Infrastructures, Societies, and History [and Comments]

Author(s): Maurice Godelier, Maurice Bloch, Henri J. M. Claessen, David D. Gilmore, Oriol Pi-
Sunyer and Zoltán Tagányi
Source: Current Anthropology, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Dec., 1978), pp. 763-771
Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological
Research
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CURRENTANTHROPOLOGYVol. 19, No. 4, December 1978
? 1978by The Wenner-Gren Research0011-3204/78/1904-0003$01.75
FoundationforAnthropological
Societies,and History'
Infrastructures,
by Maurice Godelier
THis ARTICLE is a translationof my responseto a requestfrom
the reviewDialectiquesformy opinionon two points funda-
mentalto the social sciences,namely,ideologyand class. For
want of space, I shall merelyoutline some provisionalcon-
clusionsthatI have reachedas briefly and as clearlyas possible.
I shall be dealingwithfourtopicsin turn: (1) the distinction
betweeninfrastructure and superstructure; (2) the relationship
betweenthedeterminant roleoftheeconomyin thelast analysis
and the dominantrole of any given superstructure; (3) the
ideel2aspect of social reality and the distinctionbetween
ideologicaland nonideologicalwhen dealing with ideel reali-
ties; (4) the roleofviolenceand consentin the workingsof the
powerofdominationofan orderora class,etc. (can we speak of
a paradox of "legitimacy"regardingthe emergenceof classes
and thestate?).
Beforegoingany farther, I shouldlike to emphasizemydebt
to the ever-growing-andalready immense-body of fresh
materialbeing thrownup by anthropologicaland historical
research.As faras historyis concerned,I am a mereamateur.
My readinghas centeredmainlyon problemsofstateformation
and the transformation of class relations.I am afraidI shall
probably disappointthose of my readers who would have
liked me to spell out morepreciselythe connectionsbetween
mygeneral,abstractpositionsand thiswealthofanthropologi-
cal material
1 This article summarizesthe main themesof a book due to be
published by Gallimard under the title Infrastructures, Societes,
Histoire.It is a translationof the paper "Infrastructures,
Societes,
Histoire,"whichappeared in the journal Dialectiquesno. 21, pp. 41-
53. The translation,by RupertSwyers,is by permissionof the editor
of Dialectiques.
2 The wordideelis a neologismused rarelyand almost exclusively
by modernFrenchphilosophersinfluencedby Germanphenomenol-
ogy. Rather than coin a freshEnglish neologism,the translation
remainswiththe original.
MAURICE GODELIER is Professorof Anthropology and Economics
and Directorof Studies at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sci-
ences Sociales (54, Boulevard Raspail, 75270 Paris Cedex 06,
France). Born in 1934, he was educated at the Ecole Normale
Superieurein Paris (Agregede Philosophie,1959). He has done
fieldwork among the Baruya of New Guinea (1967-69) underthe
auspices of the CentreNationale de RechercheScientifique.His
research interests are Melanesia, economic systems, Marxist
analysis,processesof class formation,and ideology.His publica-
tionsinclude Rationaliteet irrationalite
en economie(Paris: Mas-
pero,1966; Englishtranslation,London,1973),Sur les socieiespre-
capitalistes (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1970), Horizon, trajets
marxistesen anthropologie (Paris: Maspero, 1973; Englishtransla-
tion, Cambridge, 1977), and the edited volume Un domaine
conteste:L'anthropologieeconomique(Paris: Mouton, 1974).
The presentpaper, submittedin finalform10 III 78, was sent
forcommentto 40 scholars.The responsesare printedbelow and
are followedby a replyby the author.
Vol. 19 * No. 4 * December1978
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THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN INFRASTRUCTURE
AND SUPERSTRUCTURE
For a Marxist,surely,any examinationof the roleofideology,
oftheconditions governing itsformation and itstransformation,
or of its impactupon the evolutionof societiesmust involve
investigationinto the relationsbetweeninfrastructure, super-
structure, and ideology.Oughtwe, withAlthusser, Balibar,and
Establet (1965), to call these different things "instances"?
Oughtwe to regardthemas "levels" ofsocial reality?as some-
how substantivedistinctionsbetweendifferent kindsof social
reality?as institutionalslicesor cross-sectionsofits substance?
I don't thinkso. To my mind,a societydoes not have a top
and a bottom,or even levels. This is because the distinction
betweeninfrastructure and superstructure is not a distinction
betweeninstitutions. Its principle,rather,is one ofa distinction
betweenfunctions. What,then,does thenotionofinfrastructure
reallycover?
It designatesa combination-whichexistsin all societies-
of at least threeseriesof social and materialconditionsthat
enable a society'smembersto produceand to reproducethe
materialconditionsof theirsocial existence.These sets are:
1. The specificecologicaland geographicalconditionswithin
whicha societyexistsand fromwhichit extractsits material
meansofexistence.
2. The productiveforces,i.e., the materialand intellectual
means that the membersof a societyimplement,withinthe
different "labour" processes,in orderto workupon natureand
to extractfromit theirmeansofexistence,therebytransforming
it intoa "socialized"nature.
3. Social relationsof production,that is, relationsof any
kindthat assumeone or another(or all) of the followingthree
functions:(a) determining thesocialformofaccess to resources
and to controlof the means of production;(b) allocatingthe
labourforceof a society'smembersamongthe different labour
processes which produce its material base, and organizing
these different processes; (c) determiningthe social formof
redistribution of the productof individualor collectivelabour
and, consequently, theformsofcirculationor noncirculation of
theseproducts.
We shouldbear in mindthat,strictlyspeaking,what Marx
(1958:13) called the economic structureof a society was
merelythe social relationsof production:"These relationsof
productiontaken togetherform the economic structureof
society."3We should also bear in mind that, althoughpro-
ductive forcesand relationsof productionare distinctphe-
nomena,theyneverexistseparately;theyalwaysexisttogether
in some specificcombination.What Marx calls "mode of
bildet die
3 "Der Gesamtheit dieser Produktions verhailtnisse
OkonomischeStrukturdes Gesellschaft."
763
production"or "social formof production"are in fact the
variousspecificformsof thesecombinations.These definitions
call fora certainnumberof remarks.
First,amongthe different productiveforcesI includewhat
I have referredto as "intellectual"means of acting upon
nature.By thisI meanall the "knowledge"thata givensociety
may have ofnature,but also its bodyof technicalprocesses,of
rules governingthe manufactureof tools, of rules governing
theuse ofthebodyin work,etc. It willbe observed,then,that
rightat the heartofman's mostmaterialrelationship withthe
materialnaturesurrounding himlies a complexbody of repre-
sentations,ideas, patterns,etc., which I call ideel realities;
theirpresenceand theiraction are essentialforany kind of
materialactivityto be able to occur. Contemporaryanthro-
pologyhas started to take stock of the ideelrealitieswhich
formpart of the different materialprocessesin the societies
investigated.It is this that constitutesthe vast fieldof ethno-
science,collectingnative taxonomiesof plants,animals,soils,
climates,rulesforthe manufactureof tools,etc. This is also
the purposeof Needham's (1954-76) studiesof Chinese tech-
nologyand scienceor oftheworkofHaudricourt(1962; Haudri-
court and Brunhes-Delamarre1955,Haudricourtand Hedin
1943).
Now, these ideel realities may be grasped, in the first
place, in the speech of the peoples and social groupsthat use
them.They thus exist as linguisticrealities,as facts that are
indissociablefromlanguage and thought,and it is through
these that theymay be communicatedthroughoutthe social
body and transmitted fromone generationto the next.
