G.R. No.
L-16749 January 31, 1963 It is in accordance with the above-quoted provisions that the
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E.
CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.
ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the
deceased, Executor and Heir-appellees,
vs.
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.
M. R. Sotelo for executor and heir-appellees.
Leopoldo M. Abellera and Jovito Salonga for oppositor-appellant.
LABRADOR, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of
Davao, Hon. Vicente N. Cusi, Jr., presiding, in Special Proceeding
No. 622 of said court, dated September 14, 1949, approving among
things the final accounts of the executor, directing the executor to
reimburse Maria Lucy Christensen the amount of P3,600 paid by
her to Helen Christensen Garcia as her legacy, and declaring Maria
Lucy Christensen entitled to the residue of the property to be
enjoyed during her lifetime, and in case of death without issue,
one-half of said residue to be payable to Mrs. Carrie Louise C.
Borton, etc., in accordance with the provisions of the will of the
testator Edward E. Christensen. The will was executed in Manila on
March 5, 1951 and contains the following provisions:
3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, named MARIA
LUCY CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs. Bernard Daney), who was
born in the Philippines about twenty-eight years ago, and
who is now residing at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los
Angeles, California, U.S.A.
4. I further declare that I now have no living ascendants,
and no descendants except my above named daughter,
MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY.
xxx xxx xxx
7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN
CHRISTENSEN, now married to Eduardo Garcia, about
eighteen years of age and who, notwithstanding the fact
that she was baptized Christensen, is not in any way
related to me, nor has she been at any time adopted by
me, and who, from all information I have now resides in
Egpit, Digos, Davao, Philippines, the sum of THREE
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P3,600.00), Philippine
Currency the same to be deposited in trust for the said
Maria Helen Christensen with the Davao Branch of the
Philippine National Bank, and paid to her at the rate of
One Hundred Pesos (P100.00), Philippine Currency per
month until the principal thereof as well as any interest
which may have accrued thereon, is exhausted..
xxx xxx xxx
12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-
beloved daughter, the said MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN
DANEY (Mrs. Bernard Daney), now residing as aforesaid
at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California,
U.S.A., all the income from the rest, remainder, and
residue of my property and estate, real, personal and/or
mixed, of whatsoever kind or character, and
wheresoever situated, of which I may be possessed at my
death and which may have come to me from any source
whatsoever, during her lifetime: ....
executor in his final account and project of partition ratified the
payment of only P3,600 to Helen Christensen Garcia and proposed
that the residue of the estate be transferred to his daughter, Maria
Lucy Christensen.
Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by
Helen Christensen Garcia, insofar as it deprives her (Helen) of her
legitime as an acknowledged natural child, she having been
declared by Us in G.R. Nos. L-11483-84 an acknowledged natural
child of the deceased Edward E. Christensen. The legal grounds of
opposition are (a) that the distribution should be governed by the
laws of the Philippines, and (b) that said order of distribution is
contrary thereto insofar as it denies to Helen Christensen, one of
two acknowledged natural children, one-half of the estate in full
ownership. In amplification of the above grounds it was alleged
that the law that should govern the estate of the deceased
Christensen should not be the internal law of California alone, but
the entire law thereof because several foreign elements are
involved, that the forum is the Philippines and even if the case were
decided in California, Section 946 of the California Civil Code, which
requires that the domicile of the decedent should apply, should be
applicable. It was also alleged that Maria Helen Christensen having
been declared an acknowledged natural child of the decedent, she
is deemed for all purposes legitimate from the time of her birth.
The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen
of the United States and of the State of California at the time of his
death, the successional rights and intrinsic validity of the provisions
in his will are to be governed by the law of California, in accordance
with which a testator has the right to dispose of his property in the
way he desires, because the right of absolute dominion over his
property is sacred and inviolable (In re McDaniel's Estate, 77 Cal.
Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952, and In re Kaufman, 117 Cal. 286, 49
Pac. 192, cited in page 179, Record on Appeal). Oppositor Maria
Helen Christensen, through counsel, filed various motions for
reconsideration, but these were denied. Hence, this appeal.
The most important assignments of error are as follows:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE DECISION OF THE
HONORABLE SUPREME COURT THAT HELEN IS THE
ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILD OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN
AND, CONSEQUENTLY, IN DEPRIVING HER OF HER JUST SHARE IN
THE INHERITANCE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY IGNORING AND/OR
FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THE EXISTENCE OF SEVERAL FACTORS,
ELEMENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES CALLING FOR THE APPLICATION
OF INTERNAL LAW.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW, PARTICULARLY UNDER THE RENVOI
DOCTRINE, THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE TESTAMENTARY
DISPOSITION OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE OF THE
DECEASED EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY
THE LAWS OF THE PHILIPPINES.
IV
1
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE
SCHEDULE OF DISTRIBUTION SUBMITTED BY THE EXECUTOR IS
CONTRARY TO THE PHILIPPINE LAWS.
V meaning from mere temporary presence to the most
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT UNDER THE
PHILIPPINE LAWS HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA IS ENTITLED TO
ONE-HALF (1/2) OF THE ESTATE IN FULL OWNERSHIP.
There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the
United States and of the State of California at the time of his death.
But there is also no question that at the time of his death he was
domiciled in the Philippines, as witness the following facts admitted
by the executor himself in appellee's brief:
In the proceedings for admission of the will to probate,
the facts of record show that the deceased Edward E.
Christensen was born on November 29, 1875 in New York
City, N.Y., U.S.A.; his first arrival in the Philippines, as an
appointed school teacher, was on July 1, 1901, on board
the U.S. Army Transport "Sheridan" with Port of
Embarkation as the City of San Francisco, in the State of
California, U.S.A. He stayed in the Philippines until 1904.
In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen returned to the
United States and stayed there for the following nine
years until 1913, during which time he resided in, and was
teaching school in Sacramento, California.
Mr. Christensen's next arrival in the Philippines was in
July of the year 1913. However, in 1928, he again
departed the Philippines for the United States and came
back here the following year, 1929. Some nine years
later, in 1938, he again returned to his own country, and
came back to the Philippines the following year, 1939.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the
foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved
by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties
adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered
by this stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
Being an American citizen, Mr. Christensen was interned
by the Japanese Military Forces in the Philippines during
World War II. Upon liberation, in April 1945, he left for
the United States but returned to the Philippines in
December, 1945. Appellees Collective Exhibits "6", CFI
Davao, Sp. Proc. 622, as Exhibits "AA", "BB" and "CC-
Daney"; Exhs. "MM", "MM-l", "MM-2-Daney" and p. 473,
t.s.n., July 21, 1953.)
In April, 1951, Edward E. Christensen returned once more
to California shortly after the making of his last will and
testament (now in question herein) which he executed at
his lawyers' offices in Manila on March 5, 1951. He died
at the St. Luke's Hospital in the City of Manila on April 30,
1953. (pp. 2-3)
In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the deceased is the
