Hybrid warfare

THE 2018 IDEAS Expo in Karachi featured a high-level seminar on hybrid warfare. This was a
timely recognition that threats to national security can and do assume complex forms.

For over 60 years, nuclear weapons have deterred a major conflict between nuclear-armed
states, and, because of the global revulsion against the use of nuclear weapons, the nuclear
powers have been also unable to realise offensive objectives through nuclear coercion, even
against non-nuclear weapon states. Thus, most conflicts are in the form of conventional military
interventions against smaller or weaker states, sub-conventional (guerrilla or irregular) conflicts
or ‘hybrid warfare’.

Western analysts have termed the comprehensive approach employed by Russia in Ukraine
(encompassing narrative control, cyberattacks, use of anonymous militias and irregular forces,
clandestine supplies and diplomatic support) as “hybrid warfare”. The Russians refer to it as the
‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ (after the Russian military chief). This form of warfare is also called:
asymmetrical, non-conventional, gray zone conflict, ‘new generation warfare’, ‘whole of
government’ approach and so on. It is emerging as the preferred modality in today’s contests
between the great powers.

Often, hybrid war may not be a war at all. The objective may not be to secure an adversary’s
immediate defeat, but to erode its morale; isolate it; ‘soften’ it up before a conflict; deflect it
from pursuing unacceptable military or political objectives; disrupt its communications,
command and control and/or important infrastructure; impose economic pain to secure
adherence to political demands; delegitimise an adversary’s government; compromise its
leaders.

The objective may not be to secure an adversary’s immediate defeat, but to erode its morale.

The toolbox of instruments that can be used to wage such ‘hybrid’ warfare is rapidly expanding
and becoming more sophisticated: eg autonomous weapons, advanced cyber programmes,
social media, data mining, algorithms and artificial intelligence (AI), etc. By 2020, the ‘internet of
things’ will reportedly connect 30 billion devices. Power will rest with the people who control
these devices.

Technology is progressively blurring the distinction between hybrid and conventional warfare
and increasing the incentives, opportunities and compulsions for the preemptive or ‘first-use’ of
offensive action by adversaries eg to knock out an enemy’s command and control through a
cyber strike. Given the complexities of defence and offence in such complex conflict, it will
become increasingly difficult to prevent the escalation of hybrid wars to the conventional and
even the nuclear level.

Pakistan was the target of hybrid or indirect ‘war’ in 1971. New Delhi’s hybrid strategy
(promotion of Mujib’s six-point plan, the genocide and refugees narrative, training the Mukti
Bahini, the Indo-Soviet ‘Friendship Treaty’) all laid the ground for the coup de grâce of Indian
military intervention in East Pakistan.

Since then, Pakistan has been the target of multiple ‘hybrid’ campaigns. Exaggerated
proliferation concerns and coercive diplomacy were utilised to hold back Pakistan’s nuclear and
missile programmes. The legitimacy of the Kashmiri freedom struggle was eroded by its
projection as terrorism including through false-flag operations, infiltration of militant Kashmiri
groups and concerted propaganda. The onus for America’s colossal military and political failure
in Afghanistan was ascribed to alleged Afghan Taliban ‘safe havens’ in Pakistan. The Pakistan
Army and the ISI remain a special focus of propaganda and fake news.

Today, the hybrid war against Pakistan is focused on Balochistan, the former Fata region, Gilgit-
Baltistan and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.

Pakistan has developed credible capabilities to deter nuclear and conventional aggression.
However, it remains very vulnerable to hybrid warfare. Pakistan’s adversaries enjoy considerable
prowess in IT, cyber, media projection and narrative construction, including ‘fake news’,
subversion and sabotage, and sponsorship of terrorism, including ‘false-flag’ operations.

The main modality of this ‘indirect war’ against Pakistan is the media, including social media.
Very few Indian media personalities enjoy the ‘freedom’ to be critical of their country or their
current government. Meanwhile, Pakistan print and electronic media speaks with many voices.
There is little space for pro-Pakistani narratives in the Western media. An army of Indian trolls
has been recruited to malign Pakistan on the internet.

There are numerous other ‘agents of influence’ who are used to develop and project an anti-
Pakistan narrative. Many foreign funded and directed non-governmental organisations have
been ubiquitous in developing negative critiques about Pakistan within Pakistan. Some among
our local elite are co-opted by these organisations through jobs, travel and other perks. No
wonder there has been such a hue and cry about the long overdue diligence conducted recently
by the government and the Foreign Office on these organisations.

The hybrid campaign incorporates some ethnic and religious groups. Foreign sponsorship of the
Balochistan Liberation Army and the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan is well established. Some others
need to be subjected to close scrutiny.

Any foreign funding of any Pakistani organisation ought to be declared and officially approved.
Receipt of undeclared foreign payments should be a crime. This is an international norm. (Surely,
the Financial Action Task Force will approve.)

Pakistan’s agencies must be equipped with the most advanced surveillance and data collection
techniques to detect future Jadhevs or Osamas and neutralise any ‘black ops’, ‘false-flag’ or
infiltration operations planned by enemy agencies.

Pakistan must possess the cyber capability to defend its crucial command-and-control systems
and its industrial and transport infrastructure against enemy attack. But to deter such attack,
Pakistan must also have the capability for offensive cyber action.