Clearly,then,the distinctionbetweeninfrastructure, super-
structure,and ideologymay be seen as a distinctionbetween
functionsand not betweeninstitutions. As we have just seen,
thoughtand language may functionas componentsof the
infrastructure, as part of a society'sforcesof production.The
distinction,then, is not between material and immaterial,
forI fail to see in what way thoughtcould be less material
than the rest of social life. Nor is it a distinctionbetween
tangibleand intangible.It is a distinctionof positionwithin
thoseactivitiesnecessaryto the reproduction of social life.
The secondpointon whichI shouldlike to commentis the
notion of the labourprocess.First of all, it should be noted
thattheconceptofworkis notcommonto all societies.Ancient
Greek has two words,poiein and prattein,neitherof which
means to work:respectivelytheymean makingand doing.In
Latin, the word laboris used forany kind of heavy activity,
like thewordponosin Greek,and thewordnegotium designates
an activitythatinterrupts or counteractsthe otium,or leisure,
that is the markof a freeman as well as being the condition
permitting him to conducthis politicaland culturalactivities.
It is extremely rare,furthermore, that the wordlabour,where
used,is used to connoteand containtheidea ofa "transforma-
tion" of nature and of man. All these representations form
part of the labourprocess,and theyare joined by otherrepre-
sentationswhichlegitimizethe presenceor absence of a given
social groupin a given labour process.These representations
may,forexample,serveto justifythefactthatit is thewomen
that are sent out to gatherwild plants,or to carryfirewood,
and they may moreoverpresentsuch activities'as being un-
worthyofmen,to whomare reserved-as ofright,we maysay-
nobler activities such as hunting,war, or the mastery of
rituals.But in touchingon thisquestionwe are in facttouching
on thepointsofcontact betweenrelationsofproductionand the
divisionoflabour.
It is importantto bear in mind,on the questionof relations
ofproduction,that,dependingon thesocietyand thehistorical
epoch under consideration,relations of productiondo not
occupy the same locus, nor do theytake the same form;con-
sequently,theydo nothave thesame effects upon theevolution
ofsocieties.I shalloffertwoexamplesofwhatmightbe termed
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the topology of economics-the comparative topology of
relationsof production.In hunter-gatherer societiessuch as
that of the AustralianAborigines,it has been observedthat
the social relationsthat govern the huntingand gathering
territories,determinethe compositionof the groupsdoingthe
huntingand gathering,and decide how the productof these
activitiesis sharedout are relationsofkinship,i.e., relationsof
descent,marriage,and residence.To be moreprecise,we may
observethatthe (somewhat)abstract conditionofappropriation
ofnatureis membership in a descentgroup,whichinheritscom-
mon (though"nonexclusive")rightsover the undomesticated
resourcesof different territoriesfromgenerationto generation.
In theeverydayprocessofconcrete appropriation, whathappens
is thatconsanguinealand affinalrelationsformthe cooperative
framework forhuntingand gatheringand forthe distribution
of produce.But we need to go fartherstill,forin practicean
Australianband-a unit of direct,everydayappropriationof
nature-is compositein structure.It is composedof a central
coreof mendescendedpatrilineally froma numberofcommon
ancestorsand heirsto rightsover a givenportionof territory;
around this core is a clusterof allies, i.e., representatives of
different groupsthathave eithergivenor receivedwivesin the
courseof earliergenerations.This providesthe groupwiththe
possibilityof usingseveraldifferent territoriesshouldthe need
arise.The chieffeatureofthesystem,then,is thefactofshared
ownershipof resourcesby a numberof kinshipgroups;these
kinshipgroups,moreover,are not exclusiveownersof these
rights,since, in certain criticalcircumstances,allied groups
also have rightsto the same territory.
Here we arriveat a fundamental point,namely,the relation-
ship betweenthe natureof the forcesof productionand the
natureofsocial relationsofproduction.Underlying thissystem
ofshared,thoughnonexclusive, ownershipofresources,we find
not only that the individualis unable to reproducehimself
exceptin groups,but also thatgroupscannotreproducethem-
selves if they are alone and requireothergroupsin orderto
be able to do so. This is whereproductiveforcesmesh with
social formsof relationsof production.We shall be coming
back to thispointlater,but alreadyit is difficult to escape the
conclusionthat,here,relationsof kinshipfunctionas relations
of production and that they do so internally. The distinction
betweeninfrastructure and superstructure is not a distinction
betweeninstitutions, but a distinctionbetween differentfunctions
withina singleinstitution.
My secondexample-based on theworkofFrankfort(1948),
Oppenheim (1964), Adams (1966), and others-deals with
ancient Sumerianorganization.It would seem that, in the
city-statesof Mesopotamia,the land was originallyregarded
as belongingto a god,thegod whosetemplestoodin themiddle
of the city.The economyworkedas a vast centralizedsystem
withinwhichthe communities of the cityand the surrounding
countryside weresubjectto the authorityof the priestsof the
god whoownedtheland,and thesecommunities oweda portion
of theirlabourand theirproduceto thesepriests.Here, it will
be observed,it was religiousrelationsthatfunctioned internally
as relationsof production.The exampleof a Greekcity-state,
on the otherhand, would show that membership-bybirth-
in a polis gave the freecitizenboth privateand public rights
over the city's land. Here, politics,in the Greeksense of the
word,functioned internallyas a relationofproduction.
Beforedrawingany generalconclusionsfromthis analysis,
I shouldliketo returnto one essentialpoint,one thathas given
riseto a good deal ofconfusionamongMarxists:thedistinction
between labour process and process of production.Certain
anthropologists, such as Terray (1969) and Rey (1971, 1973),
have dubbed the different formsof labour processthat they
have discoveredin the descriptionof a particularsociety-in
thiscase, Meillassoux's(1964) description ofthedifferent forms
of hunting,farming,and craftsto be foundamong the Ivory
CURRENT ANTITHROPOLOGY
Coast Guro-"mode of production."Hence, we have hunting,
farming, pastoral,etc., modesofproduction.This, however,is
to confuseforms ofthedivisionoflabourwithmodesofproduction.
The practice,withinthe same relationsof production,of,for
example,farmingcombinedwithanimalhusbandryand small-
scale domestichandicraftsdoes not imply the existenceof
several different modes of productionwith interconnections
thatneedto be found.It is at thispointthatsomepeopleinvoke
the conceptof "economicand social formation."In fact,what
basicallydefinesa mode of productionare the different forms
of appropriationof resources,of means of production,and of
the productitself.There may, therefore, be several different
formsoflabourprocessand cooperationwhichcombineon the
basis of a singleformof property.One can imaginejust how
profitable a rigorousreviewof the vast mass ofanthropological
and historicalmaterialnow available would be. But one can
also see thatby no meanseverything thatoughtto be said has
beensaid regarding abstractnotionssuchas forceofproduction,
and thatevenwithinthesenotionsthereremainvastunexplored
regionswaitingto be openedup by theoreticalanalysis.
We may alreadydraw one generalconclusion,at any rate.
This is that the distinctionbetweeninfrastructure and super-
structure is not a distinctionbetweeninstitutions,or instances,
but betweenfunctions.It is onlyin certainsocieties,and par-
ticularlyin capitalistsociety,thatthisdistinction between func-
tionshappensto coincidewitha distinction betweeninstitutions.
This, in my view, is the real reasonforthe "epistemological
break" broughtabout by Marx's work;the primereasonsfor
this break are to be soughtnot in Marx's thoughtitself,but
in the natureof the capitalistmode of production,which,far
morethan manyothers,separatedeconomics, politics,religion,
kinship,art,etc.,intoso manydistinctinstitutions.