Philippines, we are persuaded by the fact that he was born in New
York, migrated to California and resided there for nine years, and
since he came to the Philippines in 1913 he returned to California
very rarely and only for short visits (perhaps to relatives), and
considering that he appears never to have owned or acquired a
home or properties in that state, which would indicate that he
would ultimately abandon the Philippines and make home in the
State of California.
Sec. 16. Residence is a term used with many shades of
permanent abode. Generally, however, it is used to
denote something more than mere physical presence.
(Goodrich on Conflict of Laws, p. 29)
As to his citizenship, however, We find that the citizenship that he
acquired in California when he resided in Sacramento, California
from 1904 to 1913, was never lost by his stay in the Philippines, for
the latter was a territory of the United States (not a state) until
1946 and the deceased appears to have considered himself as a
citizen of California by the fact that when he executed his will in
1951 he declared that he was a citizen of that State; so that he
appears never to have intended to abandon his California
citizenship by acquiring another. This conclusion is in accordance
with the following principle expounded by Goodrich in his Conflict
of Laws.
The terms "'residence" and "domicile" might well be
taken to mean the same thing, a place of permanent
abode. But domicile, as has been shown, has acquired a
technical meaning. Thus one may be domiciled in a place
where he has never been. And he may reside in a place
where he has no domicile. The man with two homes,
between which he divides his time, certainly resides in
each one, while living in it. But if he went on business
which would require his presence for several weeks or
months, he might properly be said to have sufficient
connection with the place to be called a resident. It is
clear, however, that, if he treated his settlement as
continuing only for the particular business in hand, not
giving up his former "home," he could not be a domiciled
New Yorker. Acquisition of a domicile of choice requires
the exercise of intention as well as physical presence.
"Residence simply requires bodily presence of an
inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily
presence in that place and also an intention to make it
one's domicile." Residence, however, is a term used with
many shades of meaning, from the merest temporary
presence to the most permanent abode, and it is not safe
to insist that any one use et the only proper one.
(Goodrich, p. 29)
The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is
defined in Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is as
follows:
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is
subject to the law of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both
with respect to the order of succession and to the
amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity
of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is under
consideration, whatever may be the nature of the
property and regardless of the country where said
property may be found.
The application of this article in the case at bar requires the
determination of the meaning of the term "national law"is used
therein.
2
There is no single American law governing the validity of
testamentary provisions in the United States, each state of the
Union having its own private law applicable to its citizens only and
in force only within the state. The "national law" indicated in Article
16 of the Civil Code above quoted can not, therefore, possibly mean
or apply to any general American law. So it can refer to no other
than the private law of the State of California.
The next question is: What is the law in California governing the
disposition of personal property? The decision of the court below,
sustains the contention of the executor-appellee that under the
California Probate Code, a testator may dispose of his property by
will in the form and manner he desires, citing the case of Estate of
McDaniel, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952. But appellant invokes
the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, which is
as follows:
If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where
personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow the
person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his
domicile.
The existence of this provision is alleged in appellant's opposition
and is not denied. We have checked it in the California Civil Code
and it is there. Appellee, on the other hand, relies on the case cited
in the decision and testified to by a witness. (Only the case of
Kaufman is correctly cited.) It is argued on executor's behalf that as
the deceased Christensen was a citizen of the State of California,
the internal law thereof, which is that given in the abovecited case,
should govern the determination of the validity of the
testamentary provisions of Christensen's will, such law being in
force in the State of California of which Christensen was a citizen.
Appellant, on the other hand, insists that Article 946 should be
applicable, and in accordance therewith and following the doctrine
of the renvoi, the question of the validity of the testamentary
provision in question should be referred back to the law of the
decedent's domicile, which is the Philippines.
The theory of doctrine of renvoi has been defined by various
authors, thus:
The problem has been stated in this way: "When the
Conflict of Laws rule of the forum refers a jural matter to
a foreign law for decision, is the reference to the purely
internal rules of law of the foreign system; i.e., to the
totality of the foreign law minus its Conflict of Laws
rules?"
On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The Michigan
court chose to accept the renvoi, that is, applied the
Conflict of Laws rule of Illinois which referred the matter
back to Michigan law. But once having determined the
the Conflict of Laws principle is the rule looked to, it is
difficult to see why the reference back should not have
been to Michigan Conflict of Laws. This would have
resulted in the "endless chain of references" which has so
often been criticized be legal writers. The opponents of
the renvoi would have looked merely to the internal law
of Illinois, thus rejecting the renvoi or the reference back.
Yet there seems no compelling logical reason why the
original reference should be the internal law rather than
to the Conflict of Laws rule. It is true that such a solution
avoids going on a merry-go-round, but those who have
accepted the renvoi theory avoid this inextricabilis
circulas by getting off at the second reference and at that
point applying internal law. Perhaps the opponents of
the renvoi are a bit more consistent for they look always
to internal law as the rule of reference.
Strangely enough, both the advocates for and the
objectors to the renvoi plead that greater uniformity will
result from adoption of their respective views. And still
more strange is the fact that the only way to achieve
uniformity in this choice-of-law problem is if in the
dispute the two states whose laws form the legal basis of
the litigation disagree as to whether the renvoi should be
accepted. If both reject, or both accept the doctrine, the
result of the litigation will vary with the choice of the
forum. In the case stated above, had the Michigan court
rejected the renvoi, judgment would have been against
the woman; if the suit had been brought in the Illinois
courts, and they too rejected the renvoi, judgment would
be for the woman. The same result would happen,
though the courts would switch with respect to which
would hold liability, if both courts accepted the renvoi.
The Restatement accepts the renvoi theory in two
instances: where the title to land is in question, and
where the validity of a decree of divorce is challenged. In
these cases the Conflict of Laws rule of the situs of the
land, or the domicile of the parties in the divorce case, is
applied by the forum, but any further reference goes only
to the internal law. Thus, a person's title to land,
recognized by the situs, will be recognized by every court;
and every divorce, valid by the domicile of the parties,
will be valid everywhere. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec.
7, pp. 13-14.)
X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate, domiciled in
France, leaving movable property in Massachusetts,
England, and France. The question arises as to how this
property is to be distributed among X's next of kin.
Assume (1) that this question arises in a Massachusetts
court. There the rule of the conflict of laws as to intestate
succession to movables calls for an application of the law
of the deceased's last domicile. Since by hypothesis X's
last domicile was France, the natural thing for the
Massachusetts court to do would be to turn to French
statute of distributions, or whatever corresponds thereto
in French law, and decree a distribution accordingly. An
