The Genealogy of Muslim Radicalism in Indonesia A Study of The Roots and Characteristics of The Padri Movement

The Genealogy of Muslim Radicalism in Indonesia
THE GENEALOGY OF MUSLIM RADICALISM IN INDONESIA

A Study of the Roots and Characteristics of the Padri
Movement
Abd A’la
IAIN Sunan Ampel Surabaya, Indonesia
Abstract: This paper will trace the roots of religious
radicalism in Indonesia with the Padri movement as the
case in point. It argues that the history of the Padri
movement is complex and multifaceted. Nevertheless, it
seems to be clear that the Padri movement was in many
ways a reincarnation of its counterpart in the Arabian
Peninsula, the Wahha>bi> movement, even though it was not
a perfect replica of the latter. While the two shared some
similarities, they were also quite different in other respects.
The historical passage of the Padris was therefore not the
same as that of the Wahha>bi>s. Each movement had its own
dimensions and peculiarities according to its particular
context and setting. Despite these differences, both were
united by the same objective; they were radical in their
determination to establish what they considered the purest
version of Islam, and both manipulated religious symbols
in pursuit of their political agendas.
Keywords: Padri movement, fundamentalism, radicalism,
Minangkabau, Wahha>bism.
Introduction
Almost all historians agree that Islam in the Malay Archipelago – a
large part of which subsequently became known as Indonesia – was
disseminated in a peaceful process. The people of the archipelago
accepted the religion of Islam wholeheartedly without any pressure or
compulsion. To a certain extent, these people even treated Islam as
belonging to their own culture, seeing striking similarities between the
new religion and existing local traditions. This peaceful process, which
JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 267

Volume 02, Number 02, December 2008
Abd A'la
characterized the advent of Islam and its dissemination in the

archipelago, stands as a kind of historical hallmark in Indonesia.
Nonetheless, the advent of Islam and its continued existence in the
region were not always marked by peace and harmony. At certain
phases of its development and in certain areas of the archipelago,
Islam -or to be more precise certain individuals and groups
representing Islam- were involved in violent acts. Among the first
groups that used violence, not only against non-Muslims but also
against Muslims, was the Padri movement.1
Even a superficial analysis of this movement reveals that the
violent acts that its proponents committed over time were the result
not only of a shallow understanding of religion but also of their
political ideology. In other words, these violent acts were not born out
of the blue.
The Padris’ uncertain interpretation of Islam was constructed in
such a way that violence might be legitimized. It was here that the
Padris found a perfect concurrence with the ideology of the Wahha>bi>
movement in the Arabian Peninsula.
On the historical link between the two movements, Benda has
rightly pointed out that what he calls the Pax Wahha>bi>ca attracted the
attention of many Muslims in the Indonesian archipelago and exerted a
serious influence on them. This Arabian dogma was also able to
transcend the doctrinal differences existing among its Indonesian
adherents and united them in the pursuance for their ideological
cause.2
Wahha>bi> beliefs were first brought to Indonesia by early pilgrims,
who upon their return from the Holy Land disseminated the ideas,
imbued them with their own interpretative touches and sought to
ingrain them in the minds and souls of their followers.
This paper aims at investigating the complexity involved in the
phenomenon of the Padri movement. It will try first to trace the
characteristics of the Padri movement, shedding light on its
1 See Azyumardi Azra, “Islamic Radical Movement in Indonesia,” (Paper presented at

the Conference “The Link-up Terrorism in Southeast Asia,” Center for Moderate
Muslim, Jakarta 2006). See also Azyumardi Azra, “Salafisme,” Republika, 14 April 2005.
2See Harry J. Benda, The Crescent and the Rising Sun: Indonesian Islam under The Japanese
Occupation 1942-1945 (Netherlands: W. van Hoeve Ltd. – The Hague and Bandung,
1958), p. 73.
268 JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM

background and mode of religiosity, and then highlighting its acts of

violence. Then it is necessary to demonstrate the relationship between
this movement and the Wahha>bi> movement since this relationship
formed a central part of the Padri’s ideological tenets. The study holds
that there was indeed such relationship. Although the Padri movement
might have developed its own normative values, agendas and
obsessions, an ideological and perhaps pedagogical relationship
remains possible. While there might have been some kind of
discontinuity between the two movements, this discontinuity remains
to be proven.
The violence that the Padri movement committed was not simply
ideological or theological in nature. I distinguish between self-defense
“violence,” ad hoc violence, violence committed for non-religious
reasons, and religious violence. The Padri movement committed all
forms violence, although I regard the first form not as violence in a
pejorative sense.
Islam in Minangkabau
Various views have been expressed concerning the precise period
of the arrival of Islam in Minangkabau, the region in Western Sumatra
where the Padri movement flourished. One of these views holds that
Islam –notably in its Sufistic form– was already established in
Minangkabau in the 14th century.3 This view, however, lacks accurate
evidence and is ultimately unconvincing. It is unlikely that during that
period of time Islam was already in Minangkabau because the whole
region was overwhelmingly Hindu and was controlled by Aditya-
warman, the viceroy of the strong Javanese Hindu Kingdom called
Majapahit.4 In all likelihood, Islam arrived and then flourished in
Minangkabau around the 16th century. Quoting Pires, Ricklefs
maintains that by that time the king of Minangkabau and hundreds of
his relatives and partisans had already embraced Islam. The masses in
Minangkabau then followed in the footsteps of their leaders.5 This
view is considered more accurate, and receives unequivocal approval
3 See Melissa Rimac, “Matrinial Minangkabau,” in http://www.practitionerdirectory.-

com.au/natural_health_article?cid=751&pid=17365.
4 See M. C. Ricklefs, Sejarah Modern Indonesia 1200-2004 (Jakarta: PT Serambi Ilmu
Semesta, 2005), p. 302.

5 Ibid., p. 35.

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from the historian Dobbin, who believes that the conversion of the
people of Minangkabau to Islam took place during the period at the
end of the 16th century and the beginning of the 17th century when the
Muslim Kingdom of Aceh dominated the whole of Sumatra.6
Another view says that Islam came to Mingankabau in the 15th
century. This view is based on a local legend called tambo which
highlights the idea of creation in the world-view of the Minangkabau.7
The tambo has it that the world of Minangkabau was created from, as
Azra quotes, “the light of Muhammad” during the same time that two
other worlds, namely “Benua Ruhum,” (the Turkish Ottoman
Empire), and the “Benua Cina” (the Chinese continent) were created.8
Azra argues that after the Ottoman Empire conquered Constantinople
in the second half of the 15th century - in 1453 to be precise - the
Ottomans established their political and cultural supremacy over some
parts of the Malay archipelago.9 By associating themselves with the
Islamic Ottoman Empire, the people of Minangkabau seem to have
identified themselves as Muslims.
Because of these conflicting historical accounts, it preferable to
focus on the mode and process of the Islamisation of this region rather
than to argue about the exact date of Islam’s arrival. Suffice it to say
that Islam might have come to Minangkabau during the 14th century,
but it was only in the 16th century that Islam was established as the
religion of the majority. What is of paramount importance is to note
that, once it was established as the public religion as it were, Islam
became a monumental phenomenon that attracted not only the
6 Christine Dobbin, “Tuanku Imam Bondjol (1772-1864),” Indonesia Vol. 13 (April

1972), p. 5.
7 “The World of Minangkabau” is regarded as an integral concept representing the
overall system, institution and the life of people of Minangkabau. The world of
Minangkabau consists of three domains, namely lu(h)ak called Agam, Limapuluh Kota,
and Tanah Datar. Subsequently, the world of Minangkabau also consists of Solok
known previously as Kubung XIII, and IX Koto. These four regions were known as
Padang Darat. Each region has what they call nagari numbering at the time 600. See
Elisabeth E. Graves, Asal Usul Elite Minangkabau Modern: Respons terhadap Belanda Abad
XIX/XX, Translation (Jakarta: Yayasan Obor Indonesia, 2007), pp. 1-5; pp. 30-31.
8Azyumardi Azra, Jaringan Ulama Timur Tengah dan Kepulauan Nusantara Abad XVII dan
XVIII (Bandung: Penerbit Mizan, 1994), p. 45.
9 Ibid., pp. 47-48.