Once thishas been grasped,a vast new fieldof investigation
opensup, namely,thesearchforthe reasonsand theconditions
which,in history,have broughtabout shiftsin the locus-and
hence changes in the forms-of relationsof production.To
carryout this investigation,though,it is firstnecessaryto
eschewattemptsto deduce the locus and formof a society's
economyfromsome dubiousabstracttheory.For a Marxist-
as foranyoneelse-the main thingis to go and take a close
look foroneself.This is not to say that Marxismis a kind of
empiricism,but of all theoreticalapproachesit is assuredly
the one that is obligedto submititselfmostthoroughly to the
concretediversityof experience.
Marxistsare not entirelyunarmedin this respect;afterall,
Marx did suggestthat theremightbe some "correspondence"
betweenthe natureof the forcesof productionand the nature
of relationsofproduction.Nature heremeanslocus,form,and
effect.But I shall make no secretof the fact that I findthis
hypothesistrickyto handle, for several reasons. The term
"correspondence"is unclear. Does it referto a relationof
causalityor a relationof compatibility? Furthermore, we lack
reliableanalyses of forcesof productionand theirevolution.
Only this kind of investigationcould allow us to break out of
the currentimpasse,in whichall one can do is say that while
we have no difficulty seeing what specificproductiveforces
prevent, it is impossibleto see exactlywhattheypermit, stillless
whattheyimpose.Whilethereis no questionof our beingable
to deduce social formsfromforcesof production,we must
nevertheless seek to identifythe limitsof theirrangeof pos-
sibilitiesand themechanismswherebyone of thesepossibilities
is in factselected.I shall be returning to theseproblemsat the
end of the secondsection,in whichI shall attemptto discuss
the controversybetween Marxists and non-Marxists(and
among Marxists themselves)concerningthe bases for the
domination,in any society,of what Marxistssee as a super-
structure:kinshipin certainprimitivesocieties,the politico-
religiousspherein PharaonicEgypt,etc. I shall be discussing
this controversy, moreover,in termsofwhat has alreadybeen
Vol. 19 * No. 4 * December1978
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Godelier:INFRASTRUCTURES, SOCIETIES, AND HISTORY
said hereabout the notionofinfrastructure.How can Marxists
reconcilethe hypothesisthat it is the infrastructurewhichis
determinant in the last analysiswith the fact that in certain
historicalsocieties one finds a superstructureoccupyinga
dominantposition?
ECONOMIC DETERMINATION AND
SUPERSTRUCTUJRAL DOMINATION
One not infrequently comes across anthropologists and his-
toriansclaimingthat the facts fallingwithintheirspeciality
refuteMarxism.For Radcliffe-Brown (1930-31),it was enough
to showthatkinshipwas thedominantfactoramongAustralian
Aboriginesto conclude this refutation.Dumont (1966) sees
thisrefutation as furnishedby theblatantdominationofreligion
in India and by the factthat the caste systemtakes the form
of an ideologicaloppositionbetweenpure and impure.For the
historianWill (1972), the dominationof politics in ancient
Greece shows clearlythat economicsdid not play the deter-
miningrole and did not even amountto a system.What are
we to make of this?
Reviewingthese examplesin the light of our definitionof
relationsofproduction,we findthatin each case the dominant
"superstructure"functionssimultaneouslyas a relation of
production.In each of the threesocietiesdealt with above,
descentand marriageare regulatedby kinship,as in all socie-
ties; yet kinshipis dominantin one case only, that of the
AustralianAboriginesIn all three,man's relationswith the
supernaturalare regulatedby religion,but onlyin one, Hindu
society,does religionpredominate.We may thus put forward
thehypothesisthattheexplicitfunctions ofkinshipand religion,
which are to regulatesocially respectivelythe reproduction
of life itselfthroughthe regulationof marriageand descent
and the relationswiththe invisiblepowerssupposedto control
the reproduction of the universe,are notin themselves enough
to allow one or the otherof these "superstructures" to attain
a dominantpositionwhereit in factdoes so. I shouldtherefore
like to put forwardan alternativeworkinghypothesis:
For a social activity-and with it its correspondingand
organizingideas and institutions-toplay a dominantrole in
the functioning and evolutionof a society,and hence in the
thoughtand action of the groupsand individualscomposing
it, it is notenoutghforthis activityto fulfillseveralfunctions;
it must necessarily,in additionto its own ostensiblepurpose
and its explicitfunctions,functiondirectly arndinternally as a
relationofproduction.
This hypothesismakesno assumptionsregardingthe nature
ofsocial relationseligibleto functionas relationsofproduction.
It merelyassumessomethingabout the reasonsforthe relative
weightand the unequal importanceof the various formsof
social activityin the functioning and evolutionof societies;it
assumesthatthisrelativeweightdependsless upon whatsocial
relationsare (kinship,religion,etc.) than on what theydo or,
better,make people do. If we managed to verifythat social
relationsdominatewhentheyfunctionas relationsof produc-
tion, then we should have workedour way back to Marx's
hypothesisregardingthe determinant role,in the last analysis,
of infrastructure. This hypothesisshouldbe construedin the
senseof theuniversalexistenceofa hierarchy offunctionsto be
assumedby social relationsin orderfora societyto be able to
existas suchand to carryon reproducing; but this hypothesis
does not permitus to jump to any conclusionsregardingthe
natureand the formof relationsof productionin any given
society.It thusbecomesimpossibleto attemptto refuteMarx-
ism by pointingto the dominanceof a superstructure.
This viewcontrastswiththeway Marxistssuchas Althusser,
765
Balibar (1965), and theirfollowersin anthropology and history
have conceivedthe causalityof economicsin the last analysis.
They view the economyas selecting fromamongthe different
instancesthe one that is to occupythe dominantpositionand
thenplacingit in thatposition.This twofoldactionis regarded
as constituting causal mechanism.Unfor-
the infrastructure's
tunately,this view is incapable of explaininghow a single
institution-kinship, forexample-can act both as a relation
of productionand as a superstructure. Whateverthe answer
to thisquestionmay be, we mustseek to explainhowit is that
kinship(or religion)comesto functionas a relationofproduc-
tion and hence to dominate. Concerningkinship,we may
imaginethat in primitivesocietieslivinglabour forcecounts
formorethanlabouraccumulatedin the formof tools,domes-
ticatedresources,etc. We know that in all societiesthe repro-
duction of life is governedby different formsof kinship.It
may be, then,that we shouldlook forthe ultimatereasonsfor
kinshiprelations'functioning as relationsof production,and
henceforkinship'sdominance,in somegivenstate of the pro-
ductiveforces,i.e., in somerelationbetween"living" (present)
labourand "dead" (past) labour.
Perhaps,on the basis of the foregoing, we can now take a
look at the questionof the distinctionbetweenthe ideological
and the nonideological spheres.
THE ID1EL IN REALITY AND THE PROBLEM
OF THE IDEOLOGICAL SPHERE
Does the foregoing suggesta new approachto the problemof
differentiating, among all the differentideelrealitiesthat any
society contains,which are ideologicaland which are not?
