Notes on Community, Hegemony, and the Uses of the Past

Author(s): James Brow

Source: Anthropological Quarterly, Vol. 63, No. 1, Tendentious Revisions of the Past in the
Construction of Community (Jan., 1990), pp. 1-6
Published by: The George Washington University Institute for Ethnographic Research
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NOTES ON COMMUNITY,HEGEMONY,AND THE USES
OF THE PAST
JAMES BROW
Universityof Texas at Austin

While it is plausibleto maintainthat, havingal- processesis more effectivelycapturedin Weber's

ready happened,the past cannot be altered, it is refashioningof the contrastbetweenGemeinschaft
equally evident that memoryis less fixed. More- and Gesellschaft.Webermakesa fundamentaldis-
over, it is clearly not only in so-calledtraditional tinctionbetweencommunalrelationships,in which
societiesthat culturallyconstructedversionsof the "the orientation of social action . . . is based on a
past are authorizedto shape a people'ssense of subjective feeling of the parties . . . that they be-
identity.Representations of the past are an equally long together"(1978: 40), and associativerelation-
prominentfeatureof hegemonicstrugglein modern ships, in which "the orientationof social action
industrialsocieties. The papers collected in this . . . rests on a rationallymotivatedadjustmentof
special issue of Anthropological Quarterly analyze interests or a similarly motivated agreement"
the tendentiousrevisionof historyin four very dif- (1978: 40-41), but he insists that this is an ideal-
ferentcontemporary settings (Sri Lanka, Ecuador, typical contrastbetweenopposingtendenciesthat
Palestine,and Shetland),in each case focusingon may in practiceoccur together,and he recognizes
representations of the past withinthe socialcontext that "the greatmajorityof socialrelationshipshave
of local movementsto createcommunity.These in- this (communal) characteristicto some degree,
troductory notes outline a conceptualapparatus while beingat the same time to somedegreedeter-
that is intendedto facilitate the task of grasping minedby associativefactors"(1978: 41; parenthe-
the mechanismsand significanceof these complex ses added).This formulationnot only drawsatten-
processes. tion to "the constant interweavingof economic
utility and social affinity"(Bendix 1962: 476) but
Community also acknowledgesthat communalizationis an
ongoingand pervasiveprocessin social life.
"Community" referssimplyto "a sense of belong- Communalization takesplaceon variousbases.
ing together"(cf. Weber 1978: 40). Since the term In his general discussion of Vergemeinschaftung
is oftenverylooselyappliedeitherto a placeor to a Weber (1978: 41) mentions"a religiousbrother-
collectionof people,it is necessaryto insist that in hood, an erotic relationship,a relationof personal
the presentessay communityis definedby nothing loyalty,a nationalcommunity,the esprit de corps
moreor less than this subjectivestate. The senseof of a militaryunit (and) the family" to exemplify
belongingtogethertypically combines both affec- the rangeof possibilities.Marx,of course,empha-
tive and cognitivecomponents,both a feeling of sized the creationof communalrelationson the ba-
solidarityand an understanding of sharedidentity. sis of commonclass positionas a crucialaspectof
By extension,"communalization" is definedas the transformationof a class-in-itselfinto a class-
any pattern of action that promotes a sense of be- for-itself.The case studies that follow are largely
longingtogether. Communalization is a continuous concerned with the interplayamong processesof
process, for the analysis of which Weber provides communalization that emergefrom differentbases
us with more useful guidelinesthan does Durk- situated betweenthe levels of the family and the
heim. AlthoughDurkheim'sinsightfulaccountsof nation,as these are conditionedby changesin the
communalization are still suggestive,his rigid di- distributionof power within the capitalist world
chotomybetweenthe domainsof the sacred and economy.
the profane(1965: 52), and his interpretationof Anderson's(1983: 15) much-citeddefinitionof
the sacredritualsof the positivecult as functioning the nation as "an imaginedpoliticalcommunity"
to revitalizea sense of solidaritythat is dissipated not only affirmsthat the sense of belongingto-
in the mundanecourseof profanelife (1965: 385- getheris an activeprocessbut also tacitlyacknowl-
392), excessivelysegregatethe worldof communal edges that an ideal of communitycan be generated
actionfromthat in whichpeoplepursuetheir indi- withouta concomitantfeelingof solidarity.The re-
vidual interests.The ubiquityof communalization verse, however,is not possible.As he also writes,
1
2 ANTHROPOLOGICAL
QUARTERLY
"all communitieslargerthan primordialvillagesof
face-to-facecontact (and perhapseven these) are
imagined"(1983: 15; parenthesesin the original).
