(11)

FESTO R. GALANG, JR. v. HON. RAMIRO R. GERONIMO

643 SCRA 745, February 22, 2011
Cruz, J:

FACTS: Respondent Ramos filed an election protest case against petitioner before the RTC. The court
sheriff went to petitioner's residence to serve summons with a copy of the petition. The Sheriff's Return of
Summons stated that the sheriff was able to serve Summons on petitioner.

Petitioner, together with his then counsel of record, Atty. Abner Perez, appeared in court and requested a
copy of the summons with a copy of the election protest. One of his affirmative defenses was that the
electoral protest was filed out of time, since it was filed more than ten (10) days after the date of
proclamation of the winning candidate.

The trial court then issued the assailed Order finding the service of Summons on petitioner as valid, and
declaring the Answer filed on as filed out of time.

Petitioner then filed before the Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65, alleging that
respondent judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in considering as valid, the Sheriff's Service of Summons. However,
respondents pointed out that the petition for certiorari should not be filed with this Court but with the
COMELEC.

ISSUE: WON petitioner’s petition for certiorari should be filed with COMELEC

RULING: YES. Section 4, Rule 65 provides that in election cases involving an act or omission of a municipal
or regional trial court, the petition shall be filed exclusively with the COMELEC, in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction. Interpreting the phrase phrase "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction," if a case may be appealed to
a particular court or judicial tribunal or body, then said court or judicial tribunal or body has jurisdiction to
issue the extraordinary writ of certiorari, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.

Since it is the COMELEC which has jurisdiction to take cognizance of an appeal from the decision of
the regional trial court in election contests involving elective municipal officials, then it is also the COMELEC
which has jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. Clearly, petitioner erred
in invoking this Court's power to issue said extraordinary writ.
(12)

ESMERALDO C. ROMULLO,
vs.
SAMAHANG MAGKAKAPITBAHAY NG BAYANIHAN COMPOUND HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.,
represented by its President, PAQUITO QUITALIG

G.R. No. 180687, October 6, 2010

NACHURA, J.:

FACTS: Respondent secured a loan from the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation
Development Fund (NHMFCDF) for the purchase of a land. Such would thereafter be
distributed to members/beneficiaries of the respondent under its housing program. After
the sale was consummated, two Transfer Certificates of Title were issued in the name of the
respondent and the land was distributed in portions to respondent’s members/beneficiaries.
However, despite demand, petitioners refused to pay their monthly dues and legal fees as
well as the deposits and amortizations for their respective lot allocations. Resultantly,
respondent approved a Resolution expelling the petitioners as its members and
disqualifying them as beneficiaries of the housing project and in another Resolution, also
approved the substitution of petitioners by qualified members.

Despite notice of disqualification, petitioners continued to occupy the lots alloted to them
and refused to execute a waiver of their lot allotments. The matter was referred to the
barangay for conciliation but still no settlement was reached. As such, respondent sought to
recover possession of the said lots by filing a case for ejectment.

MeTC gave more weight to the arguments raised by the petitioners and the complaint was
dismissed. However, this judgment was reversed by the RTC on appeal.

ISSUE: WON complaint sufficiently alleges cause of action for unlawful detainer

RULING: Yes. A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it
recites the following:

(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by

tolerance of the plaintiff;
(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant
of the termination of the latter's right of possession;
(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived
the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and
(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the
plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.
In this case, respondent’s allegations in the complaint clearly make a case for
unlawful detainer, essential to confer jurisdiction over the subject matter.
(13)
Excellent Quality Apparel v. Win Multi Rich Builders
G.R. No. 175048, February 10, 2009

Facts: On March 26, 1996, petitioner Excellent Quality Apparel, Inc. then represented by Max
L.F. Ying, vice-president for productions, and Alfredo R. Orden, treasurer, entered into a
contract with Multi-Rich Builders represented by Wilson G. Chua, its president and general
manager, for the construction of a garment factory within the Cavite Philippine Economic
Zone Authority (CPEZ). The duration of the project was for a maximum period of 5 months
or 150 consecutive calendar days. An arbitration clause was included in the contract. The
construction of the factory building was completed on November 27, 1996. Respondent Win
Multi-Rich Builders Inc. was incorporated with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) on February 26, 2004, Win filed a complaint for a sum of money against petitioner and
to which the latter then filed an Omnibus Motion questioning the jurisdiction of the trial
court and pointing out the presence of an Arbitration Clause in their contract. Petitioner also
moved to dismiss the case since respondent herein is neither a contractor nor a party to the
contract. Both the trial court and CA found in favor of respondent herein. Hence the present
petition.