Apparently,we have done nothingto alterthe view,generally
heldto be Marxist,ofideologiesand theirdomination.We may,
indeed, on the basis of the idea advanced above-namely,
that the dominantsocial relationswithina societyare those
which (regardlessof whichthey are) functionas relationsof
production-suggestthattheideas thatrepresent and legitimize
thesedominantsocial relationsoughtto play a dominantrole
almostautomatically.Or, if we take social relationsforwhat
they are, namely,concreterelationsbetweendistinctsocial
groupsoccupyingdifferent positionsin relations(functioningas
relations)of production-whetherthese be relationsof men's
dominationover womenin classless societiesor relationsof
one caste's or class's dominationover the others-we may
guess that the ideas that legitimizethis dominationof a sex,
caste, or class will virtuallyor almost automaticallybe the
dominantideas in the societyin question.In the same vein,
we may also anticipatethat the developmentof the specific
contradictions contained in differenttypes of relations of
productionand social relationswill bring about changes in
the relationsbetweendominantand dominatedand in power
relationsand ideologicalrelations;we may equally anticipate
that this will lead to the transformation of the dominated
person'sconsciousnessof the realitydominatinghim.
Once we have taken these customaryMarxistpropositions
intoaccount,the difficulties begin.First,theylack any precise
criterion ofwhatturnsan idea intoan "ideological"representa-
tion.It wouldappear that whatis ideologicalis any idea that
legitimizes an existingsocial order,along withthe relationsof
dominationand oppressionthat it contains withinit. One
mighteven go so faras to say that the idea's content,the fact
that it is trueor false,or moreor less true,is irrelevant,and
that any idea can becomeideologicalthe momentit entersthe
serviceofa dominantsocialgroupand presentsthisdomination
as a naturalphenomenon.At the same time,though,surely
an idea automaticallybecomes partlyfalse the momentits
presentsa social orderas the onlypossible,immutable,social
order?An historiclie thus turnsintoa theoreticalerror.
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Further,ifwe assumethe existenceof dominantideas in the
serviceof dominantclasses,do we automaticallytherebyhave
to assumethe existenceof dominatedideas forthe dominated
classes? But then,are not dominantideas dominantprecisely
because they are widely shared by the dominated classes
themselves?Of course, experienceshows that in any social
systemmembersof the dominatedgroupentertainideas that
oppose themand that theythemselvesoppose to thoseof the
dominantgroup.Are we thento conclude,in reference to the
foregoingdemonstration, that these dominatedpeople's ideas
are what mightbe termedideas "against," a sort of counter-
ideology,and hencea different ideology?Or are we to say that
theycannotbe called an ideologysince theydo not legitimize
the existingorderand do notparticipatein its mendacity?But
are all legitimizingideas illusory?If so, illusoryforwhom?Not
forthose-dominantand dominated-who sharethem.There-
foreit mustbe forthosewho rejectthissocial orderand want
to changeit, or forus outsideobservers.As can be seen,then,
it is impossibleto definean idea as ideologicaleitherin termsof
a single criterion-truthor falsehood,legitimizationor non-
legitimization-orin termsof a combinationof the two. The
reasoningbreaksdownin each case. In fact,ifwe are to escape
thisdilemmaofformalor functionaldefinitions of theideologi-
cal sphere,we are going to have to develop a theoryof the
componentsof the power of dominationand oppression,a
theoryof relationsbetweenviolenceand consent.
We cannotdevelopsucha theory,however,ifwe continueto
considerideas merelyas a passive reflection, in the mind,of
social relationsthat are themselvesregardedas being born
outside the mind, independentlyof it and prior to it. This
bringsus to a fundamental problem-a strategiccrossroadsin
theinterpretation ofsocialfactsand historyand also inpractice.
Indeed, we findourselvesat a partingof the ways,at a point
wherevariousways of beingmaterialist diverge.Here we shall
returnto our earlieranalysisof theideelelementcontainedin
everymaterialrelationship withthe materialnaturesurround-
ingus. As we have seen,any materialproductiveforcecontains
in it, rightfromthe outset,a complexideelelementwhichis
not a passive, a posteriori,representation of this productive
forcein the mind, but, fromthe very beginning,an active
ingredient,an internalconditionof its very emergence.We
should have no difficulty in showing,moreover,that this
analysiscan be extendedto all social relations.For example,it
is impossibleforkinshiprelationsto emergeand to reproduce
down the generationswithoutdefinitionof the rules and the
termsof descent,marriage,and residenceand the notionsof
kinshipand nonkinship;theserules,terms,and notionsare not
a posteriorireflectionsof kinship relations,but an integral
componentthat has to existrightfromthe wordgo. Needless
to say, kinshiprelationscannotbe reducedto these different
ideel components,but they cannot exist withoutthem.And
we can generalizefromthis and advance the idea that all
social relationsariseand existsimultaneously bothin thoughtand
outsideofit-that all social relationscontain,fromthe outset,
an ideelelementwhichis not an a posteriorireflection of it,
but a conditionforits emergenceand ultimatelyan essential
component.The ideelelementexists not only in the formof
thecontentofconsciousness, but in theformofall thoseaspects
ofsocial relationsthatmake themrelationsofsignification and
make theirmeaningor meaningsmanifest.
A certaintype of Marxismhas all too oftenneglectedthe
fact that thoughtdoes not passively "reflect"reality,but
ratherinterpretsit actively.But this is not the most serious
point,forpeople have also tendedto forgetthat thoughtnot
only interpretsreality,but actually organizesevery kind of
social practiceon the basis of thisreality,therebycontributing
to theproductionofnewsocial realities.It is thiswhichmakes
all the differencebetweenthe severaldifferent ways of being
materialistin scientificand politicalpractice.The differences
CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY
 becomeevenmoremarkedifwe startconfusing man's relation-
ship withnaturewithhis relationshipwithhistory,forwhile
natureexists,always has existed,and always will continueto
exist independently of man and his thoughtand-where its
nondomesticated portionis concerned-without man'sinterven-
tion,a social relationcan onlylead a doublelife,both outside
of man's thoughtand withinit. Social relations,therefore, are
simultaneously a materialand an ideelreality.
To conclude,I shall attemptto apply this analysis to the
problemsof the originsof class and of the state. I would take
this opportunity to remindthe reader that, as Bonte (1975)
has shownfortheKel GressTuaregofNiger,class societiescan
exist withouttheirhaving to have a state as well-without
requiringa distinct,centralizedinstitutionthroughwhichthe
dominantclass may wieldits power.
VIOLENCE AND CONSENT: PARADOXES
UNDERLYING THE ORIGINS OF CLASSES AND
THE STATE
The powerof dominationconsistsof two indissolubleelements
whose combinationconstitutesits strength:violence and
consent.At the riskof shockinga certainnumberof readers,I
would go so far as to say that, of these two componentsof
power,the strongeris not the violenceof the dominant,but
theconsentofthedominatedto theirdomination.I am perfectly
awareofthedifferences betweenconsentobtainedunderduress,
passiveacceptance,lukewarmadherence,and sharedconviction.
I realizethat in any society,even a classlessone, not all indi-
vidualsor groupsare equallyconsentingin theiracceptanceof
the social order.Even whenactive,theirconsentis not always
given withoutreservationsor contradictions. The reasonlies
beyond the realm of thought,in the fact that all societies,
includingthe mostegalitarianclasslessones,containa mixture
of commonand particularintereststhat are constantlycon-
flictingand compromising. Withoutthis,we wouldneverhave
had any history.But althoughit is enormouslyimportantto
the evolutionof a society-and to the individualor collective
fateofits members-whether the dominatedpersonsor groups
are deeply convinced,half-convinced, or submissivelycon-
vincedof the legitimacyof theirsystemor latentlyopposedor
even overtlyhostileto this system,the fact is that all these
are particularconfigurations
of a major historicalforcein the
preservationor transformation of societies,namely,the force
of ideas, of ideologies,and thisforceis bornnot merelyof the
contentoftheseideas,but also of thefactthat theyare shared.