attention of the converted, but also of people of different cultures,

races and religions.
From its establishment, Islam in Minangkabau was identical to its
Sufistic form. This is apparent, for example, from the popular
understanding among the people of Minangkabau concerning the idea
of creation.10 The question remains, however, what kind of Sufism the
people of this region adhered to.
According to Fathurrahman the predominant school of Sufism in
Minangkabau was Shattariyah. This order is recorded to have been
present here from the return of Shaikh Burhanuddin – leader of
Shattariyah order - from Aceh. He studied Tasawuf under the
patronage of the famous Shaikh Abdurrauf al-Sinkili. This order has
left a marked imprint on the people of this region and guided them to
what many have recognized as the tolerant form of Islam. The primary
text of this order is Kitab Menerangkan Agama Islam di Minangkabau (A
Book on the Explanation of Islam in Minangkabau).11
The Shattariyah order was disseminated by Burhanuddin's main
disciples into neighboring regions. By the second half of the 18th
century, the order had become the sole religious power in
Minangkabau.12
A unique characteristic of Shattariyah was that it was able to
absorb local culture and customs.13 From the beginning of the
10 Ibid., p. 45.
11Oman Fathurrahman, “Tarekat Shattariyah di Dunia Melayu-Indonesia: Kajian atas
Dinamika dan Perkembangannya Melalui Naskah-naskah di Sumatera Barat,”
(Unpublished Ph.D Dissertation, School of Humanity Studies, Postgraduate Program,
the University of Indonesia, Jakarta, 2003), p. 164.
12 They include Shaikh Datuk Maruhun Panjang of Padang Ganting Batussangkar, who
propagated his teaching in Tanah Datar, Shaikh Tarapang (Syaikh Pandan Baico) of
Kubung Tiga Belas Solok, who propagated his ideas in Solok and Sijunjung, Shaikh
Abdul Muhsin (Shaikh Supayang) of Supayang, who worked in Alahan Panjang Muara
Labuh and Lubuk Gadang, Shaikh Muhammad Nasir (Shaikh Surau Baru) of Koto
Tangah Padang, in Koto Tangah Pauh Lubuk Bagalung Padang, Shaikh Buyung Muda
(Shaikh Bayang) of Bayang Bandar, in Bandar Sibupuluh and Kuraji, and Shaikh
Jalaluddin Kapeh Kapeh of Paninjauan Padang Panjang, in Luhak Agam and Luhak
Lima Puluh Kota Payakumbuh. See Ibid., pp. 88-89.
13 See Irina Katkova, “Islamic Manuscripts of Western Sumatera, Problem of
Investigation and Preservation (on the Materials Field Research Work in Western
Sumatera of 2006),” in http://www.islamicmanuscript.org/resources/files/katkova_-
Irina_TIMA.pdf/.

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conversion of the locals to Islam, efforts had been made to reconcile

Islam with the values of local traditions and culture. The Shattariyah
order played a constructive role in these efforts. In most cases, the
process of reconciliation was gradual. Hence Islam was first introduced
into the coastal regions (rantau), and only then into the inland regions
(darek, darat). In this strategy lay the conviction that in propagating
religion it is wise to proceed gradually from step to step.14
Through the Shattariyah order, the process of reconciliation was
not only commenced but also intensified. But it was by virtue of the
reconciling power of this order that “the Islam” of Minangkabau was –
and perhaps still is - known for its prudence, tolerance and peaceful
manner.
Like those of many others, the traditions and customs of the
Minangkabau are complicated. They form a web of complex
relationships, drawing together many aspects of human life: social,
economic and religious. Furthermore, these traditions contain forces
of both conflict and integration. Within them one may find what is
commonly called the system of dual laras; Koto Piliang and Bodi Caniago.
The former concerns the prestige of leadership, where the leader is
considered to be the sole occupying authority at the top of the
hierarchy (puncak), whereas the latter concerns the principles of
egalitarianism, according to which the country (nagari) must be ruled by
a group of religious leaders from various major clans.15
Similarly, the social structure of the Minangkabau is just as
complicated as its traditions and customs. The social structure consists
of two opposing systems, one monarchical, representing patriarchal
values, the other a popular system, representing matriarchal norms. In
the Minangkabau ethos, this dual system of social structure must at the
end be reconciled if society is to survive. Marriage is the way toward
that reconciliation because marriage unites two opposing entities –
man and woman - bringing them together in a spirit of togetherness
and harmony.16
Following the Islamisation of Minangkabau in the 16th century, the
political system in the region changed. A tripartite form of leadership
14 Fathurrahman, “Tarekat Shattariyah,” p. 68.

15 Taufik Abdullah, “Adat and Islam: An Examination of Conflict in Minangkabau,”
Indonesia 2 (October 1966), pp. 6-7.
16 Ibid., p. 4.

was then introduced according to which the Kingdom was to be ruled

by three kings at once. These three kings were the King of Nature
(Raja Alam), the King of Tradition (Raja Adat) and the King of Rites
(Raja Ibadat), the kings being known in the local language as Rajo Tigo
Selo. The King of Tradition – whether man or woman - was seen as the
personification of patriarchal values. The King of Rites – again,
whether man or woman - was regarded as representing the matriarchal
values. Together they were called Rajo Duo Selo and held the
prerogative authority in their respective domains. Meanwhile, the King
of Nature was expected to combine the two above-mentioned
authorities.
In reality, however, there are doubts whether this kind of political
system was ever applied in the region, for the heartland of
Minangkabau (darat) was in fact never ruled by a king. It was ruled by
religious leaders who ran the government hereditarily. The kings ruled
only the coastal regions and their territories.17
Whatever the case might be, what this paper is interested in is the
fact that the concept of the King of Rites was already recognized as
part and parcel of the political system in Minangkabau. By any
standard, this recognition bears an explicit meaning that the people of
Minangkabau had already acknowledged the public role of religion
politically and perhaps culturally as well.
Quite apart from this, the concept of nagari (country) also
underwent a process of Islamisation. Prior to the advent of Islam, this
concept was understood as referring only to the social, political and
economic entity. According to this old concept, the nagari was upheld
as consisting of a territorial unit comprising agricultural lands, open
grounds, parks, sources of water, chicken nesting spots and so on.
Legally speaking, the nagari also consisted of certain rules and was
associated with certain institutions, traditions or customs.18 With the
coming of Islam, the nagari was transformed and perhaps modernized
to encompass such things as the balai, musajik (mosque), labuah (public
road), and tepian tampek mandi (public washing place). Balai was an
institution symbolizing the rules of integration and the laws of religion.
17 Ibid., pp. 4-5.

18See John S. Ambler, “Historical Perspectives on Sawah Cultivation and the Political
and Economic Context for Irrigation in West Sumatera,” Indonesia Vol. 46 (October
1988), p. 42.

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The members of this institution, who usually had shown strong

religious and intellectual acumen, were called urang patuik.19
The respect that Muslims in general, and the Shattariyah order in
particular, showed towards local traditions in Minangkabau opened up
the soft ground for the easy process of Islamisation in this region. In
the same vein, Muslims, from the advent of Islam, never behaved in a
way that would threaten the original foundation of the local
community. On the contrary, they helped preserve local culture,
strengthen its foundations and enrich its elements.20 In this respect,
credit must go not only to the Muslims in general but also to the
followers of the Shattariyah order who, thanks to their credible
understanding of their religion, were able to reconcile Islam with local
traditions, and contextualize this religion into the new condition that
they found in Minangkabau. It was through this order that Islam was
finally and fully integrated into the life of the people of this land.
All this is to say that both the religious traditions and the local
customs of Minangkabau were overtly flexible. Both were able to adapt
to each other, and absorb one another. By the end of the 18th century,
however, Islam was no longer what it was. It was about to change
forever. Islam, a religion couched in tolerance and able to understand
the very fabric of an alien culture, was now about to be transformed
into another kind of Islam at odds with its own values and norms. It
was the Naqshabandiyah order that initiated this drastic change. When
it came to this region, it sent a shock wave through the whole
community, creating early tension and conflict. The source of this
conflict was twofold: the inability of the members of this order to
respect different religious views, and the political struggle for
domination.21 When the Padris came in as the patrons of the order, the
situation became even worse. Violence in the name of religion
prevailed and intimidation became the rule of the day.
The Padris: Their Advent and Development
Two decades before the end of the 18th century, Minangkabau was
known for its gold production. The gold-producing villages in this
region and other surrounding villages which acted as export routes
19 Abdullah, “Adat and Islam,” p. 12.