Issue: Whether or not Win has legal personality to institute the case.

Ruling: NO. Win admitted that the contract was executed between Multi-Rich and petitioner. It further
admitted that Multi-Rich was a sole proprietorship with a business permit issued by the Office of the Mayor
of Manila. The sole proprietor is personally liable for all the debts and obligations of the business. A sole
proprietorship does not possess a juridical personality separate and distinct from the personality of the
owner of the enterprise. The law does not vest a separate legal personality on the sole proprietorship or
empower it to file or defend an action in court.
The original petition was instituted by Win, which is a SEC-registered corporation. It filed a collection
of sum of money suit which involved a construction contract entered into by petitioner and Multi-Rich, a sole
proprietorship. The counsel of Win wanted to change the name of the plaintiff in the suit to Multi-Rich. The
change cannot be countenanced. The plaintiff in the collection suit is a corporation. The name cannot be
changed to that of a sole proprietorship. Again, a sole proprietorship is not vested with juridical personality
to file or defend an action.
In order for a corporation to be able to file suit and claim the receivables of its predecessor in
business, in this case a sole proprietorship, it must show proof that the corporation had acquired the assets
and liabilities of the sole proprietorship. Win could have easily presented or attached any document e.g.,
deed of assignment which will show whether the assets, liabilities and receivables of Multi-Rich were
acquired by Win. Having been given the opportunity to rebut the allegations made by petitioner, Win failed
to use that opportunity. Thus, we cannot presume that Multi-Rich is the predecessor-in-business of Win and
hold that the latter has standing to institute the collection suit
(14)
EUFEMIO C. DOMINGO v HON. GUILLERMO N. CARAGUE, in his capacity as Chairman, Commission
on Audit
G.R. No. 161065, April 15, 2005
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Facts: Assailed in this petition for certiorari is the legality of Resolution No. 2002-05 of the Commission on
Audit (COA) providing for Organizational Restructuring Plan. The petitioners alleged therein that this plan
is intrinsically void for want of enabling law which gives that COA to undertake the same and providing for
the necessary standards, conditions, restrictions, limitations, guidelines and parameters. Petitioners further
alleged that COA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), countered that petitioners have no
legal standing to file the present petition since they have not shown "a personal stake in the outcome of
the case" or an actual or potential injury that can be redressed by our favorable decision. In essence, it
is alleged that the petitioners are not a party in interest, but the petitioners claim otherwise by reason that
the matter is of public concern. The said Organizational Restructuring Plan is not just a mere
reorganization but a revamp or overhaul of the COA, with a "spillover effect" upon its audit performance.
This will have an impact upon the rest of the government bodies subject to its audit supervision, thus, should
be treated as a matter of transcendental importance.

ISSUE: Whether petitioners have the legal standing to institute the instant petition.

HELD: NO. It stated that: (Locus Standi) There was no showing that they had any direct and personal
interest in the COA Organizational Restructuring Plan. There was also of an admission that "they do not seek
any affirmative relief nor impute any improper or improvident act against the respondents" and "are not
motivated by any desire to seek affirmative relief from COA or from respondents that would redound to
their personal benefit or gain." Hence, the petitioners do not have any legal standing to file the instant suit.
This case was decided by the Supreme Court En Banc.
He who is directly affected and whose interest is immediate and substantial has the standing to sue. A party
must show a personal stake in the outcome of the case or an injury to himself that can be redressed by a
favorable decision in order to warrant an invocation of the court
(15)
HERMANA R. CEREZO vs. DAVID TUAZON
G.R. No. 141538, March 23, 2004
CARPIO, J.:

FACTS: A Country Bus Lines passenger bus, driven by Danilo Foronda and owned by Mrs. Cerezo, collided
with a tricycle, driven by Tuazon. Because of this, Tuazon suffered serious physical injuries. Tuazon filed a
complaint for damages against: (1) Mrs.Cerezo; (2) Attorney Juan Cerezo (husband of Mrs. Cerezo); (3)
Foronda. Tuazon alleged that at the time of the incident,
Tuazon was in his proper lane, while Foronda willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously operate the said motor
vehicle in a negligent, careless, and imprudent manner without due regard to traffic rules and regulation.