examination of French law, however, would show that if
a French court were called upon to determine how this
property should be distributed, it would refer the
distribution to the national law of the deceased, thus
applying the Massachusetts statute of distributions. So
on the surface of things the Massachusetts court has
open to it alternative course of action: (a) either to apply
the French law is to intestate succession, or (b) to resolve
itself into a French court and apply the Massachusetts
statute of distributions, on the assumption that this is
what a French court would do. If it accepts the so-
called renvoidoctrine, it will follow the latter course, thus
applying its own law.
This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented
which the conflict-of-laws rule of the forum refers to a
foreign law, the conflict-of-laws rule of which, in turn,
refers the matter back again to the law of the forum. This
is renvoi in the narrower sense. The German term for this
judicial process is 'Ruckverweisung.'" (Harvard Law
Review, Vol. 31, pp. 523-571.)
3
 After a decision has been arrived at that a foreign law is
to be resorted to as governing a particular case, the
further question may arise: Are the rules as to the conflict
of laws contained in such foreign law also to be resorted
to? This is a question which, while it has been considered
by the courts in but a few instances, has been the subject
of frequent discussion by textwriters and essayists; and
the doctrine involved has been descriptively designated
by them as the "Renvoyer" to send back, or the
"Ruchversweisung", or the "Weiterverweisung", since an
affirmative answer to the question postulated and the
operation of the adoption of the foreign law in toto
would in many cases result in returning the main
controversy to be decided according to the law of the
forum. ... (16 C.J.S. 872.)
Another theory, known as the "doctrine of renvoi", has
been advanced. The theory of the doctrine of renvoi is
that the court of the forum, in determining the question
before it, must take into account the whole law of the
other jurisdiction, but also its rules as to conflict of laws,
and then apply the law to the actual question which the
rules of the other jurisdiction prescribe. This may be the
law of the forum. The doctrine of the renvoi has generally
been repudiated by the American authorities. (2 Am. Jur.
296)
The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been defined and the
reasons for its application in a country explained by Prof. Lorenzen
in an article in the Yale Law Journal, Vol. 27, 1917-1918, pp. 529-
531. The pertinent parts of the article are quoted herein below:
The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the
rules of the conflict of laws are to be understood as
incorporating not only the ordinary or internal law of the
foreign state or country, but its rules of the conflict of
laws as well. According to this theory 'the law of a
country' means the whole of its law.
xxx xxx xxx
Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the
Institute of International Law, at Neuchatel, in 1900, in
the form of the following theses:
(1) Every court shall observe the law of its country as
regards the application of foreign laws.
(2) Provided that no express provision to the contrary
exists, the court shall respect:
(a) The provisions of a foreign law which
disclaims the right to bind its nationals abroad
as regards their personal statute, and desires
that said personal statute shall be determined
by the law of the domicile, or even by the law
of the place where the act in question
occurred.
(b) The decision of two or more foreign systems
of law, provided it be certain that one of them
is necessarily competent, which agree in
attributing the determination of a question to
the same system of law.
xxx xxx xxx
If, for example, the English law directs its judge to
distribute the personal estate of an Englishman who has
died domiciled in Belgium in accordance with the law of
his domicile, he must first inquire whether the law of
Belgium would distribute personal property upon death
in accordance with the law of domicile, and if he finds
that the Belgian law would make the distribution in
accordance with the law of nationality — that is the
English law — he must accept this reference back to his
own law.
We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of
laws rule, while the rule applied in In re Kaufman, Supra, its internal
law. If the law on succession and the conflict of laws rules of
California are to be enforced jointly, each in its own intended and
appropriate sphere, the principle cited In re Kaufman should apply
to citizens living in the State, but Article 946 should apply to such
of its citizens as are not domiciled in California but in other
jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting to the law of the
domicile in the determination of matters with foreign element
involved is in accord with the general principle of American law that
the domiciliary law should govern in most matters or rights which
follow the person of the owner.
When a man dies leaving personal property in one or
more states, and leaves a will directing the manner of
distribution of the property, the law of the state where
he was domiciled at the time of his death will be looked
to in deciding legal questions about the will, almost as
completely as the law of situs is consulted in questions
about the devise of land. It is logical that, since the
domiciliary rules control devolution of the personal
estate in case of intestate succession, the same rules
should determine the validity of an attempted
testamentary dispostion of the property. Here, also, it is
not that the domiciliary has effect beyond the borders of
the domiciliary state. The rules of the domicile are
recognized as controlling by the Conflict of Laws rules at
the situs property, and the reason for the recognition as
in the case of intestate succession, is the general
convenience of the doctrine. The New York court has said
on the point: 'The general principle that a dispostiton of
a personal property, valid at the domicile of the owner, is
valid anywhere, is one of the universal application. It had
its origin in that international comity which was one of
the first fruits of civilization, and it this age, when
business intercourse and the process of accumulating
property take but little notice of boundary lines, the
practical wisdom and justice of the rule is more apparent
than ever. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 164, pp. 442-
443.)
Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines pointed out as the national law is the internal law of
California. But as above explained the laws of California have
prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one for residents therein
and another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions. Reason
demands that We should enforce the California internal law
prescribed for its citizens residing therein, and enforce the conflict
of laws rules for the citizens domiciled abroad. If we must enforce
the law of California as in comity we are bound to go, as so declared
in Article 16 of our Civil Code, then we must enforce the law of
California in accordance with the express mandate thereof and as
above explained, i.e., apply the internal law for residents therein,
and its conflict-of-laws rule for those domiciled abroad.
4
It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if there is no law
to the contrary in the place where the property is situated" in Sec.
946 of the California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines and that the law to the contrary in the Philippines
is the provision in said Article 16 that the national law of the
deceased should govern. This contention can not be sustained. As
explained in the various authorities cited above the national law
mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on conflict of
laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes
the reference or return of the question to the law of the testator's
domicile. The conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946, Civil
Code, precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is not
domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in
the case at bar. The court of the domicile can not and should not
refer the case back to California; such action would leave the issue
incapable of determination because the case will then be like a
football, tossed back and forth between the two states, between
the country of which the decedent was a citizen and the country of
his domicile. The Philippine court must apply its own law as
directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if
the question has to be decided, especially as the application of the
internal law of California provides no legitime for children while the
Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines,
makes natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the
parent recognizing them.