20 Ibid., p. 11.
21 Fathurrahman, “Tarekat Shattariyah,” pp. 164-165.

were supportive of the royal family. However, by the end of that

century, the gold trade was in decline, and Minangkabau faced serious
commercial problems as a result. By the 1780s Minangkabau had
established new commercial centers such as Agam, a cotton producing
region outside Tanah Datar, which at the same time was also a trade
hub where Javanese salt traders did business with the locals. This new
form of trade was quite different from the gold trade in that while the
former was open to everyone, the latter was controlled only by the
elites. Between the 1790s and 1830s, Minangkabau, especially the
regions of Agam and Limapuluh Kota, began to profit from booming
coffee demands from countries such as the United States of America.
This and other factors helped shift the mode and nature of the power
balance within the Minangkabau community.22 Economically speaking,
men of religion – the clerics and their followers - benefited from this
shift and gained higher status accordingly. As the mode of trade shifted
from an elite-based trade to an individual-based one, these clerics
became the main benefactors because they essentially constituted the
major element in the society.
Concomitant to that, this emerging class of clerics, with their
power and advantages, brought about a new form of social diversity in
the community. Their economic renaissance had notable
consequences23 for their own political careers and the political
opportunities of their followers. All now became major players not
only in religious domain but also in economic and political arena.
Following their economic renaissance, Islamic educational
institutions such as surau began to flourish. Here numbers of Muslim
students converged to study. At the same time these students were also
involved in business activities organized by the clerics and their
institutions. Hence, there occurred a transformation in society, turning
formerly disadvantaged members into an economically advantaged
class of new rich. As a result of intensive business activities, these
22 See Christine Dobbin, “Economic Change in Minangkabau as a Factor in the Rise of
the Padri Movement, 1784-1830,” Indonesia, Vol. 23 (April 1977): pp. 1-21.
23 Helmut Lukas, “The Perception of Indonesia’s History and Culture by Western
Historian and Social Scientists,” (Paper presented at the Conference “Indonesia’s

Cultural Diversity in Time of Global Change,” Indonesian Embassy Brussels, The
European Institute for Asia Studies, Brussels, The Royal Academy of Overseas
Sciences, Brussels, and The International Institute for Asian Studies (Leiden: 16
December 2002), p. 5.

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people soon became wealthy. Since business activities were reasonably

lucrative at that time, the number of the rich grew significantly, and the
number of people leaving for the Holy Land also increased. This
expansion in pilgrimage in itself provides strong evidence that the
economy of the people was good.24
The visit to the Holy Land turned out to be not only a ritual for
these people, but also a process of learning and perhaps indoctrination.
They began to hear – and subsequently learn - about the Wahha>bi>yah
and its principles. A reasonable number of them even became
acquainted with its teachings and sympathetic to its doctrines. Upon
their return, they founded a Wahha>bi>-oriented community and
disseminated its teachings through out the region.
Among the early Wahha>bi>s in Minangkabau were Haji Miskin of
Lu(h)ak Agam, Haji Abdur Rahman of Piobang, a sub-region of
Lu(h)ak Limah Puluh Kota, and Haji Muhammad Arief of Sumanik,
Batusangkar. Haji Miskin returned from Mecca in either 1803 or 1804
and soon embarked on a reform mission in his homeland. He believed
that the structure of the Minangkabau society was not at all in line with
the teachings of the Qur'an and the Sunnah, and must therefore be
reformed. He sought a replica of the Saudi style of reform where the
old structure of society is totally replaced by a new one, regardless of
the different nature of the existing social structure.25 This idea of total
reform was welcomed by a large number of people including Haji
Abdur Rahman and Haji Muhammad Arif. In time, the three reached
the conclusion that a common platform must be formulated. The
situation called for a “holy” mission to commence immediately. The
seeds of the Padri movement were sewn, and intellectual agendas to
launch what subsequently appeared to be a furious onslaught on their
foes were then tabled.
In their effort to undertake radical reform in Minangkabau, the
three Hajis received strong opposition especially from the leadership
of the Shattariyah order.26 Haji Miskin for example, was denounced by
Tuanku Nan Tuo, a religious leader and a former business partner of
Haji Miskin before the latter left for Mecca. Nan Tuo rejected entirely
the ideas of Haji Miskin and succeeded in persuading his followers not
24 Dobbin, “Economic Change in Minangkabau,” p. 28.

25 Ibid., p. 30.

to tolerate those ideas. As a result, Haji Miskin was forced to

acknowledge his defeat from his former colleague and left for Enam
Kota. He stayed in Pandai Sikat for a while, and continued to
propagate his Wahha>bi>-inspired ideas. But here he failed. He then left
for Kota Lawas where – recognizing the causes of his failure - he
adopted a new strategy and a more well-planned approach. He
succeeded here in promoting his ideas and prompting the total reform
to which he aspired. Eventually, he decided to employ a physical
approach, burning down public halls (balai) and finally capturing all
regions in Enam Kota including Kota Lawas and Pandai Sikat.27
While the Padri movement was initially, organized in a rather
sporadic and unsystematic manner, as it matured, it developed a more
united and centralized form. By the time the Padri movement gained
real momentum in 1811, Haji Miskin, with the support from Tuanku
Nan Renceh, another religious leader, was already viewed as the
strongest leader in the region. Realizing his strength, Haji Miskin
officially announced that total reform must by now begin.28 He was
confident that he would succeed. Apart from the popular support that
he received, he was also backed by the so-called Harimau Nan Selapan,
eight strong local leaders calling themselves the eight lions: Tuanku of
Kubu Sanang, Tuanku of Ladang Lawas, Tuanku of Padang Luar,
Tuanku of Galung, Tuanku of Koto Ambalan, and Tuanku of Lubuk
Aur.29 (only 6 – are they lions or tigers?)
In 1813 Tuanku Lintau signed up.30 Some time before that, in
1807, another strong and charismatic religious leader called Tuanku
Muda of Alahan Panjang had also joined the group. It was this man,
later known as Tuanku Imam Bonjol, who transformed the
organization into something else and gave it the real impetus that
would move it forward. With his experience and firm leadership,
Tuanku Imam Bonjol succeeded in exercising considerable power and
27 Dobbin, “Economic Change in Minangkabau,” pp. 30-31.

28 Ibid., p. 32.
29See Suryadi, “Kontroversi Kaum Padri: Jika Bukan Karena Tuanku Nan Renceh,” in
http://naskahkuno.blogspot.com/2007/11/kontroversi-kaum-paderi-jika-bukan.html;
Cf. Abdul Qadir Djaelani, “Perang Padri,” in http://www.mail-archive.com/urang-
awak@yahoogroups.com/msg00475.html; Cf. Dobbin, “Tuanku Imam Bondjol,” p.
10.
30 Dobbin, “Economic Change in Minangkabau,” P. 36.