This poses a theoreticalproblem:underwhatconditionsdo
dominatedgroupscome to share interpretations
of the world
that legitimizethe existingsocial ordernot onlyin the eyes of
the dominantgroup, but also in their own eyes? Certain
philosophers and anthropologists,suchas Deleuze and Guattari
(1972) in L'Anti-OEdipeand Clastres and Lefort (1977) in
theiranalysisofLa Boetie's Discourssur la servitude volontaire, the universeand oflife,and that thisfactmusthave played a
referto a certainnumberof savage tribes-selectedarbitrarily
but carefullyreinterpreted-inorderto arguethat classes and
thestate (althoughtheseare by no meansthesame thing)were
bornout of somepeople's reprehensible wish to be servedand
theremainder's reprehensible wishto be enslaved.On thisview,
theemergenceofthe State, of theDespot, ofthe One above all
others,withinthe internalevolutionaryprocess of primitive
societiesremainsunaccountable.It doesn't seem to me that
classes could be an avatar of desire,althoughI do not fora
momentwishto denythepowerto desire,feelings, or emotional the
forcesin the lives ofindividualsor of societies.I am becoming the
increasinglypersuaded that we are in fact dealing with a
paradox that is diametrically opposed to the viewsof Deleuze
and Guattari,Lefortand Clastres,et al., namely,that classes
Godelier:INFRASTRUCTURES, SOCIETIES, AND HISTORY
could onlyhave grownup in classlesssocietieslegitimately-or,
at least, that the processof transformation must have been
slow and the legitimacyof theirformationmust long have
weighedmore heavily in the balance than such factorsas
violence,usurpation,betrayals,etc.
For example,among the So, a farmingtribe of 5,000 in
Uganda (Laughlinand Laughlin 1972), politicaland religious
powerwas concentrated in thehandsof roughly50 elders,who
wereold menrepresenting the different
patrilinealclans. These
elders belongedto an initiatorysociety called the Kenisan.
They alone had the powerto communicatewiththe ancestors
and, throughthem,with God, the masterof the rain and of
health and prosperity.When we examinetheiractivities,we
findtheminvolvedin all the ritualsrequiredforrainmaking,
forblessingthe sorghum, fordrivingaway sickness,forhalting
enemiesat the frontiers-ina word,in everything requiredto
preservepeace, justice, and prosperity.There was no police
force,but each noninitiatelivedunderthepermanentthreatof
going mad and eating his own excrementshould he seek to
communicatewith the ancestorshimselfand to infringethe
elders'monopoly.As we can see, here,consentis alwaysbacked
bythethreat cf viole'ice,even thoughthe latter remainson the
horizon,keepinga low profile.But it wouldbe equallyvain to
tryto imaginea durablepowerof dominationand oppression
based solelyeitheron nakedviolenceand terroror on the total
consentof everymemberof society.These would be extreme
cases, highlyephemeraland transitoryin the evolution of
history.Even societiesfoundedupon conquest,such as the
Yatenga Mossi, so admirablydescribedby Izard (1975), end
up, aftera time,adoptingan institutional patternthatdemands
at least some consenton the part of the dominatedto their
domination.We can see thisin the enthronement ritualof the
newking,withhis famousringujourney:thenewking,selected
by the dominantgroup,sets out dressedin rags to visit the
villagesofthedominatedand to be recognizedas kingby them.
At the end ofhis journey,he reentershis capital,but thistime
as king,clothedin the ornamentsof his functionand ridingon
a whitehorse.
I shouldnow like to formulatethe followinghypothesis:for
relationsof dominationand exploitationto have arisen and
reproducedthemselvesdurablyin formerly classlesssocieties,
such relations must have presented themselves as an exchange
and as an exchangeofservices. This was how theymanagedto
get themselvesaccepted,and this was how they managed to
obtain the consent-passive or active-of the dominated.I
should furtherbe inclined to hypothesizethat, among the
factors leadingto internaldifferentiation ofsocial statusand to
the moreor less gradualformation of new hierarchies based on
the divisionof society intoorders,castes,or classes,the services
renderedby the dominantindividualsor group must have
involved,in the firstplace, invisiblerealitiesand forcescon-
trolling(in the thoughtof thesesocieties)the reproduction of
vital role.
To my way of thinking,the monopolyof the means (to us
imaginary) of reproductionof the universeand of life must
have precededthe monopolyof the visiblematerialmeans of
production,i.e., of thosemeanswhicheveryonecould and had
to producein orderto reproduce, giventheirrelativesimplicity.
In the balance that emergedbetween services exchanged,
however,those renderedby the dominantgroupappeared to
be all the morefundamentalinasmuchas theytouchedupon
invisiblepart of the world;the morematerialand visible
tasks performed by the dominatedgroups,the moretheir
serviceswereregardedas trivial.We mayeven suggestthatthe
formationof classes may have taken the formof an unequal
exchange,one thatlookedmoreadvantageousto thedominated

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 than to the dominant,and it is perhapsthis that we call an
extremecase of alienation.The dominantwere obliged,how-
ever, to provide "proof" that the lives of the dominated
depended upon them. For example,certain kings in Africa
wereput to death when theygrewold or fellsick, as it was
feared that their conditionplaced theirkingdomunder the
threatof bad harvests,epidemics,or some othercatastrophe.
I am preparedto suggest,moreover,that thesetransforma-
tions occurredunderveryprecisecircumstances, namely,the
late sedentarization of hunter-gatherer populationsand, later,
thedevelopment offarming and animalhusbandry.A newkind
of dependencegrewup duringthe latterphase: here,we are
no longerdealingwithsavage man existingin savage nature
but,gradually,witha domesticatednatureand with"civilized"
man,whosetask it was to reproducethisdomesticatednature.
It was perhapsin this contextthat the religiousspherede-
veloped in such a way as to bringabout the establishment of
stabilizedsocial hierarchies,of aristocracies,thus creatingthe
conditionsforthe extractionofsupplementary labourfromthe
commonpeople.Firth's(1965) studyoftheTikopiacontainsan
importantexamplethat meritsconsideration.He shows that
the aristocracypossesseda monopolyof communication with
thegodsand theancestors,but thatit enjoyed-wherematerial
rewardsand place in the productionprocesswereconcerned-
onlyminoradvantages.
In conclusion,I shouldlike to draw attentionto one final
problem:Oughtwe reallyto be usingwordssuch as class and
state when referring to hierarchizedprecapitalistancient or
exoticsocieties?
Firstofall, I shouldpointout thatMarxistsoughtto reread
Marx's GermanIdeologyvery carefully,because he takes the
utmostpains to distinguishbetweenorder,or estate (as in the
expression"ThirdEstate"), and class,a socialgroupexclusively
definedby its place in relationto the means of production.
Such definition was not the case, forexample,forhierarchies
ofstatusor rankin exoticaristocratic societiesor fortheruling
ordersin the ancientRoman or Greek city. Capitalismhas
simplified social relationsto the pointwherethe status of the
individualis defined,firstand foremost, by economiccriteria.
So whatdid Marx mean whenhe used the termclass forwhat
he knew to be ordersin antiquityor in the Middle Ages?
Certainlynot thatwe oughtto starthuntingforclasses hiding
behindtheorders-classesthatMarxistsalonewouldbe able to
discoverand that the Greeksor the Romans,history'sactors,
could neverhave seen forthemselves.What Marx was really
sayingwas that we oughtto interpretthesesocial differences
by seekingthe reasons for them in materialfactorsand in
relationsofproductionand by sheddinglighton theoppressive
characterof relationsof exploitationofmenby men.
