion to set the case
for preliminary hearing on their affirmative defense that the proper party to bring the
action is the estate of the decedent and not the respondents. It must be stressed that
the holding of a preliminary hearing on an affirmative defense lies in the discretion of
the court. This is clear from the Rules of Court, thus:
SEC. 5. Pleadings grounds as affirmative defenses.- Any of the grounds for dismissal
provided for in this rule, except improper venue, may be pleaded as an affirmative
defense, and a preliminary hearing may be had thereon as if a motion to dismiss had
been filed.[22] (Emphasis supplied.)
Certainly, the incorporation of the word may in the provision is clearly indicative of
the optional character of the preliminary hearing. The word denotes discretion and
cannot be construed as having a mandatory effect.[23] Subsequently, the electivity of
the proceeding was firmed up beyond cavil by the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure with
the inclusion of the phrase in the discretion of the Court, apart from the retention of
the word may in Section 6,[24] in Rule 16 thereof.
Just as no blame of abuse of discretion can be laid on the lower courts doorstep for
not hearing petitioners affirmative defense, it cannot likewise be faulted for
recognizing the legal standing of the respondents as heirs to bring the suit.
Pending the filing of administration proceedings, the heirs without doubt have legal
personality to bring suit in behalf of the estate of the decedent in accordance with the
provision of Article 777 of the New Civil Code that (t)he rights to succession are
transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent. The provision in turn is
the foundation of the principle that the property, rights and obligations to the extent
and value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted through his death to another
or others by his will or by operation of law.[25]
Even if administration proceedings have already been commenced, the heirs may still
bring the suit if an administrator has not yet been appointed. This is the proper
modality despite the total lack of advertence to the heirs in the rules on party
representation, namely Section 3, Rule 3[26]and Section 2, Rule 87[27] of the Rules of
Court. In fact, in the case of Gochan v. Young,[28] this Court recognized the legal
standing of the heirs to represent the rights and properties of the decedent under
administration pending the appointment of an administrator. Thus:
The above-quoted rules,[29] while permitting an executor or administrator to represent
or to bring suits on behalf of the deceased, do not prohibit the heirs from representing
the deceased. These rules are easily applicable to cases in which an administrator has
already been appointed. But no rule categorically addresses the situation in which
special proceedings for the settlement of an estate have already been instituted, yet no
administrator has been appointed. In such instances, the heirs cannot be expected to
wait for the appointment of an administrator; then wait further to see if the
administrator appointed would care enough to file a suit to protect the rights and the
interests of the deceased; and in the meantime do nothing while the rights and the
properties of the decedent are violated or dissipated.
Even if there is an appointed administrator, jurisprudence recognizes two
exceptions, viz: (1) if the executor or administrator is unwilling or refuses to bring
suit;[30] and (2) when the administrator is alleged to have participated in the act
complained of[31] and he is made a party defendant.[32]Evidently, the necessity for the
heirs to seek judicial relief to recover property of the estate is as compelling when
there is no appointed administrator, if not more, as where there is an appointed
administrator but he is either disinclined to bring suit or is one of the guilty parties
himself.
All told, therefore, the rule that the heirs have no legal standing to sue for the recovery
of property of the estate during the pendency of administration proceedings has three
exceptions, the third being when there is no appointed administrator such as in this
case.
As the appellate court did not commit an error of law in upholding the order of the
lower court, recourse to this Court is not warranted.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The assailed decision and resolution
of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Heirs of Tomas Calpatura, Sr., vs. Prado (G.R. No. 156879, January
20, 2004)
FLORDELIZA CALPATURA FLORA, DOMINADOR CALPATURA and TOMAS CALPATURA,
JR., Heirs of TOMAS CALPATURA, SR., petitioners, vs. ROBERTO, ERLINDA, DANIEL,
GLORIA, PATRICIO, JR. and EDNA, all surnamed PRADO and NARCISA
PRADO, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The property under litigation is the northern half portion of a residential land
consisting of 552.20 square meters, more or less, situated at 19thAvenue, Murphy,
Quezon City and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 71344 issued on August
15, 1963 by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City in the name of Narcisa Prado and
her children by her first husband, Patricio Prado, Sr., namely, Roberto, Erlinda, Daniel,
Gloria, Patricio, Jr. and Edna, respondents herein.
The pertinent facts are as follows:
On December 19, 1959, Patricio Prado, Sr. died. Narcisa subsequently married
Bonifacio Calpatura. In order to support her minor children with her first husband,
Narcisa and her brother-in-law, Tomas Calpatura, Sr., executed on April 26, 1968
an Agreement of Purchase and Sale whereby the former agreed to sell to the latter the
northern half portion of the property for the sum of P10,500.00.[1] On July 28, 1973,
Narcisa executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Tomas over the said property.[2]
In 1976, Tomas daughter, Flordeliza Calpatura Flora, built a two-storey duplex with
firewall[3] on the northern half portion of the property.Respondents, who occupied the
southern half portion of the land, did not object to the construction. Flordeliza Flora
and her husband Wilfredo declared the property for taxation purposes[4] and paid the
corresponding taxes thereon.[5] Likewise, Maximo Calpatura, the son of Tomas cousin,
built a small house on the northern portion of the property.
On April 8, 1991, respondents filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of sale and
delivery of possession of the northern half portion of the subject property against
petitioners Flordeliza Calpatura Flora, Dominador Calpatura and Tomas Calpatura, Jr.
before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 100, docketed as Civil Case No.
Q-91-8404.[6] Respondents alleged that the transaction embodied in the Agreement to
Purchase and Sale between Narcisa and Tomas was one of mortgage and not of sale;
that Narcisas children tried to redeem the mortgaged property but they learned that
the blank document which their mother had signed was transformed into a Deed of
Absolute Sale; that Narcisa could not have sold the northern half portion of the
property considering that she was prohibited from selling the same within a period of
25 years from its acquisition, pursuant to the condition annotated at the back of the
title;[7] that Narcisa, as natural guardian of her children, had no authority to sell the
northern half portion of the property which she and her children co-owned; and that
only P5,000.00 out of the consideration of P10,500.00 was paid by Tomas.
In their answer, petitioners countered that Narcisa owned 9/14 of the property,
consisting of as her share in the conjugal partnership with her first husband and 1/7
as her share in the estate of her deceased husband; that the consideration of the sale
in the amount of P10,500.00 had been fully paid as of April 1, 1968; that Narcisa sold
her conjugal share in order to support her minor children; that Narcisas claim was
barred by laches and prescription; and that the Philippine Homesite and Housing
Corporation, not the respondents, was the real party in interest to question the sale
within the prohibited period.
On April 2, 1997, the court a quo[8] dismissed the complaint. It found that the sale was
valid; that the Agreement to Purchase and Sale and the Deed of Absolute Sale were
duly executed; that the sum of P10,500.00 as selling price for the subject property was
fully paid there being no demand for the payment of the remaining balance; that the
introduction of improvements thereon by the petitioners was without objection from
the respondents; and that Roberto and Erlinda failed to contest the transaction within
four years after the discovery of the alleged fraud and reaching the majority age in
violation of Article 1391 of the Civil Code.[9]
Petitioners appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, where it was docketed as
CA-G.R. CV No. 56843. On October 3, 2002, a decision[10]was rendered by the Court of
Appeals declaring that respondents were co-owners of the subject property, thus the
sale was valid only insofar as Narcisas 1/7 undivided share thereon was
concerned. The dispositive portion of the said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that the
sale in dispute is declared valid only with respect to the one-seventh (1/7) share of
plaintiff-appellant NARCISA H. PRADO in the subject property, which is equivalent to
78.8857 square meters. In all other respects, the same decision stands. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[11]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in a Resolution dated
January 14, 2003.[12] Hence this petition for review on the following assigned errors:
I wife. Proof of acquisition during the marriage is a condition sine qua non in order for
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
IN MODIFYING THE DECISION RENDERED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT WITHOUT
TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THAT, ASIDE FROM THE DECLARATION OF THE
VALIDITY OF THE SALE, THE PETITIONERS HEREIN HAVE TAKEN ACTUAL POSSESSION
OF THE SAID ONE-HALF (1/2) TO THE EXCLUSION OF THE RESPONDENTS AND
INTRODUCED IMPROVEMENTS THEREON.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
IN MODIFYING THE DECISION RENDERED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT WITHOUT
TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL STATEMENT IN THE
SALE THAT THE SAME PERTAINS TO THE CONJUGAL SHARE OF RESPONDENT NARCISA
PRADO AND THE OTHER RESPONDENTS HAD NO FINANCIAL CAPACITY TO ACQUIRE
THE SAID PROPERTY SINCE THEY WERE MINORS THEN AT THE ISSUANCE OF THE SAID
TCT NO. 71344 ON AUGUST 15, 1963.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
IN NOT DECLARING THE HEREIN RESPONDENTS GUILTY OF LACHES IN FILING THE
INSTANT CASE ONLY ON APRIL 8, 1991, THAT IS 18 YEARS AFTER THE SAID SALE WITH
THE PETITIONERS TAKING ACTUAL POSSESSION OF SAID PORTION OF THE PROPERTY.
IV
THAT THE DECISION OF THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS WILL UNDULY ENRICH THE
RESPONDENTS AT THE EXPENSE OF THE HEREIN PETITIONERS.[13]
At the outset, it must be stressed that only questions of law may be raised in petitions
for review before this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.[14] It was thus error
for petitioners to ascribe to the Court of Appeals grave abuse of discretion. This
procedural lapse notwithstanding, in the interest of justice, this Court shall treat the
issues as cases of reversible error.[15]
The issues for resolution are: (1) Is the subject property conjugal or paraphernal? (2)
Is the transaction a sale or a mortgage? (3) Assuming that the transaction is a sale,
what was the area of the land subject of the sale?
Article 160 of the Civil Code, which was in effect at the time the sale was entered into,
provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the
the presumption in favor of conjugal ownership to operate.[16]
In the instant case, while Narcisa testified during cross-examination that she bought
the subject property from Peoples Homesite Housing Corporation with her own
funds,[17] she, however admitted in the Agreement of Purchase and Sale and the Deed
of Absolute Sale that the property was her conjugal share with her first husband,
Patricio, Sr.[18] A verbal assertion that she bought the land with her own funds is
inadmissible to qualify the terms of a written agreement under the parole evidence
rule.[19] The so-called parole evidence rule forbids any addition to or contradiction of
the terms of a written instrument by testimony or other evidence purporting to show
that, at or before the execution of the parties written agreement, other or different
terms were agreed upon by the parties, varying the purport of the written
contract. Whatever is not found in the writing is understood to have been waived and
abandoned.[20]
Anent the second issue, the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Narcisa in favor of
Tomas is contained in a notarized[21] document. In Spouses Alfarero, et al. v. Spouses
Sevilla, et al.,[22] it was held that a public document executed and attested through the
intervention of a notary public is evidence of the facts in a clear, unequivocal manner
therein expressed. Otherwise stated, public or notarial documents, or those
instruments duly acknowledged or proved and certified as provided by law, may be
presented in evidence without further proof, the certificate of acknowledgment
being prima facie evidence of the execution of the instrument or document
involved. In order to contradict the presumption of regularity of a public document,
evidence must be clear, convincing, and more than merely preponderant.
It is well-settled that in civil cases, the party that alleges a fact has the burden of
proving it.[23] Except for the bare allegation that the transaction was one of mortgage
and not of sale, respondents failed to adduce evidence in support
thereof. Respondents also failed to controvert the presumption that private
transactions have been fair and regular.[24]
Furthermore, Narcisa, in fact did not deny that she executed an Affidavit allowing
spouses Wilfredo and Flordeliza Flora to construct a firewall between the two-storey
duplex and her house sometime in 1976. The duplex was made of strong materials,
the roofing being galvanized sheets.While the deed of sale between Tomas and
Narcisa was never registered nor annotated on the title, respondents had knowledge
of the possession of petitioners of the northern half portion of the
property. Obviously, respondents recognized the ownership of Tomas, petitioners
predecessor-in-interest.
Respondents belatedly claimed that only P5,000.00 out of the P10,500.00 conveyed the northern portion thereof before the partition, the terms of which was
consideration was paid. Both the Agreement of Purchase and Sale and the Deed of still to be determined by the parties before the trial court.
Absolute Sale state that said consideration was paid in full. Moreover, the
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals on October 3, 2002, as well as the
presumption is that there was sufficient consideration for a written contract.[25]
Resolution dated January 14, 2003 is PARTLY AFFIRMED subject to the following
The property being conjugal, upon the death of Patricio Prado, Sr., one-half of the MODIFICATIONS:
subject property was automatically reserved to the surviving spouse, Narcisa, as her
1) Narcisa Prado is entitled to 9/14 of the residential land consisting of 552.20 square
share in the conjugal partnership. Particios rights to the other half, in turn, were
meters, more or less, situated at 19th Avenue, Murphy, Quezon City and covered by
transmitted upon his death to his heirs, which includes his widow Narcisa, who is
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 71344;
entitled to the same share as that of each of the legitimate children. Thus, as a result
of the death of Patricio, a regime of co-ownership arose between Narcisa and the 2) the sale of the undivided one half portion thereof by Narcisa Prado in favor of Tomas
other heirs in relation to the property. The remaining one-half was transmitted to his Calpatura, Sr. is valid.
heirs by intestate succession. By the law on intestate succession, his six children and
Narcisa Prado inherited the same at one-seventh (1/7) each pro indiviso.[26] Inasmuch Furthermore, the case is REMANDED to the court of origin, only for the purpose of
as Narcisa inherited one-seventh (1/7) of her husband's conjugal share in the said determining the specific portion being conveyed in favor of Tomas Calpatura, Sr.
property and is the owner of one-half (1/2) thereof as her conjugal share, she owns a pursuant to the partition that will be agreed upon by the respondents.
total of 9/14 of the subject property. Hence, Narcisa could validly convey her total
SO ORDERED.
undivided share in the entire property to Tomas. Narcisa and her children are deemed
co-owners of the subject property.

Neither can the respondents invoke the proscription of encumbering the property
within 25 years from acquisition. In Sarmiento, et al. v. Salud, et al.,[27] it was held that:

xxx The condition that the appellees Sarmiento spouses could not resell the property
except to the Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC for short) within the
next 25 years after appellees purchasing the lot is manifestly a condition in favor of
the PHHC, and not one in favor of the Sarmiento spouses. The condition conferred no
actionable right on appellees herein, since it operated as a restriction upon their jus
disponendi of the property they bought, and thus limited their right of ownership. It
follows that on the assumption that the mortgage to appellee Salud and the
foreclosure sale violated the condition in the Sarmiento contract, only the PHHC was
entitled to invoke the condition aforementioned, and not the Sarmientos. The validity
or invalidity of the sheriff's foreclosure sale to appellant Salud thus depended
exclusively on the PHHC; the latter could attack the sale as violative of its right of
exclusive reacquisition; but it (PHHC) also could waive the condition and treat the sale
as good, in which event, the sale can not be assailed for breach of the condition
aforestated.

Finally, no particular portion of the property could be identified as yet and delineated
as the object of the sale considering that the property had not yet been partitioned in
accordance with the Rules of Court.[28] While Narcisa could validly sell one half of the
subject property, her share being 9/14 of the same, she could not have particularly
Felipe vs. Heirs of Aldon (February 16, 1983)
EDUARDO FELIPE, HERMOGENA V. FELIPE AND VICENTE V. FELIPE, petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF MAXIMO ALDON, NAMELY: GIMENA ALMOSARA, SOFIA ALDON, SALVADOR
ALDON, AND THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
Maximo Aldon married Gimena Almosara in 1936. The spouses bought several pieces
of land sometime between 1948 and 1950. In 1960-62, the lands were divided into
three lots, 1370, 1371 and 1415 of the San Jacinto Public Land Subdivision, San Jacinto,
Masbate.
In 1951, Gimena Almosara sold the lots to the spouses Eduardo Felipe and Hermogena
V. Felipe. The sale was made without the consent of her husband, Maximo.
On April 26, 1976, the heirs of Maximo Aldon, namely his widow Gimena and their
children Sofia and Salvador Aldon, filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of
Masbate against the Felipes. The complaint which was docketed as Civil Case No. 2372
alleged that the plaintiffs were the owners of Lots 1370, 1371 and 1415; that they had
orally mortgaged the same to the defendants; and an offer to redeem the mortgage
had been refused so they filed the complaint in order to recover the three parcels of
land.
The defendants asserted that they had acquired the lots from the plaintiffs by
purchase and subsequent delivery to them. The trial court sustained the claim of the
defendants and rendered the following judgment:
a. declaring the defendants to be the lawful owners of the property subject of the
present litigation;
b. declaring the complaint in the present action to be without merit and is therefore
hereby ordered dismissed;
c. ordering the plaintiffs to pay to the defendants the amount of P2,000.00 as
reasonable attorney's fees and to pay the costs of the suit.
The plaintiffs appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals which rendered the
following judgment:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, and a new one is hereby RENDERED, ordering the defendants-appellees to
surrender the lots in question as well as the plaintiffs'-appellants' muniments of title
thereof to said plaintiffs-appellants, to make an accounting of the produce derived
from the lands including expenses incurred since 1951, and to solidarity turn over to
the plaintiffs-appellants the NET monetary value of the profits, after deducting the
sum of P1,800.00. No attorney's fees nor moral damages are awarded for lack of any
legal justification therefor. No. costs.
The ratio of the judgment is stated in the following paragraphs of the decision penned
by Justice Edgardo L. Paras with the concurrence of Justices Venicio Escolin and
Mariano A. Zosa:
One of the principal issues in the case involves the nature of the aforementioned
conveyance or transaction, with appellants claiming the same to be an oral contract
of mortgage or antichresis, the redemption of which could be done anytime upon
repayment of the P1,800.00 involved (incidentally the only thing written about the
transaction is the aforementioned receipt re the P1,800). Upon the other hand,
appellees claim that the transaction was one of sale, accordingly, redemption was
improper. The appellees claim that plaintiffs never conveyed the property because of
a loan or mortgage or antichresis and that what really transpired was the execution of
a contract of sale thru a private document designated as a 'Deed of Purchase and Sale'
(Exhibit 1), the execution having been made by Gimena Almosara in favor of appellee
Hermogena V. Felipe.
After a study of this case, we have come to the conclusion that the appellants are
entitled to recover the ownership of the lots in question. We so hold because although
Exh. 1 concerning the sale made in 1951 of the disputed lots is, in Our opinion, not a
forgery the fact is that the sale made by Gimena Almosara is invalid, having been
executed without the needed consent of her husband, the lots being conjugal.
Appellees' argument that this was an issue not raised in the pleadings is baseless,
considering the fact that the complaint alleges that the parcels 'were purchased by
plaintiff Gimena Almosara and her late husband Maximo Aldon' (the lots having been
purchased during the existence of the marriage, the same are presumed conjugal) and
inferentially, by force of law, could not, be disposed of by a wife without her husband's
consent.
The defendants are now the appellants in this petition for review. They invoke several
grounds in seeking the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals. One of the
grounds is factual in nature; petitioners claim that "respondent Court of Appeals has
found as a fact that the 'Deed of Purchase and Sale' executed by respondent Gimena
Almosara is not a forgery and therefore its authenticity and due execution is already
beyond question." We cannot consider this ground because as a rule only questions
of law are reviewed in proceedings under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court subject to well-
defined exceptions not present in the instant case.
The legal ground which deserves attention is the legal effect of a sale of lands
belonging to the conjugal partnership made by the wife without the consent of the
husband.
It is useful at this point to re-state some elementary rules: The husband is the
administrator of the conjugal partnership. (Art. 165, Civil Code.) Subject to certain
exceptions, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the
conjugal partnership without the wife's consent. (Art. 166, Idem.) And the wife cannot
bind the conjugal partnership without the husband's consent, except in cases provided
by law. (Art. 172, Idem.)
In the instant case, Gimena, the wife, sold lands belonging to the conjugal partnership
without the consent of the husband and the sale is not covered by the phrase "except
in cases provided by law." The Court of Appeals described the sale as "invalid" - a term
which is imprecise when used in relation to contracts because the Civil Code uses
specific names in designating defective contracts, namely: rescissible (Arts. 1380 et
seq.), voidable (Arts. 1390 et seq.), unenforceable (Arts. 1403, et seq.), and void or
inexistent (Arts. 1409 et seq.)
The sale made by Gimena is certainly a defective contract but of what category? The
answer: it is a voidable contract.
According to Art. 1390 of the Civil Code, among the voidable contracts are "[T]hose
where one of the parties is incapable of giving consent to the contract." (Par. 1.) In the
instant case-Gimena had no capacity to give consent to the contract of sale. The
capacity to give consent belonged not even to the husband alone but to both spouses.
The view that the contract made by Gimena is a voidable contract is supported by the
legal provision that contracts entered by the husband without the consent of the wife
when such consent is required, are annullable at her instance during the marriage and
within ten years from the transaction questioned. (Art. 173, Civil Code.)
Gimena's contract is not rescissible for in such contract all the essential elements are
untainted but Gimena's consent was tainted. Neither can the contract be classified as
unenforceable because it does not fit any of those described in Art. 1403 of the Civil
Code. And finally, the contract cannot be void or inexistent because it is not one of
those mentioned in Art. 1409 of the Civil Code. By process of elimination, it must
perforce be a voidable contract.
The voidable contract of Gimena was subject to annulment by her husband only during
the marriage because he was the victim who had an interest in the contract. Gimena,
who was the party responsible for the defect, could not ask for its annulment. Their
children could not likewise seek the annulment of the contract while the marriage
subsisted because they merely had an inchoate right to the lands sold.
The termination of the marriage and the dissolution of the conjugal partnership by the
death of Maximo Aldon did not improve the situation of Gimena. What she could not
do during the marriage, she could not do thereafter.
The case of Sofia and Salvador Aldon is different. After the death of Maximo they
acquired the right to question the defective contract insofar as it deprived them of
their hereditary rights in their father's share in the lands. The father's share is one-half
(1/2) of the lands and their share is two-thirds (2/3) thereof, one-third (1/3) pertaining
to the widow.
The petitioners have been in possession of the lands since 1951. It was only in 1976
when the respondents filed action to recover the lands. In the meantime, Maximo
Aldon died.
Two questions come to mind, namely: (1) Have the petitioners acquired the lands by
acquisitive prescription? (2) Is the right of action of Sofia and Salvador Aldon barred
by the statute of limitations?
Anent the first question, We quote with approval the following statement of the Court
of Appeals:
We would like to state further that appellees [petitioners herein] could not have
acquired ownership of the lots by prescription in view of what we regard as their bad
faith. This bad faith is revealed by testimony to the effect that defendant-appellee
Vicente V. Felipe (son of appellees Eduardo Felipe and Hermogena V. Felipe)
attempted in December 1970 to have Gimena Almosara sign a ready-made document
purporting to self the disputed lots to the appellees. This actuation clearly indicated
that the appellees knew the lots did not still belong to them, otherwise, why were they
interested in a document of sale in their favor? Again why did Vicente V. Felipe tell
Gimena that the purpose of the document was to obtain Gimena's consent to the
construction of an irrigation pump on the lots in question? The only possible reason
for purporting to obtain such consent is that the appellees knew the lots were not
theirs. Why was there an attempted improvement (the irrigation tank) only in 1970?
Why was the declaration of property made only in 1974? Why were no attempts made
to obtain the husband's signature, despite the fact that Gimena and Hermogena were
close relatives? An these indicate the bad faith of the appellees. Now then, even if we
were to consider appellees' possession in bad faith as a possession in the concept of
owners, this possession at the earliest started in 1951, hence the period for
extraordinary prescription (30 years) had not yet lapsed when the present action was
instituted on April 26, 1976.
As to the second question, the children's cause of action accrued from the death of
their father in 1959 and they had thirty (30) years to institute it (Art. 1141, Civil Code.)
They filed action in 1976 which is well within the period.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby modified. Judgment is

entered awarding to Sofia and Salvador Aldon their shares of the lands as stated in the
body of this decision; and the petitioners as possessors in bad faith shall make an
accounting of the fruits corresponding to the share aforementioned from 1959 and
solidarity pay their value to Sofia and Salvador Aldon; costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
Eastern vs. Lucero (124 SCRA 326) HOWEVER TRYING UTMOST BEST TO FACILITATE EVERYTHING IN ORDER STOP NO FIX
POSITIONS FROM NOON 15th UP TO 0600 HRS TO DATE NEED ASSISTANCE
APPROXIMATE DR POSITIONS AT 0600 HRS 10TH WITHIN THE VICINITY LATITUDE 20-
02, ON LONGTITUDE 110-02, OE COURSE 120 DEGREES REGARDS ...
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC., petitioner, vs. JOSEPHINE LUCERO, respondents.
LUCERO
Petition for review filed by the Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. to set aside the decision of
the National Labor Relations Commission, which affirmed the judgment rendered by
Second Message: 2
the National Seamen Board, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

February l6/80 1530 GMT VIA INTERCOM

WHEREFORE, respondent is hereby ordered to pay complainant her monthly
allotments from March, 1980 up to the amount of P54,562.00 within ten (10) days
from receipt of this decision. Respondent is likewise further ordered to pay EMICON
complainant her future monthly allotment up to the arrival of the M/V EASTERN
MINICON in the port of Manila or after four (4) years when the presumptive death EAST SHIP MANILA
established by law takes effect.
RYC NOTED ACCORDINGLY SINCE WASTE PAPER CARGO ON PORT SIDE AND HAD BEEN
The material facts that gave rise to this petition are as follows: On October 31, 1979, WASH OUT VESSEL AGAIN LISTING ON STARBOARD SIDE REGRET WE HAVE TO
Capt. Julio J. Lucero, Jr. was appointed by petitioner Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc., JETTISON STARBOARD SIDE WASTE PAPER CARGO IN ORDER TO BALANCE THE VESSEL
Company for short, as master/captain to its vessel M/V Eastern Minicon plying the NOW ALMOST BACK TO NORMAL POSITION HOWEVER VESSEL STILL LABORING
HongkongManila route, with the salary of P5,560.00 exclusive of ship board VIOLENTLY REGARDS
allowances and other benefits. Under the contract, his employment was good for one
(1) round trip only, i.e., the contract would automatically terminate upon arrival of the LUCERO
vessel at the Port of Manila, unless renewed. It was further agreed that part of the
captain's salary, while abroad, should be paid to Mrs. Josephine Lucero, his wife, in Third Message: 3
Manila.
FEBRUARY 16/80 2150 HRS
On February 16, 1980, while the vessel was enroute from Hongkong to Manila where
it was expected to arrive on February 18, 1980, Capt. Lucero sent three (3) messages PHILIPPINE COAST GUARD
to the Company's Manila office:
NEED IMMEDIATE ASSISTANCE POSITION 19-35 N 116-40 E SEAWATER ENTERING
First Message: 1 INSIDE HATCH VESSEL INCLINING 15 TO 20 DEGREES PORT IF POSSIBLE SEND
IMMEDIATE ASSISTANCE VESSEL IN DANGER PREPARING TO ABANDON ANYTIME
February l6,1980 0700 GMT Via Intercom
MASTER
EMINICON
Acting on these radio messages, the Company, respondent below, took the following
Urgent Eastship Manila steps:

REGRET TO INFORM YOU ENCOUNTERED BOISTEROUS WEATHER WITH STRONG RESPONDENT informed of the grave situation, immediately reported the matter to the
NORTHEASTERLY WINDS WITH GAIL FORCE CAUSING THE VESSEL ROLLING AND Philippine Coast Guard for search and rescue operation and the same was coordinated
PITCHING VIOLENTLY VESSEL NOW INCLINING 15 TO 20 DEGREES PORT FEARING with the U.S. Air Force based at Clark Air Base. Respondent also released radio
MIGHT JETTISON CARGO ON DECK IF EVERYTHING COME TO WORSE SITUATION messages to all vessels passing the Hongkong/Manila route requesting them to be very
cautious and vigilant for possible survivors and to scan the area whether there are
signs of debris from the ill-fated vessel "EASTERN MINICON" which has foundered In
the meantime, two (2) vessels of the respondent were also dispatched to the area last
reported by the Master for search and rescue operation, but the collective efforts of
all parties concerned yielded negative results, (p. 79, Rollo)
Subsequently, the Lloyds of London, insurer of the M/V Eastern Minicon through its
surveyors, confirmed the loss of the vessel. Thereafter, the Company paid the
corresponding death benefits to the heirs of the crew members, except respondent
Josephine Lucero, who refused to accept the same.
On July 16, 1980, Mrs. Lucerofiled a complaint with -the National Seamen Board,
Board for short, for payment of her accrued monthly allotment of P3,183.00, which
the Company had stopped since March 1980 and for continued payment of said
allotments until the M/V Minicon shall have returned to the port of Manila. She
contended that the contract of employment entered into by her husband with the
Company was on a voyage-to-voyage basis, and that the same was to terminate only
upon the vessel's arrival in Manila.
Upon the other hand, the Company maintained that Mrs. Lucero was no longer
entitled to such allotments because: [a] the Lloyds of London had already confirmed
the total loss of the vessel and had in fact settled the company's insurance claim and
[b] the Company, with the approval of the Board, had likewise paid the corresponding
death benefits to the heirs of the other seamen The Company further invoked the
provisions of Article 643 of the Code of Commerce, to wit:
Art. 643. If the vessel and her cargo should be totally lost, by reason of capture or
wreck, all rights shall be extinguished, both as regards the crew to demand any wages
whatsoever, and as regards the ship agent to recover the advances made.
xxx xxx xxx
On May 19, 1981, the Board rendered the aforecited judgment in favor of Mrs.
Josephine Lucero and against petitioner Company. The Board held that the
presumption of death could not be applied because the four-year period provided for
by Article 391(l) of the Civil Code had not yet expired; and that the payment of death
benefits to the heirs of the other crew 'members was based upon a voluntary
agreement entered into by and between the heirs and the Company, and did not bind
respondent Mrs. Lucero who was not a party thereto.
On appeal, the respondent National Labor Relations Conunission affirmed the said
decision. It held that:
Within the context of the foregoing circumstances, the only recourse is to presume
the vessel totally lost and its crew members dead. But in this connection, the question
that comes to the fore is: When will the presumption arise? Article 391 of the Civil
Code provides the answer, to wit:
Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division
of the estate among the heirs: (1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage,
or an aeroplane which is missing, who has not been heard of for four years since the
loss of the vessel or aeroplane;...
By the aforequoted law, it is quite clear that the person to be presumed dead should
first "not been heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel" before he can be
presumed dead for all purposes. Applied to Capt. LUCERO, it is evidently premature to
presume him dead as four years has not yet expired. Thus, even in Judge Advocate
General vs. Gonzales, et al., (CA) 48 O.G. 5329, the very case cited by the respondent
herein, the court Id. in the case of the missing soldier that although nothing was heard
of him since 7 May 1942, the fact of his death is not presumed until seven years after
1942.
Since Capt. LUCERO cannot yet be presumed dead as demonstrated hereinabove, it
logically follows that as of now, he is presumed have It is of no moment to Us that the
vessel was conceded by the Lloyds of London to have been totally lost which, in the
first place, was admittedly merely based on presumption as even the whereabouts of
the vessel remains unknown. Similarly, even the agreement, which formed the basis
of the Decision of the NSB ordering payment of death benefits to the heirs of some of
the crew must have been predicated upon a presumption of death of the crew
members concerned. Such circumstances do not suffice to establish the actual death
of Capt. LUCERO.
xxx xxx xxx
Indeed, by the terms of the appointment of Capt. LUCERO, his engagement terminates
upon the return of the vessel at the Port of Manila. He is considered to be still working
entitling his spouse to allotment until the vessel returns or until it is officially declared
totally lost, or until the presumption of his death becomes effective in which case the
burden of proving that he is alive is shifted to his wife for purposes of continuing her
allotment.
We are unable to agree with the reasoning and conclusion of the respondent NLRC.
It is undisputed that on February 16, 1980, the Company received three (3) radio
messages from Capt. Lucero on board the M/V Eastern Minicon the last of which,
received at 9:50 p.m. of that day, was a call for immediate assistance in view of the
existing "danger": "sea water was entering the hatch"; the vessel "was listing 50 to 60
degrees port," and they were "preparing to abandon the ship any time.' After this
message, nothing more has been heard from the vessel or its crew until the present
time.
There is thus enough evidence to show the circumstances attending the loss and
disappearance of the M/V Eastern Minicon and its crew. The foregoing facts, quite
logically. are sufficient to lead Us to a moral certainty that the vessel had sunk and that
the persons aboard had perished with it. upon this premise, the rule on presumption
of death under Article 391 (1) of the Civil Code must yield to the rule of preponderance
of evidence. As this Court said in Joaquin vs. Navarro 4 "Where there are facts, known
or knowable, from which a rational conclusion can be made, the presumption does
not step in, and the rule of preponderance of evidence controls."
Of similar import is the following pronouncement from American Jurisprudence:5
Loss of Vessel.— Where a vessel sets out on a voyage and neither the vessel nor those
who went in her are afterward heard of, the presumption arises, after the utmost limit
of time for her to have completed the voyage and for news of her arrival at any
commercial port of the world to have been received, that the vessel has been lost and
that all on board have perished. The presumption of death in such cases does not rest
on the fact alone that the person in question has been absent and unheard from for a
specific length of time, but also on the fact that the vessel has not been heard front
The question, moreover, is not whether it is impossible that the person may be alive,
but whether the circumstances do not present so strong a probability of his death that
a court should act thereon. The presumption of death from absence of tidings of the
vessel on which the absentee sailed is strengthened by proof of a storm to which the
vessel probably was exposed. The presumption is even stronger where it appears
affirmatively that the vessel was lost at sea, that nothing has been heard of a particular
person who sailed thereon, and that a sufficient time has elapsed to permit the receipt
of news of any possible survivors of the disaster.
In People vs. Ansang 6 where, in open sea, the appellant aboard a vinta ignited three
home-made bombs and threw them at the boat occupied by the victims, and the said
boat was later washed ashore and the passengers thereof were never heard or seen
again by anybody, this Court convicted the appellant of multiple murder, holding that
the victims were dead.
Similarly, in People vs. Sasota, 7 the claim of the appellants therein that there was no
conclusive evidence of death of the victim because his body was never found was
overruled by this Court in this wise:
In a case of murder or homicide, it is not necessary to recover the body or to show
where it can be found. 'Mere are cases like death at sea, where the finding or recovery
of the body is impossible. It is enough that the death and the criminal agency be
proven. There are even cases where said death and the intervention of the criminal
agency that caused it may be presumed or established by circumstantial evidence.
Moreover, it may be remembered that in several treason cages decided by this Court,
where besides the act of treason the accused is held responsible for the death of
persons he had or tortured and later taken away, where the victims were never later
seen or heard from, it has been presumed that they were lulled or otherwise criminally
disposed of or liquidated by the accused this, for the purpose of fixing the penalty.
If in the foregoing criminal cases, where the proof required for conviction must be
beyond reasonable doubt, the rule of presumption was not applied and the fact of
death was deemed established, with more reason is this Court justified in entering a
finding of death. Indeed, We cannot permit Article 391 to override, or be substituted
for, the facts established in this case which logically indicate to a moral certainty that
Capt. Lucero died shortly after he had sent his last radio message at 9:50 p.m. on
February 16, 1980.
In view of the conclusion arrived at above, We deem it unnecessary to discuss the
other issued raised in this case, they being mere adjuncts to the principa issue already
disposed of.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the NLRC subject of this petition is hereby set aside, and
the complaint of respondent Josephine Lucero dismissed. However, Mrs. Lucero is
entitled to death benefits. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Emnace vs. CA (370 SCRA 431, November 23, 2001)
EMILIO EMNACE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ESTATE OF VICENTE TABANAO,
SHERWIN TABANAO, VICENTE WILLIAM TABANAO, JANETTE TABANAO
DEPOSOY, VICENTA MAY TABANAO VARELA, ROSELA TABANAO and VINCENT
TABANAO, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Petitioner Emilio Emnace, Vicente Tabanao and Jacinto Divinagracia were
partners in a business concern known as Ma. Nelma Fishing Industry. Sometime in
January of 1986, they decided to dissolve their partnership and executed an
agreement of partition and distribution of the partnership properties among them,
consequent to Jacinto Divinagracias withdrawal from the partnership.[1] Among the
assets to be distributed were five (5) fishing boats, six (6) vehicles, two (2) parcels of
land located at Sto. Nio and Talisay, Negros Occidental, and cash deposits in the local
branches of the Bank of the Philippine Islands and Prudential Bank.
Throughout the existence of the partnership, and even after Vicente Tabanaos
untimely demise in 1994, petitioner failed to submit to Tabanaos heirs any statement
of assets and liabilities of the partnership, and to render an accounting of the
partnerships finances. Petitioner also reneged on his promise to turn over to Tabanaos
heirs the deceaseds 1/3 share in the total assets of the partnership, amounting to
P30,000,000.00, or the sum of P10,000,000.00, despite formal demand for payment
thereof.[2]
Consequently, Tabanaos heirs, respondents herein, filed against petitioner an
action for accounting, payment of shares, division of assets and damages.[3] In their
complaint, respondents prayed as follows:
1. Defendant be ordered to render the proper accounting of all the assets and
liabilities of the partnership at bar; and
2. After due notice and hearing defendant be ordered to
pay/remit/deliver/surrender/yield to the plaintiffs the following:
A. No less than One Third (1/3) of the assets, properties, dividends, cash, land(s),
fishing vessels, trucks, motor vehicles, and other forms and substance of treasures
which belong and/or should belong, had accrued and/or must accrue to the
partnership;
B. No less than Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) as moral damages;
C. Attorneys fees equivalent to Thirty Percent (30%) of the entire
share/amount/award which the Honorable Court may resolve the plaintiffs as entitled
to plus P1,000.00 for every appearance in court.[4]
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of improper venue,
lack of jurisdiction over the nature of the action or suit, and lack of capacity of the
estate of Tabanao to sue.[5] On August 30, 1994, the trial court denied the motion to
dismiss. It held that venue was properly laid because, while realties were involved, the
action was directed against a particular person on the basis of his personal liability;
hence, the action is not only a personal action but also an action in personam. As
regards petitioners argument of lack of jurisdiction over the action because the
prescribed docket fee was not paid considering the huge amount involved in the claim,
the trial court noted that a request for accounting was made in order that the exact
value of the partnership may be ascertained and, thus, the correct docket fee may be
paid. Finally, the trial court held that the heirs of Tabanao had a right to sue in their
own names, in view of the provision of Article 777 of the Civil Code, which states that
the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the
decedent.[6]
The following day, respondents filed an amended complaint,[7] incorporating the
additional prayer that petitioner be ordered to sell all (the partnerships) assets and
thereafter pay/remit/deliver/surrender/yield to the plaintiffs their corresponding
share in the proceeds thereof. In due time, petitioner filed a manifestation and motion
to dismiss,[8] arguing that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case due
to the plaintiffs failure to pay the proper docket fees. Further, in a supplement to his
motion to dismiss,[9] petitioner also raised prescription as an additional ground
warranting the outright dismissal of the complaint.
On June 15, 1995, the trial court issued an Order,[10] denying the motion to
dismiss inasmuch as the grounds raised therein were basically the same as the earlier
motion to dismiss which has been denied. Anent the issue of prescription, the trial
court ruled that prescription begins to run only upon the dissolution of the partnership
when the final accounting is done. Hence, prescription has not set in the absence of a
final accounting. Moreover, an action based on a written contract prescribes in ten
years from the time the right of action accrues.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals,[11] raising the
following issues:
I. Whether or not respondent Judge acted without jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance of a case despite the
failure to pay the required docket fee;
 II. Whether or not respondent Judge acted without jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion in insisting to try the case which involve (sic)
a parcel of land situated outside of its territorial jurisdiction;
III. Whether or not respondent Judge acted without jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion in allowing the estate of the deceased to
appear as party plaintiff, when there is no intestate case and filed by
one who was never appointed by the court as administratrix of the
estates; and
IV. Whether or not respondent Judge acted without jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion in not dismissing the case on the ground of
prescription.
On August 8, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed
decision,[12] dismissing the petition for certiorari, upon a finding that no grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction was committed by the trial
court in issuing the questioned orders denying petitioners motions to dismiss.
Not satisfied, petitioner filed the instant petition for review, raising the same
issues resolved by the Court of Appeals, namely:
I. Failure to pay the proper docket fee;
II. Parcel of land subject of the case pending before the trial court is outside
the said courts territorial jurisdiction;
III. Lack of capacity to sue on the part of plaintiff heirs of Vicente Tabanao;
and
IV. Prescription of the plaintiff heirs cause of action.
It can be readily seen that respondents primary and ultimate objective in
instituting the action below was to recover the decedents 1/3 share in the
partnerships assets. While they ask for an accounting of the partnerships assets and
finances, what they are actually asking is for the trial court to compel petitioner to pay
and turn over their share, or the equivalent value thereof, from the proceeds of the
sale of the partnership assets. They also assert that until and unless a proper
accounting is done, the exact value of the partnerships assets, as well as their
corresponding share therein, cannot be ascertained. Consequently, they feel justified
in not having paid the commensurate docket fee as required by the Rules of Court.
We do not agree. The trial court does not have to employ guesswork in
ascertaining the estimated value of the partnerships assets, for respondents
themselves voluntarily pegged the worth thereof at Thirty Million Pesos
(P30,000,000.00). Hence, this case is one which is really not beyond pecuniary
estimation, but rather partakes of the nature of a simple collection case where the
value of the subject assets or amount demanded is pecuniarily determinable.[13] While
it is true that the exact value of the partnerships total assets cannot be shown with
certainty at the time of filing, respondents can and must ascertain, through informed
and practical estimation, the amount they expect to collect from the partnership,
particularly from petitioner, in order to determine the proper amount of docket and
other fees.[14]It is thus imperative for respondents to pay the corresponding docket
fees in order that the trial court may acquire jurisdiction over the action.[15]
Nevertheless, unlike in the case of Manchester Development Corp. v. Court of
Appeals,[16] where there was clearly an effort to defraud the government in avoiding
to pay the correct docket fees, we see no attempt to cheat the courts on the part of
respondents. In fact, the lower courts have noted their expressed desire to remit to
the court any payable balance or lien on whatever award which the Honorable Court
may grant them in this case should there be any deficiency in the payment of the
docket fees to be computed by the Clerk of Court.[17] There is evident willingness to
pay, and the fact that the docket fee paid so far is inadequate is not an indication that
they are trying to avoid paying the required amount, but may simply be due to an
inability to pay at the time of filing. This consideration may have moved the trial court
and the Court of Appeals to declare that the unpaid docket fees shall be considered a
lien on the judgment award.
Petitioner, however, argues that the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in
condoning the non-payment of the proper legal fees and in allowing the same to
become a lien on the monetary or property judgment that may be rendered in favor
of respondents. There is merit in petitioners assertion. The third paragraph of Section
16, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court states that:
The legal fees shall be a lien on the monetary or property judgment in favor of the
pauper-litigant.
Respondents cannot invoke the above provision in their favor because it
specifically applies to pauper-litigants. Nowhere in the records does it appear that
respondents are litigating as paupers, and as such are exempted from the payment of
court fees.[18]
The rule applicable to the case at bar is Section 5(a) of Rule 141 of the Rules of
Court, which defines the two kinds of claims as: (1) those which are immediately
ascertainable; and (2) those which cannot be immediately ascertained as to the exact
amount. This second class of claims, where the exact amount still has to be finally
determined by the courts based on evidence presented, falls squarely under the third
paragraph of said Section 5(a), which provides:
In case the value of the property or estate or the sum claimed is less or more in
accordance with the appraisal of the court, the difference of fee shall be refunded or
paid as the case may be. (Underscoring ours)
 In Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[19] this Court
pronounced that the above-quoted provision clearly contemplates an initial payment
of the filing fees corresponding to the estimated amount of the claim subject to
adjustment as to what later may be proved.[20] Moreover, we reiterated therein the
principle that the payment of filing fees cannot be made contingent or dependent on
the result of the case. Thus, an initial payment of the docket fees based on an
estimated amount must be paid simultaneous with the filing of the
complaint. Otherwise, the court would stand to lose the filing fees should the
judgment later turn out to be adverse to any claim of the respondent heirs.
The matter of payment of docket fees is not a mere triviality. These fees are
necessary to defray court expenses in the handling of cases. Consequently, in order to
avoid tremendous losses to the judiciary, and to the government as well, the payment
of docket fees cannot be made dependent on the outcome of the case, except when
the claimant is a pauper-litigant.
Applied to the instant case, respondents have a specific claim 1/3 of the value of
all the partnership assets but they did not allege a specific amount. They did, however,
estimate the partnerships total assets to be worth Thirty Million Pesos
(P30,000,000.00), in a letter[21] addressed to petitioner. Respondents cannot now say
that they are unable to make an estimate, for the said letter and the admissions
therein form part of the records of this case. They cannot avoid paying the initial
docket fees by conveniently omitting the said amount in their amended
complaint. This estimate can be made the basis for the initial docket fees that
respondents should pay. Even if it were later established that the amount proved was
less or more than the amount alleged or estimated, Rule 141, Section 5(a) of the Rules
of Court specifically provides that the court may refund the excess or exact additional
fees should the initial payment be insufficient. It is clear that it is only the difference
between the amount finally awarded and the fees paid upon filing of this complaint
that is subject to adjustment and which may be subjected to a lien.
In the oft-quoted case of Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Hon. Maximiano
Asuncion,[22] this Court held that when the specific claim has been left for the
determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on
the judgment and it shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly
authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.
Clearly, the rules and jurisprudence contemplate the initial payment of filing and
docket fees based on the estimated claims of the plaintiff, and it is only when there is
a deficiency that a lien may be constituted on the judgment award until such additional
fee is collected.
Based on the foregoing, the trial court erred in not dismissing the complaint
outright despite their failure to pay the proper docket fees. Nevertheless, as in other
procedural rules, it may be liberally construed in certain cases if only to secure a just
and speedy disposition of an action. While the rule is that the payment of the docket
fee in the proper amount should be adhered to, there are certain exceptions which
must be strictly construed.[23]
In recent rulings, this Court has relaxed the strict adherence to
the Manchester doctrine, allowing the plaintiff to pay the proper docket fees within a
reasonable time before the expiration of the applicable prescriptive or reglementary
period.[24]
In the recent case of National Steel Corp. v. Court of Appeals,[25] this Court held
that:
The court acquires jurisdiction over the action if the filing of the initiatory pleading is
accompanied by the payment of the requisite fees, or, if the fees are not paid at the
time of the filing of the pleading, as of the time of full payment of the fees within such
reasonable time as the court may grant, unless, of course, prescription has set in the
meantime.
It does not follow, however, that the trial court should have dismissed the complaint
for failure of private respondent to pay the correct amount of docket fees.Although
the payment of the proper docket fees is a jurisdictional requirement, the trial court
may allow the plaintiff in an action to pay the same within a reasonable time before
the expiration of the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. If the plaintiff fails
to comply within this requirement, the defendant should timely raise the issue of
jurisdiction or else he would be considered in estoppel. In the latter case, the balance
between the appropriate docket fees and the amount actually paid by the plaintiff will
be considered a lien or any award he may obtain in his favor. (Underscoring ours)
Accordingly, the trial court in the case at bar should determine the proper docket
fee based on the estimated amount that respondents seek to collect from petitioner,
and direct them to pay the same within a reasonable time, provided the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period has not yet expired. Failure to comply therewith,
and upon motion by petitioner, the immediate dismissal of the complaint shall issue
on jurisdictional grounds.
On the matter of improper venue, we find no error on the part of the trial court
and the Court of Appeals in holding that the case below is a personal action which,
under the Rules, may be commenced and tried where the defendant resides or may
be found, or where the plaintiffs reside, at the election of the latter.[26]
Petitioner, however, insists that venue was improperly laid since the action is a
real action involving a parcel of land that is located outside the territorial jurisdiction
of the court a quo. This contention is not well-taken. The records indubitably show
that respondents are asking that the assets of the partnership be accounted for, sold
and distributed according to the agreement of the partners. The fact that two of the
assets of the partnership are parcels of land does not materially change the nature of
the action. It is an action in personam because it is an action against a person, namely,
petitioner, on the basis of his personal liability. It is not an action in rem where the
action is against the thing itself instead of against the person.[27] Furthermore, there is
no showing that the parcels of land involved in this case are being disputed. In fact, it
is only incidental that part of the assets of the partnership under liquidation happen
to be parcels of land.
The time-tested case of Claridades v. Mercader, et al.,[28] settled this issue thus:
The fact that plaintiff prays for the sale of the assets of the partnership, including the
fishpond in question, did not change the nature or character of the action, such sale
being merely a necessary incident of the liquidation of the partnership, which should
precede and/or is part of its process of dissolution.
The action filed by respondents not only seeks redress against petitioner. It also
seeks the enforcement of, and petitioners compliance with, the contract that the
partners executed to formalize the partnerships dissolution, as well as to implement
the liquidation and partition of the partnerships assets. Clearly, it is a personal action
that, in effect, claims a debt from petitioner and seeks the performance of a personal
duty on his part.[29] In fine, respondents complaint seeking the liquidation and
partition of the assets of the partnership with damages is a personal action which may
be filed in the proper court where any of the parties reside.[30] Besides, venue has
nothing to do with jurisdiction for venue touches more upon the substance or merits
of the case.[31] As it is, venue in this case was properly laid and the trial court correctly
ruled so.
On the third issue, petitioner asserts that the surviving spouse of Vicente
Tabanao has no legal capacity to sue since she was never appointed as administratrix
or executrix of his estate. Petitioners objection in this regard is misplaced. The
surviving spouse does not need to be appointed as executrix or administratrix of the
estate before she can file the action. She and her children are complainants in their
own right as successors of Vicente Tabanao. From the very moment of Vicente
Tabanaos death, his rights insofar as the partnership was concerned were transmitted
to his heirs, for rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of
the decedent.[32]
Whatever claims and rights Vicente Tabanao had against the partnership and
petitioner were transmitted to respondents by operation of law, more particularly by
succession, which is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and
obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance of a person are
transmitted.[33] Moreover, respondents became owners of their respective hereditary
shares from the moment Vicente Tabanao died.[34]
A prior settlement of the estate, or even the appointment of Salvacion Tabanao
as executrix or administratrix, is not necessary for any of the heirs to acquire legal
capacity to sue. As successors who stepped into the shoes of their decedent upon his
death, they can commence any action originally pertaining to the decedent. [35] From
the moment of his death, his rights as a partner and to demand fulfillment of
petitioners obligations as outlined in their dissolution agreement were transmitted to
respondents. They, therefore, had the capacity to sue and seek the courts intervention
to compel petitioner to fulfill his obligations.
Finally, petitioner contends that the trial court should have dismissed the
complaint on the ground of prescription, arguing that respondents action prescribed
four (4) years after it accrued in 1986. The trial court and the Court of Appeals gave
scant consideration to petitioners hollow arguments, and rightly so.
The three (3) final stages of a partnership are: (1) dissolution; (2) winding-up; and
(3) termination.[36] The partnership, although dissolved, continues to exist and its legal
personality is retained, at which time it completes the winding up of its affairs,
including the partitioning and distribution of the net partnership assets to the
partners.[37] For as long as the partnership exists, any of the partners may demand an
accounting of the partnerships business. Prescription of the said right starts to run
only upon the dissolution of the partnership when the final accounting is done.[38]
Contrary to petitioners protestations that respondents right to inquire into the
business affairs of the partnership accrued in 1986, prescribing four (4) years
thereafter, prescription had not even begun to run in the absence of a final
accounting. Article 1842 of the Civil Code provides:
The right to an account of his interest shall accrue to any partner, or his legal
representative as against the winding up partners or the surviving partners or the
person or partnership continuing the business, at the date of dissolution, in the
absence of any agreement to the contrary.
Applied in relation to Articles 1807 and 1809, which also deal with the duty to
account, the above-cited provision states that the right to demand an accounting
accrues at the date of dissolution in the absence of any agreement to the
contrary. When a final accounting is made, it is only then that prescription begins to
run. In the case at bar, no final accounting has been made, and that is precisely what
respondents are seeking in their action before the trial court, since petitioner has
failed or refused to render an accounting of the partnerships business and
assets. Hence, the said action is not barred by prescription.
In fine, the trial court neither erred nor abused its discretion when it denied
petitioners motions to dismiss. Likewise, the Court of Appeals did not commit
reversible error in upholding the trial courts orders. Precious time has been lost just
to settle this preliminary issue, with petitioner resurrecting the very same arguments
from the trial court all the way up to the Supreme Court. The litigation of the merits
and substantial issues of this controversy is now long overdue and must proceed
without further delay.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition is DENIED for lack
of merit, and the case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Cadiz City, Branch
60, which is ORDERED to determine the proper docket fee based on the estimated
amount that plaintiffs therein seek to collect, and direct said plaintiffs to pay the same
within a reasonable time, provided the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period
has not yet expired. Thereafter, the trial court is ORDERED to conduct the appropriate
proceedings in Civil Case No. 416-C.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
In the matter of Guardianship of the Lavides’ vs. City Court of
Lucena (G.R. No. L-50261, May 31, 1982)
IN THE MATTER OF GUARDIANSHIP OF THE MINORS CECILIA, REBECCA, FLORIDA,
RAPHAEL, RODOLFO, LUISITO, TEODORO, all surnamed LAVIDES, ALBERTO C.
LAVIDES, petitioner,
vs.
CITY COURT OF LUCENA, Branch I, respondent.
DE CASTRO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the two (2) orders of respondent City Court
of Lucena, Branch I, one dated December 5, 1978 dismissing petitioner's petition for
guardianship for lack of jurisdiction and the other, dated December 27, 1978 denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the order of December 5, 1978.
There is no dispute as to the following facts:
Upon the death of his wife, petitioner Alberto Lavides instituted on April 5, 1971
before respondent City Court a guardianship proceeding (Special Proceeding No.
0609) with respect to the person and property of their seven (7) minor children named
Cecilia, Rebecca, Florida, Raphael, Rodolfo, Luisito and Teodoro, all surnamed Lavides.
Said petition alleged that the estate left by the deceased wife of herein petitioner,
mother of the above- named minors, has a total value of thirty-five thousand pesos
(P35,000.00) or an amount of P5,000.00 pertaining to each minor. Although there had
been no previous settlement of the estate of the deceased, petitioner was appointed
and qualified as judicial guardian on May 10, 1971.
On June 23, 1971, respondent City Court, then presided by Honorable Judge Filemon
Juntereal, upon motion, authorized petitioner to settle the estate extrajudicially and
to sell a portion thereof consisting of shares of stocks. Pursuant to said authority,
petitioner extrajudicially settled the estate, and on August 28, 1971, sold the said
shares of stocks for the sum of P64,512.00
On November 22, 1978, petitioner filed a motion for confirmation and approval of a
Deed of Exchange Agreement dated November 18, 1978. While this latter motion was
still pending consideration, the respondent court, now presided by Honorable Judge
Jose J. Parentela, Jr., reviewed the records of the case and finding that the undivided
estate left by the deceased was worth at least P35,000.00, dismissed the case in an
Order dated December 5, 1978, for lack of jurisdiction, revoked the appointment of
petitioner as guardian and annulled all proceedings taken prior to the issuance of the
said order of December 5, 1978.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of said order which was denied by
respondent city court in its order dated December 27, 1978. Hence, this instant
petition, petitioner raising the following issues, namely:
a. Whether or not respondent city court's jurisdiction over a petition for general
guardianship is based on the total value of the estate or on the value of the individual
share of the minors in the estate of their deceased mother; and
b. Whether or not the promulgation of the Revised Rules of Court which was made
effective on January 1, 1964 overruled the doctrine laid down by this Honorable
Tribunal in the case of "Delgado vs. Gamboa," G. R. No. L-14326, February 28, 1962, 4
SCRA 505.
It appears that respondent city court dismissed the petition for guardianship on
ground of lack of jurisdiction 1) because a perusal of the records of the case shows
that the undivided estate left by the deceased is worth P35,000.00 which is clearly
outside its jurisdiction, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 92 of the Revised Rules of Court,
and 2) because of this Court's ruling in the case of Delgado vs. Gamboa, supra, to the
effect that the concurrent jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace Courts with the Court
of First Instance over the guardianship of the person and properties of the minors and
incompetents cannot be exercised when the estate has a value in excess of the
jurisdictional amount for the former courts.
Petitioner, on the other hand, contends that in the case of petition for guardianship
of more than one minor, the individual share of each minor which is then the estate
of said minors determines the jurisdiction of the court pursuant to Section 1, Rule 92
of the Revised Rules of Court; that inasmuch as there are seven (7) minor children
sought to be placed under guardianship and that the total value of the estate is
P35,000.00, then by simple mathematical computation, the value of the property of
each minor is P5,000.00, already a determined estate, which is well within the
jurisdiction of the respondent city court; that the case of Delgado vs. Gamboa,
promulgated in 1962, invoked by respondent city court in dismissing his petition has
been overruled and abandoned by the promulgation of the Revised Rules of Court,
which took effect in 1964.
Section 1, Rule 92 of the Revised Rules of Court granting concurrent jurisdiction to the
municipal and city courts with the Court of First Instance in the appointment of
guardians, provides:
Section 1. Where to institute proceedings.— Guardianship of the person or estate of a
minor or incompetent may be instituted in the Court of First Instance of the province,
or in the justice of the peace court of the municipality, or in the municipal court of the
chartered city where the minor or incompetent person resides, and if he resides in a
foreign country, in the Court of First Instance of the province wherein his property or
part thereof is situated; provided, however, that where the value of the property of
such minor or incompetent exceeds the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace or
municipal court, the proceedings shall be instituted in the Court of First Instance.
In the City of Manila the proceedings shall be instituted in the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court.
The above section, in clear terms, grants concurrent jurisdiction between municipal
and city court and Courts of First Instance in the appointment of guardians either with
respect to the person or property of the minor or incompetent, except that where the
value of the property of such minor or incompetent exceeds the jurisdiction of the
municipal or city courts, the guardianship proceedings shall be instituted in the Court
of First Instance. It is clear, therefore, that the value of the property of the minor or
incompetent sought to be placed in guardianship determines which court has
jurisdiction. And that property referred to is the individual estate of the minor so much
so that when there are more than one minor or in competent sought to be placed
under guardianship, what determines which court has jurisdiction is the value of the
individual property of each minor or incompetent.
In the case at bar, it appears that respondent city court dismissed the petition for
guardianship on ground of lack of jurisdiction because a perusal of the record of the
case shows that the undivided estate left by the deceased mother is worth P35,000.00
which amount is clearly outside its jurisdiction. This reasoning must be rejected for it
overlooks the fact that the petition for guardianship filed by herein petitioner before
the respondent city court clearly alleged that the individual estate or share of each of
the seven minor children sought to be placed under guardianship is P5,000.00, which
amount is well within the jurisdiction of the respondent city court (Section 88,
Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended by R.A. No. 3828). That the respondent city court
has jurisdiction over the case cannot be denied, for the rule is well-settled that
jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of
the complaint and/or petition. 1 That each of the seven (7) minor children became
owner of a one- seventh (1/7) share or an amount of P5,000 from the estate left by
the deceased mother valued at P35,000.00 upon the death of the latter cannot also
be denied for Article 777 of the New Civil Code expressly provides that "the rights to
the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent," and from
then on, the heir becomes the absolute owner of the decedent's property, subject of
the rights and obligations of the decedent and he cannot be deprived of such right
except by methods provided for by law. 2
Respondent city court, however, would also base its dismissal of the case in the light
of this Court's ruling in the case of Delgado vs. Gamboa, supra, to the effect that the
concurrence of jurisdiction between Courts of First Instance and inferior courts over
guardianship of the minors or incompetents cannot be exercised when the estate has
a value in excess of the jurisdictional amount for the latter courts. The respondent
Court, however, overlooked one vital fact. A more careful examination of the facts of
said case, decided in 1962, reveals that it involved guardianship proceeding over the
person and property of three (3) minor children of decedent and an undivided estate
valued at P7,000.00. That would make a share of P2,333.33 for each minor child, which
amount is also in excess of the jurisdictional amount for inferior courts. 3 In the case
at bar, there are seven (7) minor children to share in an undivided estate valued at
P35,000.00 or a share of P5,000.00 for each minor, which amount is well within the
jurisdiction of the respondent city court, 4 which, therefore, cannot validly invoke the
case of Delgado vs. Gamboa to support its dismissal of the petition for guardianship.
For what is decisive is not the total value of the estate of the decedent, but the value
of the individual share of each of the minor heirs for whom a guardian is sought to be
appointed individually not collectively.
But petitioner would contend, as raised in the second issue of this petition, that the
doctrine laid down by this Court in the aforecited case of Delgado vs. Gamboa, has
been overruled by the promulgation of the Revised Rules of Court, particularly Section
1 of Rule 92, He argued that the case of Delgado vs. Gamboa, promulgated on
February 28, 1962, was decided when Section 1, Rule 93 of the former Rules of Court
was still effective, which rule commands that guardianship shall be originally
cognizable by the Court of First Instance; that when the Revised Rules of Court took
effect on January 1, 1964, the institution of guardianship proceedings is now governed
by Section 1 of Rule 92 which states that guardianship proceedings may be instituted
in the Courts of First Instance or in the municipal courts.
A perusal of the case of Delgado vs. Gamboa, decided when Section 1 of former Rule
93, as amended by R.A. No. 643, was still effective, shows that it merely restated and
confirmed the doctrine laid down in the case of Morales vs. Marquez, G. R. No. L-7463,
May 27, 1955, which in effect, expounded the grant of concurrent jurisdiction
between inferior courts and Court of First Instance, as provided for by R.A. No. 643.
And a comparison of the provisions of Section 1 of former Rule 93, as amended, and
Section 1 of the present Rule 92 shows that the latter rule restates the former rule.
Under the former rule, municipal or city courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the
Court of First Instance in cases where the value of the property of such minor or
incompetent falls within the jurisdiction of the former courts. Likewise, under the
present rule, concurrent jurisdiction was also granted except that "where the value of
the property of such minor or incompetent exceeds the jurisdiction of the inferior
courts, the proceedings shall, be instituted in the Court of First Instance." The
criterion, therefore, in determining in which court the guardianship proceeding shall
be instituted under the provision of both the former Rule 93 and the present Rule 92
remains the same. Hence, it cannot be accurately stated that the Delgado ruling has
been abandoned. In any case, the Delgado doctrine, as already demonstrated, does
not militate against petitioner's contention that the City has jurisdiction over the
instant guardianship case.