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influence over others, and in his hands, the Padri movement turned
into a much more solid and well-managed organization.
Under his leadership, the Padri movement expanded its territory
beyond Minangkabau to include South Tapanuli and other neighboring
regions where the Padris recruited new and fresh leaders such as
Tuanko Rao and Tuanku Tambusai.
The Intellectual Fundamentalism of the Padris
Although some might say otherwise, the Padri movement was, in
my view, the reincarnation of Wahha>bi>sm in the Arabian Peninsula. It
is not hard to find apparent congruencies between the two
movements, for instance in their overt attitude and covert propaganda
against Tasawuf. The two movements regarded Tasawuf as misleading,
and must therefore be banned. The Padris also maintained that the
people of Minangkabau, especially the followers of the Shattariyah
order were sinful because they committed something not ordained by
God in His Shari>‘ah. Like the Wahha>bi>s, the Padris were fond of
labeling other people bid‘ah for practicing certain forms of rituals they
were not happy with. Like the Wahha>bi>s too, the Padris employed
physical, often violent means to force people to change their minds,
beliefs and traditional customs.31
It is quite clear -as many studies have shown- that in their
desperate efforts to gain the people’s support, the Padris employed a
deliberate policy of violence, unfavorable to both society and religion.
On these grounds, it is legitimate to argue that this movement was
radical outright.
For the Padris, Islam could be understood only as they interpreted
it. No other understandings and interpretations were true. It was on
this notion that the Padris based all their behavior and conduct. To be
more precise, the violent acts of the Padris stemmed from a flawed
understanding of Islam. Hence, Tuanku Nan Renceh launched a
violent attack against Tuanku Nan Tuo, his own teacher, merely on
account of slight differences between them in understanding certain
religious issues of no particular importance whatsoever to Islam.
Tuanku Nan Renceh went even further by denouncing him and others

such as Fakih Saghir as infidels, and nicknaming the latter the “King of
the Infidels.”32
Up to this point, one might conclude that the rigid stance of the
Padris must have been the result of their method and approach in
understanding the texts of Islam. Their method is deeply rooted in a
literalistic-textual kind of approach. There might be no apparent
danger in this approach. But it led to strange consequences. The
Padris, for example, obliged man to grow his beard, or else be fined.
They also prohibited men and women from cutting their teeth on pain
of being fined one adult cow. A man who walked in public with his
legs bared would also be fined a certain amount of money, and so
would women who appeared in public without a burka covering her
whole body save her eyes and hands. Worse still, a person found
neglecting the s}ala>h (the compulsory five prayers) was to be punished
the first time with a fine of 5 gulden, and the second time be
condemned him to death.33
By virtue of their radical dogma, the Padris not only indoctrinated
people but also imposed on their codes of conduct and dress. Thus,
the Padris forced people to wear a long white dress as the compulsory
form of male dress.34 Those who disobeyed this order would be
punished. The Padris called themselves “the whites” and were required
always to appear in that colour.
In addition to these rather absurd rules and regulations, the Padris
also formulated religion-based laws that, at first sight, look
contradictory. For instance Tuanku Imam Bonjol, the highest authority
in the movement, while ruling that slavery was prohibited, himself
owned many slaves. He sometimes also announced publicly that
slavery was permissible. In his memoir, written by his own hand,
Tuanku recorded that he had 70 slaves man and women.35 This is an
apparent contradiction indeed, and is against the very teaching of
Islam. Islam speaks of freedom, equality and justice for all people
whatever their race, language, color or religion. The whole mission of
32 Suryadi, ”Kontroversi Kaum Padri.”

34See Dobbin “Tuanku Imam Bondjol,” p. 10; Cf. Mangaraja Onggang Parlindungan,
Pongkinangolngolan Sinambela Gelar Tuanku Rao: Teror Agama Islam Mazhab Hambali di
Tanah Batak 1816-1833 (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2007), p. 132.
35 See “Memorandum of Tuanku Imam,” pp. 19-20.

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the Qur'an and Muhammad's prophecy is to abolish slavery, and to

establish justice and equality.
Slavery in Minangkabau has its roots in the period prior to the
coming of Islam. Slaves were considered the second-class citizens.
After the coming of Islam, the system of slavery was only applied to
non-Muslims. These slaves normally originated from such regions as
Nias, Mentawai, Tapanuli and Riau, and a large number of them
resided in remote parts of the nagari, quite isolated from the majority of
the people. In most part, they were employed as laborers in agricultural
sectors or as domestic workers, and by virtue of their being slaves, they
could not get married to someone who was not slave. In certain phases
of Minangkabau history, efforts were made to free these slaves, but
these efforts came to no fruition and slavery was even regaining its
momentum at the time of the coming of the Padris.36 Ironically,
however, while the Padris spoke of the application of Shari>‘ah, they
themselves, at the same time, violated the benevolent values of Islam
and advocated instead the abhorrent self-made rules and regulations of
the slavery system.
The literalistic nature of their approach toward the Qur'an and the
Sunnah seems to have made them unable to look beyond the literal
meaning of the two major sources of Islam.37 Hence, they ignored the
concept of Rah}ma>n according to which a rule must be underpinned by
the spirit of compassion and forgiveness. The Padris failed to do this,
and in their appeal to apply the rules of Shari>‘ah, they forgot that the
heart of Shari>‘ah is compassion, respect, tolerance and justice. They
also failed to respect other views and opinions on Islam and tended to
go overboard when damning their foes as infidels and hypocrites.
When a literalistic approach is applied, as El Fadl has noted, one is
forced to read a religious text in isolation from the historical and moral
context. In this method of interpretation, the substantive content of
the text may often be ignored. The result is a rigid, one-sided and
inauthentic interpretation of Islam.38 This indeed was both the style
36 Graves, Asal Usul Elite Minangkabau Modern, pp. 29-31.

37See Fazlur Rahman, Islam and Modernity: Transformation of an Intellectual Tradition
(Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1982), p. 4.
38 Khaled Abou El Fadl, “Toleransi dalam Islam,” in Joshua Cohen and Ian Lague
(eds), Cita dan Fakta Toleransi Islam: Puritanisme versus Pluralisme, Translation (Bandung:
Arasy Mizan, 2003), p. 31.

and attitude of the Padris in their interpretation on the Qur’an and the
Sunnah, a style that gave birth to their rigid and absurd understanding
of this noble religion.
In practical terms what this implied was that the Padris then
tended to legitimize their acts and justify them on religious grounds,
regardless of whether or not these acts were against moral norms and
religious values. The Padris were unequivocally fundamentalist in the
literal sense of the word.
The connotative and pejorative meaning of the word
fundamentalism is still open to debate. It was first used to refer to the
radical Protestant group in America in the beginning of the 20th
century. Members of this group called themselves fundamentalists to
distinguish them from liberal Protestants, whom they regarded as
having been misled from the true faith of the religion. The Protestant
fundamentalists, like the Wahha>bi>s and the Padris, employed a
literalistic approach to their understanding of the teaching and
tradition of their holy texts.39
On many accounts, fundamentalism is peculiar, but not unique, to
Christianity. Armstrong, following Martin E Marty and R. Scott
Appleby, maintains that fundamentalism is a form of militant
spiritualism vis-à-vis what is considered to be a moral crisis. Funda-
mentalism is a response toward the beliefs, and perhaps prejudices, of
the secularists. In their attitude towards secular thought, the
fundamentalists argue that the struggle to reveal its inherent lack of
balance represents a cosmic war against evil. It should come as no
surprise that in their bid to wage their war, fundamentalists first and
foremost tend to resort to the strictest dogma of their religion as a way
to preserve their faith against the perceived onslaught of the
secularists. Dubbing themselves the only true representatives of their
religion, fundamentalists of any religious tradition normally live an
isolated life away from society and create their own community and
culture.40
In the same vein, Azra, modifying the thesis of Marty and
Appleby, argues that a constant characteristic of fundamentalism is
resistance against modernity, secularism, Western values, the methods
39 See Karen Armstrong, The Battle for God: Fundamentalism in Judaism, Christianity and
Islam (London: HarperCollins Publishers, 2000), p. x.
40 Ibid., p. xi.

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of hermeneutics, pluralism, relativism (cultural and not religious

relativism) and a rejection of the social and historical dynamism which
fundamentalists deem to represent a threat toward religion.41 For
Habermas, on the other hand, the main characteristic of funda-
mentalism is rigidity and stubbornness in imposing, politically and one-
sidedly, its values and convictions upon others, in order to disguise the
fact that these values and convictions are irrational.42
While there are subtle differences in these accounts concerning
fundamentalism, these propositions nonetheless agree that funda-
mentalism, in a broad sense, is a form of rigid religiosity that calls for
the direct return to the original sources of religion by means of
violence and force.
In the history of Islam, fundamentalism in the sense of returning
to the original sources of religion and of interpreting these sources
literally has been known since the early phase of its development. As
such, it was first witnessed during the Tah}ki>m (peace deal) between Ali
and Mu‘a>wiyah, when a third party, the Khawa>rij, declined to get
involved in it. This third group turned violent and quickly pointed
fingers at both Ali and Mu‘a>wiyah as infidels. In the view of the
Khawa>rij, the two had committed a grave sin by agreeing on arbitrage
which was in its nature against the very teaching of the holy texts. The
two must therefore be killed.
In Islam, fundamentalism confronts not only modernity but also
its own tradition and legacy. Muslim fundamentalists are trapped in
their own obsession as if they are beaten, isolated and marginalized not
only by the lucrative power of modernity but also by the well-
preserved traditions of Islam.43 It seems Muslim fundamentalists were
first frustrated by the traditions of Islam, and only second were
marginalized by the lore of modernity.
On these grounds, one may speak of two forms of fundamentalism
in Islam. One is classical fundamentalism, and the other is neo-
fundamentalism. The Padri movement is close to the former. Since its
41 Azyumardi Azra, Pergolakan Politik Islam: Dari Fundamentalisme, Modernisme hingga Post-
Modernisme (Jakarta: Penerbit Paramadina, 1996), pp. 109-110.