The Philippine cases (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156; Riera vs.
Palmaroli, 40 Phil. 105; Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867; Babcock
Templeton vs. Rider Babcock, 52 Phil. 130; and Gibbs vs.
Government, 59 Phil. 293.) cited by appellees to support the
decision can not possibly apply in the case at bar, for two important
reasons, i.e., the subject in each case does not appear to be a citizen
of a state in the United States but with domicile in the Philippines,
and it does not appear in each case that there exists in the state of
which the subject is a citizen, a law similar to or identical with Art.
946 of the California Civil Code.

We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen,

a citizen of California, is the Philippines, the validity of the
provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural child, the
appellant, should be governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile,
pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California, not by the
internal law of California..

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and

the case returned to the lower court with instructions that the
partition be made as the Philippine law on succession provides.
Judgment reversed, with costs against appellees.

5
G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.
PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-
appellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.
Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors appellants.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-appellees E. A.
Bellis, et al.
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al.
J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust Company.
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law, from an
order of the Court of First Instance of Manila dated April 30, 1964,
approving the project of partition filed by the executor in Civil Case
No. 37089 therein.1äwphï1.ñët
The facts of the case are as follows:
Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas
and of the United States." By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom
he divorced, he had five legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis,
George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis,
Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman; by his second wife, Violet
Kennedy, who survived him, he had three legitimate children:
Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he
had three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis
and Miriam Palma Bellis.
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines,
in which he directed that after all taxes, obligations, and expenses
of administration are paid for, his distributable estate should be
divided, in trust, in the following order and manner: (a)
$240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his
three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis,
Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing
two items have been satisfied, the remainder shall go to his seven
surviving children by his first and second wives, namely: Edward A.
Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman,
Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal
shares.1äwphï1.ñët
Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of
San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted to probate in the
Court of First Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958.
The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid
all the bequests therein including the amount of $240,000.00 in the
form of shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the three (3)
illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and
Miriam Palma Bellis, various amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in
satisfaction of their respective legacies, or a total of P120,000.00,
which it released from time to time according as the lower court
approved and allowed the various motions or petitions filed by the
latter three requesting partial advances on account of their
respective legacies.
On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the
executor submitted and filed its "Executor's Final Account, Report
of Administration and Project of Partition" wherein it
reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary E. Mallen
by the delivery to her of shares of stock amounting to $240,000.00,
and the legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam
Palma Bellis in the amount of P40,000.00 each or a total of
P120,000.00. In the project of partition, the executor — pursuant
to the "Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will and Testament —
divided the residuary estate into seven equal portions for the
benefit of the testator's seven legitimate children by his first and
second marriages.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis
filed their respective oppositions to the project of partition on the
ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate
children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.
Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him,
proof of service of which is evidenced by the registry receipt
submitted on April 27, 1964 by the executor.1
After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other
pertinent pleadings, the lower court, on April 30, 1964, issued an
order overruling the oppositions and approving the executor's final
account, report and administration and project of partition. Relying
upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the
decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not provide for
legitimes.
Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied
by the lower court on June 11, 1964, oppositors-appellants
appealed to this Court to raise the issue of which law must apply —
Texas law or Philippine law.
In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even
discuss, the doctrine of renvoi, applied by this Court in Aznar v.
Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31, 1963. Said doctrine is
usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one country,
and a domicile of another. In the present case, it is not disputed
that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile
thereof at the time of his death.2 So that even assuming Texas has
a conflict of law rule providing that the domiciliary system (law of
the domicile) should govern, the same would not result in a
reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to
Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the
situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of
the place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise,
since the properties here involved are found in the Philippines. In
the absence, however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of
Texas, it should not be presumed different from ours. 3 Appellants'
position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi. As stated,
they never invoked nor even mentioned it in their arguments.
Rather, they argue that their case falls under the circumstances
mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article
16 of the Civil Code.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable
the national law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary
successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession;
(b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the
provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. They provide
that —
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is
subject to the law of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both
with respect to the order of succession and to the
6
 amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity
of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is under
consideration, whatever may he the nature of the
property and regardless of the country wherein said
property may be found.

ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of

the nation of the decedent.

Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three,

of the Civil Code, stating that —

Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or

property, and those which have for their object public
order, public policy and good customs shall not be
rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated,
or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a
foreign country.

prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-
quoted. This is not correct. Precisely, Congress deleted the phrase,
"notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next preceding
article" when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art.
17 of the new Civil Code, while reproducing without substantial
change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art.
16 in the new. It must have been their purpose to make the second
paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision in itself which must be
applied in testate and intestate succession. As further indication of
this legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under Art.
1039, which decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed by
the national law of the decedent.

It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs

may be involved in our System of legitimes, Congress has not
intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals.
For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of
successional rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific
provisions must prevail over general ones.

Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two
wills — one to govern his Texas estate and the other his Philippine
estate — arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to
govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that such was the
decedent's intention in executing a separate Philippine will, it
would not alter the law, for as this Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo,
50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that
his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law
and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law
cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 — now
Article 16 — of the Civil Code states said national law should
govern.

The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen
of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there
are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic
validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional
rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on
legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.

Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in

toto, with costs against appellants. So ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar,

Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.