Now, how does this tie in withthe firsttwo sectionsof my
analysis?In otherwords,how does thisrelateto my definition
ofrelationsofproductionand to myexplanationofthedomina-
tion of superstructures? In the example of Athens,we find
that the fact that politicalrelationsin the cityfunctionedas
relationsof productionand that theydominatedthe thought
and actionsof membersof society(both freemen and slaves)
preventedcontradictionsbetweenfree men and slaves from
directlymakingtheirappearancein thepoliticalarena.We may
say that the locus and the formof relationsof production,
and theirintimatelinkswithpolitics,made it unthinkableand
impossiblefor the slaves themselvesto acquire politicalcon-
sciousnessof theirsituationand thus to wage directly
political
strugglesto put an end to theirslaveryand theiroppression.
Even so, little by little the slave systempiled up internal
blockageswhich,in thelongrun,wereto weakenit and slowly
to reduceit to stagnation.But it was to take a good deal more
than that,and barbarianinvasionsin particular,beforethese
slave relationsultimatelygave way to otherformsof domina-
tion. The thinkableand the do-able thus reach out beyond
768
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thought,but theycannotescape the natureof the relationsof
productionand theproductiveforcesexistingin a givensociety.
It is perhapsthisthatis meantby "historicalnecessity."4
Comments
by MAURICE BLOCH
Departmentof Anthropology, LondonSchool of Economics,
HoughtonSt., London WC2, England.9 vi 78
Godelier'spaper is an extremelyclear and powerfulpresenta-
tion of a point of view whichhas been of immensevalue to
Marxismand the social sciences.I findmyselfin agreement
withmost of it. However,because it is so wide-ranging and
because it coverssomealreadyfamiliargroundI wantto com-
menton only one aspect of it: Godelier'sdiscussionof ideol-
ogy. Behindthisdiscussion,and indeedthe wholepaper,is the
assumptionthat thereare two radicallydifferent typesof so-
cieties:precapitalist and capitalistsocieties,whichforGodelier
correspondwithnonclassand class societies.Onlyin thelatter
are thereideologicalinstitutions or phenomena.In the former
ideologyis only to be thoughtof as a functionin a seamless
whole. Furthermore, Godelierdistinguishes betweenthe ideo-
logical,thatwhichlegitimates and "naturalizes"power,and the
ideational,whichis the processof conceptformation. In pre-
capitalistsocieties,the ideationalis organisedby the ideologi-
cal, and,as a result,thetwodependon each otherso intimately
thatthe nonideological becomesunthinkable;slaves in ancient
Rome could not have realisedthe exploitationto whichthey
were subjectedin a scientific manner,and factorsexternalto
the slaves' consciousnesswere requiredto breakdownRoman
slavery.Only in capitalistsocieties,wherethe ideologicalhas
a specificlocation,can challengeoccur throughself-conscious
action.Hence theoccurrenceof Marx's writing at theinception
of the capitalistsystem.
This argumentcontrastswithone I have recentlyput for-
ward (Bloch 1977). My argumentconsistsof twomainpoints.
The firstis thatall societieshave somecompletely nonideologi-
cal concepts,formedthroughthe interactionof man and the
worldat a givenhistoricalconjuncture.The secondis thatin
all societiesconceptualisation deformedby ideologyis to be
foundeitheronly,or at least especially,in certaintypes of
ritualdiscourse,not spreadequallythroughout. Thereis there-
forealwayssome nonideological discourseand alwaysa poten-
tial languagewithwhichto challengeideology.On this second
pointI am in sharpdisagreement withGodelier,who sees this
state of affairsas possible only in capitalist-dominated social
formations. I am aware that thereare manyproblemsin this
position,but I have takenit because theproblemsin the coun-
terview,that held by Godelier,seem to me even greater.
Firstly,we do have a lot of evidenceof fundamentalchal-
lenge of the very natureof dominationby dominatedgroups
in the typesof societieswhichGodelierdescribesas nonclass
societies.I do not know about Roman slavery,but the con-
tinualpeasants' revoltswhichpunctuatedFrenchand English
feudalismare evidenceof this.The spokesmenforsuchrevolts
I On the subject of the thinkableand the do-able,I should like to
make one importantpoint clear. The fact that kinship,forexample,
is dominantin a givensocietymeans that everyproblemor eventis
goingto take the formof a problemof kinship;wherepoliticsdomi-
nates, every problemwill inevitablyassume a "political" formin
order to become thinkable.Thus, dependingon the locus and the
formof relationsof production,history'sactors, on each occasion,
develop a specificformof illusion regardingtheirown conditionsof
existence.Each mode of productionthus spontaneouslyengendersa
specificmode of screening,of occultation-in the spontaneouscon-
sciousnessof the membersof a society-of the contentand founda-
tionsof theirsocial relations.Far fromtakinga society'sownillusions
about itselffor reality,my theoreticalapproach seeks to lay these
bare and to explain theirexistence.
CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY
brokecompletelyfromthe ideologyof feudalismand did not Godelier:INFRASTRUCTURES, SOCIETIES, AND HISTORY
simplyrephraseit, as is evidencedby,forexample,JohnBall's
famous:"WhenAdam delvedand Eve span,whowas thenthe of expression, its lack of dogmatism, its avoidanceof cantand
gentleman?"Thereare manyotherexamples,perhapsthemost jargon,its logic. Having been disappointedby much of the
strikingand elaboratebeingthe 17th-century writingsof Win- workof theFrenchschoolin thepast becauseof its murkyand
stanley,who said: "The bestlaws thatEnglandhathare yokes obscurelanguage,I foundthisclear,incisivepapera revelation.
and manaclestyingone sortof people to be slaves to another." Part of the creditmay go to the excellenttranslation, but I
The secondpointis that,as Godelierrightly pointsout,our thinkthat thispiece is as impressiveas it is because it is the
interestin ideologyis concernedwithits role in the reproduc- productof a profoundthinkerat the pinnacleof his powers,
tionof domination. But if we defineideologyfunctionally, any- givingus clearlyand directlythe best of his ideas.
thingwe say about whatit does willbe meretautology,sinceit The workis "revisionist"in the best sense of the word: it
willderivefromour "functional"definition. In thiswaywe will revisesMarx by rediscovering Marx. Its originality lies in a
be unable to demonstrate or explainits historicalsignificance. returnto origins,to the Marx of the Grundrisse and the Philo-
sophicalManuscripts,to the Marx of questionsand not just
answers.Certaindogmatists insistthatMarxismbe "scientific,"
by HENRI J. M. CLAESSEN but they forget that science by its verynaturemustalwaysbe
Instituteof CulturalantdSocial Studies,University ofLeiden, refining itselfby elaboratingand developingquestionableele-
Leiden,The Netherlands.2 vi 78 mentsof theory,by basingitselfon a dialecticof theoryand
evidence,in short,by beingrevisionist. The recenttrendtoward
It is no easy task to commentupon an articlewithwhichone
a moreflexibleMarxistapproachin thesocial sciencessuggests
cannotbut agree.The clearsynthesisGodelierpresentsis most
thata new era is dawningin Marxiststudies,a timeof "para-
welcome,and the way in whichhe clarifiesseveralconceptual
problemsis outstanding.My comments,therefore, digm"reevaluation.If so, thenGodeliermuststandas one of
are partly
the major intellectualmidwivesto thisnew era, if onlyon the
forthe sake of argumentand partlybecause the scope of an
basis of this short,brilliantpiece.
essay does not permitmakingeverything as explicitas one
Godelierhas set forhimselfa formidabletask: reconciling
would wish.