42 Giovanna Borradori, Filsafat dalam Masa Teror: Dialog dengan Jürgen Habermas dan
Jacques Derida, Translation (Jakarta: Penerbit Buku Kompas, 2005), pp. 45-46.
43Khaled Abou El Fadl, “Islam and Theology of Power,” in Middle East Report, 221,
(2001), from http://www.merip.org/mer/mer221/221-abu_el_fadl.html.

very inception, the proponents of this movement propagate the idea of

the direct return to the Qur'an and to the purest form of Islam, that is,
to the original form Islam revealed to the prophet Muhammad. Thus,
the Padris did not acknowledge medieval Islam as representing the
idealistic Islam. They also renounced the modern reality of Islam as
not symbolizing the pure form of this religion. The Padris were
obsessed by a pure form of Islam, the prophetic Islam as exemplified
in the life of the Prophet Muhammad and in his four exemplary
disciples. Peculiar to the Padris is furthermore their insistence on the
truth-claim, that what was true was what they thought to be true. Truth
became their commodity.
It goes without saying, therefore, that the Padris,were incapable of
distinguishing between Islam as ordained in the Qur'an and the Sunnah
and Islam as the product of man’s discursive interpretation. The
former is absolute while the latter may become obsolete over time. The
grave mistake of the Padris lay in their assumption that the obsolete
interpretation of Islam might represent, and perhaps replace, the
absolute aspect. The truth is that the interpretation of Islam is subject
to change and criticism, open to objection and re-interpretation, while
the absolute aspect of Islam will stay as it is. In the final analysis, the
Padris were by all standards absolutists who believed that criticism of
them was an attack against Islam itself.
The Radicalism of the Padris
The radicalism of the Padris may be found in two domains, first in
their discursive interpretation of Islam, and second in their day-to-day
attitude towards others.
Violence was the rule of the day for the Padris. This violence, to
borrow from Galtung, took three forms: structural, occasional and
cultural violence. Whereas the first two involved physical and direct
violence against opposing parties, the third concerned the process of
legitimization and justification of violence itself.
The data at my disposal reveal that the Padris committed cultural
violence by justifying what they did by means of religion, ideology,
language and knowledge. They condemned their opponents as infidels
by citing verses of the Qur'an and prophetic sayings. They
systematically designed structural violence by marginalizing their
opponents among individuals and groups of Minangkabau. This
structural violence was then followed by occasional violence in the
form of physical attacks, abduction and even assassination. All this was

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justified by religion as if religion was responsible for these abhorrent

acts.
One of the violent acts that the Padris committed was the
assassination of the royal family of Pagaruyung, Tanah Datar. This
royal family converted to Islam in the 16th century and was attacked by
the Padris in 1809. Puti Reno Raudha Thaib assumes that the tragic
assassination happened when the Padris and representatives of certain
traditional tribes were involved in an argument on matters of particular
religious importance. In that argument, Tuanku Lelo of South
Tapanuli, one of the Padri most ambitious leaders alleged that some
members of royal family such as Tuanku Rajo Naro, Tuanku of Talang
and another prince, were abandoning the tenets of Islam. They had
become infidels, and must therefore be killed.44 The Padris were then
provoked and ran amok, murdering all in their way, including the
leading members of the royal family, one of the king's assistants, and
some royal clerics.45
Several years later, in 1815, the Padris led by Tuanku Lintau
initiated another attack on the royal family. They murdered all its living
members.46 Some historians relate that the Kingdom of Pagaruyung
experienced attacks from the Padris on many occasions, as a result of
which it finally collapsed.
The Padris also intimidated their opponents and anyone who
stood in their way including their own family members. Adrianus
Khatib, a researcher, following Steijn Parve, believes that Tuanku Nan
Renceh was responsible for the suffering of the elderly woman who
happened to be his own aunt. When the poor woman died, he decreed
that the body should not be properly buried, but be thrown away in
the bushes. The lady was killed by the Padris simply because she ate
44 This includes a paper by A.A. Navis, Alam Terkembang Jadi Guru (Jakarta: PT Pustaka
Grafiti Press, 1984); MD Mansur et. al., Sejarah Minangkabau, (Jakarta: Bharata, 1970);
and Muhamad Radjab, Perang Paderi (Jakarta: Balai Pustaka, 1964).
45 See Puti Reno Raudha Thaib, “Sejarah Istana Pagaruyung,” in http://groups.yahoo.-
com/group/RantauNet/message/61114.
46 See Dobbin, “Economic Change in Minangkabau,” pp. 36-37; Cf. M.C. Ricklefs,
“Islamizing Indonesia: Religion and Politics in Singapore’s Giant Neighbour,” public

lecture Asian Civilisations Museum, Asia Research Institute, National University of
Singapore (23 September, 2004), p. 1.

sirih leaves, something forbidden according Padri law.47 Ironically,

however, this act–the murder by Tuanku Nan Renceh of his own
aunt–was condoned by other members of the movement and was even
applauded by the most fanatical.
The above passages on the violence committed by the Padris and
the civil wars they instigated may paint a picture of instability and
never-ending chaos in Minangkabau. What was to follow was even
worse. For it was this condition of instability that triggered the
eventual coming of the Dutch to the land of Minangkabau. It may
seem shameful but at the same time it is understandable, that some
traditional tribal leaders and the royal family of Pagaruyung, in their
attempts to defend themselves against the Padris, appealed to the
Dutch for help. It was Sultan Muningsah of Pagaruyung who first
invited the Dutch to come to Minangkabau. Agreement between the
two parties soon followed. On the 21st February 1821, the traditional
tribes of Minangkabau agreed to grant the Dutch the whole region of
Lu(h)ak Nan Tigo (Agam, Tanah Datar and Lima Puluh Kota) on the
condition that the Dutch protect them from the onslaught of the
Padris. In April of the same year, the Dutch attacked Simawang and
Sulit Air, and quickly controlled them after some little resistance from
the Padris.48 Meanwhile, without request from the appealing tribes and
royal family, the Dutch, on their own initiative expanded their
domination over Tanah Datar and other surrounding areas.
Soon after controlling Tanah Datar, the Dutch built a fortress in
Batusangkar near the Pagaruyung palace from which they launched
frantic attacks against the regions of Padang Lawas and Pandai Sikat in
Agam. Here the Dutch built another castle, which subsequently
became their stronghold in successive attacks on the region of Kota
Baru. In this region, the Dutch encountered strong resistance from the
Padris, even suffering defeat such as in the battle of Kapau, and they
were forced to withdraw. In 1831, the Dutch, under the leadership of
Colonel Elout, returned to Kapau and succeeded in capturing it. The
colonizing power soon expanded its dominion and quickly controlled
47 Adrianus Khatib, “Kaum Padri dan Pemikiran Keagamaan di Minangkabau,”
(Unpublished Ph.D Dissertation, Postgraduate Program, IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah,

Jakarta, 1991), p. 269.
48 Suryadi, “Tuanku Imam Bonjol: Dikenang Sekaligus Digugat,” in http://naskah
kuno.blogspot.com/2007/11/tuanku-imam-bonjol-dikenang-sekaligus.html.