7
[G.R. Nos. L-27860 & L-27896. September 30, 1975.]
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK, Administrator
of the Testate Estate of Charles Newton Hodges (Sp. Proc. No.
1672 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo), Petitioner, v. THE
HONORABLE VENICIO ESCOLIN, presiding Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Iloilo, Branch II, and AVELINA A.
MAGNO, Respondents.
[G.R. Nos. L-27936 & L-27937. September 30, 1975.]
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE LINNIE JANE HODGES (Sp. Proc. No.
1307). TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE CHARLES NEWTON HODGES
(Sp. Proc. No. 1672) PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL
BANK, administrator-appellant, v. LORENZO CARLES, JOSE
PABLICO, ALFREDO CATEDRAL, SALVADOR GUZMAN, BELCESAR
CAUSING, FLORENIA BARRIDO, PURIFICACION CORONADO,
GRACIANO LUCERO, ARITEO THOMAS JAMIR, MELQUIADES
BATISANAN, PEPITO IYULORES, ESPERIDION PARTISALA,
WINIFREDO ESPADA, ROSARIO ALINGASA, ADELFA PREMAYLON,
SANTIAGO PACAONSIS, and AVELINA MAGNO, the last as
Administratrix in Sp. Proc. No. 1307, appellees, WESTERN
INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, INC., movant-appellee.
SYNOPSIS
In regard to a decision decided by the Supreme Court on March 29,
1974 the following pleadings were filed before the Court: a motion
for reconsideration of the decision of the petitioner-appellant, a
motion for modification of the judgment by the heirs of the
testator, and a motion for the assessment of damages suffered by
reason of the lifting of the preliminary injunction filed by
respondent-appellee Magno.
The Supreme Court, not finding any new matter in the said motions
sufficient to induce a modification of its judgment, reaffirmed its
previous opinion, denied the first two motion, and authorized the
trial court to make the assessment to the damages prayed for.
Because of the length of time that the subject estates have been
pending judicial settlement, the parties were enjoined to exert all
efforts to have the inventories of said estates finalized and to
extrajudicially settle their remaining differences. The respondent
court was likewise directed to expedite proceedings and to close
the same upon the payment of the corresponding taxes due within
three months from notice.
SYLLABUS
1. JUDGMENT MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OR MODIFICATION
THEREOF; DENIAL OF THE SAME WHERE NO NEW MATTERS ARE
PRESENTED SUFFICIENT TO CHANGE THE PREVIOUS DECISION OF
THE COURT. — Where the Court, upon consideration of the
motions filed in regard to a previously decided case, had not found
any new matter therein sufficiently persuasive to induce a
modification of its judgment, the previous decision is reaffirmed
and the motions for reconsideration and for modification of its
judgment are denied.
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. JUDGMENTS; MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OR
MODIFICATION THEREOF; DENIAL OF THE SAME WHERE NO NEW
MATTERS ARE PRESENTED SUFFICIENT TO CHANGE THE PREVIOUS
DECISION OF THE COURT; DIRECTIVE TO RESPONDENT COURT TO
EXPEDITE AND TERMINATE PROCEEDINGS WITHIN THREE MONTHS
SUPERSEDES PRO TANTO THE DISPOSITION IN THE ORIGINAL
DECISION. — The resolution’s directive to respondent court to
expedite and terminate the protracted proceedings within three
months supersedes pro tanto the disposition in the original
decision of March 29, 1974 for the segregation of the minimum
one-fourth of the community properties adjudged to be the estate
of Linnie Jane Hodges for delivery and to exclusive administration
by respondent as her estate’s administrator, with the other one-
fourth to remain under the joint administration of said respondent
and petitioner and Charles Newton Hodges’ one-half share to be
administered by petitioner exclusively as his estate’s administrator,
since such physical segregation and separate administration could
not possibly be accomplished before the more pressing and
indispensable matters of submittal of the two estates’ inventories
and determination by respondent court within the limited three-
month period given in the Court’s resolution.
RESOLUTION
BARREDO, J.:
Motion for reconsideration followed by a supplemental motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner-appellant Philippine
Commercial and Industrial Bank and motion for modification filed
by Joe Hodges and "the other heirs of Charles Newton Hodges" in
regard to the decision of this Court of March 29, 1974.
Upon consideration of said motions, the Court has not found any
new matter therein sufficiently persuasive to induce a modification
of its judgment, for which reason, the Court, with its members
reaffirming their previous opinions and vote resolved unanimously
to DENY as it hereby DENIES the motions for reconsideration and
modification above referred to.
Anent the motion of respondent-appellee Avelina Magno 1 the
assessment of the damages she claims she and the Estate Linnie
Jane Hodges have suffered by reason of the preliminary injunction
in this case which was lifted per resolution of 1 Court of September
8, 1972, the Court resolved to authorize trial court to make the
assessment prayed for, subject to appeal, to this Court, if
necessary.
Considering the substantial value of the subject estates the length
of time they have already been pending judicial settlement and for
the reason that the payment of the corresponding taxes thereon
are being unduly delayed, and because the properties of said
estates have to be disposed favor of Filipinos before May 27, 1976,
the Court enjoins the parties to exert all efforts to have the
inventories of said states finalized without further delay, and if
possible to extrajudicially settle their remaining differences to
further complications, expenses and unnecessary loss time. The
respondent court is directed to expedite processing by giving due
priority thereto, requiring the parties to submit the inventories
within thirty days from notice hereof, and to resolve the remaining
issues as delineated in the Court’s decision and to close the
proceedings upon payment of the corresponding taxes within three
months from notice hereof. Respondent judge is further directed
to report to this Court from time to time the action taken by him
hereon.
Castro, Acting C.J., Ferrando, Muñoz Palma, Aquino and Martin, JJ.,
concur.
Makalintal, C.J. Esguerra and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., are on leave.
8
Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

I join in the resolution denying the motions f reconsideration for

the reasons and considerations already indicated in my separate
concurring and dissenting opinion of March 29, 1974.

I specially welcome the resolution’s directive to respondent court

to expedite and terminate these long-drawn proceedings (for over
18 years now since Linnie Jane Hodges’ death on May 23, 1957) and
to "resolve the remaining issues as delineated in the Court’s
decision" and to cause the payment in the estate and inheritance
taxes long overdue to the Government "within three months from
notice hereof." (See pp. 19-20, writer’s separate opinion).

I take it that the resolution’s directive to respondent court to

expedite and terminate the protracted proceedings three months
supersedes pro tanto the disposition original decision of March 29,
1974 for the segregation minimum one-fourth of the community
properties adjudged to be the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges for
delivery to and exclusive administration by respondent as her
estate’s administrator, with the other one-fourth to remain under
the joint administration of said respondent and petitioner and
Charles Newton Hodges’ one-half share to be administered by
petitioner exclusively as his estate’s administrator, since such
physical segregation and separate administration could not
possibly be accomplished before the more pressing and
indispensable matters of submittal of the two estates’ inventories
and determination by respondent court of the remaining issues are
attended to by respondent court within the limited three-month
period given in the Court’s resolution. (See pages 7-8, writer’s
separate opinion).

