Duty to preserve and to transmit

83. Crisologo v Singson, 4 SCRA 491) SERNEO

Facts: An action for partition commenced by the spouses Consolacion Florentino and Francisco Crisologo against
Manuel Singson in connection with a residential lot located a Plaridel St., Vigan, Ilocos Sur, with an area of approximately
193 square meters, and the improvements existing thereon. Their complaint alleged that Singson owned one-half pro-
indiviso of said property and that Consolacion Florentino owned the other half by virtue of the provisions of the duly
probated last will of Dña. Leona Singson, the original owner, and the project of partition submitted to, and approved by
the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur in special Proceeding No. 453; that plaintiffs had made demands for the partition of
said property, but defendant refused to accede thereto, thus compelling them to bring action.
Defendant's defense was that Consolacion Florentino was a mere usufructuary of, and not owner of one-half pro-
indiviso of the property in question, and that, therefore, she was not entitled to demand partition thereof.

Lower court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff. Singson appealed. At the time of the execution of the will, the
nearest living relatives of the orig owner were her brothers Evaristo, Manuel and Dionisio Singson, her nieces Rosario, Emilia
and Trinidad, and her grandniece Consolation, all surnamed Florentino.
ISSUE: Whether the testamentary disposition provided for sustitucion vulgar or for sustitucion fideicomisaria?
RULING: SUSTITUCION VULGAR. The old Civil Code governs this case. Testator may not only designate heirs
who’ll succeed him, but also substitutes in the event that said heirs don’t accept or are in no position to accept inheritance or
legacies, or die ahead of him. Testator may also bequeath his properties to particular person w/ obligation, on part of latter,
to deliver the same to another, totally or partially, upon occurrence of particular event.
The particular testamentary clause provides for substitution of heir in this manner: upon death of
Consolacion Florentino, whether before or after that of testatrix, property bequeathed to her shall be delivered or
shall belong in equal parts to testatrix's three brothers, Evaristo, Manuel, Dionisio, or their forced heirs, should
anyone of them die ahead of Consolacion Florentino.
If this created sustitucion vulgar, necessary result would be that Consolacion Florentino, upon death of
testatrix, became owner of one undivided half of the property, but if it provided for sustitution fideicomisaria, she
would have acquired nothing more than usufructuary rights over same half. In the former, she would be entitled to
partition, but not in the latter. As Manresa says, if fiduciary did not acquire full ownership of property bequeathed by will, but
mere usufructuary rights until time came for him to deliver said property to the fideicomisario, it’s obvious that nude ownership
over property, upon death of testatrix, passed to and was acquired by another person, and the person cannot be other than
the fideicomisario.

It seems to be of the essence of a fideicommissary substitution that an obligation be clearly imposed upon
first heir to preserve & transmit to another the whole or part of estate bequeathed to him, upon his death or upon
happening of particular event. For this reason, Art 785 of old Civil Code provides that fideicommissary substitution
has no effect unless made expressly either by giving it such name, or by imposing upon first heir the absolute
obligation to deliver the inheritance to a substitute or second heir.
The substitution of heirs provided for therein is not expressly made of fideicommissary kind, nor does it contain
a clear statement to the effect that appellee, during her lifetime, shall only enjoy usufructuary rights over the property
bequeathed to her, naked ownership thereof being vested in the brothers of the testatrix. As already stated, it merely
provides that upon appellee's death, whether before or after that of testatrix, her share shall belong to the brothers of the
testatrix.

Prohibition to Alienate Property (Art. 870;