theMarxistidentification of "infrastructure" (techno-economic
I wonderwhy Godelier,afterdiscussingthe infrastructure,
base) as the primaryfactor in social dominationwith the
the superstructure, and the ideologyas "different functions
mountingevidencethat it is superstructure (kinshipand reli-
withina singleinstitution," does not use the word cultureto
gion,specifically) whicheffects domination in manyprecapitalist
characterizethis "single institution."I have some problems
withthe way in whichhe summarizesTerray'spositionwith societies.He does this by arguingthat the conceptof infra-
structureitselfhas been too narrowlyinterpreted and mustbe
regardto the concept"mode of production."It seems to me
that he does not take into considerationthat Terray'sideas expandedto includeall aspects of the relationsof production.
incorporating the
have undergonesome evolutionin the courseof time,so that, Here Godeliergoes beyondotherMarxistsby
forinstance,his use of this conceptin his studyof the Abron realmof ethicalideals and values (whichhe calls "the ideel,"
but whichmay be construedI thinkas consciousness).In this
(Terray1975) does notverywellfitGodelier'scharacterization.
view, the ideel is not simplya passive reflection of economic
Godeliercreatestheimpression of notgivingmuchweightto
forces, but an active contributor;ideas are a "reality,"a "ma-
the ideas of a minority whichdoes not accept the dominating
social force.This is a point which
ideology.As Wertheim(1970) has arguedat length,quiteoften terial,"in the sense of a
such a minorityis at the very centerof revolutionary Marx himselfmade in theearlywritings and whichcertaindis-
move-
ments. Of course this is not to deny that agreementwith cipleslike Lukaicshave emphasizedin discussionsof falsecon-
(slowlydeveloping)dominating ideas is characteristicof most, sciousnessand mystification.
if not all, stablepoliticalsystems.This hypothesisfindsample My onlycomplaintis thatGodelierstopstoo soon. He does
confirmation in the data of the Early State Project. It is not not tellus howto applyhis ground-breaking insightselsewhere.
theemployment of force,but thehighdegreeof agreement and He does not relatehis ideas to suitableethnographic or ethno-
acceptancethatappearsto be characteristic here.The exchange historical data, although there are many contemporary exam-
basis of services-reciprocity-evencame to be includedin the ples of social dominationwhichwould benefitfromthe ap-
definition of the earlystate (Claessen and Skalnik1978:640). proach developedhere, for example,in the Middle East and
Mesoamerica.Perhapstheseare thingswhichare takenup in
the forthcoming book fromwhichthispiece is extracted;and
I look forwardto readingit. In any case, Godelieris to be
by DAVID D. GILMORE congratulatedfor makingus thinkabout these issues in the
Departmentof Anthropology, State University of New York mostprovocativeway. He has successfully broachedthe most
at StonyBrook,StonyBrook,N.Y. 11794,U.S.A. 16 vi 78 neglectedbut mostcrucialproblemin anthropology today: the
Thoughtand beingare indeeddistinct, buttheyalso forma unity. historicalrelationshipbetweenclass structureand social con-
[Marx1956:78] sciousnessin theprocessof culturechange.
This is one of the moststimulating and imaginative, as well as
coherent,statementsto come fromthe FrenchMarxistgroup
in a long while.By goingback and questioningbasic elements by ORIOL PI-SUNYER
of theory,Godelierhas renderedan invaluableserviceto all of Departmentof Anthropology, Universityof Massachusetts,
us who feelthatMarxismis notan inertor immutabledoctrine Amherst, Mass. 01003, U.S.A. 31 v 78
of belief,but a living,self-correctingscientificmethodof anal- This is notan articlethatlendsitselfto easy commentary. The
ysis. I thinkthispaper shouldopen new vistas forresearchin wholeapproachis verydifferent fromthatutilizedby the ma-
the areas of religion,kinship,class formation, social domina- jorityof American-trained anthropologists. The distinctionis
tion,"false consciousness," and the originof thestate.It is an not onlyconceptualor theoretical, but also linguistic,and gives
authenticbreakthrough in thatit revitalizesour understanding rise to a situationthatmay at timescall fora formof mental
of the role of consciousnessin the social behaviorswhichare interlinear translation. To getthemostout of thiscontribution,
traditionally the focusof anthropological inquiry.It is admira- thereadermusthave donehis homework, a taskwhichinvolves
ble not only forthe new lightit sheds on the questionof the not onlyfamiliarity withthe classicalMarxistcorpus,but also
"unity"of thoughtand being,but also forits refreshing clarity some backgroundin contemporary Marxistanthropology. For

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mypart,I have foundGodelier'sown Perspectivesin Marxist of the hypothetical,the originsof classes and the state might
Anthropology (1977) well-nighindispensable.It is also myim- be tracedto an exchangeof servicesor at least represented in
pressionthat the translatorwas too loyal to the originaltext this manner.The degree to which the stock-in-trade of the
and thatthismay accountforsome passages of trulyimpene- emergent directing
classeswas "invisiblerealities"probablyde-
trableprose.Finally,a highdegreeof abstractioncharacterizes pendedgreatlyon conditionsand circumstances.
the whole article,a circumstancethat left me starved for Such a system,once in being,has the capacityto maintain
ethnographic documentation. itselffora longtime.As Harris (1971:406) has written:
I foundthesedifficulties
real enoughto warrantmention,but
the issues raisedby Godelierare criticallyimportantones and The evolutionary viabilityof the staterestsin largemeasureon
the perfectionof institutionalstructuresthat protectthe ruling
deserveour carefulconsideration. At the centerof his discus- class fromconfrontation withcoalitionsof alienatedcommoners.
sion is the natureof powerin humansocieties: the economic Thesestructuresfallintotwobasiccategories: (1) institutions
that
determinants of power; the degreeto whichmodes of social controlthe contentof ideology;and (2) institutions thatphysi-
organizationact to interpretand channelpowerrelations;the callysuppressthesubversive, rebellious,
and revolutionary actions
function ofideologyinlegitimatingdomination and exploitation. of alienatedindividuals
and groups.
Some valid questionscan be raisedwithrespectto thesuper-
structure/ infrastructuremodel. Most anthropologists It is such institutional
structures, togetherwiththe idea sys-
would
agree that the forcesof productionare embeddedin the net- temsthatgive themlegitimacy, thatmakeit especiallydifficult
workof social relationsand thattheresulting structure is main- forthe oppresseddirectlyto confrontthe conventionalorder.
tained and supportedby ideology.Also, I findno difficulties Nevertheless, even the Mandate of Heaven can be lost,given
with the conceptthat institutions(kinship,politics,religion, the properconstellationof eventsand causes. At the root of
and so forth)are multifunctional and thatthe organizationof Marxisttheoryis the conceptthatwhat activatesthe process
production-who gets what, when, and why-is in the last of transformation is the conflict
betweenthematerialforcesof
productionand the social relationswithinwhichthe forcesof
analysisculturallydetermined. On the otherhand,theissue of
productionoperate.Anthropologists, and for our purposesI
causalities,sequences,and hierarchiesis more questionable.
Have we gainedmuchby hypothesizing thatthe importanceof would includehistoriansand archaeologists, have at theirdis-
posal a rangeof societiesand a body of data,on theprocesses
kinshipin simplesocietiesmay be attributedto the fact that
of changethatshouldpermitthe testingof hypotheseson con-
livinglabor in such societiesmay count for more than the
tinuitiesand transformations in humansocieties.Similarly,the
productsof accumulatedlabor?
conceptof exchange,so centralto the Marxistperspectiveof
It also seems reasonableto ask whetherit is necessaryto
asymmetrical economicrelations, is groundthatanthropologists
selecta givensuperstructural formas the organizing principle
have cultivatedfor a long time.It is true that,'for the most
in a particularsocietyor typeof society.One does not have to
part, anthropologists have studiednonmonetary classless so-
denytheimportanceof kinshipin band-levelsocietiesto recog-
cieties,but even thisis changingfast,in part at least because
nize thatkinshipis typicallyvalidatedby mythswhichare in-
societiesof this typeare rapidlydisappearingfromthe scene.
tegralpartsof cosmologicalsystemsof orderand classification.