The remaining issues to be resolved by respondent court revolve

on the two questions of renvoi and renunciation. In his separate
opinion (at page 7 et seq.), as concurred in by the Chief Justice and
Justice Makasiar and Antonio, the writer urged that these two
questions should be resolved "preferentially and expeditiously" by
respondent court, since aside from the time problem, these
proceedings have "apparently degenerated into running battle
between the administrators of the two estates to the common
prejudice of all the heirs." (at page 20).

Since respondent court is now again presided by still another judge

in a long line of judges who have come and gone with even
terminating the proceedings, and since as is clear from the decision
itself, no consensus on the best means of expediting the closing of
the estates was reached by a majority of the Court (see pages 8 and
10, separate opinion), I trust that those who did not concur with
the "suggested guidelines" in the writer’s separate opinion (at
pages 8-20) either because they were not ready to express their
definite opinion thereon or because they felt that respondent court
should be given a free hand, will understand that the writer now
commends anew to the new judge presiding respondent court the
careful reading the said suggested guidelines in the hope that they
may lighten his work and help find the appropriate measures and
solutions to "expedite the closing of the protracted estate
proceedings below to the mutual satisfaction of the heirs and
without need of a dissatisfied party elevating his resolution of this
only remaining issue once more to this Court and dragging out
indefinitely the proceedings." (page 10, separate opinion), and thus
enable him to comply timely with the Court’s directive to close out
the estates within three months from notice.

Makasiar and Antonio, JJ., concur.