The tentative qualificationhere is unwarranted:
communalizationalways contains an imaginative
aspect.
Anderson(1983: 16) claims that the nationis
imaginedas a communitybecause it "is always
conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship."
"Deep comradeship"certainlyexemplifieswhat is
to be understoodby "a sense of belonging to-
gether,"but any implicationthat communalrela-
tions are always exclusivelyhorizontalshould be
resisted.As one movesalong a scale of communal
intensity-a scale that reaches its extremeat the
point designated by Turner (1969) as "com-
munitas," where all separations are dis-
solved-horizontal relations of equality may be-
comemorepronouncedand verticalties muted,but
the latterare not incompatiblewith the experience
of community,howeveruncongenialthis may ap-
pear to the purportedlyegalitariantemperof our
times. The popularBritish identificationwith its
royalfamily,for example,bearsampletestimonyto
the persistentpowerof vertical solidarityeven in
class-dividedindustrialsocieties. Communalrela-
tions may, in other words,possessboth egalitarian
and hierarchicaldimensions.
All communal relations are socially con-
structed.Even if sociobiologistswere to find sup-
portfor theirclaim that certainkindsof communal
relationsare geneticallybased,it wouldstill be evi-
dent that the specificformof those relationsis al-
ways culturallyand historicallydetermined.This
appliesto so-called"primordial" relationsas much
as to any others.Geertz(1973:259) recognizesthis
when he definesa primordialattachmentas "one
that stems fromthe 'givens'--or,moreprecisely,as
culture is inevitablyinvolvedin such matters,the
assumed'givens'--of social existence."
Nevertheless,providedit is not simplyused as
an excuseto terminatesociologicalanalysisprema-
turely, the identificationof certain kinds of com-
munalrelationsas primordialis importantand re-
vealing. It draws attentionto the fact that some
communalrelations are felt to be more deeply
bindingthan others,to the pointwherethey "seem
to flow more from a sense of natural . . . affinity
than from social interaction"and come to possess
"an ineffable,and at times overpowering,
coercive-
ness in and of themselves"(Geertz 1973:259-260;
cf. Anderson1983: 131-132).As the term implies,
the inevitabilityof primordialrelationsis associ-
ated with the belief that they haveexistedfromthe
very beginning.The studiesthat followare particu-
larly concerned with the political aspects of
"primordialization," usingthis term to describethe
processwherebycertain kinds of communalrela-
tions are promotedand experiencedas if they pos-
sessed an originaland naturalinevitability.
The primordialexperienceof communitycor-
respondsto a socialorderof what Bourdieu(1977:
164-171) calls "doxa,"where the culturallycon-
structedworldis "seen as a self-evidentand natu-
ral order"(1977: 166) that is "takenfor granted"
(1977: 165). Doxa prevailsin the absenceof con-
tending opinions, where "what is essential goes
without saying because it comes without saying"
(1977: 167). A doxic order, which of course is
never fully achieved,is one that has successfully
accomplished"the naturalizationof its own arbi-
trariness"(1977: 164). One aspect of this is the
primordialization of communalrelations,whichare
experienced as ineluctable precisely because, as
Anderson(1983: 131) puts it, "in everything'natu-
ral' there is alwayssomethingunchosen."
Throughoutthe world, however,the field of
doxa coexists with a field of opinion, which
Bourdieualso describesas a universeof discourse
or argument(cf. Giddens'[1979, 1984] distinction
between practical and discursive consciousness).
Where competingopinions confront one another
the primordialityof communal relations is pre-
served only by their incarcerationin the doxic
prisonof innocence.Elsewhere,in the universeof
discourse,the basisof communityis alwaysvulner-
able to challenge. Moreover,rapid and profound
changesin the objectiveconditionsof contemporary
life constantlythreatento subvertthe boundaries
of doxa. But if, on the one hand,the primordiality
of establishedcommunitiesseemseverywhereto be
under attack, on the other hand vigorous new
are scarcely less ap-
projectsof primordialization
parent.Perhaps the most pervasiveand forcefully
forms of contemporaryprimordializa-
propagated
tion are nationalismand ethnicism, the various
componentsof which (kinship,language,religion,
locality, etc.) interact both with one anotherand
with communalizationon other bases, especially
class, in extremelycomplexand variedways.