It may thus be that the questionsGodelierasks will receive
I am also uncomfortable withsuperstructure categoriesthat the attentionthattheydeserve.
appear deceptivelystraightforward but are difficultto confirm
by inspection.Godelierseemsto take forgrantedthe inferior
status of womenin band-levelsocieties,but a recentcross- by ZOLTAN TAGANYI
culturalanalysisof thestatusof womenin 93 societies(Whyte Bogar u. 5, 1022 Budapest,Hungary.30 V 78
1978:214-15) notes that
The authorof thisstudytriesto appeara Marxist,buthis work
possibleforwomenin one societyto have impor- showsthe influenceof Frenchstructuralism,
it is perfectly of whichhe does
tantproperty rightswhilebeingexcludedfromkeyreligious posts not speak. His thesisdeals with "superstructure" and "infra-
and ceremonies; theymay also do mostof the productive work structure."He sees the elementsof the formeras consisting of
or havean important rolein politicallifewhilesuffering
undera the specificecologicaland geographicalconditions, theproduc-
severedoublestandard.. . . Aspectsof whathas oftenbeen as- tive forces,materialand intellectual, and thesocial relationsof
sumedto be a unitaryphenomenon-the statusof women-turn
out uponcloserexamination to be largelydiscreteand unrelated. production. This analysiswould be Marxist,but he goes on to
includetheseelementsin his analysisas social factsverysimi-
Let me make it clear that I do not arguethatthe conceptof lar to thoseof classicalFrenchsociologyand Emile Durkheim;
sex-baseddominationis invalid,but ratherthatthereare spe- further,he sees these facts as creatingconfigurations-the
cificmatrices,whichvary cross-culturally, withinwhichsuch "superstructure" of each societyis built by combiningthese
dominationmanifestsitself. elements.This is noteworthy because Levi-Strauss(1952) also
Godelier'sconceptof ide'elrealitiesmightperhapsbe ren- supposes,in discussingthe rules of the developmentof socie-
dered as "cognitivesystems"or "semanticstructures," and I t-ies,basic social building-elements and sees the characteristic
doubt that therewill be disagreement withhis claim that all featuresof societiesas being definedby the configuration of
social relations-all culture,in fact-contain an ideel aspect. theseelements.
My only cautionhere is that the quest fordeep or "hidden" A distinction maybe observedin Godelier'sformulation with
structuresmay, in Geertz's (1973:30) words,tend to "lose regardto the structureand functionof institutions. On the
touchwiththehardsurfacesof life." lowerlevel of development, foreach institu-
it is characteristic
Godelier'sfinalsectionon violenceand consentis especially tionto have severalfunctions, but on thehigherlevel of devel-
stimulating. In readingit I was remindedof Orwell's (1961: opment,especiallyin capitalistsociety,institutions may have
109) observationthat the greatappeal of colonialservicefor onlyone function.This opinionis untenable,because informal
the Englishlower bourgeoisiewas that only in such contexts groups,such as the peer groupsof the slums of towns,exist
could they live the ideologythey shared with the directing alongsidethe formalgroupsin capitalistsociety(Gans 1967).
classes: "The people who went thereas soldiersand officials Further,we can observe,in additionto theunambiguous struc-
did not go thereto makemoney.... theywenttherebecause ture and functionof industrialenterprise,informalgroups
in India, withcheap horses,freeshooting,and hordesof black withinit, such as neighborhoods, friendshipand visitingrela-
servants,it was so easy to play at beinga gentleman."This, tions,and cliques.These informalgroupsmayhave morefunc-
too, was a exchangeof sorts-colonial serviceforstatusdeter- tionsthanthe formalones (Etzioni 1964).
minants-and,whileagain the issue is verymuchin the realm Some terminological mattersare as follows:A moreappro-

770 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY

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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
priate expressionthan "superstructure" is social formation.
The term"superstructure" is unfortunate because the socio-
logicalliteraturecontainsotherexpressionsforthesephenome-
na such as "outside world" or "global society"or "nation."
("Outside world"is used by the authorin the latterpart of
thisarticle.)The term"infrastructure" is also unfortunate,
be-
cause it is already employedby economistsfor the service
sector.
Anotherquestionof detail: Godelierconnectstheappearance
of states with the rise of agricultureand animal husbandry,
emphasizing thisphenomenon withregardto the statesof the
ThirdWorld.If we examinethe questionof origins,however,
we findthat the appearance of agricultureand animal hus-
bandryis followedby the rise of city-statesin Neolithictimes,
but not in the spread of these phenomenafromAsia Minor
throughthe Balkan peninsulato CentralEurope.
[MauriceGodelier's replyhadnotarrived bypresstimeandtherefore
will appear in the March issue.-EDITOR.]
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Wanted
* Contributions fromall countriesin which the problemis
being studied to a proposedreader entitledThe Politics of
PatriarchalViolence:A Systematicand IntegratedAnalysisof
ViolenceagainstWomen.Amongthe topicsto be includedare
sexualharassment, wifebattering, rape,maritalrape,and sex-
ual abuse of femalechildren.The methodology may be thatof
a case study,statisticalanalysis,or theoreticalformulation,
but
all manuscriptsmust examinethe problemin feministterms.
Whilepreviouslypublishedpaperswill be considered,the em-
phasis will be on new contributions. Manuscriptsof 15-25
pages in length(double-spaced)or descriptions of workto be
undertaken or in progressshouldbe sentto Ruth A. Schwartz,
2509 AvenueK, Brooklyn,N.Y. 11210,U.S.A.
a Collaborationin researchon the cross-cultural aspects of
tobaccouse and relatedbehavior.Social SystemsAnalystshas
prepareda fieldmanual forthe collectionof data on tobacco-
relatedbehavior,includingreasonsforuse, personnelinvolved,
situationalcontext,boundarydefinitionand maintenance, sta-
tus differentiation,
and symbolicmeanings.We wish to dis-
tributethemanualto anthropologistswho are currently or will
Vol. 19 * No. 4 * December1978
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soon be doingfieldwork;our hope is to gatherrepresentative
and standardized data on as manysocietiesas possible.We will
fullyacknowledgeall contributions and will send a summary
of the findings
on request.We would also like to distributea
questionnaireto interestedinvestigators
who have been in the
fieldand can recall relevantdata. For furtherinformation
please write:SherwinJ. Feinhandlerand Kjell I. Enge, Social
SystemsAnalysts,2 Calvin Rd., Watertown,Mass. 02172,
U.S.A.
* Information relevantto a studyin progresson behaviorand
cognitivecategoriesin relationto energyuse in Americanso-
ciety.Until now Americanshave been subject to little more
than warningsregardingpossible energyshortagesand price
increases; no actual crisis has yet occurred.Other societies
have notbeen as fortunate. We wouldlike to know,fromany-
one currently workingin an area in whichfuel is very scarce
and/or prohibitivelyexpensivein relationto householdincome,
how behavioris alteredand how economicchoicesare made.
We would also appreciatehearingfromanyonewho has con-
ducted,or plans to conduct,similaror relatedstudiesin Amer-
ican society.Please write: SherwinJ. Feinhandler,Social Sys-
temsAnalysts,2 Calvin Rd., Watertown,Mass. 02172, U.S.A.
771