Lastly, there is still one aspect of this case which must not be overlooked. It is not
disputed that the respondent City Court has entertained and granted petitioner's
petition for guardianship in its Order as early as May 10, 1971 and has exercised its
jurisdiction by granting authority to petitioner to settle the estate extrajudicially and
to sell a portion thereof consisting of shares of stock; that after the lapse of seven (7)
years or on November 22, 1978, respondent City Court dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction, revoked the appointment of petitioner as guardian and annulled all
proceedings taken. Would it serve the interest of justice to dismiss the case at this
stage and let a new petition for guardianship be filed in another court? To draw a
tenuous jurisdictional line is to undermine stability in litigations. The time to be lost,
effort wasted, anxiety augmented, additional expenses incurred—these are
considerations which weigh heavily if this situation is allowed to happen. As aptly
stated by the petitioner.—"To let the respondent court reverse its stand now will pave
a pattern of judicial instability which, to reason and logic, is definitely not healthy
administration of justice and not inducive of court's veneration." 5

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Order of respondent City Court of December 5, 1978
dismissing the petition and the Order of December 27, 1978 denying petitioner's
motion for reconsideration thereof are hereby set aside and the case is remanded to
it for further proceedings. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
Bonilla vs. Barcena
ROSALIO BONILLA (a minor) SALVACION BONILLA (a minor) and PONCIANO BONILLA
(their father) who represents the minors, petitioners, vs. LEON BARCENA, MAXIMA
ARIAS BALLENA, ESPERANZA BARCENA, MANUEL BARCENA, AGUSTINA NERI, widow of
JULIAN TAMAYO and HON. LEOPOLDO GIRONELLA of the Court of First Instance of
Abra, respondents.
This is a petition for review 1 of the Order of the Court of First Instance of Abra in Civil
Case No. 856, entitled Fortunata Barcena vs. Leon Barcena, et al., denying the motions
for reconsideration of its order dismissing the complaint in the aforementioned case.
On March 31, 1975 Fortunata Barcena, mother of minors Rosalio Bonilla and Salvacion
Bonilla and wife of Ponciano Bonilla, instituted a civil action in the Court of First
Instance of Abra, to quiet title over certain parcels of land located in Abra.
On May 9, 1975, defendants filed a written motion to dismiss the complaint, but
before the hearing of the motion to dismiss, the counsel for the plaintiff moved to
amend the complaint in order to include certain allegations therein. The motion to
amend the complaint was granted and on July 17, 1975, plaintiffs filed their amended
complaint.
On August 4, 1975, the defendants filed another motion to dismiss the complaint on
the ground that Fortunata Barcena is dead and, therefore, has no legal capacity to sue.
Said motion to dismiss was heard on August 14, 1975. In said hearing, counsel for the
plaintiff confirmed the death of Fortunata Barcena, and asked for substitution by her
minor children and her husband, the petitioners herein; but the court after the hearing
immediately dismissed the case on the ground that a dead person cannot be a real
party in interest and has no legal personality to sue.
On August 19, 1975, counsel for the plaintiff received a copy of the order dismissing
the complaint and on August 23, 1975, he moved to set aside the order of the dismissal
pursuant to Sections 16 and 17 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. 2
On August 28, 1975, the court denied the motion for reconsideration filed by counsel
for the plaintiff for lack of merit. On September 1, 1975, counsel for deceased plaintiff
filed a written manifestation praying that the minors Rosalio Bonilla and Salvacion
Bonilla be allowed to substitute their deceased mother, but the court denied the
counsel's prayer for lack of merit. From the order, counsel for the deceased plaintiff
filed a second motion for reconsideration of the order dismissing the complaint
claiming that the same is in violation of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court but the same was denied.
Hence, this petition for review.
The Court reverses the respondent Court and sets aside its order dismissing the
complaint in Civil Case No. 856 and its orders denying the motion for reconsideration
of said order of dismissal. While it is true that a person who is dead cannot sue in court,
yet he can be substituted by his heirs in pursuing the case up to its completion. The
records of this case show that the death of Fortunata Barcena took place on July 9,
1975 while the complaint was filed on March 31, 1975. This means that when the
complaint was filed on March 31, 1975, Fortunata Barcena was still alive, and
therefore, the court had acquired jurisdiction over her person. If thereafter she died,
the Rules of Court prescribes the procedure whereby a party who died during the
pendency of the proceeding can be substituted. Under Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules
of Court "whenever a party to a pending case dies ... it shall be the duty of his attorney
to inform the court promptly of such death ... and to give the name and residence of
his executor, administrator, guardian or other legal representatives." This duty was
complied with by the counsel for the deceased plaintiff when he manifested before
the respondent Court that Fortunata Barcena died on July 9, 1975 and asked for the
proper substitution of parties in the case. The respondent Court, however, instead of
allowing the substitution, dismissed the complaint on the ground that a dead person
has no legal personality to sue. This is a grave error. Article 777 of the Civil Code
provides "that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the
death of the decedent." From the moment of the death of the decedent, the heirs
become the absolute owners of his property, subject to the rights and obligations of
the decedent, and they cannot be deprived of their rights thereto except by the
methods provided for by law. 3 The moment of death is the determining factor when
the heirs acquire a definite right to the inheritance whether such right be pure or
contingent. 4 The right of the heirs to the property of the deceased vests in them even
before judicial declaration of their being heirs in the testate or intestate
proceedings. 5 When Fortunata Barcena, therefore, died her claim or right to the
parcels of land in litigation in Civil Case No. 856, was not extinguished by her death but
was transmitted to her heirs upon her death. Her heirs have thus acquired interest in
the properties in litigation and became parties in interest in the case. There is,
therefore, no reason for the respondent Court not to allow their substitution as parties
in interest for the deceased plaintiff.
Under Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court "after a party dies and the claim is not
thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal
representative of the deceased to appear and be substituted for the deceased, within
such time as may be granted ... ." The question as to whether an action survives or not
depends on the nature of the action and the damage sued for. 6 In the causes of action
which survive the wrong complained affects primarily and principally property and
property rights, the injuries to the person being merely incidental, while in the causes
of action which do not survive the injury complained of is to the person, the property
and rights of property affected being incidental. 7 Following the foregoing criterion the
claim of the deceased plaintiff which is an action to quiet title over the parcels of land
in litigation affects primarily and principally property and property rights and therefore
is one that survives even after her death. It is, therefore, the duty of the respondent
Court to order the legal representative of the deceased plaintiff to appear and to be
substituted for her. But what the respondent Court did, upon being informed by the
counsel for the deceased plaintiff that the latter was dead, was to dismiss the
complaint. This should not have been done for under the same Section 17, Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court, it is even the duty of the court, if the legal representative fails to
appear, to order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal
representative of the deceased. In the instant case the respondent Court did not have
to bother ordering the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal
representative of the deceased because her counsel has not only asked that the minor
children be substituted for her but also suggested that their uncle be appointed as
guardian ad litem for them because their father is busy in Manila earning a living for
the family. But the respondent Court refused the request for substitution on the
ground that the children were still minors and cannot sue in court. This is another
grave error because the respondent Court ought to have known that under the same
Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the court is directed to appoint a guardian ad
litem for the minor heirs. Precisely in the instant case, the counsel for the deceased
plaintiff has suggested to the respondent Court that the uncle of the minors be
appointed to act as guardian ad litem for them. Unquestionably, the respondent Court
has gravely abused its discretion in not complying with the clear provision of the Rules
of Court in dismissing the complaint of the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 856 and refusing
the substitution of parties in the case.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the order of the respondent Court dismissing the
complaint in Civil Case No. 856 of the Court of First Instance of Abra and the motions
for reconsideration of the order of dismissal of said complaint are set aside and the
respondent Court is hereby directed to allow the substitution of the minor children,
who are the petitioners therein for the deceased plaintiff and to appoint a qualified
person as guardian ad litem for them. Without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
Borromeo-Herrera vs. Borromeo (152 SCRA 172)
TESTATE ESTATE OF VITO BORROMEO. JOSE H. JUNQUERA, petitioner-appellee, vs.
CRISPIN BORROMEO, ET AL., oppositors-appellants. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, intervenor-appellant.
Vito Borromeo, a widower and permanent resident of the City of Cebu, died on March
13, 1952, in Parañaque, Rizal, at the age of 88 years, without forced heirs but leaving
extensive properties in the province of Cebu.
On April 19 of the same year, Jose H. Junquera, filed with the Court of First Instance
of said province a petition for the probate of a one page document as the last will left
by said deceased, devising all his properties to Tomas, Fortunato and Amelia, all
surnamed Borromeo, in equal and undivided shares, and designating Junquera as
executor thereof (Special Proceedings No. 916-R). The document — now in the record
as Exhibit "A" — was dated May 17, 1946, drafted in Spanish, and allegedly signed,
and thumbmarked by said deceased, in the presence of Dr. Cornelio G. Gandionco,
Eusebio Cabiluna and Filiberto Leonardo as attesting witnesses. On June 14, 1952, the
probate court appointed Junquera as special administrator of the estate.
On November 14 of the same year, Teofilo Borromeo filed an opposition to the
probate of the will based on the following grounds: (1) that the formalities required
by law had not been complied with; (2) that the testator was mentally incapable of
making a will at the time of its execution; (3) that the will was procured by undue and
improper influence, on the part of the beneficiaries and/or some other person; (4)
that the signature of the testator was procured by fraud; and (5) that the testator
acted by mistake or did not intend the instrument he signed to be his will at the time
he affixed his signature thereto.
Upon motion of the abovenamed oppositor, on June 9, 1953, the Court removed
Junquera as special administrator and appointed Dr. Patricio Beltran in his place.
On November 27, 1953, Vitaliana Borromeo, a niece of the deceased, filed her own
opposition to the probate of the will, on the ground that the signature "Vito
Borromeo" appearing thereon was a forgery. Other oppositions were subsequently
filed by Patrocinio Borromeo de Tabotabo (her opposition was later withdrawn), Lilia
Morre de Tabotabo, Lamberto Morre, Patricia Morre de Ranario, Aurora Morre de
Borromeo, Ramon Ocampo, Isagani Morre and Rosario Morre, invoking substantially
the same grounds mentioned heretofore.
Meanwhile, Tomas, Amelia and Fortunato Borromeo, manifestly on behalf of the
"Cebu Arcade Company, T. L. Borromeo y Cia.", a duly organized partnership
controlled by them, filed a motion to exclude from the inventory of the Estate
previously filed by the new special administrator, thirteen parcels of land situated in
the City of Cebu with a total area of 2,148 square meters, alleging that during his
lifetime the deceased testator had sold said lots to them, as evidenced by the
document now in the record as Exhibit F-1 executed on May 17, 1945, confirming the
alleged previous sale. After due hearing, the court, in its order of July 16, 1954, denied
the motion for exclusion, ruling that movants' remedy was to file a separate accion
reivindicatoria against the administrator.
On October 28, 1955, the Republic of the Philippines filed a motion for leave to
intervene and join the oppositors in contesting the probate of the will, on the ground
that, should the estate be adjudicated the latter by intestacy, it stood to collect a
considerable amount by way of estate and inheritance taxes. In its order of December
10 of the same year, the Court allowed the intervention.
After a prolonged trial, on May 28, 1960, the Court rendered a decision denying the
probate of the will and declaring itself without jurisdiction to pass upon the question
of ownership over the thirteen lots which the Cebu Arcade etc. claimed as its own. All
the parties appealed — the proponents of the will from the portion of the decision
denying probate, and the oppositors and the Republic of the Philippines, from that
portion thereof where the court refused to decide the question of ownership of the
thirteen lots already mentioned.
The proponents of the disputed will, mainly with the testimony of the three attesting
witnesses, Cornelio Gandionco, Filiberto Leonardo and Eusebio Cabiluna, sought to
prove the following facts:
In the morning of May 17, 1945, Tomas Borromeo, complying with the request of Vito
Borromeo, went to the house of Atty. Filiberto Leonardo to request him to be a
witness at the execution of the latter's last will. Dr. Cornelio Gandionco, who at the
time happened to be in the house of Leonardo, was likewise requested to act as such.
Together, the three went to the residence of Vito Borromeo at Ramos Street, Cebu
City. Upon their arrival the third witness, Eusebio Cabiluna, who was living on the
ground floor of the house, was asked to come upstairs. Thereafter, in their presence,
Vito Borromeo executed first, the document Exhibit "F" (deed of confirmation of an
alleged previous sale to Cebu Arcade Company, T. L. Borromeo y Cia.) witnessed by
Gandionco and Cabiluna. Later, Vito Borromeo, being of sound and disposing mind,
and without pressure or influence exerted on him, dictated the substance of his will
to Tomas Borromeo, who in turn typewrote it in proper legal language. The document
was then read by Vito Borromeo, who later signed and thumbmarked it (Exhibit "A")
and carbon copies thereof (Exhibits "E" and "K") in the presence of the attesting
witnesses, who, in turn, signed the will and its copies in the presence of Vito Borromeo
and of each other.
Proponents also placed the Rev. Fr. Julio Corres, a Spanish Catholic priest who was the
confessor of Vito Borromeo from 1942 to 1946, the Rev. Fr. Sergio Alfafara, who was
his confessor from 1946 to 1947, and Vicenta Mañacap, a mid-wife who lived in the
testator's house and had served him from May 1945 up to his death on March 30,
1952 on the witness stand. The gist of their testimony is to the effect that at the time
of the execution of the will, Vito Borromeo was still strong and could move around
freely with the aid of a cane; that he was still mentally alert and was a man of strong
will; that his right hand was unimpaired and he could write with it unaided; that as a
matter of fact — according to Vicenta Mañacap — he still wrote personal letters to
Tomas Borromeo, could eat by himself and even played the piano.
On the other hand, the oppositors presented several witnesses who testified that the
signatures purporting to be those of Vito Borromeo on the document Exhibit "A" and
its copies were forgeries; that they were too good and too perfect signatures and,
therefore, quite impossible for the deceased — an ailing man already 82 years old on
May 17, 1945 — to write; that he was found "positive for bacillus leprosy" by Dr.
Antonio Garcia as early as 1926 or 1927, having been treated for it consistently by
injections of chaulmoogra oil administered by Dr. Max Borromeo and Dr. Cornelio
Gandionco; that Vito Borromeo's usual signatures during his better days had always
been characterized by certain flourishes, technically called "rubric"; that Vito
Borromeo had also reared and educated two of the oppositors, Crispin Borromeo and
the late Teofilo Borromeo and there was no conceivable reason why they were left
out in the will, if any such will had really been made by him knowingly; that the
testamentary witness Cornelio Gandionco, is a nephew of the other witness, Filiberto
Leonardo, and was the fiance of Angeles Borromeo, a sister of Tomas Borromeo, one
of the instituted heirs; that the third testamentary witness, Eusebio Cabiluna is the
real father of Fortunato Borromeo, another instituted heir, who admittedly grew up
and was reared by Vito Borromeo and his wife Juliana Evangelista since he was barely
three months; that Amelia Borromeo, the third instituted heir, is a younger sister of
Tomas Borromeo and dependent upon him; that on May 17, 1945, the deceased's
leprosy was so far advanced that the fingers of his right hand were already hardened
and atrophied, this making it difficult, if not impossible, for him to write; and that on
the same date, his sense of hearing and his eyesight had been considerably impaired,
his eyes being always watery due to the progress of his leprosy.
The oppositors also presented Felipe Logan of the National Bureau of Investigation
and Jose G. Villanueva, as handwriting experts, who testified, after examining the
supposed signatures of the deceased in Exhibit "A" and comparing them with his
accepted standard signatures, that the questioned signatures were forgeries. The
proponents, however, presented their own handwriting expert, Martin Ramos, who
testified to the contrary.
The trial court refused to believe the testimony of the attesting witnesses and, as a
result, denied the petition for probate, because, in its opinion, they appeared not to
be "wholly disinterested persons" and because of the serious discrepancies in their
testimonies with respect to the number of copies made of the disputed document.
The court also found that the physical condition of the deceased at the time of the
execution of the questioned document was such that it was highly improbable, if not
impossible, for him to have affixed his signatures on the documents Exhibits A, E and
K in the spontaneous and excellent manner they appear to have been written. Thus,
the court was also led to believe the testimony of the handwriting experts for
oppositors, — adverse to the genuineness of the signatures of Vito Borromeo on the
questioned document — more than that of the handwriting expert presented by the
proponents of the will.
It seems clear, therefore, that the main issue to be decided in the present appeal is
whether or not the evidence of record is sufficient to prove the due execution of the
will in question.1äwphï1.ñët
It must be conceded that in this jurisdiction, the subscribing witnesses to a contested
will are regarded as the best witnesses in connection with its due execution. It is
similarly true, however, that to deserve full credit, their test, testimony must be
reasonable and unbiased, and that, as in the case of any other witness, their testimony
may be overcome by any competent evidence — direct or circumstantial (Board, etc.
vs. Shasser, 10 Kan. 585, 168 Pac. 836 [1917]).
It is also an appellate practice of long standing in this jurisdiction to accord great
weight to the findings of fact made by the trial court and not to disturb them unless
said court had failed to consider material facts and circumstances or had given undue
weight to, or misconstrued the testimony of particular witnesses, the reason for this
being that the trial judge had full opportunity to hear and observe the conduct and
demeanor of the witnesses while testifying and was consequently in a better position
than the reviewing court to determine the question of their credibility. While this is
not applicable to the present case because His Honor, the judge who penned the
appealed decision was not the same judge before whom the evidence of the parties
was presented, it must be stated that, judging from the carefully written decision
under review, it was only after a thorough study of the record that His Honor arrived
at the conclusion that the subscribing witnesses do not appear to be wholly
disinterested persons.
On the matter of the number of copies made of the questioned will allegedly signed
by the testator and the three subscribing witnesses, His Honor found that Cabiluna
was very uncertain and confused; that a certain stage of his examination, he said that
only two copies of the will were prepared — the original and one carbon copy — while
at another stage he affirmed that he did not know whether or not there was a
duplicate and that all he could say was that he had affixed his signature three times
(Transcript, Marquiala, August 22, 1958, pp. 49-50). In truth, however, he really signed
six (6) times — twice on the original and twice on each of the two copies. Adding
confusion to the situation is the answer he gave when he was asked if Vito Borromeo
also signed the carbon copy, to which his answer was "I did not see" (Idem., p. 50).
On the other hand, the other subscribing witness, Atty. Filiberto Leonardo, testified
categorically that there were only the original and one carbon copy of the will and that
the testator and all the subscribing witnesses signed both (Transcript, Marquiala,
December 23, 1953, pp. 167, 210, and 218). However, the naked and highly disturbing
fact is that, contrary to what is inferable from the vacillating testimony of Cabiluna and
the categorical assertion of Atty. Leonardo, the proponents of the questioned will
themselves presented three copies of said will; the original, a carbon duplicate copy
and a carbon triplicate copy, now in the record as Exhibits A, E and K, respectively.
While it is true that the testimony of these subscribing witnesses was given around
eight years after the alleged execution of the questioned will, still we believe that the
transaction in which they claim to have taken an important part is of such character
and importance that it can not be a very easy matter for anyone of them to have a
hazy recollection of the number of copies signed by the testator and by them. Stranger
still would it be for them to say something in open contradiction with the reality on
the matter. If, as may be clearly deduced from their testimony — Cabiluna and
Leonardo's — there was only the original and one copy signed by the testator and the
subscribing witnesses, why is it that three — original and two copies — were really in
existence and were produced in court during the trial?
In the case of the third subscribing witness, Dr. Cornelio Gandionco, the imputation
was made by two witnesses, Dr. Teofilo Borromeo and Judge Crispin Borromeo, that
he was the fiance of Angeles Borromeo, sister of Tomas Borromeo, who is one of the
three heirs instituted in the questioned will, evidently to show that he is not a
completely disinterested witness. The evidence to this effect appears to have
remained unimpeached, although the proponents of the will could have done it by
calling on Dr. Gandionco himself or on Angeles Borromeo to deny the imputation.
Moreover, the evidence also disclose that Dr. Gandionco was the uncle of the other
subscribing witness, Atty. Leonardo, and that, in fact, they were living together at the
time of the alleged execution of the will. This circumstance — apparently trivial — can
not be taken lightly because in view of appellee's claim that Angeles Borromeo was
the fiance of Dr. Gandionco, it would not be unreasonable to entertain the suspicion
that both subscribing witnesses were not wholly disinterested. Material to this point
is the fact established by the evidence that Atty. Leonardo was the notary public
before whom the document Exhibit 4-A — which purports to convey to a partnership
controlled by the heirs instituted in the questioned will thirteen parcels of land
situated in the commercial center of Cebu City — was supposedly acknowledged by
the testator on the same date May 17, 1945.
In the light of the foregoing, We can not see our way clear to holding that the trial
court erred in refusing to give full credit to the testimony of the three subscribing
witnesses.
It has also been held that the condition and physical appearance of a questioned
document constitute a valuable factor which, if correctly evaluated in the light of
surrounding circumstances, may help in determining whether it is genuine or forged.
Subscribing witnesses may forget or exaggerate what they really know, saw, heard or
did; they may be biased and, therefore, tell only half truths to mislead the court or
favor one party to the prejudice of the other. This can not be said of the condition and
physical appearance of the questioned document itself. Both, albeit silently, will reveal
the naked truth, hiding nothing, forgetting nothing, and exaggerating nothing. For this
reason, independently of the conflicting opinions expressed by the handwriting
experts called to the witness stand by the parties, we have carefully examined and
considered the physical appearance and condition of the original and two copies of
the questioned will found in the record — particularly the signatures attributed to the
testator — and We have come to the conclusion that the latter could not have been
written by him.
Upon the face of the original and two copies of the contested will (Exhibits A, E and K)
appear a total of six alleged signatures of the testator. They are all well written along
a practically straight line, without any visible sign of tremor or lack of firmness in the
hand that wrote them. In fact, in the respects just adverted to, they appear better
written than the unquestioned signatures, of attesting witnesses Gandionco and
Cabiluna, inspite of the fact that on the date of the alleged execution of the will (May
17, 1945) the testator was considerably older and in a much poorer physical condition
than they. According to the evidence, the testator was then a sick man, eighty-two
years old, with the entire left half of his body paralyzed since six years before, while
the oldest attesting witness (Cabiluna) was around sixty-five years of age and Leonardo
and Gandionco were only forty-four and forty-five years old respectively, and were all
in good health. Despite the obviously very poor physical condition of the testator,
Leonardo claims that he signed the alleged will unaided, writing his name thereon
slowly but continuously or without interruption, and that, on the same occasion, he
signed his name several times not only on the original of the will and its copies but
also on the original and several copies of the alleged confirmatory sale Exhibit F-1 and
on his residence certificate. Considering all the attendant circumstances, we agree
with the lower court that Vito Borromeo could not have written the questioned
signatures.
In view of what has been said heretofore, We find it unnecessary to examine and
consider in detail the conflicting testimony of the handwriting experts presented by
the parties: Martin Ramos by the proponents of the will, to sustain the genuineness of
the questioned signatures, and Felipe Logan and Jose G. Villanueva, by the oppositors,
to prove that said signatures are forgeries. We shall limit ourselves in this connection
to quoting with approval the following portion of the appealed decision:
It appears that on February 11, 1954 Tomas, Amelia, and Fortunato Borromeo,
through counsel, filed a motion for the exclusion from the inventory of the Estate of
the thirteen lots therein mentioned, with a total area of 2,348 square meters, claiming
that the same had been sold by the deceased Vito Borromeo during his lifetime to the
Cebu Arcade, T. L. Borromeo y Cia. This motion for exclusion was denied by the lower
court in its order of July 16, 1954, and the ruling was reiterated in the appealed
decision "for the same reasons and considerations" upon which it rejected the probate
of the will. The ruling on the matter, however, was expressly made provisional in
nature.

What the Court finds to be a weakness in the conclusions of Martin Ramos, based on
his comparative examination of the questioned and standard signatures of Vito
Borromeo, is his apparent assumption that all the signatures were made by Vito
Borromeo under equality or similarity of circumstances, that is, that in all instances
Vito Borromeo had normal use of both of his hands, — the right and the left. He failed
to take into account that when Vito Borromeo allegedly affixed those signatures on
May 17, 1945 on Exhibits 'A', 'E', and 'K' the left portion of his body, including the left
hand, was already paralyzed, and Vito Borromeo was represented to have written his
name alone by himself and unaided. Maybe, if he was previously apprised of those
circumstances, he would hesitate to make the conclusion that those flawless
signatures reading Vito Borromeo, written straight and in a form as good as, if not
better than, the signatures of three much younger attesting witnesses, were positively
in the handwriting of the 82-year old, ailing, and paralytic Vito Borromeo. The Court
consequently, finds itself not disposed to adopt his conclusions, but on the contrary is
inclined toward the views of the other two experts witnesses, Felipe Logan and Jose
G. Villanueva.
We believe, and so hold, that the resolution of the lower court on this matter is correct
because said court, acting in its capacity as a probate court, had no jurisdiction to
determine with finality the question of ownership involved. That such matter must be
litigated in a separate action has been the established jurisprudence in this jurisdiction
(Ongsinco vs. Borja, L-7635, July 25, 1955; Mallari vs. Mallari, L-4656, February 23,
1953; Garcia vs. Martin, G.R. No. L-9233, June 29, 1957; Cordova vs. Ocampo, 73 Phil.
661; Pascual vs. Pascual, 73 Phil. 561 and others), except where a party merely prays
for the inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of any particular property, in which
case the probate court may pass upon provisionally, the question of inclusion or
exclusion, but without prejudice to its final determination in an appropriate separate
action (Garcia vs. Garcia, 67 Phil. 353; Marcelino vs. Antonio, 70 Phil. 388; Guinguing
vs. Abuton, 48 Phil. 144, 147).
In view of all the foregoing, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs.

As stated at the outset, the contested will is claimed to have been signed
and thumbmarked by the testator. An examination of the thumbmarks, however,
readily shows that, as the lower court found, the same are "glaringly far from being
distinct and clear"; that "they are not a possible means of identification" nor can "they
possibly be identified to be those of Vito Borromeo, or for that matter, of any other
person whatsoever". It is, therefore, obvious, that they are of little use in the
resolution of the issue before Us.

We shall now consider the appeal, taken by the oppositors and the Republic of the
Philippines from that portion of the decision where the lower court declined to decide
with finality the question of who owns the thirteen parcels of land subject-matter of
the confirmatory sale Exhibit F-1 and whether or not they should be included in or
excluded from the inventory of properties of the Estate of the deceased Vito
Borromeo.
Dela Merced vs. Dela Merced (February 25, 1999)
BLANQUITA E. DELA MERCED, LUISITO E. DELA MERCED, BLANQUITA M. MACATANGAY,
MA. OLIVIA M. PAREDES, TERESITA P. RUPISAN, RUBEN M. ADRIANO,
HERMINIO M. ADRIANO, JOSELITO M. ADRIANO, ROGELIO M. ADRIANO,
WILFREDO M. ADRIANO, VICTOR M. ADRIANO, CORAZON A. ONGOCO, JASMIN
A. MENDOZA and CONSTANTINO M. ADRIANO, petitioners, vs. JOSELITO P.
DELA MERCED, respondent.
DECISION
PURISIMA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals,
dated October 17, 1996, in CA-G.R. CV No. 41283, which reversed the decision, dated
June 10, 1992, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 67, Pasig City, in Civil Case No.
59705.
The facts of the case are, as follows:
On March 23, 1987, Evarista M. dela Merced died intestate, without issue. She
left five (5) parcels of land situated in Orambo, Pasig City.
At the time of her death, Evarista was survived by three sets of heirs, viz:
(1) Francisco M. dela Merced, her legitimate brother ; (2) Teresita P. Rupisan, her
niece who is the only daughter of Rosa de la Merced-Platon (a sister who died in
1943) ; and (3) the legitimate children of Eugenia dela Merced-Adriano (another sister
of Evarista who died in 1965), namely: Herminio, Ruben, Joselito, Rogelio, Wilfredo,
Victor and Constantino, all surnamed Adriano, Corazon Adriano-Ongoco and Jasmin
Adriano-Mendoza.
Almost a year later or on March 19, 1988, to be precise, Francisco (Evaristas
brother) died. He was survived by his wife Blanquita Errea dela Merced and their three
legitimate children, namely, Luisito E. dela Merced, Blanquita M. Macatangay and Ma.
Olivia M. Paredes.
On April 20, 1989, the three sets of heirs of the decedent, Evarista M. dela
Merced, referring to (1) the abovenamed heirs of Francisco; (2) Teresita P. Rupisan
and (3) the nine [9] legitimate children of Eugenia, executed an extrajudicial
settlement, entitled Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased Evarista M.
dela Merced adjudicating the properties of Evarista to them, each set with a share of
one-third (1/3) pro-indiviso.
On July 26 ,1990, private respondent Joselito P. Dela Merced , illegitimate son of
the late Francisco de la Merced, filed a Petition for Annulment of the Extrajudicial
Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased Evarista M. Dela Merced with Prayer for a
Temporary Restraining Order, alleging that he was fraudulently omitted from the
said settlement made by petitioners, who were fully aware of his relation to the late
Francisco. Claiming successional rights, private respondent Joselito prayed that he be
included as one of the beneficiaries, to share in the one-third (1/3) pro-indiviso share
in the estate of the deceased Evarista, corresponding to the heirs of Francisco.
On August 3, 1990, the trial court issued the temporary restraining order prayed
for by private respondent Joselito, enjoining the sale of any of the real properties of
the deceased Evarista.
After trial, however, or on June 10, 1992, to be definite, the trial court dismissed
the petition, lifted the temporary restraining order earlier issued, and cancelled the
notice of lis pendens on the certificates of title covering the real properties of the
deceased Evarista.
In dismissing the petition, the trial court stated:
The factual setting of the instant motion after considering the circumstances of the
entire case and the other evidentiary facts and documents presented by the herein
parties points only to one issue which goes into the very skeleton of the controversy,
to wit: Whether or not the plaintiff may participate in the intestate estate of the late
Evarista M. Dela Merced in his capacity as representative of his alleged father,
Francisdo Dela Merced, brother of the deceased, whose succession is under
consideration.
xxxxxxxxx
It is to be noted that Francisco Dela Merced, alleged father of the herein plaintiff, is a
legitimate child, not an illegitimate. Plaintiff, on the other hand, is admittedly an
illegitimate child of the late Francisco Dela Merced. Hence, as such, he cannot
represent his alleged father in the succession of the latter in the intestate estate of
the late Evarista Dela Merced, because of the barrier in Art. 992 of the New Civil Code
which states that:
An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children
and relatives of his father or mother, nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the
same manner from the illegitimate child.
The application of Art. 992 cannot be ignored in the instant case, it is clearly worded
in such a way that there can be no room for any doubts and ambiguities. This provision
of the law imposes a barrier between the illegitimate and the legitimate family. x x
x (Rollo, p. 87-88)
 Not satisfied with the dismissal of his petition, the private respondent appealed
to the Court of Appeals.
In its Decision of October 17,1996, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of
the trial court of origin and ordered the petitioners to execute an amendatory
agreement which shall form part of the original settlement, so as to include private
respondent Joselito as a co-heir to the estate of Francisco, which estate includes one-
third (1/3) pro indiviso of the latters inheritance from the deceased Evarista.
The relevant and dispositive part of the Decision of the Court of Appeals, reads:
xxxxxxxxx
It is a basic principle embodied in Article 777, New Civil Code that the rights to the
succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent, so that
Francisco dela Merced inherited 1/3 of his sisters estate at the moment of the latters
death. Said 1/3 of Evaristas estate formed part of Franciscos estate which was
subsequently transmitted upon his death on March 23, 1987 to his legal heirs, among
whom is appellant as his illegitimate child. Appellant became entitled to his share in
Franciscos estate from the time of the latters death in 1987. The extrajudicial
settlement therefore is void insofar as it deprives plaintiff-appellant of his share in the
estate of Francisco M. dela Merced. As a consequence, the cancellation of the notice
of lis pendens is not in order because the property is directly affected.Appellant has
the right to demand a partition of his fathers estate which includes 1/3 of the property
inherited from Evarista dela Merced.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Defendants-appellees are hereby ordered to execute an amendatory
agreement/settlement to include herein plaintiff-appellant Joselito dela Merced as co-
heir to the estate of Francisco dela Merced which includes 1/3 of the estate subject of
the questioned Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Evarista M. dela
Merced dated April 20, 1989. The amendatory agreement/settlement shall form part
of the original Extrajudicial Settlement. With costs against defendants-appellees.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 41)
In the Petition under consideration, petitioners insist that being an illegitimate
child, private respondent Joselito is barred from inheriting from Evarista because of
the provision of Article 992 of the New Civil Code, which lays down an impassable
barrier between the legitimate and illegitimate families.
The Petition is devoid of merit.
Article 992 of the New Civil Code is not applicable because involved here is not a
situation where an illegitimate child would inherit ab intestato from a legitimate sister
of his father, which is prohibited by the aforesaid provision of law. Rather, it is a
scenario where an illegitimate child inherits from his father, the latters share in or
portion of, what the latter already inherited from the deceased sister, Evarista.
As opined by the Court of Appeals, the law in point in the present case is Article
777 of the New Civil Code, which provides that the rights to succession are transmitted
from the moment of death of the decedent.
Since Evarista died ahead of her brother Francisco, the latter inherited a portion
of the estate of the former as one of her heirs. Subsequently, when Francisco died, his
heirs, namely: his spouse, legitimate children, and the private respondent, Joselito, an
illegitimate child, inherited his (Franciscos) share in the estate of Evarista. It bears
stressing that Joselito does not claim to be an heir of Evarista by right of
representation but participates in his own right, as an heir of the late Francisco, in the
latters share (or portion thereof) in the estate of Evarista.
Petitioners argue that if Joselito desires to assert successional rights to the
intestate estate of his father, the proper forum should be in the settlement of his own
fathers intestate estate, as this Court held in the case of Gutierrez vs. Macandog (150
SCRA 422 [1987])
Petitioners reliance on the case of Gutierrez vs. Macandog (supra) is
misplaced. The said case involved a claim for support filed by one Elpedia Gutierrez
against the estate of the decedent, Agustin Gutierrez, Sr., when she was not even an
heir to the estate in question, at the time, and the decedent had no obligation
whatsoever to give her support. Thus, this Court ruled that Elpedia should have asked
for support pendente lite before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court in which
court her husband (one of the legal heirs of the decedent) had instituted a case for
legal separation against her on the ground of an attempt against his life. When
Mauricio (her husband) died, she should have commenced an action for the
settlement of the estate of her husband, in which case she could receive whatever
allowance the intestate court would grant her.
The present case, however, relates to the rightful and undisputed right of an heir
to the share of his late father in the estate of the decedent Evarista, ownership of
which had been transmitted to his father upon the death of Evarista. There is no legal
obstacle for private respondent Joselito, admittedly the son of the late Francisco, to
inherit in his own right as an heir to his fathers estate, which estate includes a one-
third (1/3) undivided share in the estate of Evarista.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the Appealed
Decision of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Gayon vs. Gayon (November 26, 1970)
G.R. No. L-28394 November 26, 1970
PEDRO GAYON, plaintiff-appellant, vs. SILVESTRE GAYON and GENOVEVA DE
GAYON, defendants-appellees.
Appeal, taken by plaintiff Pedro Gayon, from an order of the Court of First Instance of
Iloilo dismissing his complaint in Civil Case No. 7334 thereof.
The records show that on July 31, 1967, Pedro Gayon filed said complaint against the
spouses Silvestre Gayon and Genoveva de Gayon, alleging substantially that, on
October 1, 1952, said spouses executed a deed — copy of which was attached to the
complaint, as Annex "A" — whereby they sold to Pedro Gelera, for the sum of P500.00,
a parcel of unregistered land therein described, and located in the barrio of
Cabubugan, municipality of Guimbal, province of Iloilo, including the improvements
thereon, subject to redemption within five (5) years or not later than October 1, 1957;
that said right of redemption had not been exercised by Silvestre Gayon, Genoveva de
Gayon, or any of their heirs or successors, despite the expiration of the period
therefor; that said Pedro Gelera and his wife Estelita Damaso had, by virtue of a deed
of sale — copy of which was attached to the complaint, as Annex "B" — dated March
21, 1961, sold the aforementioned land to plaintiff Pedro Gayon for the sum of
P614.00; that plaintiff had, since 1961, introduced thereon improvements worth
P1,000; that he had, moreover, fully paid the taxes on said property up to 1967; and
that Articles 1606 and 1616 of our Civil Code require a judicial decree for the
consolidation of the title in and to a land acquired through a conditional sale, and,
accordingly, praying that an order be issued in plaintiff's favor for the consolidation of
ownership in and to the aforementioned property.
In her answer to the complaint, Mrs. Gayon alleged that her husband, Silvestre Gayon,
died on January 6, 1954, long before the institution of this case; that Annex "A" to the
complaint is fictitious, for the signature thereon purporting to be her signature is not
hers; that neither she nor her deceased husband had ever executed "any document
of whatever nature in plaintiff's favor"; that the complaint is malicious and had
embarrassed her and her children; that the heirs of Silvestre Gayon had to "employ
the services of counsel for a fee of P500.00 and incurred expenses of at least P200.00";
and that being a brother of the deceased Silvestre Gayon, plaintiff "did not exert
efforts for the amicable settlement of the case" before filing his complaint. She prayed,
therefore, that the same be dismissed and that plaintiff be sentenced to pay damages.
Soon later, she filed a motion to dismiss, reproducing substantially the averments
made in her answer and stressing that, in view of the death of Silvestre Gayon, there
is a "necessity of amending the complaint to suit the genuine facts on record."
Presently, or on September 16, 1967, the lower court issued the order appealed from,
reading:
Considering the motion to dismiss and it appearing from Exhibit "A" annexed to the
complaint that Silvestre Gayon is the absolute owner of the land in question, and
considering the fact that Silvestre Gayon is now dead and his wife Genoveva de Gayon
has nothing to do with the land subject of plaintiff's complaint, as prayed for, this case
is hereby dismissed, without pronouncement as to costs.1
A reconsideration of this order having been denied, plaintiff interposed the present
appeal, which is well taken.
Said order is manifestly erroneous and must be set aside. To begin with, it is not true
that Mrs. Gayon "has nothing to do with the land subject of plaintiff's complaint." As
the widow of Silvestre Gayon, she is one of his compulsory heirs2and has, accordingly,
an interest in the property in question. Moreover, her own motion to dismiss indicated
merely "a necessity of amending the complaint," to the end that the other successors
in interest of Silvestre Gayon, instead of the latter, be made parties in this case. In her
opposition to the aforesaid motion for reconsideration of the plaintiff, Mrs. Gayon
alleged, inter alia, that the "heirs cannot represent the dead defendant, unless there
is a declaration of heirship." Inasmuch, however, as succession takes place, by
operation of law, "from the moment of the death of the decedent" 3 and "(t)he
inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person which are not
extinguished by his death,"4 it follows that if his heirs were included as defendants in
this case, they would be sued, not as "representatives" of the decedent, but as owners
of an aliquot interest in the property in question, even if the precise extent of their
interest may still be undetermined and they have derived it from the decent. Hence,
they may be sued without a previous declaration of heirship, provided there is no
pending special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the decedent.5
As regards plaintiff's failure to seek a compromise, as an alleged obstacle to the
present case, Art. 222 of our Civil Code provides:
No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless it
should appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that
the same have failed, subject to the limitations in article 2035.
It is noteworthy that the impediment arising from this provision applies to suits "filed
or maintained between members of the same family." This phrase, "members of the
same family," should, however, be construed in the light of Art. 217 of the same Code,
pursuant to which:

Family relations shall include those:

(1) Between husband and wife;

(2) Between parent and child;

(3) Among other ascendants and their descendants;

(4) Among brothers and sisters.

Mrs. Gayon is plaintiff's sister-in-law, whereas her children are his nephews and/or
nieces. Inasmuch as none of them is included in the enumeration contained in said
Art. 217 — which should be construed strictly, it being an exception to the general
rule — and Silvestre Gayon must necessarily be excluded as party in the case at bar, it
follows that the same does not come within the purview of Art. 222, and plaintiff's
failure to seek a compromise before filing the complaint does not bar the same.

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby set aside and the case remanded to
the lower court for the inclusion, as defendant or defendants therein, of the
administrator or executor of the estate of Silvestre Gayon, if any, in lieu of the
decedent, or, in the absence of such administrator or executor, of the heirs of the
deceased Silvestre Gayon, and for further proceedings, not inconsistent with this
decision, with the costs of this instance against defendant-appellee, Genoveva de
Gayon. It is so ordered.
Palicte vs. Ramolete (September 21, 1987)
MATILDE S. PALICTE, petitioner, vs. HON. JOSE O. RAMOLETE as Presiding Judge of
Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch III, and MARCELO SOTTO,
Administrator, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the order of the then Court of First Instance
of Cebu declaring the deed of redemption executed for the petitioner null and void
and denying the petitioner's motion that the Registrar of Deeds of the City of Cebu be
directed to transfer the Owner's Duplicate Certificates of Title to Lot Nos. 1049, 1051,
and 1052 from Filemon Sotto to her and to issue a new Owner's Duplicate Certificate
of Title to Lot 2179-C in her name.
On July 5, 1979, a sale at public auction was held pursuant to a writ of execution issued
on February 5, 1979 by the respondent judge and to a court order dated June 4, 1979
in the case of Pilar Teves, et al. vs Marcelo Sotto, Administrator, Civil Case No. R-10027,
for the satisfaction of judgment in the amount of P725,270.00.
The following properties belonging to the late Don Filemon Sotto and administered by
respondent Marcelo Sotto were levied upon:
1. Parcel of land on Lot No. 1049, covered by TCT No. 27640 of the Banilad Friar Lands
Estate, Cebu City;
2. Parcel of land on Lot No. 1052, covered by TCT No. 27642 of the Banilad Friar Lands
Estate, Cebu City;
3. Parcel of land on Lot No. 1051,covered by TCT No. 27641 of the Banilad Friad Lands
Estate, Cebu City;
4. Parcel of land on Lot No. 5253 of the Cebu Cadastre, Cebu City, covered by TCT No.
27639;
5. Parcel of land situated at Mantalongon, Dalaguete, Cebu, covered by TD No.
010661, with an area of 76-708; (sic)
6. Parcel of land on Lot No. 4839 of the Upon Cadastre, at Barrio Sa-ac Mactan Island,
with an area of Forty Four Thousand Six Hundred Forty Four (44,644) square meters
more or less;
7. Residential House of strong materials, situated on a Government lot at Lahug, Cebu
City;
8. Residential House of strong materials, situated at Central, Cebu City. " (Rollo, p. 40)
Seven of the above-described properties were awarded to Pilar Teves, who alone bid
for them for the amount of P217,300.00.
The residential house situated on a government lot at Lahug, Cebu City, was awarded
to lone bidder Asuncion Villarante for the amount of P10,000.00.
Within the period for redemption, petitioner Matilde S. Palicte, as one of the heirs of
the late Don Filemon Sotto, redeemed from purchaser Pilar Teves, four (4) lots for the
sum of P60,000.00.
A deed of redemption dated July 29, 1980, executed by Deputy Provincial Sheriff Felipe
V. Belandres and approved by the Clerk of Court, Esperanza Garcia as Ex-Officio Sheriff,
was issued for these lots:
1. A parcel of land or Lot No. 2179-C-PDI-25027 Cebu Cadastre, Cebu City, bid at
P20,000.00;
2. A parcel of land or Lot No. 1052, covered by TCT No. 27642, of the Banilad Friar
Lands Estate, Cebu City, bid at P15,000.00;
3. A parcel of land or Lot No.1051,covered by TCT No. 27641, of the Banilad Friar Lands
Estate, Cebu City, at P5,000.00;
4. A parcel of land or Lot No. 1049, covered by TCT No. 27640, of the Banilad Friar
Lands Estate, Cebu City, at P20,000.00. (Rollo, p. 42)
On July 24, 1980, petitioner Palicte filed a motion with respondent Judge Ramolete for
the transfer to her name of the titles to the four (4) parcels of land covered by the
deed of redemption.
This motion was opposed by the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. R-10027, entitled "Pilar
Teves, et al. vs Marcelo Sotto, administrator" on several grounds, principal among
which, is that movant, Palicte, is not one of those authorized to redeem under the
provisions of the Rules of Court.
A hearing on the said motion, with both parties adducing evidence was held.
The lower court held that although Palicte is one of the declared heirs in Spl. Proc. No.
2706-R, she does not qualify as a successor-in-interest who may redeem the real
properties sold. It ruled that the deed of redemption is null and void. The motion of
Palicte was denied.
Hence, the present petition.
The petitioner raises the following assignment of errors:
A sold. Such redeeming creditor is termed a redemptioner.
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN RULING THAT THE JUDGMENT DEBTOR ENTITLED TO
REDEEM UNDER SECTION 29(a), RULE 39 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT REAL
PROPERTY SOLD ON EXECUTION AGAINST THE ESTATE OF THE DECEDENT IS ONLY THE
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE, OR HIS SUCCESSOR-IN-INTEREST.
B
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONER, WHO IS A DECLARED HEIR
OF THE DECEDENT, IS NOT THE JUDGMENT DEBTOR NOR DOES SHE QUALIFY AS A
SUCCESSOR-IN-INTEREST OF THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE ENTITLED TO
RIGHT OF REDEMPTION UNDER SECTION 29(a), RULE 39 OF THE RULES OF COURT.
C McKinney's California Jurisprudence, 99); one or more joint debtors who were joint
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN RULING THAT ALTHOUGH PETITIONER IS A DECLARED
HEIR OF THE DECEDENT, HER RIGHT TO THE ESTATE, LIKE THAT OF REDEMPTION OF
CERTAIN ESTATE PROPERTY, COULD ONLY ARISE AFTER DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE
AS THERE IS STILL JUDGMENT DEBT CHARGEABLE AGAINST THE ESTATE.
D 260, 268). (Emphasis supplied).
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONER'S REDEMPTION OF FOUR (4)
PARCELS OF LAND OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEDENT SOLD ON EXECUTION OF
JUDGMENT AGAINST THE ESTATE IS NULL AND VOID AND INEFFECTIVE. (Rollo, pp. 17-
18)
These assigned errors center on whether or not petitioner Palicte may validly exercise
the right of redemption under Sec. 29, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
We answer in the affirmative. Sec. 29 of Rule 39 provides:
SEC. 29. Who may redeem real property so sold. — Real property sold as provided in
the last preceding section, or any part thereof sold separately, may be redeemed in
the manner hereinafter provided, by the following persons:
(a) The judgment debtor, or his successor in interest in the whole or any part of the
property;
(b) A creditor having a lien by attachment, judgment or mortgage on the property sold,
or on some part thereof, subsequent to the judgment under which the property was
Under Subsection (a), property sold subject to redemption may be redeemed by the
judgment debtor or his successor-in-interest in the whole or any part of the property.
Does Matilde Palicte fall within the term "successor-in-interest"?
Magno vs Viola and Sotto (61 Phil. 80, 84-85) states that:
The rule is that the term "successor-in-interest" includes one to whom the debtor has
transferred his statutory right of redemption (Big Sespe Oil Co. vs Cochran, 276 Fed.,
216, 223); one to whom the debtor has conveyed his interest in the property for the
purpose of redemption (Southern California Lumber Co. vs. McDowell, 105 Cal, 99; 38
Pac., 627; Simpson vs. Castle, 52 Cal., 644; Schumacher vs. Langford, 20 Cal. App., 61;
127 Pac., 1057); one who succeeds to the interest of the debtor by operation of law (XI
owners of the property sold (Emerson vs. Yosemite Gold Min. etc. Co., 149 Cal., 50; 85
Pac., 122); the wife as regards her husband's homestead by reason of the fact that
some portion of her husband' title passes to her (Hefner vs. Urton, 71 Cal., 479; 12
Pac., 486). This court has held that a surety can not redeem the property of the
principal sold on execution because the surety, by paying the debt of the principal,
stands in the place of the creditor, not of the debtor, and consequently is not a
successor in interest in the property. (G. Urruitia & Co. vs. Moreno and Reyes, 28 Phil.,
In the case at bar, petitioner Palicte is the daughter of the late Don Filemon Sotto
whose estate was levied upon on execution to satisfy the money judgment against it.
She is one of the declared heirs in Special Proceeding No. 2706-R. As a legitimate heir,
she qualifies as a successor-in- interest.
Art. 777 of the Civil Code states that:
The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the
decedent.
At the moment of the decedent's death, the heirs start to own the property, subject
to the decedent's liabilities. In fact, they may dispose of the same even while the
property is under administration. (Barretto vs. Tuason, 59 Phil. 845; Jakosalem vs.
Rafols, 73 Phil. 628). If the heirs may dispose of their shares in the decedent's property
even while it is under administration. With more reason should the heirs be allowed
to redeem redeemable properties despite the presence of an administrator.
The respondents contend that the petitioner must positively prove that the three
other co-heirs, the administrator, and the intestate court had expressly agreed to the
redemption of the disputed parcels of land. We see no need for such prior approval.
While it may have been desirable, it is not indispensable under the circumstances of
this case. What is important is that all of them acquiesced in the act of redeeming
property for the estate. The petitioner contends that the administrator and the three
other heirs agreed to the redemption. There is, however. no clear proof of such
approval. What is beyond dispute from the records is that they did not disapprove nor
reprobate the acts of the petitioner. There is likewise nothing in the records to indicate
that the redemption was not beneficial to the estate of Don Filemon Sotto.
It may be true that the interest of a specific heir is not yet fixed and determinate
pending the order of distribution but, nonetheless, the heir's interest in the
preservation of the estate and the recovery of its properties is greater than anybody
else's, definitely more than the administrator's who merely holds it for the creditors,
the heirs, and the legatees.
The petitioner cites precedents where persons with inchoate or contingent interest
were allowed to exercise the right of redemption as "successors-in-interest,"
e.g. Director of Lands vs. Lagniton (103 Phil. 889, 892) where a son redeemed the
property of his parents sold on execution and Rosete vs. Provincial Sheriff of
Zambales (95 Phil. 560, 564), where a wife by virtue of what the Court called "inchoate
right of dower or contingent interest" redeemed a homestead as successor-in-interest
of her husband.
In fact, the Court was explicit in Lagniton that:
... The right of a son, with respect to the property of a father or mother, is also an
inchoate or contingent interest, because upon the death of the father or the mother
or both, he will have a right to inherit said conjugal property. If any holder of an
inchoate interest is a successor in interest with right to redeem a property sold on
execution, then the son is such a successor in interest, as he has an inchoate right to
the property of his father.
The lower court, therefore, erred in considering the person of the administrator as the
judgment debtor and as the only "successor-in-interest." The estate of the deceased
is the judgment debtor and the heirs who will eventually acquire that estate should
not be prohibited from doing their share in its preservation.
Although petitioner Palicte validly redeemed the properties, her motion to transfer
the titles of the four (4) parcels of land covered by the Deed of Redemption from
registration in the name of Filemon Sotto to her name cannot prosper at this time.
Otherwise, to allow such transfer of title would amount to a distribution of the estate.
As held in the case of Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank vs. Escolin (56 SCRA
267, 345- 346):
Indeed, the law on the matter is specific, categorical and unequivocal. Section 1 of
Rule 90 provides:
SECTION 1. When order for distribution of residue made. — When the debts, funeral
charges, and expenses of administration, the allowance to the widow, and inheritance
tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in accordance with law, have been paid, the court,
on the application of the executor or administrator, or of a person interested in the
estate, and after hearing upon notice, shall assign the residue of the estate to the
persons entitled to the same, naming them and the proportions, or parts, to which
each is entitled, and such persons may demand and recover their respective shares
from the executor or administrator, or any other person having the same in his
possession. If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of
the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled
under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above mentioned
has been made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond,
in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations
within such time as the court directs.
These provisions cannot mean anything less than that in order that a proceeding for
the settlement of the estate of a deceased may be deemed ready for final closure, (1)
there should have been issued already an order of distribution or assignment of the
estate of the decedent among or to those entitled thereto by will or by law, but (2)
such order shall not be issued until after it is shown that the "debts, funeral expenses,
expenses of administration, allowances, taxes, etc., chargeable to the estate" have
been paid, which is but logical and proper, (3) besides, such an order is usually issued
upon proper and specific application for the purpose of the interested party or parties,
and not of the court."