The Past
Almost everywhere,it seems, the sense of belong-
 NOTES ON COMMUNITY
ing togetheris nourishedby beingcultivatedin the
fertile soil of the past. Evennewly establishedcol-
lectivitiesquicklycomposehistoriesfor themselves
that enhancetheir members'sense of sharediden-
tity, while solidarity is fortified by a people's
knowledgethat their communalrelationsenjoy an
historicalprovenance.
Communalizationis further strengthenedby
the convictionthat what ties a groupof peopleto-
getheris not just a sharedpast but a commonori-
gin. Anthropologistshardly need to be reminded
that claimsof descentfroma commonancestorare
amongthe most effectiveand commonplacemeans
by whichhumangroupsforgebondsof community.
But what gives kinshipits specialpotencyas a ba-
sis of communityis that it can draw upon the pst
not simply to posit a commonorigin but also to
claim substantialidentity in the present.Kinship
thus providesa standardidiom of communityfor
collectivitiesrangingfrom the family, the lineage
and the clan to the nationand the race, and is ex-
tendedalso to includereligiousbrotherhoods, femi-
nist sisterhoods,fraternalordersof all kinds, and
even the wholefamilyof nations.
Despite the rhetoric of kinship ("blood is
thicker than water"), the power of the past to
shapecommunalrelationsin the presentis morea
matterof culturethan of nature.What is at stake
is not geneticaffinityor the inertiaof habitualbe-
havior but the moral authorityof tradition,the
maintenanceof which requirescontinuouscultural
work. Variousmeans are availableto bolster the
authorityof tradition,of which one of the most
widelyadoptedis its sacralization,as Weber(1978:
215) noted when he describedthe ideal-typeof
traditionalauthorityas "restingon an established
belief in the sanctityof immemorialtraditions."
Constructionof an authoritativetraditionthat
identifiesall who acceptit as membersof the same
political communityis particularlyprominentin
the creationof nationsand sub-nations.Tradition
typicallycomposesa versionof the past that not
only binds the membersof the nation to one an-
other, by proclaimingtheir shareddescentand/or
commonexperience,but also associatesthe nation
as a whole with a particular territory
that-maintaining the domestic imagery of the
family-is its homeland.Such renditionsof the
past establish the enduringcharacterof the na-
tionalcommunitydespiteall the rupturesand vicis-
situdes of history.The essentialcontinuityof the
nationis often also representedin the figureof the
3
countrymanor peasant,doubtlessbecausehis way
of life seems endlesslyto reproducethat of ances-
tral generations,while his (less often, her) intimate
connectionwith the land epitomizesthe nation'sin-
violableattachmentto its territory.
Wherenormsof traditionalismprevail,behav-
ior is legitimated by appeals to precedent.But
memoryis less stable than the events it recollects,
and knowledgeof what happenedin the past is al-
ways subjectto selectiveretention,innocentamne-
sia, and tendentiousre-interpretation.Traditions
are also invented(Hobsbawmand Ranger 1983).
In otherwords,appealsto the authorityof tradition
do not precludeinnovation.Discussingtraditional
domination,Weber (1956: 101; quoted in Bendix
1962: 331) writesthat "as a matterof principleit
is out of the questionto create new laws whichde-
viate from the historical norms. However, new
rightsare createdin fact, but only by way of 'rec-
ognizing'them as havingbeen valid 'fromtime im-
memorial'."Innovationcan thus evade the stric-
turesevenof a rigidtraditionalismby appearingin
the guise of preservation,recovery,or purification.
Hegemony
Since knowledgeof what happenedin the past can
never be definitivelyfixed, prevailingunderstand-
ings are always at risk. And, given the intimate
and intricatectnnectionsbetween knowledgeand
power(Foucault1980), at any momentsociallyor-
ganizedknowledgeof the past both reflectsand af-
fects the distributionand exerciseof power.Mem-
ory is thus an importantsite of politicalconflict,
and contendingversionsof the past figure promi-
nently in what it is useful to describe,in the sense
opened up by Gramsci, as the struggle for
hegemony.
The attainmentof hegemony,in the senseof a
"state of 'total social authority'which, at certain
specificconjunctures,a specificclass alliancewins,
but a combinationof 'coercion'and 'consent',over
the whole social formation"(Hall 1980: 331), is
very rare. But the struggle for hegemony,under-
stood as the processwherebythe interestsof other
groupsare coordinatedwith thoseof a dominantor
potentiallydominantgroup,throughthe creationof
"not only a unisonof economicand politicalaims,
but also intellectualand moral unity" (Gramsci
1971: 181), is continuous.Fromthis latterperspec-
tive communalizationis an indispensablecompo-
nent of any hegemonicprocess.