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Alahan Panjang and Bonjol.49 Finally, the Dutch dominated

Minangkabau, the last and the most important stronghold of the
Padris.
During the many years of the Dutch war with the Padris many
peace deals, including cease-fire agreements, were signed by both
parties. However, as soon as a peace deal was signed, both parties
tended to return to war and attack each other. For instance, General de
Stuers, chief commander of the Dutch military force in Padang, and
Imam Bonjol signed a peace deal in 1824, but soon ruined the deal,
violated it and took up arms again. In most cases, it was the Padris that
initiated the attacks and committed anarchical acts against the Dutch.
The Dutch generally acted only in self-defense.50
In the meantime, the Padris had their own version of this whole
issue. They maintained that it was the Dutch who violated the peace
deals, initiated the attacks and embarked on incursions against the
Padris. The Naskah Tuanku Imam Bonjol relates that when the two
parties reached a peace deal, Colonel Elout, the successor of General
Stuers, promised in 1831 that he would not interfere with the social
and religious affairs of the local people.51 In reality, however, when the
Dutch occupied the region of Banjul, they, according to the Naskah,
entered a mosque and broke into people's residences bringing with
them dogs and other filthy materials. They also confiscated people’s
belongings, compelled them to do hard labor and plundered their rice
fields without compensation. The Naskah further mentions that the
Dutch torched the local communities, often without any acceptable
reason.52
Be that as it may, whether it was the Dutch or the Padris that
should be held accountable for these atrocities, countless testimonies
have it that the Padris, amid social and political unrest in Minangkabau
and while the people were suffering from the continuing war in the
region, who kept on committing harassment against the hopeless. They
also expanded their propagation to penetrate Mandailing, a region to
the north of Minangkabau in 1820, and “forced” the local people to
49 “Memorandum of Tuanku Imam,” pp. 21-23.

50 See Graves, Asal Usul Elite Minangkabau Modern, p. 68.
51 “Memorandum of Tuanku Imam,” p. 24.
52 Ibid., p. 27.

embrace Islam.53 Here in Mandailing, the Padris again harassed the

people and tortured them in the same way that they did in
Minangkabau when they, under the leadership of Tuanku Tambusai
and Tuanku Rao, terrorized the people with all sorts of threats and
intimidation.
In their attacks against their victims, the Padris often sought
assistance from the Bataks, who themselves originated mostly from
Mandailing.54 In this way the Padris divided the people in order to rule
them.
In Mandailing people were forced to defend themselves, and
eventually they launched an armed struggle against the Padris,
recruiting in the process people from all walks of life including pagans,
Muslims, non-Muslims, immigrants and indigenous people. The latter
were known as Lubus, and their leaders were Patuan Naga and Raja
Gadombang. These two leaders tried to stand firm in their self-defense
against the Padris, but without a great deal of success, and after
consecutive failures, they sought military assistance from the Dutch in
1832.55 The Dutch cooperated with the indigenous people and
together they launched an attack on the Padris and gained an easy
victory as a result.
Violence by the Padris in Mandailing has been the subject of many
studies. Harahap, following Willer, narrates that, in their efforts to
intimidate their victims, the Padris surrounded their villages and
threatened them with swords, burned down their houses and stole
their belongings. They also commandeered people’s domestic animals
and even murdered those whom they considered a danger to them.
Those who survived the murder attempts during the raids were
enslaved.56
That is one view. Some scholars hold an opposing view and
question whether the Padris were really that violent. These scholars
doubt the authenticity of evidence for the hideous acts of the Padris.
Lukas for example, believes that most of the information that stands
53 Abdur-Razzaq Lubis, “Mandailing Islam Across Borders,” Taiwan Journal of Southeast
Asian Studies, Vol. 2, No. 2 (2005), p. 60.

54 Ibid., p. 61.
55 Ibid., p. 63.
56 See Basyral Hamidy Harahap, Ggeret Tuanku Rao (Depok: Komunitas Bambu, 2007),
p. 63.

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against the Padris is Dutch-based, and must therefore be questioned

and investigated. He further warns that acts the Dutch committed
against the Padris in particular and the people of Minangkabau in
general resemble what Bush has done toward al-Qaeda and the
Muslims at large.57 What Lukas and people like him try to say is that, as
far as the historical information is concerned, the Dutch attempted to
distort history, putting blames on the Padris and destroying the image
of the Muslim in general.
What Lukas questions then is the authenticity of the data. And
Lukas is not alone. Hamka shares his skepticism, questioning the data
presented by MO Parlindungan in his Tuanko Rao. To Hamka, this
book lacks accuracy because it does not include in its pages solid and
clear data. However, upon closer inspection, Hamka himself does in
fact acknowledge that the Padris committed violence on many
occasions. He quotes Hikayat Shaikh Jalaluddin of Faqih Shagir and
remarks that:
“… what is evil about the Padris is that they murdered
clerics and scholars, raped married women, married women
without their consent, committed fornication against
prisoners of war, humiliated men of honor, and alleged that
their opponents were infidels…”58
Shagir, for his part, reports that when Tuanku Nan Renceh and his
troops attacked the nagari Tilatang, they demolished its buildings and
houses, pulled down public facilities, and robbed people's belongings
and their animals. Those who survived the assault had to run away and
take refuge in another region.59 It is narrated also in Naskah Tuanku
Imam Bonjol, that Tuanku Imam Bonjol also acknowledged that during
his leadership he and many of his colleagues and subordinates
committed all sorts of violence including human trafficking and
slavery.60
57 Helmut Lukas, “The Perception of Indonesia’s History and Culture,” p. 4.

58 See “Mengenang Sanggahan Hamka,” Tempo, 34/XXXVI (15-21 October 2007).
59 The text reads: “Maka sampailah habis nagari Tilatang dan banyaklah [orang] berpindah
dalam nagari; dan sukar menghinggakan ribu laksa rampasan, dan orang terbunuh dan tertawan
lalu kepada terjual, dan [wanita] dijadikannya gundi’nya [gundiknya].” See Suryadi,
”Kontroversi Kaum Padri.”
60 Harahap, Ggeret Tuanku Rao, p. 104.

The data that I acquired from Shagir and the Naskah further reveal
that the Padris used violence not only as a means of intimidation and
victimization but also as an effective strategy to propagate their ideas
and reform mission. There can be no doubt therefore that the Padris
may be called radical on that point.
One should be objective in looking at historical data. The Padris
were radical, just as the Dutch were colonialist. Both committed
atrocities equally against the innocent people of Minangkabau and
represent the same form of radicalism by using religion and economic
ambition respectively. Both victimized the local people and reduced
them to a state of mental disorder.
In view of this, the information provided by Parlindungan
concerning the background of the Padri movement and its leadership
cannot be overlooked. As he has discovered, Haji Piobang, one of the
Padri leaders, was a retired colonel who used to work for Janiseri
Kavaleri, a Turkish military unit. Similarly, Haji Sumanik, another Padri
leader was a retired major who also used to work for another Turkish
military unit. The two were not learned, and were purely military
men.61 Looking at their background, it seems highly likely that the style
of the Padri leadership was predominantly militaristic using torture and
violence to persuade people and subdue them.
The Padri Radicalism: Between Religiosity and the Politics of
Domination
The militaristic style of the Padri leadership, its thought and
agendas all suggest that this movement was an extension of the
Wahabi ideology in Saudi Arabia. Like the Wahha>bi>, the Padri
movement was first of all concerned with the purification of Islamic
teachings. But given the geographical and social milieu, the Padri
movement had some internal uniqueness not exhibited by the Wahha>bi>
group. In other words, while there were some striking similarities
between the two movements, there were also some noticeable
differences between them. They were the products of different
geographical, cultural and social circumstances.
Nonetheless, regarding their militancy and political mission, they
seem to have been the same. They also shared the quality of absorbing
the doctrines of their leaders and transforming those doctrines into
61 See Parlindungan, Pongkinangolngolan Sinambela Gelar Tuanku Rao, p. 126.