Alias Summons was served at the office of Atty. Cerezo

inTarlac after the initial summons were returned unserved.
Cerezo spouses participated in the proceedings before the RTC. Atty. Valera, the counsel of the Cerezo
spouses, filed a motion praying for the issuance of new summons on the Cerezo spouses to satisfy proper
service in accordance with the Rules of Court.

RTC denied such motion, claiming that any infirmity in the service of the summons has been cured.
The RTC also declared the spouses Cerezo in default of failure to file an answer.

On May 30, 1995, the RTC: (1) ruled in favor of Tuazon;(2) made no pronouncement on Foronda’s
liability since no summons was served on him; (3) held Mrs. Cerezo solely
liable due to the negligence of Mrs. Cerezo’s employee, pursuant to Article 2180; (4) did not
hold Atty. Cerezo liable as Tuazon failed to show that Mrs. Cerezo’s business benefited the family.

ISSUE: Whether the defendant-driver Danilo A. Foronda whose negligence is the main issue is an
indispensable party whose presence is compulsory but [whom] the lower court did not summon.

RULING: Foronda is not an indispensable party, contrary to Mrs. Cerezo's contention. An indispensable
party is one whose interest is affected by the court's action in the litigation, and without whom no final
resolution of the case is possible. However, Mrs. Cerezo's liability as an employer in action for quasi-delict is
not only solidary, it is also primary and direct.

The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary. Where there is a
solidary liability on the part of the debtors, as in this case, each debtor is liable for the entire obligation. Hence,
each debtor is liable to pay for the entire obligation in full. There is no merger or renunciation of rights, but
only mutual representation. Where the obligation of the parties is solidary, either of the parties is
indispensable, and the other is not even a necessary party because complete relief is available from either.
Therefore, jurisdiction over Foronda is not even necessary as Tuazon may collect from Mrs. Cerezo alone.
(87)
FELISA M. JARAVATA vs. MA. DIANA KAROLUS and GRACE V. KUHAIL
G.R. No. 154988 June 21, 2007
AZCUNA, J.:

FACTS: Felisa Jaravata filed an Action for Reconveyance and Declaration of Nullity of Titles
and Damages against Diana Karolus. She claims that she is the lawful owner and actual
occupant of a parcel of land in Zambales which is subdivided into 3 different lots. She further
alleges that Karolus illegally secured titles to 2 of the 3 subdivided lots. In their Answer, Karolus
contended that the issuance of the free patents was not fraudulent and that there was no
overlapping of the lots. They also set up the defense of prescription.
Thereafter, a Third Party Complaint was filed against Javarata’s lawyer, Atty. Tacorda. Later on,
Jaravata served two separate sets of written interrogatories upon Karolus. However, the latter objected to
thembut was denied by the RTC. As such, Karolus filed a Manifestation and Compliance attaching their ans
wers to the written interrogatories. Jaravata and Atty. Tacorda then filed a Joint Omibus Motion to
compel Karolus to fully and completely answer the written interrogatories. Failing this, RTC declared
Karolus in default pursuant to Sec 3 (c) of Rule 29. Thereafter, RTC ruled for Jaravata. However, CA reversed
the decisión and ruled in favor of Karolus.

ISSUE: WON CA erred in setting aside RTC’s default judgment considering that respondents
did not fully answer written interrogatories served upon them.

RULING: No. The CA was correct in holding that the RTC erred in rendering a judgment by
default against the defendants for refusal or failure to answer written interrogatories,
without first requiring an application by the proponent to compel an answer. This is the
requisite procedure under Section 1 of Rule 29 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Nevertheless, CA erred in proceeding to decide the case on the merits since there was
as yet no trial or presentation of evidence in the RTC. Jaravata’s prayer to affirm the trial court’s
default decision does not mean that there was a trial. The decision of the RTC was based on
constructive admissions by Karolus of the allegations of the plaintiff due to the court’s
application of the sanction for not answering the written interrogatories.
In reversing the application of the sanction, the CA should have given the parties a chance to
substantiate by evidence their respective claims at the trial court. This is particularly true with
respect to the Jaravata’s claim of physical possession for more than 30 years, regarding
which the CA said that clear and convincing evidence was required but wanting. This is
because the wrong procedure followed by the trial court effectively aborted a trial and presentation
of evidence.

The case was therefore ordered remanded to the RTC for trial and/or further
proceedings.