4 ANTHROPOLOGICAL QUARTERLY

Hegemonycannot adequatelybe understood (Williams 1977: 110) and the normallytaken-for-

simplyby referenceto the thesis of a moreor less granted understandingsof practicalconsciousness
coherentand articulate"dominantideology"(Ab- and commonsense, also connect with Bourdieu's
ercrombieet al. 1980) that people either con- discussionof the relationshipbetween a field of
sciously accept or consciouslyreject. As Laclau doxa, in which "the establishedcosmologicaland
and Mouffe (1982: 100) argue, hegemonyis not political order . . . goes without saying and there-
"an externalrelationbetweenpreconstitutedsocial fore goes unquestioned" (1977: 166), and a field of
agents, but the very processof the discursivecon- opiniondefined by the confrontationof orthodox
stitutionof those agents."It can thereforeonly be and heterodoxargumentsthat "recognizethe possi-
graspedas a process,one that is typicallyuneven, bility of different and antagonistic beliefs" (p.
heterogeneousand incomplete,and that operatesat 164). Bourdieuargues that the boundarybetween
other levels of consciousnessbesidesthat of "mere the fieldof opinionand the fieldof doxais a crucial
opinion or mere manipulation"(Williams 1980: site of hegemonicstruggle:
38). Its internalstructuresare normallyfractured
by contradictions,and although it may absorb the dominated classeshavean interestin pushingback
some oppositionalcurrents,it simultaneouslygen- the limitsof doxaandexposingthe arbitrariness of the
takenforgranted; the dominant classeshavean interest
eratesothers.Analysismust thereforeattendto the in defending the integrityof doxaor, shortof this,of es-
complexmovementsand formationsthroughwhich, tablishingin itsplace-the imperfect
necessarily substitute,
as Williams(1977: 112) puts it, hegemonyis con- orthodoxy (p. 169).
tinually "renewed,recreated,defendedand modi-
fied ... [but] also continuallyresisted,limited,al- Thus, to bring into questionand discussionwhat
tered,challengedby pressuresnot all its own." was previouslyunquestionedand thereforeundis-
These movementstraverseall levels of con- cussed is an act of politicalconsciousness-raising.
sciousness.For Williams (1977: 109-110), one of Conversely,primordialization,as an instance of
the conceptualadvantagesof hegemonylies in what Bourdieu(p. 164) claims is the tendencyof
"every established order . . to produce . . . the
its refusalto equateconsciousness naturalizationof its own arbitrariness"
withthearticulate for- is an act of
malsystemwhichcanbe andordinarily is abstracted
as
politicalconsciousness-reduction.
'ideology.'It of coursedoesnotexcludethearticulate and
The particularsector of common sense on
formalmeanings,valuesand beliefswhicha dominant
class developsand propagates.
which strugglesfor the past are foughtout is that
But it does not equate
thesewithconsciousness, of popularmemorywhich,accordingto the Popular
orratherit doesnotreducecon-
sciousness to them.Insteadit seesthe relationsMemoryGroup(1982: 211), is structuredby two
of domi-
nanceandsubordination, in theirformsas practicalcon-
sets of relations--on the one hand, "the relation
sciousness, as in effecta saturationof the wholeprocess
betweendominantmemoryand oppositionalforms"
of living... to sucha depththatthepressures andlim-
its of whatcanultimately and, on the other,the relationbetween"publicdis-
be seenas a specificeconomic,
courses"and "the moreprivatisedsenseof the past
politicalandculturalsystemseemto mostof us thepres-
suresandlimitsof simpleexperience andcommonsense.
that is generatedwithin a lived culture."Images
and sentimentsof communitythat are produced,
This formulation recalls Gramsci's (1971: contested, diffused, and modifiedon this terrain
331) assertionthat "the relationbetweencommon featureprominentlyin projectsto promoteor resist
sense and the upperlevel of philosophyis assured the intellectualand moralunity that definesan ef-
by 'politics'."ForGramsci(1971: 323-331), "com- fective hegemony.