The other heirs are, therefore, given a six months period to join as co-redemptioners
in the redemption made by the petitioner before the motion to transfer titles to the
latter's name may be granted.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The respondent court's orders

declaring the deed of redemption null and void and denying the motion to transfer
title over the redeemed properties to Matilda Palicte are REVERSED and SET ASIDE,
subject to the right of the other heirs to join in the redemption as stated above.

SO ORDERED.
Locsin vs. CA (G.R. NO. 89783, February 19, 1992)
MARIANO B. LOCSIN, JULIAN J. LOCSIN, JOSE B. LOCSIN, AUREA B. LOCSIN, MATILDE L.
CORDERO, SALVADOR B. LOCSIN and MANUEL V. DEL ROSARIO, petitioners, vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE JAUCIAN, FLORENTINO JAUCIAN, MERCEDES
JAUCIAN ARBOLEDA, HEIRS OF JOSEFINA J. BORJA, HEIRS OF EDUARDO JAUCIAN and
HEIRS OF VICENTE JAUCIAN, respondents.
NARVASA, C.J.:
Reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. CV-11186 — affirming
with modification the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Albay in favor of the
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 7152 entitled "Jose Jaucian, et al. v. Mariano B. Locsin, et
al.," an action for recovery of real property with damages — is sought. in these
proceedings initiated by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court.
The petition was initially denied due course and dismissed by this Court. It was
however reinstated upon a second motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners,
and the respondents were required to comment thereon. The petition was thereafter
given due course and the parties were directed to submit their memorandums. These,
together with the evidence, having been carefully considered, the Court now decides
the case.
First, the facts as the Court sees them in light of the evidence on record:
The late Getulio Locsin had three children named Mariano, Julian and Magdalena, all
surnamed Locsin. He owned extensive residential and agricultural properties in the
provinces of Albay and Sorsogon. After his death, his estate was divided among his
three (3) children as follows:
(a) the coconut lands of some 700 hectares in Bual, Pilar, Sorsogon, were adjudicated
to his daughter, Magdalena Locsin;
(b) 106 hectares of coconut lands were given to Julian Locsin, father of the petitioners
Julian, Mariano, Jose, Salvador, Matilde, and Aurea, all surnamed Locsin;
(c) more than forty (40) hectares of coconut lands in Bogtong, eighteen (18) hectares
of riceland in Daraga, and the residential lots in Daraga, Albay and in Legazpi City went
to his son Mariano, which Mariano brought into his marriage to Catalina Jaucian in
1908. Catalina, for her part, brought into the marriage untitled properties which she
had inherited from her parents, Balbino Jaucian and Simona Anson. These were
augmented by other properties acquired by the spouses in the course of their
union,1 which however was not blessed with children.
Eventually, the properties of Mariano and Catalina were brought under the Torrens
System. Those that Mariano inherited from his father, Getulio Locsin, were surveyed
cadastrally and registered in the name of "Mariano Locsin, married to Catalina
Jaucian.'' 2
Mariano Locsin executed a Last Will and Testament instituting his wife, Catalina, as the
sole and universal heir of all his properties. 3 The will was drawn up by his wife's
nephew and trusted legal adviser, Attorney Salvador Lorayes. Attorney Lorayes
disclosed that the spouses being childless, they had agreed that their properties, after
both of them shall have died should revert to their respective sides of the
family, i.e., Mariano's properties would go to his "Locsin relatives" (i.e., brothers and
sisters or nephews and nieces), and those of Catalina to her "Jaucian relatives." 4
Don Mariano Locsin died of cancer on September 14, 1948 after a lingering illness. In
due time, his will was probated in Special Proceedings No. 138, CFI of Albay without
any opposition from both sides of the family. As directed in his will, Doña Catalina was
appointed executrix of his estate. Her lawyer in the probate proceeding was Attorney
Lorayes. In the inventory of her husband's estate 5 which she submitted to the probate
court for approval, 6Catalina declared that "all items mentioned from Nos. 1 to 33 are
the private properties of the deceased and form part of his capital at the time of the
marriage with the surviving spouse, while items Nos. 34 to 42 are conjugal." 7
Among her own and Don Mariano's relatives, Doña Catalina was closest to her
nephew, Attorney Salvador Lorayes, her nieces, Elena Jaucian, Maria Lorayes-Cornelio
and Maria Olbes-Velasco, and the husbands of the last two: Hostilio Cornelio and
Fernando Velasco. 8 Her trust in Hostilio Cornelio was such that she made him
custodian of all the titles of her properties; and before she disposed of any of them,
she unfailingly consulted her lawyer-nephew, Attorney Salvador Lorayes. It was Atty.
Lorayes who prepared the legal documents and, more often than not, the witnesses
to the transactions were her niece Elena Jaucian, Maria Lorayes-Cornelio, Maria Olbes-
Velasco, or their husbands. Her niece, Elena Jaucian, was her life-long companion in
her house.
Don Mariano relied on Doña Catalina to carry out the terms of their compact, hence,
nine (9) years after his death, as if in obedience to his voice from the grave, and fully
cognizant that she was also advancing in years, Doña Catalina began transferring, by
sale, donation or assignment, Don Mariano's as well as her own, properties to their
respective nephews and nieces. She made the following sales and donation of
properties which she had received from her husband's estate, to his Locsin nephews 15 Nov. 26, 1975 Deed of Sale in favor of 261 P 4,930 - ditto -
and nieces: Aurea Locsin

EXHIBIT DATE PARTICULARS AREA/SQ.M. PRICE WITNESSES 16 Oct. 17, 1975 Deed of Sale in favor of 533 P 2,000 Delfina Anson
Aurea Locsin M. Acabado
23 Jan. 26, 1957 Deed of Absolute Sale in 962 P 481
favor of Mariano Locsin 17 Nov. 26, 1975 Deed of Sale in favor of 373 P 1,000 Leonor Satuito
Aurea Locsin Mariano B. Locsin
1-JRL Apr. 7, 1966 Deed of Sale in favor of 430,203 P 20,000
Jose R. Locsin 19 Sept. 1, 1975 Conditional Donation in 1,130 P 3,000 - ditto -
favor of Mariano Locsin
1-JJL Mar. 22, 1967 Deed of Sale in favor of 5,000 P 1,000 Hostilio Cornello
Julian Locsin (Lot 2020) Helen M. Jaucian 1-MVRJ Dec. 29, 1972 Deed of Reconveyance 1,5110.66 P 1,000 Delfina Anson
in favor of Manuel V. del (Lot 2155) Antonio Illegible
1 Nov. 29, 1974 Deed of Donation in 26,509 Rosario whose maternal
favor Aurea Locsin, grandfather was Getulio
Matilde L. Cordero Locsin
and Salvador Locsin
2-MVRJ June 30, 1973 Deed of Reconveyance 319.34 P 500 Antonio Illegible
2 Feb. 4, 1975 Deed of Donation in 34,045 in favor of Manuel V. del (Lot 2155) Salvador Nical
favor Aurea Locsin, Rosario but the rentals
Matilde L. Cordero from bigger portion of
and Salvador Locsin Lot 2155 leased to Filoil
Refinery were assigned to
3 Sept. 9, 1975 Deed of Donation in (Lot 2059) Maria Jaucian Lorayes
favor Aurea Locsin, Cornelio
Matilde L. Cordero
and Salvador Locsin Of her own properties, Doña Catalina conveyed the following to her own nephews and
nieces and others:
4 July 15, 1974 Deed of Absolute Sale in 1,424 Hostilio Cornelio
favor of Aurea B. Locsin Fernando Velasco EXHIBIT DATE PARTICULARS AREA/SQ.M. PRICE

5 July 15, 1974 Deed of Absolute Sale in 1,456 P 5,750 Hostilio Cornelio 2-JJL July 16, 1964 Deed of Sale in favor 5,000 P 1,000
favor of Aurea B. Locsin Elena Jaucian Vicente Jaucian (lot 2020)
(6,825 sqm. when
6 July 15, 1974 Deed of Absolute Sale in 1,237 P 5,720 - ditto - resurveyed)
favor of Aurea B. Locsin
24 Feb. 12, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale 100 P 1,000
7 July 15, 1974 Deed of Absolute Sale in 1,404 P 4,050 - ditto - in favor of Francisco M.
favor of Aurea B. Locsin Maquiniana
26 July 15, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 130 P 1,300 After the trial, judgment was rendered on July 8, l985 in favor of the plaintiffs (Jaucian),
favor of Francisco and against the Locsin defendants, the dispositive part of which reads:
Maquiniana
WHEREFORE, this Court renders judgment for the plaintiffs and against the
27 May 3, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 100 P 1,000 defendants:
favor of Ireneo Mamia
(1) declaring the, plaintiffs, except the heirs of Josefina J. Borja and Eduardo Jaucian,
28 May 3, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 75 P 750 who withdrew, the rightful heirs and entitled to the entire estate, in equal portions, of
favor of Zenaida Buiza Catalina Jaucian Vda. de Locsin, being the nearest collateral heirs by right of
representation of Juan and Gregorio, both surnamed Jaucian, and full-blood brothers
29 May 3, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 150 P 1,500 of Catalina;
favor of Felisa Morjella
(2) declaring the deeds of sale, donations, reconveyance and exchange and all other
30 Apr. 3, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 31 P 1,000 instruments conveying any part of the estate of Catalina J. Vda. de Locsin including,
favor of Inocentes Motocinos but not limited to those in the inventory of known properties (Annex B of the
complaint) as null and void ab-initio;
31 Feb. 12, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 150 P 1,500
favor of Casimiro Mondevil (3) ordering the Register of Deeds of Albay and/or Legazpi City to cancel all certificates
of title and other transfers of the real properties, subject of this case, in the name of
32 Mar. 1, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 112 P 1,200 defendants, and derivatives therefrom, and issue new ones to the plaintiffs;
favor of Juan Saballa
(4) ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to reconvey ownership and
25 Dec. 28, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 250 P 2,500 possession of all such properties to the plaintiffs, together with all muniments of title
of Rogelio Marticio properly endorsed and delivered, and all the fruits and incomes received by the
defendants from the estate of Catalina, with legal interest from the filing of this action;
and where reconveyance and delivery cannot be effected for reasons that might have
Doña Catalina died on July 6, 1977.
intervened and prevent the same, defendants shall pay for the value of such
properties, fruits and incomes received by them, also with legal interest from the filing,
Four years before her death, she had made a will on October 22, 1973 affirming and
of this case
ratifying the transfers she had made during her lifetime in favor of her husband's, and
her own, relatives. After the reading of her will, all the relatives agreed that there was
(5) ordering each of the defendants to pay the plaintiffs the amount of P30,000.00 as
no need to submit it to the court for probate because the properties devised to them
exemplary damages; and the further sum of P20,000.00 each as moral damages; and
under the will had already been conveyed to them by the deceased when she was still
alive, except some legacies which the executor of her will or estate, Attorney Salvador
Lorayes, proceeded to distribute. (6) ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs attorney's fees and litigation
expenses, in the amount of P30,000.00 without prejudice to any contract between
plaintiffs and counsel.
In 1989, or six (6) years after Doña Catalina's demise, some of her Jaucian nephews
and nieces who had already received their legacies and hereditary shares from her
estate, filed action in the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City (Branch VIII, Civil Case No. Costs against the defendants.9
7152) to recover the properties which she had conveyed to the Locsins during her
lifetime, alleging that the conveyances were inofficious, without consideration, and The Locsins appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. CV-11186) which rendered
intended solely to circumvent the laws on succession. Those who were closest to Doña its now appealed judgment on March 14, 1989, affirming the trial court's decision.
Catalina did not join the action.
The petition has merit and should be granted.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the private respondents,
nephews and nieces of Doña Catalina J. Vda. de Locsin, entitled to inherit the
properties which she had already disposed of more than ten (10) years before her
death. For those properties did not form part of her hereditary estate, i.e., "the
property and transmissible rights and obligations existing at the time of (the
decedent's) death and those which have accrued thereto since the opening of the
succession." 10 The rights to a person's succession are transmitted from the moment
of his death, and do not vest in his heirs until such time.11 Property which Doña
Catalina had transferred or conveyed to other persons during her lifetime no longer
formed part of her estate at the time of her death to which her heirs may lay
claim. Had she died intestate, only the property that remained in her estate at the
time of her death devolved to her legal heirs; and even if those transfers were, one
and all, treated as donations, the right arising under certain circumstances to impugn
and compel the reduction or revocation of a decedent's gifts inter vivos does not inure
to the respondents since neither they nor the donees are compulsory (or forced)
heirs. 12
There is thus no basis for assuming an intention on the part of Doña Catalina, in
transferring the properties she had received from her late husband to his nephews
and nieces, an intent to circumvent the law in violation of the private respondents'
rights to her succession. Said respondents are not her compulsory heirs, and it is not
pretended that she had any such, hence there were no legitimes that could
conceivably be impaired by any transfer of her property during her lifetime. All that
the respondents had was an expectancy that in nowise restricted her freedom to
dispose of even her entire estate subject only to the limitation set forth in Art. 750,
Civil Code which, even if it were breached, the respondents may not invoke:
Art. 750. The donation may comprehend all the present property of the donor or part
thereof, provided he reserves, in full ownership or in usufruct, sufficient means for the
support of himself, and of all relatives who, at the time of the acceptance of the
donation, are by law entitled to be supported by the donor. Without such reservation,
the donation shall be reduced on petition of any person affected. (634a)
The lower court capitalized on the fact that Doña Catalina was already 90 years old
when she died on July 6, 1977. It insinuated that because of her advanced years she
may have been imposed upon, or unduly influenced and morally pressured by her
husband's nephews and nieces (the petitioners) to transfer to them the properties
which she had inherited from Don Mariano's estate. The records do not support that
conjecture.
For as early as 1957, or twenty-eight (28) years before her death, Doña Catalina had
already begun transferring to her Locsin nephews and nieces the properties which she
received from Don Mariano. She sold a 962-sq.m. lot on January 26, 1957 to his
nephew and namesake Mariano Locsin II. 13 On April 7, 1966, or 19 years before she
passed away, she also sold a 43 hectare land to another Locsin nephew, Jose R.
Locsin.14 The next year, or on March 22, 1967, she sold a 5,000-sq.m. portion of Lot
2020 to Julian Locsin.15
On March 27, 1967, Lot 2020 16 was partitioned by and among Doña Catalina, Julian
Locsin, Vicente Jaucian and Agapito Lorete.17 At least Vicente Jaucian, among the
other respondents in this case, is estopped from assailing the genuineness and due
execution of the sale of portions of Lot 2020 to himself, Julian Locsin, and Agapito
Lorete, and the partition agreement that he (Vicente) concluded with the other co-
owners of Lot 2020.
Among Doña, Catalina's last transactions before she died in 1977 were the sales of
property which she made in favor of Aurea Locsin and Mariano Locsin in 1975.18
There is not the slightest suggestion in the record that Doña Catalina was mentally
incompetent when she made those dispositions. Indeed, how can any such suggestion
be made in light of the fact that even as she was transferring properties to the Locsins,
she was also contemporaneously disposing of her other properties in favor of the
Jaucians? She sold to her nephew, Vicente Jaucian, on July 16, 1964 (21 years before
her death) one-half (or 5,000 sq.m.) of Lot 2020. Three years later, or on March 22,
1967, she sold another 5000 sq.m. of the same lot to Julian Locsin.19
From 1972 to 1973 she made several other transfers of her properties to her relatives
and other persons, namely: Francisco Maquiniana, Ireneo Mamia, Zenaida Buiza,
Feliza Morjella, Inocentes Motocinos, Casimiro Mondevil, Juan Saballa and Rogelio
Marticio. 20 None of those transactions was impugned by the private respondents.
In 1975, or two years before her death, Doña Catalina sold some lots not only to Don
Mariano's niece, Aurea Locsin, and his nephew, Mariano LocsinII, 21 but also to her
niece, Mercedes Jaucian Arboleda. 22 If she was competent to make that conveyance
to Mercedes, how can there be any doubt that she was equally competent to transfer
her other pieces of property to Aurea and Mariano II?
The trial court's belief that Don Mariano Locsin bequeathed his entire estate to his
wife, from a "consciousness of its real origin" which carries the implication that said
estate consisted of properties which his wife had inherited from her parents, flies in
the teeth of Doña Catalina's admission in her inventory of that estate, that "items 1 to
33 are the private properties of the deceased (Don Mariano) and forms (sic) part of
his capital at the time of the marriage with the surviving spouse, while items 34 to 42
are conjugal properties, acquired during the marriage." She would have known better
than anyone else whether the listing included any of her paraphernal property so it is
safe to assume that none was in fact included. The inventory was signed by her under
oath, and was approved by the probate court in Special Proceeding No. 138 of the
Court of First Instance of Albay. It was prepared with the assistance of her own nephew
and counsel, Atty. Salvador Lorayes, who surely would not have prepared a false
inventory that would have been prejudicial to his aunt's interest and to his own, since
he stood to inherit from her eventually.
This Court finds no reason to disbelieve Attorney Lorayes' testimony that before Don
Mariano died, he and his wife (Doña Catalina), being childless, had agreed that their
respective properties should eventually revert to their respective lineal relatives. As
the trusted legal adviser of the spouses and a full-blood nephew of Doña Catalina, he
would not have spun a tale out of thin air that would also prejudice his own interest.
and six (6) years after Doña Catalina's death, it prescribed four (4) years after the
subject transactions were recorded in the Registry of Property,28 whether considered
an action based on fraud, or one to redress an injury to the rights of the plaintiffs. The
private respondents may not feign ignorance of said transactions because the
registration of the deeds was constructive notice thereof to them and the whole
world.29
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted. The decision dated March 14, 1989 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 11186 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The private
respondents' complaint for annulment of contracts and reconveyance of properties in
Civil Case No. 7152 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch VIII of Legazpi City, is
DISMISSED, with costs against the private respondents, plaintiffs therein.
SO ORDERED.

Little significance, it seems, has been attached to the fact that among Doña Catalina's
nephews and nieces, those closest to her: (a) her lawyer-nephew Attorney Salvador
Lorayes; (b) her niece and companion Elena Jaucian: (c) her nieces Maria Olbes-
Velasco and Maria Lorayes-Cornelio and their respective husbands, Fernando Velasco
and Hostilio Cornelio, did not join the suit to annul and undo the dispositions of
property which she made in favor of the Locsins, although it would have been to their
advantage to do so. Their desistance persuasively demonstrates that Doña Catalina
acted as a completely free agent when she made the conveyances in favor of the
petitioners. In fact, considering their closeness to Doña Catalina it would have been
well-nigh impossible for the petitioners to employ "fraud, undue pressure, and subtle
manipulations" on her to make her sell or donate her properties to them. Doña
Catalina's niece, Elena Jaucian, daughter of her brother, Eduardo Jaucian, lived with
her in her house. Her nephew-in-law, Hostilio Cornelio, was the custodian of the titles
of her properties. The sales and donations which she signed in favor of the petitioners
were prepared by her trusted legal adviser and nephew, Attorney Salvador Lorayes.
The (1) deed of donation dated November 19,
197423 in favor of Aurea Locsin, (2) another deed of donation dated February 4,
1975 24 in favor of Matilde Cordero, and (3) still another deed dated September 9,
1975 25 in favor of Salvador Lorayes, were all witnessed by Hostilio Cornelio (who is
married to Doña Catalina's niece, Maria Lorayes) and Fernando Velasco who is married
to another niece, Maria Olbes.26 The sales which she made in favor of Aurea Locsin on
July 15, 1974 27 were witnessed by Hostilio Cornelio and Elena Jaucian. Given those
circumstances, said transactions could not have been anything but free and voluntary
acts on her part.

Apart from the foregoing considerations, the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred
in not dismissing this action for annulment and reconveyance on the ground of
prescription. Commenced decades after the transactions had been consummated,
Llenares vs. CA (G.R. No. 98709, May 13, 1993)
MAGDALENA LLENARES, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and APOLINAR
ZABELLA, respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Petitioner availed of this recourse under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court to
obtain a reversal of the Decision of the Seventh Division of Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 09853, promulgated on 24 April 1990,1 and the reinstatement of the 4 April
1986 Decision of Branch 57 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Lucena City, in a
case2involving the recovery of the possession and quieting of title over a parcel of land.
The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiff who is declared the true
and absolute owner of the land covered by TCT No. 28170 (Registry of Deeds, Lucena
City) particularly described in par. 2 of plaintiff's complaint and it is hereby ordered —
1. That the defendant or any person acting in his behalf surrender and transfer
possession of the land in question (covered by TCT No. 28170 to the plaintiff;
2. That the defendant render an accounting of the fruits he received from the
aforementioned property from August 1976 until possession is transferred to the
plaintiff, said accounting to be approved by the court;
3. That in keeping with the findings of this court, the Register of Deeds, Lucena City,
should, as he is hereby ordered cancel Entry No. 35285 in TCT No. 28170, said entry
being an annotation of the adverse claim of defendant Apolinar Zabella inscribed on
Feb. 17, 1977;
4. That the defendant pay to plaintiff the amount of P2,500.00 as attorney's fees and
P1,000.00 as expenses of litigation.3
Petitioner filed the aforementioned complaint on 12 July 1977 after she had been
allegedly dispossessed of the property in question by private respondent Apolinar
Zabella in 1976, and after the latter had caused to be annotated in Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. 28170 an affidavit of adverse claim on 17 February 1977. She prayed
therein that, inter alia, she be restored to the possession of the said property and that
the adverse claim be cancelled.4
As disclosed by the pleadings and the challenged decision, the antecedent facts are as
follows:
Juan Zabella and Anastacio Llenares were co-owners, in equal shares, of a parcel of
land situated in barrio Silangang Mayao of the then Municipality, now City, of Lucena.
In the cadastral survey of the said municipality, the lot was designated as Cadastral Lot
No. 4804-D. This designation was later changed to Lot. No. 5015.
On 21 December 1929, Anastacio Llenares sold his one-half (1/2) share in the lot to
Ariston Zabella, private respondent's father. Subsequently, after due proceedings, the
cadastral court awarded Lot. No. 5015 to Juan Zabella and Anastacio Llenares in equal
shares. Decree No. 54398 was issued to both of them and on the basis thereof, Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 43073 was issued in their names on July 1937.
Anastacio Llenares passed away on 27 March 1931 leaving the petitioner, his only
child, as his sole heir. On the other hand, Juan Zabella and niece Irene Catapat. On 5
February 1960, Rosario and Irene adjudicated to themselves Juan Zabella's one-half
(1/2) share in the lot. This adjudication was annotated in OCT No. 43073. Rosario died
on 5 June 1962 leaving, as her only heirs, her children Godofredo, Noemi, Natividad,
Olimpio and Numeriana, all surnamed Zaracena.
On 22 June 1976, petitioner, as the sole heir of Anastacio Llenares, adjudicated to
herself, by way of a Salaysay ng Pagmamana ng Nag-iisang Tagapagmana (Exhibit
"A"), the one-half (1/2) share in the property belonging to Anastacio Llenares. This fact
was likewise annotated in OCT No. 43073.
On 26 August 1976, however, OCT No. 43073 was cancelled and in its place, TCT No.
T-27166 was issued for the entire lot. On 16 February 1977, private respondent Zabella
filed an adverse claim which was duly annotated in TCT No. T-27166.
As a consequence of a Kasunduan ng Pagsusukat (Exhibit "I") executed by and
between Irene Catapat and the heirs of Rosario Zabella Zaracena, Lot No. 5015 was
subsidivided into Lot. Nos. 5015-A, 5015-B and 5015-C. Lot No. 5015-A, which
comprises one-half (1/2) of Lot No. 5015 corresponding to Anastacio's share, was
allotted to the petitioner. TCT No. T-27166 was thereafter cancelled and separate
Transfer Certificate of Title were issued for each of the subdivided lots. TCT No. 28170
was issued in the petitioner's name for Lot No. 5015-A.
As regards the issue of possession, the petitioner's evidence discloses that since she
was only four (4) years old when her father died, her cousin Rosario Zabella
administered the land in question until 1959 when she (petitioner) placed Rufo Orig
as tenant therein. The latter worked as such, delivering to the petitioner her share of
the harvest until 1976, when he stopped doing so as he was ordered by the private
respondent not to give the petitioner her share anymore. Private respondent allegedly
claimed ownership over the property. Petitioner further proved that she had been
paying the land taxes on the property until the filing of the case.
On the other hand, according to his own version, private respondent and his siblings
took possession of that portion of the land sold by Anastacio Llenares after Ariston
Zabella's death on 21 March 1930. He then converted the same into riceland. It was
irrigated in 1955 and he has been paying the irrigation charges since 1960. Moreover,
he and his co-heirs have been in possession of the property without interference by
any party until "the present."5
The trial court limited the issues to the following: whether the private respondent had
acquired absolute ownership of the land in question by prescription and whether the
plaintiff's (petitioner) action is barred by laches.6 In finding for the petitioner, the
lower court made the following disquisitions:
It is beyond cavil that the land in question (then part of a big parcel) has been
registered and titled in the name of plaintiff's father Anastacio Llenares since July 28,
1937 even as it is now registered in the name of plaintiff who made an affidavit of self-
adjudification on June 22, 1976 being the only child of Anastacio Llenares. Anastacio
Llenares became the registered owner by virtue of a cadastral proceedings, a
proceedings in rem that is binding and conclusive against the whole world. No
evidence of irregularity or fraud in the issuance of the title has been adduced, and
even if there is intrinsic fraud, the period of one year within which to ventilate this
infirmity has long expired. It is a postulate in law that "no title to registered land in
derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession. Prescription is unavailing not only against the registered owner but also
against his hereditary successors because the latter merely step into the shoes of the
decedent by operation of law and are merely the continuation of the personality of
their predecessor in interest." (Barcelona vs. Barcelona, 100 Phil. 251). On this score
alone, defendant's claim of prescription should fail. The court also notes, in passing,
that defendant's evidence does not convincingly establish that he possessed the
property publicly, exclusively and peacefully in the concept of owner. For one thing,
he has not even paid any realty tax on the property as the property is not declared for
taxation purposes in his name. The court is neither impressed with the credibility of
defendant's witnesses. For example, the witness Sergio Dalida testified that in 1918
the land in litigation was in the possession of Ariston Zabella (T.S.N. 8-21-84 p. 8).
There seems to be no truth to this because the property was bought by Ariston Zabella
only in the year 1929. And then, there was that other witness Cosme Ranillo who
unequivocally admitted during cross-examination that he was coached by the
defendant (vide: t.s.n. 11-20-84 p. 24-26).
As regards the Deed of Sale of the property in litigation in favor of Ariston Zabella (Exh.
"1") which is apparently the cornerstone of defendant's claim over the property the
court concurs with the submission of the plaintiff that after final judgment has been
rendered in the cadastral proceedings, all rights or claims prior thereto are deemed
barred by the principle of res judicata. Hence after the finality of the judgment in the
cadastral case, the Deed of Sale has lost its efficacy being functus oficio.
With respect to the defense of laches so emphatically and exhaustively discussed by
defendant's counsel in his brief we find this to be devoid of merit because of the
following cogent reasons, viz:
Firstly, the defense of laches was never interposed or pleaded in the answer filed by
the defendant. Not even in our most gratuitous moment can we see a nuance of this
defense being asserted in the answer: It is a rule of procedure that defenses and
objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed
waived. (Sec. 2 Rule 9 of the Rules of Court).
Secondly, the evidence shows that plaintiff has not been sleeping on her rights.
According to her she was dispossessed of the land in 1976. It is admitted by the
defendant that in 1977, plaintiff lodged a complaint against the defendant regarding
the land in question with the Presidential Action Committee On Land Problems
(PACLAP) as (sic) Camp Wilhelm, Lucena City. And then the instant action was filed in
court on July 12, 1977.
On the contrary it is the defendant and/or his predeccessor in interest who have been
sleeping on their rights if any. They did not assert their right of ownership over the
land in question arising from the Deed of Sale during the cadastral proceedings in the
year 1937 or thereabout (sic). Except for filing an adverse claim on February 17, 1977,
defendant has not taken any step to have the title of the property and its tax
declaration transferred to his name.
Thirdly, as adverted to, a title once registered cannot be defeated even by adverse,
open and notorious possession. In the same vein, laches, too, may not be considered
a valid defense for claiming ownership of registered land. Where prescription would
not lie, neither would laches be available (De La Cruz vs. De La Cruz, CA-G.R. No. 4700-
R, Aug. 14, 1950; Adove vs, Lopez, CA-G.R. No. 18060-R, Aug. 30, 1957.7
From this adverse decision, the private respondent appealed to the respondent Court
of Appeals, which docketed the case as CA-G.R. CV No. 09853. He asked the
respondent Court to reverse the RTC because the latter erred: (a) in not considering
the unsullied testimonial and documentary evidence for the appellant; (b) in
appreciating the plaintiff-appellee's flimsy and insufficient testimonial evidence; (c) in
not declaring that prescription and laches were raised by the defendant; (d) in
declaring that the failure to present to the cadastral court the deed of absolute sale
bars the appellant (private respondent) from proving his ownership over the land in
suit; and (e) in rendering judgment in favor of the petitioner.8
In its Decision, the respondent Court upheld the private respondent's position and
decreed as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is reversed and another one entered —
(1) declaring defendant-appellant the true and lawful owner of the 12,501 square
meters of land described in and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-28170 of
the Registry of Deeds of Lucena City;
(2) ordering the plaintiff-appellee to execute to the defendant-appellant the proper
deed of conveyance transferring full ownership of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
28170 to the said defendant-appellant;
(3) ordering the Register of Deeds of Lucena City to cancel said Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-28170 and to issue thereafter a new one in the name of defendant-
appellant, in the event the plaintiff-appellee shall fail or refuse to execute the
conveyance;
(4) ordering the plaintiff-appellee to pay attorney's fees of P10,000.00.
Costs against the plaintiff-appellee.9
In resolving the appeal against the petitioner, the respondent Court stressed the fact
that although OCT No. 43073 was issued in 1937, it was only on 26 August 1976 that
the petitioner initially moved "to change the registered ownership" of the property
with the issuance of TCT No. 27166. At that time, petitioner was already forty-nine
(49) years old. In short, the respondent Court observed that she allowed twenty-eight
(28) years to pass — from the time she attained the age of majority — before taking
any affirmative action to protect her rights over the property. It thus concluded that
"suspicion then is not altogether unjustified that the inaction was because the
appellee knew of the sale by her father Juan Zabella (sic)," and that such knowledge is
notice "that appellee had no right over half of the land. "10
Anent the petitioner's contention that the private respondent is not only guilty of
laches but that prescription had already set in against him, the respondent Court ruled
that the former's evidence speaks otherwise because after TCT No. T-27166 was
issued on 26 August 1976, the private respondent promptly filed his adverse claim,
thereby making of record his interest in the land. Thus, neither prescription nor laches
applies against him.11
Public respondent also overturned the trail court's finding that the petitioner was in
possession of the property until she was dispossessed in 1976 by the private
respondent principally because it was in the third quarter of 1977 that she (petitioner)
declared the questioned property in her name, and had paid land taxes thereon only
for the same third quarter of 1977. The other tax payments were not in her name, but
in the names of Godofredo Zaracena and Juan Zabella. The respondent Court opined
that "[N]ormally, one who claims possession in ownership will declare the property in
his name and will pay taxes on it,"12 and concluded that the petitioner's claimed
possession "is not possession in law that deserves protection and recognition."13 On
the other hand, it gave credit to the private respondent's version chiefly because he
has been paying irrigation charges since 1960.
Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner took this recourse, and raises the following issues:
1. Whether or not the alleged sale of a property by virtue of an instrument which was
not filed or registered under Act 3344 and was not submitted before the Cadastral
Court during the hearing thereof may deprived (sic) an adjudicated-declared owner
the (sic) enjoyment of possession and the improvements thereof.
2. Whether or not a party in (sic) whose title was vested by virtue of a rendition of
judgment and issuance of the decree of registration in a judicial proceeding in
rem which as such, binds the whole world and who ever claim (sic) thereafter on the
said land are (sic) deemed barred under the principle of res judicata.
3. Whether (sic) or not property covered by Torence (sic) Title can be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession.14
After the private respondent filed his Comment, We gave due course to the petition
and directed both parties to submit their respective Memoranda, which they complied
with.
The petition is impressed with merit.
1. In the first place, the public respondent's factual findings on the issuance of
possession — on the basis of which it rejected the findings of fact and conclusions of
the trial court — are conjectural and speculative. Hence, We cannot be bound by such
findings under the rule that findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on
this Court.15The trial court gave credence to the petitioner's account that she had
legally possessed the property in question until 1976, categorically ruling that the
private respondent's "evidence does not convincingly establish that he possessed the
property publicly, exclusively and peacefully in the concept of owner."16 The reasons
for this pronouncement have already been given. Clearly, these matters are inexorably
anchored on the witnesses' credibility. It is a settled judicial precept that the issue of
the credibility of witnesses is primarily addressed to the trial court since it is in a better
position to decide such a question, having seen and heard the witnesses and having
observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial.17
Moreover, its findings on such credibility carry great weight and respect, and will be
sustained by the appellate court unless certain facts of substance and value have been
overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of the case. 18 That the
petitioner neither declared the property in her name nor paid the taxes thereon until
1977 is not, contrary to the public respondent's conclusion, fatal to her cause. Until
27 June 1976, the property remained covered by OCT No. 43073 in the names of Juan
Zabella and Anastacio Llenares. The private respondent's alleged claim was not
annotated thereon. There is, as well, no evidence to show that the private respondent
had earlier made any extrajudicial or judicial demands to enforce his claim on the
property based on the so-called deed of sale which Anastacio had executed on 21
December 1929 in favor of Ariston Zabella, the private respondent's predecessor-in-
interest. Since the petitioner is Anastacio Llenares's sole heir, the continued existence
of OCT No. 43073 fully protected her rights; and her failure to declare for taxation
purposes the one-half (1/2) portion of the land pertaining to Anastacio did not,
therefore, prejudice her because the payments of the real estate taxes by other —
such as Godofredo Zaracena and Juan Zabella, as found by the public respondent per
Exhibits "C", "C-1" and "C-2" 19 — for and in behalf of the registered owners —
benefited the registered owners themselves and their successors-in-interest. On the
other, the private respondent neither had the property declared in his name for
taxation purposes nor paid the real estate taxes thereon. All that he paid, and this was
only beginning in 1960, were the irrigation charges. And yet, the respondent Court
resolved the issue in his favor. This palpable inconsistency on the part of the Court of
Appeals defies all logic.
Furthermore, the respondent Court's conclusion that the petitioner made no move to
have the property declared in her name or pay the real estate taxes thereon before
1976 because she knew all along about the 1929 sale executed by her father to Ariston
Zabella, is plain speculation and, as characterized by the public respondent, a mere
"suspicion," thus:
. . . The suspicion then is not altogether unjustified that the inaction
was because the appellee knew of the sale by her father to Juan (sic)
Zabella. . . .20
Such a suspicion has no basis at all. The parties do not dispute the fact that
at the time of Anastacio Llenares' death on 27 March 1931, the petitioner
was only four (4) years old. The deed of sale was executed by Anastacio
Llenares on 21 December 1929, when the petitioner was only two (2) years
old. Being at that time very much below the age of reason, the petitioner
could not have been expected to be aware of the existence of the said deed
of sale, much less understand its contents. The evidence failed to show that
the private respondent informed the petitioner of such a sale at any time
before the former filed the adverse claim on 17 February 1977.
2. Secondly, the respondent Court erroneously applied the rule on prescription against
the petitioner and not against the private respondent. The evidence conclusively
established that at an appropriate cadastral proceedings, Lot No. 5015 was awarded
by the cadastral court to Juan Zabella and Anastacio Llenares in equal pro-
indiviso shares; the decision became final; and on 28 July 1937, OCT No. 43073 was
issued in favor of Juan Zabella and Anastacio Llenares. It was only on 17 February 1977,
or after the lapse of over thirty-nine (39) years, that the private respondent, as a
successor-in-interest of Ariston Zabella, took the first legal step — i.e., the filing of the
affidavit of adverse claim — to protect and preserve his supposed right acquired under
the deed of sale. Unfortunately, however, this move did not produce any legal effect.
An adverse claim under Section 110 of the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496), the
governing law at that time, referred to a claim of "any part or interest in registered
land adverse to the registered owner, arising subsequent to the date of the original
registration."21 In the instant case, the private respondent's "adverse claim" is one
based on a transaction which had occurred long before the rendition of the decision
in the cadastral proceedings and the issuance of OCT No. 43073. This seems to have
escaped the attention of the public respondent which instead concluded that it was
the petitioner who did not take any legal action from 1937, when OCT No. 43073 was
issued, until 26 August 1976, when TCT NO. 27166 was issued following her execution
on 22 June 1976 of the affidavit of "self-adjudication." This conclusion has no basis. As
has been earlier adverted to, the continued existence of OCT No. 43073 in Juan
Zabella's name protected the petitioner as the sole heir of Anastacio Llenares. There
is no law which requires her, as a sole heir, to execute an affidavit of adjudication and
cause both the cancellation of the OCT and the issuance of a new one in her name and
in the names of the heirs of co-owner Juan Zabella in order to transfer the ownership
of the property to her, or protect her rights and interests therein. The transfer in her
favor took place, ipso jure, upon the death of Anastacio Llenares.22
3. Finally, the so-called deed of sale executed by Anastacio Llenares in 1929 had lost
its efficacy after the judgment in the cadastral proceedings adjudicating Lot No. 5015
to him and Juan Zabella became final. Ariston Zabella, the vendee in the said sale, did
not file any answer in the cadastral proceedings or advance any claims on the said lot.
It is to be noted that the proceedings under the Cadastral Act (Act No. 2259, as
amended)23 are judicial and in rem. As such, they bind the whole world. The final
judgment rendered therein is deemed to have settled the status of the land subject
thereof; any claim over it not noted thereon by other parties is therefore deemed
barred under the principle of res judicata.24 In a cadastal proceeding, the Government
is actually the plaintiff and all the claimants are defendants.25 This is because the
former, represented by the Solicitor General, institutes the proceedings by a petition
against the holders, claimants, possessors or occupants of such lands or any part
thereof while the latter, or those claiming interest in the entire land or any part of it,
whether named in the notice or not, are required to appear before the court and file
an answer on or before the return day or within such further time as may be followed
by the court.26 All conflicting interest shall be adjudicated therein and the decree
awarded in favor of the party entitled to the land; when it has become final, the decree
shall serve as the basis for an original certificate of title in favor of the said party. This
shall have the same effect as a certificate of title granted under the Land Registration
Act.27

A party fraudulently deprived of his property in a cadastral proceeding may

nevertheless file, within one (1) year from the entry of the decree, a petition for
review. 28 After the lapse of the said period, if the property has not yet passed on to
an innocent purchaser for value, an action for conveyance may still be filed by the
aggrieved party.29 In the instant case, that action for conveyance could have only been
based on an implied trust in Article 1456 of the Civil Code:

Art. 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the

person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an
implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property
comes.

It is now settled that an action for the conveyance of property based on an implied or
constructive trust prescribes in ten (10) years.30

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the instant petition, ANNULING

the challenged decision of the public respondent Court of Appeals of 24 April 1991 in
CA-G.R. CV No. 09853 and REINSTATING the decision of the trial court subject of the
appeal in the latter case.

Costs against the private respondent.

SO ORDERED.
Gevero vs. IAC (G.R. NO. 77029, August 30, 1990) Teodorica Babangha insofar as the same prejudices the land which it acquired a
portion of lot 2476.

Plaintiff now seeks to quiet title and/or annul the partition made by the heirs of
BIENVENIDO, ESTELITA, MACARIO, LUIS, ADELAIDE, ENRIQUITA and CLAUDIO, all
Teodorica Babangha insofar as the same prejudices the land which it acquired, a
surnamed, GEVERO, petitioners,
portion of Lot 2476. Plaintiff proved that before purchasing Lot 2476-A it first
vs.
investigated and checked the title of Luis Lancero and found the same to be intact in
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and DEL MONTE DEVELOPMENT
the office of the Register of Deeds of Cagayan de Oro City. The same with the
CORPORATION, respondents.
subdivision plan (Exh. "B"), the corresponding technical description (Exh. "P") and the
Deed of Sale executed by Ricardo Gevero — all of which were found to be
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the March 20, 1988 decision 1 of the then unquestionable. By reason of all these, plaintiff claims to have bought the land in good
Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) in AC-GR CV No. 69264, entitled faith and for value, occupying the land since the sale and taking over from Lancero's
Del Monte Development Corporation vs. Enrique Ababa, et al., etc. affirming the possession until May 1969, when the defendants Abadas forcibly entered the
decision 2 of the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Misamis property. (Rollo, p. 23)
Oriental declaring the plaintiff corporation as the true and absolute owner of that
portion of Lot 476 of the Cagayan Cadastre, particularly Lot No. 2476-D of the
After trial the court a quo on July 18, 1977 rendered judgment, the dispositive portion
subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-80450, containing an area of Seven Thousand Eight
of which reads as follows:
Hundred Seventy Eight (7,878) square meters more or less.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the

As found by the Appellate Court, the facts are as follows:
plaintiff corporation as the true and absolute owner of that portion of Lot No. 2476 of
the Cagayan Cadastre, particularly Lot No. 2476-D of the subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-
The parcel of land under litigation is Lot No. 2476 of the Subdivision Plan Psd-37365 80450, containing an area of SEVEN THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT
containing an area of 20,119 square meters and situated at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. (7,878) square meters, more or less. The other portions of Lot No. 2476 are hereby
Said lot was acquired by purchase from the late Luis Lancero on September 15, 1964 adjudicated as follows:
as per Deed of Absolute Sale executed in favor of plaintiff and by virtue of which
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 4320 was issued to plaintiff (DELCOR for brevity). Luis
Lot No. 2476 – B – to the heirs of Elena Gevero;
Lancero, in turn acquired the same parcel from Ricardo Gevero on February 5, 1952
per deed of sale executed by Ricardo Gevero which was duly annotated as entry No.
1128 at the back of Original Certificate of Title No. 7610 covering the mother lot Lot No. 2476 – C – to the heirs of Restituto Gevero;
identified as Lot No. 2476 in the names of Teodorica Babangha — 1/2 share and her
children: Maria; Restituto, Elena, Ricardo, Eustaquio and Ursula, all surnamed Lot No. 2476 – E – to the defendant spouses Enrique C. Torres and Francisca Aquino;
surnamed Gevero, 1/2 undivided share of the whole area containing 48,122 square
meters. Lot No. 2476 – F – to the defendant spouses Eduard Rumohr and Emilia Merida
Rumohf ;
Teodorica Babangha died long before World War II and was survived by her six children
aforementioned. The heirs of Teodorica Babangha on October 17,1966 executed an Lot Nos. 2476-H, 2476-I and 2476 — G — to defendant spouses Enrique Abada and
Extra-Judicial Settlement and Partition of the estate of Teodorica Babangha, consisting Lilia Alvarez Abada.
of two lots, among them was lot 2476. By virtue of the extra-judicial settlement and
partition executed by the said heirs of Teodorica Babangha, Lot 2476-A to Lot 2476-I, No adjudication can be made with respect to Lot No. 2476-A considering that the said
inclusive, under subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-80450 duly approved by the Land lot is the subject of a civil case between the Heirs of Maria Gevero on one hand and
Registration Commission, Lot 2476-D, among others, was adjudicated to Ricardo the spouses Daniel Borkingkito and Ursula Gevero on the other hand, which case is
Gevero who was then alive at the time of extra-judicial settlement and partition in now pending appeal before the Court of Appeals. No pronouncement as to costs,
1966. Plaintiff (private respondent herein) filed an action with the CFI (now RTC) of
Misamis Oriental to quiet title and/or annul the partition made by the heirs of
SO ORDERED. (Decision, Record on Appeal, p. 203; Rollo, pp. 21-22)
From said decision, defendant heirs of Ricardo Gevero (petitioners herein) appealed
to the IAC (now Court of Appeals) which subsequently, on March 20, 1986, affirmed
the decision appealed from.
Petitioners, on March 31, 1986, filed a motion for reconsideration (Rollo, p. 28) but
was denied on April 21, 1986.
Hence, the present petition.
This petition is devoid of merit.
Basically, the issues to be resolved in the instant case are: 1) whether or not
the deed of sale executed by Ricardo Gevero to Luis Lancero is valid; 2) in the
affirmative, whether or not the 1/2 share of interest of Teodorica Babangha
in one of the litigated lots, lot no. 2476 under OCT No. 7610 is included in the
deed of sale; and 3) whether or not the private respondents' action is barred
by laches.
Petitioners maintain that the deed of sale is entirely invalid citing alleged flaws
thereto, such as that: 1) the signature of Ricardo was forged without his knowledge of
such fact; 2) Lancero had recognized the fatal defect of the 1952 deed of sale when
he signed the document in 1968 entitled "Settlement to Avoid the Litigation"; 3)
Ricardo's children remained in the property notwithstanding the sale to Lancero; 4)
the designated Lot No. is 2470 instead of the correct number being Lot No. 2476; 5)
the deed of sale included the share of Eustaquio Gevero without his authority; 6) T.C.T.
No. 1183 of Lancero segregated the area of 20,119 square meters from the bigger
area (OCT No. 7616) without the consent of the other co-owners; 7) Lancero caused
the 1952 Subdivision survey without the consent of the Geveros' to bring about the
segregation of the 20,119 square meters lot from the mother lot 2476 which brought
about the issuance of his title T-1183 and to DELCOR's title T4320, both of which were
illegally issued; and 8) the area sold as per document is 20,649 square meters whereas
the segregated area covered by TCT No. T-1183 of Lancero turned out to be 20,119
square meters (Petitioners Memorandum, pp. 62-78).
As to petitioners' claim that the signature of Ricardo in the 1952 deed of sale in favor
of Lancero was forged without Ricardo's knowledge of such fact (Rollo, p. 71) it will be
observed that the deed of sale in question was executed with all the legal formalities
of a public document. The 1952 deed was duly acknowledged by both parties before
the notary public, yet petitioners did not bother to rebut the legal presumption of the
regularity of the notarized document (Dy v. Sacay, 165 SCRA 473 [1988]); Nuguid v.
C.A., G.R. No. 77423, March 13, 1989). In fact it has long been settled that a public
document executed and attested through the intervention of the notary public is
evidence of the facts in clear, unequivocal manner therein expressed. It has the
presumption of regularity and to contradict all these, evidence must be clear,
convincing and more than merely preponderant (Rebuleda v. I.A.C., 155 SCRA 520-521
[1987]). Forgery cannot be presumed, it must be proven (Siasat v. IAC, No. 67889,
October 10, 1985). Likewise, petitioners allegation of absence of consideration of the
deed was not substantiated. Under Art. 1354 of the Civil Code, consideration is
presumed unless the contrary is proven.
As to petitioners' contention that Lancero had recognized the fatal defect of the 1952
deed when he signed the document in 1968 entitled "Settlement to Avoid Litigation"
(Rollo, p. 71), it is a basic rule of evidence that the right of a party cannot be prejudiced
by an act, declaration, or omission of another (Sec. 28. Rule 130, Rules of Court). This
particular rule is embodied in the maxim "res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet."
Under Section 31, Rule 130, Rules of Court "where one derives title to property from
another, the act, declaration, or omission of the latter, while holding the title, in
relation to the property is evidence against the former." It is however stressed that
the admission of the former owner of a property must have been made while he was
the owner thereof in order that such admission may be binding upon the present
owner (City of Manila v. del Rosario, 5 Phil. 227 [1905]; Medel v. Avecilla, 15 Phil. 465
[1910]). Hence, Lanceros' declaration or acts of executing the 1968 document have no
binding effect on DELCOR, the ownership of the land having passed to DELCOR in 1964.
Petitioners' claim that they remained in the property, notwithstanding the alleged sale
by Ricardo to Lancero (Rollo, p. 71) involves a question of fact already raised and
passed upon by both the trial and appellate courts. Said the Court of Appeals:
Contrary to the allegations of the appellants, the trial court found
that Luis Lancero had taken possession of the land upon proper
investigation by plaintiff the latter learned that it was indeed Luis
Lancero who was the owner and possessor of Lot 2476 D. . . .
(Decision, C.A., p. 6).
As a finding of fact, it is binding upon this Court (De Gola-Sison v. Manalo, 8 SCRA 595
[1963]; Gaduco vs. C.A., 14 SCRA 282 [1965]; Ramos v. Pepsi-Cola, 19 SCRA 289 [1967];
Tan v. C.A., 20 SCRA 54 [1967]; Ramirez Tel. Co. v. Bank of America, 33 SCRA 737
[1970]; Lucero v. Loot, 25 SCRA 687 [1968]; Guerrero v. C.A., 142 SCRA 130 [1986]).
Suffice it to say that the other flaws claimed by the petitioners which allegedly
invalidated the 1952 deed of sale have not been raised before the trial court nor
before the appellate court. It is settled jurisprudence that an issue which was neither
averred in the complaint nor raised during the trial in the court below cannot be raised
for the first time on appeal as it would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice
and due process. (Matienzo v. Servidad, 107 SCRA 276 [1981]; Dela Santa v. C.A., 140
SCRA 44 [1985]; Dihiansan v. C.A., 157 SCRA 434 [1987]; Anchuelo v. IAC, 147 SCRA
434 [1987]; Dulos Realty and Development Corporation v. C.A., 157 SCRA [1988];
Kamos v. IAC, G.R. No. 78282, July 5, 1989).
Petitioners aver that the 1/2 share of interest of Teodorica (mother of Ricardo) in Lot
2476 under OCT No. 7610 was not included in the deed of sale as it was intended to
limit solely to Ricardos' proportionate share out of the undivided 1/2 of the area
pertaining to the six (6) brothers and sisters listed in the Title and that the Deed did
not include the share of Ricardo, as inheritance from Teodorica, because the Deed did
not recite that she was deceased at the time it was executed (Rollo, pp. 67-68).
The hereditary share in a decedents' estate is transmitted or vested immediately from
the moment of the death of the "causante" or predecessor in interest (Civil Code of
the Philippines, Art. 777), and there is no legal bar to a successor (with requisite
contracting capacity) disposing of his hereditary share immediately after such death,
even if the actual extent of such share is not determined until the subsequent
liquidation of the estate (De Borja v. Vda. de Borja, 46 SCRA 577 [1972]).
Teodorica Babangha died long before World War II, hence, the rights to the succession
were transmitted from the moment of her death. It is therefore incorrect to state that
it was only in 1966, the date of extrajudicial partition, when Ricardo received his share
in the lot as inheritance from his mother Teodorica. Thus, when Ricardo sold his share
over lot 2476 that share which he inherited from Teodorica was also included unless
expressly excluded in the deed of sale.
Petitioners contend that Ricardo's share from Teodorica was excluded in the sale
considering that a paragraph of the aforementioned deed refers merely to the shares
of Ricardo and Eustaquio (Rollo, p. 67-68).
It is well settled that laws and contracts shall be so construed as to harmonize and give
effect to the different provisions thereof (Reparations Commission v. Northern Lines,
Inc., 34 SCRA 203 [1970]), to ascertain the meaning of the provisions of a contract, its
entirety must be taken into account (Ruiz v. Sheriff of Manila, 34 SCRA 83 [1970]). The
interpretation insisted upon by the petitioners, by citing only one paragraph of the
deed of sale, would not only create contradictions but also, render meaningless and
set at naught the entire provisions thereof.
Petitioners claim that DELCOR's action is barred by laches considering that the
petitioners have remained in the actual, open, uninterrupted and adverse possession
thereof until at present (Rollo, p. 17).
An instrument notarized by a notary public as in the case at bar is a public instrument
(Eacnio v. Baens, 5 Phil. 742). The execution of a public instrument is equivalent to the
delivery of the thing (Art. 1498, 1st Par., Civil Code) and is deemed legal delivery.
Hence, its execution was considered a sufficient delivery of the property (Buencamino
v. Viceo, 13 Phil. 97; [1906]; Puato v. Mendoza, 64 Phil. 457 [1937]; Vda. de Sarmiento
v. Lesaca, 108 Phil. 900 [1960]; Phil. Suburban Development Corp. v. Auditor Gen., 63
SCRA 397 (1975]).
Besides, the property sold is a registered land. It is the act of registration that transfers
the ownership of the land sold. (GSIS v. C.A., G.R. No. 42278, January 20, 1989). If the
property is a registered land, the purchaser in good, faith has a right to rely on the
certificate of title and is under no duty to go behind it to look for flaws (Mallorca v. De
Ocampo, No. L-26852, March 25, 1970; Unchuan v. C.A., 161 SCRA 710 [1988]; Nuguid
v. CA-G.R. No. 77427, March 13, 1989).
Under the established principles of land registration law, the person dealing with
registered land may generally rely on the correctness of its certificate of title and the
law will in no way oblige him to go behind the certificate to determine the condition
of the property (Tiongco v. de la Merced, L-2446, July 25, 1974; Lopez vs. CA., G.R. No.
49739, January 20, 1989; Davao Grains Inc. vs. IAC, 171 SCRA 612 [1989]). This
notwithstanding, DELCOR did more than that. It did not only rely on the certificate of
title. The Court of Appeals found that it had first investigated and checked the title
(T.C.T. No. T-1183) in the name of Luis Lancero. It likewise inquired into the Subdivision
Plan, the corresponding technical description and the deed of sale executed by
Ricardo Gevero in favor of Luis Lancero and found everything in order. It even went to
the premises and found Luis Lancero to be in possession of the land to the exclusion
of any other person. DELCOR had therefore acted in good faith in purchasing the land
in question.
Consequently, DELCOR's action is not barred by laches.
The main issues having been disposed of, discussion of the other issues appear
unnecessary.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the decision of
the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Suarez vs. CA (G.R. No. 94918, September 2, 1992) been liquidated or partitioned. In 1977, petitioners’ widowed mother and Rizal Realty
Corporation lost in the consolidated cases for rescission of contract and for damages,
and were ordered by Branch 1 of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal (now Branch
DANILO I. SUAREZ, EUFROCINA SUAREZ-ANDRES, MARCELO I. SUAREZ, JR., EVELYN 151, RTC of Pasig) to pay, jointly and severally, herein respondents the aggregate
SUAREZ-DE LEON and REGINIO I. SUAREZ, Petitioners, v. THE COURT OF APPEALS, principal amount of about P70,000 as damages. 1
VALENTE RAYMUNDO, VIOLETA RAYMUNDO, MA. CONCEPCION VITO and VIRGINIA
BANTA, Respondents. The judgment against petitioner’s mother and Rizal Realty Corporation having become
final and executory, five (5) valuable parcel of land in Pasig, Metro Manila, (worth to
Villareal Law Offices, for Petitioners. be millions then) were levied and sold on execution on June 24, 1983 in favor of the
private respondents as the highest bidder for the amount of P94,170.000. Private
Nelson Loyola for Private Respondent. respondents were then issued a certificate of sale which was subsequently registered
or August 1, 1983.