84. Rodriguez v CA, 27 SCRA 546) SERNEO
FACTS: Doña Margarita Rodriguez left a last will and testament leaving no compulsory heirs or forced heirs and,
consequently was free to dispose of her properties even to strangers at will as provided in her will. The testatrix made letters
of trusteeship to petitioners, who were the executors under the will. The said last will and testament was legalized by virtue
of the resolution or order of the Court of First Instance of Manila without the appellant’s opposition in, hence the extrinsic
validity of the will was substantially not in question. The executor also presented a project of partition and the same was
approved by the Court of First Instance of Manila, again without the opposition of the appellants. Hence, the intrinsic validity
of the will could never be again questioned.
the trust created by the testatrix was then objected to by private respondents, who claimed to be first cousins of the
deceased. Such an objection was overruled by the lower court which granted letters of trusteeship to petitioners, who were
the executors under the will. Such an order of the lower court was appealed by respondent to the Court of Appeals, which, in
the original decision affirmed the action taken by the Court of First Instance.
The motion for reconsideration filed by private respondents resulted in a resolution which set aside its previous
decision and modified the judgment appealed from insofar as the validity of the provision of clause 10 of the will creating the
trusteeship was concerned. The disputed clause reads thus:
"Ang lahat ng pag-aaring nasasabi Clausulang ito (hindi kasama ang ‘generator’ at automobile) hindi maisasanla o
maipagbibili kailan man, maliban sa pag-aaring nasa Quezon Boulevard, Maynila, na maaring isanla kung walang
pondo sa gagamitin sa ipagpapaigi or ipagpapagawa ng panibago at alinsunod sa kaayusang hinihingi ng panahon"
 The Court of Appeals held that the above "perpetual prohibition to alienate" the property mentioned, constitutes a
clear violation of Article 867 and Article 870 of the Civil Code. The trust in question is then a nullity for being in violation of
the aforestated rules. There being then no institution of heirs as regards the properties covered by the trust, the Court of
Appeals held that "there should be intestate succession concerning the same, with the nearest relative of the deceased
entitled to inherit the properties in accordance with the law on intestacy.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trust in question should be annulled as being in violation of the rules against perpetuities
and the limitation on the prohibition for the alienation of the property left by the deceased.
RULING: No. It does not admit of doubt that in the disputed clause the testatrix did make clear her purpose not to
mortgage or to sell forevermore (kailan man) certain properties left by her. There would seem then some justification for the
Court of Appeals in the challenged resolution to deny force and effect to such a wish considering that "a perpetual prohibition
to alienate" is by the Civil Code forbidden. The more controlling provision, however, as already made mention of is supplied
by Article 870. Its terms are clear: "The dispositions of the testator declaring all or part of the estate inalienable for more than
twenty years are void.
The codal provision does not need any interpretation. It speaks categorically. What is declared void is the
testamentary disposition prohibiting alienation after the twenty-year period. In the interim, such a provision does
not suffer from the vice of invalidity. It cannot be stricken down. The wishes of the testatrix constitute the law. Her
will must be given effect. This is so even if there could be an element of uncertainty insofar as the ascertainment thereof is
concerned. In the language of a Civil Code provision: "If a testamentary disposition admits of different interpretations,
in case of doubt, that interpretation by which the disposition is to be operative shall be preferred.
Respect for the will of a testator as expressed in his last testamentary disposition, constitutes the principal basis of
the rules which the law prescribes for the correct interpretation of all of the clauses of the will; the words and provisions therein
written must be plainly construed in order to avoid a violation of his intentions and real purpose. The will of the testator clearly
and explicitly stated must be respected and complied with as an inviolable law among the parties in interest.
Nothing can be clearer, therefore, than that petitioners could not challenge the provision in question. It had
no right to vindicate. Such a right may never arise. The twenty-year period is still with us. What would transpire
thereafter is still locked up in the inscrutable future, beyond the power of mere mortals to foretell. At any rate, We
cannot anticipate. Nor should We. We do not possess the power either of conferring a cause of action to a party
when, under the circumstances disclosed, it had none.

Modal Institution (Art. 882)

85. Rabadilla v Court of Appeals, 334 SCRA 522 SERNEO
Facts: In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla,
predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was instituted as a devisee of a parcel of land. The said
Codicil, which was duly probated before the then CFI of Negros Occidental. Pursuant to the same Codicil, the subject land
was transferred to the deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, and the Transfer Certificate of Title thereto was issued in his name.Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla died and was survived by his wife Rufina and children Johnny (petitioner), Aurora, Ofelia and Zenaida, all
surnamed Rabadilla.
Respondent brought a complaintbefore the RTC in Bacolod City, against the above-mentioned heirs of Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, to enforce the provisions of subject Codicil. The Complaint alleged that the defendant-heirs violated the conditions
of the Codicil.
The plaintiff then prayed for the reconveyance/return of the subject land to the surviving heirs of the late Aleja Belleza,
because it is alleged that petitioner failed to comply with the terms of the will; that since 1985, Johnny failed to deliver the
fruits; and that the the land was mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank, which is a violation of the will.
In his defense, Johnny avers that the term “near descendants” in the will of Aleja pertains to the near descendants
of Aleja and not to the near descendants of Dr. Rabadilla, hence, since Aleja had no near descendants at the time of his
death, no can substitute Dr. Rabadilla on the obligation to deliver the fruits of the devised land.

Issue: WON the testamentary institution of Dr. Rabadilla is a modal institution.

RULING: YES. The Court of Appeals erred not in ruling that the institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil
is in the nature of a modal institution and therefore, Article 882 of the New Civil Code is the provision of law in point. From the
provisions of the Codicil litigated upon, it can be gleaned unerringly that the testatrix intended that subject property
be inherited by Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.
It is likewise clearly worded that the testatrix imposed an obligation on the said instituted heir and his
successors-in-interest to deliver one hundred piculs of sugar to the herein private respondent, Marlena Coscolluela
Belleza, during the lifetime of the latter. However, the testatrix did not make Dr. Jorge Rabadilla’s inheritance and the
effectivity of his institution as a devisee, dependent on the performance of the said obligation. It is clear, though, that should
the obligation be not complied with, the property shall be turned over to the testatrix’s near descendants. The manner of
institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil is evidently modal in nature because it imposes a charge
upon the instituted heir without, however, affecting the efficacy of such institution.

c. Legitime of Legitimate Children and Legitimate Descendants

86. Francisco vs. Francisco-Alfonso

Exclusion of Ascendants

87. Bertua vs CA

The Origin and the First Transmission of Title

88.Chua v CFI of Negros Occidental, 78 SCRA 414
The Reservor and the Second Transmission of Title
89.Solivio v Court of Appeals, 182 SCRA 119
90.Lacerna v vda. de Corsino, 1 SCRA 1227
Reservor’s title to the Reservable Property
91.Edroso v Sablan, 25 Phil 295)
Reservor as a conditional heir
92.Sienes v Esparcia, 1 SCRA 750)