mon sense"refersto the generalconceptionof the Recent studies (for example, Alonso 1988a,
world that informs the practical, everyday con- 1988b; Bommes and Wright 1982; Brow 1988;
sciousnessof ordinarypeople in a particularsoci- Comaroff 1985; Comaroff and Comaroff 1987;
ety. FollowingGramsci,Hall (1986: 20) pointsout Corriganand Sayer 1985;PopularMemoryGroup
that commonsense is "the terrainof conceptions 1982;Turton 1984;Wright 1985) show that natu-
and categorieson whichthe practicalconsciousness ralizationof the arbitraryis only one of several
of the massesof the peopleis actuallyformed.. rhetoricalstrategiesthat are recurrentlydiscernible
[and] . . . on which more coherent ideologies and in hegemonicconstructionsof historyand commu-
philosophiesmust contendfor mastery." nity. Besides"naturalization," Alonso (1988a: 44-
These treatmentsof hegemonyas encompass- 45) also identifies"departicularization" (or univer-
ing both "the articulateupperlevel of 'ideology'" salization) and "idealization"among the "multi-
 NOTES ON COMMUNITY
plicity of techniques"by means of which "hege-
monic ideologies appropriate and transform
popularhistories."Departicularization is the pro-
cess wherebyhistoricaldiscoursesand practicesare
emptiedof their local, concretemeaningsand uni-
versalized,made the propertyof all who are incor-
poratedwithin the hegemony.Idealizationis the
processthroughwhich the past is cleaned up and
made the palatable embodiment of dominant
values.
Anderson's(1983: 15) remarkthat the nation
is imaginedas "inherentlylimited"appliesalso to
other kinds of community.Just as "no nation
imaginesitself as coterminouswith mankind"(p.
16), so everycommunityis definedin oppositionto
others.Communalization
is, then,a processboth of
inclusionand of exclusion.At the same time differ-
ences among those who are incorporatedwithin a
communityare often mutedor obscured,while dif-
ferencesbetweeninsidersand outsidersare loudly
affirmed.This patternof polarizationbetweencom-
munities and homogenization within them
(Tambiah1986: 120) can then be fortifiedby ap-
peals to the past that representa culturaldistinc-
tion as an originaland essentialdifference.
None of these processes,however,is either
uniform or unassailable.The contradictionsand
distortionswithinany hegemonicdiscourse,as well
as the discrepanciesbetweenit and the popularun-
derstandingsof commonsense,leave it evervulner-
able to penetration,criticism, and refusal (Scott
1985; Willis 1981). The strugglefor hegemonyis
always an open-endedprocess of contestationas
well as incorporation, of negotiationand resistance
as much as of accommodationand consent.
The politicalconnectionthat Gramscidiscerns
"betweencommonsenseand the upperlevel of phi-
losophy"shouldbe understoodin the broadestpos-
sible sense. State officialsand politicalpartiesare
NOTES
AcknowledgmentsI am grateful to Ana Maria Alonso, Amy
Burce, Daniel Nugent, Ted Swedenburg,Carol Trosset, and
Mike Woost, all of whom read and commentedon an earlier
5
certainlyamongthe majoragenciesthat determine
this relationship,but cultural,educational,and reli-
gious institutions,as well as the family and all
kinds of voluntaryorganizations,are also funda-
mentally involved (Hall 1986: 21). As Williams
(1977: 110) stressesin the passagequotedearlier,
the conceptof hegemonylooks at
relationsof domination andsubordination . . as in ef-
fecta saturationof thewholeprocessof living-notonly
of politicalandeconomicactivity,noronlyof manifest
socialactivity,butof thewholesubstance of livedidenti-
ties andrelationships.
In short,hegemonicstruggleis ubiquitousin social
life.
The papersin this collectionexaminea varied
rangeof sites, vehicles,and processesof hegemonic
activity. Their unity lies in their shared focus on
practicesthat foster a sense of belongingtogether
by constructingand disseminatingpersuasivevi-
sions of the past. This crucialtheme of hegemonic
struggleis perhapsmost obviousin officiallyorgan-
ized projectsand productionssuch as state rituals,
school textbooks, religious ceremonies, and the
mass media, but it is also evidentin the unofficial
practicesof ordinarylife, where it saturatesthe
terrainof commonsense on which ideologiescon-
tend for mastery. The studies draw on ethno-
graphicand historicalresearchto analyzethe plays
that are made with this theme not only in authori-
tative rituals of heritageand development(Brow,
Church),but also in the shapingof the landscape
(Crain, Swedenburg),in local pageantsand cele-
brations of folklore (Church, Crain), in poetry,
painting,and dress style (Swedenburg),and else-
where.They demonstratethat, in the strugglefor
community,re-visionsof historyare as pervasiveas
they are endlesslycontested.
draft of this paper. None of them is responsiblefor whatever
errorsor shortcomingsremain.
6 ANTHROPOLOGICAL
QUARTERLY

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