The technologies for waging a “comprehensive” conflict and “new generation warfare” are being
actively developed by every significant State. Pakistan cannot afford to be left behind. To acquire
credible capacity to defend against and repel hybrid wars, Pakistan will need to make dedicated
efforts, comparable to those deployed to develop its nuclear and missile programmes.

However, there are certain elements of such warfare (cyberattacks, autonomous weapons, false-
flag operations) which pose the threat of systemic and global disruption, destabilisation and
military escalation. Pakistan and other responsible nations should take an initiative in relevant
international forums to secure a global ban or restrictions on such dangerous elements of hybrid
warfare.

Hybrid Warfare and Pakistan

Political pundits around the globe see hybrid warfare as a distinct 21st century phenomenon in
terms of the anticipated frequency of the conflict in the century than previously. The warfare is
not new. Frank G. Hoffman traces the origin of hybrid conflict back to 431 BCE when Sparta went
to war with Athens in the famous Peloponnesian War, which historian Thucydides wrote
firsthand in his account titled The History of the Peloponnesian War. The warfare remained in
vogue during 20th century. Hybrid war is the latest buzzword in the corridors of power in
Pakistan.

Hybrid warfare is a blend of conventional, unconventional and irregular warfare. It also

incorporates terrorist acts, indiscriminate violence, criminal disorder and cyber warfare, which is
an “attempt to damage another nation’s computers or information networks through, for
example, computer viruses or denial-of-service attacks,” as defined by RAND Corporation.
Multinational Capability Development Campaign (MCDC)’s project document titled
Understanding Hybrid Warfare defines hybrid warfare as “the synchronized use of multiple
instruments of power tailored to specific vulnerabilities across the full spectrum of societal
functions to achieve synergistic effects”. Add the battle of ideas, critical of power brokers, fought
in the mainstream electronic and print media and social media, hybrid warfare becomes
synonymous with the so-called ‘fifth generation warfare’ in our context.

Hybrid war is conducted by both state and non-state actors. In the warfare, state actors evade
detection. They employ proxies. This helps them to deny plausibly their complicity in an
eventuality. The utility of the hybrid conflict stems from the fact that the warfare does not lead
to conventional war from an adversary state. The war is aimed to exploit the vulnerabilities of an
adversary. These vulnerabilities cut across a wide range of socio-economic, political,
informational and military spectrums. One opinion is that Pakistan is in the throes of a hybrid
conflict.

The understanding is that the country is facing three types of threat. First is the conventional
threat. India, the arch rival, falls in this category. Second threat stems from terrorists, Taliban and
others of their ilk. Third type of threat is the hybrid warfare. The understanding goes that
because Pakistan is a nuclear power, India would not make any mistake of attacking the former.
Similarly, irregular warfare, launched by the non-state actors, has been neutralised. The
understanding is that the threat of hybrid war is active.

Pakistan, at times, remains vulnerable on religious, sectarian, ethno nationalistic and political
fronts. The understanding in the upper echelons of power seems to be that Pakistan’s regional
adversaries are the architects of whatsoever untoward happens on these fronts. Attack on
Chinese consulate in Karachi last November, the assassination of Ali Raza Abidi in December and
armed opposition to the execution of CPEC in parts of Balochistan and terrorist attack on FC
training centre Loralai in January 2019 are all presented as manifestations of hybrid warfare
inside the country.

Hybrid war is conducted by both state and non-state actors. In the warfare, state actors evade
detection. They employ proxies. This helps them to deny plausibly their complicity in an
eventuality. The utility of the hybrid conflict stems from the fact that the warfare does not lead
to conventional war.

One strongly held belief by a coterie of people in Pakistan is that the ‘fifth generation warfare’
targets human mind. Fake news is fed into minds of people in order to incite them against their
own country, the argument runs. The problem with this understanding is that it is nearly
impossible to distinguish between what is a genuine critique in a democracy and what falls
within the ambit of sowing hatred and spewing venom against the state. What is more
problematic is how one defines the state. Is criticism against institutions with political roles
equivalent to criticism against the state?

Critical commentators and politically aware citizens take exception to the so-called fifth
generation war mantra as an excuse to silence genuine critique on Pakistan security policies and
the country’s slide into the dark alley of authoritarianism, masquerading behind the democratic
façade. It is the social media that is out of bounds of the state’s jurisdiction in the ‘fifth
generation warfare’.

State finds itself consistently outmaneuvered in the media space by critical activists working with
a cellphone and an Internet connection. It is in the battle of narratives that state is at the
receiving end. The state has managed to stifle critical voices and commentary in electronic
media and, to a certain extent, in print media too. One medium that is still challenging the
‘security state’ narrative is social media which has been giving vent to people’s pent up
emotions. Pakistani social media activists, living in Pakistan and especially abroad, are accused of
being on the payroll of hostile countries. It is no coincidence that when these activists are
arrested their social media accounts are sniffed around.

Is hybrid war real or is it merely a bogey to distract attention from genuine causes and discredit
them by branding them as voices of the enemy? Either way, we need an inside out approach to
deal with our multiple challenges. A typical security state approach has failed us miserably!