9
G.R. No. L-22595 November 1, 1927
Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN MICIANO,
administrator, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
ANDRE BRIMO, opponent-appellant.
Ross, Lawrence and Selph for appellant.
Camus and Delgado for appellee.
The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G. Brimo is
in question in this case.
The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition.
Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased, opposed it. The
court, however, approved it.
The errors which the oppositor-appellant assigns are:
(1) The approval of said scheme of partition; (2) denial of his participation
in the inheritance; (3) the denial of the motion for reconsideration of the
order approving the partition; (4) the approval of the purchase made by the
Pietro Lana of the deceased's business and the deed of transfer of said
business; and (5) the declaration that the Turkish laws are impertinent to
this cause, and the failure not to postpone the approval of the scheme of
partition and the delivery of the deceased's business to Pietro Lanza until
the receipt of the depositions requested in reference to the Turkish laws.
The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition in
question puts into effect the provisions of Joseph G. Brimo's will
which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality,
for which reason they are void as being in violation or article 10 of
the Civil Code which, among other things, provides the following:
Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in
respect to the order of succession as well as to the
amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic
validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is in
question, whatever may be the nature of the property or
the country in which it may be situated.
But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said testimentary
dispositions are not in accordance with the Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did
not present any evidence showing what the Turkish laws are on the matter,
and in the absence of evidence on such laws, they are presumed to be the
same as those of the Philippines. (Lim and Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 36
Phil., 472.)
It has not been proved in these proceedings what the Turkish laws are. He,
himself, acknowledges it when he desires to be given an opportunity to
present evidence on this point; so much so that he assigns as an error of the
court in not having deferred the approval of the scheme of partition until
the receipt of certain testimony requested regarding the Turkish laws on
the matter.
The refusal to give the oppositor another opportunity to prove such laws
does not constitute an error. It is discretionary with the trial court, and,
taking into consideration that the oppositor was granted ample opportunity
to introduce competent evidence, we find no abuse of discretion on the part
of the court in this particular. There is, therefore, no evidence in the record
that the national law of the testator Joseph G. Brimo was violated in the
testamentary dispositions in question which, not being contrary to our laws
in force, must be complied with and executed. lawphil.net
Therefore, the approval of the scheme of partition in this respect
was not erroneous.
In regard to the first assignment of error which deals with the
exclusion of the herein appellant as a legatee, inasmuch as he is
one of the persons designated as such in will, it must be taken into
consideration that such exclusion is based on the last part of the
second clause of the will, which says:
Second. I like desire to state that although by law, I am a
Turkish citizen, this citizenship having been conferred
upon me by conquest and not by free choice, nor by
nationality and, on the other hand, having resided for a
considerable length of time in the Philippine Islands
where I succeeded in acquiring all of the property that I
now possess, it is my wish that the distribution of my
property and everything in connection with this, my will,
be made and disposed of in accordance with the laws in
force in the Philippine islands, requesting all of my
relatives to respect this wish, otherwise, I annul and
cancel beforehand whatever disposition found in this will
favorable to the person or persons who fail to comply
with this request.
The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the
condition is that the instituted legatees must respect the testator's
will to distribute his property, not in accordance with the laws of
his nationality, but in accordance with the laws of the Philippines.
If this condition as it is expressed were legal and valid, any legatee
who fails to comply with it, as the herein oppositor who, by his
attitude in these proceedings has not respected the will of the
testator, as expressed, is prevented from receiving his legacy.
The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being contrary
to law, for article 792 of the civil Code provides the following:
Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good
morals shall be considered as not imposed and shall not
prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever,
even should the testator otherwise provide.
And said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores
the testator's national law when, according to article 10 of the civil
Code above quoted, such national law of the testator is the one to
govern his testamentary dispositions.
Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above cited,
is considered unwritten, and the institution of legatees in said will
is unconditional and consequently valid and effective even as to the
herein oppositor.
It results from all this that the second clause of the will regarding
the law which shall govern it, and to the condition imposed upon
the legatees, is null and void, being contrary to law.
All of the remaining clauses of said will with all their dispositions
and requests are perfectly valid and effective it not appearing that
said clauses are contrary to the testator's national law.
Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it is directed
that the distribution of this estate be made in such a manner as to
include the herein appellant Andre Brimo as one of the legatees,
and the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator
is approved in all other respects, without any pronouncement as to
costs.
So ordered.
10
G.R. No. 124371 November 23, 2000
PAULA T. LLORENTE, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA F. LLORENTE, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The Case
The case raises a conflict of laws issue.
What is before us is an appeal from the decision of the Court of
Appeals1 modifying that of the Regional Trial Court, Camarines Sur,
Branch 35, Iriga City2 declaring respondent Alicia F. Llorente
(herinafter referred to as "Alicia"), as co-owners of whatever
property she and the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente (hereinafter
referred to as "Lorenzo") may have acquired during the twenty-five
(25) years that they lived together as husband and wife.
The Facts
The deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of
the United States Navy from March 10, 1927 to September 30,
1957.3
On February 22, 1937, Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente
(hereinafter referred to as "Paula") were married before a parish
priest, Roman Catholic Church, in Nabua, Camarines Sur.4
Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for the
United States and Paula stayed in the conjugal home in barrio
Antipolo, Nabua, Camarines Sur.5
On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to United States
citizenship and Certificate of Naturalization No. 5579816 was
issued in his favor by the United States District Court, Southern
District of New York.6
Upon the liberation of the Philippines by the American Forces in
1945, Lorenzo was granted an accrued leave by the U. S. Navy, to
visit his wife and he visited the Philippines.7 He discovered that his
wife Paula was pregnant and was "living in" and having an
adulterous relationship with his brother, Ceferino Llorente. 8
On December 4, 1945, Paula gave birth to a boy registered in the
Office of the Registrar of Nabua as "Crisologo Llorente," with the
certificate stating that the child was not legitimate and the line for
the father’s name was left blank.9
Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her. In fact, on
February 2, 1946, the couple drew a written agreement to the
effect that (1) all the family allowances allotted by the United States
Navy as part of Lorenzo’s salary and all other obligations for Paula’s
daily maintenance and support would be suspended; (2) they
would dissolve their marital union in accordance with judicial
proceedings; (3) they would make a separate agreement regarding
their conjugal property acquired during their marital life; and (4)
Lorenzo would not prosecute Paula for her adulterous act since she
voluntarily admitted her fault and agreed to separate from Lorenzo
peacefully. The agreement was signed by both Lorenzo and Paula
and was witnessed by Paula’s father and stepmother. The
agreement was notarized by Notary Public Pedro Osabel.10
Lorenzo returned to the United States and on November 16, 1951
filed for divorce with the Superior Court of the State of California in
and for the County of San Diego. Paula was represented by counsel,
John Riley, and actively participated in the proceedings. On
November 27, 1951, the Superior Court of the State of California,
for the County of San Diego found all factual allegations to be true
and issued an interlocutory judgment of divorce.11
On December 4, 1952, the divorce decree became final.12
In the meantime, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines.
On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in
Manila.13 Apparently, Alicia had no knowledge of the first marriage
even if they resided in the same town as Paula, who did not oppose
the marriage or cohabitation.14
From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as husband
and wife.15 Their twenty-five (25) year union produced three
children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surnamed Llorente.16
On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament.
The will was notarized by Notary Public Salvador M. Occiano, duly
signed by Lorenzo with attesting witnesses Francisco Hugo,
Francisco Neibres and Tito Trajano. In the will, Lorenzo bequeathed
all his property to Alicia and their three children, to wit:
"(1) I give and bequeath to my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO exclusively
my residential house and lot, located at San Francisco, Nabua,
Camarines Sur, Philippines, including ALL the personal properties
and other movables or belongings that may be found or existing
therein;
"(2) I give and bequeath exclusively to my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and
to my children, Raul F. Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F.
Llorente, in equal shares, all my real properties whatsoever and
wheresoever located, specifically my real properties located at
Barangay Aro-Aldao, Nabua, Camarines Sur; Barangay Paloyon,
Nabua, Camarines Sur; Barangay Baras, Sitio Puga, Nabua,
Camarines Sur; and Barangay Paloyon, Sitio Nalilidong, Nabua,
Camarines Sur;
"(3) I likewise give and bequeath exclusively unto my wife Alicia R.
Fortuno and unto my children, Raul F. Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and
Beverly F. Llorente, in equal shares, my real properties located in
Quezon City Philippines, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 188652; and my lands in Antipolo, Rizal, Philippines, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 124196 and 165188, both of the
Registry of Deeds of the province of Rizal, Philippines;
"(4) That their respective shares in the above-mentioned
properties, whether real or personal properties, shall not be
disposed of, ceded, sold and conveyed to any other persons, but
could only be sold, ceded, conveyed and disposed of by and among
themselves;
"(5) I designate my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO to be the sole executor
of this my Last Will and Testament, and in her default or incapacity
of the latter to act, any of my children in the order of age, if of age;
"(6) I hereby direct that the executor named herein or her lawful
substitute should served (sic) without bond;
11
"(7) I hereby revoke any and all my other wills, codicils, or