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practical agendas. The two movements were both conscious that in

order to succeed in their cause, there had to be a process of
indoctrination, which would normally start from the idea that a return
to the pure teaching of the Qur'an and the Sunnah was a must. This
would then be followed by the creation of a so-called “Islamic
identity”; an identity which would mostly be identifiable through dress,
attitude, and a certain way of thinking. In their efforts to establish their
dream community, the Wahha>bi> and Padri movements invented this
new identity to distinguish themselves from others.
To this it may be added that the attempt by the Padris in particular
to invent the new identity was in fact a perfect testimony to their
political, social and missionary failure. The Padris, it is noted by some
historians, were generally not welcomed by the societies in which they
operated. To express their frustration at not gaining recognition from
their community, they then invented a new community with a new
identity.62
The invention of this new community may also be a sign that the
Padris were not happy with the hereditary system of their nagari.
According to this system, people of no social status could not become
the staff, let alone the elite, of the nagari. By and large the Padris came
from the non-elite, so, having realized that they could not hold certain
governmental posts at the nagari by virtue of their social status, they
revolted and invented a community of their own.63
Whatever the case might be, all the above evidence indicates that
the Padris, in the pursuit of their cause, seemed to have employed
violence and intimidation. Another point to note is that, what the
Padris really wanted was power, and they did not hesitate to employ
violence as the swiftest means to acquire that power. They also seemed
to have realized that violence might serve as a vehicle to achieve
internal and collective solidarity among their members.
What is curious about the Padris is the fact that they attempted to
centralize their power at the hands of certain individuals only. These
individuals had to possess certain religious qualities such as good
leadership, and being learned and well-versed in religious knowledge.
The danger of this strategy was that when violence was perpetrated, it
was committed symbolically in the name of religion, because the
62 See Abdullah, “Adat and Islam,” p. 14.

63 See Graves, Asal Usul Elite Minangkabau Modern, p. 50.

leaders were men of religion, and was committed collectively because

the power was politically centralized.
Strangely enough, the Padris had a certain amount of success in
gaining support from the masses. The religious sentiment that the
movement was attached to helped it persuade people of “good
religiosity” to follow its cause. Like other radical movements, the Padri
successfully built a communal loyalty that would later serve as the very
ground for its ideological foundation. Moreover, the loyalty that the
Padris built was not based on customary traditions or social norms, but
on religion and faith.64 In other words, it was religion, not local
traditions, that counted.
On these grounds, whatever the Padris did in violating certain rules
or in intimidating people, they justified by the norms of their religion.
This, in turn, irrevocably prompted further acts of violence in the
name of religiosity.
Bearing all this in mind, there can be no doubt that the Padri
movement was fundamentalist or radical in nature. In these final
passages, I would like to touch briefly on the meaning of
fundamentalism and radicalism. I follow Olivier Roy in arguing that
there is slight difference between the two, in that fundamentalism
becomes radicalism when the fundamentalists’ dreams of realizing their
objective is transformed into a practical agenda.65 The fantasy of the
fundamentalists consists mostly of acquiring of power using religious
sentiment. I would also like to add that these two concepts –
radicalism and fundamentalism – do seem to be related. In my view,
radicalism develops out of the womb of fundamentalism. Political and
social conflict is the result of fundamentalism, but the act of being
anarchical in this conflict is called radicalism.
Moving to the discursive domain, radicalism and fundamentalism
tend to be the product of the same mentality. In general, both radicals
and fundamentalists are people of superficial understanding of their
religion, developing a correspondingly short-sighted view concerning
the religion itself, society and democracy.66 This superficial
64 Ibid., p. 49.
65 Olivier Roy, Genealogi Islam Radikal, Translation (Yogyakarta: Genta Press, 2005), pp.
13-14.
66 See Muhammad bin ‘Alawi al-Maliki, “al-Ghuluwwu wa A>>tha>ruhu>> fi al-Irh}a>b wa
Ifsa>>d al-Mujtama',”a compilation of papers of the National Seminar Nasional on al-

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understanding of religion is the result of a methodological shortcoming

according to which a particular religion is deemed truer than another,
or one society is thought to be better than another. This kind of
methodology is called ‘scriptural’ or ‘literalistic’, and often, to say the
least, ignores the historical and social context in interpreting religious
texts. Text is always true in what it says without any consideration of
the social, cultural and historical background of a society. Social and
historical contexts are assumed dead. The text is understood in
isolation of these contexts.
Having shed light on the methodological mode of the Padris, I
may repeat that, in this respect, the Padris share a lot with the
Wahha>bi>s. The only slight difference – discontinuity, borrowing
Foucault67- lies in the social and cultural backgrounds out of which
they were born. This difference in social and cultural backgrounds
does give rise to different traits in terms of propagation strategy or in
organizational structure. Hence, the Wahha>bi>s, for instance, in their
strategy to counter the attacks of the Ottoman Empire, recruited
members of various tribes around the Saudi Peninsula. But the Padris
never did the same. They, on the contrary, distanced themselves from
the tribes and regarded these tribes as their enemies that must be
banished. The Padri strategy, in this particular instance, led to war,
conflict and discord, while the Wahha>bi> strategy produced peace and
accord.
The Padris were also selective when drawing their religious tenets
from Wahha>bi> dogmas. While, in certain areas, the Padris adopted
Wahha>bi> doctrines wholeheartedly, in others, they did not. The Padris
sometimes also combined Wahha>bi> doctrines with Ash’arite teachings.
Thus, according to the Naskah Tuanku Imam Bonjol, as cited by Dobbin,
the Padris, in their accounts of the twenty attributes of God,68 adopted
the view of the Ash‘a>riyah and combined it with the doctrine of the
Wahha>bi>yah. What the Padris intended to do in these instances was to
persuade people that their views were sound and justifiable because
Ghuluwwu wa al-I‘tida>l: Ru’yah Manha>ji>yyah Sha>milah (Makkah al-Mukarramah, 5-9 Dhu

al-Qa‘dah 1424 H), pp. 36-37.
67 See Michel Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” in D. F. Bouchard (ed.),
Language, Counter-Memory Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1977), p. 154.
68 Dobbin “Tuanku Imam Bondjol,” p. 13.

they were based not only on Wahha>bi>yah but also on the authoritative
Ash‘a>riyah school of thought.
Ultimately it is clear that the Padris aimed at politicizing Islam and
its teachings by using the doctrines of Wahha>bi>yah and Ash‘a>riyah.
When these doctrines were formulated in political terms, a tendency
toward acquiring power and domination became even more apparent.
Religion was ideologicized, the purpose of this ideologicization being
none other than power, domination and authority.
The differences that the two movements have were social, political
and cultural, as well as economic. Some argue that economic factors
actually gave rise to the emergence of the Padri movement, other
factors being merely to the economic factor. When they planned
certain agendas, the Padris often had an economic purpose in mind.
Thus, when they invaded the region of Tanah Datar, they first
captured areas with rich natural resources and ignored the others.69
Similarly, when they expanded to the north, they took as their bounty
agricultural products such as rice, corns, sugarcane, and the like. Gusti
Asnan, a historian, testifies in weekly Tempo magazine that when the
Padris were forced to surrender to the Dutch in the south, they fled to
Pasaman and Tapanuli, two rich regions with diverse natural resources.
They moved there first of all because of the regions’ rich and fertile
land. It produced mainly coffee.
That the Padris were in need of money was understandable. They
needed to fund their propagation as well as their war against other
tribes, foes and above all the Dutch.70
To speak of the radicalism of the Padris one does need to consult
the view of Taufik Abdullah, an authoritative historian in modern
Indonesia. He, as Lucius cites, maintains that in their radicalism the
Padris were driven not only by religious ideals, but also by economic
and political obsessions.71
Bassam Tibi, in his thesis concerning religious fundamentalism,
argues that in their determination to grab cultural, economic, social and
political ends the fundamentalists tend to manipulate and distort
69 Dobbin, “Economic Change in Minangkabau,” p. 37.

70 “Kontroversi Kebrutalan Kaum Padri,” Tempo, 34/XXXVI (15-21 October 2007).
71Robert E. Lucius, “A House Divided: The Decline and Fall of Masyumi (1950-
1956),” (Unpubslihed MA Thesis, the Naval Postgraduate School California,
September 2003), p. 23.