SYLLABUS On June 21, 1984 before the expiration of the redemption period, petitioners filed a
reinvindicatory action 2 against private respondents and the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal,
thereafter docketed as Civil Case No. 51203, for the annulment of the auction sale and
1. CIVIL LAW; WILLS AND SUCCESSION; LEGITIME; PROPRIETARY INTEREST OF THE the recovery of the ownership of the levied pieces of property. Therein, they alleged,
CHILDREN, DIFFERENT AND ADVERSE FROM THEIR MOTHER. — The legitime of the among others, that being strangers to the case decided against their mother, they
surviving spouse is equal to the legitime of each child. The proprietary interest of cannot be held liable therefor and that the five (5) parcels of land, of which they are
petitioners in the levied and auctioned property is different from and adverse to that co-owners, can neither be levied nor sold on execution.
of their mother. Petitioners became co-owners of the property not because of their
mother but through their own right as children of their deceased father. Therefore, On July 31, 1984, the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal issued to private respondents a final
petitioners are not barred in any way from instituting the action to annul the auction deed of sale 3 over the properties.
sale to protect their own interest.
On October 22, 1984, Teofista Suarez joined by herein petitioners filed with Branch
151 a Motion for Reconsideration 4 of the Order dated October 10, 1984, claiming
DECISION that the parcels of land are co-owned by them and further informing the Court the
filing and pendency of an action to annul the auction sale (Civil Case No. 51203), which
motion however, was denied.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
NOCON, J.:
On February 25, 1985, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued enjoining private
respondents from transferring to third parties the levied parcels of land based on the
The ultimate issue before Us is whether or not private respondents can validly acquire finding that the auctioned lands are co-owned by petitioners.
all the five (5) parcels of land co-owned by petitioners and registered in the name of
petitioner’s deceased father. Marcelo Suarez, whose estate has not been partitioned On March 1, 1985, private respondent Valente Raymundo filed in Civil Case No. 51203
or liquidated, after the said properties were levied and publicly sold en masse to a Motion to Dismiss for failure on the part of the petitioners to prosecute, however,
private respondents to satisfy the personal judgment debt of Teofista Suarez, the such motion was later denied by Branch 155, Regional Trial Court, Pasig.
surviving spouse of Marcelo Suarez, mother of herein petitioners.chanrobles law
library On December 1985, Raymundo filed in Civil Case No. 51203 an Ex-Parte Motion to
Dismiss complaint for failure to prosecute. This was granted by Branch 155 through an
The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library Order dated May 29, 1986, notwithstanding petitioner’s pending motion for the
issuance of alias summons to be served upon the other defendants in the said case. A
Herein petitioners are brothers and sisters. Their father died in 1955 and since then motion for reconsideration was filed but was later denied.
his estate consisting of several valuable parcels of land in Pasig, Metro Manila has lot
On October 10, 1984, RTC Branch 151 issued in Civil Case Nos. 21736-21739 an Order
directing Teofista Suarez and all persons claiming right under her to vacate the lots "The legitime of the legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half of the
subject of the judicial sale; to desist from removing or alienating improvements hereditary estate of the father and of the mother.
thereon; and to surrender to private respondents the owner’s duplicate copy of the
torrens title and other pertinent documents. The latter may freely dispose of the remaining half, subject to the rights of illegitimate
children and of the surviving spouse as hereinafter provided."cralaw virtua1aw library
Teofista Suarez then filed with the then Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari to
annul the Orders of Branch 151 dated October 10, 1984 and October 14, 1986 issued Article 892 par. 2 likewise provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
in Civil Case Nos. 21736-21739.
"If there are two or more legitimate children or descendants, the surviving spouse shall
On December 4, 1986 petitioners filed with Branch 155 a Motion for reconsideration be entitled to a portion equal to the legitime of each of the legitimate children or
of the Order 5 dated September 24, 1986. In an Order dated June 10, 1987, 6 Branch descendants."cralaw virtua1aw library
155 lifted its previous order of dismissal and directed the issuance of alias
summons.chanrobles law library : red Thus, from the foregoing, the legitime of the surviving spouse is equal to the legitime
of each child.
Respondents then appealed to the Court of Appeals seeking to annul the orders dated
February 25, 1985, 7 May 19, 1989 8 and February 26, 1990 9 issued in Civil Case No. The proprietary interest of petitioners in the levied and auctioned property is different
51203 and further ordering respondent Judge to dismiss Civil Case No. 51203. The from and adverse to that of their mother. Petitioners became co-owners of the
appellate court rendered its decision on July 27, 1990, 10 the dispositive portion of property not because of their mother but through their own right as children of their
which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph deceased father. Therefore, petitioners are not barred in any way from instituting the
action to annul the auction sale to protect their own interest.
"WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby granted and the questioned orders
dated February 25, 1985, May 19, 1989 and February 26, 1990 issued in Civil Case No. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 27, 1990 as well as its
51203 are hereby annulled, further respondent Judge is ordered to dismiss Civil Case Resolution of August 28, 1990 are hereby REVERSED and set aside; and Civil Case No.
No. 51203." 11 51203 is reinstated only to determine that portion which belongs to petitioners and
to annul the sale with regard to said portion.chanrobles law library
Hence, this appeal.
SO ORDERED.
Even without touching on the incidents and issues raised by both petitioner and
private respondents and the developments subsequent to the filing of the complaint,
We cannot but notice the glaring error committed by the trial court.

It would be useless to discuss the procedural issue on the validity of the execution and
the manner of publicly selling en masse the subject properties for auction. To start
with, only one-half of the 5 parcels of land should have been the subject of the auction
sale.

The law in point is Article 777 of the Civil Code, the law applicable at the time of the
institution of the case.

"The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the
decedent."cralaw virtua1aw library

Article 888 further provides:chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library

Lorenzo vs. Posadas (64 PHIL 353)
PABLO LORENZO, as trustee of the estate of Thomas Hanley, deceased, plaintiff-
appellant,
vs.
JUAN POSADAS, JR., Collector of Internal Revenue, defendant-appellant.
defendant-appellant.
LAUREL, J.:
On October 4, 1932, the plaintiff Pablo Lorenzo, in his capacity as trustee of the estate
of Thomas Hanley, deceased, brought this action in the Court of First Instance of
Zamboanga against the defendant, Juan Posadas, Jr., then the Collector of Internal
Revenue, for the refund of the amount of P2,052.74, paid by the plaintiff as
inheritance tax on the estate of the deceased, and for the collection of interst thereon
at the rate of 6 per cent per annum, computed from September 15, 1932, the date
when the aforesaid tax was [paid under protest. The defendant set up a counterclaim
for P1,191.27 alleged to be interest due on the tax in question and which was not
included in the original assessment. From the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Zamboanga dismissing both the plaintiff's complaint and the defendant's
counterclaim, both parties appealed to this court.
It appears that on May 27, 1922, one Thomas Hanley died in Zamboanga, Zamboanga,
leaving a will (Exhibit 5) and considerable amount of real and personal properties. On
june 14, 1922, proceedings for the probate of his will and the settlement and
distribution of his estate were begun in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga. The
will was admitted to probate. Said will provides, among other things, as follows:
4. I direct that any money left by me be given to my nephew Matthew Hanley.
5. I direct that all real estate owned by me at the time of my death be not sold or
otherwise disposed of for a period of ten (10) years after my death, and that the same
be handled and managed by the executors, and proceeds thereof to be given to my
nephew, Matthew Hanley, at Castlemore, Ballaghaderine, County of Rosecommon,
Ireland, and that he be directed that the same be used only for the education of my
brother's children and their descendants.
6. I direct that ten (10) years after my death my property be given to the above
mentioned Matthew Hanley to be disposed of in the way he thinks most
advantageous.
xxx xxx xxx
8. I state at this time I have one brother living, named Malachi Hanley, and that my
nephew, Matthew Hanley, is a son of my said brother, Malachi Hanley.
The Court of First Instance of Zamboanga considered it proper for the best interests
of ther estate to appoint a trustee to administer the real properties which, under the
will, were to pass to Matthew Hanley ten years after the two executors named in the
will, was, on March 8, 1924, appointed trustee. Moore took his oath of office and gave
bond on March 10, 1924. He acted as trustee until February 29, 1932, when he
resigned and the plaintiff herein was appointed in his stead.
During the incumbency of the plaintiff as trustee, the defendant Collector of Internal
Revenue, alleging that the estate left by the deceased at the time of his death
consisted of realty valued at P27,920 and personalty valued at P1,465, and allowing a
deduction of P480.81, assessed against the estate an inheritance tax in the amount of
P1,434.24 which, together with the penalties for deliquency in payment consisting of
a 1 per cent monthly interest from July 1, 1931 to the date of payment and a surcharge
of 25 per cent on the tax, amounted to P2,052.74. On March 15, 1932, the defendant
filed a motion in the testamentary proceedings pending before the Court of First
Instance of Zamboanga (Special proceedings No. 302) praying that the trustee, plaintiff
herein, be ordered to pay to the Government the said sum of P2,052.74. The motion
was granted. On September 15, 1932, the plaintiff paid said amount under protest,
notifying the defendant at the same time that unless the amount was promptly
refunded suit would be brought for its recovery. The defendant overruled the
plaintiff's protest and refused to refund the said amount hausted, plaintiff went to
court with the result herein above indicated.
In his appeal, plaintiff contends that the lower court erred:
I. In holding that the real property of Thomas Hanley, deceased, passed to his
instituted heir, Matthew Hanley, from the moment of the death of the former, and
that from the time, the latter became the owner thereof.
II. In holding, in effect, that there was deliquency in the payment of inheritance tax
due on the estate of said deceased.
III. In holding that the inheritance tax in question be based upon the value of the estate
upon the death of the testator, and not, as it should have been held, upon the value
thereof at the expiration of the period of ten years after which, according to the
testator's will, the property could be and was to be delivered to the instituted heir.
IV. In not allowing as lawful deductions, in the determination of the net amount of the
estate subject to said tax, the amounts allowed by the court as compensation to the
"trustees" and paid to them from the decedent's estate.
V. In not rendering judgment in favor of the plaintiff and in denying his motion for new
trial.
The defendant-appellant contradicts the theories of the plaintiff and assigns the
following error besides:
The lower court erred in not ordering the plaintiff to pay to the defendant the sum of
P1,191.27, representing part of the interest at the rate of 1 per cent per month from
April 10, 1924, to June 30, 1931, which the plaintiff had failed to pay on the inheritance
tax assessed by the defendant against the estate of Thomas Hanley.
The following are the principal questions to be decided by this court in this appeal: (a)
When does the inheritance tax accrue and when must it be satisfied? (b) Should the
inheritance tax be computed on the basis of the value of the estate at the time of the
testator's death, or on its value ten years later? (c) In determining the net value of the
estate subject to tax, is it proper to deduct the compensation due to trustees? (d)
What law governs the case at bar? Should the provisions of Act No. 3606 favorable to
the tax-payer be given retroactive effect? (e) Has there been deliquency in the
payment of the inheritance tax? If so, should the additional interest claimed by the
defendant in his appeal be paid by the estate? Other points of incidental importance,
raised by the parties in their briefs, will be touched upon in the course of this opinion.
(a) The accrual of the inheritance tax is distinct from the obligation to pay the same.
Section 1536 as amended, of the Administrative Code, imposes the tax upon "every
transmission by virtue of inheritance, devise, bequest, gift mortis causa, or advance in
anticipation of inheritance,devise, or bequest." The tax therefore is upon transmission
or the transfer or devolution of property of a decedent, made effective by his death.
(61 C. J., p. 1592.) It is in reality an excise or privilege tax imposed on the right to
succeed to, receive, or take property by or under a will or the intestacy law, or deed,
grant, or gift to become operative at or after death. Acording to article 657 of the Civil
Code, "the rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of
his death." "In other words", said Arellano, C. J., ". . . the heirs succeed immediately to
all of the property of the deceased ancestor. The property belongs to the heirs at the
moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed
and delivered to them a deed for the same before his death." (Bondad vs. Bondad, 34
Phil., 232. See also, Mijares vs. Nery, 3 Phil., 195; Suilong & Co., vs. Chio-Taysan, 12
Phil., 13; Lubrico vs. Arbado, 12 Phil., 391; Innocencio vs. Gat-Pandan, 14 Phil., 491;
Aliasas vs.Alcantara, 16 Phil., 489; Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321; Malahacan
vs. Ignacio, 19 Phil., 434; Bowa vs. Briones, 38 Phil., 27; Osario vs. Osario & Yuchausti
Steamship Co., 41 Phil., 531; Fule vs. Fule, 46 Phil., 317; Dais vs. Court of First Instance
of Capiz, 51 Phil., 396; Baun vs. Heirs of Baun, 53 Phil., 654.) Plaintiff, however, asserts
that while article 657 of the Civil Code is applicable to testate as well as intestate
succession, it operates only in so far as forced heirs are concerned. But the language
of article 657 of the Civil Code is broad and makes no distinction between different
classes of heirs. That article does not speak of forced heirs; it does not even use the
word "heir". It speaks of the rights of succession and the transmission thereof from
the moment of death. The provision of section 625 of the Code of Civil Procedure
regarding the authentication and probate of a will as a necessary condition to effect
transmission of property does not affect the general rule laid down in article 657 of
the Civil Code. The authentication of a will implies its due execution but once probated
and allowed the transmission is effective as of the death of the testator in accordance
with article 657 of the Civil Code. Whatever may be the time when actual transmission
of the inheritance takes place, succession takes place in any event at the moment of
the decedent's death. The time when the heirs legally succeed to the inheritance may
differ from the time when the heirs actually receive such inheritance. "Poco importa",
says Manresa commenting on article 657 of the Civil Code, "que desde el falleimiento
del causante, hasta que el heredero o legatario entre en posesion de los bienes de la
herencia o del legado, transcurra mucho o poco tiempo, pues la adquisicion ha de
retrotraerse al momento de la muerte, y asi lo ordena el articulo 989, que debe
considerarse como complemento del presente." (5 Manresa, 305; see also, art. 440,
par. 1, Civil Code.) Thomas Hanley having died on May 27, 1922, the inheritance tax
accrued as of the date.
From the fact, however, that Thomas Hanley died on May 27, 1922, it does not follow
that the obligation to pay the tax arose as of the date. The time for the payment on
inheritance tax is clearly fixed by section 1544 of the Revised Administrative Code as
amended by Act No. 3031, in relation to section 1543 of the same Code. The two
sections follow:
SEC. 1543. Exemption of certain acquisitions and transmissions. — The
following shall not be taxed:
(a) The merger of the usufruct in the owner of the naked title.
(b) The transmission or delivery of the inheritance or legacy by the fiduciary heir or
legatee to the trustees.
(c) The transmission from the first heir, legatee, or donee in favor of another
beneficiary, in accordance with the desire of the predecessor.
In the last two cases, if the scale of taxation appropriate to the new beneficiary is
greater than that paid by the first, the former must pay the difference.
SEC. 1544. When tax to be paid. — The tax fixed in this article shall be paid:
(a) In the second and third cases of the next preceding section, before entrance into
possession of the property.
(b) In other cases, within the six months subsequent to the death of the predecessor;
but if judicial testamentary or intestate proceedings shall be instituted prior to the
expiration of said period, the payment shall be made by the executor or administrator
before delivering to each beneficiary his share.
If the tax is not paid within the time hereinbefore prescribed, interest at the rate of
twelve per centum per annum shall be added as part of the tax; and to the tax and
interest due and unpaid within ten days after the date of notice and demand thereof
by the collector, there shall be further added a surcharge of twenty-five per centum.
A certified of all letters testamentary or of admisitration shall be furnished the
Collector of Internal Revenue by the Clerk of Court within thirty days after their
issuance.
It should be observed in passing that the word "trustee", appearing in subsection (b)
of section 1543, should read "fideicommissary" or "cestui que trust". There was an
obvious mistake in translation from the Spanish to the English version.
The instant case does fall under subsection (a), but under subsection (b), of section
1544 above-quoted, as there is here no fiduciary heirs, first heirs, legatee or donee.
Under the subsection, the tax should have been paid before the delivery of the
properties in question to P. J. M. Moore as trustee on March 10, 1924.
(b) The plaintiff contends that the estate of Thomas Hanley, in so far as the real
properties are concerned, did not and could not legally pass to the instituted heir,
Matthew Hanley, until after the expiration of ten years from the death of the testator
on May 27, 1922 and, that the inheritance tax should be based on the value of the
estate in 1932, or ten years after the testator's death. The plaintiff introduced
evidence tending to show that in 1932 the real properties in question had a reasonable
value of only P5,787. This amount added to the value of the personal property left by
the deceased, which the plaintiff admits is P1,465, would generate an inheritance tax
which, excluding deductions, interest and surcharge, would amount only to about
P169.52.
If death is the generating source from which the power of the estate to impose
inheritance taxes takes its being and if, upon the death of the decedent, succession
takes place and the right of the estate to tax vests instantly, the tax should be
measured by the vlaue of the estate as it stood at the time of the decedent's death,
regardless of any subsequent contingency value of any subsequent increase or
decrease in value. (61 C. J., pp. 1692, 1693; 26 R. C. L., p. 232; Blakemore and Bancroft,
Inheritance Taxes, p. 137. See also Knowlton vs. Moore, 178 U.S., 41; 20 Sup. Ct. Rep.,
747; 44 Law. ed., 969.) "The right of the state to an inheritance tax accrues at the
moment of death, and hence is ordinarily measured as to any beneficiary by the value
at that time of such property as passes to him. Subsequent appreciation or
depriciation is immaterial." (Ross, Inheritance Taxation, p. 72.)
Our attention is directed to the statement of the rule in Cyclopedia of Law of and
Procedure (vol. 37, pp. 1574, 1575) that, in the case of contingent remainders,
taxation is postponed until the estate vests in possession or the contingency is settled.
This rule was formerly followed in New York and has been adopted in Illinois,
Minnesota, Massachusetts, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin. This rule, horever, is by
no means entirely satisfactory either to the estate or to those interested in the
property (26 R. C. L., p. 231.). Realizing, perhaps, the defects of its anterior system, we
find upon examination of cases and authorities that New York has varied and now
requires the immediate appraisal of the postponed estate at its clear market value and
the payment forthwith of the tax on its out of the corpus of the estate transferred. (In
re Vanderbilt, 172 N. Y., 69; 69 N. E., 782; In re Huber, 86 N. Y. App. Div., 458; 83 N. Y.
Supp., 769; Estate of Tracy, 179 N. Y., 501; 72 N. Y., 519; Estate of Brez, 172 N. Y., 609;
64 N. E., 958; Estate of Post, 85 App. Div., 611; 82 N. Y. Supp., 1079. Vide also, Saltoun
vs. Lord Advocate, 1 Peter. Sc. App., 970; 3 Macq. H. L., 659; 23 Eng. Rul. Cas., 888.)
California adheres to this new rule (Stats. 1905, sec. 5, p. 343).
But whatever may be the rule in other jurisdictions, we hold that a transmission by
inheritance is taxable at the time of the predecessor's death, notwithstanding the
postponement of the actual possession or enjoyment of the estate by the beneficiary,
and the tax measured by the value of the property transmitted at that time regardless
of its appreciation or depreciation.
(c) Certain items are required by law to be deducted from the appraised gross in
arriving at the net value of the estate on which the inheritance tax is to be computed
(sec. 1539, Revised Administrative Code). In the case at bar, the defendant and the
trial court allowed a deduction of only P480.81. This sum represents the expenses and
disbursements of the executors until March 10, 1924, among which were their fees
and the proven debts of the deceased. The plaintiff contends that the compensation
and fees of the trustees, which aggregate P1,187.28 (Exhibits C, AA, EE, PP, HH, JJ, LL,
NN, OO), should also be deducted under section 1539 of the Revised Administrative
Code which provides, in part, as follows: "In order to determine the net sum which
must bear the tax, when an inheritance is concerned, there shall be deducted, in case
of a resident, . . . the judicial expenses of the testamentary or intestate proceedings, .
. . ."
A trustee, no doubt, is entitled to receive a fair compensation for his services (Barney
vs. Saunders, 16 How., 535; 14 Law. ed., 1047). But from this it does not follow that
the compensation due him may lawfully be deducted in arriving at the net value of the
estate subject to tax. There is no statute in the Philippines which requires trustees'
commissions to be deducted in determining the net value of the estate subject to
inheritance tax (61 C. J., p. 1705). Furthermore, though a testamentary trust has been
created, it does not appear that the testator intended that the duties of his executors
and trustees should be separated. (Ibid.; In re Vanneck's Estate, 161 N. Y. Supp., 893;
175 App. Div., 363; In re Collard's Estate, 161 N. Y. Supp., 455.) On the contrary, in
paragraph 5 of his will, the testator expressed the desire that his real estate be handled
and managed by his executors until the expiration of the period of ten years therein
provided. Judicial expenses are expenses of administration (61 C. J., p. 1705) but, in
State vs. Hennepin County Probate Court (112 N. W., 878; 101 Minn., 485), it was said:
". . . The compensation of a trustee, earned, not in the administration of the estate,
but in the management thereof for the benefit of the legatees or devises, does not
come properly within the class or reason for exempting administration expenses. . . .
Service rendered in that behalf have no reference to closing the estate for the purpose
of a distribution thereof to those entitled to it, and are not required or essential to the
perfection of the rights of the heirs or legatees. . . . Trusts . . . of the character of that
here before the court, are created for the the benefit of those to whom the property
ultimately passes, are of voluntary creation, and intended for the preservation of the
estate. No sound reason is given to support the contention that such expenses should
be taken into consideration in fixing the value of the estate for the purpose of this tax."
(d) The defendant levied and assessed the inheritance tax due from the estate of
Thomas Hanley under the provisions of section 1544 of the Revised Administrative
Code, as amended by section 3 of Act No. 3606. But Act No. 3606 went into effect on
January 1, 1930. It, therefore, was not the law in force when the testator died on May
27, 1922. The law at the time was section 1544 above-mentioned, as amended by Act
No. 3031, which took effect on March 9, 1922.
It is well-settled that inheritance taxation is governed by the statute in force at the
time of the death of the decedent (26 R. C. L., p. 206; 4 Cooley on Taxation, 4th ed., p.
3461). The taxpayer can not foresee and ought not to be required to guess the
outcome of pending measures. Of course, a tax statute may be made retroactive in its
operation. Liability for taxes under retroactive legislation has been "one of the
incidents of social life." (Seattle vs. Kelleher, 195 U. S., 360; 49 Law. ed., 232 Sup. Ct.
Rep., 44.) But legislative intent that a tax statute should operate retroactively should
be perfectly clear. (Scwab vs. Doyle, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep., 491; Smietanka vs. First Trust &
Savings Bank, 257 U. S., 602; Stockdale vs. Insurance Co., 20 Wall., 323; Lunch vs.
Turrish, 247 U. S., 221.) "A statute should be considered as prospective in its operation,
whether it enacts, amends, or repeals an inheritance tax, unless the language of the
statute clearly demands or expresses that it shall have a retroactive effect, . . . ." (61
C. J., P. 1602.) Though the last paragraph of section 5 of Regulations No. 65 of the
Department of Finance makes section 3 of Act No. 3606, amending section 1544 of
the Revised Administrative Code, applicable to all estates the inheritance taxes due
from which have not been paid, Act No. 3606 itself contains no provisions indicating
legislative intent to give it retroactive effect. No such effect can begiven the statute by
this court.
The defendant Collector of Internal Revenue maintains, however, that certain
provisions of Act No. 3606 are more favorable to the taxpayer than those of Act No.
3031, that said provisions are penal in nature and, therefore, should operate
retroactively in conformity with the provisions of article 22 of the Revised Penal Code.
This is the reason why he applied Act No. 3606 instead of Act No. 3031. Indeed, under
Act No. 3606, (1) the surcharge of 25 per cent is based on the tax only, instead of on
both the tax and the interest, as provided for in Act No. 3031, and (2) the taxpayer is
allowed twenty days from notice and demand by rthe Collector of Internal Revenue
within which to pay the tax, instead of ten days only as required by the old law.
Properly speaking, a statute is penal when it imposes punishment for an offense
committed against the state which, under the Constitution, the Executive has the
power to pardon. In common use, however, this sense has been enlarged to include
within the term "penal statutes" all status which command or prohibit certain acts,
and establish penalties for their violation, and even those which, without expressly
prohibiting certain acts, impose a penalty upon their commission (59 C. J., p. 1110).
Revenue laws, generally, which impose taxes collected by the means ordinarily
resorted to for the collection of taxes are not classed as penal laws, although there are
authorities to the contrary. (See Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 361; Twine Co.
vs. Worthington, 141 U. S., 468; 12 Sup. Ct., 55; Rice vs. U. S., 4 C. C. A., 104; 53 Fed.,
910; Com. vs. Standard Oil Co., 101 Pa. St., 150; State vs. Wheeler, 44 P., 430; 25 Nev.
143.) Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable to the case at bar, and in
the absence of clear legislative intent, we cannot give Act No. 3606 a retroactive
effect.
(e) The plaintiff correctly states that the liability to pay a tax may arise at a certain time
and the tax may be paid within another given time. As stated by this court, "the mere
failure to pay one's tax does not render one delinqent until and unless the entire
period has eplased within which the taxpayer is authorized by law to make such
payment without being subjected to the payment of penalties for fasilure to pay his
taxes within the prescribed period." (U. S. vs. Labadan, 26 Phil., 239.)
The defendant maintains that it was the duty of the executor to pay the inheritance
tax before the delivery of the decedent's property to the trustee. Stated otherwise,
the defendant contends that delivery to the trustee was delivery to the cestui que
trust, the beneficiery in this case, within the meaning of the first paragraph of
subsection (b) of section 1544 of the Revised Administrative Code. This contention is
well taken and is sustained. The appointment of P. J. M. Moore as trustee was made
by the trial court in conformity with the wishes of the testator as expressed in his will.
It is true that the word "trust" is not mentioned or used in the will but the intention to
create one is clear. No particular or technical words are required to create a
testamentary trust (69 C. J., p. 711). The words "trust" and "trustee", though apt for
the purpose, are not necessary. In fact, the use of these two words is not conclusive
on the question that a trust is created (69 C. J., p. 714). "To create a trust by will the
testator must indicate in the will his intention so to do by using language sufficient to
separate the legal from the equitable estate, and with sufficient certainty designate
the beneficiaries, their interest in the ttrust, the purpose or object of the trust, and
the property or subject matter thereof. Stated otherwise, to constitute a valid
testamentary trust there must be a concurrence of three circumstances: (1) Sufficient
words to raise a trust; (2) a definite subject; (3) a certain or ascertain object; statutes
in some jurisdictions expressly or in effect so providing." (69 C. J., pp. 705,706.) There
is no doubt that the testator intended to create a trust. He ordered in his will that
certain of his properties be kept together undisposed during a fixed period, for a
stated purpose. The probate court certainly exercised sound judgment in appointment
a trustee to carry into effect the provisions of the will (see sec. 582, Code of Civil
Procedure).
P. J. M. Moore became trustee on March 10, 1924. On that date trust estate vested in
him (sec. 582 in relation to sec. 590, Code of Civil Procedure). The mere fact that the
estate of the deceased was placed in trust did not remove it from the operation of our
inheritance tax laws or exempt it from the payment of the inheritance tax. The
corresponding inheritance tax should have been paid on or before March 10, 1924, to
escape the penalties of the laws. This is so for the reason already stated that the
delivery of the estate to the trustee was in esse delivery of the same estate to
the cestui que trust, the beneficiary in this case. A trustee is but an instrument or agent
for the cestui que trust (Shelton vs. King, 299 U. S., 90; 33 Sup. Ct. Rep., 689; 57 Law.
ed., 1086). When Moore accepted the trust and took possesson of the trust estate he
thereby admitted that the estate belonged not to him but to his cestui que
trust (Tolentino vs. Vitug, 39 Phil.,126, cited in 65 C. J., p. 692, n. 63). He did not acquire
any beneficial interest in the estate. He took such legal estate only as the proper
execution of the trust required (65 C. J., p. 528) and, his estate ceased upon the
fulfillment of the testator's wishes. The estate then vested absolutely in the
beneficiary (65 C. J., p. 542).
The highest considerations of public policy also justify the conclusion we have reached.
Were we to hold that the payment of the tax could be postponed or delayed by the
creation of a trust of the type at hand, the result would be plainly disastrous. Testators
may provide, as Thomas Hanley has provided, that their estates be not delivered to
their beneficiaries until after the lapse of a certain period of time. In the case at bar,
the period is ten years. In other cases, the trust may last for fifty years, or for a longer
period which does not offend the rule against petuities. The collection of the tax would
then be left to the will of a private individual. The mere suggestion of this result is a
sufficient warning against the accpetance of the essential to the very exeistence of
government. (Dobbins vs. Erie Country, 16 Pet., 435; 10 Law. ed., 1022; Kirkland vs.
Hotchkiss, 100 U. S., 491; 25 Law. ed., 558; Lane County vs. Oregon, 7 Wall., 71; 19
Law. ed., 101; Union Refrigerator Transit Co. vs. Kentucky, 199 U. S., 194; 26 Sup. Ct.
Rep., 36; 50 Law. ed., 150; Charles River Bridge vs. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet., 420; 9 Law.
ed., 773.) The obligation to pay taxes rests not upon the privileges enjoyed by, or the
protection afforded to, a citizen by the government but upon the necessity of money
for the support of the state (Dobbins vs. Erie Country, supra). For this reason, no one
is allowed to object to or resist the payment of taxes solely because no personal
benefit to him can be pointed out. (Thomas vs. Gay, 169 U. S., 264; 18 Sup. Ct. Rep.,
340; 43 Law. ed., 740.) While courts will not enlarge, by construction, the
government's power of taxation (Bromley vs. McCaughn, 280 U. S., 124; 74 Law. ed.,
226; 50 Sup. Ct. Rep., 46) they also will not place upon tax laws so loose a construction
as to permit evasions on merely fanciful and insubstantial distictions. (U. S. vs. Watts,
1 Bond., 580; Fed. Cas. No. 16,653; U. S. vs. Wigglesirth, 2 Story, 369; Fed. Cas. No.
16,690, followed in Froelich & Kuttner vs. Collector of Customs, 18 Phil., 461, 481;
Castle Bros., Wolf & Sons vs. McCoy, 21 Phil., 300; Muñoz & Co. vs. Hord, 12 Phil., 624;
Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation vs. Rafferty, 39 Phil., 145; Luzon
Stevedoring Co. vs. Trinidad, 43 Phil., 803.) When proper, a tax statute should be
construed to avoid the possibilities of tax evasion. Construed this way, the statute,
without resulting in injustice to the taxpayer, becomes fair to the government.
That taxes must be collected promptly is a policy deeply intrenched in our tax system.
Thus, no court is allowed to grant injunction to restrain the collection of any internal
revenue tax ( sec. 1578, Revised Administrative Code; Sarasola vs. Trinidad, 40 Phil.,
252). In the case of Lim Co Chui vs. Posadas (47 Phil., 461), this court had occassion to
demonstrate trenchment adherence to this policy of the law. It held that "the fact that
on account of riots directed against the Chinese on October 18, 19, and 20, 1924, they
were prevented from praying their internal revenue taxes on time and by mutual
agreement closed their homes and stores and remained therein, does not authorize
the Collector of Internal Revenue to extend the time prescribed for the payment of
the taxes or to accept them without the additional penalty of twenty five per cent."
(Syllabus, No. 3.)
". . . It is of the utmost importance," said the Supreme Court of the United States, ". .
. that the modes adopted to enforce the taxes levied should be interfered with as little
as possible. Any delay in the proceedings of the officers, upon whom the duty is
developed of collecting the taxes, may derange the operations of government, and
thereby, cause serious detriment to the public." (Dows vs. Chicago, 11 Wall., 108; 20
Law. ed., 65, 66; Churchill and Tait vs. Rafferty, 32 Phil., 580.)
It results that the estate which plaintiff represents has been delinquent in the payment
of inheritance tax and, therefore, liable for the payment of interest and surcharge
provided by law in such cases.
The delinquency in payment occurred on March 10, 1924, the date when Moore
became trustee. The interest due should be computed from that date and it is error
on the part of the defendant to compute it one month later. The provisions cases is
mandatory (see and cf. Lim Co Chui vs. Posadas, supra), and neither the Collector of
Internal Revenuen or this court may remit or decrease such interest, no matter how
heavily it may burden the taxpayer.
To the tax and interest due and unpaid within ten days after the date of notice and
demand thereof by the Collector of Internal Revenue, a surcharge of twenty-five per
centum should be added (sec. 1544, subsec. (b), par. 2, Revised Administrative Code).
Demand was made by the Deputy Collector of Internal Revenue upon Moore in a
communiction dated October 16, 1931 (Exhibit 29). The date fixed for the payment of
the tax and interest was November 30, 1931. November 30 being an official holiday,
the tenth day fell on December 1, 1931. As the tax and interest due were not paid on
that date, the estate became liable for the payment of the surcharge.
the date of delinquency, to September 15, 1932, the date of payment under protest,
a period covering 8 years, 6 months and 5 days. To the tax and interest thus computed
should be added the sum of P724.88, representing a surhcarge of 25 per cent on both
the tax and interest, and also P10, the compromise sum fixed by the defendant (Exh.
29), giving a grand total of P3,634.43.
As the plaintiff has already paid the sum of P2,052.74, only the sums of P1,581.69 is
legally due from the estate. This last sum is P390.42 more than the amount demanded
by the defendant in his counterclaim. But, as we cannot give the defendant more than
what he claims, we must hold that the plaintiff is liable only in the sum of P1,191.27
the amount stated in the counterclaim.
The judgment of the lower court is accordingly modified, with costs against the
plaintiff in both instances. So ordered.

In view of the foregoing, it becomes unnecessary for us to discuss the fifth error
assigned by the plaintiff in his brief.

We shall now compute the tax, together with the interest and surcharge due from the
estate of Thomas Hanley inaccordance with the conclusions we have reached.

At the time of his death, the deceased left real properties valued at P27,920 and
personal properties worth P1,465, or a total of P29,385. Deducting from this amount
the sum of P480.81, representing allowable deductions under secftion 1539 of the
Revised Administrative Code, we have P28,904.19 as the net value of the estate
subject to inheritance tax.

The primary tax, according to section 1536, subsection (c), of the Revised
Administrative Code, should be imposed at the rate of one per centum upon the first
ten thousand pesos and two per centum upon the amount by which the share exceed
thirty thousand pesos, plus an additional two hundred per centum. One per centum
of ten thousand pesos is P100. Two per centum of P18,904.19 is P378.08. Adding to
these two sums an additional two hundred per centum, or P965.16, we have as
primary tax, correctly computed by the defendant, the sum of P1,434.24.

To the primary tax thus computed should be added the sums collectible under section
1544 of the Revised Administrative Code. First should be added P1,465.31 which
stands for interest at the rate of twelve per centum per annum from March 10, 1924,
ARTICLE 779
Rodriguez vs. Borja (17 SCRA 41)
ANGELA RODRIGUEZ, MARIA RODRIGUEZ, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN DE BORJA, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch III,
ANATOLIA PANGILINAN and ADELAIDA JACALAN, respondents.
Lorenzo Somulong for petitioners.
Torres and Torres for respondents.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Petitioners Angela, Maria, Abelardo and Antonio, surnamed Rodriguez, petition this
Court for a writ of certiorari and prohibition to the Court of First Instance of Bulacan,
for its refusal to grant their motion to dismiss its Special Proceeding No. 1331, which
said Court is alleged to have taken cognizance of without jurisdiction.
The facts and issues are succinctly narrated in the order of the respondent court,
dated June 13, 1963 (Petition, Annex 0), in this wise:
It is alleged in the motion to dismiss filed by Angela, Maria, Abelardo and Antonio
Rodriguez, through counsel, that this Court "has no jurisdiction to try the above-
entitled case in view of the pendency of another action for the settlement of the estate
of the deceased Rev. Fr. Celestino Rodriguez in the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
namely, Sp. Proceedings No. 3907 entitled 'In the matter of the Intestate Estate of the
deceased Rev. Fr. Celestino Rodriguez which was filed ahead of the instant case".
The records show that Fr. Celestino Rodriguez died on February 12, 1963 in the City of
Manila; that on March 4, 1963, Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan delivered to
the Clerk of Court of Bulacan a purported last will and testament of Fr. Rodriguez; that
on March 8, 1963, Maria Rodriguez and Angela Rodriguez, through counsel filed a
petition for leave of court to allow them to examine the alleged will; that on March
11, 1963 before the Court could act on the petition, the same was withdrawn; that on
March 12, 1963, aforementioned petitioners filed before the Court of First Instance of
Rizal a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of Fr. Rodriguez alleging,
among other things, that Fr. Rodriguez was a resident of Parañaque, Rizal, and died
without leaving a will and praying that Maria Rodriguez be appointed as Special
Administratrix of the estate; and that on March 12, 1963 Apolonia Pangilinan and
Adelaida Jacalan filed a petition in this Court for the probation of the will delivered by
them on March 4, 1963. It was stipulated by the parties that Fr. Rodriguez was born in
Parañaque, Rizal; that he was Parish priest of the Catholic Church of Hagonoy, Bulacan,
from the year 1930 up to the time of his death in 1963; that he was buried in
Parañaque, and that he left real properties in Rizal, Cavite, Quezon City and Bulacan.
The movants contend that since the intestate proceedings in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal was filed at 8:00 A.M. on March 12, 1963 while the petition for
probate was filed in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan at 11:00 A.M. on the same
date, the latter Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for probate, citing as
authority in support thereof the case of Ongsingco Vda. de Borja vs. Tan and De Borja,
G.R. No. 7792, July 27, 1955.
The petitioners Pangilinan and Jacalan, on the other hand, take the stand that the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan acquired jurisdiction over the case upon delivery by
them of the will to the Clerk of Court on March 4, 1963, and that the case in this Court
therefore has precedence over the case filed in Rizal on March 12, 1963.
The Court of First Instance, as previously stated denied the motion to dismiss on the
ground that a difference of a few hours did not entitle one proceeding to preference
over the other; that, as early as March 7, movants were aware of the existence of the
purported will of Father Rodriguez, deposited in the Court of Bulacan, since they filed
a petition to examine the same, and that movants clearly filed the intestate
proceedings in Rizal "for no other purpose than to prevent this Court (of Bulacan) from
exercising jurisdiction over the probate proceedings". Reconsideration having been
denied, movants, now petitioners, came to this Court, relying principally on Rule 73,
section 1 of the Rules of Court, and invoking our ruling in Ongsingco vs. Tan and De
Borja, L-7792, July 27, 1955.
SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. — If the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his
will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the
Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and
if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province
which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate
of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The
jurisdiction assumed by a court, as far as it depends on the place of residence of the
decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding,
except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of
jurisdiction appears on the record.
We find this recourse to be untenable. The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance
of Bulacan became vested upon the delivery thereto of the will of the late Father
Rodriguez on March 4, 1963, even if no petition for its allowance was filed until later,
because upon the will being deposited the court could, motu proprio, have taken steps
to fix the time and place for proving the will, and issued the corresponding notices
conformably to what is prescribed by section 3, Rule 76, of the Revised Rules of Court
(Section 3, Rule 77, of the old Rules):
SEC. 3. Court to appoint time for proving will. Notice thereof to be published. — When
a will is delivered to, or a petition for the allowance of a will is filed in, the Court having
jurisdiction, such Court shall fix a time and place for proving the will when all
concerned may appear to contest the allowance thereof, and shall cause notice of
such time and place to be published three (3) weeks successively, previous to the time
appointed, in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
But no newspaper publication shall be made where the petition for probate has been
filed by the testator himself.
The use of the disjunctive in the words "when a will is delivered to OR a petition for
the allowance of a will is filed" plainly indicates that the court may act upon the mere
deposit therein of a decedent's testament, even if no petition for its allowance is as
yet filed. Where the petition for probate is made after the deposit of the will, the
petition is deemed to relate back to the time when the will was delivered. Since the
testament of Fr. Rodriguez was submitted and delivered to the Court of Bulacan on
March 4, while petitioners initiated intestate proceedings in the Court of First Instance
of Rizal only on March 12, eight days later, the precedence and exclusive jurisdiction
of the Bulacan court is incontestable.1äwphï1.ñët
But, petitioners object, section 3 of revised Rule 76 (old Rule 77) speaks of a will being
delivered to "the Court having jurisdiction," and in the case at bar the Bulacan court
did not have it because the decedent was domiciled in Rizal province. We can not
disregard Fr. Rodriguez's 33 years of residence as parish priest in Hagonoy, Bulacan
(1930-1963); but even if we do so, and consider that he retained throughout
some animus revertendi to the place of his birth in Parañaque, Rizal, that detail would
not imply that the Bulacan court lacked jurisdiction. As ruled in previous decisions, the
power to settle decedents' estates is conferred by law upon all courts of first instance,
and the domicile of the testator only affects the venue but not the jurisdiction of the
Court (In re Kaw Singco, 74 Phil. 239; Reyes vs. Diaz, 73 Phil. 484; Bernabe vs. Vergara,
73 Phil. 676). Neither party denies that the late Fr. Rodriguez is deceased, or that he
left personal property in Hagonoy, province of Bulacan (t.s.n. p. 46, hearing of June
11, 1963, Annex "H", Petition, Rec., p. 48). That is sufficient in the case before us.
In the Kaw Singco case (ante) this Court ruled that:
"... If we consider such question of residence as one affecting the jurisdiction of the
trial court over the subject-matter, the effect shall be that the whole proceedings
including all decisions on the different incidents which have arisen in court will have
to be annulled and the same case will have to be commenced anew before another
court of the same rank in another province. That this is of mischievous effect in the
prompt administration of justice is too obvious to require comment. (Cf. Tanunchuan
vs. Dy Buncio & Co., G.R. No. 48206, December 31, 1942). Furthermore, section 600
of Act No. 190, providing that the estate of a deceased person shall be settled in the
province where he had last resided, could not have been intended as defining the
jurisdiction of the probate court over the subject matter, because such legal provision
is contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with procedural matters, and, as we
have said time and again, procedure is one thing and jurisdiction over the subject
matter is another. (Attorney General vs. Manila Railroad Company, 20 Phil. 523.) The
law of jurisdiction — Act No. 136, Section 56, No. 5 — confers upon Courts of First
Instance jurisdiction over all probate cases independently of the place of residence of
the deceased.1 Since, however, there are many Courts of First Instance in the
Philippines, the Law of Procedure, Act No. 190, section 600, fixes the venue or the
place where each case shall be brought. Thus, the place of residence of the deceased
is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely of venue. And it is
upon this ground that in the new Rules of Court the province where the estate of a
deceased person shall be settled is properly called "venue" (Rule 75, section 1.) Motion
for reconsideration is denied.
The estate proceedings having been initiated in the Bulacan Court of First Instance
ahead of any other, that court is entitled to assume jurisdiction to the exclusion of all
other courts, even if it were a case of wrong venue by express provisions of Rule 73
(old Rule 75) of the Rules of Court, since the same enjoins that:
The Court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. (Sec.
1)
This disposition presupposes that two or more courts have been asked to take
cognizance of the settlement of the estate. Of them only one could be of proper
venue, yet the rule grants precedence to that Court whose jurisdiction is first invoked,
without taking venue into account.
There are two other reasons that militate against the success of petitioners. One is
that their commencing intestate proceedings in Rizal, after they learned of the delivery
of the decedent's will to the Court of Bulacan, was in bad faith, patently done with a
view to divesting the latter court of the precedence awarded it by the Rules. Certainly
the order of priority established in Rule 73 (old Rule 75) was not designed to convert
the settlement of decedent's estates into a race between applicants, with the
administration of the properties as the price for the fleetest.
The other reason is that, in our system of civil law, intestate succession is only
subsidiary or subordinate to the testate, since intestacy only takes place in the absence
of a valid operative will. Says Article 960 of the Civil Code of the Philippines:

ART. 960. Legal or intestate succession takes place:

(1) If a person dies without a will, or with a void will, or one which has
subsequently lost its validity;

(2) When the will does not institute an heir to, or dispose of all the property
belonging to the testator. In such case, legal succession shall take place only
with respect to the property in which the testator has not disposed;

(3) If the suspensive condition attached to the institution of heir does not
happen or is not fulfilled, or if the heir dies before the testator, or repudiates
the inheritance, there being no substitution, and no right of accretion takes
place;

(4) When the heir instituted is incapable of succeeding, except in cases

provided in this Code.

Therefore, as ruled in Castro, et al. vs. Martinez, 10 Phil. 307, "only after final decision
as to the nullity of testate succession could an intestate succession be instituted in the
form of pre-established action". The institution of intestacy proceedings in Rizal may
not thus proceed while the probate of the purported will of Father Rodriguez is
pending.

We rule that the Bulacan Court of First Instance was entitled to priority in the
settlement of the estate in question, and that in refusing to dismiss the probate.
proceedings, said court did not commit any abuse of discretion. It is the proceedings
in the Rizal Court that should be discontinued.

Wherefore, the writ of certiorari applied for is denied. Costs against petitioners
Rodriguez.
Balanay, Jr. vs. Martinez (64 SCRA 452)
In the Matter of the Petition to Approve the Will of Leodegaria Julian. FELIX BALANAY,
JR., petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch VI;
AVELINA B. ANTONIO and DELIA B. LANABAN, respondents.
Roberto M. Sarenas for petitioner.
Jose B. Guyo for private respondents.
AQUINO, J.:
Felix Balanay, Jr. appealed by certiorari from the order of the Court of First Instance of
Davao dated February 28, 1974, declaring illegal and void the will of his mother,
Leodegaria Julian, converting the testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding and
ordering the issuance of the corresponding notice to creditors (Special Case No. 1808).
The antecedents of the appeal are as follows:
Leodegaria Julian, a native of Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur, died on February 12, 1973 in Davao
City at the age of sixty-seven. She was survived by her husband, Felix Balanay, Sr., and
by their six legitimate children named Felix Balanay, Jr., Avelina B. Antonio, Beatriz B.
Solamo, Carolina B. Manguiob, Delia B. Lanaban and Emilia B. Pabaonon.
Felix J. Balanay, Jr. filed in the lower court a petition dated February 27, 1973 for the
probate of his mother's notarial will dated September 5, 1970 which is written in
English. In that will Leodegaria Julian declared (a) that she was the owner of the
"southern half of nine conjugal lots (par. II); (b) that she was the absolute owner of
two parcels of land which she inherited from her father (par. III), and (c) that it was
her desire that her properties should not be divided among her heirs during her
husband's lifetime and that their legitimes should be satisfied out of the fruits of her
properties (Par. IV).
Then, in paragraph V of the will she stated that after her husband's death (he was
eighty-two years old in 1973) her paraphernal lands and all the conjugal lands (which
she described as "my properties") should be divided and distributed in the manner set
forth in that part of her will. She devised and partitioned the conjugal lands as if they
were all owned by her. She disposed of in the will her husband's one half share of the
conjugal assets. *
Felix Balanay, Sr. and Avelina B. Antonio opposed the probate of the will on the
grounds of lack of testamentary capacity, undue influence, preterition of the husband
and alleged improper partition of the conjugal estate. The oppositors claimed that
Felix Balanay, Jr. should collate certain properties which he had received from the
testatrix.
Felix Balanay, Jr., in his reply to the opposition, attached thereto an affidavit of Felix
Balanay, Sr. dated April 18, 1973 wherein he withdrew his opposition to the probate
of the will and affirmed that he was interested in its probate. On the same date Felix
Balanay, Sr. signed an instrument captioned "Conformation (sic) of Division and
Renunciation of Hereditary Rights" wherein he manifested that out of respect for his
wife's will he "waived and renounced' his hereditary rights in her estate in favor of
their six children. In that same instrument he confirmed the agreement, which he and
his wife had perfected before her death, that their conjugal properties would be
partitioned in the manner indicated in her will.
Avelina B. Antonio, an oppositor, in her rejoinder contended that the affidavit and
"conformation" of Felix Balanay, Sr. were void. The lower court in its order of June 18,
1973 "denied" the opposition and reset for hearing the probate of the will. It gave
effect to the affidavit and conformity of Felix Balanay, Sr. In an order dated August 28,
1973 it appointed its branch clerk of court as special administrator of the decedent's
estate.
Mrs. Antonio moved for the reconsideration of the lower court's order of June 18,
1973 on the grounds (a) that the testatrix illegally claimed that she was the owner of
the southern half of the conjugal lots and (b) that she could not partition the conjugal
estate by allocating portions of the nine lots to her children. Felix Balanay, Jr., through
his counsel, Hermenegildo Cabreros, opposed that motion. The lower court denied it
in its order of October 15, 1973.
In the meanwhile, another lawyer appeared in the case. David O. Montaña, Sr.,
claiming to be the lawyer of petitioner Felix Balanay, Jr. (his counsel of record was Atty.
Cabreros), filed a motion dated September 25, 1973 for "leave of court to withdraw
probate of alleged will of Leodegaria Julian and requesting authority to proceed by
intestate estate proceeding." In that motion Montaña claimed to be the lawyer not
only of the petitioner but also of Felix Balanay, Sr., Beatriz B. Solamo, Carolina B.
Manguiob and Emilia B. Pabaonon.
Montaña in his motion assailed the provision of the will which partitioned the conjugal
assets or allegedly effected a compromise of future legitimes. He prayed that the
probate of the will be withdrawn and that the proceeding be converted into an
intestate proceeding. In another motion of the same date he asked that the
corresponding notice to creditors be issued.
Avelina B. Antonio and Delia B. Lanaban, through Atty. Jose B. Guyo, in their comments
dated October 15, 1973 manifested their conformity with the motion for the issuance
of a notice to creditors. They prayed that the will be declared void for being contrary
to law and that an intestacy be declared.
The lower court, acting on the motions of Atty. Montaña, assumed that the issuance
of a notice to creditors was in order since the parties had agreed on that point. It
adopted the view of Attys. Montaña and Guyo that the will was void. So, in its order
of February 28, 1974 it dismissed the petition for the probate, converted the testate
proceeding into an intestate proceeding, ordered the issuance of a notice to creditors
and set the intestate proceeding for hearing on April 1 and 2, 1974. The lower court
did not abrogate its prior orders of June 18 and October 15, 1973. The notice to
creditors was issued on April 1, 1974 and published on May 2, 9 and 16 in the Davao
Star in spite of petitioner's motion of April 17, 1974 that its publication be held in
abeyance.
Felix Balanay, Jr., through a new counsel, Roberto M. Sarenas, in a verified motion
dated April 15, 1974, asked for the reconsideration of the lower court's order of
February 28, 1974 on the ground that Atty. Montaña had no authority to withdraw
the petition for the allowance of the will. Attached to the motion was a copy of a letter
dated March 27, 1974 addressed to Atty. Montaña and signed by Felix Balanay, Jr.,
Beatriz V. Solamo, Carolina B. Manguiob and Emilia B. Pabaonon, wherein they
terminated Montaña's services and informed him that his withdrawal of the petition
for the probate of the will was without their consent and was contrary to their
repeated reminder to him that their mother's will was "very sacred" to them.
Avelina B. Antonio and Delia B. Lanaban opposed the motion for reconsideration. The
lower court denied the motion in its order of June 29, 1974. It clarified that it declared
the will void on the basis of its own independent assessment of its provisions and not
because of Atty. Montaña's arguments.
The basic issue is whether the probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic validity
of the will, before ruling on its allowance or formal validity, and in declaring it void.
We are of the opinion that in view of certain unusual provisions of the will, which are
of dubious legality, and because of the motion to withdraw the petition for probate
(which the lower court assumed to have been filed with the petitioner's authorization),
the trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even before
its formal validity had been established. The probate of a will might become an idle
ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void. Where practical
considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even
before it is probated, the court should meet the issue (Nuguid vs. Nuguid, 64 O.G.
1527, 17 SCRA 449. Compare with Sumilang vs. Ramagosa, L-23135, December 26,
1967, 21 SCRA 1369; Cacho vs. Udan, L-19996, April 30, 1965, 13 SCRA
693).1äwphï1.ñët
But the probate court erred in declaring, in its order of February 28, 1974 that the will
was void and in converting the testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding
notwithstanding the fact that in its order of June 18, 1973 , it gave effect to the
surviving husband's conformity to the will and to his renunciation of his hereditary
rights which presumably included his one-half share of the conjugal estate.
The rule is that "the invalidity of one of several dispositions contained in a will does
not result in the invalidity of the other dispositions, unless it is to be presumed that
the testator would not have made such other dispositions if the first invalid disposition
had not been made" (Art. 792, Civil Code). "Where some of the provisions of a will are
valid and others invalid, the valid parts will be upheld if they can be separated from
the invalid without defeating the intention of the testator or interfering with the
general testamentary scheme, or doing injustice to the beneficiaries" (95 C.J.S. 873).
The statement of the testatrix that she owned the "southern half of the conjugal lands
is contrary to law because, although she was a coowner thereof, her share was
inchoate and proindiviso (Art. 143, Civil Code; Madrigal and Paterno vs. Rafferty and
Concepcion, 38 Phil. 414). But That illegal declaration does not nullify the entire will.
It may be disregarded.
The provision of the will that the properties of the testatrix should not be divided
among her heirs during her husband's lifetime but should be kept intact and that the
legitimes should be paid in cash is contrary to article 1080 of the Civil Code which
reads:
ART. 1080. Should a person make a partition of his estate by an act inter vivos, or by
will, such partition shall be respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of
the compulsory heirs.
A parent who, in the interest of his or her family, to keep any agricultural, industrial,
or manufacturing enterprise intact, may avail himself of the right granted him in this
article, by ordering that the legitime of the other children to whom the property is not
assigned be paid in cash. (1056a)
The testatrix in her will made a partition of the entire conjugal estate among her six
children (her husband had renounced his hereditary rights and his one-half conjugal
share). She did not assign the whole estate to one or more children as envisaged in
article 1080. Hence, she had no right to require that the legitimes be paid in cash. On
the other hand, her estate may remain undivided only for a period of twenty years.
So, the provision that the estate should not be divided during her husband's lifetime
would at most be effective only for twenty years from the date of her death unless
there are compelling reasons for terminating the coownership (Art. 1083, Civil Code).
Felix Balanay, Sr. could validly renounce his hereditary rights and his one-half share of
the conjugal partnership (Arts. 179[1] and 1041, Civil Code) but insofar as said
renunciation partakes of a donation of his hereditary rights and his one-half share in
the conjugal estate (Art. 1060[1] Civil Code), it should be subject to the limitations
prescribed in articles 750 and 752 of the Civil Code. A portion of the estate should be
adjudicated to the widower for his support and maintenance. Or at least his legitime
should be respected.
Subject to the foregoing observations and the rules on collation, the will is intrinsically
valid and the partition therein may be given effect if it does not prejudice the creditors
and impair the legitimes. The distribution and partition would become effective upon
the death of Felix Balanay, Sr. In the meantime, the net income should be equitably
divided among the children and the surviving spouse.
It should be stressed that by reason of the surviving husband's conformity to his wife's
will and his renunciation of his hereditary rights, his one-half conjugal share became a
part of his deceased wife's estate. His conformity had the effect of validating the
partition made in paragraph V of the will without prejudice, of course, to the rights of
the creditors and the legitimes of the compulsory heirs.
Article 793 of the Civil Code provides that "property acquired after the making of a will
shall only pass thereby, as if the testator had it at the time of making the will, should
it expressly appear by the will that such was his intention". Under article 930 of the
Civil Code "the legacy or devise of a thing belonging to another person is void, if the
testator erroneously believed that the thing pertained to him. But if the thing
bequeathed, though not belonging to the testator when he made the will, afterwards
becomes his, by whatever title, the disposition shall take effect."
In the instant case there is no doubt that the testatrix and her husband intended to
partition the conjugal estate in the manner set forth in paragraph V of her will. It is
true that she could dispose of by will only her half of the conjugal estate (Art. 170, Civil
Code) but since the husband, after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership, had
assented to her testamentary partition of the conjugal estate, such partition has
become valid, assuming that the will may be probated.
The instant case is different from the Nuguid case, supra, where the testatrix
instituted as heir her sister and preterited her parents. Her will was intrinsically void
because it preterited her compulsory heirs in the direct line. Article 854 of the Civil
Code provides that "the preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory
heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born
after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and
legacies, shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious." Since the preterition of the
parents annulled the institution of the sister of the testatrix and there were no legacies
and devises, total intestacy resulted (.Art. 960[2], Civil Code).1äwphï1.ñët
In the instant case, the preterited heir was the surviving spouse. His preterition did
not produce intestacy. Moreover, he signified his conformity to his wife's will and
renounced his hereditary rights. .
It results that the lower court erred in not proceeding with the probate of the will as
contemplated in its uncancelled order of June 18, 1973. Save in an extreme case where
the will on its face is intrinsically void, it is the probate court's duty to pass first upon
the formal validity of the will. Generally, the probate of the will is mandatory (Art. 838,
Civil Code; Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479 and 98 Phil. 249; Fernandez vs. Dimagiba,
L-23638, October 12, 1967, 21 SCRA 428).
As aptly stated by Mr. Justice Barredo, "the very existence of a purported testament
is in itself prima facie proof that the supposed testator has willed that his estate should
be distributed in the manner therein provided, and it is incumbent upon the state that,
if legally tenable, such desire be given effect independent of the attitude of the parties
affected thereby" (Resolution, Vda. de Precilla vs. Narciso, L-27200, August 18, 1972,
46 SCRA 538, 565).
To give effect to the intention and wishes of the testatrix is the first and principal law
in the matter of testaments (Dizon-Rivera vs. Dizon, L-24561, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA
554, 561). Testacy is preferable to intestacy. An interpretation that will render a
testamentary disposition operative takes precedence over a construction that will
nullify a provision of the will (Arts. 788 and 791, Civil Code).
Testacy is favored. Doubts are resolved in favor of testacy especially where the will
evinces an intention on the part of the testator to dispose of practically his whole
estate. So compelling is the principle that intestacy should be avoided and that the
wishes of the testator should prevail that sometimes the language of the will can be
varied for the purpose of giving it effect (Austria vs. Reyes, L-23079, February 27, 1970,
31 SCRA 754, 762).
As far as is legally possible, the expressed desire of the testator must be followed and
the dispositions of the properties in his will should be upheld (Estorque vs. Estorque,
L-19573, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 540, 546).

The law has a tender regard for the wishes of the testator as expressed in his will
because any disposition therein is better than that which the law can make (Castro vs.
Bustos, L-25913, February 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 327, 341).

Two other errors of the lower court may be noticed. It erred in issuing a notice to
creditors although no executor or regular administrator has been appointed. The
record reveals that it appointed a special administrator. A notice to creditors is not in
order if only a special administrator has been appointed. Section 1, Rule 86 of the
Rules of Court, in providing that "immediately after granting letters of testamentary
or of administration, the court shall issue a notice requiring all persons having money
claims against the decedent to file them in the office of the clerk of said court" clearly
contemplates the appointment of an executor or regular administrator and not that
of a special administrator.

It is the executor or regular administrator who is supposed to oppose the claims

against the estate and to pay such claims when duly allowed (See. 10, Rule 86 and sec.
1, Rule 88, Rules of Court).

We also take this occasion to point out that the probate court's appointment of its
branch clerk of court as special administrator (p. 30, Rollo) is not a salutary practice
because it might engender the suspicion that the probate Judge and his clerk of court
are in cahoots in milking the decedent's estate. Should the branch clerk of court
commit any abuse or devastavit in the course of his administration, the probate Judge
might find it difficult to hold him to a strict accountability. A court employee should
devote his official time to his official duties and should not have as a sideline the
administration of a decedent's estate.

WHEREFORE, the lower court's orders of February 28, and June 29, 1974 are set aside
and its order of June 18, 1973, setting for hearing the petition for probate, is affirmed.
The lower court is directed to conduct further proceedings in Special Case No. 1808 in
consonance with this opinion. Costs, against the private respondents.

SO ORDERED.
ARTICLE 780
Balanay, Jr. vs. Martinez (64 SCRA 452)
In the Matter of the Petition to Approve the Will of Leodegaria Julian. FELIX BALANAY,
JR., petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch VI;
AVELINA B. ANTONIO and DELIA B. LANABAN, respondents.
Roberto M. Sarenas for petitioner.
Jose B. Guyo for private respondents.
AQUINO, J.:
Felix Balanay, Jr. appealed by certiorari from the order of the Court of First Instance of
Davao dated February 28, 1974, declaring illegal and void the will of his mother,
Leodegaria Julian, converting the testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding and
ordering the issuance of the corresponding notice to creditors (Special Case No. 1808).
The antecedents of the appeal are as follows:
Leodegaria Julian, a native of Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur, died on February 12, 1973 in Davao
City at the age of sixty-seven. She was survived by her husband, Felix Balanay, Sr., and
by their six legitimate children named Felix Balanay, Jr., Avelina B. Antonio, Beatriz B.
Solamo, Carolina B. Manguiob, Delia B. Lanaban and Emilia B. Pabaonon.
Felix J. Balanay, Jr. filed in the lower court a petition dated February 27, 1973 for the
probate of his mother's notarial will dated September 5, 1970 which is written in
English. In that will Leodegaria Julian declared (a) that she was the owner of the
"southern half of nine conjugal lots (par. II); (b) that she was the absolute owner of
two parcels of land which she inherited from her father (par. III), and (c) that it was
her desire that her properties should not be divided among her heirs during her
husband's lifetime and that their legitimes should be satisfied out of the fruits of her
properties (Par. IV).
Then, in paragraph V of the will she stated that after her husband's death (he was
eighty-two years old in 1973) her paraphernal lands and all the conjugal lands (which
she described as "my properties") should be divided and distributed in the manner set
forth in that part of her will. She devised and partitioned the conjugal lands as if they
were all owned by her. She disposed of in the will her husband's one half share of the
conjugal assets. *
Felix Balanay, Sr. and Avelina B. Antonio opposed the probate of the will on the
grounds of lack of testamentary capacity, undue influence, preterition of the husband
and alleged improper partition of the conjugal estate. The oppositors claimed that
Felix Balanay, Jr. should collate certain properties which he had received from the
testatrix.
Felix Balanay, Jr., in his reply to the opposition, attached thereto an affidavit of Felix
Balanay, Sr. dated April 18, 1973 wherein he withdrew his opposition to the probate
of the will and affirmed that he was interested in its probate. On the same date Felix
Balanay, Sr. signed an instrument captioned "Conformation (sic) of Division and
Renunciation of Hereditary Rights" wherein he manifested that out of respect for his
wife's will he "waived and renounced' his hereditary rights in her estate in favor of
their six children. In that same instrument he confirmed the agreement, which he and
his wife had perfected before her death, that their conjugal properties would be
partitioned in the manner indicated in her will.
Avelina B. Antonio, an oppositor, in her rejoinder contended that the affidavit and
"conformation" of Felix Balanay, Sr. were void. The lower court in its order of June 18,
1973 "denied" the opposition and reset for hearing the probate of the will. It gave
effect to the affidavit and conformity of Felix Balanay, Sr. In an order dated August 28,
1973 it appointed its branch clerk of court as special administrator of the decedent's
estate.
Mrs. Antonio moved for the reconsideration of the lower court's order of June 18,
1973 on the grounds (a) that the testatrix illegally claimed that she was the owner of
the southern half of the conjugal lots and (b) that she could not partition the conjugal
estate by allocating portions of the nine lots to her children. Felix Balanay, Jr., through
his counsel, Hermenegildo Cabreros, opposed that motion. The lower court denied it
in its order of October 15, 1973.
In the meanwhile, another lawyer appeared in the case. David O. Montaña, Sr.,
claiming to be the lawyer of petitioner Felix Balanay, Jr. (his counsel of record was Atty.
Cabreros), filed a motion dated September 25, 1973 for "leave of court to withdraw
probate of alleged will of Leodegaria Julian and requesting authority to proceed by
intestate estate proceeding." In that motion Montaña claimed to be the lawyer not
only of the petitioner but also of Felix Balanay, Sr., Beatriz B. Solamo, Carolina B.
Manguiob and Emilia B. Pabaonon.
Montaña in his motion assailed the provision of the will which partitioned the conjugal
assets or allegedly effected a compromise of future legitimes. He prayed that the
probate of the will be withdrawn and that the proceeding be converted into an
intestate proceeding. In another motion of the same date he asked that the
corresponding notice to creditors be issued.
Avelina B. Antonio and Delia B. Lanaban, through Atty. Jose B. Guyo, in their comments
dated October 15, 1973 manifested their conformity with the motion for the issuance
of a notice to creditors. They prayed that the will be declared void for being contrary
to law and that an intestacy be declared.
The lower court, acting on the motions of Atty. Montaña, assumed that the issuance
of a notice to creditors was in order since the parties had agreed on that point. It
adopted the view of Attys. Montaña and Guyo that the will was void. So, in its order
of February 28, 1974 it dismissed the petition for the probate, converted the testate
proceeding into an intestate proceeding, ordered the issuance of a notice to creditors
and set the intestate proceeding for hearing on April 1 and 2, 1974. The lower court
did not abrogate its prior orders of June 18 and October 15, 1973. The notice to
creditors was issued on April 1, 1974 and published on May 2, 9 and 16 in the Davao
Star in spite of petitioner's motion of April 17, 1974 that its publication be held in
abeyance.
Felix Balanay, Jr., through a new counsel, Roberto M. Sarenas, in a verified motion
dated April 15, 1974, asked for the reconsideration of the lower court's order of
February 28, 1974 on the ground that Atty. Montaña had no authority to withdraw
the petition for the allowance of the will. Attached to the motion was a copy of a letter
dated March 27, 1974 addressed to Atty. Montaña and signed by Felix Balanay, Jr.,
Beatriz V. Solamo, Carolina B. Manguiob and Emilia B. Pabaonon, wherein they
terminated Montaña's services and informed him that his withdrawal of the petition
for the probate of the will was without their consent and was contrary to their
repeated reminder to him that their mother's will was "very sacred" to them.
Avelina B. Antonio and Delia B. Lanaban opposed the motion for reconsideration. The
lower court denied the motion in its order of June 29, 1974. It clarified that it declared
the will void on the basis of its own independent assessment of its provisions and not
because of Atty. Montaña's arguments.
The basic issue is whether the probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic validity
of the will, before ruling on its allowance or formal validity, and in declaring it void.
We are of the opinion that in view of certain unusual provisions of the will, which are
of dubious legality, and because of the motion to withdraw the petition for probate
(which the lower court assumed to have been filed with the petitioner's authorization),
the trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even before
its formal validity had been established. The probate of a will might become an idle
ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void. Where practical
considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even
before it is probated, the court should meet the issue (Nuguid vs. Nuguid, 64 O.G.
1527, 17 SCRA 449. Compare with Sumilang vs. Ramagosa, L-23135, December 26,
1967, 21 SCRA 1369; Cacho vs. Udan, L-19996, April 30, 1965, 13 SCRA
693).1äwphï1.ñët
But the probate court erred in declaring, in its order of February 28, 1974 that the will
was void and in converting the testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding
notwithstanding the fact that in its order of June 18, 1973 , it gave effect to the
surviving husband's conformity to the will and to his renunciation of his hereditary
rights which presumably included his one-half share of the conjugal estate.
The rule is that "the invalidity of one of several dispositions contained in a will does
not result in the invalidity of the other dispositions, unless it is to be presumed that
the testator would not have made such other dispositions if the first invalid disposition
had not been made" (Art. 792, Civil Code). "Where some of the provisions of a will are
valid and others invalid, the valid parts will be upheld if they can be separated from
the invalid without defeating the intention of the testator or interfering with the
general testamentary scheme, or doing injustice to the beneficiaries" (95 C.J.S. 873).
The statement of the testatrix that she owned the "southern half of the conjugal lands
is contrary to law because, although she was a coowner thereof, her share was
inchoate and proindiviso (Art. 143, Civil Code; Madrigal and Paterno vs. Rafferty and
Concepcion, 38 Phil. 414). But That illegal declaration does not nullify the entire will.
It may be disregarded.
The provision of the will that the properties of the testatrix should not be divided
among her heirs during her husband's lifetime but should be kept intact and that the
legitimes should be paid in cash is contrary to article 1080 of the Civil Code which
reads:
ART. 1080. Should a person make a partition of his estate by an act inter vivos, or by
will, such partition shall be respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of
the compulsory heirs.
A parent who, in the interest of his or her family, to keep any agricultural, industrial,
or manufacturing enterprise intact, may avail himself of the right granted him in this
article, by ordering that the legitime of the other children to whom the property is not
assigned be paid in cash. (1056a)
The testatrix in her will made a partition of the entire conjugal estate among her six
children (her husband had renounced his hereditary rights and his one-half conjugal
share). She did not assign the whole estate to one or more children as envisaged in
article 1080. Hence, she had no right to require that the legitimes be paid in cash. On
the other hand, her estate may remain undivided only for a period of twenty years.
So, the provision that the estate should not be divided during her husband's lifetime
would at most be effective only for twenty years from the date of her death unless
there are compelling reasons for terminating the coownership (Art. 1083, Civil Code).
Felix Balanay, Sr. could validly renounce his hereditary rights and his one-half share of
the conjugal partnership (Arts. 179[1] and 1041, Civil Code) but insofar as said
renunciation partakes of a donation of his hereditary rights and his one-half share in
the conjugal estate (Art. 1060[1] Civil Code), it should be subject to the limitations
prescribed in articles 750 and 752 of the Civil Code. A portion of the estate should be
adjudicated to the widower for his support and maintenance. Or at least his legitime
should be respected.
Subject to the foregoing observations and the rules on collation, the will is intrinsically
valid and the partition therein may be given effect if it does not prejudice the creditors
and impair the legitimes. The distribution and partition would become effective upon
the death of Felix Balanay, Sr. In the meantime, the net income should be equitably
divided among the children and the surviving spouse.
It should be stressed that by reason of the surviving husband's conformity to his wife's
will and his renunciation of his hereditary rights, his one-half conjugal share became a
part of his deceased wife's estate. His conformity had the effect of validating the
partition made in paragraph V of the will without prejudice, of course, to the rights of
the creditors and the legitimes of the compulsory heirs.
Article 793 of the Civil Code provides that "property acquired after the making of a will
shall only pass thereby, as if the testator had it at the time of making the will, should
it expressly appear by the will that such was his intention". Under article 930 of the
Civil Code "the legacy or devise of a thing belonging to another person is void, if the
testator erroneously believed that the thing pertained to him. But if the thing
bequeathed, though not belonging to the testator when he made the will, afterwards
becomes his, by whatever title, the disposition shall take effect."
In the instant case there is no doubt that the testatrix and her husband intended to
partition the conjugal estate in the manner set forth in paragraph V of her will. It is
true that she could dispose of by will only her half of the conjugal estate (Art. 170, Civil
Code) but since the husband, after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership, had
assented to her testamentary partition of the conjugal estate, such partition has
become valid, assuming that the will may be probated.
The instant case is different from the Nuguid case, supra, where the testatrix
instituted as heir her sister and preterited her parents. Her will was intrinsically void
because it preterited her compulsory heirs in the direct line. Article 854 of the Civil
Code provides that "the preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory
heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born
after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and
legacies, shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious." Since the preterition of the
parents annulled the institution of the sister of the testatrix and there were no legacies
and devises, total intestacy resulted (.Art. 960[2], Civil Code).1äwphï1.ñët
In the instant case, the preterited heir was the surviving spouse. His preterition did
not produce intestacy. Moreover, he signified his conformity to his wife's will and
renounced his hereditary rights. .
It results that the lower court erred in not proceeding with the probate of the will as
contemplated in its uncancelled order of June 18, 1973. Save in an extreme case where
the will on its face is intrinsically void, it is the probate court's duty to pass first upon
the formal validity of the will. Generally, the probate of the will is mandatory (Art. 838,
Civil Code; Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479 and 98 Phil. 249; Fernandez vs. Dimagiba,
L-23638, October 12, 1967, 21 SCRA 428).
As aptly stated by Mr. Justice Barredo, "the very existence of a purported testament
is in itself prima facie proof that the supposed testator has willed that his estate should
be distributed in the manner therein provided, and it is incumbent upon the state that,
if legally tenable, such desire be given effect independent of the attitude of the parties
affected thereby" (Resolution, Vda. de Precilla vs. Narciso, L-27200, August 18, 1972,
46 SCRA 538, 565).
To give effect to the intention and wishes of the testatrix is the first and principal law
in the matter of testaments (Dizon-Rivera vs. Dizon, L-24561, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA
554, 561). Testacy is preferable to intestacy. An interpretation that will render a
testamentary disposition operative takes precedence over a construction that will
nullify a provision of the will (Arts. 788 and 791, Civil Code).
Testacy is favored. Doubts are resolved in favor of testacy especially where the will
evinces an intention on the part of the testator to dispose of practically his whole
estate. So compelling is the principle that intestacy should be avoided and that the
wishes of the testator should prevail that sometimes the language of the will can be
varied for the purpose of giving it effect (Austria vs. Reyes, L-23079, February 27, 1970,
31 SCRA 754, 762).
As far as is legally possible, the expressed desire of the testator must be followed and
the dispositions of the properties in his will should be upheld (Estorque vs. Estorque,
L-19573, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 540, 546).

The law has a tender regard for the wishes of the testator as expressed in his will
because any disposition therein is better than that which the law can make (Castro vs.
Bustos, L-25913, February 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 327, 341).

Two other errors of the lower court may be noticed. It erred in issuing a notice to
creditors although no executor or regular administrator has been appointed. The
record reveals that it appointed a special administrator. A notice to creditors is not in
order if only a special administrator has been appointed. Section 1, Rule 86 of the
Rules of Court, in providing that "immediately after granting letters of testamentary
or of administration, the court shall issue a notice requiring all persons having money
claims against the decedent to file them in the office of the clerk of said court" clearly
contemplates the appointment of an executor or regular administrator and not that
of a special administrator.

It is the executor or regular administrator who is supposed to oppose the claims

against the estate and to pay such claims when duly allowed (See. 10, Rule 86 and sec.
1, Rule 88, Rules of Court).

We also take this occasion to point out that the probate court's appointment of its
branch clerk of court as special administrator (p. 30, Rollo) is not a salutary practice
because it might engender the suspicion that the probate Judge and his clerk of court
are in cahoots in milking the decedent's estate. Should the branch clerk of court
commit any abuse or devastavit in the course of his administration, the probate Judge
might find it difficult to hold him to a strict accountability. A court employee should
devote his official time to his official duties and should not have as a sideline the
administration of a decedent's estate.

WHEREFORE, the lower court's orders of February 28, and June 29, 1974 are set aside
and its order of June 18, 1973, setting for hearing the petition for probate, is affirmed.
The lower court is directed to conduct further proceedings in Special Case No. 1808 in
consonance with this opinion. Costs, against the private respondents.

SO ORDERED.
ARTICLE 781
Heirs of vs. Mauricio-Natividad (G.R. No. 198434, February 29,
2016)
HEIRS OF LEANDRO NATIVIDAD v. JUANA MAURICIO-NATIVIDAD +
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Challenged in the present petition for review on certiorari are the Decision[1] and
Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated February 7, 2011 and August 25,
2011, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 92840. The assailed CA Decision modified the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court. (RTC) of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 75, in Civil Case
No. 1637-02-SM, while the CA Resolution denied petitioners' motion for
reconsideration.
The present petition arose from an action for specific performance and/or recovery of
sum of money filed against herein respondents by the spouses Leandro Natividad
(Leandro) and Juliana Natividad (Juliana), who are the predecessors of herein
petitioners.
In their Complaint, Leandro and Juliana alleged that sometime in 1974, Sergio
Natividad (Sergio), husband of respondent Juana Mauricio-Natividad (Juana) and
father of respondent Jean Natividad-Cruz (Jean), obtained a loan from the
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). As security for the loan, Sergio mortgaged
two parcels of land, one of which is co-owned and registered in his name and that of
his siblings namely, Leandro, Domingo and Adoracion. This property is covered by
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 5980. Sergio's siblings executed a Special Power
of Attorney authorizing him to mortgage the said property. The other mortgaged
parcel of land, covered by OCT No. 10271, was registered in the name of Sergio and
Juana. Subsequently, Sergio died without being able to pay his obligations with DBP.
Since the loan was nearing its maturity and the mortgaged properties were in danger
of being foreclosed, Leandro paid Sergio's loan obligations. Considering that
respondents were unable to reimburse Leandro for the advances he made in Sergio's
favor, respondents agreed that Sergio's share in the lot which he co-owned with his
siblings and the other parcel of land in the name of Sergio and Juana, shall be assigned
in favor of Leandro and Juliana. Leandro's and Sergio's brother, Domingo, was tasked
to facilitate the transfer of ownership of the subject properties in favor of Leandro and
Juliana. However, Domingo died without being able to cause such transfer.
Subsequently, despite demands and several follow-ups made by petitioners,
respondents failed and refused to honor their undertaking.
Respondents filed their Answer denying the allegations in the complaint and raising
the following defenses: (1) respondents are not parties to the contract between Sergio
and DBP; (2) there is neither verbal nor written agreement between petitioners and
respondents that the latter shall reimburse whatever payment was made by the
former or their predecessor-in-interest; (3) Jean was only a minor during the execution
of the alleged agreement and is not a party thereto; (4) that whatever liability or
obligation of respondents is already barred by prescription, laches and estoppel; (5)
that the complaint states no cause of action as respondents are not duty-bound to
reimburse whatever alleged payments were made by petitioners; and (6) there is no
contract between the parties to the effect that respondents are under obligation to
transfer ownership in petitioners' favor as reimbursement for the alleged payments
made by petitioners to DBP.
Respondents waived their right to present evidence and they merely filed their
memorandum. Also, during pendency' of the trial, Leandro died and was substituted
by his heirs, herein petitioners.
On November. 4, 2008, the RTC rendered its Decision in favor of petitioners, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Defendants Juana Mauricio [Vda.] de Natividad and Jean Natividad-Cruz are ordered
to effect the transfer of title in OCT No. 5980 with respect to the undivided share of
the late Sergio Natividad; and in OCT No. 10271 both of the Registry of Deeds of the
Province of Rizal in favor of plaintiff Juliana [Vda.] de Natividad and the Heirs of the
late Leandro Natividad.
2. Defendants to pay jointly and severally, attorney's fees in the sum of Thirty
Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00); and cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.[3]
Aggrieved by the RTC Decision, respondents filed an Appeal with the CA.
On February 7, 2011, the C A'promulgated its questioned Decision, disposing as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated November 4, 2008
is hereby " MODIFIED in that defendants-appellants Juana Mauricio-Natividad and
Jean Natividad-Cruz are ordered instead to reimburse plaintiffs-appellees Juliana
Natividad and the heirs of the late Leandro Natividad the amount of P162,514.88
representing the amount of the loan obligation paid to the Development Bank of the
Philippines, plus legal interest of 12% per annum computed from June 23, 2001 until
finality of the judgment, the total amount of which shall be to the extent only of
defendants-appellants' successional rights in the mortgaged properties and Juana1 s
conjugal share in [the] property covered by OCT No. 10271. The award of attorney's
fees and cost of suit are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.[4]
Petitioners filed a Motion 'for Partial Reconsideration, while respondents filed their
own Motion for Reconsideration, both of which, however, were denied by the CA in
its assailed Resolution dated August 25, 2011.
Hence, the instant petition based on the following grounds:
I. WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS' RULING THAT THE
VERBAL AGREEMENT TO CONVEY THE PROPERTY SHARES OF SERGIO NATIVIDAD IN
THE PAYMENT OF HIS OBLIGATION IS COVERED BY THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS DESPITE
THE FACT THAT IT HAS BEEN PARTIALLY EXECUTED, IS CONTRARY TO EXISTING
JURISPRUDENCE.
II. WITH DUE RESPECT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING
THAT THE INTEREST ON THE UNPAID LOAN OBLIGATION SHOULD BE IMPOSED ONLY
ON JUNE 23, 2001, DATE OF THE DEMAND FOR PAYMENT INSTEAD OF SEPTEMBER 23,
1994, WHEN THE PARTIES VERBALLY AGREED TO CONVEY THEIR PROPERTY RIGHTS
WITH THE EXECUTION OF THE EXTRAJUDIC1AL SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE OF SERGIO
NATIVIDAD.[5]
Petitioners, insist that there was a verbal agreement between respondents and
Leandro, their predecessor-in-interest, wherein the subject properties shall be
assigned to the latter as reimbursement for the payments he made in Sergio's favor.
To support this contention, petitioners relied heavily on the Extrajudicial Settlement
Among Heirs, which was executed by respondents to prove that there was indeed such
an agreement and that such a Settlement is evidence of the partial execution of the
said agreement. The provisions of the said Settlement are as follows:
EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT AMONG HEIRS b. A one-fourth (1/4) share in the parcel of land situated in Guinayang, San Mateo,
Rizal, containing an area of 2,742 square meters, Covered by OCT No. 10493.

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

c. A one-fourth (1/4) share in the parcel of land situated in San Jose, Montalban, Rizal,
containing an area of 4,775 square meters, and covered by OCT No. ON-403.

This EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT, made and entered into by and among:

d. A one-fourth (1/4) share in the parcel of land situated in Cambal, San Mateo, Rizal,
containing an area of 13,456 square meters, and covered by OCT No. 5980.
JUAN M. NATIVIDAD, widow; JEAN N. CRUZ, married to JERRY CRUZ; JOSELITO M.
NATIVIDAD, single, all of legal age, Filipino citizens, and residents of Malanday, San
Mateo, Rizal
That no other personal properties are involved in this extrajudicial settlement.

That to the best knowledge and information of the parties hereto, the said deceased
WITNESSETH left certain obligations amounting to PI75,000.00 representing loan obligations with
the Development Bank of the Philippines.

That the above-named parties, is the legitimate wife and children and sole heirs of the
deceased SERGIO NATIVIDAD, who died in San Mateo, Rizal on May 31, 1981; That a notice of this extrajudicial settlement had been published once a week for three
consecutive weeks in____________ a newspaper of general circulation in
___________, as certified by the said newspaper hereto attached as Annex "A";

That the said deceased, at the time of his death, left certain real estate properties
located at San Mateo, Rizal, and Montalban, Rizal, more particularly described as
follows: That the parties hereto being all of legal age and with full civil capacity to contract,
hereby by these presents, agree to divide and adjudicate, as they hereby divide and
adjudicate, among themselves the above-described real estate property in equal
shares and interest.
a. A whole portion of a parcel of land (Plan Psu-295655, L.R. Case No. Q-29, L.R.C.
Record No. N-295 ________ , situated in the Barrio of Malanday, Municipality of San
Mateo, Province of Rizal, containing an area of TWO HUNDRED EIGHT (208) SQUARE
METERS, more or less, and covered by OCT NO. 10271. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have signed this document on this 2nd day of
September, 1994 in San Mateo, Rizal, Philippines.

x x x[6]
After a careful reading of the abovequoted Extrajudicial Settlement Among Heirs, the
Court agrees with the CA that there is nothing in the said document which would
indicate that respondents agreed to the effect that the subject properties shall be
transferred in the name of Leandro as reimbursement for his payment of Sergio's loan
obligations with the DBP. On the contrary, the second to the last paragraph of the said
Settlement clearly shows that herein respondents, as heirs of Sergio, have divided the
subject properties exclusively among themselves.
There is no competent evidence to prove the verbal agreement being claimed by
respondents. Aside from the subject Extrajudicial Settlement Among Heirs, the self-
serving claims of Leandro on the witness stand, as well as the cash voucher,[7] which
supposedly represented payment of P8,000.00 given to Atty. Domingo Natividad for
the expenses in transferring the title of the subject properties in Leandro's favor,
would hardly count as competent evidence in the eyes of the law. Respondents' claim
of the existence of a verbal agreement between them, on one hand, and petitioners'
predecessors-in-interest, on the other, remains to be mere allegation. It is an age-old
rule in civil cases that he who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and a mere
allegation is not evidence.[8]
In relation to petitioners' contention that the subject verbal agreement actually
existed, they-reiterate their contention that the conveyance of the subject properties
in their favor is not covered by the Statute of Frauds because they claim that
respondents' execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement Among Heirs constitutes partial
execution of their alleged agreement.
The Court does not agree.
Suffice it to say that there is no partial execution of any contract, whatsoever, because
petitioners failed to prove, in the first place, that there was a verbal agreement that
was entered into.
Even granting that such an agreement existed, the CA did not commit any error in
ruling that the assignment of the shares of Sergio in the subject properties in
petitioners' favor as payment of Sergio's obligation cannot be enforced if there is no
written contract to such effect. Under the Statute of Frauds[9], an agreement to
convey real properties shall be unenforceable by action in the absence of a written
note or memorandum thereof and subscribed by the party charged or by his agent. As
earlier discussed, the pieces of evidence presented by petitioners, consisting of
respondents' acknowledgment of Sergio's loan obligations with DBP as embodied in
the Extrajudicial Settlement Among Heirs, as well as the cash voucher which allegedly
represents payment for taxes and transfer of title in petitioners' name do not serve as
written notes or memoranda of the alleged verbal agreement.
The foregoing, notwithstanding, the Court finds it proper to reiterate the CA ruling
that, in any case, since respondents had already acknowledged that Sergio had, in fact,
incurred loan obligations with the DBP, they are liable to reimburse the amount paid
by Leandro for the payment of the said obligation even if such payment was made
without their knowledge or consent.
Article 1236 of the Civil Code clearly provides that:
The creditor is not bound to accept payment or performance by a third person who
has no interest in the fulfillment of the obligation, unless there is a stipulation to the
contrary.
Whoever pays for another may demand from the debtor what he has paid, except that
if he paid without the knowledge or against the will of the debtor, he can recover only
insofar as the payment has been beneficial to the debtor. (Emphasis supplied)

Neither can respondents evade liability by arguing that they were not parties to the
contract between Sergio and the DBP. As earlier stated, the fact remains that, in the
Extrajudicial Settlement Among Heirs, respondents clearly acknowledged Sergio's loan
obligations with the DBP. Being Sergio's heirs, they succeed not only to the rights of
Sergio but also to his obligations.
The following provisions of the Civil Code are clear on this matter, to wit:
Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights
and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are
transmitted through his death to another or others either by will or by operation of
law.
Art. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person
which are not extinguished by his death.
Art. 781. The inheritance of a person includes not only the property and the
transmissible rights and obligations existing at the time of his death, but also those
which have accrued thereto since the opening of the succession.
In the present case, respondents, being heirs of Sergio, are now liable to settle his
transmissible obligations, which include the amount due to petitioners, prior to the
distribution of the remainder of Sergio's estate to them, in accordance with Section
I,[10] Rule 90 of the Rules of Court.
As to when the interest on the sum due from respondents should be reckoned, the
Court finds no error in the ruling of the CA that such interest should be computed from
June 23, 2001, the date when petitioners made a written demand for the payment of
respondents' obligation.[11] There is no merit in petitioners' contention that the
reckoning date should have been September 23, 1994, the date when respondents
executed the Extrajudicial Settlement Among Heirs, because there is nothing therein
to prove that petitioners, at that time, made a demand for reimbursement.
However, the rate of interest should be modified in view of the issuance of Circular
No. 799, Series of 2013 by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Monetary Board (BSP-MB).
The said Circular reduced the "rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any
money, goods or credits and the rate allowed in judgments, in the absence of an
express contract as to such rate of interest," from twelve percent (12%) to six percent
(6%) per annum. The Circular was made effective on July 1-, 2013. Hence, under the
modified guidelines in the imposition of interest, as laid down in the case of Nacar v.
Gallery Frames,[12] this Court held that:
xxxx
II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and
compensatory damages, the rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed,
as follows:
1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of
money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which
may have been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn
legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the
rate of interest shall be 6% per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from
judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of
the Civil Code.
2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached,
an interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion,
of the court at the rate of 6% per annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged on
unliquidated claims or damages, except when or until the demand can be established
with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is established with
reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made
judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code), but when such certainty cannot be
so reasonably established at the time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to
run only from the date the judgment of the court is made (at which time the
quantification of damages may be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained). The
.actual base for the computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on the amount
finally adjudged.
3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and
executory, the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or
paragraph 2, above, shall be 6% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this
interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit.
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, in accordance with the above ruling, the rate of interest on the principal amount
due to petitioners shall be 12% from June 23, 2001, the date when petitioners made
a demand for payment, to June 30, 2013. From July 1, 2013, the effective date of BSP-
MB Circular No. 799, until full satisfaction of the monetary award, the rate of interest
shall be 6%.-
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court
of Appeals, dated February 7, 2011 and August 25, 2011, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV
No. 92840 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION by ORDERING respondents to pay
petitioners, in addition to the principal amount of P162,514.88, interest thereon at
the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum, computed from June 23, 2001 to June
30, 2013, and six percent (6%) per annum from July 1, 2013 until full satisfaction of
the judgment award.
So ordered.

x x x[13]

The Court explained that:

[F]rom the foregoing, in the absence of an express stipulation as to the rate of interest
that would govern the parties, the rate of legal interest for loans or forbearance of any
money, goods or credits and the rate allowed in judgments shall no longer be twelve
percent (12%) per annum -as reflected in the case of Eastern Shipping Lines and
Subsection X305.1 of the Manual of Regulations for Btoks and Sections 4305Q.1,
4305S.3 and 4303P.1 of the Manual of Regulations for Non-Bank Financial Institutions,
before its amendment by BSP-MB Circular No. 799 - but will now be six percent (6%)
per annum effective July 1, 2013. It should be noted, nonetheless, that the new rate
could only be applied prospectively and not retroactively. Consequently, the twelve
percent (12%) per annum legal interest shall apply only until June 3.0, 2013. Come July
1, 2013, the new rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall be the prevailing rate of
interest when applicable.[14]
ARTICLE 783. (a)....It is also my command, in this my addition (Codicil), that should I die and Jorge
Rabadilla shall have already received the ownership of the said Lot No. 1392 of the
Rabadilla vs. CA (June 29, 2000) Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4002 (10942), and
also at the time that the lease of Balbinito G. Guanzon of the said lot shall expire, Jorge
JOHNNY S. RABADILLA,1 petitioner, Rabadilla shall have the obligation until he dies, every year to give to Maria Marlina
vs. Coscolluela y Belleza, Seventy (75) (sic) piculs of Export sugar and Twenty Five (25)
COURT OF APPEALS AND MARIA MARLENA2 COSCOLUELLA Y BELLEZA piculs of Domestic sugar, until the said Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza dies.
VILLACARLOS, respondents. FIFTH
DECISION (a) Should Jorge Rabadilla die, his heir to whom he shall give Lot No. 1392 of the
PURISIMA, J.: Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4002 (10492), shall
have the obligation to still give yearly, the sugar as specified in the Fourth paragraph
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals,3 dated December of his testament, to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza on the month of December of
23, 1993, in CA-G.R. No. CV-35555, which set aside the decision of Branch 52 of the each year.
Regional Trial Court in Bacolod City, and ordered the defendants-appellees (including
herein petitioner), as heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, to reconvey title over Lot No. 1392, SIXTH
together with its fruits and interests, to the estate of Aleja Belleza. I command, in this my addition (Codicil) that the Lot No. 1392, in the event that the
The antecedent facts are as follows: one to whom I have left and bequeathed, and his heir shall later sell, lease, mortgage
this said Lot, the buyer, lessee, mortgagee, shall have also the obligation to respect
In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr. Jorge and deliver yearly ONE HUNDRED (100) piculs of sugar to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y
Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was Belleza, on each month of December, SEVENTY FIVE (75) piculs of Export and TWENTY
instituted as a devisee of 511, 855 square meters of that parcel of land surveyed as FIVE (25) piculs of Domestic, until Maria Marlina shall die, lastly should the buyer,
Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre. The said Codicil, which was duly probated and lessee or the mortgagee of this lot, not have respected my command in this my
admitted in Special Proceedings No. 4046 before the then Court of First Instance of addition (Codicil), Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, shall immediately seize this Lot
Negros Occidental, contained the following provisions: No. 1392 from my heir and the latter's heirs, and shall turn it over to my near
desendants, (sic) and the latter shall then have the obligation to give the ONE
"FIRST
HUNDRED (100) piculs of sugar until Maria Marlina shall die. I further command in this
I give, leave and bequeath the following property owned by me to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla my addition (Codicil) that my heir and his heirs of this Lot No. 1392, that they will obey
resident of 141 P. Villanueva, Pasay City: and follow that should they decide to sell, lease, mortgage, they cannot negotiate with
others than my near descendants and my sister."4
(a) Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
RT-4002 (10942), which is registered in my name according to the records of the Pursuant to the same Codicil, Lot No. 1392 was transferred to the deceased, Dr. Jorge
Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental. Rabadilla, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44498 thereto issued in his name.

(b) That should Jorge Rabadilla die ahead of me, the aforementioned property and the Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his wife Rufina and children
rights which I shall set forth hereinbelow, shall be inherited and acknowledged by the Johnny (petitioner), Aurora, Ofelia and Zenaida, all surnamed Rabadilla.
children and spouse of Jorge Rabadilla.
On August 21, 1989, Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza Villacarlos brought a
xxx complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 5588, before Branch 52 of the Regional Trial
Court in Bacolod City, against the above-mentioned heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, to
FOURTH
enforce the provisions of subject Codicil. The Complaint alleged that the defendant-
heirs violated the conditions of the Codicil, in that:
1. Lot No. 1392 was mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank and the Republic
Planters Bank in disregard of the testatrix's specific instruction to sell, lease, or
mortgage only to the near descendants and sister of the testatrix.
2. Defendant-heirs failed to comply with their obligation to deliver one hundred (100)
piculs of sugar (75 piculs export sugar and 25 piculs domestic sugar) to plaintiff Maria
Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza from sugar crop years 1985 up to the filing of the
complaint as mandated by the Codicil, despite repeated demands for compliance.
3. The banks failed to comply with the 6th paragraph of the Codicil which provided
that in case of the sale, lease, or mortgage of the property, the buyer, lessee, or
mortgagee shall likewise have the obligation to deliver 100 piculs of sugar per crop
year to herein private respondent.
The plaintiff then prayed that judgment be rendered ordering defendant-heirs to
reconvey/return-Lot No. 1392 to the surviving heirs of the late Aleja Belleza, the
cancellation of TCT No. 44498 in the name of the deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, and
the issuance of a new certificate of title in the names of the surviving heirs of the late
Aleja Belleza.
On February 26, 1990, the defendant-heirs were declared in default but on March 28,
1990 the Order of Default was lifted, with respect to defendant Johnny S. Rabadilla,
who filed his Answer, accordingly.
During the pre-trial, the parties admitted that:
On November 15, 1998, the plaintiff (private respondent) and a certain Alan Azurin,
son-in-law of the herein petitioner who was lessee of the property and acting as
attorney-in-fact of defendant-heirs, arrived at an amicable settlement and entered
into a Memorandum of Agreement on the obligation to deliver one hundred piculs of
sugar, to the following effect:
"That for crop year 1988-89, the annuity mentioned in Entry No. 49074 of TCT No.
44489 will be delivered not later than January of 1989, more specifically, to wit:
75 piculs of 'A' sugar, and 25 piculs of 'B' sugar, or then existing in any of our names,
Mary Rose Rabadilla y Azurin or Alan Azurin, during December of each sugar crop year,
in Azucar Sugar Central; and, this is considered compliance of the annuity as
mentioned, and in the same manner will compliance of the annuity be in the next
succeeding crop years.
That the annuity above stated for crop year 1985-86, 1986-87, and 1987-88, will be
complied in cash equivalent of the number of piculs as mentioned therein and which
is as herein agreed upon, taking into consideration the composite price of sugar during
each sugar crop year, which is in the total amount of ONE HUNDRED FIVE THOUSAND
PESOS (P105,000.00).
That the above-mentioned amount will be paid or delivered on a staggered cash
installment, payable on or before the end of December of every sugar crop year, to
wit:
For 1985-86, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos,
payable on or before December of crop year 1988-89;
For 1986-87, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos,
payable on or before December of crop year 1989-90;
For 1987-88, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos,
payable on or before December of crop year 1990-91; and
For 1988-89, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos,
payable on or before December of crop year 1991-92."5
However, there was no compliance with the aforesaid Memorandum of Agreement
except for a partial delivery of 50.80 piculs of sugar corresponding to sugar crop year
1988 -1989.
On July 22, 1991, the Regional Trial Court came out with a decision, dismissing the
complaint and disposing as follows:
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the aforegoing findings, the Court finds that the action is
prematurely filed as no cause of action against the defendants has as yet arose in favor
of plaintiff. While there maybe the non-performance of the command as mandated
exaction from them simply because they are the children of Jorge Rabadilla, the title
holder/owner of the lot in question, does not warrant the filing of the present
complaint. The remedy at bar must fall. Incidentally, being in the category as creditor
of the left estate, it is opined that plaintiff may initiate the intestate proceedings, if
only to establish the heirs of Jorge Rabadilla and in order to give full meaning and
semblance to her claim under the Codicil.
In the light of the aforegoing findings, the Complaint being prematurely filed is
DISMISSED without prejudice.
SO ORDERED."6
On appeal by plaintiff, the First Division of the Court of Appeals reversed the decision
of the trial court; ratiocinating and ordering thus:
"Therefore, the evidence on record having established plaintiff-appellant's right to
receive 100 piculs of sugar annually out of the produce of Lot No. 1392; defendants-
appellee's obligation under Aleja Belleza's codicil, as heirs of the modal heir, Jorge
Rabadilla, to deliver such amount of sugar to plaintiff-appellant; defendants-appellee's
admitted non-compliance with said obligation since 1985; and, the punitive
consequences enjoined by both the codicil and the Civil Code, of seizure of Lot No.
1392 and its reversion to the estate of Aleja Belleza in case of such non-compliance,
this Court deems it proper to order the reconveyance of title over Lot No. 1392 from
the estates of Jorge Rabadilla to the estate of Aleja Belleza. However, plaintiff-
appellant must institute separate proceedings to re-open Aleja Belleza's estate, secure
the appointment of an administrator, and distribute Lot No. 1392 to Aleja Belleza's
legal heirs in order to enforce her right, reserved to her by the codicil, to receive her
legacy of 100 piculs of sugar per year out of the produce of Lot No. 1392 until she dies.
Accordingly, the decision appealed from is SET ASIDE and another one entered
ordering defendants-appellees, as heirs of Jorge Rabadilla, to reconvey title over Lot
No. 1392, together with its fruits and interests, to the estate of Aleja Belleza.
SO ORDERED."7
Dissatisfied with the aforesaid disposition by the Court of Appeals, petitioner found
his way to this Court via the present petition, contending that the Court of Appeals
erred in ordering the reversion of Lot 1392 to the estate of the testatrix Aleja Belleza
on the basis of paragraph 6 of the Codicil, and in ruling that the testamentary
institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla is a modal institution within the purview of Article 882
of the New Civil Code.
The petition is not impressed with merit.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in resolving the appeal in
accordance with Article 882 of the New Civil Code on modal institutions and in
deviating from the sole issue raised which is the absence or prematurity of the cause
of action. Petitioner maintains that Article 882 does not find application as there was
no modal institution and the testatrix intended a mere simple substitution - i.e. the
instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, was to be substituted by the testatrix's "near
descendants" should the obligation to deliver the fruits to herein private respondent
be not complied with. And since the testatrix died single and without issue, there can
be no valid substitution and such testamentary provision cannot be given any effect.
The petitioner theorizes further that there can be no valid substitution for the reason
that the substituted heirs are not definite, as the substituted heirs are merely referred
to as "near descendants" without a definite identity or reference as to who are the
"near descendants" and therefore, under Articles 8438 and 8459 of the New Civil Code,
the substitution should be deemed as not written.
The contentions of petitioner are untenable. Contrary to his supposition that the Court
of Appeals deviated from the issue posed before it, which was the propriety of the
dismissal of the complaint on the ground of prematurity of cause of action, there was
no such deviation. The Court of Appeals found that the private respondent had a cause
of action against the petitioner. The disquisition made on modal institution was,
precisely, to stress that the private respondent had a legally demandable right against
the petitioner pursuant to subject Codicil; on which issue the Court of Appeals ruled
in accordance with law.
It is a general rule under the law on succession that successional rights are transmitted
from the moment of death of the decedent10 and compulsory heirs are called to
succeed by operation of law. The legitimate children and descendants, in relation to
their legitimate parents, and the widow or widower, are compulsory heirs.11 Thus, the
petitioner, his mother and sisters, as compulsory heirs of the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, succeeded the latter by operation of law, without need of further
proceedings, and the successional rights were transmitted to them from the moment
of death of the decedent, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.
Under Article 776 of the New Civil Code, inheritance includes all the property, rights
and obligations of a person, not extinguished by his death. Conformably, whatever
rights Dr. Jorge Rabadilla had by virtue of subject Codicil were transmitted to his forced
heirs, at the time of his death. And since obligations not extinguished by death also
form part of the estate of the decedent; corollarily, the obligations imposed by the
Codicil on the deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to his
compulsory heirs upon his death.
In the said Codicil, testatrix Aleja Belleza devised Lot No. 1392 to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla,
subject to the condition that the usufruct thereof would be delivered to the herein
private respondent every year. Upon the death of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his compulsory
heirs succeeded to his rights and title over the said property, and they also assumed
his (decedent's) obligation to deliver the fruits of the lot involved to herein private
respondent. Such obligation of the instituted heir reciprocally corresponds to the right
of private respondent over the usufruct, the fulfillment or performance of which is
now being demanded by the latter through the institution of the case at bar.
Therefore, private respondent has a cause of action against petitioner and the trial
court erred in dismissing the complaint below.
Petitioner also theorizes that Article 882 of the New Civil Code on modal institutions
is not applicable because what the testatrix intended was a substitution - Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla was to be substituted by the testatrix's near descendants should there be
noncompliance with the obligation to deliver the piculs of sugar to private respondent.
Again, the contention is without merit.
Substitution is the designation by the testator of a person or persons to take the place
of the heir or heirs first instituted. Under substitutions in general, the testator may
either (1) provide for the designation of another heir to whom the property shall pass
in case the original heir should die before him/her, renounce the inheritance or be
incapacitated to inherit, as in a simple substitution,12 or (2) leave his/her property to
one person with the express charge that it be transmitted subsequently to another or
others, as in a fideicommissary substitution.13 The Codicil sued upon contemplates
neither of the two.
In simple substitutions, the second heir takes the inheritance in default of the first heir
by reason of incapacity, predecease or renunciation.14 In the case under consideration,
the provisions of subject Codicil do not provide that should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla default
due to predecease, incapacity or renunciation, the testatrix's near descendants would
substitute him. What the Codicil provides is that, should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs
not fulfill the conditions imposed in the Codicil, the property referred to shall be seized
and turned over to the testatrix's near descendants.
Neither is there a fideicommissary substitution here and on this point, petitioner is
correct. In a fideicommissary substitution, the first heir is strictly mandated to
preserve the property and to transmit the same later to the second heir.15 In the case
under consideration, the instituted heir is in fact allowed under the Codicil to alienate
the property provided the negotiation is with the near descendants or the sister of the
testatrix. Thus, a very important element of a fideicommissary substitution is lacking;
the obligation clearly imposing upon the first heir the preservation of the property and
its transmission to the second heir. "Without this obligation to preserve clearly
imposed by the testator in his will, there is no fideicommissary substitution." 16 Also,
the near descendants' right to inherit from the testatrix is not definite. The property
will only pass to them should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the obligation
to deliver part of the usufruct to private respondent.
Another important element of a fideicommissary substitution is also missing here.
Under Article 863, the second heir or the fideicommissary to whom the property is
transmitted must not be beyond one degree from the first heir or the fiduciary. A
fideicommissary substitution is therefore, void if the first heir is not related by first
degree to the second heir.17 In the case under scrutiny, the near descendants are not
at all related to the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.
The Court of Appeals erred not in ruling that the institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under
subject Codicil is in the nature of a modal institution and therefore, Article 882 of the
New Civil Code is the provision of law in point. Articles 882 and 883 of the New Civil
Code provide:
Art. 882. The statement of the object of the institution or the application of the
property left by the testator, or the charge imposed on him, shall not be considered
as a condition unless it appears that such was his intention.
That which has been left in this manner may be claimed at once provided that the
instituted heir or his heirs give security for compliance with the wishes of the testator
and for the return of anything he or they may receive, together with its fruits and
interests, if he or they should disregard this obligation.
Art. 883. When without the fault of the heir, an institution referred to in the preceding
article cannot take effect in the exact manner stated by the testator, it shall be
complied with in a manner most analogous to and in conformity with his wishes.
The institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in Article 882 is what is known in
the law of succession as an institucion sub modo or a modal institution. In a modal
institution, the testator states (1) the object of the institution, (2) the purpose or
application of the property left by the testator, or (3) the charge imposed by the
testator upon the heir.18 A "mode" imposes an obligation upon the heir or legatee but
it does not affect the efficacy of his rights to the succession.19 On the other hand, in a
conditional testamentary disposition, the condition must happen or be fulfilled in
order for the heir to be entitled to succeed the testator. The condition suspends but
does not obligate; and the mode obligates but does not suspend.20 To some extent, it
is similar to a resolutory condition.21
From the provisions of the Codicil litigated upon, it can be gleaned unerringly that the
testatrix intended that subject property be inherited by Dr. Jorge Rabadilla. It is
likewise clearly worded that the testatrix imposed an obligation on the said instituted
heir and his successors-in-interest to deliver one hundred piculs of sugar to the herein
private respondent, Marlena Coscolluela Belleza, during the lifetime of the latter.
However, the testatrix did not make Dr. Jorge Rabadilla's inheritance and the
effectivity of his institution as a devisee, dependent on the performance of the said
obligation. It is clear, though, that should the obligation be not complied with, the
property shall be turned over to the testatrix's near descendants. The manner of
institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil is evidently modal in nature
because it imposes a charge upon the instituted heir without, however, affecting the
efficacy of such institution.
Then too, since testamentary dispositions are generally acts of liberality, an obligation subject of a compromise agreement which would thereby defeat the very purpose of
imposed upon the heir should not be considered a condition unless it clearly appears making a Will.
from the Will itself that such was the intention of the testator. In case of doubt, the
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the decision of the Court of
institution should be considered as modal and not conditional.22
Appeals, dated December 23, 1993, in CA-G.R. No. CV-35555 AFFIRMED. No
Neither is there tenability in the other contention of petitioner that the private pronouncement as to costs
respondent has only a right of usufruct but not the right to seize the property itself
SO ORDERED.
from the instituted heir because the right to seize was expressly limited to violations
by the buyer, lessee or mortgagee.

In the interpretation of Wills, when an uncertainty arises on the face of the Will, as to
the application of any of its provisions, the testator's intention is to be ascertained
from the words of the Will, taking into consideration the circumstances under which
it was made.23 Such construction as will sustain and uphold the Will in all its parts must
be adopted.24

Subject Codicil provides that the instituted heir is under obligation to deliver One
Hundred (100) piculs of sugar yearly to Marlena Belleza Coscuella. Such obligation is
imposed on the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his heirs, and their buyer, lessee,
or mortgagee should they sell, lease, mortgage or otherwise negotiate the property
involved. The Codicil further provides that in the event that the obligation to deliver
the sugar is not respected, Marlena Belleza Coscuella shall seize the property and turn
it over to the testatrix's near descendants. The non-performance of the said obligation
is thus with the sanction of seizure of the property and reversion thereof to the
testatrix's near descendants. Since the said obligation is clearly imposed by the
testatrix, not only on the instituted heir but also on his successors-in-interest, the
sanction imposed by the testatrix in case of non-fulfillment of said obligation should
equally apply to the instituted heir and his successors-in-interest.

Similarly unsustainable is petitioner's submission that by virtue of the amicable

settlement, the said obligation imposed by the Codicil has been assumed by the lessee,
and whatever obligation petitioner had become the obligation of the lessee; that
petitioner is deemed to have made a substantial and constructive compliance of his
obligation through the consummated settlement between the lessee and the private
respondent, and having consummated a settlement with the petitioner, the recourse
of the private respondent is the fulfillment of the obligation under the amicable
settlement and not the seizure of subject property.

Suffice it to state that a Will is a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a
person disposes of his property, to take effect after his death. 25 Since the Will
expresses the manner in which a person intends how his properties be disposed, the
wishes and desires of the testator must be strictly followed. Thus, a Will cannot be the
Herreros vs. Gil (88 Phil 260).
TESTATE estate of Carlos Gil, deceased. ISABEL HERREROS VDA. DE GIL, administratrix-
appellee,
vs.
PILAR GIL VDA. DE MURCIANO, oppositor-appellant.
Eligio C. Lagman for appellant.
Reyes, Albert and Agcaoili for appellee.
JUGO, J.:
The Court of First Instance of Manila admitted to probate the alleged will and
testament of the deceased Carlos Gil. The oppositor Pilar Gil Vda. de Murciano
appealed to this Court, raising only question of law. Her counsel assigns the two
following alleged errors:
Primer Error. — El Juzgado inferior erro al dejar de declarar que el alegado
testamento de Carlos Gil no ha sido otogar de acuerdo con la ley.
Segundo Error. — Erro finalmente a legalizar el referido testamento.
The alleged will read as follows:
Primera Pagina (1)
EN EL NOMBRE DE DIOS, AMEN
Yo, Carlos Gil, de 66 años de edad, residente de Porac, Pampanga, I. F.,
hallandome sano y en pleno goce de mis facultades intelectuales, libre y
expontaneamente, sin violencia, coaccion, dolo o influencia ilegal de persona
extraña, otorgo y ordeno este mi testamento y ultima voluntad en castellano,
idioma que poseo y entiendo, de la manera siguiente:
1. Declaro que durante mi matrimonio con mi esposa la hoy Isabel Herreros
no tuvimos hijos;
2. Declaro que tengo propiedades situadas en Manila y en la Provincia de
Pampanga;
3. Doy y adjudico a mi querida esposa Isabel Herretos todos mis bienes ya
que muebles e inmuebles situados en Manila y en Pampanga, bajo la
condicion de que cuando esta muera y si hayan bienes remanentes
heredadas por ella de mi, que dichos bienes remanentes se adjudicaran a
Don Carlos Worrel.
4. Nombro como albacea de mis bienes despues de mi fallecimiento al Dr.
Galicano Coronel a quien tengo absoluta confianza, con relevacion de fianza;
En testimonio de todo lo cual, firmo este mi testamento y en el margen
izquierdo de cada una de sus dos paginas, utiles con la clausula de
atestiguamiento en presencia de los testigos, quienes a su vez firmaron cada
una de dichas paginas y la clausula de atestiguamiento en mi presencia cada
uno de ellos con la de los demas, hoy en Porac, Pampanga, I. F., el dia 27 de
Mayo de mil novecientos treinta y nueve.
CARLOS GIL
Testificacion:
Segunda Pagina (2)
Nosotros los que suscribimos, todos mayores de edad, certificamos: que el
testamento que precede este escrito en la lengua castellana que conoce la
testadora, compuesto de dos paginas utiles con la clausula de
atestiguamiento paginadas correlativamente en letras y numeros en la parte
superior de la casilla, asi como todas las hojas del mismo, en nuestra
presencia y que cada uno de nosotros hemos atestiguado y firmado dicho
documento y todas las hojas del mismo en presencia del testador y en la de
cada uno de nosotros.
(Fdo.) ALFREDO T. RIVERA
(Fdo.) RAMON MENDIOLA
(Fdo.) MARIANO OMAÑA
Regarding the correctness and accuracy of the above-copied alleged will, the court
below said:
 . . . The only copy available is a printed form contained in the record appeal
in case G.R. No. L-254, entitled "Testate Estate of Carlos Gil; Isabel Herreros
Vda. de Gil, petitioner and appellant vs. Roberto Toledo y Gil, oppositor and
appellee." Both parties are agreed that this is a true and correct copy of the
will. (P. 10, Record on Appeal).
The appeal being only on questions of law the above finding of the court below cannot
be disputed. The conclusions of law reached by said court are based on it. Moreover,
the finding is correctly based on the evidence of record. The parties agreed that said
copy is true and correct. If it were otherwise, they would not have so agreed,
considering that the defect is of an essential character and is fatal to the validity of the
attestation clause.
It will be noted that the attestation clause above quoted does not state that the
alleged testor signed the will. It declares only that it was signed by the witnesses. This
is a fatal defect, for the precise purpose of the attestation clause is to certify that the
testator signed the will, this being the most essential element of the clause. Without
it there is no attestation at all. It is said that the court may correct a mere clerical error.
This is too much of a clerical error for it effects the very essence of the clause. Alleged
errors may be overlooked or correct only in matters of form which do not affect the
substance of the statement.
It is claimed that the correction may be made by inference. If we cure a deficiency by
means of inferences, when are we going to stop making inferences to supply fatal
deficiencies in wills? Where are we to draw the line? Following that procedure we
would be making interpolations by inferences, implication, and even
by internal circumtantial evidence. This would be done in the face of the clear,
uniquivocal, language of the statute as to how the attestation clause should be made.
It is to be supposed that the drafter of the alleged will read the clear words of the
statute when he prepared it. For the court to supply alleged deficiencies would be
against the evident policy of the law. Section 618 of Act No. 190, before it was
amended, contained the following provision:
. . . But the absence of such form of attestation shall not render the will invalid
if it proven that the will was in fact signed and attested as in this section
provided.
However, Act No. 2645 of the Philippine Legislature, passed on July 1, 1916, besides
increasing the contents of the attestation clause, entirely suppressed the above-
quoted provision. This would show that the purpose of the amending act was to
surround the execution of a will with greater guarantees and solemnities. Could we,
in view of this, hold that the court can cure alleged deficiencies by inferences,
implications, and internal circumstantial evidence? Even in ordinary cases the law
requires certain requisities for the conclusiveness of circumstantial evidence.
It is contended that the deficiency in the attestation clause is cured by the last
paragraph of the body of the alleged will, which we have quoted above. At first glance,
it is queer that the alleged testator should have made an attestation clause, which is
the function of the witness. But the important point is that he attests or certifies his
own signature, or, to be accurate, his signature certifies itself. It is evident that one
cannot certify his own signature, for it does not increase the evidence of its
authenticity. It would be like lifting one's self by his own bootstraps. Consequently, the
last paragraph of the will cannot cure in any way the fatal defect of the attestation
clause of the witnesses. Adding zero to an insufficient amount does not make it
sufficient.
It is said that the rules of statutory construction are applicable to documents and wills.
This is true, but said rules apply to the body of the will, containing the testamentary
provisions, but not to the attestation clause, which must be so clear that it should not
require any construction.
The parties have cited pro and con several decisions of the Supreme Court, some of
which are said to be rather strict and others liberal, in the interpretation of section
618 of Act No. 190, as amended by Act No. 2645.
In the case of Gumban vs. Gorecho (50 Phil., 30, 31), the court had the following to
say:
1. WILLS; ALLOWANCE OR DISALLOWANCE; SECTIONS 618 AND 634 OF THE
CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE CONSTRUED. — The right to dispose of the
property by will is governed entirely by statute. The law is here found in
section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended. The law not alone
carefully makes use of the imperative, but cautiously goes further and makes
use of the negative, to enforce legislative intention.
2. ID.; ID.; ATTESTATION. — The Philippine authorities relating to the
attestation clause to wills reviewed. The cases of Saño vs. Quintana ([1925],
48 Phil., 506), and Nayve vs. Mojal and Aguilar ([1924], 47 Phil., 152),
particularly compared. The decision in In re Will of Quintana, supra, adopted
and reaffirmed. The decision in Nayve vs. Mojal and Aguilar, supra, modified.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — The portion of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
as amended, which provides that "The attestation clause shall state the
number of sheets or pages used, upon which the will is written, and the fact
that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some
 other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence
of three witnesses, and the latter witnessed and signed the will and all pages
thereof in the presence of the testator and of each other" applied and
enforced.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — An attestation clause which does not recite that the
witnesses signed the will and each and every page thereof on the left margin
in the presence of the testator is defective, and such a defect annuls the will.
(Sano vs. Quintana, supra.)
In the subsequent case of Quinto vs. Morata (54 Phil., 481, 482), Judge Manuel V.
Moran, now Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, in his decision made the following
pronouncement:
. . . En la clausula de atestiguamiento del testamento en cuestion, se hace
constar que los testadores firmaron el testamento en presencia de los tres
testigos instrumentales y que estos firmaron el testamento los unos en
presencia de los otros, pero no se hace constar que dichos testigos firmaron
el testamento enpresencia de los testadores, ni que estos y aquellos firmaron
todas y cada una de las paginas del testamento los primeros en presencia de
los segundos y vice-versa.
En su virtud, se deniega la solicitud en la que se pide la legalizacion del
alegado testamento Exhibit A de Gregorio Pueblo y Carmen Quinto, y se
declara que Gregorio Pueblo murio intestado.
The Supreme Court fully affirmed the decision, laying down the following doctrine:
1. WILLS; ATTESTATION CLAUSE; EVIDENCE TO SUPPLY DEFECTS OF. — The
attestation clause must be made in strict conformity with the requirements
of section 618 of Act No. 190, as amended. Where said clause fails to show
on its face a full compliance with those requirements, the defect constitutes
sufficient ground for the disallowance of the will. (Sano vs. Quintana, 48 Phil.,
506; Gumban vs. Gorecho, 50 Phil., 30). Evidence aliunde should not be
admitted to establish facts not appearing on the attestation clause, and
where said evidence has been admitted it should not be given the effect
intended. (Uy Coque vs. Navas L. Sioca, 43 Phil., 405, 409.).
2. ID.; ID.; INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 618 OF ACT NO. 190, AS AMENDED.
— Section 618 of Act No. 190, as amended, should be given a strict
interpretation in order to give effect to the intention of the Legislature.
Statutes prescribing formalities to be observed in the execution of wills are
very strictly construed. Courts cannot supply the defensive execution of will.
(40 Cyc., p. 1079; Uy Coque vs. Navas L. Sioca, supra.)
It is true that in subsequent decisions, the court has somewhat relaxed the doctrine
of the Gumban vs. Gorcho case, supra, but not to the extent of validating an
attestation clause similar to that involved herein.
In the case of Aldaba vs. Roque (43 Phil., 378), the testatrix signed the attestation
clause which was complete, and it was also signed by the two attesting witnesses. For
this reason, the court said:
In reality, it appears that it is the testatrix who makes the declaration about
the points contained in the above described paragraph; however, as the
witnesses, together with the testatrix, have signed the said declaration, we
are of the opinion and so hold that the words above quoted of the testament
constitute a sufficient compliance with the requirements of section 1 of Act
No. 2645 which provides that: . . . (p. 381, supra.)
The attestation clause involved herein is very different.
In the case of Dischoso de Ticson vs. De Gorotiza (57 Phil., 437), it was held that:
An attestation clause to a will, copied from a form book and reading: "We,
the undersigned attesting witnesses, whose residences are stated opposite
our respective names, do hereby certify that the testatrix, whose name is
signed hereinabove, has publish unto us the foregoing will consisting of two
pages as her Last Will and Testament, and has signed the same in our
presence, and in witness whereof we have each signed the same and each
page thereof in the presence of said testatrix and in the presence of each
other," held not to be fatally defective and to conform to the law.
This very different from the attestation clause in the case at bar.
In the case of Grey vs. Fabie * (40 Off. Gaz., 1st Supplement, 196, No. 3, May 23, 1939),
the will was objected to on the ground that, although the attestation clause stated
that "each of the pages of which the said will is composed" was signed by the testatrix
at the left margin and at the foot of the fifth page, it did not state that the signature
was made in the presence of the witnesses. It was held, however, that said deficiency
was cured by the phrase "as well as by each of us in the presence of the testatrix." The
words "as well as" indicate that the testatrix signed also in the presence of the
witnesses, for the phrase "as well as" in this case is equivalent to "also." The language
is clear and, unlike the attestation clause in the present case, does not necessitate any
correction. In the body of the will the testatrix stated that she signed in the presence
of each and all of the three witnesses. This was considered as a corroboration, but it
was unnecessary.
In the case of Leynez vs. Leynez (40 Off. Gaz., 3rd Supplement, 51, 52, No. 7, October
18, 1939; 68 Phil., 745), the attestation clause reads as follows:
Suscrito y declarado por el testador Valerio Leynez, como su ultima voluntad
y testamento en presencia de todos y cada uno de nosotros, y a ruego de
dicho testador, firmamos el presente cada uno en presencia de los otros, o
de los demas y de la del mismo testsador, Valerio Leynez. El testamento
consta de dos (2) paginas solamente.
The objection was that the attestation clause did not state that the testator and the
witnesses signed each and every page of the will. This fact , however, appears in the
will itself. It is clear, therefore, that in case of the will complied with all the requisites
for its due execution. In the instant case, essential words were omitted.
In the case of Alcala vs. De Villa 1 (40 Off. Gaz., 14th Supplement, 131, 134-135, No.
23, April 18, 1939), the attestation clause reads as follows:
Hacemos constar que en la fecha y pueblo arriba mencionadios otorgo el Sr.
Emiliano Alcala su ultima voluntad o testamentao compuesto de cuatro
paginas incluida ya esta clasula de atestiguamiento. Que estabamos
presentes en el momento de leer y ratificar el que el testamento arriba
mencionado es su ultima voluntad o testamento compuesto de cuatro
paginasen papel de maquinilla. Que igualmente estabamos presentes cuando
el firmo este documento al pie del mismo y en el margen izquierdo de cada
pagina del testador tambien en presencia suya y de cada uno de nosotros en
cada pagina y en el margen izquierdo de esta escritura o testamento. En su
testimonio firmamos abajo en prsencia del testador y de cada uno de
nosotros.
The above attestation clause is substantially perfect. The only clerical error is that it
says "testador" instead of "testamento" in the phrase "cada pagina del testador." The
word "tambien" renders unnecessary the use of the verb "firmamos."
In the case of Mendoza vs. Pilapil 2 (40 Off. Gaz., 1855, No. 9, June 27, 1941), the
attestation clause did not state the number of pages of the will. However, it was held
that this deficiency was cured by the will itself, which stated that it consisted of three
pages and in fact it had three pages.
In the case of Rallos vs. Rallos (44 Off. Gaz., 4938, 4940, No. 12, October 23, 1947),
decided by the Court of Appeals, the attestation clause (translated in Spanish) reads
as follows:
Nosotros, los testigos, certificamos que este que hemos firmado es el
testamento y ultima voluntad, que se ha redactado en cuatro paginas, de
Numeriano Rallos, quien despues de leer y de leer y de leerle el mencionado
testamento, y despues de que ella dio su conformidad, firmo y marco con su
dedo pulgar derecho en nuestra presencia y en presencia de cada uno de
nosotros, que asimismo cada uno de nosotros, los testigos, firmamos
enpresencia de la testadora y en presencia de cada uno de nosotros.
It will be noticed that the only thing omitted is the statement as to the signing of the
testatrix and the witnesses of each and every page of the will, but the omission is cured
by the fact that their signatures appear on every page. This attestation clause is
different from that involved in the present case.
There is no reason why wills should not be executed by complying substantially with
the clear requisites of the law, leaving it to the courts to supply essential elements.
The right to dispose of property by will is not natural but statutory, and statutory
requirements should be satisfied.
The right to make a testamentary disposition of one's property is purely of
statutory creation, and is available only upon the compliance with the
requirements of the statute. The formalities which the Legislature has
prescribed for the execution of a will are essential to its validity, and cannot
be disregarded. The mode so prescribed is the measure for the exercise of
the right, and the heir can be deprived of his inheritance only by a compliance
with this mode. For the purpose of determining whether a will has been
properly executed, the intention of the testator in executing it is entitled to
no consideration. For that purpose only intention of the Legislature, as
expressed in the language of the statute, can be considered by the court, and
whether the will as presented, shows a compliance with the statute. Estate
of Walker, 110 Cal., 387, 42 Pac., 815, 30 L. R. A., 460, 52 Am. St. Rep. 104. In
re Seaman's Estate, 80 Pac., 700, 701.)
In interpreting the legislature's thought, courts have rigidly opposed any
exception tending to weaken the basic principle underlying the law, the chief
purpose of which is to see that the testator's wishes are observed. It is
possible, in some or many cases, a decedent may have thought he had made
a will, but the statute says he had not. The question is not one of his intention,
but of what he actually did, or . . . failed to do. . . . It may happen . . . that . . .
wills . . . truly expressing the intertions of the testator are made without
 observations of the required forms; and whenever that happens, the genuine
intention is frustrated. . . . The Legislature . . . has taught of it best and has
therefore determined, to run the risk of frustrating (that intention, . . . in
preference to the risk of giving effect to or facilitating the formation of
spurious wills, by the absence of forms. . . . The evil probably to arise by giving
to wills made without any form, . . ." or, in derogation of testator's wishes,
fraudulently imposing spurious wills on his effect on his estate. Churchill's
Estate, 260 Pac. 94, 101, 103 Atl. 533.
It has always been the policy of this court to sustain a will if it is legally
possible to do so, but we cannot break down the legislative barriers
protecting a man's property after death, even if a situation may be presented
apparently meritorious. (In Re: Maginn, 30 A. L. R., pp. 419, 420.)
In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is reversed, denying the probate
of the alleged will and declaring intestate the estate of the deceased Carlos Gil. With
costs against the appellee. It is so ordered.
Moran, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
TUAZON, J., dissenting:
The decision takes for granted that the will was written just as it was copied in the
stipulation of facts by the parties. But counsel for appellee makes the correctness of
the copy an issue thereby raising the question of not whether the burnt will possessed
the statutory requirements but whether the copy is erroneous. Since this is a chief
feature on which the appellee's case is built; since, in fact, the objection to form of the
attestation clause, with which the decision wholly deals, would disappear if the
appellee's contention were well founded, it is proper that in this dissenting opinion we
should accord the matter at least a passing notice.
It may be stated as background that the original of the will was filed in the Court of
First Instance of Manila in 1943; that in 1945, before the will came up for probate, it
was destroyed by fire or looters; that in the probate proceeding after liberation, the
parties submitted an agreed statement of facts in which the will was reproduced
as copied in the record on appeal in another case docketed in this court on appeal as
G.R. No. L-254 and decided on April 30, 1948. It further appears from the record of
that case and from the decision of this court that the controversy there concerned the
right of a nephew of the testator to impugn the will, it being alleged that he was not a
legal heir and had no interest in the probate.
As transcribed in the majority decision, it will be seen that the attestation clause is
truncated and meaningless. The last of the compound sentence in incomplete, lacking
an adjective phrase. Counsel for appellee contends that the phrase "ha sido firmado
por el testador" or equivalent expression between the words "del mismo" and the
words "en nuestra presencia" should be inserted if the sentence is to be complete and
have sense. The attestation clause with the inclusion of the omitted phrase, which we
italicize should read thus:
Nosotros, los que suscribimos, todos mayores de edad, certificamos que el
testamento que precede escrito en la lengua castellana que conoce la
testador, compuesto de las paginadas utiles con la clausula de
atestiguamiento paginadas correlativamente en letras y numeros en la parte
superior de la casilla, asi como todos las hojas del mismo (Ha sido firmado
por el testador) en nuestra presencia y que cada de nosotros hemos
atestiguado y firmado dicho documento y todas las hojas del mismo
presencia del testador y en la de cada uno de nosotros.
It seems obvious that the missing phrase was inadvertently left out. The probabilities
of error in the copy are enhanced by the fact that the form of the will was not in
controversy. The form of the will being immaterial, it is easily conceivable that little or
on care was employed in the copying thereof in the pleading or record on appeal
above mentioned. The absence of the signature of the testator on the first page of the
copy is an additional proof that little or on pain was taken to insure accuracy in the
transcription. The appearance of "la testadora" in the copy instead of "el testador" is
another.
Quite aside from all this, the testator was presumed to know the law, as the decision
says. Certainly, Attorney Mariano Omaña, who drafted the whole instrument and
signed it as an attesting witness, knew the law and, by the context of the whole
instrument, has shown familiarity with the rules of grammar and ability to express his
idea properly.
Read in the light of these circumstances — without mentioning the evidence or record,
not objected to, that the testator signed the will in the presence of the attesting
witnesses — so important an omission as to make the sentence senseless — granting
such omission existed in the original document-could not have been intentional or due
to ignorance. The most that can be said is that the flaw was due to a clerical mistake,
inadvertance, or oversight.
There is insinuation that the appellee in agreeing that the will read as it was
"reproduced in the record on Appeal" above mentioned is bound by the agreement.
This is not an absolute rule. The binding effect of a stipulation on the parties does not
go to the extent of barring them or either of them from impeaching it on the score of
clerical error or clear mistake. That there was such mistake, is indubitable. It is
noteworthy that the opponent and appellant herself appears not to have noticed any
defect in the attestation clause as copied in the stipulation. It would seem that in the
court below she confined her attack on the will to the alleged failure of the testator to
sign the first page. We say this because it was only the alleged unsigning of the first
page of the document which the trial court in the appealed decision discussed and
ruled upon. There is not the slightest reference in the decision, direct or implied, to
any flaw in the attestation clause — which is by far more important than the alleged
absence of the testator's signature on the first page.
As stated the problem posed by the omission in question is governed, not by the law
of wills which requires certain formalities to be observed in the execution, but by the
rules of construction applicable to statues and documents in general. And this rule
would obtain even if the omission had occurred in the original document and not in
the copy alone. In either case, the court may and should correct the error by supplying
the omitted word or words.
In Testamentaria del finado Emilio Alcala, a similar situation arose and the Court said:
Es evidente que leyendo la clausula de atestiguacion se nota a simple vista
que en su redaccion se ha incurrido en omisiones que la razon y el sentido
comon pueden suplirlas sin alterar ni tergiversar la intencion tanto del
testador como la de los tres testigos que intervinieron en el otorgamiento de
la misma. Teniendo en cuenta la fraselogia de la segunda parte de la clausula
se observara que las omisiones, aunque son substanciales, consisten en
meros errores gramaticales que los tribunales, en el ejercicio de su discrecion
y en la aplicacion de las reglas de interpretacion de documentos, pueden
subsanarlos para dar efectividad a la intencion y hacer que el conjunto de los
terminos de la clausula de atestacion surtan sus efectos.
La interpritacion que se acaba de bar a la clausula de atestacion y la
correccion de los errores gramaticales de que misma adolece, incluyendo la
insercion del verbo "firmamos" que se omitio involuntariamente, esta de
acuerdo con las reglas fundamentals de interpretacion de documentos segun
las cuales se debe hacer prevalecer siempre la intencion del que haya
redactado el instrumento (art. 288, Cod. de Proc. Civ.; Pecson contra, 45 Jur.
Fil., 224; 28 R. C. L., sec. 187, pags. 225, 226.)
La solucion que se acaba de bar al asunto es la que se halla mas conforme
con la justificia en vista de que se ha presentado prueba alguna que insinue
siquiera que en el otorgamiento del testamento se ha cometido dolo o fraude
con el animo de perjudiar a cualquiera. (Testamentaria de Emiano Alcala, 40
G. O., 14. Suplemento, No. 23, pags. 131, 132.)
From 69 C. J., 82 83, we quote: "Words omitted from a will may be supplied by the
court whenever necessary to effectuate the testator's intention as expressed in the
will; but not where the effect of inserting the words in the will would alter or defeat
such intention, or change the meaning of words that are clear and unequivocal." On
pages 50, 51, the same work says: "To aid the court in ascertaining and giving effect
to the testator's intention in the case of an ambiguous will, certain rules have been
established for guidance in the construction or interpretation to be placed upon such
a will, and in general a will should be construed according to these established rules
of construction." Speaking of construction of statutes which, as has been said, is
applicable to construction of documents, the same work, in Vol. 59, p. 992, says:
"Where it appears from the context that certain words have been inadvertently
omitted from a statute, the court may supply such words as are necessary to complete
the sense, and to express the legislative intent.
Adding force to the above principle is the legal presumption that the will is in
accordance with law. (2 Page on Wills, 840, 841; 57 Am. Jur., 720.)
Let us assume, for the purpose of this decision only, that the attestation clause was
drawn as the draftsman intended, that the mistake in language in said clause was not
inadvertent, and consider the case on the premise from which the court has
approached it; is the decision well grounded, at least in the light of this court's previous
decisions?
At the outset, it should be pointed out that as early as 1922 a similar case, in which
the validity of the will was sustained, found its way into this court. (Aldaba vs. Roque,
43 Phil., 378). The case was more than four-square behind the case at bar. There the
departure from the statutory formality was more radical, in that the testator took
charge or writing the entire attestation clause in the body of the will, the witnesses
limiting their role to signing the document below the testator's signature. Here, at
most, the testator took away from the witness only a small part of their assigned task,
leaving them to perform the rest.
Referring to "the lack of attestation clause required by law," this court, in a unanimous
decision in banc, through Mr. Justice Villamor said (syllabus): "When the attestation
clause is signed by the witnesses to the instruments besides the testator, such
attestation clause is valid and constitutes a substantial compliance with the provisions
of section 1 of Act No. 2645, even though the facts recited in said attestation appear
to have been make by the testator himself."
That was good doctrine when it was announced. We think it is good law still. That
ruling should set the present case at rest unless the court wants to discard it. On the
possibility that this is the intention, we will dwell on the subject further.
This Court noted in Dichoso de Ticson vs. De Gorostiza, (1922), 57 Phil., 437, "that
there have been noticeable in the Philippines two divergent tendencies in the law of
wills — the one being planted on strict construction and the other on liberal
construction. A late example of the former views may be found in the decision
in Rodriguez vs. Alcala (1930), 55 Phil., 150, sanctioning a literal enforcement of the
law. The basic case in the other direction,predicated on reason, is Abangan vs.
Abangan (1919), 40 Phil., 476, oft-cited approvingly in later decisions." In the Abangan
case, unanimous court, speaking through Mr. Justice Avanceña, later Chief Justice,
observed: "The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close
the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and
to guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore the laws on this subject should be
interpreted in such a way as to attain these primodial ends. But, on the other hand,
also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain
and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an interpretation already
given assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but
demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the
testator's last will, must be disregarded."
Subsequent decisions which followed and adopted the Abangan principle were
numerous: Avera vs. Garcia (1921), 42 Phil., 145; Aldaba vs. Roque (1922), 43 Phil.,
378; Unson vs. Abella (1922,) 43 Phil., 494; Pecson vs. Coronel (1923), 45 Phil.,
216; Fernandez vs. Vergel de Dios (1924), 46 Phil., 922; Nayve vs. Mojal (1924), 47
Phil., 152; De Gala vs. Gonzales (1929), 53 Phil., 104; Rey vs. Cartegana (1931), 56
Phil., 282; Ticson vs. Gorostiza (1932), 57 Phil., 437; Testamentaria de M. Ozoa (1933),
57 J. F., 1007; Sebastian vs. Pañganiban (1934), 59 Phil., 653; Rodriguez vs.
Yap (1939)1, 40 Off. Gaz., 1st Suppl. No. 3, p. 194; Grey vs. Fabia (1939)2, 40 Off. Gaz.,
1st Suppl. No. 3, p. 196; Leynez vs. Leynez (1939)3, 40 Off. Gaz., 3rd Suppl. No. 7, p.
51; Martir vs. Martir (1940)4, 40 Off. Gaz., 7th Suppl. No. 11, p. 215; Sabado vs.
Fernandez (1941)5, 40 Off. Gaz., 1844; Mendoza vs. Pilapil (1941)6 40 Off. Gaz.,
1855; Alcala vs. De Villa (1941)7, 40 Off. Gaz., 14th Suppl. No. 23, p. 131; and Lopez vs.
Liboro (1948)8, 46 Off. Gaz., Suppl. No. 1, p. 211.
The majority decision says, and we quote: "If we cure a deficiency by means of
inferences, when are we going to stop making inferences to supply fatal deficiencies
in wills? Where are we to draw the line?" These same questions might well have been
asked in the case above cited by the opponents of the new trends. But the so-called
liberal rule does not offer any puzzle or difficulty, nor does it open the door to serious
consequences. The decisions we have cited to tell us when and where to stop; the
dividing line is drawn with precision. They say "Halt" when and where evidence aliunde
to fill a void in any part of the document is attempted. They only permit a probe, an
exploration within the confines of the will, to ascertain its meaning and to determine
the existence or absence of the formalities of law. They do not allow the courts to go
outside the will or to admit extrinsic evidence to supply missing details that should
appear in the will itself. This clear, sharp limitation eliminates uncertainly and ought
to banish any fear of dire results.
The case at hand comes within the bounds thus defined. If the witnesses here
purposely omitted or forgot that the testator signed the will in their presence, the
testator said that he did and the witnesses by their signatures in the will itself said it
was so. No extraneous proof was necessary and none was introduced or taken into
consideration.
To regard the letter rather than the spirit of the will and of the law behind it was the
thing that led to unfortunate consequences. It was the realization of the injustice of
the old way that impelled this court, so we believe, to forsake the antiquated, outworn
worship of form in preference to substance. It has been said, and experience has
known, that the mechanical system of construction has operated more to defeat
honest wills than prevent fraudulent ones. That, it must be conceded, is the effect in
this case of this court's rejection of the will under consideration. For the adverse party
concedes the genuineness of the document. At least, the genuineness is super
obvious, and there is not the slightest insinuation of undue pressure, mental incapacity
of the testator of fraud.
It is said that for the testator to certify that he signed the will in the witnesses'
presence "would be like lifting one's self by his own bootstraps." The simile, we say
with due respect, does not look to us quite well placed. Under physical law a man
cannot raise his body from the ground by his own bare hands without the aid of some
mechanical appliance, at least not for more than a flitting moment. But there is no
impossibility or impropriety in one attesting to his own act unless forbidden by rules
of positive law. The rationale of our dissent is that he is not. If we were to make a
metaphorical comparison, it would be more appropriate to say that a man can and
generally does himself pull the bootstraps to put the boots on.
Coming to execution of wills, we see no legitimate practical reason for objecting to the
testator instead of the witnesses certifying that he signed the will in the presence of
the latter. The will is the testator's and the intervention of attesting witnesses is
designed merely to protect the testator's and not anybody else's interest.
If the sole purpose of the statute is to make it certain that the testator has definite
and complete intention to pass his property, and to prevent, as far as possible, any
chance of substituting one instrument for another (1 Page on Wills, 481), What better
guaranty of the genuineness of the will can there be than a certification by the testator
himself in the body of the will so long as the testator's signature is duly authenticated?
Witnesses may sabotage the will by muddling it or attestation clause. For the testator,
who is desirous of making a valid will, to do so would be a contradiction. If the
formalities are only a means to an end and not the end themselves, and that end is
achieved by another method slightly different from the prescribed manner, what has
been done by the testator and the witnesses in the execution of the instant will should
satisfy both law and conscience. The chief requirements of statutes are writing,
signature by the testator, and attestation and signature of three witnesses. Whether
the courts profess to follow the harsher rule, whether to follow the milder rule, they
agree on one thing — that as long as the testator performs each of those acts the
courts should require no more. (1 Page on Wills, 481, 484.)

Paras, Feria, Montemayor and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.

Montinola vs. Herbosa (Court of Appeals case) *not found*
Merza vs. Porras (93 Phil 142)
JOSE MERZA, petitioner, vs. PEDRO LOPEZ PORRAS, respondent.
Primicias, Abad, Mencies & Castillo for petitioner.
Moises Ma. Buhain for respondent.
TUAZON , J.:
This is an appeal from the Court of Appeals which affirmed an order of the Court of
First Instance of Zambales denying the probate of the last will and testament and so-
called codicil, identified as Exhibits A and B, of Pilar Montealegre, deceased. The
testatrix was survived by the husband and collateral relatives, some of whom, along
with the husband, were disinherited in Exhibit B for the reasons set forth therein.
The opposition to Exhibit A was predicated on alleged defects of the attestation clause.
Written in the local dialect known to the testatrix, the attestation clause, as translated
into English in the record on appeal, reads:
The foregoing instrument consisting of three pages, on the date above-mentioned,
was executed, signed and published by testatrix Pilar Montealegre and she declared
that the said instrument is her last will and testament; that in our presence and also
in the very presence of the said testatrix as likewise in the presence of two witnesses
and the testatrix each of us three witnesses signed this a testament.
The opponent objected that this clause did not estate that the tetratrix and the
witnesses had signed each and every page of the will or that she had signed the
instrument in the presence of the witnesses. The Appellate Court dismissed the first
objection, finding that "failure to estate in the attestation clause in question that the
testatrix and/or the witnesses had signed each and every page of Exhibit A were cured
by the fact that each one of the page of the instrument appears to be signed by the
testatrix and the three attesting witnesses (Nayve vs. Mojal, 47 Phil., 152, (1924);
Ticson vs. Gorostiza, 57 Phil., (1932); Leynes vs. Leynes, 40 Off. Gaz., 3rd Suppl.
(October 18, 1939), 510, 528; Rallos vs. Rallos, 44 Off. Gaz., 4938, 4940)." But granting
the correctness of the premise, the court held the second objection well taken and
thus concluded: "The question whether the testatrix had signed in the presence of said
witnesses can not be verified upon physical examination of the instrument. Hence, the
absence of the require statement in said clause may not, pursuant to the decisions of
the Supreme Court, be offset by proof aliunde even if admitted without any
objection."
The premise of the conclusion is, in our opinion, incorrect.
It must be admitted that the attestation clause was very poor drawn, its language
exceedingly ungrammatical to the point of being difficult to understand; but from a
close examination of the whole context in relation to its purpose the implication seems
clear that the testatrix signed in the presence of the witnesses. Considering that the
witnesses' only business at hand was to sign and attest to the testatrix's signing of the
document, and that the only actors of the proceeding were the maker and the
witnesses acting and speaking collectively and in the first person, the phrase "in our
presence," used as it was in connection with the process of signing, can not imply
anything but the testatrix signed before them. No other inference is possible. The
prepositional phrase "in our presence" denotes an active verb and the verb a subject.
The verb could not be other than signed and the subject no other than the testatrix.
The use of the word "also" is no less enlightening. It denotes that, as each of the
witnesses sign in the presence of the testatrix and of one another, so the testatrix sign
in similar or like manner — in their presence.
In consonance with the principle of the liberal interpretation, adhered to in numerous
later decision of this Court and affirmed and translated into inactment in the new Civil
Code (Article 827), we are constrained to hold the attestation clause under
consideration sufficient and valid.
"Precision of language in the drafting of the attestation clause is desirable. However,
it is not imperative that a parrot-like copy of the word of the statue be made. It is
sufficient if from the language employed it can reasonably be deduced that the
attestation clause fulfills what the law expects of it." (Ticson vs. Gorostiza, supra.)
"It could have been the intention of the legislature in providing for the essential
safeguards in the execution of a will to shackle the very right of the testamentary
disposition which the law recognizes and holds sacred." (Leynes vs.Leynes, supra.)
With reference of Exhibit B the Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court that the
document having been executed one day before Exhibit A could not be considered as
a codicil "because a codicil, as the word implies, is only an addition to, or modification
of, the will." The Court of Appeals added that "the content of Exhibit B are couched in
the language of ordinarily used in a simple affidavit and as such, may not have the legal
effect and force to a testamentary disposition." Furthermore, the Court of Appeals
observed, disinheritance "may not be made in any instrument other than the will of
Exhibit A, as expressly provided for in article 849 of the Civil Code," and, "there being
no disposition as to the disinheritance of the oppositor, Pedro Lopez Porras (the
surviving spouse), in the said Exhibit A, it is quite clear that he can not be disinherited
in any other instrument including Exhibit B, which is, as above stated, a simple
affidavit."
Exhibit B does partake of the nature of a will. A will is defined in article 667 of the Civil
code of Spain as "the act by which a persons dispose of all his property or a portion of
it," and in article 783 of the new Civil Code as "an act whereby a person is permitted,
with the formalities prescribed by law, to control to a certain degree the disposition
of his estate, to take effect after his death. Exhibit B comes within this definition.
Being of testamentary character and having been made with all the formalities of law,
Exhibit B is entitled to probate as an independent testementary desposition. In the
absence of any legal provision to the contrary — and there is none in this jurisdiction
— it is the general, well-established rule that two separate and distinct wills may be
probated if one does not revoke the other (68 C.J., 885) and provided that the
statutory requirements relative to the execution of wills have been complied with (Id.
881). As seen, Exhibit B embodied all the requisites of a will, even free of such formal
of literary imperfections as are found in Exhibit A.

It also follows that Exhibit B is a legal and effective vehicle for excluding lawful heirs
from testate or intestate succession. Article 849 of the Civil Code of Spain does not, as
the appealed decision seems to insinuate, require that the disinheritance should be
accomplished in the same instrument by which the maker provides the disposition of
his or her property after his or death. This article merely provides that "disinheritance
can be affected only by a will (any will) in which the legal cause upon which it is based
is expressly stated."

It is our judgment therefore that the instruments Exhibit A and B admitted to probate,
subject of courts to the right of the disinherited person under particle 850 to contest
the disinheritance, and it is so ordered, with costs against the appellee.
Paras, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Bautista Angelo and Labrador, JJ., concur.
Vitug vs. CA, 183 SCRA 755)
ROMARICO G. VITUG, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and
ROWENA FAUSTINO-CORONA, respondents.
Rufino B. Javier Law Office for petitioner.
Quisumbing, Torres & Evangelista for private respondent.
SARMIENTO, J.:
1
This case is a chapter in an earlier suit decided by this Court involving the probate of
the two wills of the late Dolores Luchangco Vitug, who died in New York, U. S.A., on
November 10, 1980, naming private respondent Rowena Faustino-Corona executrix.
In our said decision, we upheld the appointment of Nenita Alonte as co-special
administrator of Mrs. Vitug's estate with her (Mrs. Vitug's) widower, petitioner
Romarico G. Vitug, pending probate.
On January 13, 1985, Romarico G. Vitug filed a motion asking for authority from the
probate court to sell certain shares of stock and real properties belonging to the estate
to cover allegedly his advances to the estate in the sum of P667,731.66, plus interests,
which he claimed were personal funds. As found by the Court of Appeals, 2 the alleged
advances consisted of P58,147.40 spent for the payment of estate tax, P518,834.27
as deficiency estate tax, and P90,749.99 as "increment thereto." 3 According to Mr.
Vitug, he withdrew the sums of P518,834.27 and P90,749.99 from savings account No.
35342-038 of the Bank of America, Makati, Metro Manila.
On April 12, 1985, Rowena Corona opposed the motion to sell on the ground that the
same funds withdrawn from savings account No. 35342-038 were conjugal
partnership properties and part of the estate, and hence, there was allegedly no
ground for reimbursement. She also sought his ouster for failure to include the sums
in question for inventory and for "concealment of funds belonging to the estate." 4
Vitug insists that the said funds are his exclusive property having acquired the same
through a survivorship agreement executed with his late wife and the bank on June
19, 1970. The agreement provides:
We hereby agree with each other and with the BANK OF AMERICAN NATIONAL TRUST
AND SAVINGS ASSOCIATION (hereinafter referred to as the BANK), that all money now
or hereafter deposited by us or any or either of us with the BANK in our joint savings
current account shall be the property of all or both of us and shall be payable to and
collectible or withdrawable by either or any of us during our lifetime, and after the
death of either or any of us shall belong to and be the sole property of the survivor or
survivors, and shall be payable to and collectible or withdrawable by such survivor or
survivors.
We further agree with each other and the BANK that the receipt or check of either,
any or all of us during our lifetime, or the receipt or check of the survivor or survivors,
for any payment or withdrawal made for our above-mentioned account shall be valid
and sufficient release and discharge of the BANK for such payment or withdrawal. 5
The trial courts 6 upheld the validity of this agreement and granted "the motion to sell
some of the estate of Dolores L. Vitug, the proceeds of which shall be used to pay the
personal funds of Romarico Vitug in the total sum of P667,731.66 ... ." 7
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals, in the petition for certiorari filed by the
herein private respondent, held that the above-quoted survivorship agreement
constitutes a conveyance mortis causa which "did not comply with the formalities of
a valid will as prescribed by Article 805 of the Civil Code," 8 and secondly, assuming
that it is a mere donation inter vivos, it is a prohibited donation under the provisions
of Article 133 of the Civil Code. 9
The dispositive portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals states:
WHEREFORE, the order of respondent Judge dated November 26, 1985 (Annex II,
petition) is hereby set aside insofar as it granted private respondent's motion to sell
certain properties of the estate of Dolores L. Vitug for reimbursement of his alleged
advances to the estate, but the same order is sustained in all other respects. In
addition, respondent Judge is directed to include provisionally the deposits in Savings
Account No. 35342-038 with the Bank of America, Makati, in the inventory of actual
properties possessed by the spouses at the time of the decedent's death. With costs
against private respondent. 10
In his petition, Vitug, the surviving spouse, assails the appellate court's ruling on the
strength of our decisions in Rivera v. People's Bank and Trust Co. 11 and Macam v.
Gatmaitan 12 in which we sustained the validity of "survivorship agreements" and
considering them as aleatory contracts. 13
The petition is meritorious.
The conveyance in question is not, first of all, one of mortis causa, which should be
embodied in a will. A will has been defined as "a personal, solemn, revocable and free
act by which a capacitated person disposes of his property and rights and declares or
complies with duties to take effect after his death." 14 In other words, the bequest or
device must pertain to the testator. 15 In this case, the monies subject of savings
account No. 35342-038 were in the nature of conjugal funds In the case relied
on, Rivera v. People's Bank and Trust Co., 16 we rejected claims that a survivorship
agreement purports to deliver one party's separate properties in favor of the other,
but simply, their joint holdings:
xxx xxx xxx
... Such conclusion is evidently predicated on the assumption that Stephenson was the
exclusive owner of the funds-deposited in the bank, which assumption was in turn
based on the facts (1) that the account was originally opened in the name of
Stephenson alone and (2) that Ana Rivera "served only as housemaid of the deceased."
But it not infrequently happens that a person deposits money in the bank in the name
of another; and in the instant case it also appears that Ana Rivera served her master
for about nineteen years without actually receiving her salary from him. The fact that
subsequently Stephenson transferred the account to the name of himself and/or Ana
Rivera and executed with the latter the survivorship agreement in question although
there was no relation of kinship between them but only that of master and servant,
nullifies the assumption that Stephenson was the exclusive owner of the bank account.
In the absence, then, of clear proof to the contrary, we must give full faith and credit
to the certificate of deposit which recites in effect that the funds in question belonged
to Edgar Stephenson and Ana Rivera; that they were joint (and several) owners
thereof; and that either of them could withdraw any part or the whole of said account
during the lifetime of both, and the balance, if any, upon the death of either, belonged
to the survivor. 17
xxx xxx xxx
In Macam v. Gatmaitan, 18 it was held:
xxx xxx xxx
This Court is of the opinion that Exhibit C is an aleatory contract whereby, according
to article 1790 of the Civil Code, one of the parties or both reciprocally bind
themselves to give or do something as an equivalent for that which the other party is
to give or do in case of the occurrence of an event which is uncertain or will happen
at an indeterminate time. As already stated, Leonarda was the owner of the house and
Juana of the Buick automobile and most of the furniture. By virtue of Exhibit C, Juana
would become the owner of the house in case Leonarda died first, and Leonarda would
become the owner of the automobile and the furniture if Juana were to die first. In
this manner Leonarda and Juana reciprocally assigned their respective property to one
another conditioned upon who might die first, the time of death determining the
event upon which the acquisition of such right by the one or the other depended. This
contract, as any other contract, is binding upon the parties thereto. Inasmuch as
Leonarda had died before Juana, the latter thereupon acquired the ownership of the
house, in the same manner as Leonarda would have acquired the ownership of the
automobile and of the furniture if Juana had died first. 19
xxx xxx xxx
There is no showing that the funds exclusively belonged to one party, and hence it
must be presumed to be conjugal, having been acquired during the existence of the
marita. relations. 20
Neither is the survivorship agreement a donation inter vivos, for obvious reasons,
because it was to take effect after the death of one party. Secondly, it is not a donation
between the spouses because it involved no conveyance of a spouse's own properties
to the other.
It is also our opinion that the agreement involves no modification petition of the
conjugal partnership, as held by the Court of Appeals, 21 by "mere stipulation" 22 and
that it is no "cloak" 23 to circumvent the law on conjugal property relations. Certainly,
the spouses are not prohibited by law to invest conjugal property, say, by way of a
joint and several bank account, more commonly denominated in banking parlance as
an "and/or" account. In the case at bar, when the spouses Vitug opened savings
account No. 35342-038, they merely put what rightfully belonged to them in a money-
making venture. They did not dispose of it in favor of the other, which would have
arguably been sanctionable as a prohibited donation. And since the funds were
conjugal, it can not be said that one spouse could have pressured the other in placing
his or her deposits in the money pool.
The validity of the contract seems debatable by reason of its "survivor-take-all"
feature, but in reality, that contract imposed a mere obligation with a term, the term
being death. Such agreements are permitted by the Civil Code. 24
Under Article 2010 of the Code:
ART. 2010. By an aleatory contract, one of the parties or both reciprocally bind
themselves to give or to do something in consideration of what the other shall give or
do upon the happening of an event which is uncertain, or which is to occur at an
indeterminate time.
Under the aforequoted provision, the fulfillment of an aleatory contract depends on
either the happening of an event which is (1) "uncertain," (2) "which is to occur at an
indeterminate time." A survivorship agreement, the sale of a sweepstake ticket, a
transaction stipulating on the value of currency, and insurance have been held to fall
under the first category, while a contract for life annuity or pension under Article
2021, et sequentia, has been categorized under the second. 25 In either case, the
element of risk is present. In the case at bar, the risk was the death of one party and
survivorship of the other.
However, as we have warned:
xxx xxx xxx
But although the survivorship agreement is per se not contrary to law its operation or
effect may be violative of the law. For instance, if it be shown in a given case that such
agreement is a mere cloak to hide an inofficious donation, to transfer property in fraud
of creditors, or to defeat the legitime of a forced heir, it may be assailed and annulled
upon such grounds. No such vice has been imputed and established against the
agreement involved in this case. 26
xxx xxx xxx
There is no demonstration here that the survivorship agreement had been executed
for such unlawful purposes, or, as held by the respondent court, in order to frustrate
our laws on wills, donations, and conjugal partnership.
The conclusion is accordingly unavoidable that Mrs. Vitug having predeceased her
husband, the latter has acquired upon her death a vested right over the amounts
under savings account No. 35342-038 of the Bank of America. Insofar as the
respondent court ordered their inclusion in the inventory of assets left by Mrs. Vitug,
we hold that the court was in error. Being the separate property of petitioner, it forms
no more part of the estate of the deceased.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent appellate court, dated June 29, 1987,
and its resolution, dated February 9, 1988, are SET ASIDE.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Seangio vs. Reyes (G.R. No. 149753, November 27, 2006)
DY YIENG SEANGIO, BARBARA D. SEANGIO and VIRGINIA D. SEANGIO, Petitioners,
vs. HON. AMOR A. REYES, in her capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 21, Manila, ALFREDO D. SEANGIO, ALBERTO D.
SEANGIO, ELISA D. SEANGIO-SANTOS, VICTOR D. SEANGIO, ALFONSO D. SEANGIO,
SHIRLEY D. SEANGIO-LIM, BETTY D. SEANGIO-OBAS and JAMES D.
SEANGIO, Respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari1 with application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order seeking the nullification of the orders,
dated August 10, 1999 and October 14, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 21 (the RTC), dismissing the petition for probate on the ground of preterition,
in the consolidated cases, docketed as SP. Proc. No. 98-90870 and SP. Proc. No. 99-
93396, and entitled, "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Segundo C. Seangio v.
Alfredo D. Seangio, et al." and "In the Matter of the Probate of the Will of Segundo C.
Seangio v. Dy Yieng Seangio, Barbara D. Seangio and Virginia Seangio."
The facts of the cases are as follows:
On September 21, 1988, private respondents filed a petition for the settlement of the
intestate estate of the late Segundo Seangio, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 98–90870 of
the RTC, and praying for the appointment of private respondent Elisa D. Seangio–
Santos as special administrator and guardian ad litem of petitioner Dy Yieng Seangio.
Petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara and Virginia, all surnamed Seangio, opposed the petition.
They contended that: 1) Dy Yieng is still very healthy and in full command of her
faculties; 2) the deceased Segundo executed a general power of attorney in favor of
Virginia giving her the power to manage and exercise control and supervision over his
business in the Philippines; 3) Virginia is the most competent and qualified to serve as
the administrator of the estate of Segundo because she is a certified public
accountant; and, 4) Segundo left a holographic will, dated September 20, 1995,
disinheriting one of the private respondents, Alfredo Seangio, for cause. In view of the
purported holographic will, petitioners averred that in the event the decedent is found
to have left a will, the intestate proceedings are to be automatically suspended and
replaced by the proceedings for the probate of the will.
On April 7, 1999, a petition for the probate of the holographic will of Segundo,
docketed as SP. Proc. No. 99–93396, was filed by petitioners before the RTC. They
likewise reiterated that the probate proceedings should take precedence over SP.
Proc. No. 98–90870 because testate proceedings take precedence and enjoy priority
over intestate proceedings.2
The document that petitioners refer to as Segundo’s holographic will is quoted, as
follows:
Kasulatan sa pag-aalis ng mana
Tantunin ng sinuman
Ako si Segundo Seangio Filipino may asawa naninirahan sa 465-A Flores St., Ermita,
Manila at nagtatalay ng maiwanag na pag-iisip at disposisyon ay tahasan at hayagang
inaalisan ko ng lahat at anumang mana ang paganay kong anak na si Alfredo Seangio
dahil siya ay naging lapastangan sa akin at isan beses siya ng sasalita ng masama
harapan ko at mga kapatid niya na si Virginia Seangio labis kong kinasama ng loob ko
at sasabe rin ni Alfredo sa akin na ako nasa ibabaw gayon gunit daratin ang araw na
ako nasa ilalim siya at siya nasa ibabaw.
Labis kong ikinasama ng loob ko ang gamit ni Alfredo ng akin pagalan para
makapagutang na kuarta siya at kanya asawa na si Merna de los Reyes sa China
Bangking Corporation na millon pesos at hindi ng babayad at hindi ng babayad ito ay
nagdulot sa aking ng malaking kahihiya sa mga may-ari at stockholders ng China
Banking.
At ikinagalit ko pa rin ang pagkuha ni Alfredo at ng kanyang asawa na mga custome[r]
ng Travel Center of the Philippines na pinagasiwaan ko at ng anak ko si Virginia.
Dito ako nagalit din kaya gayon ayoko na bilanin si Alfredo ng anak ko at hayanan kong
inaalisan ng lahat at anoman mana na si Alfredo at si Alfredo Seangio ay hindi ko siya
anak at hindi siya makoha mana.
Nila[g]daan ko ngayon ika 20 ng Setyembre 1995 sa longsod ng Manila sa harap ng
tatlong saksi. 3
(signed)
Segundo Seangio
Nilagdaan sa harap namin
(signed)
Dy Yieng Seangio (signed)
Unang Saksi ikalawang saksi
(signed)
ikatlong saksi
On May 29, 1999, upon petitioners’ motion, SP. Proc. No. 98–90870 and SP. Proc. No.
99–93396 were consolidated.4
On July 1, 1999, private respondents moved for the dismissal of the probate
proceedings5 primarily on the ground that the document purporting to be the
holographic will of Segundo does not contain any disposition of the estate of the
deceased and thus does not meet the definition of a will under Article 783 of the Civil
Code. According to private respondents, the will only shows an alleged act of
disinheritance by the decedent of his eldest son, Alfredo, and nothing else; that all
other compulsory heirs were not named nor instituted as heir, devisee or legatee,
hence, there is preterition which would result to intestacy. Such being the case, private
respondents maintained that while procedurally the court is called upon to rule only
on the extrinsic validity of the will, it is not barred from delving into the intrinsic validity
of the same, and ordering the dismissal of the petition for probate when on the face
of the will it is clear that it contains no testamentary disposition of the property of the
decedent.
Petitioners filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss contending that: 1)
generally, the authority of the probate court is limited only to a determination of the
extrinsic validity of the will; 2) private respondents question the intrinsic and not the
extrinsic validity of the will; 3) disinheritance constitutes a disposition of the estate of
a decedent; and, 4) the rule on preterition does not apply because Segundo’s will does
not constitute a universal heir or heirs to the exclusion of one or more compulsory
heirs.6
On August 10, 1999, the RTC issued its assailed order, dismissing the petition for
probate proceedings:
A perusal of the document termed as "will" by oppositors/petitioners Dy Yieng
Seangio, et al., clearly shows that there is preterition, as the only heirs mentioned
thereat are Alfredo and Virginia. [T]he other heirs being omitted, Article 854 of the
New Civil Code thus applies. However, insofar as the widow Dy Yieng Seangio is
concerned, Article 854 does not apply, she not being a compulsory heir in the direct
line.
As such, this Court is bound to dismiss this petition, for to do otherwise would amount
to an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court in the case of Acain v. Intermediate
Appellate Court [155 SCRA 100 (1987)] has made its position clear: "for … respondents
to have tolerated the probate of the will and allowed the case to progress when, on
its face, the will appears to be intrinsically void … would have been an exercise in
futility. It would have meant a waste of time, effort, expense, plus added futility. The
trial court could have denied its probate outright or could have passed upon the
intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions before the extrinsic validity of the will
was resolved(underscoring supplied).
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion to Suspend Proceedings is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit. Special
Proceedings No. 99–93396 is hereby DISMISSED without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.7
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied by the RTC in its order dated
October 14, 1999.
Petitioners contend that:
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED IN EXCESS OF HER JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION AND
DECIDED A QUESTION OF LAW NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN
ISSUING THE QUESTIONED ORDERS, DATED 10 AUGUST 1999 AND 14 OCTOBER 1999
(ATTACHMENTS "A" AND "B" HEREOF) CONSIDERING THAT:
I
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE, WITHOUT EVEN COMPLYING WITH SECTIONS 3 AND 4 OF
RULE 76 OF THE RULES OF COURT ON THE PROPER PROCEDURE FOR SETTING THE
CASE FOR INITIAL HEARING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE JURISDICTIONAL FACTS,
DISMISSED THE TESTATE CASE ON THE ALLEGED GROUND THAT THE TESTATOR’S WILL
IS VOID ALLEGEDLY BECAUSE OF THE EXISTENCE OF PRETERITION, WHICH GOES INTO
THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL, DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT IS A SETTLED RULE
THAT THE AUTHORITY OF PROBATE COURTS IS LIMITED ONLY TO A DETERMINATION
OF THE EXTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL, I.E., THE DUE EXECUTION THEREOF, THE
TESTATOR’S TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY AND THE COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUISITES
OR SOLEMNITIES PRESCRIBED BY LAW;
II
EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS THE AUTHORITY TO
RULE UPON THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL OF THE TESTATOR, IT IS
INDUBITABLE FROM THE FACE OF THE TESTATOR’S WILL THAT NO PRETERITON EXISTS
AND THAT THE WILL IS BOTH INTRINSICALLY AND EXTRINSICALLY VALID; AND,
III
RESPONDENT JUDGE WAS DUTY BOUND TO SUSPEND THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE
INTESTATE CASE CONSIDERING THAT IT IS A SETTLED RULE THAT TESTATE
PROCEEDINGS TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS.
Petitioners argue, as follows:
First, respondent judge did not comply with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76 of the Rules
of Court which respectively mandate the court to: a) fix the time and place for proving
the will when all concerned may appear to contest the allowance thereof, and cause
notice of such time and place to be published three weeks successively previous to
the appointed time in a newspaper of general circulation; and, b) cause the mailing of
said notice to the heirs, legatees and devisees of the testator Segundo;
Second, the holographic will does not contain any institution of an heir, but rather, as
its title clearly states, Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, simply contains a
disinheritance of a compulsory heir. Thus, there is no preterition in the decedent’s will
and the holographic will on its face is not intrinsically void;
Third, the testator intended all his compulsory heirs, petitioners and private
respondents alike, with the sole exception of Alfredo, to inherit his estate. None of the
compulsory heirs in the direct line of Segundo were preterited in the holographic will
since there was no institution of an heir;
Fourth, inasmuch as it clearly appears from the face of the holographic will that it is
both intrinsically and extrinsically valid, respondent judge was mandated to proceed
with the hearing of the testate case; and,
Lastly, the continuation of the proceedings in the intestate case will work injustice to
petitioners, and will render nugatory the disinheritance of Alfredo.
The purported holographic will of Segundo that was presented by petitioners was
dated, signed and written by him in his own handwriting. Except on the ground of
preterition, private respondents did not raise any issue as regards the authenticity of
the document.
The document, entitled Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, unmistakably showed
Segundo’s intention of excluding his eldest son, Alfredo, as an heir to his estate for the
reasons that he cited therein. In effect, Alfredo was disinherited by Segundo.
For disinheritance to be valid, Article 916 of the Civil Code requires that the same must
be effected through a will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be specified. With
regard to the reasons for the disinheritance that were stated by Segundo in his
document, the Court believes that the incidents, taken as a whole, can be considered
a form of maltreatment of Segundo by his son, Alfredo, and that the matter presents
a sufficient cause for the disinheritance of a child or descendant under Article 919 of
the Civil Code:
Article 919. The following shall be sufficient causes for the disinheritance of children
and descendants, legitimate as well as illegitimate:
(1) When a child or descendant has been found guilty of an attempt against the life of
the testator, his or her spouse, descendants, or ascendants;
(2) When a child or descendant has accused the testator of a crime for which the law
prescribes imprisonment for six years or more, if the accusation has been found
groundless;
(3) When a child or descendant has been convicted of adultery or concubinage with
the spouse of the testator;
(4) When a child or descendant by fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence
causes the testator to make a will or to change one already made;
(5) A refusal without justifiable cause to support the parents or ascendant who
disinherit such child or descendant;
(6) Maltreatment of the testator by word or deed, by the child or descendant;8
(7) When a child or descendant leads a dishonorable or disgraceful life;
(8) Conviction of a crime which carries with it the penalty of civil interdiction.
Now, the critical issue to be determined is whether the document executed by
Segundo can be considered as a holographic will.
A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the Civil Code, must be entirely
written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other
form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed.
Segundo’s document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance
instrument, conforms to the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is
written, dated and signed by the hand of Segundo himself. An intent to dispose mortis
causa[9] can be clearly deduced from the terms of the instrument, and while it does
not make an affirmative disposition of the latter’s property, the disinheritance of
Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself. In other words, the disinheritance
results in the disposition of the property of the testator Segundo in favor of those who
would succeed in the absence of Alfredo.10
Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the testator,
expressed in the form and within the limits prescribed by law, must be recognized as
the supreme law in succession. All rules of construction are designed to ascertain and
give effect to that intention. It is only when the intention of the testator is contrary to
law, morals, or public policy that it cannot be given effect.11
Holographic wills, therefore, being usually prepared by one who is not learned in the
law, as illustrated in the present case, should be construed more liberally than the
ones drawn by an expert, taking into account the circumstances surrounding the
execution of the instrument and the intention of the testator.12 In this regard, the
Court is convinced that the document, even if captioned as Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng
Mana, was intended by Segundo to be his last testamentary act and was executed by
him in accordance with law in the form of a holographic will. Unless the will is
probated,13 the disinheritance cannot be given effect.14
With regard to the issue on preterition,15 the Court believes that the compulsory heirs
in the direct line were not preterited in the will. It was, in the Court’s opinion,
Segundo’s last expression to bequeath his estate to all his compulsory heirs, with the
sole exception of Alfredo. Also, Segundo did not institute an heir16 to the exclusion of
his other compulsory heirs. The mere mention of the name of one of the petitioners,
Virginia, in the document did not operate to institute her as the universal heir. Her
name was included plainly as a witness to the altercation between Segundo and his
son, Alfredo.1âwphi1
Considering that the questioned document is Segundo’s holographic will, and that the
law favors testacy over intestacy, the probate of the will cannot be dispensed with.
Article 838 of the Civil Code provides that no will shall pass either real or personal
property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court. Thus,
unless the will is probated, the right of a person to dispose of his property may be
rendered nugatory.17
In view of the foregoing, the trial court, therefore, should have allowed the
holographic will to be probated. It is settled that testate proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of the decedent take precedence over intestate proceedings
for the same purpose.18
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 21, dated August 10, 1999 and October 14, 1999, are set aside.
Respondent judge is directed to reinstate and hear SP Proc. No. 99-93396 for the
allowance of the holographic will of Segundo Seangio. The intestate case or SP. Proc.
No. 98-90870 is hereby suspended until the termination of the aforesaid testate
proceedings.
No costs.
SO ORDERED
ARTICLE 784.
Castañeda vs. Alemany (3 Phil 426)
G.R. No. 1439 March 19, 1904
ANTONIO CASTAÑEDA, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOSE E. ALEMANY, defendant-appellant.
Ledesma, Sumulong and Quintos for appellant.
The court erred in holding that all legal formalities had been complied with in the
execution of the will of Doña Juana Moreno, as the proof shows that the said will was
not written in the presence of under the express direction of the testratrix as required
by section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Antonio V. Herrero for appellee.
The grounds upon which a will may be disallowed are limited to those mentioned in
section 634 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
WILLARD, J.:
(1) The evidence in this case shows to our satisfaction that the will of Doña Juana
Moreno was duly signed by herself in the presence of three witnesses, who signed it
as witnesses in the presence of the testratrix and of each other. It was therefore
executed in conformity with law.
There is nothing in the language of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure which
supports the claim of the appellants that the will must be written by the testator
himself or by someone else in his presence and under his express direction. That
section requires (1) that the will be in writing and (2) either that the testator sign it
himself or, if he does sign it, that it be signed by some one in his presence and by his
express direction. Who does the mechanical work of writing the will is a matter of
indifference. The fact, therefore, that in this case the will was typewritten in the office
of the lawyer for the testratrix is of no consequence. The English text of section 618 is
very plain. The mistakes in translation found in the first Spanish edition of the code
have been corrected in the second.
All such questions must be decided in some other proceeding. The grounds on which
a will may be disallowed are stated the section 634. Unless one of those grounds
appears the will must be allowed. They all have to do with the personal condition of
the testator at the time of its execution and the formalities connected therewith. It
follows that neither this court nor the court below has any jurisdiction in his
proceedings to pass upon the questions raised by the appellants by the assignment of
error relating to the appointment of a guardian for the children of the deceased.
It is claimed by the appellants that there was no testimony in the court below to show
that the will executed by the deceased was the same will presented to the court and
concerning which this hearing was had. It is true that the evidence does not show that
the document in court was presented to the witnesses and identified by them, as
should have been done. But we think that we are justified in saying that it was assumed
by all the parties during the trial in the court below that the will about which the
witnesses were testifying was the document then in court. No suggestion of any kind
was then made by the counsel for the appellants that it was not the same instrument.
In the last question put to the witness Gonzales the phrase "this will" is used by the
counsel for the appellants. In their argument in that court, found on page 15 of the
record, they treat the testimony of the witnesses as referring to the will probate they
were then opposing.
The judgment of the court below is affirmed, eliminating therefrom, however, the
clause "el cual debera ejecutarse fiel y exactamente en todas sus partes." The costs of
this instance will be charged against the appellants.
Arellano, C. J., Torres, Cooper, Mapa, McDonough and Johnson, JJ., concur.

(2) To establish conclusively as against everyone, and once for all, the facts that a will
was executed with the formalities required by law and that the testator was in a
condition to make a will, is the only purpose of the proceedings under the new code
for the probate of a will. (Sec. 625.) The judgment in such proceedings determines and
can determine nothing more. In them the court has no power to pass upon the validity
of any provisions made in the will. It can not decide, for example, that a certain legacy
is void and another one valid. It could not in this case make any decision upon the
question whether the testratrix had the power to appoint by will a guardian for the
property of her children by her first husband, or whether the person so appointed was
or was not a suitable person to discharge such trust.
ARTICLE 788. After the executrix filed her inventory of the estate, Dr. Adelaido Bernardo of Angeles,
Pampanga was appointed commissioner to appraise the properties of the estate. He
Dizon Rivera vs. Dizon (33 SCRA 554) filed in due course his report of appraisal and the same was approved in toto by the
lower court on December 12, 1963 upon joint petition of the parties.
MARINA DIZON-RIVERA, executrix-appellee, vs. ESTELA DIZON, TOMAS V. DIZON, The real and personal properties of the testatrix at the time of her death thus had a
BERNARDITA DIZON, JOSEFINA DIZON, ANGELINA DIZON and LILIA DIZON, oppositors- total appraised value of P1,811,695.60, and the legitime of each of the seven
appellants. compulsory heirs amounted to P129,362.11.3 (¹/7 of the half of the estate reserved for
Punzalan, Yabut & Eusebio for executrix-appellee. the legitime of legitimate children and descendants).4 In her will, the testatrix
Leonardo Abola for oppositors-appellants. "commanded that her property be divided" in accordance with her testamentary
disposition, whereby she devised and bequeathed specific real properties comprising
practically the entire bulk of her estate among her six children and eight grandchildren.
TEEHANKEE, J.: The appraised values of the real properties thus respectively devised by the testatrix
Appeal from orders of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga approving the to the beneficiaries named in her will, are as follows:
Executrix-appellee's project of partition instead of Oppositors-Appellants' proposed 1. Estela Dizon ....................................... P 98,474.80
counter-project of partition.1 2. Angelina Dizon .................................. 106,307.06
3. Bernardita Dizon .................................. 51,968.17
On January 28, 1961, the testatrix, Agripina J. Valdez, a widow, died in Angeles, 4. Josefina Dizon ...................................... 52,056.39
Pampanga, and was survived by seven compulsory heirs, to wit, six legitimate children 5. Tomas Dizon ....................................... 131,987.41
named Estela Dizon, Tomas V. Dizon, Bernardita Dizon, Marina Dizon (herein 6. Lilia Dizon .............................................. 72,182.47
executrix-appellee), Angelina Dizon and Josefina Dizon, and a legitimate 7. Marina Dizon ..................................... 1,148,063.71
granddaughter named Lilia Dizon, who is the only legitimate child and heir of Ramon 8. Pablo Rivera, Jr. ...................................... 69,280.00
Dizon, a pre-deceased legitimate son of the said decedent. Six of these seven 9. Lilia Dizon, Gilbert Garcia,
compulsory heirs (except Marina Dizon, the executrix-appellee) are the oppositors- Cayetano Dizon, Francisco Rivera,
appellants. Agripina Ayson, Dioli or Jolly
Jimenez, Laureano Tiamzon ................. 72,540.00
The deceased testatrix left a last will executed on February 2, 1960 and written in the Total Value ...................... P1,801,960.01
Pampango dialect. Named beneficiaries in her will were the above-named compulsory The executrix filed her project of partition dated February 5, 1964, in substance
heirs, together with seven other legitimate grandchildren, namely Pablo Rivera, Jr., adjudicating the estate as follows:
Gilbert D. Garcia, Cayetano Dizon, Francisco Rivera, Agripina Ayson, Jolly Jimenez and
Laureano Tiambon. (1) with the figure of P129,254.96 as legitime for a basis Marina (exacultrix-appellee)
and Tomas (appellant) are admittedly considered to have received in the will more
In her will, the testatrix divided, distributed and disposed of all her properties than their respective legitime, while the rest of the appellants, namely, Estela,
appraised at P1,801,960.00 (except two small parcels of land appraised at P5,849.60, Bernardita, Angelina, Josefina and Lilia received less than their respective legitime;
household furniture valued at P2,500.00, a bank deposit in the sum of P409.95 and
ten shares of Pampanga Sugar Development Company valued at P350.00) among her (2) thus, to each of the latter are adjudicated the properties respectively given them
above-named heirs. in the will, plus cash and/or properties, to complete their respective legitimes to
P129,254.96; (3) on the other hand, Marina and Tomas are adjudicated the properties
Testate proceedings were in due course commenced2 and by order dated March 13, that they received in the will less the cash and/or properties necessary to complete
1961, the last will and testament of the decedent was duly allowed and admitted to the prejudiced legitime mentioned in number 2 above;
probate, and the appellee Marina Dizon-Rivera was appointed executrix of the
testatrix' estate, and upon her filing her bond and oath of office, letters testamentary (4) the adjudications made in the will in favor of the grandchildren remain
were duly issued to her. untouched.<äre||anº•1àw>
On the other hand oppositors submitted their own counter-project of partition dated
February 14, 1964, wherein they proposed the distribution of the estate on the
following basis:
(a) all the testamentary dispositions were proportionally reduced to the value of one-
half (½) of the entire estate, the value of the said one-half (½) amounting to
P905,534.78; (b) the shares of the Oppositors-Appellants should consist of their
legitime, plus the devises in their favor proportionally reduced; (c) in payment of the
total shares of the appellants in the entire estate, the properties devised to them plus
other properties left by the Testatrix and/or cash are adjudicated to them; and (d) to
the grandchildren who are not compulsory heirs are adjudicated the properties
respectively devised to them subject to reimbursement by Gilbert D. Garcia, et al., of
the sums by which the devise in their favor should be proportionally reduced.
Under the oppositors' counter-project of partition, the testamentary disposition made
by the testatrix of practically her whole estate of P1,801,960.01, as above stated, were
proposed to be reduced to the amounts set forth after the names of the respective
heirs and devisees totalling one-half thereof as follows:
1. Estela Dizon ........................................... P 49,485.56
2. Angelina Dizon ......................................... 53,421.42
3. Bernardita Dizon ....................................... 26,115.04
4. Josefina Dizon .......................................... 26,159.38
5. Tomas V. Dizon ......................................... 65,874.04
6. Lilia Dizon .................................................. 36,273.13
7. Marina Dizon ........................................... 576,938.82
8. Pablo Rivera, Jr. ......................................... 34,814.50
9. Grandchildren Gilbert Garcia et al .......... 36,452.80
T o t a l ................................................... P905,534.78
while the other half of the estate (P905,534.78) would be deemed as constituting the
legitime of the executrix-appellee and oppositors-appellants, to be divided among
them in seven equal parts of P129,362.11 as their respective legitimes.
The lower court, after hearing, sustained and approved the executrix' project of
partition, ruling that "(A)rticles 906 and 907 of the New Civil Code specifically provide
that when the legitime is impaired or prejudiced, the same shall be completed and
satisfied. While it is true that this process has been followed and adhered to in the two
projects of partition, it is observed that the executrix and the oppositors differ in
respect to the source from which the portion or portions shall be taken in order to
fully restore the impaired legitime. The proposition of the oppositors, if upheld, will
substantially result in a distribution of intestacy, which is in controversion of Article
791 of the New Civil Code" adding that "the testatrix has chosen to favor certain heirs
in her will for reasons of her own, cannot be doubted. This is legally permissible within
the limitation of the law, as aforecited." With reference to the payment in cash of
some P230,552.38, principally by the executrix as the largest beneficiary of the will to
be paid to her five co-heirs, the oppositors (excluding Tomas Dizon), to complete their
impaired legitimes, the lower court ruled that "(T)he payment in cash so as to make
the proper adjustment to meet with the requirements of the law in respect to
legitimes which have been impaired is, in our opinion, a practical and valid solution in
order to give effect to the last wishes of the testatrix."
From the lower court's orders of approval, oppositors-appellants have filed this
appeal, and raise anew the following issues: .
1. Whether or not the testamentary dispositions made in the testatrix' will are in the
nature of devises imputable to the
free portion of her estate, and therefore subject to reduction;
2. Whether the appellants are entitled to the devise plus their legitime under Article
1063, or merely to demand completion of their legitime under Article 906 of the Civil
Code; and
3. Whether the appellants may be compelled to accept payment in cash on account
of their legitime, instead of some of the real properties left by the Testatrix;
which were adversely decided against them in the proceedings below.
The issues raised present a matter of determining the avowed intention of the
testatrix which is "the life and soul of a will."5 In consonance therewith, our Civil Code
included the new provisions found in Articles 788 and 791 thereof that "(I)f a
testamentary disposition admits of different interpretations, in case of doubt, that
interpretation by which the disposition is to be operative shall be preferred" and
"(T)he words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will give to every
expression some effect, rather than one which will render any of the expressions
inoperative; and of two modes of interpreting a will, that is to be preferred which will
prevent intestacy." In Villanueva vs. Juico6 for violation of these rules of interpretation
as well as of Rule 123, section 59 of the old Rules of Court, 7 the Court, speaking
through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, overturned the lower court's decision and stressed
that "the intention and wishes of the testator, when clearly expressed in his will,
constitute the fixed law of interpretation, and all questions raised at the trial, relative
to its execution and fulfillment, must be settled in accordance therewith, following the
plain and literal meaning of the testator's words, unless it clearly appears that his
intention was otherwise." 8
The testator's wishes and intention constitute the first and principal law in the matter
of testaments, and to paraphrase an early decision of the Supreme Court of
Spain, 9 when expressed clearly and precisely in his last will amount to the only law
whose mandate must imperatively be faithfully obeyed and complied with by his
executors, heirs and devisees and legatees, and neither these interested parties nor
the courts may substitute their own criterion for the testator's will. Guided and
restricted by these fundamental premises, the Court finds for the appellee.
1. Decisive of the issues at bar is the fact that the testatrix' testamentary disposition
was in the nature of a partition of her estate by will. Thus, in the third paragraph of
her will, after commanding that upon her death all her obligations as well as the
expenses of her last illness and funeral and the expenses for probate of her last will
and for the administration of her property in accordance with law, be paid, she
expressly provided that "it is my wish and I command that my property be divided" in
accordance with the dispositions immediately thereafter following, whereby she
specified each real property in her estate and designated the particular heir among
her seven compulsory heirs and seven other grandchildren to whom she bequeathed
the same. This was a valid partition 10 of her estate, as contemplated and authorized
in the first paragraph of Article 1080 of the Civil Code, providing that "(S)hould a
person make a partition of his estate by an act inter vivos or by will, such partition shall
be respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs."
This right of a testator to partition his estate is subject only to the right of compulsory
heirs to their legitime. The Civil Code thus provides the safeguard for the right of such
compulsory heirs:
ART. 906. Any compulsory heir to whom the testator has left by any title less than the
legitime belonging to him may demand that the same be fully satisfied.
ART. 907. Testamentary dispositions that impair or diminish the legitime of the
compulsory heirs shall be reduced on petition of the same, insofar as they may be
inofficious or excessive.
This was properly complied with in the executrix-appellee's project of partition,
wherein the five oppositors-appellants namely Estela, Bernardita, Angelina, Josefina
and Lilia, were adjudicated the properties respectively distributed and assigned to
them by the testatrix in her will, and the differential to complete their respective
legitimes of P129,362.11 each were taken from the cash and/or properties of the
executrix-appellee, Marina, and their co-oppositor-appellant, Tomas, who admittedly
were favored by the testatrix and received in the partition by will more than their
respective legitimes.
2. This right of a testator to partition his estate by will was recognized even in Article
1056 of the old Civil Code which has been reproduced now as Article 1080 of the
present Civil Code. The only amendment in the provision was that Article 1080 "now
permits any person (not a testator, as under the old law) to partition his estate by
act inter vivos." 11 This was intended to repeal the then prevailing doctrine 12 that for
a testator to partition his estate by an act inter vivos, he must first make a will with all
the formalities provided by law. Authoritative commentators doubt the efficacy of the
amendment 13 but the question does not here concern us, for this is a clear case of
partition by will, duly admitted to probate, which perforce must be given full validity
and effect. Aside from the provisions of Articles 906 and 907 above quoted, other
codal provisions support the executrix-appellee's project of partition as approved by
the lower court rather than the counter-project of partition proposed by oppositors-
appellants whereby they would reduce the testamentary disposition or partition made
by the testatrix to one-half and limit the same, which they would consider as mere
devises or legacies, to one-half of the estate as the disposable free portion, and apply
the other half of the estate to payment of the legitimes of the seven compulsory heirs.
Oppositors' proposal would amount substantially to a distribution by intestacy and pro
tanto nullify the testatrix' will, contrary to Article 791 of the Civil Code. It would further
run counter to the provisions of Article 1091 of the Civil Code that "(A) partition legally
made confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the property adjudicated to
him."
3. In Habana vs. Imbo, 14 the Court upheld the distribution made in the will of the
deceased testator Pedro Teves of two large coconut plantations in favor of his
daughter, Concepcion, as against adverse claims of other compulsory heirs, as being a
partition by will, which should be respected insofar as it does not prejudice the
legitime of the compulsory heirs, in accordance with Article 1080 of the Civil Code. In
upholding the sale made by Concepcion to a stranger of the plantations thus
partitioned in her favor in the deceased's will which was being questioned by the other
compulsory heirs, the Court ruled that "Concepcion Teves by operation of law, became
the absolute owner of said lots because 'A partition legally made confers upon each
heir the exclusive ownership of the property adjudicated to him' (Article 1091, New
Civil Code), from the death of her ancestors, subject to rights and obligations of the
latter, and, she can not be deprived of her rights thereto except by the methods
provided for by law (Arts. 657, 659, and 661, Civil Code). 15 Concepcion Teves could,
as she did, sell the lots in question as part of her share of the proposed partition of the
properties, especially when, as in the present case, the sale has been expressly
recognized by herself and her co-heirs ..."
4. The burden of oppositors' contention is that the testamentary dispositions in their
favor are in the nature of devises of real property, citing the testatrix' repeated use of
the words "I bequeath" in her assignment or distribution of her real properties to the
respective heirs. From this erroneous premise, they proceed to the equally erroneous
conclusion that "the legitime of the compulsory heirs passes to them by operation of
law and that the testator can only dispose of the free portion, that is, the remainder
of the estate after deducting the legitime of the compulsory heirs ... and all
testamentary dispositions, either in the nature of institution of heirs or of devises or
legacies, have to be taken from the remainder of the testator's estate constituting the
free portion." 16
Oppositors err in their premises, for the adjudications and assignments in the testatrix'
will of specific properties to specific heirs cannot be considered all devises, for it clearly
appear from the whole context of the will and the disposition by the testatrix of her
whole estate (save for some small properties of little value already noted at the
beginning of this opinion) that her clear intention was to partition her whole estate
through her will. The repeated use of the words "I bequeath" in her testamentary
dispositions acquire no legal significance, such as to convert the same into devises to
be taken solely from the free one-half disposable portion of the estate. Furthermore,
the testatrix' intent that her testamentary dispositions were by way of adjudications
to the beneficiaries as heirs and not as mere devisees, and that said dispositions were
therefore on account of the respective legitimes of the compulsory heirs is expressly
borne out in the fourth paragraph of her will, immediately following her testamentary
adjudications in the third paragraph in this wise: "FOURTH: I likewise command that
in case any of those I named as my heirs in this testament any of them shall die before
I do, his forced heirs under the law enforced at the time of my death shall inherit the
properties I bequeath to said deceased." 17
Oppositors' conclusions necessarily are in error. The testamentary dispositions of the
testatrix, being dispositions in favor of compulsory heirs, do not have to be taken only
from the free portion of the estate, as contended, for the second paragraph of Article
842 of the Civil Code precisely provides that "(O)ne who has compulsory heirs may
dispose of his estate provided he does not contravene the provisions of this Code with
regard to the legitime of said heirs." And even going by oppositors' own theory of
bequests, the second paragraph of Article 912 Civil Code covers precisely the case of
the executrix-appellee, who admittedly was favored by the testatrix with the large bulk
of her estate in providing that "(T)he devisee who is entitled to a legitime may retain
the entire property, provided its value does not exceed that of the disposable portion
and of the share pertaining to him as legitime." For "diversity of apportionment is the
usual reason for making a testament; otherwise, the decedent might as well die
intestate." 18 Fundamentally, of course, the dispositions by the testatrix constituted a
partition by will, which by mandate of Article 1080 of the Civil Code and of the other
cited codal provisions upholding the primacy of the testator's last will and testament,
have to be respected insofar as they do not prejudice the legitime of the other
compulsory heirs.
Oppositors' invoking of Article 1063 of the Civil Code that "(P)roperty left by will is not
deemed subject to collation, if the testator has not otherwise provided, but the
legitime shall in any case remain unimpaired" and invoking of the construction thereof
given by some authorities that "'not deemed subject to collation' in this article really
means not imputable to or chargeable against the legitime", while it may have some
plausibility 19 in an appropriate case, has no application in the present case. Here, we
have a case of a distribution and partition of the entire estate by the testatrix, without
her having made any previous donations during her lifetime which would require
collation to determine the legitime of each heir nor having left merely some properties
by will which would call for the application of Articles 1061 to 1063 of the Civil Code
on collation. The amount of the legitime of the heirs is here determined and
undisputed.
5. With this resolution of the decisive issue raised by oppositors-appellants, the
secondary issues are likewise necessarily resolved. Their right was merely to demand
completion of their legitime under Article 906 of the Civil Code and this has been
complied with in the approved project of partition, and they can no longer demand a
further share from the remaining portion of the estate, as bequeathed and partitioned
by the testatrix principally to the executrix-appellee.
Neither may the appellants legally insist on their legitime being completed with real
properties of the estate instead of being paid in cash, per the approved project of
partition. The properties are not available for the purpose, as the testatrix had
specifically partitioned and distributed them to her heirs, and the heirs are called
upon, as far as feasible to comply with and give effect to the intention of the testatrix
as solemnized in her will, by implementing her manifest wish of transmitting the real
properties intact to her named beneficiaries, principally the executrix-appellee. The
appraisal report of the properties of the estate as filed by the commissioner appointed
by the lower court was approved in toto upon joint petition of the parties, and hence,
there cannot be said to be any question — and none is presented — as to fairness of
the valuation thereof or that the legitime of the heirs in terms of cash has been
understated. The plaint of oppositors that the purchasing value of the Philippine peso
has greatly declined since the testatrix' death in January, 1961 provides no legal basis
or justification for overturning the wishes and intent of the testatrix. The transmission
of rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent
(Article 777, Civil Code) and accordingly, the value thereof must be reckoned as of
then, as otherwise, estates would never be settled if there were to be a revaluation
with every subsequent fluctuation in the values of the currency and properties of the
estate. There is evidence in the record that prior to November 25, 1964, one of the
oppositors, Bernardita, accepted the sum of P50,000.00 on account of her inheritance,
which, per the parties' manifestation, 20 "does not in any way affect the adjudication
made to her in the projects of partition of either party as the same is a mere advance
of the cash that she should receive in both projects of partition." The payment in cash
by way of making the proper adjustments in order to meet the requirements of the
law on non-impairment of legitimes as well as to give effect to the last will of the
testatrix has invariably been availed of and sanctioned. 21That her co-oppositors would
receive their cash differentials only now when the value of the currency has declined
further, whereas they could have received them earlier, like Bernardita, at the time of
approval of the project of partition and when the peso's purchasing value was higher,
is due to their own decision of pursuing the present appeal.
ACCORDINGLY, the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed. Without cost.
Vda. De Villanueva vs. Juico (4 SCRA 550) her husband's estate and in that proceeding, she was appointed judicial administratrix.
In due course of administration, she submitted a project of partition, now Exhibit "E".
LEONOR VILLAFLOR VDA. DE VILLANUEVA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. DELFIN N. JUICO, in
In the order of November 24, 1924, now exhibit "C", the probate court approved the
his capacity as Judicial Administrator of the testate estate of FAUSTA
project of partition and declared the proceeding closed. As the project of partition,
NEPOMUCENO,defendant-appellee.
Exhibit "E", now shows Doña Fausta Nepomuceno received by virtue thereof the
Amado G. Salazar for plaintiff-appellant.
ownership and possession of a considerable amount of real and personal estate. By
Sycip, Salazar, Luna and Associates for defendant-appellee.
virtue also of the said project of partition, she received the use and possession of all
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
the real and personal properties mentioned and referred to in Clause 7th of the will.
Subject to this direct appeal to us on points of law is the decision of the Court of First
The order approving the project of partition (Exh. "C"), however, expressly provided
Instance of Rizal, in its Civil Case No. Q-2809, dismissing plaintiff-appellant's complaint
that approval thereof was "sin perjuicio de lo dispuesto en la clausula 8.o del
for the recovery of certain properties that were originally owned by the plaintiff's
testamento de Nicolas Villaflor." .
granduncle, Nicolas Villaflor, and which he granted to his widow, Doña Fausta
On May 1, 1956, Doña Fausta Nepomuceno died without having contracted a second
Nepomuceno, bequeathing to her "su uso y posesion mientras viva y no se case en
marriage, and without having begotten any child with the deceased Nicolas Villaflor.
segundas nupcias".
Her estate is now being settled in Special Proceeding No. Q-1563 in the lower court,
The following facts appear of record: On October 9, 1908, Don Nicolas Villaflor, a
with the defendant Delfin N. Juico as the duly appointed and qualified judicial
wealthy man of Castillejos, Zambales, executed a will in Spanish in his own
handwriting, devising and bequeathing in favor of his wife, Dona Fausta Nepomuceno, administrator.
one-half of all his real and personal properties, giving the other half to his brother Don The plaintiff Leonor Villaflor Vda. de Villanueva is admitted to be the same Leonor
Fausto Villaflor. Villaflor mentioned by Don Nicolas Villaflor in his will as his "sobrina nieta Leonor
Clause 6th, containing the institution of heirs, reads as follows: . Villaflor".
SEXTO — En virtud de las facultades que me conceden las leyes, instituyo per Plaintiff Leonor Villaflor instituted the present action against the administrator of the
mis unicos y universales herederos de todos mis derechos y acciones a mi estate of the widow Fausta Nepomuceno, on February 8, 1958, contending that upon
hermano D. Fausto Villaflor y a mi esposa Da. Fausta Nepomuceno para que the widow's death, said plaintiff became vested with the ownership of the real and
partan todos mis bienes que me pertenescan, en iguales partes, para despues personal properties bequeathed by the late Nicolas Villaflor to clause 7 of his will,
de mi muerte, exceptuando las donaciones y legados que, abajo mi mas pursuant to its eight (8th) clause. Defendant's position, adopted by the trial court, is
expontanea voluntad, lo hago en la forma siguiente: . that the title to the properties aforesaid became absolutely vested in the widow upon
SEPTIMO: — Lego para dispues de mi muerte a mi esposa Da. Fausta her death, on account of the fact that she never remarried.
We agree with appellant that the plain desire and intent of the testator, as manifested
Nepomuceno, en prueba de mi amor y carino, los bienes, alhajas y muebles
in clause 8 of his testament, was to invest his widow with only a usufruct or life tenure
que a continuacion se expresan; .
OCTAVO: — Que estos legades disfrutaria mi referida esposa Da. Fausta in the properties described in the seventh clause, subject to the further condition
(admitted by the appellee) that if the widow remarried, her rights would thereupon
Nepomuceno su uso y posesion mientras viva y no se case en segundas
cease, even during her own lifetime. That the widow was meant to have no more than
nupcias, de la contrario, pasara a ser propiedad estos dichos legados de mi
a life interest in those properties, even if she did not remarry at all, is evident from the
sobrina nieta Leonor Villaflor.
expressions used by the deceased "uso y posesion mientras viva" (use and possession
The 12th clause of the will provided, however, that Clauses 6th and 7th thereof would
while alive) in which the first half of the phrase "uso y posesion" instead of "dominio"
be deemed annulled from the moment he bore any child with Doña Fausta
or "propiedad") reinforces the second ("mientras viva"). The testator plainly did not
Nepomuceno. Said Clause 12th reads as follows: .
give his widow the full ownership of these particular properties, but only the right to
DUODECIMO: — Quedan anulados las parrafos 6.0 y 7.0 de este testamento
their possession and use (or enjoyment) during her lifetime. This is in contrast with
que tratan de institucion de herederos y los legados que se haran despues de
the remainder of the estate in which she was instituted universal heir together with
mi muerte a favor de mi esposa, en el momento que podre tener la dicha de
contrar con hijo y hijos legitimos o legitimados, pues estos, conforme a ley the testator's brother (clause 6). 1äwphï1.ñët
SEXTO: — En virtud de las facultades que me conceden las leyes, instituyo
seran mis herederos.
por mis unicos y universales herederos de todos mis derechos y acciones a
Don Nicolas Villaflor died on March 3, 1922, without begetting any child with his wife
mi hermano D. Fausto Villaflor y a mi esposa Da. Fausta Nepomuceno para
Doña Fausta Nepomuceno. The latter, already a widow, thereupon instituted Special
que parten todos mis bienes que me pertenescan, en iguales partes, para
Proceeding No. 203 of the Court of First Instance of Zambales, for the settlement of
 despues de mi muerte, exceptuando las donaciones y legados que, abajo mi ofrece la menor duda, pueda sustituirse por ningun otro criterio de alguna de
mas expontanea voluntad, lo hago en la forma siguiente. los interesados, ni tampoco por el judicial. (Tribunal Supremo of Spain, Sent.
The court below, in holding that the appellant Leonor Villaflor, as reversionary legatee, 20 March 1918) .
could succeed to the properties bequeathed by clause 7 of the testament only in the The American decisions invoked by appellee in his brief inapplicable, because they
event that the widow remarried, has unwarrantedly discarded the expression involve cases where the only condition imposed on the legatee was that she should
"mientras viva," and considered the words "uso y posesion" as equivalent to "dominio" remain a widow. As already shown, the testament of Don Nicolas Villaflor clearly and
(ownership). In so doing, the trial court violated Article 791 of the Civil Code of the unmistakably provided that his widow should have the possession and use of the
Philippines, as well as section 59 of Rule 123 of the Rules of Court. legacies while alive and did not remarry. It necessarily follows that by the express
ART. 791. The words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will give provisions of the 8th clause of his will, the legacies should pass to the testator's
to every expression some effect, rather than one which will render any of the "sobrinanieta", appellant herein, upon the widow's death, even if the widow never
expressions inoperative; and of two modes of interpreting a will, that one is remarried in her lifetime. Consequently, the widow had no right to retain or dispose
to be preferred which will prevent intestacy." . of the aforesaid properties, and her estate is accountable to the reversionary legatee
SEC. 59. Instrument construed so as to give effect to all provisions. — In the for their return, unless they had been lost due to fortuitous event, or for their value
construction of an instrument where there are several provisions or should rights of innocent third parties have intervened.
particulars, such a construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will give effect PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is reversed, and the appellant
to all." . Leonor Villaflor Vda. de VILLANUEVA is declared entitled to the ownership and fruits
Speculation as to the motives of the testator in imposing the conditions contained in of the properties described in clause 7 of the will or testament, from the date of the
clause 7 of his testament should not be allowed to obscure the clear and unambiguous death of Doña Fausta Nepomuceno. The records are ordered remanded to the court
meaning of his plain words, which are over the primary source in ascertaining his of origin for liquidation, accounting and further proceedings conformably to this
intent. It is well to note that if the testator had intended to impose as sole condition decision. Costs against the Administrator-appellee.
the non-remarriage of his widow, the words "uso y posesion mientras viva" would
have been unnecessary, since the widow could only remarry during her own lifetime.
The Civil Code, in Article 790, p. 1 (Article 675 of the Code of 1889), expressly enjoins
the following: .
ART. 790. The words of a will are to be taken in their ordinary and
grammatical sense, unless a clear intention to use them in another sense can
be gathered, and that other can be ascertained." .
Technical words in a will are to be taken in their technical sense, unless the
context clearly indicates a contrary intention, or unless it satisfactorily
appears that the will was drawn solely by the testator, and that he was
unacquainted with such technical sense. (675a)
In consonance with this rule, this Supreme Court has laid the doctrine in In re Estate
of Calderon, 26 Phil., 233, that the intention and wishes of the testator, when clearly
expressed in his will, constitute the fixed law of interpretation, and all questions raised
at the trial, relative to its execution and fulfillment, must be settled in accordance
therewith, following the plain and literal meaning of the testator's words, unless
it clearly appears that his intention was otherwise. The same rule is adopted by the
Supreme Court of Spain (TS. Sent. 20 Marzo 1918; 28 Mayo 1918; 30 Abril 1913; 16
Enero 1915; 23 Oct. 1925).
La voluntad del testador, clara, precisa y constantemente expresada al
ordenar su ultimo voluntad, es ley unica, imperativa y obligatoria que han de
obedecer y cumplir fieldmente albaceas, legatarios y heredera, hoy sus
sucesores, sin que esa voluntad patente, que no ha menester de
interpretaciones, pues no ofrece la menor duda, pueda sustituirse, pues no
Del Rosario vs. Del Rosario (2 Phil 321) *not found*
Balanay, Jr. vs. Martinez (64 SCRA 452, G.R. No. L-39247 June 27,
1975) *refer to ART. 779
ARTICLE 789.
Estate of Rigor vs. Rigor (89 S 493)
G.R. No. L-22036 April 30, 1979
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE REVEREND FATHER PASCUAL RIGOR. THE PARISH PRIEST
OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH OF VICTORIA, TARLAC, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
BELINA RIGOR, NESTORA RIGOR, FRANCISCA ESCOBAR DE RIGOR and JOVITA ESCOBAR
DE FAUSTO, respondents-appellees.
D. Tañedo, Jr. for appellants.
J. Palanca, Sr. for appellee.
AQUINO, J.:
This case is about the efficaciousness or enforceability of a devise of ricelands located
at Guimba, Nueva Ecija, with a total area of around forty- four hectares That devise
was made in the will of the late Father Pascual Rigor, a native of Victoria Tarlac, in
favor of his nearest male relative who would study for the priesthood.
The parish priest of Victoria, who claimed to be a trustee of the said lands, appealed
to this Court from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the order of the
probate court declaring that the said devise was inoperative (Rigor vs. Parish Priest of
the Roman Catholic Church of Victoria, Tarlac, CA-G.R. No. 24319-R, August 1, 1963).
The record discloses that Father Rigor, the parish priest of Pulilan, Bulacan, died on
August 9, 1935, leaving a will executed on October 29, 1933 which was probated by
the Court of First Instance of Tarlac in its order of December 5, 1935. Named as
devisees in the will were the testators nearest relatives, namely, his three sisters:
Florencia Rigor-Escobar, Belina Rigor-Manaloto and Nestora Rigor-Quiambao. The
testator gave a devise to his cousin, Fortunato Gamalinda.
In addition, the will contained the following controversial bequest (paragraphing
supplied to facilitate comprehension of the testamentary provisions):
To implement the foregoing bequest, the administratix in 1940 submitted a project
containing the following item:
Doy y dejo como legado CUATRO (4) PARCELAS de terreno palayeros
situados en el municipiooo de Guimba de la provinciaaa de NUEVA
ECIJA, cuyo num. de CERTIFICADO DE TRANSFERENCIA DE TITULO
SON; — Titulo Num. 6530, mide 16,249 m. cuadrados de superficie
Titulo Num. 6548, mide 242,998 m. cuadrados de superficie y
annual 6525, mide 62,665 m. cuadrados de superficie; y Titulo Num.
6521, mide 119,251 m. cuadrados de superficie; a cualquier
pariente mio varon mas cercano que estudie la carrera eclesiatica
hasta ordenarse de Presbiterado o sea Sacerdote; las condiciones de
estate legado son;
(1.a) Prohibe en absoluto la venta de estos terrenos arriba situados
objectos de este legado;
(2.a) Que el legatario pariente mio mas cercano tendra derecho de
empezar a gozar y administrar de este legado al principiar a curzar
la Sagrada Teologio, y ordenado de Sacerdote, hasta su muerte;
pero que pierde el legatario este derecho de administrar y gozar de
este legado al dejar de continuar sus estudios para ordenarse de
Presbiterado (Sacerdote).
Que el legatario una vez Sacerdote ya estara obligado a celebrar
cada año VEINTE (20) Misas rezadas en sufragio de mi alma y de mis
padres difuntos, y si el actual legatario, quedase excomulgado, IPSO
FACTO se le despoja este legado, y la administracion de esto pasara
a cargo del actual Parroco y sus sucesores de la Iglecia Catolica de
Victoria, Tarlac.
Y en intervalo de tiempo que no haya legatario acondicionado segun
lo arriba queda expresado, pasara la administracion de este legado
a cargo del actual Parroco Catolico y sus sucesores, de Victoria,
Tarlac.
El Parroco administrador de estate legado, acumulara, anualmente
todos los productos que puede tener estate legado, ganando o
sacando de los productos anuales el CINCO (5) por ciento para su
administracion, y los derechos correspondientes de las VEINTE (20)
Misas rezadas que debiera el Parroco celebrar cada año,
depositando todo lo restante de los productos de estate legado, en
un banco, a nombre de estate legado.
5. LEGACY OF THE CHURCH
0
0
That it be adjudicated in favor of the legacy purported to be given
to the nearest male relative who shall take the priesthood, and in T 3 1 1 3
the interim to be administered by the actual Catholic Priest of the - 6 1 8 ,
Roman Catholic Church of Victoria, Tarlac, Philippines, or his 6 6 . 7 5
successors, the real properties hereinbelow indicated, to wit: 5 6 9 3 8
2 2 3 0
1 5 .
T L A T A
1 0
i o r a s
0
t t e x s
l N a D .
e o i e V Total amount and value — 44.1163 P13,090.00
N . n c a
o H . l Judge Roman A. Cruz in his order of August 15, 1940, approving the project of
. a u partition, directed that after payment of the obligations of the estate (including the
s e sum of P3,132.26 due to the church of the Victoria parish) the administratrix should
. deliver to the devisees their respective shares.
T 3 1 1 P
It may be noted that the administratrix and Judge Cruz did not bother to analyze the
- 6 . 8 3
meaning and implications of Father Rigor's bequest to his nearest male relative who
6 6 6 7 4
would study for the priesthood. Inasmuch as no nephew of the testator claimed the
5 3 2 4 0
devise and as the administratrix and the legal heirs believed that the parish priest of
3 4 0 .
Victoria had no right to administer the ricelands, the same were not delivered to that
0 9 0
ecclesiastic. The testate proceeding remained pending.
0

T 3
- 4
6 4
5 5
4 -
8 C
2 1 7 About thirteen years after the approval of the project of partition, or on February 19,
4 8 , 1954, the parish priest of Victoria filed in the pending testate proceeding a petition
. 7 2 praying for the appointment of a new administrator (succeeding the deceased
2 3 9 administration Florencia Rigor), who should deliver to the church the said ricelands,
9 0 0 and further praying that the possessors thereof be ordered to render an accounting
9 . of the fruits. The probate court granted the petition. A new administrator was
8 0 appointed. On January 31, 1957 the parish priest filed another petition for the delivery
0 of the ricelands to the church as trustee.

T 3 6 1 1 The intestate heirs of Father Rigor countered with a petition dated March 25, 1957
- 6 . 8 , praying that the bequest be d inoperative and that they be adjudged as the persons
6 7 2 7 8 entitled to the said ricelands since, as admitted by the parish priest of Victoria, "no
5 0 6 3 8 nearest male relative of" the testator "has ever studied for the priesthood" (pp. 25 and
2 6 6 0 35, Record on Appeal). That petition was opposed by the parish priest of Victoria.
5 5 .
Finding that petition to be meritorious, the lower court, through Judge Bernabe de
Aquino, declared the bequest inoperative and adjudicated the ricelands to the
testator's legal heirs in his order of June 28, 1957. The parish priest filed two motions
for reconsideration.
Judge De Aquino granted the respond motion for reconsideration in his order of
December 10, 1957 on the ground that the testator had a grandnephew named
Edgardo G. Cunanan (the grandson of his first cousin) who was a seminarian in the San
Jose Seminary of the Jesuit Fathers in Quezon City. The administrator was directed to
deliver the ricelands to the parish priest of Victoria as trustee.
effect to a will". (See Dissent of Justice Moreland in Santos vs. Manarang, 27 Phil. 209,
223, 237-8.)
One canon in the interpretation of the testamentary provisions is that "the testator's
intention is to be ascertained from the words of the wilt taking into consideration the
circumstances under which it was made", but excluding the testator's oral declarations
as to his intention (Art. 789, Civil Code of the Philippines).
To ascertain Father Rigor's intention, it may be useful to make the following re-
statement of the provisions of his will.

The legal heirs appealed to the Court of Appeals. It reversed that order. It held that 1. that he bequeathed the ricelands to anyone of his nearest male relatives who would
Father Rigor had created a testamentary trust for his nearest male relative who would pursue an ecclesiastical career until his ordination as a priest.
take the holy orders but that such trust could exist only for twenty years because to
enforce it beyond that period would violate "the rule against perpetuities. It ruled that 2. That the devisee could not sell the ricelands.
since no legatee claimed the ricelands within twenty years after the testator's death,
the same should pass to his legal heirs, citing articles 888 and 912(2) of the old Civil
3. That the devisee at the inception of his studies in sacred theology could enjoy and
Code and article 870 of the new Civil Code.
administer the ricelands, and once ordained as a priest, he could continue enjoying
and administering the same up to the time of his death but the devisee would cease
The parish priest in this appeal contends that the Court of Appeals erred in not finding to enjoy and administer the ricelands if he discontinued his studies for the priesthood.
that the testator created a public charitable trust and in not liberally construing the
testamentary provisions so as to render the trust operative and to prevent intestacy.
4. That if the devisee became a priest, he would be obligated to celebrate every year
twenty masses with prayers for the repose of the souls of Father Rigor and his parents.
As refutation, the legal heirs argue that the Court of Appeals d the bequest inoperative
because no one among the testator's nearest male relatives had studied for the
5. That if the devisee is excommunicated, he would be divested of the legacy and the
priesthood and not because the trust was a private charitable trust. According to the
administration of the riceland would pass to the incumbent parish priest of Victoria
legal heirs, that factual finding is binding on this Court. They point out that appellant
and his successors.
priest's change of theory cannot be countenanced in this appeal .
6. That during the interval of time that there is no qualified devisee as contemplated
In this case, as in cases involving the law of contracts and statutory construction,
above, the administration of the ricelands would be under the responsibility of the
where the intention of the contracting parties or of the lawmaking body is to be
incumbent parish priest of Victoria and his successors, and
ascertained, the primary issue is the determination of the testator's intention which is
the law of the case (dicat testor et erit lex. Santos vs. Manarang, 27 Phil. 209, 215;
7. That the parish priest-administrator of the ricelands would accumulate annually the
Rodriguez vs. Court of Appeals, L-28734, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 546).
products thereof, obtaining or getting from the annual produce five percent thereof
for his administration and the fees corresponding to the twenty masses with prayers
The will of the testator is the first and principal law in the matter of testaments. When
that the parish priest would celebrate for each year, depositing the balance of the
his intention is clearly and precisely expressed, any interpretation must be in accord
income of the devise in the bank in the name of his bequest.
with the plain and literal meaning of his words, except when it may certainly appear
that his intention was different from that literally expressed (In re Estate of Calderon,
From the foregoing testamentary provisions, it may be deduced that the testator
26 Phil. 333).
intended to devise the ricelands to his nearest male relative who would become a
priest, who was forbidden to sell the ricelands, who would lose the devise if he
The intent of the testator is the cardinal rule in the construction of wills." It is "the life
discontinued his studies for the priesthood, or having been ordained a priest, he was
and soul of a will It is "the first greatest rule, the sovereign guide, the polestar, in giving
excommunicated, and who would be obligated to say annually twenty masses with
prayers for the repose of the souls of the testator and his parents.
On the other hand, it is clear that the parish priest of Victoria would administer the
ricelands only in two situations: one, during the interval of time that no nearest male
relative of the testator was studying for the priesthood and two, in case the testator's
nephew became a priest and he was excommunicated.
What is not clear is the duration of "el intervalo de tiempo que no haya legatario
acondicionado", or how long after the testator's death would it be determined that he
had a nephew who would pursue an ecclesiastical vocation. It is that patent ambiguity
that has brought about the controversy between the parish priest of Victoria and the
testator's legal heirs.
Interwoven with that equivocal provision is the time when the nearest male relative
who would study for the priesthood should be determined. Did the testator
contemplate only his nearest male relative at the time of his death? Or did he have in
mind any of his nearest male relatives at anytime after his death?
We hold that the said bequest refers to the testator's nearest male relative living at
the time of his death and not to any indefinite time thereafter. "In order to be
capacitated to inherit, the heir, devisee or legatee must be living at the moment the
succession opens, except in case of representation, when it is proper" (Art. 1025, Civil
Code).
The said testamentary provisions should be sensibly or reasonably construed. To
construe them as referring to the testator's nearest male relative at anytime after his
death would render the provisions difficult to apply and create uncertainty as to the
disposition of his estate. That could not have been his intention.
In 1935, when the testator died, his nearest leagal heirs were his three sisters or
second-degree relatives, Mrs. Escobar, Mrs. Manaloto and Mrs. Quiambao. Obviously,
when the testator specified his nearest male relative, he must have had in mind his
nephew or a son of his sister, who would be his third-degree relative, or possibly a
grandnephew. But since he could not prognosticate the exact date of his death or state
with certitude what category of nearest male relative would be living at the time of
his death, he could not specify that his nearest male relative would be his nephew or
grandnephews (the son of his nephew or niece) and so he had to use the term "nearest
male relative".
It is contended by the legal heirs that the said devise was in reality intended for Ramon
Quiambao, the testator's nephew and godchild, who was the son of his sister, Mrs.
Quiambao. To prove that contention, the legal heirs presented in the lower court the
affidavit of Beatriz Gamalinda, the maternal grandmother of Edgardo Cunanan, who
deposed that after Father Rigor's death her own son, Valentin Gamalinda, Jr., did not
claim the devise, although he was studying for the priesthood at the San Carlos
Seminary, because she (Beatriz) knew that Father Rigor had intended that devise for
his nearest male relative beloning to the Rigor family (pp. 105-114, Record on Appeal).
Mrs. Gamalinda further deposed that her own grandchild, Edgardo G. Cunanan, was
not the one contemplated in Father Rigor's will and that Edgardo's father told her that
he was not consulted by the parish priest of Victoria before the latter filed his second
motion for reconsideration which was based on the ground that the testator's
grandnephew, Edgardo, was studying for the priesthood at the San Jose Seminary.
Parenthetically, it should be stated at this juncture that Edgardo ceased to be a
seminarian in 1961. For that reason, the legal heirs apprised the Court of Appeals that
the probate court's order adjudicating the ricelands to the parish priest of Victoria had
no more leg to stand on (p. 84, Appellant's brief).
Of course, Mrs. Gamalinda's affidavit, which is tantamount to evidence aliunde as to
the testator's intention and which is hearsay, has no probative value. Our opinion that
the said bequest refers to the testator's nephew who was living at the time of his
death, when his succession was opened and the successional rights to his estate
became vested, rests on a judicious and unbiased reading of the terms of the will.
Had the testator intended that the "cualquier pariente mio varon mas cercano que
estudie la camera eclesiatica" would include indefinitely anyone of his nearest male
relatives born after his death, he could have so specified in his will He must have
known that such a broad provision would suspend for an unlimited period of time the
efficaciousness of his bequest.
What then did the testator mean by "el intervalo de tiempo que no haya legatario
acondicionado"? The reasonable view is that he was referring to a situation whereby
his nephew living at the time of his death, who would like to become a priest, was still
in grade school or in high school or was not yet in the seminary. In that case, the parish
priest of Victoria would administer the ricelands before the nephew entered the
seminary. But the moment the testator's nephew entered the seminary, then he
would be entitled to enjoy and administer the ricelands and receive the fruits thereof.
In that event, the trusteeship would be terminated.
Following that interpretation of the will the inquiry would be whether at the time
Father Rigor died in 1935 he had a nephew who was studying for the priesthood or
who had manifested his desire to follow the ecclesiastical career. That query is
categorically answered in paragraph 4 of appellant priest's petitions of February 19,
1954 and January 31, 1957. He unequivocally alleged therein that "not male relative
of the late (Father) Pascual Rigor has ever studied for the priesthood" (pp. 25 and 35, SO ORDERED
Record on Appeal).

Inasmuch as the testator was not survived by any nephew who became a priest, the
unavoidable conclusion is that the bequest in question was ineffectual or inoperative.
Therefore, the administration of the ricelands by the parish priest of Victoria, as
envisaged in the wilt was likewise inoperative.

The appellant in contending that a public charitable trust was constituted by the
testator in is favor assumes that he was a trustee or a substitute devisee That
contention is untenable. A reading of the testamentary provisions regarding the
disputed bequest not support the view that the parish priest of Victoria was a trustee
or a substitute devisee in the event that the testator was not survived by a nephew
who became a priest.

It should be understood that the parish priest of Victoria could become a trustee only
when the testator's nephew living at the time of his death, who desired to become a
priest, had not yet entered the seminary or, having been ordained a priest, he was
excommunicated. Those two contingencies did not arise, and could not have arisen in
this case because no nephew of the testator manifested any intention to enter the
seminary or ever became a priest.

The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that this case is covered by article 888 of the old
Civil Code, now article 956, which provides that if "the bequest for any reason should
be inoperative, it shall be merged into the estate, except in cases of substitution and
those in which the right of accretion exists" ("el legado ... por qualquier causa, no tenga
efecto se refundira en la masa de la herencia, fuera de los casos de sustitucion y
derecho de acrecer").

This case is also covered by article 912(2) of the old Civil Code, now article 960 (2),
which provides that legal succession takes place when the will "does not dispose of all
that belongs to the testator." There being no substitution nor accretion as to the said
ricelands the same should be distributed among the testator's legal heirs. The effect
is as if the testator had made no disposition as to the said ricelands.

The Civil Code recognizes that a person may die partly testate and partly intestate, or
that there may be mixed succession. The old rule as to the indivisibility of the testator's
win is no longer valid. Thus, if a conditional legacy does not take effect, there will be
intestate succession as to the property recovered by the said legacy (Macrohon Ong
Ham vs. Saavedra, 51 Phil. 267).

We find no merit in the appeal The Appellate Court's decision is affirmed. Costs against
the petitioner.
Del Rosario vs. Del Rosario (2 Phil 321) *not found*
Rabadilla vs. CA (June 29, 2000) *refer to ART. 783*
ARTICLE 791 ten shares of Pampanga Sugar Development Company valued at P350.00) among her
above-named heirs.
Dizon Rivera vs. Dizon (33 SCRA 554)
Testate proceedings were in due course commenced2 and by order dated March 13,
1961, the last will and testament of the decedent was duly allowed and admitted to
MARINA DIZON-RIVERA, executrix-appellee, probate, and the appellee Marina Dizon-Rivera was appointed executrix of the
vs. testatrix' estate, and upon her filing her bond and oath of office, letters testamentary
ESTELA DIZON, TOMAS V. DIZON, BERNARDITA DIZON, JOSEFINA DIZON, ANGELINA were duly issued to her.
DIZON and LILIA DIZON, oppositors-appellants.
After the executrix filed her inventory of the estate, Dr. Adelaido Bernardo of Angeles,
Punzalan, Yabut & Eusebio for executrix-appellee. Pampanga was appointed commissioner to appraise the properties of the estate. He
filed in due course his report of appraisal and the same was approved in toto by the
Leonardo Abola for oppositors-appellants. lower court on December 12, 1963 upon joint petition of the parties.

The real and personal properties of the testatrix at the time of her death thus had a
total appraised value of P1,811,695.60, and the legitime of each of the seven
compulsory heirs amounted to P129,362.11.3 (¹/7 of the half of the estate reserved for
TEEHANKEE, J.: the legitime of legitimate children and descendants).4 In her will, the testatrix
"commanded that her property be divided" in accordance with her testamentary
Appeal from orders of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga approving the disposition, whereby she devised and bequeathed specific real properties comprising
practically the entire bulk of her estate among her six children and eight grandchildren.
Executrix-appellee's project of partition instead of Oppositors-Appellants' proposed
The appraised values of the real properties thus respectively devised by the testatrix
counter-project of partition.1
to the beneficiaries named in her will, are as follows:
On January 28, 1961, the testatrix, Agripina J. Valdez, a widow, died in Angeles,
1. Estela Dizon ....................................... P 98,474.80
Pampanga, and was survived by seven compulsory heirs, to wit, six legitimate children
2. Angelina Dizon .................................. 106,307.06
named Estela Dizon, Tomas V. Dizon, Bernardita Dizon, Marina Dizon (herein
3. Bernardita Dizon .................................. 51,968.17
executrix-appellee), Angelina Dizon and Josefina Dizon, and a legitimate
4. Josefina Dizon ...................................... 52,056.39
granddaughter named Lilia Dizon, who is the only legitimate child and heir of Ramon
Dizon, a pre-deceased legitimate son of the said decedent. Six of these seven 5. Tomas Dizon ....................................... 131,987.41
compulsory heirs (except Marina Dizon, the executrix-appellee) are the oppositors- 6. Lilia Dizon .............................................. 72,182.47
7. Marina Dizon ..................................... 1,148,063.71
appellants.
8. Pablo Rivera, Jr. ...................................... 69,280.00
9. Lilia Dizon, Gilbert Garcia,
The deceased testatrix left a last will executed on February 2, 1960 and written in the
Cayetano Dizon, Francisco Rivera,
Pampango dialect. Named beneficiaries in her will were the above-named compulsory
Agripina Ayson, Dioli or Jolly
heirs, together with seven other legitimate grandchildren, namely Pablo Rivera, Jr.,
Jimenez, Laureano Tiamzon ................. 72,540.00
Gilbert D. Garcia, Cayetano Dizon, Francisco Rivera, Agripina Ayson, Jolly Jimenez and
Total Value ...................... P1,801,960.01
Laureano Tiambon.
The executrix filed her project of partition dated February 5, 1964, in substance
In her will, the testatrix divided, distributed and disposed of all her properties
adjudicating the estate as follows:
appraised at P1,801,960.00 (except two small parcels of land appraised at P5,849.60,
household furniture valued at P2,500.00, a bank deposit in the sum of P409.95 and
(1) with the figure of P129,254.96 as legitime for a basis Marina
(exacultrix-appellee) and Tomas (appellant) are admittedly
 considered to have received in the will more than their respective
legitime, while the rest of the appellants, namely, Estela, Bernardita,
Angelina, Josefina and Lilia received less than their respective
legitime;
(2) thus, to each of the latter are adjudicated the properties
respectively given them in the will, plus cash and/or properties, to
complete their respective legitimes to P129,254.96; (3) on the other
hand, Marina and Tomas are adjudicated the properties that they
received in the will less the cash and/or properties necessary to
complete the prejudiced legitime mentioned in number 2 above;
(4) the adjudications made in the will in favor of the grandchildren
remain untouched.<äre||anº•1àw>
On the other hand oppositors submitted their own counter-project
of partition dated February 14, 1964, wherein they proposed the
distribution of the estate on the following basis:
(a) all the testamentary dispositions were proportionally reduced to
the value of one-half (½) of the entire estate, the value of the said
one-half (½) amounting to P905,534.78; (b) the shares of the
Oppositors-Appellants should consist of their legitime, plus the
devises in their favor proportionally reduced; (c) in payment of the
total shares of the appellants in the entire estate, the properties
devised to them plus other properties left by the Testatrix and/or
cash are adjudicated to them; and (d) to the grandchildren who are
not compulsory heirs are adjudicated the properties respectively
devised to them subject to reimbursement by Gilbert D. Garcia, et
al., of the sums by which the devise in their favor should be
proportionally reduced.
Under the oppositors' counter-project of partition, the testamentary disposition made
by the testatrix of practically her whole estate of P1,801,960.01, as above stated, were
proposed to be reduced to the amounts set forth after the names of the respective
heirs and devisees totalling one-half thereof as follows:
1. Estela Dizon ........................................... P
2. Angelina Dizon .........................................
3. Bernardita Dizon .......................................
4. Josefina Dizon ..........................................
5. Tomas V. Dizon .........................................
6. Lilia Dizon ..................................................
7. Marina Dizon ........................................... 576,938.82
8. Pablo Rivera, Jr. ......................................... 34,814.50
9. Grandchildren Gilbert Garcia et al .......... 36,452.80
T o t a l ................................................... P905,534.78
while the other half of the estate (P905,534.78) would be deemed as constituting the
legitime of the executrix-appellee and oppositors-appellants, to be divided among
them in seven equal parts of P129,362.11 as their respective legitimes.
The lower court, after hearing, sustained and approved the executrix' project of
partition, ruling that "(A)rticles 906 and 907 of the New Civil Code specifically provide
that when the legitime is impaired or prejudiced, the same shall be completed and
satisfied. While it is true that this process has been followed and adhered to in the two
projects of partition, it is observed that the executrix and the oppositors differ in
respect to the source from which the portion or portions shall be taken in order to
fully restore the impaired legitime. The proposition of the oppositors, if upheld, will
substantially result in a distribution of intestacy, which is in controversion of Article
791 of the New Civil Code" adding that "the testatrix has chosen to favor certain heirs
in her will for reasons of her own, cannot be doubted. This is legally permissible within
the limitation of the law, as aforecited." With reference to the payment in cash of
some P230,552.38, principally by the executrix as the largest beneficiary of the will to
be paid to her five co-heirs, the oppositors (excluding Tomas Dizon), to complete their
impaired legitimes, the lower court ruled that "(T)he payment in cash so as to make
the proper adjustment to meet with the requirements of the law in respect to
legitimes which have been impaired is, in our opinion, a practical and valid solution in
order to give effect to the last wishes of the testatrix."
From the lower court's orders of approval, oppositors-appellants have filed this
appeal, and raise anew the following issues: .
1. Whether or not the testamentary dispositions made in the testatrix' will are in the
nature of devises imputable to the free portion of her estate, and therefore subject to
reduction;
2. Whether the appellants are entitled to the devise plus their legitime under Article
1063, or merely to demand completion of their legitime under Article 906 of the Civil
49,485.56 Code; and
53,421.42
26,115.04 3. Whether the appellants may be compelled to accept payment in cash on account
26,159.38 of their legitime, instead of some of the real properties left by the Testatrix;
65,874.04
36,273.13 which were adversely decided against them in the proceedings below.
The issues raised present a matter of determining the avowed intention of the
testatrix which is "the life and soul of a will."5 In consonance therewith, our Civil Code
included the new provisions found in Articles 788 and 791 thereof that "(I)f a
testamentary disposition admits of different interpretations, in case of doubt, that
interpretation by which the disposition is to be operative shall be preferred" and
"(T)he words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will give to every
expression some effect, rather than one which will render any of the expressions
inoperative; and of two modes of interpreting a will, that is to be preferred which will
prevent intestacy." In Villanueva vs. Juico6 for violation of these rules of interpretation
as well as of Rule 123, section 59 of the old Rules of Court, 7 the Court, speaking
through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, overturned the lower court's decision and stressed
that "the intention and wishes of the testator, when clearly expressed in his will,
constitute the fixed law of interpretation, and all questions raised at the trial, relative
to its execution and fulfillment, must be settled in accordance therewith, following the
plain and literal meaning of the testator's words, unless it clearly appears that his
intention was otherwise." 8
The testator's wishes and intention constitute the first and principal law in the matter
of testaments, and to paraphrase an early decision of the Supreme Court of
Spain, 9 when expressed clearly and precisely in his last will amount to the only law
whose mandate must imperatively be faithfully obeyed and complied with by his
executors, heirs and devisees and legatees, and neither these interested parties nor
the courts may substitute their own criterion for the testator's will. Guided and
restricted by these fundamental premises, the Court finds for the appellee.
1. Decisive of the issues at bar is the fact that the testatrix' testamentary disposition
was in the nature of a partition of her estate by will. Thus, in the third paragraph of
her will, after commanding that upon her death all her obligations as well as the
expenses of her last illness and funeral and the expenses for probate of her last will
and for the administration of her property in accordance with law, be paid, she
expressly provided that "it is my wish and I command that my property be divided" in
accordance with the dispositions immediately thereafter following, whereby she
specified each real property in her estate and designated the particular heir among
her seven compulsory heirs and seven other grandchildren to whom she bequeathed
the same. This was a valid partition 10 of her estate, as contemplated and authorized
in the first paragraph of Article 1080 of the Civil Code, providing that "(S)hould a
person make a partition of his estate by an act inter vivos or by will, such partition shall
be respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs."
This right of a testator to partition his estate is subject only to the right of compulsory
heirs to their legitime. The Civil Code thus provides the safeguard for the right of such
compulsory heirs:
ART. 906. Any compulsory heir to whom the testator has left by any
title less than the legitime belonging to him may demand that the
same be fully satisfied.
ART. 907. Testamentary dispositions that impair or diminish the
legitime of the compulsory heirs shall be reduced on petition of the
same, insofar as they may be inofficious or excessive.
This was properly complied with in the executrix-appellee's project
of partition, wherein the five oppositors-appellants namely Estela,
Bernardita, Angelina, Josefina and Lilia, were adjudicated the
properties respectively distributed and assigned to them by the
testatrix in her will, and the differential to complete their respective
legitimes of P129,362.11 each were taken from the cash and/or
properties of the executrix-appellee, Marina, and their co-
oppositor-appellant, Tomas, who admittedly were favored by the
testatrix and received in the partition by will more than their
respective legitimes.
2. This right of a testator to partition his estate by will was recognized even in Article
1056 of the old Civil Code which has been reproduced now as Article 1080 of the
present Civil Code. The only amendment in the provision was that Article 1080 "now
permits any person (not a testator, as under the old law) to partition his estate by
act inter vivos." 11 This was intended to repeal the then prevailing doctrine 12 that for
a testator to partition his estate by an act inter vivos, he must first make a will with all
the formalities provided by law. Authoritative commentators doubt the efficacy of the
amendment 13 but the question does not here concern us, for this is a clear case of
partition by will, duly admitted to probate, which perforce must be given full validity
and effect. Aside from the provisions of Articles 906 and 907 above quoted, other
codal provisions support the executrix-appellee's project of partition as approved by
the lower court rather than the counter-project of partition proposed by oppositors-
appellants whereby they would reduce the testamentary disposition or partition made
by the testatrix to one-half and limit the same, which they would consider as mere
devises or legacies, to one-half of the estate as the disposable free portion, and apply
the other half of the estate to payment of the legitimes of the seven compulsory heirs.
Oppositors' proposal would amount substantially to a distribution by intestacy and pro
tanto nullify the testatrix' will, contrary to Article 791 of the Civil Code. It would further
run counter to the provisions of Article 1091 of the Civil Code that "(A) partition legally
made confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the property adjudicated to
him."
3. In Habana vs. Imbo, 14 the Court upheld the distribution made in the will of the
deceased testator Pedro Teves of two large coconut plantations in favor of his
daughter, Concepcion, as against adverse claims of other compulsory heirs, as being a
partition by will, which should be respected insofar as it does not prejudice the
legitime of the compulsory heirs, in accordance with Article 1080 of the Civil Code. In
upholding the sale made by Concepcion to a stranger of the plantations thus
partitioned in her favor in the deceased's will which was being questioned by the other
compulsory heirs, the Court ruled that "Concepcion Teves by operation of law, became
the absolute owner of said lots because 'A partition legally made confers upon each
heir the exclusive ownership of the property adjudicated to him' (Article 1091, New
Civil Code), from the death of her ancestors, subject to rights and obligations of the
latter, and, she can not be deprived of her rights thereto except by the methods
provided for by law (Arts. 657, 659, and 661, Civil Code). 15 Concepcion Teves could,
as she did, sell the lots in question as part of her share of the proposed partition of the
properties, especially when, as in the present case, the sale has been expressly
recognized by herself and her co-heirs ..."
4. The burden of oppositors' contention is that the testamentary dispositions in their
favor are in the nature of devises of real property, citing the testatrix' repeated use of
the words "I bequeath" in her assignment or distribution of her real properties to the
respective heirs. From this erroneous premise, they proceed to the equally erroneous
conclusion that "the legitime of the compulsory heirs passes to them by operation of
law and that the testator can only dispose of the free portion, that is, the remainder
of the estate after deducting the legitime of the compulsory heirs ... and all
testamentary dispositions, either in the nature of institution of heirs or of devises or
legacies, have to be taken from the remainder of the testator's estate constituting the
free portion." 16
Oppositors err in their premises, for the adjudications and assignments in the testatrix'
will of specific properties to specific heirs cannot be considered all devises, for it clearly
appear from the whole context of the will and the disposition by the testatrix of her
whole estate (save for some small properties of little value already noted at the
beginning of this opinion) that her clear intention was to partition her whole estate
through her will. The repeated use of the words "I bequeath" in her testamentary
dispositions acquire no legal significance, such as to convert the same into devises to
be taken solely from the free one-half disposable portion of the estate. Furthermore,
the testatrix' intent that her testamentary dispositions were by way of adjudications
to the beneficiaries as heirs and not as mere devisees, and that said dispositions were
therefore on account of the respective legitimes of the compulsory heirs is expressly
borne out in the fourth paragraph of her will, immediately following her testamentary
adjudications in the third paragraph in this wise: "FOURTH: I likewise command that
in case any of those I named as my heirs in this testament any of them shall die before
I do, his forced heirs under the law enforced at the time of my death shall inherit the
properties I bequeath to said deceased." 17
Oppositors' conclusions necessarily are in error. The testamentary dispositions of the
testatrix, being dispositions in favor of compulsory heirs, do not have to be taken only
from the free portion of the estate, as contended, for the second paragraph of Article
842 of the Civil Code precisely provides that "(O)ne who has compulsory heirs may
dispose of his estate provided he does not contravene the provisions of this Code with
regard to the legitime of said heirs." And even going by oppositors' own theory of
bequests, the second paragraph of Article 912 Civil Code covers precisely the case of
the executrix-appellee, who admittedly was favored by the testatrix with the large bulk
of her estate in providing that "(T)he devisee who is entitled to a legitime may retain
the entire property, provided its value does not exceed that of the disposable portion
and of the share pertaining to him as legitime." For "diversity of apportionment is the
usual reason for making a testament; otherwise, the decedent might as well die
intestate." 18 Fundamentally, of course, the dispositions by the testatrix constituted a
partition by will, which by mandate of Article 1080 of the Civil Code and of the other
cited codal provisions upholding the primacy of the testator's last will and testament,
have to be respected insofar as they do not prejudice the legitime of the other
compulsory heirs.
Oppositors' invoking of Article 1063 of the Civil Code that "(P)roperty left by will is not
deemed subject to collation, if the testator has not otherwise provided, but the
legitime shall in any case remain unimpaired" and invoking of the construction thereof
given by some authorities that "'not deemed subject to collation' in this article really
means not imputable to or chargeable against the legitime", while it may have some
plausibility 19 in an appropriate case, has no application in the present case. Here, we
have a case of a distribution and partition of the entire estate by the testatrix, without
her having made any previous donations during her lifetime which would require
collation to determine the legitime of each heir nor having left merely some properties
by will which would call for the application of Articles 1061 to 1063 of the Civil Code
on collation. The amount of the legitime of the heirs is here determined and
undisputed.
5. With this resolution of the decisive issue raised by oppositors-appellants, the
secondary issues are likewise necessarily resolved. Their right was merely to demand
completion of their legitime under Article 906 of the Civil Code and this has been
complied with in the approved project of partition, and they can no longer demand a
further share from the remaining portion of the estate, as bequeathed and partitioned
by the testatrix principally to the executrix-appellee.
Neither may the appellants legally insist on their legitime being completed with real
properties of the estate instead of being paid in cash, per the approved project of
partition. The properties are not available for the purpose, as the testatrix had
specifically partitioned and distributed them to her heirs, and the heirs are called
upon, as far as feasible to comply with and give effect to the intention of the testatrix
as solemnized in her will, by implementing her manifest wish of transmitting the real
properties intact to her named beneficiaries, principally the executrix-appellee. The
appraisal report of the properties of the estate as filed by the commissioner appointed
by the lower court was approved in toto upon joint petition of the parties, and hence,
there cannot be said to be any question — and none is presented — as to fairness of
the valuation thereof or that the legitime of the heirs in terms of cash has been
understated. The plaint of oppositors that the purchasing value of the Philippine peso
has greatly declined since the testatrix' death in January, 1961 provides no legal basis
or justification for overturning the wishes and intent of the testatrix. The transmission
of rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent
(Article 777, Civil Code) and accordingly, the value thereof must be reckoned as of
then, as otherwise, estates would never be settled if there were to be a revaluation
with every subsequent fluctuation in the values of the currency and properties of the
estate. There is evidence in the record that prior to November 25, 1964, one of the
oppositors, Bernardita, accepted the sum of P50,000.00 on account of her inheritance,
which, per the parties' manifestation, 20 "does not in any way affect the adjudication
made to her in the projects of partition of either party as the same is a mere advance
of the cash that she should receive in both projects of partition." The payment in cash
by way of making the proper adjustments in order to meet the requirements of the
law on non-impairment of legitimes as well as to give effect to the last will of the
testatrix has invariably been availed of and sanctioned. 21That her co-oppositors would
receive their cash differentials only now when the value of the currency has declined
further, whereas they could have received them earlier, like Bernardita, at the time of
approval of the project of partition and when the peso's purchasing value was higher,
is due to their own decision of pursuing the present appeal.

ACCORDINGLY, the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed. Without cost.
Vda. De Villaflor vs. Juico (February 28, 1962)
G.R. No. L-15737 February 28, 1962
LEONOR VILLAFLOR VDA. DE VILLANUEVA, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
DELFIN N. JUICO, in his capacity as Judicial Administrator of the testate estate of FAUSTA
NEPOMUCENO,defendant-appellee.
Amado G. Salazar for plaintiff-appellant.
Sycip, Salazar, Luna and Associates for defendant-appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Subject to this direct appeal to us on points of law is the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, in its Civil Case No. Q-2809, dismissing plaintiff-appellant's complaint
for the recovery of certain properties that were originally owned by the plaintiff's
granduncle, Nicolas Villaflor, and which he granted to his widow, Doña Fausta
Nepomuceno, bequeathing to her "su uso y posesion mientras viva y no se case en
segundas nupcias".
The following facts appear of record: On October 9, 1908, Don Nicolas Villaflor, a
wealthy man of Castillejos, Zambales, executed a will in Spanish in his own
handwriting, devising and bequeathing in favor of his wife, Dona Fausta Nepomuceno,
one-half of all his real and personal properties, giving the other half to his brother Don
Fausto Villaflor.
Clause 6th, containing the institution of heirs, reads as follows: .
SEXTO — En virtud de las facultades que me conceden las leyes, instituyo per
mis unicos y universales herederos de todos mis derechos y acciones a mi
hermano D. Fausto Villaflor y a mi esposa Da. Fausta Nepomuceno para que
partan todos mis bienes que me pertenescan, en iguales partes, para despues
de mi muerte, exceptuando las donaciones y legados que, abajo mi mas
expontanea voluntad, lo hago en la forma siguiente: .
SEPTIMO: — Lego para dispues de mi muerte a mi esposa Da. Fausta
Nepomuceno, en prueba de mi amor y carino, los bienes, alhajas y muebles
que a continuacion se expresan; .
OCTAVO: — Que estos legades disfrutaria mi referida esposa Da. Fausta
Nepomuceno su uso y posesion mientras viva y no se case en segundas
nupcias, de la contrario, pasara a ser propiedad estos dichos legados de mi
sobrina nieta Leonor Villaflor.
The 12th clause of the will provided, however, that Clauses 6th and 7th thereof would
be deemed annulled from the moment he bore any child with Doña Fausta
Nepomuceno. Said Clause 12th reads as follows: .
DUODECIMO: — Quedan anulados las parrafos 6.0 y 7.0 de este testamento
que tratan de institucion de herederos y los legados que se haran despues de
mi muerte a favor de mi esposa, en el momento que podre tener la dicha de
contrar con hijo y hijos legitimos o legitimados, pues estos, conforme a ley
seran mis herederos.
Don Nicolas Villaflor died on March 3, 1922, without begetting any child with his wife
Doña Fausta Nepomuceno. The latter, already a widow, thereupon instituted Special
Proceeding No. 203 of the Court of First Instance of Zambales, for the settlement of
her husband's estate and in that proceeding, she was appointed judicial administratrix.
In due course of administration, she submitted a project of partition, now Exhibit "E".
In the order of November 24, 1924, now exhibit "C", the probate court approved the
project of partition and declared the proceeding closed. As the project of partition,
Exhibit "E", now shows Doña Fausta Nepomuceno received by virtue thereof the
ownership and possession of a considerable amount of real and personal estate. By
virtue also of the said project of partition, she received the use and possession of all
the real and personal properties mentioned and referred to in Clause 7th of the will.
The order approving the project of partition (Exh. "C"), however, expressly provided
that approval thereof was "sin perjuicio de lo dispuesto en la clausula 8.o del
testamento de Nicolas Villaflor." .
On May 1, 1956, Doña Fausta Nepomuceno died without having contracted a second
marriage, and without having begotten any child with the deceased Nicolas Villaflor.
Her estate is now being settled in Special Proceeding No. Q-1563 in the lower court,
with the defendant Delfin N. Juico as the duly appointed and qualified judicial
administrator.
The plaintiff Leonor Villaflor Vda. de Villanueva is admitted to be the same Leonor
Villaflor mentioned by Don Nicolas Villaflor in his will as his "sobrina nieta Leonor
Villaflor".
Plaintiff Leonor Villaflor instituted the present action against the administrator of the
estate of the widow Fausta Nepomuceno, on February 8, 1958, contending that upon
the widow's death, said plaintiff became vested with the ownership of the real and
personal properties bequeathed by the late Nicolas Villaflor to clause 7 of his will,
pursuant to its eight (8th) clause. Defendant's position, adopted by the trial court, is
that the title to the properties aforesaid became absolutely vested in the widow upon
her death, on account of the fact that she never remarried.
We agree with appellant that the plain desire and intent of the testator, as manifested
in clause 8 of his testament, was to invest his widow with only a usufruct or life tenure
in the properties described in the seventh clause, subject to the further condition
(admitted by the appellee) that if the widow remarried, her rights would thereupon
cease, even during her own lifetime. That the widow was meant to have no more than
a life interest in those properties, even if she did not remarry at all, is evident from the
expressions used by the deceased "uso y posesion mientras viva" (use and possession
while alive) in which the first half of the phrase "uso y posesion" instead of "dominio"
or "propiedad") reinforces the second ("mientras viva"). The testator plainly did not
give his widow the full ownership of these particular properties, but only the right to
their possession and use (or enjoyment) during her lifetime. This is in contrast with
the remainder of the estate in which she was instituted universal heir together with
the testator's brother (clause 6). 1äwphï1.ñët
SEXTO: — En virtud de las facultades que me conceden las leyes, instituyo
por mis unicos y universales herederos de todos mis derechos y acciones a
mi hermano D. Fausto Villaflor y a mi esposa Da. Fausta Nepomuceno para
que parten todos mis bienes que me pertenescan, en iguales partes, para
despues de mi muerte, exceptuando las donaciones y legados que, abajo mi
mas expontanea voluntad, lo hago en la forma siguiente.
The court below, in holding that the appellant Leonor Villaflor, as reversionary legatee,
could succeed to the properties bequeathed by clause 7 of the testament only in the
event that the widow remarried, has unwarrantedly discarded the expression
"mientras viva," and considered the words "uso y posesion" as equivalent to "dominio"
(ownership). In so doing, the trial court violated Article 791 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, as well as section 59 of Rule 123 of the Rules of Court.
ART. 791. The words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will give
to every expression some effect, rather than one which will render any of the
expressions inoperative; and of two modes of interpreting a will, that one is
to be preferred which will prevent intestacy." .
SEC. 59. Instrument construed so as to give effect to all provisions. — In the
construction of an instrument where there are several provisions or
particulars, such a construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will give effect
to all." .
Speculation as to the motives of the testator in imposing the conditions contained in
clause 7 of his testament should not be allowed to obscure the clear and unambiguous
meaning of his plain words, which are over the primary source in ascertaining his
intent. It is well to note that if the testator had intended to impose as sole condition
the non-remarriage of his widow, the words "uso y posesion mientras viva" would
have been unnecessary, since the widow could only remarry during her own lifetime.
The Civil Code, in Article 790, p. 1 (Article 675 of the Code of 1889), expressly enjoins
the following: .
ART. 790. The words of a will are to be taken in their ordinary and
grammatical sense, unless a clear intention to use them in another sense can
be gathered, and that other can be ascertained." .
Technical words in a will are to be taken in their technical sense, unless the
context clearly indicates a contrary intention, or unless it satisfactorily
appears that the will was drawn solely by the testator, and that he was
unacquainted with such technical sense. (675a)
In consonance with this rule, this Supreme Court has laid the doctrine in In re Estate
of Calderon, 26 Phil., 233, that the intention and wishes of the testator, when clearly
expressed in his will, constitute the fixed law of interpretation, and all questions raised
at the trial, relative to its execution and fulfillment, must be settled in accordance
therewith, following the plain and literal meaning of the testator's words, unless
it clearly appears that his intention was otherwise. The same rule is adopted by the
Supreme Court of Spain (TS. Sent. 20 Marzo 1918; 28 Mayo 1918; 30 Abril 1913; 16
Enero 1915; 23 Oct. 1925).
La voluntad del testador, clara, precisa y constantemente expresada al
ordenar su ultimo voluntad, es ley unica, imperativa y obligatoria que han de
obedecer y cumplir fieldmente albaceas, legatarios y heredera, hoy sus
sucesores, sin que esa voluntad patente, que no ha menester de
interpretaciones, pues no ofrece la menor duda, pueda sustituirse, pues no
ofrece la menor duda, pueda sustituirse por ningun otro criterio de alguna de
los interesados, ni tampoco por el judicial. (Tribunal Supremo of Spain, Sent.
20 March 1918) .
The American decisions invoked by appellee in his brief inapplicable, because they
involve cases where the only condition imposed on the legatee was that she should
remain a widow. As already shown, the testament of Don Nicolas Villaflor clearly and
unmistakably provided that his widow should have the possession and use of the
legacies while alive and did not remarry. It necessarily follows that by the express
provisions of the 8th clause of his will, the legacies should pass to the testator's
"sobrinanieta", appellant herein, upon the widow's death, even if the widow never
remarried in her lifetime. Consequently, the widow had no right to retain or dispose
of the aforesaid properties, and her estate is accountable to the reversionary legatee
for their return, unless they had been lost due to fortuitous event, or for their value
should rights of innocent third parties have intervened.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is reversed, and the appellant
Leonor Villaflor Vda. de VILLANUEVA is declared entitled to the ownership and fruits
of the properties described in clause 7 of the will or testament, from the date of the
death of Doña Fausta Nepomuceno. The records are ordered remanded to the court
of origin for liquidation, accounting and further proceedings conformably to this
decision. Costs against the Administrator-appellee.
Yambao vs. Gonzales (1 SCRA 1157) It appears that on August 10, 1942, Maria Gonzales executed a will bequeathing to
appellees all her properties situated in Sta. Rosa, Laguna. The will was probated in
1948. Immediately, thereafter, appellant went to appellees to request that he be
placed as tenant of the riceland which, by an express provision of said will, they were
G.R. No. L-10763 April 29, 1961
directed to give to him for cultivation, as tenant, and when they refused alleging that
they had already given it to another tenant he filed the present action.
DELFIN YAMBAO, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
In holding that the provisions of the will relied upon by appellant imposes only
ANGELINA GONZALES, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
a moral but not a legal obligation, the trial court went on to consider the import of the
word "Pahihintulutan" employed with reference to appellant. In its opinion said word
Marcial G. Mendiola for plaintiff-appellant. only means to permit or to allow, but not to direct appellees to appoint appellant as
Onofre P. Guevara for defendants-appellees. tenant. Rather, it opines, it merely contains a suggestion to employ because the
testatrix did not use the words "ipinaguutos ko" which she used in connection with
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.: other provisions of the will, so that there is no clear indication that it was her intention
to make such provision compulsory.
This is an action filed by Delfin Yambao against Angelina Gonzales and Maria Pablo
praying that the latter be ordered to appoint and employ him as tenant during his We believe, however, that the trial court has not properly interpreted the real import
lifetime on the parcels of land bequeathed to and inherited by them from Maria of the wish of the testatrix. Analyzing it carefully we will find that the same contains a
Gonzales, as well as to deliver to him the value of the harvests belonging to him as clear directive to employ appellant as may be seen from the words preceding the word
tenant of said parcels of land. In their answer, defendants averred that the provisions "pahihintulutan", which say: "Dapat din naman malaman ng dalawa kong
of the will relied upon by plaintiff is not mandatory; that the determination of who tagapagmana na sila MARIA PABLO at ANGELINA GONZALES na sila ay may dapat
should be the tenant of the land is vested in a special court; and that the present action TUNGKULIN O GANGPANAN GAYA ng mga sumusunod." The words 'dapat TUNGKULIN
is not the proper remedy. O GANGPANAN" mean to do or to carry out as a mandate or directive, and having
reference to the word "pahihintulutan", can convey no other meaning than to impose
After trial, the court dismissed the complaint for lack of sufficient cause of action. It a duty upon appellees. To follow the interpretation given by the trial court would be
held that the provisions of the will relied upon by plaintiff merely amount to a to devoid the wish of the testatrix of its real and true meaning.
suggestion to the defendants who, though morally bound, are not legally compelled
to follow said suggestion, invoking as authority Article 797 of the old Civil Code. Article 797 of the old Civil Code, invoked by the trial court, is inapplicable. That refers
Plaintiff has appealed. to an institution of an heir intended to be conditional by providing that a statement to
the effect cannot be considered as a condition unless it appears clearly that such is
The pertinent provisions of the will relied upon by appellant read as follows: the intention of the testator. We are not faced here with any conditional institution of
heirship. What we have is a clear-cut mandate which the heirs cannot fail to carry out.
Dapat din naman malaman ng dalawa kong tagapagmana na sila MARIA
PABLO at ANGELINA GONZALES na sila ay may dapat TUNGKULIN O WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed. Appellees are hereby ordered
GANGPANAN GAYA ng mga sumusunod: to employ appellant as tenant immediately after this decision has become final. Costs
against appellees.
xxx xxx xxx

(2) Pahihintulutan nila na si Delfin Yambao ang makapagtrabajo ng bukid

habang panahon, at ang nasabing bukid ay isasailalim ng pamamahala ng
Albasea samantalang ang bukid ay nasa usapin at may utang pa.
ARTICLE 792.
Balanay, Jr. vs. Martinez (64 SCRA 452, G.R. No. L-39247 June 27,
1975)
In the Matter of the Petition to Approve the Will of Leodegaria Julian. FELIX BALANAY,
JR., petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch VI;
AVELINA B. ANTONIO and DELIA B. LANABAN, respondents.
Roberto M. Sarenas for petitioner.
Jose B. Guyo for private respondents.
AQUINO, J.:
Felix Balanay, Jr. appealed by certiorari from the order of the Court of First Instance of
Davao dated February 28, 1974, declaring illegal and void the will of his mother,
Leodegaria Julian, converting the testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding and
ordering the issuance of the corresponding notice to creditors (Special Case No. 1808).
The antecedents of the appeal are as follows:
Leodegaria Julian, a native of Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur, died on February 12, 1973 in Davao
City at the age of sixty-seven. She was survived by her husband, Felix Balanay, Sr., and
by their six legitimate children named Felix Balanay, Jr., Avelina B. Antonio, Beatriz B.
Solamo, Carolina B. Manguiob, Delia B. Lanaban and Emilia B. Pabaonon.
Felix J. Balanay, Jr. filed in the lower court a petition dated February 27, 1973 for the
probate of his mother's notarial will dated September 5, 1970 which is written in
English. In that will Leodegaria Julian declared (a) that she was the owner of the
"southern half of nine conjugal lots (par. II); (b) that she was the absolute owner of
two parcels of land which she inherited from her father (par. III), and (c) that it was
her desire that her properties should not be divided among her heirs during her
husband's lifetime and that their legitimes should be satisfied out of the fruits of her
properties (Par. IV).
Then, in paragraph V of the will she stated that after her husband's death (he was
eighty-two years old in 1973) her paraphernal lands and all the conjugal lands (which
she described as "my properties") should be divided and distributed in the manner set
forth in that part of her will. She devised and partitioned the conjugal lands as if they
were all owned by her. She disposed of in the will her husband's one half share of the
conjugal assets. *
Felix Balanay, Sr. and Avelina B. Antonio opposed the probate of the will on the
grounds of lack of testamentary capacity, undue influence, preterition of the husband
and alleged improper partition of the conjugal estate. The oppositors claimed that
Felix Balanay, Jr. should collate certain properties which he had received from the
testatrix.
Felix Balanay, Jr., in his reply to the opposition, attached thereto an affidavit of Felix
Balanay, Sr. dated April 18, 1973 wherein he withdrew his opposition to the probate
of the will and affirmed that he was interested in its probate. On the same date Felix
Balanay, Sr. signed an instrument captioned "Conformation (sic) of Division and
Renunciation of Hereditary Rights" wherein he manifested that out of respect for his
wife's will he "waived and renounced' his hereditary rights in her estate in favor of
their six children. In that same instrument he confirmed the agreement, which he and
his wife had perfected before her death, that their conjugal properties would be
partitioned in the manner indicated in her will.
Avelina B. Antonio, an oppositor, in her rejoinder contended that the affidavit and
"conformation" of Felix Balanay, Sr. were void. The lower court in its order of June 18,
1973 "denied" the opposition and reset for hearing the probate of the will. It gave
effect to the affidavit and conformity of Felix Balanay, Sr. In an order dated August 28,
1973 it appointed its branch clerk of court as special administrator of the decedent's
estate.
Mrs. Antonio moved for the reconsideration of the lower court's order of June 18,
1973 on the grounds (a) that the testatrix illegally claimed that she was the owner of
the southern half of the conjugal lots and (b) that she could not partition the conjugal
estate by allocating portions of the nine lots to her children. Felix Balanay, Jr., through
his counsel, Hermenegildo Cabreros, opposed that motion. The lower court denied it
in its order of October 15, 1973.
In the meanwhile, another lawyer appeared in the case. David O. Montaña, Sr.,
claiming to be the lawyer of petitioner Felix Balanay, Jr. (his counsel of record was Atty.
Cabreros), filed a motion dated September 25, 1973 for "leave of court to withdraw
probate of alleged will of Leodegaria Julian and requesting authority to proceed by
intestate estate proceeding." In that motion Montaña claimed to be the lawyer not
only of the petitioner but also of Felix Balanay, Sr., Beatriz B. Solamo, Carolina B.
Manguiob and Emilia B. Pabaonon.
Montaña in his motion assailed the provision of the will which partitioned the conjugal
assets or allegedly effected a compromise of future legitimes. He prayed that the
probate of the will be withdrawn and that the proceeding be converted into an
intestate proceeding. In another motion of the same date he asked that the
corresponding notice to creditors be issued.
Avelina B. Antonio and Delia B. Lanaban, through Atty. Jose B. Guyo, in their comments
dated October 15, 1973 manifested their conformity with the motion for the issuance
of a notice to creditors. They prayed that the will be declared void for being contrary
to law and that an intestacy be declared.
The lower court, acting on the motions of Atty. Montaña, assumed that the issuance
of a notice to creditors was in order since the parties had agreed on that point. It
adopted the view of Attys. Montaña and Guyo that the will was void. So, in its order
of February 28, 1974 it dismissed the petition for the probate, converted the testate
proceeding into an intestate proceeding, ordered the issuance of a notice to creditors
and set the intestate proceeding for hearing on April 1 and 2, 1974. The lower court
did not abrogate its prior orders of June 18 and October 15, 1973. The notice to
creditors was issued on April 1, 1974 and published on May 2, 9 and 16 in the Davao
Star in spite of petitioner's motion of April 17, 1974 that its publication be held in
abeyance.
Felix Balanay, Jr., through a new counsel, Roberto M. Sarenas, in a verified motion
dated April 15, 1974, asked for the reconsideration of the lower court's order of
February 28, 1974 on the ground that Atty. Montaña had no authority to withdraw
the petition for the allowance of the will. Attached to the motion was a copy of a letter
dated March 27, 1974 addressed to Atty. Montaña and signed by Felix Balanay, Jr.,
Beatriz V. Solamo, Carolina B. Manguiob and Emilia B. Pabaonon, wherein they
terminated Montaña's services and informed him that his withdrawal of the petition
for the probate of the will was without their consent and was contrary to their
repeated reminder to him that their mother's will was "very sacred" to them.
Avelina B. Antonio and Delia B. Lanaban opposed the motion for reconsideration. The
lower court denied the motion in its order of June 29, 1974. It clarified that it declared
the will void on the basis of its own independent assessment of its provisions and not
because of Atty. Montaña's arguments.
The basic issue is whether the probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic validity
of the will, before ruling on its allowance or formal validity, and in declaring it void.
We are of the opinion that in view of certain unusual provisions of the will, which are
of dubious legality, and because of the motion to withdraw the petition for probate
(which the lower court assumed to have been filed with the petitioner's authorization),
the trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even before
its formal validity had been established. The probate of a will might become an idle
ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void. Where practical
considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even
before it is probated, the court should meet the issue (Nuguid vs. Nuguid, 64 O.G.
1527, 17 SCRA 449. Compare with Sumilang vs. Ramagosa, L-23135, December 26,
1967, 21 SCRA 1369; Cacho vs. Udan, L-19996, April 30, 1965, 13 SCRA
693).1äwphï1.ñët
But the probate court erred in declaring, in its order of February 28, 1974 that the will
was void and in converting the testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding
notwithstanding the fact that in its order of June 18, 1973 , it gave effect to the
surviving husband's conformity to the will and to his renunciation of his hereditary
rights which presumably included his one-half share of the conjugal estate.
The rule is that "the invalidity of one of several dispositions contained in a will does
not result in the invalidity of the other dispositions, unless it is to be presumed that
the testator would not have made such other dispositions if the first invalid disposition
had not been made" (Art. 792, Civil Code). "Where some of the provisions of a will are
valid and others invalid, the valid parts will be upheld if they can be separated from
the invalid without defeating the intention of the testator or interfering with the
general testamentary scheme, or doing injustice to the beneficiaries" (95 C.J.S. 873).
The statement of the testatrix that she owned the "southern half of the conjugal lands
is contrary to law because, although she was a coowner thereof, her share was
inchoate and proindiviso (Art. 143, Civil Code; Madrigal and Paterno vs. Rafferty and
Concepcion, 38 Phil. 414). But That illegal declaration does not nullify the entire will.
It may be disregarded.
The provision of the will that the properties of the testatrix should not be divided
among her heirs during her husband's lifetime but should be kept intact and that the
legitimes should be paid in cash is contrary to article 1080 of the Civil Code which
reads:
ART. 1080. Should a person make a partition of his estate by an
act inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall be respected, insofar
as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs.
A parent who, in the interest of his or her family, to keep any
agricultural, industrial, or manufacturing enterprise intact, may avail
himself of the right granted him in this article, by ordering that the
legitime of the other children to whom the property is not assigned
be paid in cash. (1056a)
The testatrix in her will made a partition of the entire conjugal estate among her six
children (her husband had renounced his hereditary rights and his one-half conjugal
share). She did not assign the whole estate to one or more children as envisaged in
article 1080. Hence, she had no right to require that the legitimes be paid in cash. On
the other hand, her estate may remain undivided only for a period of twenty years.
So, the provision that the estate should not be divided during her husband's lifetime
would at most be effective only for twenty years from the date of her death unless
there are compelling reasons for terminating the coownership (Art. 1083, Civil Code).
Felix Balanay, Sr. could validly renounce his hereditary rights and his one-half share of
the conjugal partnership (Arts. 179[1] and 1041, Civil Code) but insofar as said
renunciation partakes of a donation of his hereditary rights and his one-half share in
the conjugal estate (Art. 1060[1] Civil Code), it should be subject to the limitations
prescribed in articles 750 and 752 of the Civil Code. A portion of the estate should be
adjudicated to the widower for his support and maintenance. Or at least his legitime
should be respected.
Subject to the foregoing observations and the rules on collation, the will is intrinsically
valid and the partition therein may be given effect if it does not prejudice the creditors
and impair the legitimes. The distribution and partition would become effective upon
the death of Felix Balanay, Sr. In the meantime, the net income should be equitably
divided among the children and the surviving spouse.
It should be stressed that by reason of the surviving husband's conformity to his wife's
will and his renunciation of his hereditary rights, his one-half conjugal share became a
part of his deceased wife's estate. His conformity had the effect of validating the
partition made in paragraph V of the will without prejudice, of course, to the rights of
the creditors and the legitimes of the compulsory heirs.
Article 793 of the Civil Code provides that "property acquired after the making of a will
shall only pass thereby, as if the testator had it at the time of making the will, should
it expressly appear by the will that such was his intention". Under article 930 of the
Civil Code "the legacy or devise of a thing belonging to another person is void, if the
testator erroneously believed that the thing pertained to him. But if the thing
bequeathed, though not belonging to the testator when he made the will, afterwards
becomes his, by whatever title, the disposition shall take effect."
In the instant case there is no doubt that the testatrix and her husband intended to
partition the conjugal estate in the manner set forth in paragraph V of her will. It is
true that she could dispose of by will only her half of the conjugal estate (Art. 170, Civil
Code) but since the husband, after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership, had
assented to her testamentary partition of the conjugal estate, such partition has
become valid, assuming that the will may be probated.
The instant case is different from the Nuguid case, supra, where the testatrix
instituted as heir her sister and preterited her parents. Her will was intrinsically void
because it preterited her compulsory heirs in the direct line. Article 854 of the Civil
Code provides that "the preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory
heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born
after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and
legacies, shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious." Since the preterition of the
parents annulled the institution of the sister of the testatrix and there were no legacies
and devises, total intestacy resulted (.Art. 960[2], Civil Code).1äwphï1.ñët
In the instant case, the preterited heir was the surviving spouse. His preterition did
not produce intestacy. Moreover, he signified his conformity to his wife's will and
renounced his hereditary rights. .
It results that the lower court erred in not proceeding with the probate of the will as
contemplated in its uncancelled order of June 18, 1973. Save in an extreme case where
the will on its face is intrinsically void, it is the probate court's duty to pass first upon
the formal validity of the will. Generally, the probate of the will is mandatory (Art. 838,
Civil Code; Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479 and 98 Phil. 249; Fernandez vs. Dimagiba,
L-23638, October 12, 1967, 21 SCRA 428).
As aptly stated by Mr. Justice Barredo, "the very existence of a purported testament
is in itself prima facie proof that the supposed testator has willed that his estate should
be distributed in the manner therein provided, and it is incumbent upon the state that,
if legally tenable, such desire be given effect independent of the attitude of the parties
affected thereby" (Resolution, Vda. de Precilla vs. Narciso, L-27200, August 18, 1972,
46 SCRA 538, 565).
To give effect to the intention and wishes of the testatrix is the first and principal law
in the matter of testaments (Dizon-Rivera vs. Dizon, L-24561, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA
554, 561). Testacy is preferable to intestacy. An interpretation that will render a
testamentary disposition operative takes precedence over a construction that will
nullify a provision of the will (Arts. 788 and 791, Civil Code).
Testacy is favored. Doubts are resolved in favor of testacy especially where the will
evinces an intention on the part of the testator to dispose of practically his whole
estate. So compelling is the principle that intestacy should be avoided and that the
wishes of the testator should prevail that sometimes the language of the will can be
varied for the purpose of giving it effect (Austria vs. Reyes, L-23079, February 27, 1970,
31 SCRA 754, 762).
As far as is legally possible, the expressed desire of the testator must be followed and
the dispositions of the properties in his will should be upheld (Estorque vs. Estorque,
L-19573, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 540, 546).
The law has a tender regard for the wishes of the testator as expressed in his will
because any disposition therein is better than that which the law can make (Castro vs.
Bustos, L-25913, February 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 327, 341).
Two other errors of the lower court may be noticed. It erred in issuing a notice to
creditors although no executor or regular administrator has been appointed. The
record reveals that it appointed a special administrator. A notice to creditors is not in
order if only a special administrator has been appointed. Section 1, Rule 86 of the
Rules of Court, in providing that "immediately after granting letters of testamentary
or of administration, the court shall issue a notice requiring all persons having money
claims against the decedent to file them in the office of the clerk of said court" clearly
contemplates the appointment of an executor or regular administrator and not that
of a special administrator.
It is the executor or regular administrator who is supposed to oppose the claims
against the estate and to pay such claims when duly allowed (See. 10, Rule 86 and sec.
1, Rule 88, Rules of Court).
We also take this occasion to point out that the probate court's appointment of its
branch clerk of court as special administrator (p. 30, Rollo) is not a salutary practice
because it might engender the suspicion that the probate Judge and his clerk of court
are in cahoots in milking the decedent's estate. Should the branch clerk of court
commit any abuse or devastavit in the course of his administration, the probate Judge
might find it difficult to hold him to a strict accountability. A court employee should
devote his official time to his official duties and should not have as a sideline the
administration of a decedent's estate.
WHEREFORE, the lower court's orders of February 28, and June 29, 1974 are set aside
and its order of June 18, 1973, setting for hearing the petition for probate, is affirmed.
The lower court is directed to conduct further proceedings in Special Case No. 1808 in
consonance with this opinion. Costs, against the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.