testamentary dispositions heretofore executed, signed, or
published, by me;
"(8) It is my final wish and desire that if I die, no relatives of mine in
any degree in the Llorente’s Side should ever bother and disturb in
any manner whatsoever my wife Alicia R. Fortunato and my
children with respect to any real or personal properties I gave and
bequeathed respectively to each one of them by virtue of this Last
Will and Testament."17
On December 14, 1983, Lorenzo filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Iriga, Camarines Sur, a petition for the probate and allowance of his
last will and testament wherein Lorenzo moved that Alicia be
appointed Special Administratrix of his estate.18
On January 18, 1984, the trial court denied the motion for the
reason that the testator Lorenzo was still alive.19
On January 24, 1984, finding that the will was duly executed, the
trial court admitted the will to probate.20
On June 11, 1985, before the proceedings could be terminated,
Lorenzo died.21
On September 4, 1985, Paula filed with the same court a
petition22 for letters of administration over Lorenzo’s estate in her
favor. Paula contended (1) that she was Lorenzo’s surviving spouse,
(2) that the various property were acquired during their marriage,
(3) that Lorenzo’s will disposed of all his property in favor of Alicia
and her children, encroaching on her legitime and 1/2 share in the
conjugal property.23
On December 13, 1985, Alicia filed in the testate proceeding (Sp.
Proc. No. IR-755), a petition for the issuance of letters
testamentary.24
On October 14, 1985, without terminating the testate proceedings,
the trial court gave due course to Paula’s petition in Sp. Proc. No.
IR-888.25
On November 6, 13 and 20, 1985, the order was published in the
newspaper "Bicol Star".26
On May 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court issued a joint decision,
thus:
"Wherefore, considering that this court has so found that the
divorce decree granted to the late Lorenzo Llorente is void and
inapplicable in the Philippines, therefore the marriage he
contracted with Alicia Fortunato on January 16, 1958 at Manila is
likewise void. This being so the petition of Alicia F. Llorente for the
issuance of letters testamentary is denied. Likewise, she is not
entitled to receive any share from the estate even if the will
especially said so her relationship with Lorenzo having gained the
status of paramour which is under Art. 739 (1).
"On the other hand, the court finds the petition of Paula Titular
Llorente, meritorious, and so declares the intrinsic disposition of
the will of Lorenzo Llorente dated March 13, 1981 as void and
declares her entitled as conjugal partner and entitled to one-half of
their conjugal properties, and as primary compulsory heir, Paula T.
Llorente is also entitled to one-third of the estate and then one-
third should go to the illegitimate children, Raul, Luz and Beverly,
all surname (sic) Llorente, for them to partition in equal shares and
also entitled to the remaining free portion in equal shares.
"Petitioner, Paula Llorente is appointed legal administrator of the
estate of the deceased, Lorenzo Llorente. As such let the
corresponding letters of administration issue in her favor upon her
filing a bond in the amount (sic) of P100,000.00 conditioned for her
to make a return to the court within three (3) months a true and
complete inventory of all goods, chattels, rights, and credits, and
estate which shall at any time come to her possession or to the
possession of any other person for her, and from the proceeds to
pay and discharge all debts, legacies and charges on the same, or
such dividends thereon as shall be decreed or required by this
court; to render a true and just account of her administration to the
court within one (1) year, and at any other time when required by
the court and to perform all orders of this court by her to be
performed.
"On the other matters prayed for in respective petitions for want
of evidence could not be granted.
"SO ORDERED."27
In time, Alicia filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration
of the aforequoted decision.28
On September 14, 1987, the trial court denied Alicia’s motion for
reconsideration but modified its earlier decision, stating that Raul
and Luz Llorente are not children "legitimate or otherwise" of
Lorenzo since they were not legally adopted by him.29 Amending its
decision of May 18, 1987, the trial court declared Beverly Llorente
as the only illegitimate child of Lorenzo, entitling her to one-third
(1/3) of the estate and one-third (1/3) of the free portion of the
estate.30
On September 28, 1987, respondent appealed to the Court of
Appeals.31
On July 31, 1995, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision,
affirming with modification the decision of the trial court in this
wise:
"WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED
with the MODIFICATION that Alicia is declared as co-owner of
whatever properties she and the deceased may have acquired
during the twenty-five (25) years of cohabitation.
"SO ORDERED."32
On August 25, 1995, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a
motion for reconsideration of the decision.33
On March 21, 1996, the Court of Appeals,34 denied the motion for
lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.35
The Issue
Stripping the petition of its legalese and sorting through the various
arguments raised,36 the issue is simple. Who are entitled to inherit
from the late Lorenzo N. Llorente?
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We do not agree with the decision of the Court of Appeals. We
remand the case to the trial court for ruling on the intrinsic validity
of the will of the deceased.
The Applicable Law
The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American
citizen long before and at the time of: (1) his divorce from Paula;
(2) marriage to Alicia; (3) execution of his will; and (4) death, is duly
established, admitted and undisputed.
Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are necessarily
governed by foreign law.
The Civil Code clearly provides:
"Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,
condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of
the Philippines, even though living abroad.
"Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the
law of the country where it is situated.
"However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with
respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the
nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said
property may be found." (emphasis ours)
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and
our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like
any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.37
While the substance of the foreign law was pleaded, the Court of
Appeals did not admit the foreign law. The Court of Appeals and
the trial court called to the fore the renvoi doctrine, where the case
was "referred back" to the law of the decedent’s domicile, in this
case, Philippine law.
We note that while the trial court stated that the law of New York
was not sufficiently proven, in the same breath it made the
categorical, albeit equally unproven statement that "American law
follows the ‘domiciliary theory’ hence, Philippine law applies when
determining the validity of Lorenzo’s will.38
First, there is no such thing as one American law.1ªwph!1 The
"national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code cannot
possibly apply to general American law. There is no such law
governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United
States. Each State of the union has its own law applicable to its
citizens and in force only within the State. It can therefore refer to
no other than the law of the State of which the decedent was a
resident.39 Second, there is no showing that the application of
the renvoi doctrine is called for or required by New York State law.
The trial court held that the will was intrinsically invalid since it
contained dispositions in favor of Alice, who in the trial court’s
opinion was a mere paramour. The trial court threw the will out,
leaving Alice, and her two children, Raul and Luz, with nothing.
The Court of Appeals also disregarded the will. It declared Alice
entitled to one half (1/2) of whatever property she and Lorenzo
acquired during their cohabitation, applying Article 144 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines.
The hasty application of Philippine law and the complete disregard
of the will, already probated as duly executed in accordance with
the formalities of Philippine law, is fatal, especially in light of the
factual and legal circumstances here obtaining.
Validity of the Foreign Divorce
In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.40 we held that owing to the nationality
principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the
same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and
morality. In the same case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their national
law.
Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of
Appeals,41 that once proven that respondent was no longer a
Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce from petitioner, the
ruling in Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could
"very well lose her right to inherit" from him.
In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,42 we recognized the divorce obtained by
the respondent in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany.
There, we stated that divorce and its legal effects may be
recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in
view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the status of
persons.
For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of
Appeals must be reversed.43 We hold that the divorce obtained by
Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and
recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. Now, the
effects of this divorce (as to the succession to the estate of the
decedent) are matters best left to the determination of the trial
court.
Validity of the Will
The Civil Code provides:
"Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other
public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in
which they are executed.
"When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or
consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign
country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be
observed in their execution." (underscoring ours)
The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his second
wife and children by her is glaringly shown in the will he executed.
We do not wish to frustrate his wishes, since he was a foreigner,
not covered by our laws on "family rights and duties, status,
condition and legal capacity."44
Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from
Lorenzo are issues best proved by foreign law which must be
pleaded and proved. Whether the will was executed in accordance
with the formalities required is answered by referring to Philippine
law. In fact, the will was duly probated.
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As a guide however, the trial court should note that whatever
public policy or good customs may be involved in our system of
legitimes, Congress did not intend to extend the same to the
succession of foreign nationals. Congress specifically left the
amount of successional rights to the decedent's national law. 45

Having thus ruled, we find it unnecessary to pass upon the other

issues raised.

The Fallo

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 17446 promulgated on July 31, 1995 is
SET ASIDE.

In lieu thereof, the Court REVERSES the decision of the Regional

Trial Court and RECOGNIZES as VALID the decree of divorce granted
in favor of the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente by the Superior Court
of the State of California in and for the County of San Diego, made
final on December 4, 1952.

Further, the Court REMANDS the cases to the court of origin for
determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo N. Llorente’s will
and determination of the parties’ successional rights allowing proof
of foreign law with instructions that the trial court shall proceed
with all deliberate dispatch to settle the estate of the deceased
within the framework of the Rules of Court.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

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