Abd A'la
religious symbols.72 Al-Jabiri argues along the same lines. In his view,
radicalism cannot be looked at simply as social and historical
phenomenon, but also as a religious problem.73
Bearing in mind these accounts, it is safe then to assume that
religious fundamentalism is a form of politicization of religion. It
reduces religion to a mere political practice. This holds true for all
fundamentalist groups. With a slight difference in degree all
fundamentalist groups use religion as their vehicle and distort its
teachings for political interests.
That the Padris, in their manipulation of religion, ended up in
violence is clear. What is not clear is whether they themselves realized
that they had manipulated religion and committed violence along with
the process of manipulation. Interestingly, it is narrated in Naskah
Tuanku Imam Bonjol, (as cited by Harahap) that Tuanku Imam Bonjol
did realize that. He once issued an order to his followers to give back
the bounty they had grabbed in the regions of Bonjol and Lubuk
Sikaping to the original owners.74 In another part of the Naskah (as
cited by Dobbin) he was said to have told his son Su(l)tan Caniago, in
the minutes before his surrender to the Dutch, to honor and obey
religious and customary leaders, and learn the Islamic science
concerning the twenty attributes of God.75 The assumption behind this
narration implies that Tuanku Imam Bonjol seems to have repented
from his horrendous acts and did not want his followers and son to do
the same.
Nonetheless, what Tuanku Imam Bonjol did does not reflect the
policy and mentality of all Padri members. The fact remains that the
Padris did continue to commit violence especially under the leadership
of Tuanku Tambusai.
History reveals that the Padris never succeeded in disseminating
their radical views and agendas. By 1833, the people of Minangkabau
had already realized that the dull radicalism of the Padris with its
catastrophic impact must be brought to an end. A group of people
72 Bassam Tibi, The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder,
(Berkeley – Los Angeles – London: University of California Press, 1998), p. 23.

73 See Muhammad ‘Abid al-Jabiri, Qad}a>ya> al-Fikr al-‘Arabi>: al-Mas’alah al-Thaqa>fi>yyah,
(Beirut: Markaz Dira>>sah al-Wah}}dah al-‘Arabiyyah, 1994), pp. 134-135.

74 Harahap, Ggeret Tuanku Rao, p. 94.
75 Dobbin “Tuanku Imam Bondjol,” pp. 12-13.

therefore initiated a public meeting involving the Padris, the tribal

leaders and community members. They proposed that reconciliation
must be achieved, and that all elements of the people of Minangkabau
should rather join forces to combat the Dutch. This effort came to no
fruition, and the Padris walked out. In their stubbornness, they
declined to reconcile with the tribal leaders and other community
members, and chose instead to go their own way in pursuing their
obsessions.
The lesson behind this initiative is that, while the radical nature of
the Padri movement in Minangkabau was clear, a larger part of this
community remained moderate and polite. They respected tolerance
and pluralism. They were the patrons of peace and harmony. They
seem to have realized that society could not be built upon conflict and
discord. Society must be built upon understanding, respect and accord.
Accord, and not discord, was the key. Peace was a precious good.
Where violence predominated, the whole society would suffer. When
war struck, peace would be a piece of history.
Conclusion
History will never repeat itself. Tragedy has its own space and
time. The tragedy and atrocity of the Padris were not the same as the
tragedy and atrocity of the Wahha>bi>s. Each movement had its own
history and fate. What can be said of the Padris cannot be said of the
Wahha>bi>s and vice versa. Nonetheless, these two movements share
similarities. Both, for example, were radical in their determination to
establish what they thought of as pure Islamic values. In addition, both
were manipulative of religious symbols in pursuit of their political
agendas.
The complexity that reveals itself in investigating such radical
groups as the Padri and Wahha>bi> movements stands as the paramount
testimony that groups such as these deserve to be studied. Within such
study lies a concern to expose the notion of continuity –and also
discontinuity– between religion and politics, and the relation between
religion and state.
However, it is naïve, to say, for example, that the Padri movement
represented Islamic values and Muslim idealism as a whole. It is even
naïve to say that the Padri movement was always about radicalism for
there are accounts which say otherwise. The Padri movement was one
thing and Islam is quite another. Moreover, each radical movement has
its own space and time. What a radical movement did in a particular

Abd A'la
space and time cannot be said as representing other movements or

persons of entirely different space and time.
Nonetheless, one cannot be silent in the face of radicalism. Over
time, the lore of radicalism has brought catastrophic atrocities against
humanity. One needs to be cognizant therefore of the peril of
radicalism, or else other people may be its next victims. Radicalism
equals to death. Once violence reigns, death follows. By virtue of
radicalism innocent people can be physically, mentally and
physiologically victimized. They may lose their future, their loved ones,
belongings, wealth and even life.
On the other hand, the history of humanity has shown that
violence cannot be dealt with by violence. Vis-à-vis violence one must
abstain from violence. One must maintain public order and observe
moral virtues. Those who claim to be religious must try to understand
the message of their religion in moral and spiritual terms so that the
moral message embodied in all religions may be revealed. All religions
are morally and spiritually appealing. So, it is appalling to see that one
cannot learn from the moral and spiritual message of religion.
To free religion from the cage of politics is, therefore, necessary.
Religion must be treated properly and proportionally as a source of
morality. Failing to do this would have the unfortunate consequence of
banishing religion from its public role. As a source of morality, religion
is capable of bringing peace and harmony, enabling people of whatever
race, culture, language, ethnicity and even religion to sit together and
achieve common goals. Religion is the inspiration for justice-seekers
with its noticeable concept of equality, respect and tolerance. []
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The Genealogy of Muslim Radicalism in Indonesia A Study of The Roots and Characteristics of The Padri Movement

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The Genealogy of Muslim Radicalism in Indonesia

THE GENEALOGY OF MUSLIM RADICALISM IN INDONESIA

JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 267

characterized the advent of Islam and its dissemination in the

1 See Azyumardi Azra, “Islamic Radical Movement in Indonesia,” (Paper presented at

268 JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM

background and mode of religiosity, and then highlighting its acts of

3 See Melissa Rimac, “Matrinial Minangkabau,” in http://www.practitionerdirectory.-

Semesta, 2005), p. 302.

JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 269

6 Christine Dobbin, “Tuanku Imam Bondjol (1772-1864),” Indonesia Vol. 13 (April

270 JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM

attention of the converted, but also of people of different cultures,

JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 271

conversion of the locals to Islam, efforts had been made to reconcile

14 Fathurrahman, “Tarekat Shattariyah,” p. 68.

272 JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM

was then introduced according to which the Kingdom was to be ruled

17 Ibid., pp. 4-5.

JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 273

The members of this institution, who usually had shown strong

19 Abdullah, “Adat and Islam,” p. 12.

274 JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM

were supportive of the royal family. However, by the end of that

22 See Christine Dobbin, “Economic Change in Minangkabau as a Factor in the Rise of

Historian and Social Scientists,” (Paper presented at the Conference “Indonesia’s

JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 275

people soon became wealthy. Since business activities were reasonably

24 Dobbin, “Economic Change in Minangkabau,” p. 28.

276 JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM

to tolerate those ideas. As a result, Haji Miskin was forced to

27 Dobbin, “Economic Change in Minangkabau,” pp. 30-31.

JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 277

31 Fathurrahman, “Tarekat Shattariyah,” p. 167.

278 JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM

32 Suryadi, ”Kontroversi Kaum Padri.”

JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 279

the Qur'an and Muhammad's prophecy is to abolish slavery, and to

36 Graves, Asal Usul Elite Minangkabau Modern, pp. 29-31.

280 JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM

JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 281

of hermeneutics, pluralism, relativism (cultural and not religious

Modernisme (Jakarta: Penerbit Paramadina, 1996), pp. 109-110.

282 JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM

very inception, the proponents of this movement propagate the idea of

JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 283

justified by religion as if religion was responsible for these abhorrent

“Islamizing Indonesia: Religion and Politics in Singapore’s Giant Neighbour,” public

284 JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM

sirih leaves, something forbidden according Padri law.47 Ironically,

47 Adrianus Khatib, “Kaum Padri dan Pemikiran Keagamaan di Minangkabau,”

(Unpublished Ph.D Dissertation, Postgraduate Program, IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah,

JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 285

Alahan Panjang and Bonjol.49 Finally, the Dutch dominated

49 “Memorandum of Tuanku Imam,” pp. 21-23.

286 JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM

embrace Islam.53 Here in Mandailing, the Padris again harassed the

53 Abdur-Razzaq Lubis, “Mandailing Islam Across Borders,” Taiwan Journal of Southeast

Asian Studies, Vol. 2, No. 2 (2005), p. 60.

JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 287

against the Padris is Dutch-based, and must therefore be questioned

57 Helmut Lukas, “The Perception of Indonesia’s History and Culture,” p. 4.

288 JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM