CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

RIGHT TO HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT

ARTICLE II

Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them.

Section 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the
rhythm and harmony of nature.

REGALIAN DOCTRINE
ARTICLE XII
Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the
exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization
of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such
activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or
corporations or associations at least 60 per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a
period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions
as may provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of waterpower, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.
The State shall protect the nations marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and
reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.
The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish
farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fish workers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial assistance
for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the
general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the
country. In such agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local scientific and technical resources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this provision, within thirty days
from its execution.

NATIONAL PARKS

ARTICLE XII

Section 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands and national parks.
Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further classified by law according to the uses to which they may be devoted.
Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold
such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not
more than twenty-five years, and not to exceed one thousand hectares in area. Citizens of the Philippines may lease not more
than five hundred hectares, or acquire not more than twelve hectares thereof, by purchase, homestead, or grant.
Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology, and development, and subject to the requirements of agrarian
reform, the Congress shall determine, by law, the size of lands of the public domain which may be acquired, developed, held, or
leased and the conditions therefor.

Section 4. The Congress shall, as soon as possible, determine, by law, the specific limits of forest lands and national parks,
marking clearly their boundaries on the ground. Thereafter, such forest lands and national parks shall be conserved and may
not be increased nor diminished, except by law. The Congress shall provide for such period as it may determine, measures to
prohibit logging in endangered forests and watershed areas.

PREFENTIAL USE OF RESOURCES

ARTICLE XIII
Section 7. The State shall protect the rights of subsistence fishermen, especially of local communities, to the preferential use of
the communal marine and fishing resources, both inland and offshore. It shall provide support to such fishermen through
appropriate technology and research, adequate financial, production, and marketing assistance, and other services. The State
shall also protect, develop, and conserve such resources. The protection shall extend to offshore fishing grounds of subsistence
fishermen against foreign intrusion. Fishworkers shall receive a just share from their labor in the utilization of marine and
fishing resources.

ARTICLE XII Sec 2, Par 4.The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either
technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other
mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic
growth and general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local
scientific and technical resources.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT SHARE

ARTICLE X,Section 7. Local governments shall be entitled to an equitable share in the proceeds of the utilization and
development of the national wealth within their respective areas, in the manner provided by law, including sharing the same
with the inhabitants by way of direct benefits.

ACESS TO INFORMATION
ARTICLE III, Section 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government
research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law.

PEOPLE’S PARTICIPATION
ARTICLE XIII, Section 16. The right of the people and their organizations to effective and reasonable participation at all levels
of social, political, and economic decision-making shall not be abridged. The State shall, by law, facilitate the establishment of
adequate consultation mechanisms.

INDIGENOUS PEOPLE’S RIGHTS

ARTICLE XII Section 5. The State, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national development policies and
programs, shall protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands to ensure their economic, social,
and cultural well-being.
The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws governing property rights or relations in determining the
ownership and extent of ancestral domain.

G.R. No. 158290 October 23, 2006

HILARION M. HENARES, JR., VICTOR C. AGUSTIN, ALFREDO L. HENARES, DANIEL L. HENARES, ENRIQUE BELO HENARES,
and CRISTINA BELO HENARES, petitioners,
vs.
LAND TRANSPORTATION FRANCHISING AND REGULATORY BOARD and DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND
COMMUNICATIONS, respondents.

RESOLUTION

QUISUMBING, J.:
Petitioners challenge this Court to issue a writ of mandamus commanding respondents Land Transportation Franchising and
Regulatory Board (LTFRB) and the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) to require public utility
vehicles (PUVs) to use compressed natural gas (CNG) as alternative fuel.
Citing statistics from the Metro Manila Transportation and Traffic Situation Study of 1996,1 the Environmental Management
Bureau (EMB) of the National Capital Region,2 a study of the Asian Development Bank,3 the Manila Observatory4 and the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources 5 (DENR) on the high growth and low turnover in vehicle ownership in the
Philippines, including diesel-powered vehicles, two-stroke engine powered motorcycles and their concomitant emission of air
pollutants, petitioners attempt to present a compelling case for judicial action against the bane of air pollution and related
environmental hazards.
Petitioners allege that the particulate matters (PM) – complex mixtures of dust, dirt, smoke, and liquid droplets, varying in
sizes and compositions emitted into the air from various engine combustions – have caused detrimental effects on health,
productivity, infrastructure and the overall quality of life. Petitioners particularly cite the effects of certain fuel emissions
from engine combustion when these react to other pollutants. For instance, petitioners aver, with hydrocarbons, oxide of
nitrogen (NOx) creates smog; with sulfur dioxide, it creates acid rain; and with ammonia, moisture and other compounds, it
reacts to form nitric acid and harmful nitrates. Fuel emissions also cause retardation and leaf bleaching in plants. According to
petitioner, another emission, carbon monoxide (CO), when not completely burned but emitted into the atmosphere and then
inhaled can disrupt the necessary oxygen in blood. With prolonged exposure, CO affects the nervous system and can be lethal
to people with weak hearts.6
Petitioners add that although much of the new power generated in the country will use natural gas while a number of oil and
coal-fired fuel stations are being phased-out, still with the projected doubling of power generation over the next 10 years, and
with the continuing high demand for motor vehicles, the energy and transport sectors are likely to remain the major sources of
harmful emissions. Petitioners refer us to the study of the Philippine Environment Monitor 20027, stating that in four of the
country's major cities, Metro Manila, Davao, Cebu and Baguio, the exposure to PM10, a finer PM which can penetrate deep into
the lungs causing serious health problems, is estimated at over US$430 million. 8 The study also reports that the emissions of
PMs have caused the following:
· Over 2,000 people die prematurely. This loss is valued at about US$140 million.
· Over 9,000 people suffer from chronic bronchitis, which is valued at about US$120 million.
· Nearly 51 million cases of respiratory symptom days in Metro Manila (averaging twice a year in Davao and Cebu, and five to
six times in Metro Manila and Baguio), costs about US$170 million. This is a 70 percent increase, over a decade, when
compared with the findings of a similar study done in 1992 for Metro Manila, which reported 33 million cases.9
Petitioners likewise cite the University of the Philippines' studies in 1990-91 and 1994 showing that vehicular emissions in
Metro Manila have resulted to the prevalence of chronic obstructive pulmonary diseases (COPD); that pulmonary tuberculosis
is highest among jeepney drivers; and there is a 4.8 to 27.5 percent prevalence of respiratory symptoms among school
children and 15.8 to 40.6 percent among child vendors. The studies also revealed that the children in Metro Manila showed
more compromised pulmonary function than their rural counterparts. Petitioners infer that these are mostly due to the
emissions of PUVs.
To counter the aforementioned detrimental effects of emissions from PUVs, petitioners propose the use of CNG. According to
petitioners, CNG is a natural gas comprised mostly of methane which although containing small amounts of propane and
butane,10 is colorless and odorless and considered the cleanest fossil fuel because it produces much less pollutants than coal
and petroleum; produces up to 90 percent less CO compared to gasoline and diesel fuel; reduces NO x emissions by 50 percent
and cuts hydrocarbon emissions by half; emits 60 percent less PMs; and releases virtually no sulfur dioxide. Although,
according to petitioners, the only drawback of CNG is that it produces more methane, one of the gases blamed for global
warming.11
Asserting their right to clean air, petitioners contend that the bases for their petition for a writ of mandamus to order the
LTFRB to require PUVs to use CNG as an alternative fuel, lie in Section 16,12 Article II of the 1987 Constitution, our ruling in
Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.,13 and Section 414 of Republic Act No. 8749 otherwise known as the "Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999."
Meantime, following a subsequent motion, the Court granted petitioners' motion to implead the Department of Transportation
and Communications (DOTC) as additional respondent.
In his Comment for respondents LTFRB and DOTC, the Solicitor General, cites Section 3, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court
and explains that the writ of mandamus is not the correct remedy since the writ may be issued only to command a tribunal,
corporation, board or person to do an act that is required to be done, when he or it unlawfully neglects the performance of an
act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station, or unlawfully excludes another from
the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, there being no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.15 Further citing existing jurisprudence, the Solicitor General explains that in contrast to
a discretionary act, a ministerial act, which a mandamus is, is one in which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of
facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to a mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own
judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of an act done.
The Solicitor General also notes that nothing in Rep. Act No. 8749 that petitioners invoke, prohibits the use of gasoline and
diesel by owners of motor vehicles. Sadly too, according to the Solicitor General, Rep. Act No. 8749 does not even mention the
existence of CNG as alternative fuel and avers that unless this law is amended to provide CNG as alternative fuel for PUVs, the
respondents cannot propose that PUVs use CNG as alternative fuel.
The Solicitor General also adds that it is the DENR that is tasked to implement Rep. Act No. 8749 and not the LTFRB nor the
DOTC. Moreover, he says, it is the Department of Energy (DOE), under Section 26 16 of Rep. Act No. 8749, that is required to set
the specifications for all types of fuel and fuel-related products to improve fuel compositions for improved efficiency and
reduced emissions. He adds that under Section 2117 of the cited Republic Act, the DOTC is limited to implementing the
emission standards for motor vehicles, and the herein respondents cannot alter, change or modify the emission standards. The
Solicitor General opines that the Court should declare the instant petition for mandamus without merit.
Petitioners, in their Reply, insist that the respondents possess the administrative and regulatory powers to implement
measures in accordance with the policies and principles mandated by Rep. Act No. 8749, specifically Section 218 and Section
21.19 Petitioners state that under these laws and with all the available information provided by the DOE on the benefits of CNG,
respondents cannot ignore the existence of CNG, and their failure to recognize CNG and compel its use by PUVs as alternative
fuel while air pollution brought about by the emissions of gasoline and diesel endanger the environment and the people, is
tantamount to neglect in the performance of a duty which the law enjoins.
Lastly, petitioners aver that other than the writ applied for, they have no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. Petitioners insist that the writ in fact should be issued pursuant to the very same Section 3, Rule 65 of
the Revised Rules of Court that the Solicitor General invokes.
In their Memorandum, petitioners phrase the issues before us as follows:
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS HAVE THE PERSONALITY TO BRING THE PRESENT ACTION
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE PRESENT ACTION IS SUPPORTED BY LAW
III. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT IS THE AGENCY RESPONSIBLE TO IMPLEMENT THE SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVE
OF REQUIRING PUBLIC UTILITY VEHICLES TO USE COMPRESSED NATURAL GAS (CNG)
IV. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT CAN BE COMPELLED TO REQUIRE PUBLIC UTILITY VEHICLES TO USE
COMPRESSED NATURAL GAS THROUGH A WRIT OF MANDAMUS20
Briefly put, the issues are two-fold. First, Do petitioners have legal personality to bring this petition before us? Second, Should
mandamus issue against respondents to compel PUVs to use CNG as alternative fuel?
According to petitioners, Section 16,21 Article II of the 1987 Constitution is the policy statement that bestows on the people the
right to breathe clean air in a healthy environment. This policy is enunciated in Oposa.22 The implementation of this policy is
articulated in Rep. Act No. 8749. These, according to petitioners, are the bases for their standing to file the instant petition.
They aver that when there is an omission by the government to safeguard a right, in this case their right to clean air, then, the
citizens can resort to and exhaust all remedies to challenge this omission by the government. This, they say, is embodied in
Section 423 of Rep. Act No. 8749.
Petitioners insist that since it is the LTFRB and the DOTC that are the government agencies clothed with power to regulate and
control motor vehicles, particularly PUVs, and with the same agencies' awareness and knowledge that the PUVs emit
dangerous levels of air pollutants, then, the responsibility to see that these are curbed falls under respondents' functions and a
writ of mandamus should issue against them.
The Solicitor General, for his part, reiterates his position that the respondent government agencies, the DOTC and the LTFRB,
are not in a position to compel the PUVs to use CNG as alternative fuel. The Solicitor General explains that the function of the
DOTC is limited to implementing the emission standards set forth in Rep. Act No. 8749 and the said law only goes as far as
setting the maximum limit for the emission of vehicles, but it does not recognize CNG as alternative engine fuel. The Solicitor
General avers that the petition should be addressed to Congress for it to come up with a policy that would compel the use of
CNG as alternative fuel.
Patently, this Court is being asked to resolve issues that are not only procedural. Petitioners challenge this Court to decide if
what petitioners propose could be done through a less circuitous, speedy and unchartered course in an issue that Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr. in his ponencia in the Oposa case,24 describes as "inter-generational responsibility" and "inter-
generational justice."
Now, as to petitioners' standing. There is no dispute that petitioners have standing to bring their case before this Court. Even
respondents do not question their standing. This petition focuses on one fundamental legal right of petitioners, their right to
clean air. Moreover, as held previously, a party's standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which may, in the
exercise of the Court's discretion, be set aside in view of the importance of the issue raised. We brush aside this issue of
technicality under the principle of the transcendental importance to the public, especially so if these cases demand that they
be settled promptly.
Undeniably, the right to clean air not only is an issue of paramount importance to petitioners for it concerns the air they
breathe, but it is also impressed with public interest. The consequences of the counter-productive and retrogressive effects of
a neglected environment due to emissions of motor vehicles immeasurably affect the well-being of petitioners. On these
considerations, the legal standing of the petitioners deserves recognition.
Our next concern is whether the writ of mandamus is the proper remedy, and if the writ could issue against respondents.
Under Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, mandamus lies under any of the following cases: (1) against any tribunal which
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty; (2) in case any corporation, board
or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or
station; and (3) in case any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of
a right or office to which such other is legally entitled; and there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.
In University of San Agustin, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,25 we said,
…It is settled that mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, this being its main
objective. It does not lie to require anyone to fulfill contractual obligations or to compel a course of conduct, nor to control or
review the exercise of discretion. On the part of the petitioner, it is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that he
should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act
required. It never issues in doubtful cases. While it may not be necessary that the duty be absolutely expressed, it must
however, be clear. The writ will not issue to compel an official to do anything which is not his duty to do or which is his duty
not to do, or give to the applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law. The writ neither confers powers nor imposes
duties. It is simply a command to exercise a power already possessed and to perform a duty already imposed. (Emphasis
supplied.)
In this petition the legal right which is sought to be recognized and enforced hinges on a constitutional and a statutory policy
already articulated in operational terms, e.g. in Rep. Act No. 8749, the Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999. Paragraph (a), Section
21 of the Act specifically provides that when PUVs are concerned, the responsibility of implementing the policy falls on
respondent DOTC. It provides as follows:
SEC 21. Pollution from Motor Vehicles. - a) The DOTC shall implement the emission standards for motor vehicles set pursuant
to and as provided in this Act. To further improve the emission standards, the Department [DENR] shall review, revise and
publish the standards every two (2) years, or as the need arises. It shall consider the maximum limits for all major pollutants
to ensure substantial improvement in air quality for the health, safety and welfare of the general public.
Paragraph (b) states:
b) The Department [DENR] in collaboration with the DOTC, DTI and LGUs, shall develop an action plan for the control and
management of air pollution from motor vehicles consistent with the Integrated Air Quality Framework . . . . (Emphasis
supplied.)
There is no dispute that under the Clean Air Act it is the DENR that is tasked to set the emission standards for fuel use and the
task of developing an action plan. As far as motor vehicles are concerned, it devolves upon the DOTC and the line agency
whose mandate is to oversee that motor vehicles prepare an action plan and implement the emission standards for motor
vehicles, namely the LTFRB.
In Oposa26 we said, the right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing
the environment. We also said, it is clearly the duty of the responsible government agencies to advance the said right.
Petitioners invoke the provisions of the Constitution and the Clean Air Act in their prayer for issuance of a writ of mandamus
commanding the respondents to require PUVs to use CNG as an alternative fuel. Although both are general mandates that do
not specifically enjoin the use of any kind of fuel, particularly the use of CNG, there is an executive order implementing a
program on the use of CNG by public vehicles. Executive Order No. 290, entitled Implementing the Natural Gas Vehicle Program
for Public Transport (NGVPPT), took effect on February 24, 2004. The program recognized, among others, natural gas as a clean
burning alternative fuel for vehicle which has the potential to produce substantially lower pollutants; and the Malampaya Gas-
to-Power Project as representing the beginning of the natural gas industry of the Philippines. Paragraph 1.2, Section 1 of E.O.
No. 290 cites as one of its objectives, the use of CNG as a clean alternative fuel for transport. Furthermore, one of the
components of the program is the development of CNG refueling stations and all related facilities in strategic locations in the
country to serve the needs of CNG-powered PUVs. Section 3 of E.O. No. 290, consistent with E.O. No. 66, series of 2002,
designated the DOE as the lead agency (a) in developing the natural gas industry of the country with the DENR, through the
EMB and (b) in formulating emission standards for CNG. Most significantly, par. 4.5, Section 4 tasks the DOTC, working with
the DOE, to develop an implementation plan for "a gradual shift to CNG fuel utilization in PUVs and promote NGVs [natural gas
vehicles] in Metro Manila and Luzon through the issuance of directives/orders providing preferential franchises in present
day major routes and exclusive franchises to NGVs in newly opened routes…" A thorough reading of the executive order
assures us that implementation for a cleaner environment is being addressed. To a certain extent, the instant petition had been
mooted by the issuance of E.O. No. 290.
Regrettably, however, the plain, speedy and adequate remedy herein sought by petitioners, i.e., a writ of mandamus
commanding the respondents to require PUVs to use CNG, is unavailing. Mandamus is available only to compel the doing of an
act specifically enjoined by law as a duty. Here, there is no law that mandates the respondents LTFRB and the DOTC to order
owners of motor vehicles to use CNG. At most the LTFRB has been tasked by E.O. No. 290 in par. 4.5 (ii), Section 4 "to grant
preferential and exclusive Certificates of Public Convenience (CPC) or franchises to operators of NGVs based on the results of
the DOTC surveys."
Further, mandamus will not generally lie from one branch of government to a coordinate branch, for the obvious reason that
neither is inferior to the other.27 The need for future changes in both legislation and its implementation cannot be preempted
by orders from this Court, especially when what is prayed for is procedurally infirm. Besides, comity with and courtesy to a
coequal branch dictate that we give sufficient time and leeway for the coequal branches to address by themselves the
environmental problems raised in this petition.
In the same manner that we have associated the fundamental right to a balanced and healthful ecology with the twin concepts
of "inter-generational responsibility" and "inter-generational justice" in Oposa,28 where we upheld the right of future Filipinos
to prevent the destruction of the rainforests, so do we recognize, in this petition, the right of petitioners and the future
generation to clean air. In Oposa we said that if the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is now explicitly found in the
Constitution even if the right is "assumed to exist from the inception of humankind,… it is because of the well-founded fear of
its framers [of the Constitution] that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state
policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn
obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost
not only for the present generation, but also for those to come. . ." 29
It is the firm belief of this Court that in this case, it is timely to reaffirm the premium we have placed on the protection of the
environment in the landmark case of Oposa. Yet, as serious as the statistics are on air pollution, with the present fuels deemed
toxic as they are to the environment, as fatal as these pollutants are to the health of the citizens, and urgently requiring resort
to drastic measures to reduce air pollutants emitted by motor vehicles, we must admit in particular that petitioners are unable
to pinpoint the law that imposes an indubitable legal duty on respondents that will justify a grant of the writ of mandamus
compelling the use of CNG for public utility vehicles. It appears to us that more properly, the legislature should provide first
the specific statutory remedy to the complex environmental problems bared by herein petitioners before any judicial recourse
by mandamus is taken.
WHEREFORE, the petition for the issuance of a writ of mandamus is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Morales, Tinga, and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 156052 March 7, 2007

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), VLADIMIR ALARIQUE T. CABIGAO, and BONIFACIO S. TUMBOKON, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., in his capacity as Mayor of the City of Manila, Respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
In this original petition for mandamus,1 petitioners Social Justice Society (SJS), Vladimir Alarique T. Cabigao and Bonifacio S.
Tumbokon seek to compel respondent Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., mayor of the City of Manila, to enforce Ordinance No. 8027.
The antecedents are as follows.
On November 20, 2001, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8027.2 Respondent mayor approved the
ordinance on November 28, 2001.3 It became effective on December 28, 2001, after its publication. 4
Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted pursuant to the police power delegated to local government units, a principle described as
the power inherent in a government to enact laws, within constitutional limits, to promote the order, safety, health, morals and
general welfare of the society.5 This is evident from Sections 1 and 3 thereof which state:
SECTION 1. For the purpose of promoting sound urban planning and ensuring health, public safety, and general welfare of the
residents of Pandacan and Sta. Ana as well as its adjoining areas, the land use of [those] portions of land bounded by the Pasig
River in the north, PNR Railroad Track in the east, Beata St. in the south, Palumpong St. in the southwest, and Estero de
Pancacan in the west[,] PNR Railroad in the northwest area, Estero de Pandacan in the [n]ortheast, Pasig River in the southeast
and Dr. M.L. Carreon in the southwest. The area of Punta, Sta. Ana bounded by the Pasig River, Marcelino Obrero St., Mayo 28
St., and F. Manalo Street, are hereby reclassified from Industrial II to Commercial I.
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 3. Owners or operators of industries and other businesses, the operation of which are no longer permitted under Section
1 hereof, are hereby given a period of six (6) months from the date of effectivity of this Ordinance within which to cease and
desist from the operation of businesses which are hereby in consequence, disallowed.
Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area described therein from industrial to commercial and directed the owners and
operators of businesses disallowed under Section 1 to cease and desist from operating their businesses within six months
from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. Among the businesses situated in the area are the so-called "Pandacan Terminals"
of the oil companies Caltex (Philippines), Inc., Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation.
However, on June 26, 2002, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE) entered into a memorandum of
understanding (MOU)6 with the oil companies in which they agreed that "the scaling down of the Pandacan Terminals [was]
the most viable and practicable option." Under the MOU, the oil companies agreed to perform the following:
Section 1. - Consistent with the objectives stated above, the OIL COMPANIES shall, upon signing of this MOU, undertake a
program to scale down the Pandacan Terminals which shall include, among others, the immediate removal/decommissioning
process of TWENTY EIGHT (28) tanks starting with the LPG spheres and the commencing of works for the creation of safety
buffer and green zones surrounding the Pandacan Terminals. xxx
Section 2. – Consistent with the scale-down program mentioned above, the OIL COMPANIES shall establish joint operations
and management, including the operation of common, integrated and/or shared facilities, consistent with international and
domestic technical, safety, environmental and economic considerations and standards. Consequently, the joint operations of
the OIL COMPANIES in the Pandacan Terminals shall be limited to the common and integrated areas/facilities. A separate
agreement covering the commercial and operational terms and conditions of the joint operations, shall be entered into by the
OIL COMPANIES.
Section 3. - The development and maintenance of the safety and green buffer zones mentioned therein, which shall be taken
from the properties of the OIL COMPANIES and not from the surrounding communities, shall be the sole responsibility of the
OIL COMPANIES.
The City of Manila and the DOE, on the other hand, committed to do the following:
Section 1. - The City Mayor shall endorse to the City Council this MOU for its appropriate action with the view of implementing
the spirit and intent thereof.
Section 2. - The City Mayor and the DOE shall, consistent with the spirit and intent of this MOU, enable the OIL COMPANIES to
continuously operate in compliance with legal requirements, within the limited area resulting from the joint operations and
the scale down program.
Section 3. - The DOE and the City Mayor shall monitor the OIL COMPANIES’ compliance with the provisions of this MOU.
Section 4. - The CITY OF MANILA and the national government shall protect the safety buffer and green zones and shall exert
all efforts at preventing future occupation or encroachment into these areas by illegal settlers and other unauthorized parties.
The Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified the MOU in Resolution No. 97.7 In the same resolution, the Sanggunian declared that the
MOU was effective only for a period of six months starting July 25, 2002. 8 Thereafter, on January 30, 2003, the Sanggunian
adopted Resolution No. 139 extending the validity of Resolution No. 97 to April 30, 2003 and authorizing Mayor Atienza to
issue special business permits to the oil companies. Resolution No. 13, s. 2003 also called for a reassessment of the
ordinance.10
Meanwhile, petitioners filed this original action for mandamus on December 4, 2002 praying that Mayor Atienza be compelled
to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the immediate removal of the terminals of the oil companies. 11
The issues raised by petitioners are as follows:
1. whether respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the removal of the Pandacan
Terminals, and
2. whether the June 26, 2002 MOU and the resolutions ratifying it can amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8027. 12
Petitioners contend that respondent has the mandatory legal duty, under Section 455 (b) (2) of the Local Government Code
(RA 7160),13 to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals of the oil companies. Instead, he
has allowed them to stay.
Respondent’s defense is that Ordinance No. 8027 has been superseded by the MOU and the resolutions. 14 However, he also
confusingly argues that the ordinance and MOU are not inconsistent with each other and that the latter has not amended the
former. He insists that the ordinance remains valid and in full force and effect and that the MOU did not in any way prevent
him from enforcing and implementing it. He maintains that the MOU should be considered as a mere guideline for its full
implementation.15
Under Rule 65, Section 316 of the Rules of Court, a petition for mandamus may be filed when any tribunal, corporation, board,
officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office, trust or station. Mandamus is an extraordinary writ that is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a
ministerial duty that is already imposed on the respondent and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. The petitioner should have a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the performance of the act
and it must be the clear and imperative duty of respondent to do the act required to be done. 17
Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right, or to compel compliance with a duty, which is questionable or over which a
substantial doubt exists. The principal function of the writ of mandamus is to command and to expedite, not to inquire and to
adjudicate; thus, it is neither the office nor the aim of the writ to secure a legal right but to implement that which is already
established. Unless the right to the relief sought is unclouded, mandamus will not issue.18
To support the assertion that petitioners have a clear legal right to the enforcement of the ordinance, petitioner SJS states that
it is a political party registered with the Commission on Elections and has its offices in Manila. It claims to have many members
who are residents of Manila. The other petitioners, Cabigao and Tumbokon, are allegedly residents of Manila.
We need not belabor this point. We have ruled in previous cases that when a mandamus proceeding concerns a public right
and its object is to compel a public duty, the people who are interested in the execution of the laws are regarded as the real
parties in interest and they need not show any specific interest.19 Besides, as residents of Manila, petitioners have a direct
interest in the enforcement of the city’s ordinances. Respondent never questioned the right of petitioners to institute this
proceeding.
On the other hand, the Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as city mayor, to "enforce all laws and
ordinances relative to the governance of the city."> 20 One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive of the city, he
has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by the courts.21
He has no other choice. It is his ministerial duty to do so. In Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr.,22 we stated the reason for this:
These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. The
reason for this is obvious. It might seriously hinder the transaction of public business if these officers were to be permitted in
all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially
been declared unconstitutional. Officers of the government from the highest to the lowest are creatures of the law and are
bound to obey it.23
The question now is whether the MOU entered into by respondent with the oil companies and the subsequent resolutions
passed by the Sanggunian have made the respondent’s duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 doubtful, unclear or uncertain. This
is also connected to the second issue raised by petitioners, that is, whether the MOU and Resolution Nos. 97, s. 2002 and 13, s.
2003 of the Sanggunian can amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8027.
We need not resolve this issue. Assuming that the terms of the MOU were inconsistent with Ordinance No. 8027, the
resolutions which ratified it and made it binding on the City of Manila expressly gave it full force and effect only until April
30, 2003. Thus, at present, there is nothing that legally hinders respondent from enforcing Ordinance No. 8027. 24
Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted right after the Philippines, along with the rest of the world, witnessed the horror of the
September 11, 2001 attack on the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York City. The objective of the ordinance is
to protect the residents of Manila from the catastrophic devastation that will surely occur in case of a terrorist attack 25 on the
Pandacan Terminals. No reason exists why such a protective measure should be delayed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Respondent Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., as mayor of the City of Manila, is directed
to immediately enforce Ordinance No. 8027.
SO ORDERED.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

G.R. Nos. 171947-48 December 18, 2008

METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES,
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS,1 DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE,
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, PHILIPPINE
COAST GUARD, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE MARITIME GROUP, and DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, petitioners,
vs.
CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF MANILA BAY, represented and joined by DIVINA V. ILAS, SABINIANO ALBARRACIN,
MANUEL SANTOS, JR., DINAH DELA PEÑA, PAUL DENNIS QUINTERO, MA. VICTORIA LLENOS, DONNA CALOZA, FATIMA
QUITAIN, VENICE SEGARRA, FRITZIE TANGKIA, SARAH JOELLE LINTAG, HANNIBAL AUGUSTUS BOBIS, FELIMON
SANTIAGUEL, and JAIME AGUSTIN R. OPOSA, respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The need to address environmental pollution, as a cause of climate change, has of late gained the attention of the international
community. Media have finally trained their sights on the ill effects of pollution, the destruction of forests and other critical
habitats, oil spills, and the unabated improper disposal of garbage. And rightly so, for the magnitude of environmental
destruction is now on a scale few ever foresaw and the wound no longer simply heals by itself. 2 But amidst hard evidence and
clear signs of a climate crisis that need bold action, the voice of cynicism, naysayers, and procrastinators can still be heard.
This case turns on government agencies and their officers who, by the nature of their respective offices or by direct statutory
command, are tasked to protect and preserve, at the first instance, our internal waters, rivers, shores, and seas polluted by
human activities. To most of these agencies and their official complement, the pollution menace does not seem to carry the
high national priority it deserves, if their track records are to be the norm. Their cavalier attitude towards solving, if not
mitigating, the environmental pollution problem, is a sad commentary on bureaucratic efficiency and commitment.
At the core of the case is the Manila Bay, a place with a proud historic past, once brimming with marine life and, for so many
decades in the past, a spot for different contact recreation activities, but now a dirty and slowly dying expanse mainly because
of the abject official indifference of people and institutions that could have otherwise made a difference.
This case started when, on January 29, 1999, respondents Concerned Residents of Manila Bay filed a complaint before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Imus, Cavite against several government agencies, among them the petitioners, for the cleanup,
rehabilitation, and protection of the Manila Bay. Raffled to Branch 20 and docketed as Civil Case No. 1851-99 of the RTC, the
complaint alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way below the allowable standards set by law, specifically
Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1152 or the Philippine Environment Code. This environmental aberration, the complaint stated,
stemmed from:
x x x [The] reckless, wholesale, accumulated and ongoing acts of omission or commission [of the defendants] resulting in the
clear and present danger to public health and in the depletion and contamination of the marine life of Manila Bay, [for which
reason] ALL defendants must be held jointly and/or solidarily liable and be collectively ordered to clean up Manila Bay and to
restore its water quality to class B waters fit for swimming, skin-diving, and other forms of contact recreation.3
In their individual causes of action, respondents alleged that the continued neglect of petitioners in abating the pollution of the
Manila Bay constitutes a violation of, among others:
(1) Respondents’ constitutional right to life, health, and a balanced ecology;
(2) The Environment Code (PD 1152);
(3) The Pollution Control Law (PD 984);
(4) The Water Code (PD 1067);
(5) The Sanitation Code (PD 856);
(6) The Illegal Disposal of Wastes Decree (PD 825);
(7) The Marine Pollution Law (PD 979);
(8) Executive Order No. 192;
(9) The Toxic and Hazardous Wastes Law (Republic Act No. 6969);
(10) Civil Code provisions on nuisance and human relations;
(11) The Trust Doctrine and the Principle of Guardianship; and
(12) International Law
Inter alia, respondents, as plaintiffs a quo, prayed that petitioners be ordered to clean the Manila Bay and submit to the RTC a
concerted concrete plan of action for the purpose.
The trial of the case started off with a hearing at the Manila Yacht Club followed by an ocular inspection of the Manila Bay.
Renato T. Cruz, the Chief of the Water Quality Management Section, Environmental Management Bureau, Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), testifying for petitioners, stated that water samples collected from different
beaches around the Manila Bay showed that the amount of fecal coliform content ranged from 50,000 to 80,000 most probable
number (MPN)/ml when what DENR Administrative Order No. 34-90 prescribed as a safe level for bathing and other forms of
contact recreational activities, or the "SB" level, is one not exceeding 200 MPN/100 ml.4
Rebecca de Vera, for Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) and in behalf of other petitioners, testified
about the MWSS’ efforts to reduce pollution along the Manila Bay through the Manila Second Sewerage Project. For its part, the
Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) presented, as part of its evidence, its memorandum circulars on the study being conducted
on ship-generated waste treatment and disposal, and its Linis Dagat (Clean the Ocean) project for the cleaning of wastes
accumulated or washed to shore.
The RTC Ordered Petitioners to Clean Up and Rehabilitate Manila Bay
On September 13, 2002, the RTC rendered a Decision5 in favor of respondents. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, finding merit in the complaint, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the abovenamed defendant-government
agencies, jointly and solidarily, to clean up and rehabilitate Manila Bay and restore its waters to SB classification to make it fit
for swimming, skin-diving and other forms of contact recreation. To attain this, defendant-agencies, with defendant DENR as
the lead agency, are directed, within six (6) months from receipt hereof, to act and perform their respective duties by devising
a consolidated, coordinated and concerted scheme of action for the rehabilitation and restoration of the bay.
In particular:
Defendant MWSS is directed to install, operate and maintain adequate [sewerage] treatment facilities in strategic places under
its jurisdiction and increase their capacities.
Defendant LWUA, to see to it that the water districts under its wings, provide, construct and operate sewage facilities for the
proper disposal of waste.
Defendant DENR, which is the lead agency in cleaning up Manila Bay, to install, operate and maintain waste facilities to rid the
bay of toxic and hazardous substances.
Defendant PPA, to prevent and also to treat the discharge not only of ship-generated wastes but also of other solid and liquid
wastes from docking vessels that contribute to the pollution of the bay.
Defendant MMDA, to establish, operate and maintain an adequate and appropriate sanitary landfill and/or adequate solid
waste and liquid disposal as well as other alternative garbage disposal system such as re-use or recycling of wastes.
Defendant DA, through the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, to revitalize the marine life in Manila Bay and restock
its waters with indigenous fish and other aquatic animals.
Defendant DBM, to provide and set aside an adequate budget solely for the purpose of cleaning up and rehabilitation of Manila
Bay.
Defendant DPWH, to remove and demolish structures and other nuisances that obstruct the free flow of waters to the bay.
These nuisances discharge solid and liquid wastes which eventually end up in Manila Bay. As the construction and engineering
arm of the government, DPWH is ordered to actively participate in removing debris, such as carcass of sunken vessels, and
other non-biodegradable garbage in the bay.
Defendant DOH, to closely supervise and monitor the operations of septic and sludge companies and require them to have
proper facilities for the treatment and disposal of fecal sludge and sewage coming from septic tanks.
Defendant DECS, to inculcate in the minds and hearts of the people through education the importance of preserving and
protecting the environment.
Defendant Philippine Coast Guard and the PNP Maritime Group, to protect at all costs the Manila Bay from all forms of illegal
fishing.
No pronouncement as to damages and costs.
SO ORDERED.
The MWSS, Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), and PPA filed before the Court of Appeals (CA) individual Notices of
Appeal which were eventually consolidated and docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 76528.
On the other hand, the DENR, Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority (MMDA), Philippine Coast Guard (PCG), Philippine National Police (PNP) Maritime Group, and five other executive
departments and agencies filed directly with this Court a petition for review under Rule 45. The Court, in a Resolution of
December 9, 2002, sent the said petition to the CA for consolidation with the consolidated appeals of MWSS, LWUA, and PPA,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 74944.
Petitioners, before the CA, were one in arguing in the main that the pertinent provisions of the Environment Code (PD 1152)
relate only to the cleaning of specific pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning in general. And apart from raising concerns
about the lack of funds appropriated for cleaning purposes, petitioners also asserted that the cleaning of the Manila Bay is not
a ministerial act which can be compelled by mandamus.
The CA Sustained the RTC
By a Decision6 of September 28, 2005, the CA denied petitioners’ appeal and affirmed the Decision of the RTC in toto, stressing
that the trial court’s decision did not require petitioners to do tasks outside of their usual basic functions under existing laws.7
Petitioners are now before this Court praying for the allowance of their Rule 45 petition on the following ground and
supporting arguments:
THE [CA] DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE NOT HERETOFORE PASSED UPON BY THE HONORABLE COURT, I.E., IT
AFFIRMED THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION DECLARING THAT SECTION 20 OF [PD] 1152 REQUIRES CONCERNED
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES TO REMOVE ALL POLLUTANTS SPILLED AND DISCHARGED IN THE WATER SUCH AS FECAL
COLIFORMS.
ARGUMENTS
I
[SECTIONS] 17 AND 20 OF [PD] 1152 RELATE ONLY TO THE CLEANING OF SPECIFIC POLLUTION INCIDENTS AND [DO] NOT
COVER CLEANING IN GENERAL
II
THE CLEANING OR REHABILITATION OF THE MANILA BAY IS NOT A MINISTERIAL ACT OF PETITIONERS THAT CAN BE
COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS.
The issues before us are two-fold. First, do Sections 17 and 20 of PD 1152 under the headings, Upgrading of Water Quality and
Clean-up Operations, envisage a cleanup in general or are they limited only to the cleanup of specific pollution incidents? And
second, can petitioners be compelled by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the Manila Bay?
On August 12, 2008, the Court conducted and heard the parties on oral arguments.
 Our Ruling
We shall first dwell on the propriety of the issuance of mandamus under the premises.
The Cleaning or Rehabilitation of Manila Bay
Can be Compelled by Mandamus
Generally, the writ of mandamus lies to require the execution of a ministerial duty.8 A ministerial duty is one that "requires
neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment."9 It connotes an act in which nothing is left to the discretion of the
person executing it. It is a "simple, definite duty arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist and imposed by law." 10
Mandamus is available to compel action, when refused, on matters involving discretion, but not to direct the exercise of
judgment or discretion one way or the other.
Petitioners maintain that the MMDA’s duty to take measures and maintain adequate solid waste and liquid disposal systems
necessarily involves policy evaluation and the exercise of judgment on the part of the agency concerned. They argue that the
MMDA, in carrying out its mandate, has to make decisions, including choosing where a landfill should be located by
undertaking feasibility studies and cost estimates, all of which entail the exercise of discretion.
Respondents, on the other hand, counter that the statutory command is clear and that petitioners’ duty to comply with and act
according to the clear mandate of the law does not require the exercise of discretion. According to respondents, petitioners,
the MMDA in particular, are without discretion, for example, to choose which bodies of water they are to clean up, or which
discharge or spill they are to contain. By the same token, respondents maintain that petitioners are bereft of discretion on
whether or not to alleviate the problem of solid and liquid waste disposal; in other words, it is the MMDA’s ministerial duty to
attend to such services.
We agree with respondents.
First off, we wish to state that petitioners’ obligation to perform their duties as defined by law, on one hand, and how they are
to carry out such duties, on the other, are two different concepts. While the implementation of the MMDA’s mandated tasks
may entail a decision-making process, the enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law exacts to be done is
ministerial in nature and may be compelled by mandamus. We said so in Social Justice Society v. Atienza11 in which the Court
directed the City of Manila to enforce, as a matter of ministerial duty, its Ordinance No. 8027 directing the three big local oil
players to cease and desist from operating their business in the so-called "Pandacan Terminals" within six months from the
effectivity of the ordinance. But to illustrate with respect to the instant case, the MMDA’s duty to put up an adequate and
appropriate sanitary landfill and solid waste and liquid disposal as well as other alternative garbage disposal systems is
ministerial, its duty being a statutory imposition. The MMDA’s duty in this regard is spelled out in Sec. 3(c) of Republic Act No.
(RA) 7924 creating the MMDA. This section defines and delineates the scope of the MMDA’s waste disposal services to include:
Solid waste disposal and management which include formulation and implementation of policies, standards, programs and
projects for proper and sanitary waste disposal. It shall likewise include the establishment and operation of sanitary land
fill and related facilities and the implementation of other alternative programs intended to reduce, reuse and recycle solid
waste. (Emphasis added.)
The MMDA is duty-bound to comply with Sec. 41 of the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act (RA 9003) which prescribes
the minimum criteria for the establishment of sanitary landfills and Sec. 42 which provides the minimum operating
requirements that each site operator shall maintain in the operation of a sanitary landfill. Complementing Sec. 41 are Secs. 36
and 37 of RA 9003,12 enjoining the MMDA and local government units, among others, after the effectivity of the law on
February 15, 2001, from using and operating open dumps for solid waste and disallowing, five years after such effectivity, the
use of controlled dumps.
The MMDA’s duty in the area of solid waste disposal, as may be noted, is set forth not only in the Environment Code (PD 1152)
and RA 9003, but in its charter as well. This duty of putting up a proper waste disposal system cannot be characterized as
discretionary, for, as earlier stated, discretion presupposes the power or right given by law to public functionaries to act
officially according to their judgment or conscience.13 A discretionary duty is one that "allows a person to exercise judgment
and choose to perform or not to perform."14 Any suggestion that the MMDA has the option whether or not to perform its solid
waste disposal-related duties ought to be dismissed for want of legal basis.
A perusal of other petitioners’ respective charters or like enabling statutes and pertinent laws would yield this conclusion:
these government agencies are enjoined, as a matter of statutory obligation, to perform certain functions relating directly or
indirectly to the cleanup, rehabilitation, protection, and preservation of the Manila Bay. They are precluded from choosing not
to perform these duties. Consider:
(1) The DENR, under Executive Order No. (EO) 192,15 is the primary agency responsible for the conservation, management,
development, and proper use of the country’s environment and natural resources. Sec. 19 of the Philippine Clean Water Act of
2004 (RA 9275), on the other hand, designates the DENR as the primary government agency responsible for its enforcement
and implementation, more particularly over all aspects of water quality management. On water pollution, the DENR, under the
Act’s Sec. 19(k), exercises jurisdiction "over all aspects of water pollution, determine[s] its location, magnitude, extent,
severity, causes and effects and other pertinent information on pollution, and [takes] measures, using available methods and
technologies, to prevent and abate such pollution."
The DENR, under RA 9275, is also tasked to prepare a National Water Quality Status Report, an Integrated Water Quality
Management Framework, and a 10-year Water Quality Management Area Action Plan which is nationwide in scope covering
the Manila Bay and adjoining areas. Sec. 19 of RA 9275 provides:
Sec. 19 Lead Agency.––The [DENR] shall be the primary government agency responsible for the implementation and
enforcement of this Act x x x unless otherwise provided herein. As such, it shall have the following functions, powers and
responsibilities:
a) Prepare a National Water Quality Status report within twenty-four (24) months from the effectivity of this Act: Provided,
That the Department shall thereafter review or revise and publish annually, or as the need arises, said report;
b) Prepare an Integrated Water Quality Management Framework within twelve (12) months following the completion of the
status report;
c) Prepare a ten (10) year Water Quality Management Area Action Plan within 12 months following the completion of the
framework for each designated water management area. Such action plan shall be reviewed by the water quality management
area governing board every five (5) years or as need arises.
The DENR has prepared the status report for the period 2001 to 2005 and is in the process of completing the preparation of
the Integrated Water Quality Management Framework.16 Within twelve (12) months thereafter, it has to submit a final Water
Quality Management Area Action Plan.17 Again, like the MMDA, the DENR should be made to accomplish the tasks assigned to
it under RA 9275.
Parenthetically, during the oral arguments, the DENR Secretary manifested that the DENR, with the assistance of and in
partnership with various government agencies and non-government organizations, has completed, as of December 2005, the
final draft of a comprehensive action plan with estimated budget and time frame, denominated as Operation Plan for the
Manila Bay Coastal Strategy, for the rehabilitation, restoration, and rehabilitation of the Manila Bay.
The completion of the said action plan and even the implementation of some of its phases should more than ever prod the
 concerned agencies to fast track what are assigned them under existing laws.
(2) The MWSS, under Sec. 3 of RA 6234,18 is vested with jurisdiction, supervision, and control over all waterworks and
sewerage systems in the territory comprising what is now the cities of Metro Manila and several towns of the provinces of
Rizal and Cavite, and charged with the duty:
(g) To construct, maintain, and operate such sanitary sewerages as may be necessary for the proper sanitation and other uses
of the cities and towns comprising the System; x x x
(3) The LWUA under PD 198 has the power of supervision and control over local water districts. It can prescribe the minimum
standards and regulations for the operations of these districts and shall monitor and evaluate local water standards. The
LWUA can direct these districts to construct, operate, and furnish facilities and services for the collection, treatment, and
disposal of sewerage, waste, and storm water. Additionally, under RA 9275, the LWUA, as attached agency of the DPWH, is
tasked with providing sewerage and sanitation facilities, inclusive of the setting up of efficient and safe collection, treatment,
and sewage disposal system in the different parts of the country.19 In relation to the instant petition, the LWUA is mandated to
provide sewerage and sanitation facilities in Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan to prevent pollution in the Manila
Bay.
(4) The Department of Agriculture (DA), pursuant to the Administrative Code of 1987 (EO 292),20 is designated as the agency
tasked to promulgate and enforce all laws and issuances respecting the conservation and proper utilization of agricultural and
fishery resources. Furthermore, the DA, under the Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998 (RA 8550), is, in coordination with local
government units (LGUs) and other concerned sectors, in charge of establishing a monitoring, control, and surveillance system
to ensure that fisheries and aquatic resources in Philippine waters are judiciously utilized and managed on a sustainable
basis.21 Likewise under RA 9275, the DA is charged with coordinating with the PCG and DENR for the enforcement of water
quality standards in marine waters.22 More specifically, its Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) under Sec. 22(c)
of RA 9275 shall primarily be responsible for the prevention and control of water pollution for the development, management,
and conservation of the fisheries and aquatic resources.
(5) The DPWH, as the engineering and construction arm of the national government, is tasked under EO 292 23 to provide
integrated planning, design, and construction services for, among others, flood control and water resource development
systems in accordance with national development objectives and approved government plans and specifications.
In Metro Manila, however, the MMDA is authorized by Sec. 3(d), RA 7924 to perform metro-wide services relating to "flood
control and sewerage management which include the formulation and implementation of policies, standards, programs and
projects for an integrated flood control, drainage and sewerage system."
On July 9, 2002, a Memorandum of Agreement was entered into between the DPWH and MMDA, whereby MMDA was made the
agency primarily responsible for flood control in Metro Manila. For the rest of the country, DPWH shall remain as the
implementing agency for flood control services. The mandate of the MMDA and DPWH on flood control and drainage services
shall include the removal of structures, constructions, and encroachments built along rivers, waterways, and esteros
(drainages) in violation of RA 7279, PD 1067, and other pertinent laws.
(6) The PCG, in accordance with Sec. 5(p) of PD 601, or the Revised Coast Guard Law of 1974, and Sec. 6 of PD 979,24 or the
Marine Pollution Decree of 1976, shall have the primary responsibility of enforcing laws, rules, and regulations governing
marine pollution within the territorial waters of the Philippines. It shall promulgate its own rules and regulations in
accordance with the national rules and policies set by the National Pollution Control Commission upon consultation with the
latter for the effective implementation and enforcement of PD 979. It shall, under Sec. 4 of the law, apprehend violators who:
a. discharge, dump x x x harmful substances from or out of any ship, vessel, barge, or any other floating craft, or other man-
made structures at sea, by any method, means or manner, into or upon the territorial and inland navigable waters of the
Philippines;
b. throw, discharge or deposit, dump, or cause, suffer or procure to be thrown, discharged, or deposited either from or out of
any ship, barge, or other floating craft or vessel of any kind, or from the shore, wharf, manufacturing establishment, or mill of
any kind, any refuse matter of any kind or description whatever other than that flowing from streets and sewers and passing
therefrom in a liquid state into tributary of any navigable water from which the same shall float or be washed into such
navigable water; and
c. deposit x x x material of any kind in any place on the bank of any navigable water or on the bank of any tributary of any
navigable water, where the same shall be liable to be washed into such navigable water, either by ordinary or high tides, or by
storms or floods, or otherwise, whereby navigation shall or may be impeded or obstructed or increase the level of pollution of
such water.
(7) When RA 6975 or the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) Act of 1990 was signed into law on
December 13, 1990, the PNP Maritime Group was tasked to "perform all police functions over the Philippine territorial waters
and rivers." Under Sec. 86, RA 6975, the police functions of the PCG shall be taken over by the PNP when the latter acquires the
capability to perform such functions. Since the PNP Maritime Group has not yet attained the capability to assume and perform
the police functions of PCG over marine pollution, the PCG and PNP Maritime Group shall coordinate with regard to the
enforcement of laws, rules, and regulations governing marine pollution within the territorial waters of the Philippines. This
was made clear in Sec. 124, RA 8550 or the Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998, in which both the PCG and PNP Maritime Group
were authorized to enforce said law and other fishery laws, rules, and regulations. 25
(8) In accordance with Sec. 2 of EO 513, the PPA is mandated "to establish, develop, regulate, manage and operate a
rationalized national port system in support of trade and national development."26 Moreover, Sec. 6-c of EO 513 states that the
PPA has police authority within the ports administered by it as may be necessary to carry out its powers and functions and
attain its purposes and objectives, without prejudice to the exercise of the functions of the Bureau of Customs and other law
enforcement bodies within the area. Such police authority shall include the following:
xxxx
b) To regulate the entry to, exit from, and movement within the port, of persons and vehicles, as well as movement within the
port of watercraft.27
Lastly, as a member of the International Marine Organization and a signatory to the International Convention for the
Prevention of Pollution from Ships, as amended by MARPOL 73/78,28 the Philippines, through the PPA, must ensure the
provision of adequate reception facilities at ports and terminals for the reception of sewage from the ships docking in
Philippine ports. Thus, the PPA is tasked to adopt such measures as are necessary to prevent the discharge and dumping of
solid and liquid wastes and other ship-generated wastes into the Manila Bay waters from vessels docked at ports and
apprehend the violators. When the vessels are not docked at ports but within Philippine territorial waters, it is the PCG and
PNP Maritime Group that have jurisdiction over said vessels.
(9) The MMDA, as earlier indicated, is duty-bound to put up and maintain adequate sanitary landfill and solid waste and liquid
disposal system as well as other alternative garbage disposal systems. It is primarily responsible for the implementation and
enforcement of the provisions of RA 9003, which would necessary include its penal provisions, within its area of jurisdiction.29
Among the prohibited acts under Sec. 48, Chapter VI of RA 9003 that are frequently violated are dumping of waste matters in
public places, such as roads, canals or esteros, open burning of solid waste, squatting in open dumps and landfills, open
 dumping, burying of biodegradable or non- biodegradable materials in flood-prone areas, establishment or operation of open
dumps as enjoined in RA 9003, and operation of waste management facilities without an environmental compliance certificate.
Under Sec. 28 of the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992 (RA 7279), eviction or demolition may be allowed "when
persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways,
and other public places such as sidewalks, roads, parks and playgrounds." The MMDA, as lead agency, in coordination with the
DPWH, LGUs, and concerned agencies, can dismantle and remove all structures, constructions, and other encroachments built
in breach of RA 7279 and other pertinent laws along the rivers, waterways, and esteros in Metro Manila. With respect to rivers,
waterways, and esteros in Bulacan, Bataan, Pampanga, Cavite, and Laguna that discharge wastewater directly or eventually
into the Manila Bay, the DILG shall direct the concerned LGUs to implement the demolition and removal of such structures,
constructions, and other encroachments built in violation of RA 7279 and other applicable laws in coordination with the
DPWH and concerned agencies.
(10) The Department of Health (DOH), under Article 76 of PD 1067 (the Water Code), is tasked to promulgate rules and
regulations for the establishment of waste disposal areas that affect the source of a water supply or a reservoir for domestic or
municipal use. And under Sec. 8 of RA 9275, the DOH, in coordination with the DENR, DPWH, and other concerned agencies,
shall formulate guidelines and standards for the collection, treatment, and disposal of sewage and the establishment and
operation of a centralized sewage treatment system. In areas not considered as highly urbanized cities, septage or a mix
sewerage-septage management system shall be employed.
In accordance with Sec. 7230 of PD 856, the Code of Sanitation of the Philippines, and Sec. 5.1.131 of Chapter XVII of its
implementing rules, the DOH is also ordered to ensure the regulation and monitoring of the proper disposal of wastes by
private sludge companies through the strict enforcement of the requirement to obtain an environmental sanitation clearance
of sludge collection treatment and disposal before these companies are issued their environmental sanitation permit.
(11) The Department of Education (DepEd), under the Philippine Environment Code (PD 1152), is mandated to integrate
subjects on environmental education in its school curricula at all levels. 32 Under Sec. 118 of RA 8550, the DepEd, in
collaboration with the DA, Commission on Higher Education, and Philippine Information Agency, shall launch and pursue a
nationwide educational campaign to promote the development, management, conservation, and proper use of the
environment. Under the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act (RA 9003), on the other hand, it is directed to strengthen the
integration of environmental concerns in school curricula at all levels, with an emphasis on waste management principles.33
(12) The Department of Budget and Management (DBM) is tasked under Sec. 2, Title XVII of the Administrative Code of 1987
to ensure the efficient and sound utilization of government funds and revenues so as to effectively achieve the country’s
development objectives.34
One of the country’s development objectives is enshrined in RA 9275 or the Philippine Clean Water Act of 2004. This law
stresses that the State shall pursue a policy of economic growth in a manner consistent with the protection, preservation, and
revival of the quality of our fresh, brackish, and marine waters. It also provides that it is the policy of the government, among
others, to streamline processes and procedures in the prevention, control, and abatement of pollution mechanisms for the
protection of water resources; to promote environmental strategies and use of appropriate economic instruments and of
control mechanisms for the protection of water resources; to formulate a holistic national program of water quality
management that recognizes that issues related to this management cannot be separated from concerns about water sources
and ecological protection, water supply, public health, and quality of life; and to provide a comprehensive management
program for water pollution focusing on pollution prevention.
Thus, the DBM shall then endeavor to provide an adequate budget to attain the noble objectives of RA 9275 in line with the
country’s development objectives.
All told, the aforementioned enabling laws and issuances are in themselves clear, categorical, and complete as to what are the
obligations and mandate of each agency/petitioner under the law. We need not belabor the issue that their tasks include the
cleanup of the Manila Bay.
Now, as to the crux of the petition. Do Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code encompass the cleanup of water pollution in
general, not just specific pollution incidents?
Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code
Include Cleaning in General
The disputed sections are quoted as follows:
Section 17. Upgrading of Water Quality.––Where the quality of water has deteriorated to a degree where its state will
adversely affect its best usage, the government agencies concerned shall take such measures as may be necessary to upgrade
the quality of such water to meet the prescribed water quality standards.
Section 20. Clean-up Operations.––It shall be the responsibility of the polluter to contain, remove and clean-up water pollution
incidents at his own expense. In case of his failure to do so, the government agencies concerned shall undertake containment,
removal and clean-up operations and expenses incurred in said operations shall be charged against the persons and/or
entities responsible for such pollution.
When the Clean Water Act (RA 9275) took effect, its Sec. 16 on the subject, o, amended the counterpart provision (Sec. 20) of
the Environment Code (PD 1152). Sec. 17 of PD 1152 continues, however, to be operational.
The amendatory Sec. 16 of RA 9275 reads:
SEC. 16. Cleanup Operations.––Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 15 and 26 hereof, any person who causes pollution
in or pollutes water bodies in excess of the applicable and prevailing standards shall be responsible to contain, remove and
clean up any pollution incident at his own expense to the extent that the same water bodies have been rendered unfit for
utilization and beneficial use: Provided, That in the event emergency cleanup operations are necessary and the polluter fails to
immediately undertake the same, the [DENR] in coordination with other government agencies concerned, shall undertake
containment, removal and cleanup operations. Expenses incurred in said operations shall be reimbursed by the persons found
to have caused such pollution under proper administrative determination x x x. Reimbursements of the cost incurred shall be
made to the Water Quality Management Fund or to such other funds where said disbursements were sourced.
As may be noted, the amendment to Sec. 20 of the Environment Code is more apparent than real since the amendment, insofar
as it is relevant to this case, merely consists in the designation of the DENR as lead agency in the cleanup operations.
Petitioners contend at every turn that Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code concern themselves only with the matter of
cleaning up in specific pollution incidents, as opposed to cleanup in general. They aver that the twin provisions would have to
be read alongside the succeeding Sec. 62(g) and (h), which defines the terms "cleanup operations" and "accidental spills," as
follows:
g. Clean-up Operations [refer] to activities conducted in removing the pollutants discharged or spilled in water to restore it to
pre-spill condition.
h. Accidental Spills [refer] to spills of oil or other hazardous substances in water that result from accidents such as collisions
and groundings.
Petitioners proffer the argument that Secs. 17 and 20 of PD 1152 merely direct the government agencies concerned to
undertake containment, removal, and cleaning operations of a specific polluted portion or portions of the body of water
 concerned. They maintain that the application of said Sec. 20 is limited only to "water pollution incidents," which are
situations that presuppose the occurrence of specific, isolated pollution events requiring the corresponding containment,
removal, and cleaning operations. Pushing the point further, they argue that the aforequoted Sec. 62(g) requires "cleanup
operations" to restore the body of water to pre-spill condition, which means that there must have been a specific incident of
either intentional or accidental spillage of oil or other hazardous substances, as mentioned in Sec. 62(h).
As a counterpoint, respondents argue that petitioners erroneously read Sec. 62(g) as delimiting the application of Sec. 20 to
the containment, removal, and cleanup operations for accidental spills only. Contrary to petitioners’ posture, respondents
assert that Sec. 62(g), in fact, even expanded the coverage of Sec. 20. Respondents explain that without its Sec. 62(g), PD 1152
may have indeed covered only pollution accumulating from the day-to-day operations of businesses around the Manila Bay
and other sources of pollution that slowly accumulated in the bay. Respondents, however, emphasize that Sec. 62(g), far from
being a delimiting provision, in fact even enlarged the operational scope of Sec. 20, by including accidental spills as among the
water pollution incidents contemplated in Sec. 17 in relation to Sec. 20 of PD 1152.
To respondents, petitioners’ parochial view on environmental issues, coupled with their narrow reading of their respective
mandated roles, has contributed to the worsening water quality of the Manila Bay. Assuming, respondents assert, that
petitioners are correct in saying that the cleanup coverage of Sec. 20 of PD 1152 is constricted by the definition of the phrase
"cleanup operations" embodied in Sec. 62(g), Sec. 17 is not hobbled by such limiting definition. As pointed out, the phrases
"cleanup operations" and "accidental spills" do not appear in said Sec. 17, not even in the chapter where said section is found.
Respondents are correct. For one thing, said Sec. 17 does not in any way state that the government agencies concerned ought
to confine themselves to the containment, removal, and cleaning operations when a specific pollution incident occurs. On the
contrary, Sec. 17 requires them to act even in the absence of a specific pollution incident, as long as water quality "has
deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely affect its best usage." This section, to stress, commands concerned
government agencies, when appropriate, "to take such measures as may be necessary to meet the prescribed water quality
standards." In fine, the underlying duty to upgrade the quality of water is not conditional on the occurrence of any pollution
incident.
For another, a perusal of Sec. 20 of the Environment Code, as couched, indicates that it is properly applicable to a specific
situation in which the pollution is caused by polluters who fail to clean up the mess they left behind. In such instance, the
concerned government agencies shall undertake the cleanup work for the polluters’ account. Petitioners’ assertion, that they
have to perform cleanup operations in the Manila Bay only when there is a water pollution incident and the erring polluters do
not undertake the containment, removal, and cleanup operations, is quite off mark. As earlier discussed, the complementary
Sec. 17 of the Environment Code comes into play and the specific duties of the agencies to clean up come in even if there are no
pollution incidents staring at them. Petitioners, thus, cannot plausibly invoke and hide behind Sec. 20 of PD 1152 or Sec. 16 of
RA 9275 on the pretext that their cleanup mandate depends on the happening of a specific pollution incident. In this regard,
what the CA said with respect to the impasse over Secs. 17 and 20 of PD 1152 is at once valid as it is practical. The appellate
court wrote: "PD 1152 aims to introduce a comprehensive program of environmental protection and management. This is
better served by making Secs. 17 & 20 of general application rather than limiting them to specific pollution incidents." 35
Granting arguendo that petitioners’ position thus described vis-à-vis the implementation of Sec. 20 is correct, they seem to
have overlooked the fact that the pollution of the Manila Bay is of such magnitude and scope that it is well-nigh impossible to
draw the line between a specific and a general pollution incident. And such impossibility extends to pinpointing with
reasonable certainty who the polluters are. We note that Sec. 20 of PD 1152 mentions "water pollution incidents" which may
be caused by polluters in the waters of the Manila Bay itself or by polluters in adjoining lands and in water bodies or
waterways that empty into the bay. Sec. 16 of RA 9275, on the other hand, specifically adverts to "any person who causes
pollution in or pollutes water bodies," which may refer to an individual or an establishment that pollutes the land mass near
the Manila Bay or the waterways, such that the contaminants eventually end up in the bay. In this situation, the water
pollution incidents are so numerous and involve nameless and faceless polluters that they can validly be categorized as
beyond the specific pollution incident level.
Not to be ignored of course is the reality that the government agencies concerned are so undermanned that it would be almost
impossible to apprehend the numerous polluters of the Manila Bay. It may perhaps not be amiss to say that the apprehension,
if any, of the Manila Bay polluters has been few and far between. Hence, practically nobody has been required to contain,
remove, or clean up a given water pollution incident. In this kind of setting, it behooves the Government to step in and
undertake cleanup operations. Thus, Sec. 16 of RA 9275, previously Sec. 20 of PD 1152, covers for all intents and purposes a
general cleanup situation.
The cleanup and/or restoration of the Manila Bay is only an aspect and the initial stage of the long-term solution. The
preservation of the water quality of the bay after the rehabilitation process is as important as the cleaning phase. It is
imperative then that the wastes and contaminants found in the rivers, inland bays, and other bodies of water be stopped from
reaching the Manila Bay. Otherwise, any cleanup effort would just be a futile, cosmetic exercise, for, in no time at all, the Manila
Bay water quality would again deteriorate below the ideal minimum standards set by PD 1152, RA 9275, and other relevant
laws. It thus behooves the Court to put the heads of the petitioner-department-agencies and the bureaus and offices under
them on continuing notice about, and to enjoin them to perform, their mandates and duties towards cleaning up the Manila
Bay and preserving the quality of its water to the ideal level. Under what other judicial discipline describes as "continuing
mandamus,"36 the Court may, under extraordinary circumstances, issue directives with the end in view of ensuring that its
decision would not be set to naught by administrative inaction or indifference. In India, the doctrine of continuing mandamus
was used to enforce directives of the court to clean up the length of the Ganges River from industrial and municipal pollution.37
The Court can take judicial notice of the presence of shanties and other unauthorized structures which do not have septic
tanks along the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the National Capital Region (NCR) (Parañaque-Zapote, Las Piñas) Rivers, the
Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, the Meycuayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the
Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other minor rivers and connecting waterways, river banks, and esteros which
discharge their waters, with all the accompanying filth, dirt, and garbage, into the major rivers and eventually the Manila Bay.
If there is one factor responsible for the pollution of the major river systems and the Manila Bay, these unauthorized
structures would be on top of the list. And if the issue of illegal or unauthorized structures is not seriously addressed with
sustained resolve, then practically all efforts to cleanse these important bodies of water would be for naught. The DENR
Secretary said as much.38
Giving urgent dimension to the necessity of removing these illegal structures is Art. 51 of PD 1067 or the Water Code,39 which
prohibits the building of structures within a given length along banks of rivers and other waterways. Art. 51 reads:
The banks of rivers and streams and the shores of the seas and lakes throughout their entire length and within a zone
of three (3) meters in urban areas, twenty (20) meters in agricultural areas and forty (40) meters in forest areas, along their
margins, are subject to the easement of public use in the interest of recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing and
salvage. No person shall be allowed to stay in this zone longer than what is necessary for recreation, navigation, floatage,
fishing or salvage or to build structures of any kind. (Emphasis added.)
Judicial notice may likewise be taken of factories and other industrial establishments standing along or near the banks of the
Pasig River, other major rivers, and connecting waterways. But while they may not be treated as unauthorized constructions,
some of these establishments undoubtedly contribute to the pollution of the Pasig River and waterways. The DILG and the
concerned LGUs, have, accordingly, the duty to see to it that non-complying industrial establishments set up, within a
reasonable period, the necessary waste water treatment facilities and infrastructure to prevent their industrial discharge,
including their sewage waters, from flowing into the Pasig River, other major rivers, and connecting waterways. After such
period, non-complying establishments shall be shut down or asked to transfer their operations.
At this juncture, and if only to dramatize the urgency of the need for petitioners-agencies to comply with their statutory tasks,
we cite the Asian Development Bank-commissioned study on the garbage problem in Metro Manila, the results of which are
embodied in the The Garbage Book. As there reported, the garbage crisis in the metropolitan area is as alarming as it is
shocking. Some highlights of the report:
1. As early as 2003, three land-filled dumpsites in Metro Manila - the Payatas, Catmon and Rodriquez dumpsites - generate an
alarming quantity of lead and leachate or liquid run-off. Leachate are toxic liquids that flow along the surface and seep into the
earth and poison the surface and groundwater that are used for drinking, aquatic life, and the environment.
2. The high level of fecal coliform confirms the presence of a large amount of human waste in the dump sites and surrounding
areas, which is presumably generated by households that lack alternatives to sanitation. To say that Manila Bay needs
rehabilitation is an understatement.
3. Most of the deadly leachate, lead and other dangerous contaminants and possibly strains of pathogens seeps untreated into
ground water and runs into the Marikina and Pasig River systems and Manila Bay.40
Given the above perspective, sufficient sanitary landfills should now more than ever be established as prescribed by the
Ecological Solid Waste Management Act (RA 9003). Particular note should be taken of the blatant violations by some LGUs and
possibly the MMDA of Sec. 37, reproduced below:
Sec. 37. Prohibition against the Use of Open Dumps for Solid Waste.––No open dumps shall be established and operated, nor any
practice or disposal of solid waste by any person, including LGUs which [constitute] the use of open dumps for solid waste, be
allowed after the effectivity of this Act: Provided, further that no controlled dumps shall be allowed (5) years following
the effectivity of this Act. (Emphasis added.)
RA 9003 took effect on February 15, 2001 and the adverted grace period of five (5) years which ended on February 21, 2006
has come and gone, but no single sanitary landfill which strictly complies with the prescribed standards under RA 9003 has
yet been set up.
In addition, there are rampant and repeated violations of Sec. 48 of RA 9003, like littering, dumping of waste matters in roads,
canals, esteros, and other public places, operation of open dumps, open burning of solid waste, and the like. Some sludge
companies which do not have proper disposal facilities simply discharge sludge into the Metro Manila sewerage system that
ends up in the Manila Bay. Equally unabated are violations of Sec. 27 of RA 9275, which enjoins the pollution of water bodies,
groundwater pollution, disposal of infectious wastes from vessels, and unauthorized transport or dumping into sea waters of
sewage or solid waste and of Secs. 4 and 102 of RA 8550 which proscribes the introduction by human or machine of
substances to the aquatic environment including "dumping/disposal of waste and other marine litters, discharge of petroleum
or residual products of petroleum of carbonaceous materials/substances [and other] radioactive, noxious or harmful liquid,
gaseous or solid substances, from any water, land or air transport or other human-made structure."
In the light of the ongoing environmental degradation, the Court wishes to emphasize the extreme necessity for all concerned
executive departments and agencies to immediately act and discharge their respective official duties and obligations. Indeed,
time is of the essence; hence, there is a need to set timetables for the performance and completion of the tasks, some of them
as defined for them by law and the nature of their respective offices and mandates.
The importance of the Manila Bay as a sea resource, playground, and as a historical landmark cannot be over-emphasized. It is
not yet too late in the day to restore the Manila Bay to its former splendor and bring back the plants and sea life that once
thrived in its blue waters. But the tasks ahead, daunting as they may be, could only be accomplished if those mandated, with
the help and cooperation of all civic-minded individuals, would put their minds to these tasks and take responsibility. This
means that the State, through petitioners, has to take the lead in the preservation and protection of the Manila Bay.
The era of delays, procrastination, and ad hoc measures is over. Petitioners must transcend their limitations, real or imaginary,
and buckle down to work before the problem at hand becomes unmanageable. Thus, we must reiterate that different
government agencies and instrumentalities cannot shirk from their mandates; they must perform their basic functions in
cleaning up and rehabilitating the Manila Bay. We are disturbed by petitioners’ hiding behind two untenable claims: (1) that
there ought to be a specific pollution incident before they are required to act; and (2) that the cleanup of the bay is a
discretionary duty.
RA 9003 is a sweeping piece of legislation enacted to radically transform and improve waste management. It implements Sec.
16, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, which explicitly provides that the State shall protect and advance the right of the people to
a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
So it was that in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. the Court stated that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology need not even be
written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and political rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from
the inception of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational implications. 41 Even assuming
the absence of a categorical legal provision specifically prodding petitioners to clean up the bay, they and the men and women
representing them cannot escape their obligation to future generations of Filipinos to keep the waters of the Manila Bay clean
and clear as humanly as possible. Anything less would be a betrayal of the trust reposed in them.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 28, 2005 Decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 76528 and SP No. 74944
and the September 13, 2002 Decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 1851-99 are AFFIRMED but with MODIFICATIONS in view
of subsequent developments or supervening events in the case. The fallo of the RTC Decision shall now read:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the abovenamed defendant-government agencies to clean up,
rehabilitate, and preserve Manila Bay, and restore and maintain its waters to SB level (Class B sea waters per Water
Classification Tables under DENR Administrative Order No. 34 [1990]) to make them fit for swimming, skin-diving, and other
forms of contact recreation.
In particular:
(1) Pursuant to Sec. 4 of EO 192, assigning the DENR as the primary agency responsible for the conservation, management,
development, and proper use of the country’s environment and natural resources, and Sec. 19 of RA 9275, designating the
DENR as the primary government agency responsible for its enforcement and implementation, the DENR is directed to fully
implement its Operational Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal Strategy for the rehabilitation, restoration, and conservation of the
Manila Bay at the earliest possible time. It is ordered to call regular coordination meetings with concerned government
departments and agencies to ensure the successful implementation of the aforesaid plan of action in accordance with its
indicated completion schedules.
(2) Pursuant to Title XII (Local Government) of the Administrative Code of 1987 and Sec. 25 of the Local Government Code of
1991,42 the DILG, in exercising the President’s power of general supervision and its duty to promulgate guidelines in
establishing waste management programs under Sec. 43 of the Philippine Environment Code (PD 1152), shall direct all LGUs
in Metro Manila, Rizal, Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan to inspect all factories, commercial establishments, and
private homes along the banks of the major river systems in their respective areas of jurisdiction, such as but not limited to the
Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR (Parañaque-Zapote, Las Piñas) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros
Rivers, the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De
Bay, and other minor rivers and waterways that eventually discharge water into the Manila Bay; and the lands abutting the
bay, to determine whether they have wastewater treatment facilities or hygienic septic tanks as prescribed by existing laws,
ordinances, and rules and regulations. If none be found, these LGUs shall be ordered to require non-complying establishments
and homes to set up said facilities or septic tanks within a reasonable time to prevent industrial wastes, sewage water, and
human wastes from flowing into these rivers, waterways, esteros, and the Manila Bay, under pain of closure or imposition of
fines and other sanctions.
(3) As mandated by Sec. 8 of RA 9275,43 the MWSS is directed to provide, install, operate, and maintain the necessary adequate
waste water treatment facilities in Metro Manila, Rizal, and Cavite where needed at the earliest possible time.
(4) Pursuant to RA 9275,44 the LWUA, through the local water districts and in coordination with the DENR, is ordered to
provide, install, operate, and maintain sewerage and sanitation facilities and the efficient and safe collection, treatment, and
disposal of sewage in the provinces of Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan where needed at the earliest possible
time.
(5) Pursuant to Sec. 65 of RA 8550,45 the DA, through the BFAR, is ordered to improve and restore the marine life of the Manila
Bay. It is also directed to assist the LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal, Cavite, Laguna, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan in developing,
using recognized methods, the fisheries and aquatic resources in the Manila Bay.
(6) The PCG, pursuant to Secs. 4 and 6 of PD 979, and the PNP Maritime Group, in accordance with Sec. 124 of RA 8550, in
coordination with each other, shall apprehend violators of PD 979, RA 8550, and other existing laws and regulations designed
to prevent marine pollution in the Manila Bay.
(7) Pursuant to Secs. 2 and 6-c of EO 51346 and the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, the
PPA is ordered to immediately adopt such measures to prevent the discharge and dumping of solid and liquid wastes and
other ship-generated wastes into the Manila Bay waters from vessels docked at ports and apprehend the violators.
(8) The MMDA, as the lead agency and implementor of programs and projects for flood control projects and drainage services
in Metro Manila, in coordination with the DPWH, DILG, affected LGUs, PNP Maritime Group, Housing and Urban Development
Coordinating Council (HUDCC), and other agencies, shall dismantle and remove all structures, constructions, and other
encroachments established or built in violation of RA 7279, and other applicable laws along the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan
Rivers, the NCR (Parañaque-Zapote, Las Piñas) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, and connecting
waterways and esteros in Metro Manila. The DPWH, as the principal implementor of programs and projects for flood control
services in the rest of the country more particularly in Bulacan, Bataan, Pampanga, Cavite, and Laguna, in coordination with
the DILG, affected LGUs, PNP Maritime Group, HUDCC, and other concerned government agencies, shall remove and demolish
all structures, constructions, and other encroachments built in breach of RA 7279 and other applicable laws along the
Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and
other rivers, connecting waterways, and esteros that discharge wastewater into the Manila Bay.
In addition, the MMDA is ordered to establish, operate, and maintain a sanitary landfill, as prescribed by RA 9003, within a
period of one (1) year from finality of this Decision. On matters within its territorial jurisdiction and in connection with the
discharge of its duties on the maintenance of sanitary landfills and like undertakings, it is also ordered to cause the
apprehension and filing of the appropriate criminal cases against violators of the respective penal provisions of RA 9003,47
Sec. 27 of RA 9275 (the Clean Water Act), and other existing laws on pollution.
(9) The DOH shall, as directed by Art. 76 of PD 1067 and Sec. 8 of RA 9275, within one (1) year from finality of this Decision,
determine if all licensed septic and sludge companies have the proper facilities for the treatment and disposal of fecal sludge
and sewage coming from septic tanks. The DOH shall give the companies, if found to be non-complying, a reasonable time
within which to set up the necessary facilities under pain of cancellation of its environmental sanitation clearance.
(10) Pursuant to Sec. 53 of PD 1152,48 Sec. 118 of RA 8550, and Sec. 56 of RA 9003,49 the DepEd shall integrate lessons on
pollution prevention, waste management, environmental protection, and like subjects in the school curricula of all levels to
inculcate in the minds and hearts of students and, through them, their parents and friends, the importance of their duty
toward achieving and maintaining a balanced and healthful ecosystem in the Manila Bay and the entire Philippine archipelago.
(11) The DBM shall consider incorporating an adequate budget in the General Appropriations Act of 2010 and succeeding
years to cover the expenses relating to the cleanup, restoration, and preservation of the water quality of the Manila Bay, in line
with the country’s development objective to attain economic growth in a manner consistent with the protection, preservation,
and revival of our marine waters.
(12) The heads of petitioners-agencies MMDA, DENR, DepEd, DOH, DA, DPWH, DBM, PCG, PNP Maritime Group, DILG, and also
of MWSS, LWUA, and PPA, in line with the principle of "continuing mandamus," shall, from finality of this Decision, each submit
to the Court a quarterly progressive report of the activities undertaken in accordance with this Decision.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 79538 October 18, 1990
FELIPE YSMAEL, JR. & CO., INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE
DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT and TWIN PEAKS DEVELOPMENT AND REALTY
CORPORATION, respondents.
Tañada, Vivo & Tan for petitioner.
Antonio E. Escober and Jurado Law Office for respondent Twin Peaks Development Corporation.

COURTS, J.:
Soon after the change of government in February 1986, petitioner sent a letter dated March 17, 1986 to the Office of the
President, and another letter dated April 2, 1986 to Minister Ernesto Maceda of the Ministry of Natural Resources [MNR],
seeking: (1) the reinstatement of its timber license agreement which was cancelled in August 1983 during the Marcos
administration; (2) the revocation of TLA No. 356 which was issued to Twin Peaks Development and Realty Corporation
without public bidding and in violation of forestry laws, rules and regulations; and, (3) the issuance of an order allowing
petitioner to take possession of all logs found in the concession area [Annexes "6" and "7" of the Petition; Rollo, pp. 54-63].
Petitioner made the following allegations:
(a) That on October 12, 1965, it entered into a timber license agreement designated as TLA No. 87 with the Department of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, represented by then Secretary Jose Feliciano, wherein it was issued an exclusive license to
cut, collect and remove timber except prohibited species within a specified portion of public forest land with an area of 54,920
hectares located in the municipality of Maddela, province of Nueva Vizcaya * from October 12, 1965 until June 30, 1990;
(b) That on August 18, 1983, the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development [hereinafter referred to as "Bureau"], Director
Edmundo Cortes, issued a memorandum order stopping all logging operations in Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino provinces, and
cancelling the logging concession of petitioner and nine other forest concessionaires, pursuant to presidential instructions
and a memorandum order of the Minister of Natural Resources Teodoro Pena [Annex "5" of the Petition; Rollo, p. 49];
(c) that on August 25, 1983, petitioner received a telegram from the Bureau, the contents of which were as follows:
PURSUANT TO THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE PRESIDENT YOU ARE REQUESTED TO STOP ALL LOGGING OPERATIONS TO
CONSERVE REMAINING FORESTS PLEASE CONDUCT THE ORDERLY PULL-OUT OF LOGGING MACHINERIES AND EQUIPMENT
AND COORDINATE WITH THE RESPECTIVE DISTRICT FORESTERS FOR THE INVENTORY OF LOGS CUT PRIOR TO THIS
ORDER THE SUBMISSION OF A COMPLIANCE REPORT WITHIN THIRTY DAYS SHALL BE APPRECIATED — [Annex "4" of the
Petition; Rollo, p. 48];
(d) That after the cancellation of its timber license agreement, it immediately sent a letter addressed to then President
Ferdinand Marcos which sought reconsideration of the Bureau's directive, citing in support thereof its contributions to
alleging that it was not given the forest conservation and opportunity to be heard prior to the cancellation of its logging 531,
but no operations (Annex "6" of the Petition; Rollo, pp. 50 favorable action was taken on this letter;
(e) That barely one year thereafter, approximately one-half or 26,000 hectares of the area formerly covered by TLA No. 87
was re-awarded to Twin Peaks Development and Reality Corporation under TLA No. 356 which was set to expire on July 31,
2009, while the other half was allowed to be logged by Filipinas Loggers, Inc. without the benefit of a formal award or
license; and,
(f) That the latter entities were controlled or owned by relatives or cronies of deposed President Ferdinand Marcos. Acting on
petitioner's letter, the MNR through then Minister Ernesto Maceda issued an order dated July 22, 1986 denying petitioner's
request. The Ministry ruled that a timber license was not a contract within the due process clause of the Constitution, but only
a privilege which could be withdrawn whenever public interest or welfare so demands, and that petitioner was not
discriminated against in view of the fact that it was among ten concessionaires whose licenses were revoked in 1983.
Moreover, emphasis was made of the total ban of logging operations in the provinces of Nueva Ecija, Nueva Vizcaya, Quirino
and Ifugao imposed on April 2, 1986, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
It should be recalled that [petitioner's] earlier request for reinstatement has been denied in view of the total ban of all logging
operations in the provinces of Nueva Ecija, Nueva Vizcaya, Quirino and Ifugao which was imposed for reasons of conservation
and national security.
The Ministry imposed the ban because it realizes the great responsibility it bear [sic] in respect to forest t considers itself the
trustee thereof. This being the case, it has to ensure the availability of forest resources not only for the present, but also for the
future generations of Filipinos.
On the other hand, the activities of the insurgents in these parts of the country are well documented. Their financial demands
on logging concessionaires are well known. The government, therefore, is well within its right to deprive its enemy of sources
of funds in order to preserve itself, its established institutions and the liberty and democratic way of life of its people.
xxx xxx xxx
[Annex "9" of the Petition, pp. 2-4; Rollo, pp. 65-67.]
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the aforestated order reiterating, among others. its request that TLA No. 356 issued to
private respondent be declared null and void. The MNR however denied this motion in an order dated September 15, 1986.
stating in part:
xxx xxx xxx
Regarding [petitioner's] request that the award of a 26,000 hectare portion of TLA No. 87 to Twin Peaks Realty Development
Corporation under TLA No. 356 be declared null and void, suffice it to say that the Ministry is now in the process of reviewing
all contracts, permits or other form of privileges for the exploration, development, exploitation, or utilization of natural
resources entered into, granted, issued or acquired before the issuance of Proclamation No. 3, otherwise known as the
Freedom Constitution for the purpose of amending, modifying or revoking them when the national interest so requires.
xxx xxx xxx
The Ministry, through the Bureau of Forest Development, has jurisdiction and authority over all forest lands. On the basis of
this authority, the Ministry issued the order banning all logging operations/activities in Quirino province, among others,
where movant's former concession area is located. Therefore, the issuance of an order disallowing any person or entity from
removing cut or uncut logs from the portion of TLA No. 87, now under TLA No. 356, would constitute an unnecessary or
superfluous act on the part of the Ministry.
xxx xxx xxx
[Annex "11" of the Petition, pp. 3-4; Rollo, pp. 77-78.]
On November 26, 1986, petitioner's supplemental motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Meanwhile, per MNR
Administrative Order No. 54, series of 1986, issued on November 26, 1986, the logging ban in the province of Quirino was
lifted.
Petitioner subsequently appealed from the orders of the MNR to the Office of the President. In a resolution dated July 6, 1987,
the Office of the President, acting through then Deputy Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, denied petitioner's appeal for
lack of merit. The Office of the President ruled that the appeal of petitioner was prematurely filed, the matter not having been
terminated in the MNR. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied on August 14, 1987.
Hence, petitioner filed directly with this Court a petition for certiorari, with prayer for the issuance of a restraining order or
writ of preliminary injunction, on August 27, 1987. On October 13, 1987, it filed a supplement to its petition for certiorari.
Thereafter, public and private respondents submitted their respective comments, and petitioner filed its consolidated reply
thereto. In a resolution dated May 22, 1989, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition.
After a careful study of the circumstances in the case at bar, the Court finds several factors which militate against the issuance
of a writ of certiorari in favor of petitioner.
1. Firstly, the refusal of public respondents herein to reverse final and executory administrative orders does not
constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
It is an established doctrine in this jurisdiction that the decisions and orders of administrative agencies have upon their
finality, the force and binding effect of a final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata. These decisions and
orders are as conclusive upon the rights of the affected parties as though the same had been rendered by a court of general
jurisdiction. The rule of res judicata thus forbids the reopening of a matter once determined by competent authority acting
within their exclusive jurisdiction [See Brillantes v. Castro, 99 Phil. 497 (1956); Ipekdjian Merchandising Co., Inc. v. Court of
Tax Appeals, G.R. No. L-15430, September 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 72; San Luis v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 80160, June 26, 1989].
In the case at bar, petitioner's letters to the Office of the President and the MNR [now the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) dated March 17, 1986 and April 2, 1986, respectively, sought the reconsideration of a
memorandum order issued by the Bureau of Forest Development which cancelled its timber license agreement in 1983, as
well as the revocation of TLA No. 356 subsequently issued by the Bureau to private respondents in 1984.
But as gleaned from the record, petitioner did not avail of its remedies under the law, i.e. Section 8 of Pres. Dec. No. 705 as
amended, for attacking the validity of these administrative actions until after 1986. By the time petitioner sent its letter dated
April 2, 1986 to the newly appointed Minister of the MNR requesting reconsideration of the above Bureau actions, these were
already settled matters as far as petitioner was concerned [See Rueda v. Court of Agrarian Relations, 106 Phil. 300 (1959);
Danan v. Aspillera G.R. No. L-17305, November 28, 1962, 6 SCRA 609; Ocampo v. Arboleda G.R. No. L-48190, August 31, 1987,
153 SCRA 374].
No particular significance can be attached to petitioner's letter dated September 19, 1983 which petitioner claimed to have
sent to then President Marcos [Annex "6" of Petition, Rollo, pp. 50-53], seeking the reconsideration of the 1983 order issued by
Director Cortes of the Bureau. It must be pointed out that the averments in this letter are entirely different from the charges of
fraud against officials under the previous regime made by petitioner in its letters to public respondents herein. In the letter to
then President Marcos, petitioner simply contested its inclusion in the list of concessionaires, whose licenses were cancelled,
by defending its record of selective logging and reforestation practices in the subject concession area. Yet, no other
administrative steps appear to have been taken by petitioner until 1986, despite the fact that the alleged fraudulent scheme
became apparent in 1984 as evidenced by the awarding of the subject timber concession area to other entities in that year.
2. Moreover, petitioner is precluded from availing of the benefits of a writ of certiorari in the present case because he failed to
file his petition within a reasonable period.
The principal issue ostensibly presented for resolution in the instant petition is whether or not public respondents herein
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in refusing to overturn administrative orders
issued by their predecessors in the past regime. Yet, what the petition ultimately seeks is the nullification of the Bureau orders
cancelling TLA No. 87 and granting TLA No. 356 to private respondent, which were issued way back in 1983 and 1984,
respectively.
Once again, the fact that petitioner failed to seasonably take judicial recourse to have the earlier administrative actions
reviewed by the courts through a petition for certiorari is prejudicial to its cause. For although no specific time frame is fixed
for the institution of a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, the same must
nevertheless be done within a "reasonable time". The yardstick to measure the timeliness of a petition for certiorari is the
"reasonableness of the length of time that had expired from the commission of the acts complained of up to the institution of
the proceeding to annul the same" [Toledo v. Pardo, G.R. No. 56761, November 19, 1982, 118 SCRA 566, 571]. And failure to
file the petition for certiorari within a reasonable period of time renders the petitioner susceptible to the adverse legal
consequences of laches [Municipality of Carcar v. Court of First Instance of Cebu, G.R. No. L-31628, December 27, 1982, 119
SCRA 392).
Laches is defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which by exercising
due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, or to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption
that the party entitled thereto has either abandoned it or declined to assert it [Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, G.R. No. L-21450, April
15, 1968, 23 SCRA 29; Seno v. Mangubat, G.R. No. L-44339, December 2, 1987, 156 SCRA 113]. The rule is that unreasonable
delay on the part of a plaintiff in seeking to enforce an alleged right may, depending upon the circumstances, be destructive of
the right itself. Verily, the laws aid those who are vigilant, not those who sleep upon their rights (Vigilantibus et non
dormientibus jura subveniunt) [See Buenaventura v. David, 37 Phil. 435 (1918)].
In the case at bar, petitioner waited for at least three years before it finally filed a petition for certiorari with the Court
attacking the validity of the assailed Bureau actions in 1983 and 1984. Considering that petitioner, throughout the period of its
inaction, was not deprived of the opportunity to seek relief from the courts which were normally operating at the time, its
delay constitutes unreasonable and inexcusable neglect, tantamount to laches. Accordingly, the writ of certiorari requiring the
reversal of these orders will not lie.
3. Finally, there is a more significant factor which bars the issuance of a writ of certiorari in favor of petitioner and against
public respondents herein. It is precisely this for which prevents the Court from departing from the general application of the
rules enunciated above.
A cursory reading of the assailed orders issued by public respondent Minister Maceda of the MNR which were ed by the Office
of the President, will disclose public policy consideration which effectively forestall judicial interference in the case at bar,
Public respondents herein, upon whose shoulders rests the task of implementing the policy to develop and conserve the
country's natural resources, have indicated an ongoing department evaluation of all timber license agreements entered into,
and permits or licenses issued, under the previous dispensation. In fact, both the executive and legislative departments of the
incumbent administration are presently taking stock of its environmental policies with regard to the utilization of timber lands
and developing an agenda for future programs for their conservation and rehabilitation.
The ongoing administrative reassessment is apparently in response to the renewed and growing global concern over the
despoliation of forest lands and the utter disregard of their crucial role in sustaining a balanced ecological system. The
legitimacy of such concern can hardly be disputed, most especially in this country. The Court takes judicial notice of the
profligate waste of the country's forest resources which has not only resulted in the irreversible loss of flora and fauna
peculiar to the region, but has produced even more disastrous and lasting economic and social effects. The delicate balance of
nature having been upset, a vicious cycle of floods and droughts has been triggered and the supply of food and energy
resources required by the people seriously depleted.
While there is a desire to harness natural resources to amass profit and to meet the country's immediate financial
requirements, the more essential need to ensure future generations of Filipinos of their survival in a viable environment
demands effective and circumspect action from the government to check further denudation of whatever remains of the forest
lands. Nothing less is expected of the government, in view of the clear constitutional command to maintain a balanced and
healthful ecology. Section 16 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides:
SEC. 16. The State shall protect and promote the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the
rhythm and harmony of nature.
Thus, while the administration grapples with the complex and multifarious problems caused by unbridled exploitation of
these resources, the judiciary will stand clear. A long line of cases establish the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in
matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities
coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies [See Espinosa v. Makalintal, 79 Phil. 134 (1947);
Coloso v. Board of Accountancy, 92 Phil. 938 (1953); Pajo v. Ago, 108 Phil. 905 (1960); Suarez v. Reyes, G.R. No. L-19828,
February 28, 1963, 7 SCRA 461; Ganitano v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, G. R. No. L-21167, March 31, 1966,
16 SCRA 543; Villegas v. Auditor General, G.R. No. L-21352, November 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 877; Manuel v. Villena, G.R. No. L-
28218, February 27, 1971, 37 SCRA 745; Lacuesta v. Herrera, G.R. No. L-33646, January 28, 1975, 62 SCRA 115; Lianga Bay
Logging Co., Inc. v. Enage, G.R. No. L-30637, July 16, 1987, 152 SCRA 80]. More so where, as in the present case, the interests of
a private logging company are pitted against that of the public at large on the pressing public policy issue of forest
conservation. For this Court recognizes the wide latitude of discretion possessed by the government in determining the
appropriate actions to be taken to preserve and manage natural resources, and the proper parties who should enjoy the
privilege of utilizing these resources [Director of Forestry v. Munoz, G.R. No. L-24796, June 28, 1968, 23 SCRA 1183; Lim, Sr. v.
The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, G.R. No. L-26990, August 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 751]. Timber licenses,
permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of
forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege
granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular
concession area and the forest products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief
Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of
law clause [See Sections 3 (ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548,
October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].
In fine, the legal precepts highlighted in the foregoing discussion more than suffice to justify the Court's refusal to interfere in
the DENR evaluation of timber licenses and permits issued under the previous regime, or to pre-empt the adoption of
appropriate corrective measures by the department.
Nevertheless, the Court cannot help but express its concern regarding alleged irregularities in the issuance of timber license
agreements to a number of logging concessionaires.
The grant of licenses or permits to exploit the country's timber resources, if done in contravention of the procedure outlined in
the law, or as a result of fraud and undue influence exerted on department officials, is indicative of an arbitrary and whimsical
exercise of the State's power to regulate the use and exploitation of forest resources. The alleged practice of bestowing "special
favors" to preferred individuals, regardless of merit, would be an abuse of this power. And this Court will not be a party to a
flagrant mockery of the avowed public policy of conservation enshrined in the 1987 Constitution. Therefore, should the
appropriate case be brought showing a clear grave abuse of discretion on the part of officials in the DENR and related bureaus
with respect to the implementation of this public policy, the Court win not hesitate to step in and wield its authority, when
invoked, in the exercise of judicial powers under the Constitution [Section 1, Article VIII].
However, petitioner having failed to make out a case showing grave abuse of discretion on the part of public respondents
herein, the Court finds no basis to issue a writ of certiorari and to grant any of the affirmative reliefs sought.
WHEREFORE, the present petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez Jr. and Bidin, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.

G.R. No. 98332 January 16, 1995

MINERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, and JOEL D. MUYCO, Director of
Mines and Geosciences Bureau, respondents.

ROMERO, J.:
The instant petition seeks a ruling from this Court on the validity of two Administrative Orders issued by the Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources to carry out the provisions of certain Executive Orders promulgated by the
President in the lawful exercise of legislative powers.
Herein controversy was precipitated by the change introduced by Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution on the system
of exploration, development and utilization of the country's natural resources. No longer is the utilization of inalienable lands
of public domain through "license, concession or lease" under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions 1 allowed under the 1987
Constitution.
The adoption of the concept of jura regalia2 that all natural resources are owned by the State embodied in the 1935, 1973 and
1987 Constitutions, as well as the recognition of the importance of the country's natural resources, not only for national
economic development, but also for its security and national defense, 3 ushered in the adoption of the constitutional policy of
"full control and supervision by the State" in the exploration, development and utilization of the country's natural resources.
The options open to the State are through direct undertaking or by entering into co-production, joint venture; or production-
sharing agreements, or by entering into agreement with foreign-owned corporations for large-scale exploration, development
and utilization.
Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of
agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural
resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may
enter into co-production, joint venture, or product-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at
least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five
years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of
water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, beneficial
use may be the measure and limit of the grant.
xxx xxx xxx
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for
large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general
terms and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In
such agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local scientific and technical resources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this provision, within thirty days
from its execution. (Emphasis supplied)
Pursuant to the mandate of the above-quoted provision, legislative acts4 were successively issued by the President in the
exercise of her legislative 
power.5
To implement said legislative acts, the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) in turn
promulgated Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82, the validity and constitutionality of which are being challenged in this
petition.
On July 10, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her then legislative powers under Article II, Section 1 of the
Provisional Constitution and Article XIII, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution, promulgated Executive Order No. 211
prescribing the interim procedures in the processing and approval of applications for the exploration, development and
utilization of minerals pursuant to the 1987 Constitution in order to ensure the continuity of mining operations and activities
and to hasten the development of mineral resources. The pertinent provisions read as follows:
Sec. 1. Existing mining permits, licenses, leases and other mining grants issued by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources and Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences, including existing operating agreements and mining service contracts, shall
continue and remain in full force and effect, subject to the same terms and conditions as originally granted and/or approved.
Sec. 2. Applications for the exploration, development and utilization of mineral resources, including renewal applications for
approval of operating agreements and mining service contracts, shall be accepted and processed and may be approved;
concomitantly thereto, declarations of locations and all other kinds of mining applications shall be accepted and registered by
the Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences.
Sec. 3. The processing, evaluation and approval of all mining applications, declarations of locations, operating agreements and
service contracts as provided for in Section 2 above, shall be governed by Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, other
existing mining laws and their implementing rules and regulations: Provided, however, that the privileges granted, as well as
the terms and conditions thereof shall be subject to any and all modifications or alterations which Congress may adopt
pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
On July 25, 1987, President Aquino likewise promulgated Executive Order No. 279 authorizing the DENR Secretary to
negotiate and conclude joint venture, co-production, or production-sharing agreements for the exploration, development and
utilization of mineral resources, and prescribing the guidelines for such agreements and those agreements involving technical
or financial assistance by foreign-owned corporations for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals.
The pertinent provisions relevant to this petition are as follows:
Sec. 1. The Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (hereinafter referred to as "the Secretary") is
hereby authorized to negotiate and enter into, for and in behalf of the Government, joint venture, co-production, or
production-sharing agreements for the exploration, development, and utilization of mineral resources with any Filipino
citizens, or corporation or association at least sixty percent (60%) of whose capital is owned by Filipino citizens. Such joint
venture, co-production, or production-sharing agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for
not more than twenty-five years, and shall include the minimum terms and conditions prescribed in Section 2 hereof. In the
execution of a joint venture, co-production or production agreements, the contracting parties, including the Government, may
consolidate two or more contiguous or geologically — related mining claims or leases and consider them as one contract area
for purposes of determining the subject of the joint venture, co-production, or production-sharing agreement.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 6. The Secretary shall promulgate such supplementary rules and regulations as may be necessary to effectively implement
the provisions of this Executive Order.
Sec. 7. All provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, other existing mining laws, and their implementing rules and
regulations, or parts thereof, which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Executive Order, shall continue in force and
effect.
Pursuant to Section 6 of Executive Order No. 279, the DENR Secretary issued on June 23, 1989 DENR Administrative Order
No. 57, series of 1989, captioned "Guidelines of Mineral Production Sharing Agreement under Executive Order No. 279." 6
Under the transitory provision of said DENR Administrative Order No. 57, embodied in its Article 9, all existing mining leases
or agreements which were granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution pursuant to Executive Order No. 211, except
small scale mining leases and those pertaining to sand and gravel and quarry resources covering an area of twenty (20)
hectares or less, shall be converted into production-sharing agreements within one (1) year from the effectivity of these
guidelines.
On November 20, 1980, the Secretary of the DENR Administrative Order No. 82, series of 1990, laying down the
"Procedural Guidelines on the Award of Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) through Negotiation."7
Section 3 of the aforementioned DENR Administrative Order No. 82 enumerates the persons or entities required to submit
Letter of Intent (LOIs) and Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSAs) within two (2) years from the effectivity of DENR
Administrative Order No. 57 or until July 17, 1991. Failure to do so within the prescribed period shall cause the abandonment
of mining, quarry and sand and gravel claims. Section 3 of DENR Administrative Order No. 82 provides:
Sec. 3. Submission of Letter of Intent (LOIs) and MPSAs). The following shall submit their LOIs and MPSAs within two (2) years
from the effectivity of DENR A.O. 57 or until July 17, 1991.
i. Declaration of Location (DOL) holders, mining lease applicants, exploration permitees, quarry applicants and other mining
applicants whose mining/quarry applications have not been perfected prior to the effectivity of DENR Administrative Order
No. 57.
ii. All holders of DOL acquired after the effectivity of DENR A.O. No. 57.
iii. Holders of mining leases or similar agreements which were granted after (the) effectivity of 1987 Constitution.
Failure to submit letters of intent and MPSA applications/proposals within the prescribed period shall cause the abandonment
of mining, quarry and sand and gravel claims.
The issuance and the impeding implementation by the DENR of Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 after their respective
effectivity dates compelled the Miners Association of the Philippines, Inc.8 to file the instant petition assailing their validity and
constitutionality before this Court.
In this petition for certiorari, petitioner Miners Association of the Philippines, Inc. mainly contends that respondent Secretary
of DENR issued both Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 in excess of his rule-making power under Section 6 of Executive
Order No. 279. On the assumption that the questioned administrative orders do not conform with Executive Order Nos. 211
and 279, petitioner contends that both orders violate the non-impairment of contract provision under Article III, Section 10 of
the 1987 Constitution on the ground that Administrative Order No. 57 unduly pre-terminates existing mining agreements and
automatically converts them into production-sharing agreements within one (1) year from its effectivity date. On the other
hand, Administrative Order No. 82 declares that failure to submit Letters of Intent and Mineral Production-Sharing
Agreements within two (2) years from the date of effectivity of said guideline or on July 17, 1991 shall cause the abandonment
of their mining, quarry and sand gravel permits.
On July 2, 1991, the Court, acting on petitioner's urgent ex-parte petition for issuance of a restraining order/preliminary
injunction, issued a Temporary Restraining Order, upon posting of a P500,000.00 bond, enjoining the enforcement and
implementation of DENR Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82, as amended, Series of 1989 and 1990, respectively. 9
On November 13, 1991, Continental Marble Corporation, 10 thru its President, Felipe A. David, sought to intervene 11 in this
case alleging that because of the temporary order issued by the Court , the DENR, Regional Office No. 3 in San Fernando,
Pampanga refused to renew its Mines Temporary Permit after it expired on July 31, 1991. Claiming that its rights and interests
are prejudicially affected by the implementation of DENR Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82, it joined petitioner herein in
seeking to annul Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 and prayed that the DENR, Regional Office No. 3 be ordered to issue a
Mines Temporary Permit in its favor to enable it to operate during the pendency of the suit.
Public respondents were acquired to comment on the Continental Marble Corporation's petition for intervention in the
resolution of November 28, 1991.12
Now to the main petition. If its argued that Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 have the effect of repealing or abrogating
existing mining laws 13 which are not inconsistent with the provisions of Executive Order No. 279. Invoking Section 7 of said
Executive Order No. 279, 14 petitioner maintains that respondent DENR Secretary cannot provide guidelines such as
Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 which are inconsistent with the provisions of Executive Order No. 279 because both
Executive Order Nos. 211 and 279 merely reiterated the acceptance and registration of declarations of location and all other
kinds of mining applications by the Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as
amended, until Congress opts to modify or alter the same.
In other words, petitioner would have us rule that DENR Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 issued by the DENR Secretary in
the exercise of his rule-making power are tainted with invalidity inasmuch as both contravene or subvert the provisions of
Executive Order Nos. 211 and 279 or embrace matters not covered, nor intended to be covered, by the aforesaid laws.
We disagree.
We reiterate the principle that the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules and regulations in the implementation
of a statute is necessarily limited only to carrying into effect what is provided in the legislative enactment. The principle was
enunciated as early as 1908 in the case of United States v. Barrias. 15 The scope of the exercise of such rule-making power was
clearly expressed in the case of United States v. Tupasi Molina, 16 decided in 1914, thus: "Of course, the regulations adopted
under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and for the sole
purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself can not be extended. So long,
however, as the regulations relate solely to carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law
itself can not be extended. So long, however, as the regulations relate solely to carrying into effect the provision of the law,
they are valid."
Recently, the case of People v. Maceren 17 gave a brief delienation of the scope of said power of administrative officials:
Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the
provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provision. By such regulations, of
course, the law itself cannot be extended (U.S. v. Tupasi Molina, supra). An administrative agency cannot amend an act of
Congress (Santos vs. Estenzo, 109 Phil. 419, 422; Teoxon vs. Members of the Board of Administrators, L-25619, June 30, 1970,
33 SCRA 585; Manuel vs. General Auditing Office, L-28952, December 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 660; Deluao v. Casteel, L-21906,
August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 350).
The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has
been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not
covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned (University of Santo Tomas v. Board of Tax
Appeals, 93 Phil. 376, 382, citing 12 C.J. 845-46. As to invalid regulations, see Collector of Internal Revenue v. Villaflor, 69 Phil.
319; Wise & Co. v. Meer, 78 Phil. 655, 676; Del Mar v. Phil. Veterans Administration, L-27299, June 27, 1973, 51 SCRA 340,
349).
xxx xxx xxx
. . . The rule or regulation should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the administrative
agency (Davis, Administrative Law, p. 194, 197, cited in Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Social Security Commission, 114 Phil. 555,
558).
In case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or regulation issued to implement said law, the basic prevails because
said rule or regulations cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law (People v. Lim, 108 Phil. 1091).
Considering that administrative rules draw life from the statute which they seek to implement, it is obvious that the spring
cannot rise higher than its source. We now examine petitioner's argument that DENR Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82
contravene Executive Order Nos. 211 and 279 as both operate to repeal or abrogate Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended,
and other mining laws allegedly acknowledged as the principal law under Executive Order Nos. 211 and 279.
Petitioner's insistence on the application of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, as the governing law on the acceptance
and approval of declarations of location and all other kinds of applications for the exploration, development, and utilization of
mineral resources pursuant to Executive Order No. 211, is erroneous. Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, pertains to
the old system of exploration, development and utilization of natural resources through "license, concession or lease" which,
however, has been disallowed by Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. By virtue of the said constitutional mandate
and its implementing law, Executive Order No. 279 which superseded Executive Order No. 211, the provisions dealing on
"license, concession or lease" of mineral resources under Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, and other existing mining
laws are deemed repealed and, therefore, ceased to operate as the governing law. In other words, in all other areas of
administration and management of mineral lands, the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, and other
existing mining laws, still govern. Section 7 of Executive Order No. 279 provides, thus:
Sec. 7. All provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, other existing mining laws, and their implementing rules and
regulations, or parts thereof, which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Executive Order, shall continue in force and
effect.
Specifically, the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, on lease of mining claims under Chapter VIII, quarry
permits on privately-owned lands of quarry license on public lands under Chapter XIII and other related provisions on lease,
license and permits are not only inconsistent with the raison d'etre for which Executive Order No. 279 was passed, but
contravene the express mandate of Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. It force and effectivity is thus foreclosed.
Upon the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution on February 2, 1987, 18 the State assumed a more dynamic role in the exploration,
development and utilization of the natural resources of the country. Article XII, Section 2 of the said Charter explicitly ordains
that the exploration, development and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the
State. Consonant therewith, the exploration, development and utilization of natural resources may be undertaken by means of
direct act of the State, or it may opt to enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements, or it may
enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale
exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms and
conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country.
Given these considerations, there is no clear showing that respondent DENR Secretary has transcended the bounds
demarcated by Executive Order No. 279 for the exercise of his rule-making power tantamount to a grave abuse of discretion.
Section 6 of Executive Order No. 279 specifically authorizes said official to promulgate such supplementary rules and
regulations as may be necessary to effectively implement the provisions thereof. Moreover, the subject sought to be governed
and regulated by the questioned orders is germane to the objects and purposes of Executive Order No. 279 specifically issued
to carry out the mandate of Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution.
Petitioner likewise maintains that Administrative Order No. 57, in relation to Administrative Order No. 82, impairs vested
rights as to violate the non-impairment of contract doctrine guaranteed under Article III, Section 10 of the 1987 Constitution
because Article 9 of Administrative Order No. 57 unduly pre-terminates and automatically converts mining leases and other
mining agreements into production-sharing agreements within one (1) year from effectivity of said guideline, while Section 3
of Administrative Order No. 82, declares that failure to submit Letters of Intent (LOIs) and MPSAs within two (2) years from
the effectivity of Administrative Order No. 57 or until July 17, 1991 shall cause the abandonment of mining, quarry, and sand
gravel permits.
In Support of the above contention, it is argued by petitioner that Executive Order No. 279 does not contemplate automatic
conversion of mining lease agreements into mining production-sharing agreement as provided under Article 9, Administrative
Order No. 57 and/or the consequent abandonment of mining claims for failure to submit LOIs and MPSAs under Section 3,
Administrative Order No. 82 because Section 1 of said Executive Order No. 279 empowers the DENR Secretary to negotiate
and enter into voluntary agreements which must set forth the minimum terms and conditions provided under Section 2
thereof. Moreover, petitioner contends that the power to regulate and enter into mining agreements does not include the
power to preterminate existing mining lease agreements.
To begin with, we dispel the impression created by petitioner's argument that the questioned administrative orders unduly
preterminate existing mining leases in general. A distinction which spells a real difference must be drawn. Article XII, Section 2
of the 1987 Constitution does not apply retroactively to "license, concession or lease" granted by the government under the
1973 Constitution or before the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution on February 2, 1987. The intent to apply prospectively said
constitutional provision was stressed during the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission, 19 thus:
MR. DAVIDE: Under the proposal, I notice that except for the [inalienable] lands of the public domain, all other natural
resources cannot be alienated and in respect to [alienable] lands of the public domain, private corporations with the required
ownership by Filipino citizens can only lease the same. Necessarily, insofar as other natural resources are concerned, it would
only be the State which can exploit, develop, explore and utilize the same. However, the State may enter into a joint venture,
co-production or production-sharing. Is that not correct?
MR. VILLEGAS: Yes.
MR. DAVIDE: Consequently, henceforth upon, the approval of this Constitution, no timber or forest concession, permits or
authorization can be exclusively granted to any citizen of the Philippines nor to any corporation qualified to acquire lands of
the public domain?
MR. VILLEGAS: Would Commissioner Monsod like to comment on that? I think his answer is "yes."
MR. DAVIDE: So, what will happen now license or concessions earlier granted by the Philippine government to private
corporations or to Filipino citizens? Would they be deemed repealed?
MR. VILLEGAS: This is not applied retroactively. They will be respected.
MR. DAVIDE: In effect, they will be deemed repealed?
MR. VILLEGAS: No. (Emphasis supplied)
During the transition period or after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution on February 2, 1987 until the first Congress under
said Constitution was convened on July 27, 1987, two (2) successive laws, Executive Order Nos. 211 and 279, were
promulgated to govern the processing and approval of applications for the exploration, development and utilization of
minerals. To carry out the purposes of said laws, the questioned Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82, now being assailed,
were issued by the DENR Secretary.
Article 9 of Administrative Order No. 57 provides:
ARTICLE 9
TRANSITORY PROVISION
9.1. All existing mining leases or agreements which were granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution pursuant to
Executive Order No. 211, except small scale mining leases and those pertaining to sand and gravel and quarry resources
covering an area of twenty (20) hectares or less shall be subject to these guidelines. All such leases or agreements shall be
converted into production sharing agreement within one (1) year from the effectivity of these guidelines. However, any
minimum firm which has established mining rights under Presidential Decree 463 or other laws may avail of the provisions of
EO 279 by following the procedures set down in this document.
It is clear from the aforestated provision that Administrative Order No. 57 applies only to all existing mining leases or
agreements which were granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution pursuant to Executive Order No. 211. It bears
mention that under the text of Executive Order No. 211, there is a reservation clause which provides that the privileges as well
as the terms and conditions of all existing mining leases or agreements granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution
pursuant to Executive Order No. 211, shall be subject to any and all modifications or alterations which Congress may adopt
pursuant to Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. Hence, the strictures of the non-impairment of contract clause
under Article III, Section 10 of the 1987 Constitution 20 do not apply to the aforesaid leases or agreements granted after the
effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, pursuant to Executive Order No. 211. They can be amended, modified or altered by a
statute passed by Congress to achieve the purposes of Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution.
Clearly, Executive Order No. 279 issued on July 25, 1987 by President Corazon C. Aquino in the exercise of her legislative
power has the force and effect of a statute or law passed by Congress. As such, it validly modified or altered the privileges
granted, as well as the terms and conditions of mining leases and agreements under Executive Order No. 211 after the
effectivity of the 1987 Constitution by authorizing the DENR Secretary to negotiate and conclude joint venture, co-production,
or production-sharing agreements for the exploration, development and utilization of mineral resources and prescribing the
guidelines for such agreements and those agreements involving technical or financial assistance by foreign-owned
corporations for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals.
Well -settled is the rule, however, that regardless of the reservation clause, mining leases or agreements granted by the State,
such as those granted pursuant to Executive Order No. 211 referred to this petition, are subject to alterations through a
reasonable exercise of the police power of the State. In the 1950 case of Ongsiako v. Gamboa, 21 where the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 34 changing the 50-50 sharecropping system in existing agricultural tenancy contracts to 55-45 in favor of
tenants was challenged, the Court, upholding the constitutionality of the law, emphasized the superiority of the police power
of the State over the sanctity of this contract:
The prohibition contained in constitutional provisions against: impairing the obligation of contracts is not an absolute one and
it is not to be read with literal exactness like a mathematical formula. Such provisions are restricted to contracts which respect
property, or some object or value, and confer rights which may be asserted in a court of justice, and have no application to
statute relating to public subjects within the domain of the general legislative powers of the State, and involving the public
rights and public welfare of the entire community affected by it. They do not prevent a proper exercise by the State of its police
powers. By enacting regulations reasonably necessary to secure the health, safety, morals, comfort, or general welfare of the
community, even the contracts may thereby be affected; for such matter can not be placed by contract beyond the power of the
State shall regulates and control them. 22
In Ramas v. CAR and Ramos 23 where the constitutionality of Section 14 of Republic Act No. 1199 authorizing the tenants to
charge from share to leasehold tenancy was challenged on the ground that it impairs the obligation of contracts, the Court
ruled that obligations of contracts must yield to a proper exercise of the police power when such power is exercised to
preserve the security of the State and the means adopted are reasonably adapted to the accomplishment of that end and are,
therefore, not arbitrary or oppressive.
The economic policy on the exploration, development and utilization of the country's natural resources under Article XII,
Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution could not be any clearer. As enunciated in Article XII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, the
exploration, development and utilization of natural resources under the new system mandated in Section 2, is geared towards
a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income, and wealth; a sustained increase in the amount of goods and services
produced by the nation for the benefit of the people; and an expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for
all, especially the underprivileged.
The exploration, development and utilization of the country's natural resources are matters vital to the public
interest and the general welfare of the people. The recognition of the importance of the country's natural resources was
expressed as early as the 1984 Constitutional Convention. In connection therewith, the 1986 U.P. Constitution Project
observed: "The 1984 Constitutional Convention recognized the importance of our natural resources not only for its security
and national defense. Our natural resources which constitute the exclusive heritage of the Filipino nation, should be preserved
for those under the sovereign authority of that nation and for their prosperity. This will ensure the country's survival as a
viable and sovereign republic."
Accordingly, the State, in the exercise of its police power in this regard, may not be precluded by the constitutional restriction
on non-impairment of contract from altering, modifying and amending the mining leases or agreements granted under
Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, pursuant to Executive Order No. 211. Police Power, being co-extensive with the
necessities of the case and the demands of public interest; extends to all the vital public needs. The passage of Executive Order No.
279 which superseded Executive Order No. 211 provided legal basis for the DENR Secretary to carry into effect the mandate of
Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution.
Nowhere in Administrative Order No. 57 is there any provision which would lead us to conclude that the questioned order
authorizes the automatic conversion of mining leases and agreements granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution,
pursuant to Executive Order No. 211, to production-sharing agreements. The provision in Article 9 of Administrative Order No.
57 that "all such leases or agreements shall be converted into production sharing agreements within one (1) year from the
effectivity of these guidelines" could not possibility contemplate a unilateral declaration on the part of the Government that all
existing mining leases and agreements are automatically converted into
production-sharing agreements. On the contrary, the use of the term "production-sharing agreement" if they are so minded.
Negotiation negates compulsion or automatic conversion as suggested by petitioner in the instant petition. A mineral
production-sharing agreement (MPSA) requires a meeting of the minds of the parties after negotiations arrived at in good faith
and in accordance with the procedure laid down in the subsequent Administrative Order No. 82.
We, therefore, rule that the questioned administrative orders are reasonably directed to the accomplishment of the
purposes of the law under which they were issued and were intended to secure the paramount interest of the public,
their economic growth and welfare. The validity and constitutionality of Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 must be
sustained, and their force and effect upheld.
We now, proceed to the petition-in-intervention. Under Section 2, Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of Court, an intervention in a
case is proper when the intervenor has a "legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or
an interest against both, or when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property
in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof. "Continental Marble Corporation has not sufficiently shown that it falls
under any of the categories mentioned above. The refusal of the DENR, Regional Office No. 3, San Fernando, Pampanga to
renew its Mines Temporary Permit does not justify such an intervention by Continental Marble Corporation for the purpose of
obtaining a directive from this Court for the issuance of said permit. Whether or not Continental Marble matter best addressed
to the appropriate government body but certainly, not through this Court. Intervention is hereby DENIED.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Temporary Restraining Order issued on July 2, 1991 is hereby
LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ.,
concur.

G.R. No. 167707 October 8, 2008

THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE REGIONAL EXECUTIVE
DIRECTOR, DENR-REGION VI, REGIONAL TECHNICAL DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU, REGION
VI PROVINCIAL ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES OFFICER OF KALIBO, AKLAN, REGISTER OF DEEDS,
DIRECTOR OF LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF TOURISM SECRETARY, DIRECTOR OF PHILIPPINE
TOURISM AUTHORITY, petitioners,
vs.
MAYOR JOSE S. YAP, LIBERTAD TALAPIAN, MILA Y. SUMNDAD, and ANICETO YAP, in their behalf and in behalf of all
those similarly situated, respondents.

x--------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. G.R. No. 173775 October 8, 2008
DR. ORLANDO SACAY and WILFREDO GELITO, joined by THE LANDOWNERS OF BORACAY SIMILARLY SITUATED
NAMED IN A LIST, ANNEX "A" OF THIS PETITION, petitioners,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE REGIONAL TECHNICAL
DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU, REGION VI, PROVINCIAL ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES OFFICER, KALIBO, AKLAN, respondents.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
AT stake in these consolidated cases is the right of the present occupants of Boracay Island to secure titles over their occupied
lands.
There are two consolidated petitions. The first is G.R. No. 167707, a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) affirming that2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Kalibo, Aklan, which granted the petition for
declaratory relief filed by respondents-claimants Mayor Jose Yap, et al. and ordered the survey of Boracay for titling purposes.
The second is G.R. No. 173775, a petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No. 10645">[3] issued
by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo classifying Boracay into reserved forest and agricultural land.
The Antecedents
G.R. No. 167707
Boracay Island in the Municipality of Malay, Aklan, with its powdery white sand beaches and warm crystalline waters, is
reputedly a premier Philippine tourist destination. The island is also home to 12,003 inhabitants4 who live in the bone-shaped
island’s three barangays.5
On April 14, 1976, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) approved the National Reservation Survey
of Boracay
Island,6 which identified several lots as being occupied or claimed by named persons.7
On November 10, 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No. 18018 declaring Boracay Island, among
other islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as tourist zones and marine reserves under the administration of the
Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). President Marcos later approved the issuance of PTA Circular 3-829 dated September 3,
1982, to implement Proclamation No. 1801.
Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded them from filing an application for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes, respondents-claimants
Mayor Jose S. Yap, Jr., Libertad Talapian, Mila Y. Sumndad, and Aniceto Yap filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC
in Kalibo, Aklan.
In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts on their
right to secure titles over their occupied lands. They declared that they themselves, or through their predecessors-in-interest,
had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier
since time immemorial. They declared their lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes on them.10
Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No. 1801 and its implementing Circular did not place Boracay beyond the
commerce of man. Since the Island was classified as a tourist zone, it was susceptible of private ownership. Under Section
48(b) of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, they had the right to have the lots
registered in their names through judicial confirmation of imperfect titles.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the petition for declaratory relief. The OSG countered
that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands classified as "public
forest," which was not available for disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705 or the Revised
Forestry Code,11 as amended.
The OSG maintained that respondents-claimants’ reliance on PD No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 was misplaced. Their
right to judicial confirmation of title was governed by CA No. 141 and PD No. 705. Since Boracay Island had not been classified
as alienable and disposable, whatever possession they had cannot ripen into ownership.
During pre-trial, respondents-claimants and the OSG stipulated on the following facts: (1) respondents-claimants were
presently in possession of parcels of land in Boracay Island; (2) these parcels of land were planted with coconut trees and
other natural growing trees; (3) the coconut trees had heights of more or less twenty (20) meters and were planted more or
less fifty (50) years ago; and (4) respondents-claimants declared the land they were occupying for tax purposes.12
The parties also agreed that the principal issue for resolution was purely legal: whether Proclamation No. 1801 posed any
legal hindrance or impediment to the titling of the lands in Boracay. They decided to forego with the trial and to submit
the case for resolution upon submission of their respective memoranda.13
The RTC took judicial notice14 that certain parcels of land in Boracay Island, more particularly Lots 1 and 30, Plan PSU-5344,
were covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 19502 (RO 2222) in the name of the Heirs of Ciriaco S. Tirol. These lots were
involved in Civil Case Nos. 5222 and 5262 filed before the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan.15 The titles were issued on
August 7, 1933.16
RTC and CA Dispositions
On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents-claimants, with a fallo reading:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court declares that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose no legal
obstacle to the petitioners and those similarly situated to acquire title to their lands in Boracay, in accordance with the
applicable laws and in the manner prescribed therein; and to have their lands surveyed and approved by respondent Regional
Technical Director of Lands as the approved survey does not in itself constitute a title to the land.
SO ORDERED.17
The RTC upheld respondents-claimants’ right to have their occupied lands titled in their name. It ruled that neither
Proclamation No. 1801 nor PTA Circular No. 3-82 mentioned that lands in Boracay were inalienable or could not be the subject
of disposition.18 The Circular itself recognized private ownership of lands.19 The trial court cited Sections 8720 and 5321 of the
Public Land Act as basis for acknowledging private ownership of lands in Boracay and that only those forested areas in public
lands were declared as part of the forest reserve.22
 The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied.23 The Republic then appealed to the CA.
On December 9, 2004, the appellate court affirmed in toto the RTC decision, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us DENYING the appeal filed in this case and
AFFIRMING the decision of the lower court.24
The CA held that respondents-claimants could not be prejudiced by a declaration that the lands they occupied since time
immemorial were part of a forest reserve.
Again, the OSG sought reconsideration but it was similarly denied.25 Hence, the present petition under Rule 45.
G.R. No. 173775
On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of G.R. No. 167707, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 106426
classifying Boracay Island into four hundred (400) hectares of reserved forest land (protection purposes) and six hundred
twenty-eight and 96/100 (628.96) hectares of agricultural land (alienable and disposable). The Proclamation likewise
provided for a fifteen-meter buffer zone on each side of the centerline of roads and trails, reserved for right-of-way and which
shall form part of the area reserved for forest land protection purposes.
On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Dr. Orlando Sacay,27 Wilfredo Gelito,28 and other landowners29 in Boracay filed with
this Court an original petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064. 30 They allege that the
Proclamation infringed on their "prior vested rights" over portions of Boracay. They have been in continued possession of
their respective lots in Boracay since time immemorial. They have also invested billions of pesos in developing their lands and
building internationally renowned first class resorts on their lots. 31
Petitioners-claimants contended that there is no need for a proclamation reclassifying Boracay into agricultural land. Being
classified as neither mineral nor timber land, the island is deemed agricultural pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act
No. 926, known as the first Public Land Act.32 Thus, their possession in the concept of owner for the required period entitled
them to judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
Opposing the petition, the OSG argued that petitioners-claimants do not have a vested right over their occupied portions in the
island. Boracay is an unclassified public forest land pursuant to Section 3(a) of PD No. 705. Being public forest, the claimed
portions of the island are inalienable and cannot be the subject of judicial confirmation of imperfect title. It is only the
executive department, not the courts, which has authority to reclassify lands of the public domain into alienable and
disposable lands. There is a need for a positive government act in order to release the lots for disposition.
On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of the two petitions as they principally involve the same issues on
the land classification of Boracay Island.33
Issues
G.R. No. 167707
The OSG raises the lone issue of whether Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose any legal obstacle for
respondents, and all those similarly situated, to acquire title to their occupied lands in Boracay Island. 34
G.R. No. 173775
Petitioners-claimants hoist five (5) issues, namely:
I.
AT THE TIME OF THE ESTABLISHED POSSESSION OF PETITIONERS IN CONCEPT OF OWNER OVER THEIR RESPECTIVE
AREAS IN BORACAY, SINCE TIME IMMEMORIAL OR AT THE LATEST SINCE 30 YRS. PRIOR TO THE FILING OF THE PETITION
FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF ON NOV. 19, 1997, WERE THE AREAS OCCUPIED BY THEM PUBLIC AGRICULTURAL LANDS AS
DEFINED BY LAWS THEN ON JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLES OR PUBLIC FOREST AS DEFINED BY SEC. 3a,
PD 705?
II.
HAVE PETITIONERS OCCUPANTS ACQUIRED PRIOR VESTED RIGHT OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OVER THEIR OCCUPIED
PORTIONS OF BORACAY LAND, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THEY HAVE NOT APPLIED YET FOR JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF
IMPERFECT TITLE?
III.
IS THE EXECUTIVE DECLARATION OF THEIR AREAS AS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE UNDER SEC 6, CA 141 [AN]
INDISPENSABLE PRE-REQUISITE FOR PETITIONERS TO OBTAIN TITLE UNDER THE TORRENS SYSTEM?
IV.
IS THE ISSUANCE OF PROCLAMATION 1064 ON MAY 22, 2006, VIOLATIVE OF THE PRIOR VESTED RIGHTS TO PRIVATE
OWNERSHIP OF PETITIONERS OVER THEIR LANDS IN BORACAY, PROTECTED BY THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE
CONSTITUTION OR IS PROCLAMATION 1064 CONTRARY TO SEC. 8, CA 141, OR SEC. 4(a) OF RA 6657.
V.
CAN RESPONDENTS BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS TO ALLOW THE SURVEY AND TO APPROVE THE SURVEY PLANS FOR
PURPOSES OF THE APPLICATION FOR TITLING OF THE LANDS OF PETITIONERS IN BORACAY?35 (Underscoring supplied)
In capsule, the main issue is whether private claimants (respondents-claimants in G.R. No. 167707 and petitioners-
claimants in G.R. No. 173775) have a right to secure titles over their occupied portions in Boracay. The twin petitions
pertain to their right, if any, to judicial confirmation of imperfect title under CA No. 141, as amended. They do not
involve their right to secure title under other pertinent laws.
Our Ruling
Regalian Doctrine and power of the executive
to reclassify lands of the public domain
Private claimants rely on three (3) laws and executive acts in their bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, namely: (a)
Philippine Bill of 190236 in relation to Act No. 926, later amended and/or superseded by Act No. 2874 and CA No. 141;37 (b)
Proclamation No. 180138 issued by then President Marcos; and (c) Proclamation No. 106439 issued by President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo. We shall proceed to determine their rights to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under these
laws and executive acts.
But first, a peek at the Regalian principle and the power of the executive to reclassify lands of the public domain.
The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or timber.40 Meanwhile, the 1973
Constitution provided the following divisions: agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber
or forest and grazing lands, and such other classes as may be provided by law,41 giving the government great leeway for
classification.42 Then the 1987 Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution classification with one addition: national
parks.43 Of these, only agricultural lands may be alienated.44 Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, 2006, Boracay Island
had never been expressly and administratively classified under any of these grand divisions. Boracay was an unclassified land
of the public domain.
The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that the State is the source of any
asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. 45 The doctrine has been consistently
adopted under the 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions.46
All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. 47 Thus, all lands
that have not been acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of the inalienable
public domain.48 Necessarily, it is up to the State to determine if lands of the public domain will be disposed of for private
ownership. The government, as the agent of the state, is possessed of the plenary power as the persona in law to determine
who shall be the favored recipients of public lands, as well as under what terms they may be granted such privilege, not
excluding the placing of obstacles in the way of their exercise of what otherwise would be ordinary acts of ownership. 49
Our present land law traces its roots to the Regalian Doctrine. Upon the Spanish conquest of the Philippines, ownership of all
lands, territories and possessions in the Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown. 50 The Regalian doctrine was first introduced
in the Philippines through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas, which laid the foundation that "all lands that were not
acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain." 51
The Laws of the Indies was followed by the Ley Hipotecaria or the Mortgage Law of 1893. The Spanish Mortgage Law provided
for the systematic registration of titles and deeds as well as possessory claims. 52
The Royal Decree of 1894 or the Maura Law53 partly amended the Spanish Mortgage Law and the Laws of the Indies. It
established possessory information as the method of legalizing possession of vacant Crown land, under certain conditions
which were set forth in said decree.54 Under Section 393 of the Maura Law, an informacion posesoria or possessory
information title,55 when duly inscribed in the Registry of Property, is converted into a title of ownership only after the lapse of
twenty (20) years of uninterrupted possession which must be actual, public, and adverse, 56 from the date of its inscription.57
However, possessory information title had to be perfected one year after the promulgation of the Maura Law, or until April 17,
1895. Otherwise, the lands would revert to the State.58
In sum, private ownership of land under the Spanish regime could only be founded on royal concessions which took various
forms, namely: (1) titulo real or royal grant; (2) concesion especial or special grant; (3) composicion con el estado or adjustment
title; (4) titulo de compra or title by purchase; and (5) informacion posesoria or possessory information title.59>
The first law governing the disposition of public lands in the Philippines under American rule was embodied in the Philippine
Bill of 1902.60 By this law, lands of the public domain in the Philippine Islands were classified into three (3) grand divisions, to
wit: agricultural, mineral, and timber or forest lands.61 The act provided for, among others, the disposal of mineral lands by
means of absolute grant (freehold system) and by lease (leasehold system).62 It also provided the definition by exclusion of
"agricultural public lands."63 Interpreting the meaning of "agricultural lands" under the Philippine Bill of 1902, the Court
declared in Mapa v. Insular Government:64
x x x In other words, that the phrase "agricultural land" as used in Act No. 926 means those public lands acquired from
Spain which are not timber or mineral lands. x x x65 (Emphasis Ours)
On February 1, 1903, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act. The act
established a system of registration by which recorded title becomes absolute, indefeasible, and imprescriptible. This is known
as the Torrens system.66
Concurrently, on October 7, 1903, the Philippine Commission passed Act No. 926, which was the first Public Land Act. The Act
introduced the homestead system and made provisions for judicial and administrative confirmation of imperfect titles and for
the sale or lease of public lands. It permitted corporations regardless of the nationality of persons owning the controlling stock
to lease or purchase lands of the public domain.67 Under the Act, open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands for the next ten (10) years preceding July 26, 1904 was sufficient for judicial confirmation
of imperfect title.68
On November 29, 1919, Act No. 926 was superseded by Act No. 2874, otherwise known as the second Public Land Act. This
new, more comprehensive law limited the exploitation of agricultural lands to Filipinos and Americans and citizens of other
countries which gave Filipinos the same privileges. For judicial confirmation of title, possession and occupation en concepto
dueño since time immemorial, or since July 26, 1894, was required.69
After the passage of the 1935 Constitution, CA No. 141 amended Act No. 2874 on December 1, 1936. To this day, CA No. 141,
as amended, remains as the existing general law governing the classification and disposition of lands of the public domain
other than timber and mineral lands,70 and privately owned lands which reverted to the State.71
Section 48(b) of CA No. 141 retained the requirement under Act No. 2874 of possession and occupation of lands of the public
domain since time immemorial or since July 26, 1894. However, this provision was superseded by Republic Act (RA) No.
1942,72 which provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The provision
was last amended by PD No. 1073,73 which now provides for possession and occupation of the land applied for since June 12,
1945, or earlier.74
The issuance of PD No. 89275 on February 16, 1976 discontinued the use of Spanish titles as evidence in land registration
proceedings.76 Under the decree, all holders of Spanish titles or grants should apply for registration of their lands under Act
No. 496 within six (6) months from the effectivity of the decree on February 16, 1976. Thereafter, the recording of all
unregistered lands77 shall be governed by Section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3344.
On June 11, 1978, Act No. 496 was amended and updated by PD No. 1529, known as the Property Registration Decree. It
was enacted to codify the various laws relative to registration of property.78 It governs registration of lands under the Torrens
system as well as unregistered lands, including chattel mortgages.79
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the presumption of State ownership,
the Court has time and again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the government, such as an official
proclamation,80 declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. 81 In fact, Section 8
of CA No. 141 limits alienable or disposable lands only to those lands which have been "officially delimited and classified." 82
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person
applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or
disposable.83 To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the
application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.84 There must still be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as
alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant must
establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. 85 The applicant
may also secure a certification from the government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the required number of
years is alienable and disposable.86
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report, statute, or certification was presented
to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private
claimants were subject of a government proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable. Absent such well-nigh
incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot accept the submission that lands occupied by private claimants were already open
to disposition before 2006. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for proof. 87
Ankron and De Aldecoa did not make the whole of Boracay Island, or portions of it, agricultural lands. Private claimants
posit that Boracay was already an agricultural land pursuant to the old cases Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands
(1919)88 and De Aldecoa v. The Insular Government (1909).89 These cases were decided under the provisions of the Philippine
Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926. There is a statement in these old cases that "in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in
each case the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is shown."90
Private claimants’ reliance on Ankron and De Aldecoa is misplaced. These cases did not have the effect of converting the whole
of Boracay Island or portions of it into agricultural lands. It should be stressed that the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926
merely provided the manner through which land registration courts would classify lands of the public domain. Whether the
land would be classified as timber, mineral, or agricultural depended on proof presented in each case.
Ankron and De Aldecoa were decided at a time when the President of the Philippines had no power to classify lands of the
public domain into mineral, timber, and agricultural. At that time, the courts were free to make corresponding classifications
in justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit power to do so, depending upon the preponderance of the evidence. 91 This
was the Court’s ruling in Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols Vda. De Palanca v. Republic,92 in
which it stated, through Justice Adolfo Azcuna, viz.:
x x x Petitioners furthermore insist that a particular land need not be formally released by an act of the Executive before it can
be deemed open to private ownership, citing the cases of Ramos v. Director of Lands and Ankron v. Government of the Philippine
Islands.
xxxx
Petitioner’s reliance upon Ramos v. Director of Lands and Ankron v. Government is misplaced. These cases were decided under
the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the first Public Land Act No. 926 enacted by the Philippine Commission on October 7, 1926,
under which there was no legal provision vesting in the Chief Executive or President of the Philippines the power to classify
lands of the public domain into mineral, timber and agricultural so that the courts then were free to make corresponding
classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit power to do so, depending upon the preponderance of the
evidence.93
To aid the courts in resolving land registration cases under Act No. 926, it was then necessary to devise a presumption on land
classification. Thus evolved the dictum in Ankron that "the courts have a right to presume, in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is shown."94
But We cannot unduly expand the presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa to an argument that all lands of the public domain
had been automatically reclassified as disposable and alienable agricultural lands. By no stretch of imagination did the
presumption convert all lands of the public domain into agricultural lands.
If We accept the position of private claimants, the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926 would have automatically made all
lands in the Philippines, except those already classified as timber or mineral land, alienable and disposable lands. That would
take these lands out of State ownership and worse, would be utterly inconsistent with and totally repugnant to the long-
entrenched Regalian doctrine.
The presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa attaches only to land registration cases brought under the provisions of Act No.
926, or more specifically those cases dealing with judicial and administrative confirmation of imperfect titles. The
presumption applies to an applicant for judicial or administrative conformation of imperfect title under Act No. 926. It
certainly cannot apply to landowners, such as private claimants or their predecessors-in-interest, who failed to avail
themselves of the benefits of Act No. 926. As to them, their land remained unclassified and, by virtue of the Regalian doctrine,
continued to be owned by the State.
In any case, the assumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa was not absolute. Land classification was, in the end, dependent on
proof. If there was proof that the land was better suited for non-agricultural uses, the courts could adjudge it as a mineral or
timber land despite the presumption. In Ankron, this Court stated:
In the case of Jocson vs. Director of Forestry (supra), the Attorney-General admitted in effect that whether the particular land in
question belongs to one class or another is a question of fact. The mere fact that a tract of land has trees upon it or has mineral
within it is not of itself sufficient to declare that one is forestry land and the other, mineral land. There must be some proof of
the extent and present or future value of the forestry and of the minerals. While, as we have just said, many definitions hav e
been given for "agriculture," "forestry," and "mineral" lands, and that in each case it is a question of fact, we think it is safe to
say that in order to be forestry or mineral land the proof must show that it is more valuable for the forestry or the mineral
which it contains than it is for agricultural purposes. (Sec. 7, Act No. 1148.) It is not sufficient to show that there exists some
trees upon the land or that it bears some mineral. Land may be classified as forestry or mineral today, and, by reason of the
exhaustion of the timber or mineral, be classified as agricultural land tomorrow. And vice-versa, by reason of the rapid growth
of timber or the discovery of valuable minerals, lands classified as agricultural today may be differently classified tomorrow.
Each case must be decided upon the proof in that particular case, having regard for its present or future value for one
or the other purposes. We believe, however, considering the fact that it is a matter of public knowledge that a majority of the
lands in the Philippine Islands are agricultural lands that the courts have a right to presume, in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is shown. Whatever the land involved in a
particular land registration case is forestry or mineral land must, therefore, be a matter of proof. Its superior value
for one purpose or the other is a question of fact to be settled by the proof in each particular case. The fact that the land
is a manglar [mangrove swamp] is not sufficient for the courts to decide whether it is agricultural, forestry, or mineral land. It
may perchance belong to one or the other of said classes of land. The Government, in the first instance, under the provisions of
Act No. 1148, may, by reservation, decide for itself what portions of public land shall be considered forestry land, unless
private interests have intervened before such reservation is made. In the latter case, whether the land is agricultural, forestry,
or mineral, is a question of proof. Until private interests have intervened, the Government, by virtue of the terms of said Act
(No. 1148), may decide for itself what portions of the "public domain" shall be set aside and reserved as forestry or mineral
land. (Ramos vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 175; Jocson vs. Director of Forestry, supra)95 (Emphasis ours)
Since 1919, courts were no longer free to determine the classification of lands from the facts of each case, except those that
have already became private lands.96 Act No. 2874, promulgated in 1919 and reproduced in Section 6 of CA No. 141, gave the
Executive Department, through the President, the exclusive prerogative to classify or reclassify public lands into alienable or
disposable, mineral or forest.96-a Since then, courts no longer had the authority, whether express or implied, to determine the
classification of lands of the public domain.97
Here, private claimants, unlike the Heirs of Ciriaco Tirol who were issued their title in 1933, 98 did not present a justiciable case
for determination by the land registration court of the property’s land classification. Simply put, there was no opportunity for
the courts then to resolve if the land the Boracay occupants are now claiming were agricultural lands. When Act No. 926 was
supplanted by Act No. 2874 in 1919, without an application for judicial confirmation having been filed by private claimants or
their predecessors-in-interest, the courts were no longer authorized to determine the property’s land classification. Hence,
private claimants cannot bank on Act No. 926.
We note that the RTC decision99 in G.R. No. 167707 mentioned Krivenko v. Register of Deeds of Manila,100 which was decided in
1947 when CA No. 141, vesting the Executive with the sole power to classify lands of the public domain was already in effect.
Krivenko cited the old cases Mapa v. Insular Government,101 De Aldecoa v. The Insular Government,102 and Ankron v. Government
of the Philippine Islands.103
Krivenko, however, is not controlling here because it involved a totally different issue. The pertinent issue in Krivenko was
whether residential lots were included in the general classification of agricultural lands; and if so, whether an alien could
acquire a residential lot. This Court ruled that as an alien, Krivenko was prohibited by the 1935 Constitution104 from acquiring
agricultural land, which included residential lots. Here, the issue is whether unclassified lands of the public domain are
automatically deemed agricultural.
Notably, the definition of "agricultural public lands" mentioned in Krivenko relied on the old cases decided prior to the
enactment of Act No. 2874, including Ankron and De Aldecoa.105 As We have already stated, those cases cannot apply here,
since they were decided when the Executive did not have the authority to classify lands as agricultural, timber, or mineral.
Private claimants’ continued possession under Act No. 926 does not create a presumption that the land is alienable.
Private claimants also contend that their continued possession of portions of Boracay Island for the requisite period of ten
(10) years under Act No. 926106 ipso facto converted the island into private ownership. Hence, they may apply for a title in
their name.
A similar argument was squarely rejected by the Court in Collado v. Court of Appeals.107 Collado, citing the separate opinion of
now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, 107-a ruled:
"Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902. The law
governed the disposition of lands of the public domain. It prescribed rules and regulations for the homesteading, selling and
leasing of portions of the public domain of the Philippine Islands, and prescribed the terms and conditions to enable persons
to perfect their titles to public lands in the Islands. It also provided for the "issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon
public lands," for the establishment of town sites and sale of lots therein, for the completion of imperfect titles, and for the
cancellation or confirmation of Spanish concessions and grants in the Islands." In short, the Public Land Act operated on the
assumption that title to public lands in the Philippine Islands remained in the government; and that the government’s title to
public land sprung from the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties between Spain and the United States. The term "public
land" referred to all lands of the public domain whose title still remained in the government and are thrown open to private
appropriation and settlement, and excluded the patrimonial property of the government and the friar lands."
Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act No. 926, mere
possession by private individuals of lands creates the legal presumption that the lands are alienable and
disposable.108 (Emphasis Ours)
Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain prior to
Proclamation No. 1064. Such unclassified lands are considered public forest under PD No. 705. The DENR109 and the
National Mapping and Resource Information Authority110 certify that Boracay Island is an unclassified land of the public
domain.
PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of the public domain as public forest. Section 3(a) of
PD No. 705 defines a public forest as "a mass of lands of the public domain which has not been the subject of the present system
of classification for the determination of which lands are needed for forest purpose and which are not." Applying PD No. 705,
all unclassified lands, including those in Boracay Island, are ipso facto considered public forests. PD No. 705, however, respects
titles already existing prior to its effectivity.
The Court notes that the classification of Boracay as a forest land under PD No. 705 may seem to be out of touch with the
present realities in the island. Boracay, no doubt, has been partly stripped of its forest cover to pave the way for commercial
developments. As a premier tourist destination for local and foreign tourists, Boracay appears more of a commercial island
resort, rather than a forest land.
Nevertheless, that the occupants of Boracay have built multi-million peso beach resorts on the island;111 that the island has
already been stripped of its forest cover; or that the implementation of Proclamation No. 1064 will destroy the island’s
tourism industry, do not negate its character as public forest.
Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the Constitution112 classifying lands of the public domain into
"agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks," do not necessarily refer to large tracts of wooded land or
expanses covered by dense growths of trees and underbrushes.113 The discussion in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of
Forestry114 is particularly instructive:
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers or
settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or
planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way
places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be
classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive
of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land classified as "forest" is released in an official proclamation to
that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of
imperfect title do not apply.115 (Emphasis supplied)
There is a big difference between "forest" as defined in a dictionary and "forest or timber land" as a classification of lands of
the public domain as appearing in our statutes. One is descriptive of what appears on the land while the other is a legal status,
a classification for legal purposes.116 At any rate, the Court is tasked to determine the legal status of Boracay Island, and not
look into its physical layout. Hence, even if its forest cover has been replaced by beach resorts, restaurants and other
commercial establishments, it has not been automatically converted from public forest to alienable agricultural land.
Private claimants cannot rely on Proclamation No. 1801 as basis for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The
proclamation did not convert Boracay into an agricultural land. However, private claimants argue that Proclamation No.
1801 issued by then President Marcos in 1978 entitles them to judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The Proclamation
classified Boracay, among other islands, as a tourist zone. Private claimants assert that, as a tourist spot, the island is
susceptible of private ownership.
Proclamation No. 1801 or PTA Circular No. 3-82 did not convert the whole of Boracay into an agricultural land. There is
nothing in the law or the Circular which made Boracay Island an agricultural land. The reference in Circular No. 3-82 to
"private lands"117 and "areas declared as alienable and disposable"118 does not by itself classify the entire island as
agricultural. Notably, Circular No. 3-82 makes reference not only to private lands and areas but also to public forested lands.
Rule VIII, Section 3 provides:
No trees in forested private lands may be cut without prior authority from the PTA. All forested areas in public lands are
declared forest reserves. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the reference in the Circular to both private and public lands merely recognizes that the island can be classified by the
Executive department pursuant to its powers under CA No. 141. In fact, Section 5 of the Circular recognizes the then Bureau of
Forest Development’s authority to declare areas in the island as alienable and disposable when it provides:
Subsistence farming, in areas declared as alienable and disposable by the Bureau of Forest Development.
Therefore, Proclamation No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed to classify Boracay Island as alienable and
disposable land. If President Marcos intended to classify the island as alienable and disposable or forest, or both, he would
have identified the specific limits of each, as President Arroyo did in Proclamation No. 1064. This was not done in
Proclamation No. 1801.
The Whereas clauses of Proclamation No. 1801 also explain the rationale behind the declaration of Boracay Island, together
with other islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as a tourist zone and marine reserve to be administered by the PTA
– to ensure the concentrated efforts of the public and private sectors in the development of the areas’ tourism potential with
due regard for ecological balance in the marine environment. Simply put, the proclamation is aimed at administering the
islands for tourism and ecological purposes. It does not address the areas’ alienability.119
More importantly, Proclamation No. 1801 covers not only Boracay Island, but sixty-four (64) other islands, coves, and
peninsulas in the Philippines, such as Fortune and Verde Islands in Batangas, Port Galera in Oriental Mindoro, Panglao and
Balicasag Islands in Bohol, Coron Island, Puerto Princesa and surrounding areas in Palawan, Camiguin Island in Cagayan de
Oro, and Misamis Oriental, to name a few. If the designation of Boracay Island as tourist zone makes it alienable and disposable
by virtue of Proclamation No. 1801, all the other areas mentioned would likewise be declared wide open for private
disposition. That could not have been, and is clearly beyond, the intent of the proclamation.
It was Proclamation No. 1064 of 2006 which positively declared part of Boracay as alienable and opened the same to
private ownership. Sections 6 and 7 of CA No. 141120 provide that it is only the President, upon the recommendation of the
proper department head, who has the authority to classify the lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable, timber
and mineral lands.121
In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo merely exercised the authority granted to her to classify
lands of the public domain, presumably subject to existing vested rights. Classification of public lands is the exclusive
prerogative of the Executive Department, through the Office of the President. Courts have no authority to do so. 122 Absent such
classification, the land remains unclassified until released and rendered open to disposition. 123
Proclamation No. 1064 classifies Boracay into 400 hectares of reserved forest land and 628.96 hectares of agricultural land.
The Proclamation likewise provides for a 15-meter buffer zone on each side of the center line of roads and trails, which are
reserved for right of way and which shall form part of the area reserved for forest land protection purposes.
Contrary to private claimants’ argument, there was nothing invalid or irregular, much less unconstitutional, about the
classification of Boracay Island made by the President through Proclamation No. 1064. It was within her authority to make
such classification, subject to existing vested rights.
Proclamation No. 1064 does not violate the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Private claimants further assert that
Proclamation No. 1064 violates the provision of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) or RA No. 6657 barring
conversion of public forests into agricultural lands. They claim that since Boracay is a public forest under PD No. 705,
President Arroyo can no longer convert it into an agricultural land without running afoul of Section 4(a) of RA No. 6657, thus:
SEC. 4. Scope. – The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and
commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No.
229, including other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture.
More specifically, the following lands are covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program:
(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain devoted to or suitable for agriculture. No reclassification of forest
or mineral lands to agricultural lands shall be undertaken after the approval of this Act until Congress, taking into account
ecological, developmental and equity considerations, shall have determined by law, the specific limits of the public domain.
That Boracay Island was classified as a public forest under PD No. 705 did not bar the Executive from later converting it into
agricultural land. Boracay Island still remained an unclassified land of the public domain despite PD No. 705.
In Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols v. Republic, 124 the Court stated that unclassified lands are
public forests.
While it is true that the land classification map does not categorically state that the islands are public forests, the fact
that they were unclassified lands leads to the same result. In the absence of the classification as mineral or timber land,
the land remains unclassified land until released and rendered open to disposition. 125 (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, the prohibition under the CARL applies only to a "reclassification" of land. If the land had never been
previously classified, as in the case of Boracay, there can be no prohibited reclassification under the agrarian law. We
agree with the opinion of the Department of Justice126 on this point:
Indeed, the key word to the correct application of the prohibition in Section 4(a) is the word "reclassification." Where there has
been no previous classification of public forest [referring, we repeat, to the mass of the public domain which has not been the
subject of the present system of classification for purposes of determining which are needed for forest purposes and which are not]
into permanent forest or forest reserves or some other forest uses under the Revised Forestry Code, there can be no
"reclassification of forest lands" to speak of within the meaning of Section 4(a).
Thus, obviously, the prohibition in Section 4(a) of the CARL against the reclassification of forest lands to agricultural lands
without a prior law delimiting the limits of the public domain, does not, and cannot, apply to those lands of the public domain,
denominated as "public forest" under the Revised Forestry Code, which have not been previously determined, or classified, as
needed for forest purposes in accordance with the provisions of the Revised Forestry Code.127
Private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under CA No. 141. Neither do they
have vested rights over the occupied lands under the said law. There are two requisites for judicial confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely: (1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject land by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of ownership since
time immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and (2) the classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the public
domain.128
As discussed, the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801 did not convert portions of Boracay Island
into an agricultural land. The island remained an unclassified land of the public domain and, applying the Regalian doctrine, is
considered State property.
Private claimants’ bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, relying on the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and
Proclamation No. 1801, must fail because of the absence of the second element of alienable and disposable land. Their
entitlement to a government grant under our present Public Land Act presupposes that the land possessed and applied for is
already alienable and disposable. This is clear from the wording of the law itself. 129 Where the land is not alienable and
disposable, possession of the land, no matter how long, cannot confer ownership or possessory rights.130
Neither may private claimants apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Proclamation No. 1064, with respect to
those lands which were classified as agricultural lands. Private claimants failed to prove the first element of open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession of their lands in Boracay since June 12, 1945.
We cannot sustain the CA and RTC conclusion in the petition for declaratory relief that private claimants complied with the
requisite period of possession.
The tax declarations in the name of private claimants are insufficient to prove the first element of possession. We note that the
earliest of the tax declarations in the name of private claimants were issued in 1993. Being of recent dates, the tax declarations
are not sufficient to convince this Court that the period of possession and occupation commenced on June 12, 1945.
Private claimants insist that they have a vested right in Boracay, having been in possession of the island for a long time. They
have invested millions of pesos in developing the island into a tourist spot. They say their continued possession and
investments give them a vested right which cannot be unilaterally rescinded by Proclamation No. 1064.
The continued possession and considerable investment of private claimants do not automatically give them a vested right in
Boracay. Nor do these give them a right to apply for a title to the land they are presently occupying. This Court is
constitutionally bound to decide cases based on the evidence presented and the laws applicable. As the law and jurisprudence
stand, private claimants are ineligible to apply for a judicial confirmation of title over their occupied portions in Boracay even
with their continued possession and considerable investment in the island.
One Last Note
The Court is aware that millions of pesos have been invested for the development of Boracay Island, making it a by-word in the
local and international tourism industry. The Court also notes that for a number of years, thousands of people have called the
island their home. While the Court commiserates with private claimants’ plight, We are bound to apply the law strictly and
judiciously. This is the law and it should prevail. Ito ang batas at ito ang dapat umiral.
All is not lost, however, for private claimants. While they may not be eligible to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title
under Section 48(b) of CA No. 141, as amended, this does not denote their automatic ouster from the residential, commercial,
and other areas they possess now classified as agricultural. Neither will this mean the loss of their substantial investments on
their occupied alienable lands. Lack of title does not necessarily mean lack of right to possess.
For one thing, those with lawful possession may claim good faith as builders of improvements. They can take steps to preserve
or protect their possession. For another, they may look into other modes of applying for original registration of title, such as by
homestead131 or sales patent,132 subject to the conditions imposed by law.
More realistically, Congress may enact a law to entitle private claimants to acquire title to their occupied lots or to exempt
them from certain requirements under the present land laws. There is one such bill 133 now pending in the House of
Representatives. Whether that bill or a similar bill will become a law is for Congress to decide.
In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, the government has taken the step necessary to open up the island to private ownership.
This gesture may not be sufficient to appease some sectors which view the classification of the island partially into a forest
reserve as absurd. That the island is no longer overrun by trees, however, does not becloud the vision to protect its remaining
forest cover and to strike a healthy balance between progress and ecology. Ecological conservation is as important as
economic progress.
To be sure, forest lands are fundamental to our nation’s survival. Their promotion and protection are not just fancy rhetoric
for politicians and activists. These are needs that become more urgent as destruction of our environment gets prevalent and
difficult to control. As aptly observed by Justice Conrado Sanchez in 1968 in Director of Forestry v. Munoz:134
The view this Court takes of the cases at bar is but in adherence to public policy that should be followed with respect to forest
lands. Many have written much, and many more have spoken, and quite often, about the pressing need for forest preservation,
conservation, protection, development and reforestation. Not without justification. For, forests constitute a vital segment of
any country's natural resources. It is of common knowledge by now that absence of the necessary green cover on our lands
produces a number of adverse or ill effects of serious proportions. Without the trees, watersheds dry up; rivers and lakes
which they supply are emptied of their contents. The fish disappear. Denuded areas become dust bowls. As waterfalls cease to
function, so will hydroelectric plants. With the rains, the fertile topsoil is washed away; geological erosion results. With
erosion come the dreaded floods that wreak havoc and destruction to property – crops, livestock, houses, and highways – not
to mention precious human lives. Indeed, the foregoing observations should be written down in a lumberman’s decalogue. 135
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:
1. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 167707 is GRANTED and the Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 71118
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
2. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 173775 is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 135385 December 6, 2000

ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners,
vs.
SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT and
CHAIRMAN and COMMISSIONERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, respondents.
HON. JUAN M .FLAVIER, HON. PONCIANO BENNAGEN, BAYANI ASCARRAGA, EDTAMI MANSAYANGAN, BASILIO
WANDAG, EVELYN DUNUAN, YAOM TUGAS, ALFREMO CARPIANO, LIBERATO A. GABIN, MATERNIDAD M. COLAS,
NARCISA M. DALUPINES, BAI KIRAM-CONNIE SATURNO, BAE MLOMO-BEATRIZ T. ABASALA, DATU BALITUNGTUNG-
ANTONIO D. LUMANDONG, DATU MANTUMUKAW TEOFISTO SABASALES, DATU EDUAARDO BANDA, DATU JOEL UNAD,
DATU RAMON BAYAAN, TIMUAY JOSE ANOY, TIMUAY MACARIO D. SALACAO, TIMUAY EDWIN B. ENDING, DATU
SAHAMPONG MALANAW VI, DATU BEN PENDAO CABIGON, BAI NANAPNAY-LIZA SAWAY, BAY INAY DAYA-MELINDA S.
REYMUNDO, BAI TINANGHAGA HELINITA T. PANGAN, DATU MAKAPUKAW ADOLINO L. SAWAY, DATU MAUDAYAW-
CRISPEN SAWAY, VICKY MAKAY, LOURDES D. AMOS, GILBERT P. HOGGANG, TERESA GASPAR, MANUEL S. ONALAN, MIA
GRACE L. GIRON, ROSEMARIE G. PE, BENITO CARINO, JOSEPH JUDE CARANTES, LYNETTE CARANTES-VIVAL, LANGLEY
SEGUNDO, SATUR S. BUGNAY, CARLING DOMULOT, ANDRES MENDIOGRIN, LEOPOLDO ABUGAN, VIRGILIO CAYETANO,
CONCHITA G. DESCAGA, LEVY ESTEVES, ODETTE G. ESTEVEZ, RODOLFO C. AGUILAR, MAURO VALONES, PEPE H.
ATONG, OFELIA T. DAVI, PERFECTO B. GUINOSAO, WALTER N. TIMOL, MANUEL T. SELEN, OSCAR DALUNHAY, RICO O.
SULATAN, RAFFY MALINDA, ALFREDO ABILLANOS, JESSIE ANDILAB, MIRLANDO H. MANGKULINTAS, SAMIE SATURNO,
ROMEO A. LINDAHAY, ROEL S. MANSANG-CAGAN, PAQUITO S. LIESES, FILIPE G. SAWAY, HERMINIA S. SAWAY, JULIUS S.
SAWAY, LEONARDA SAWAY, JIMMY UGYUB, SALVADOR TIONGSON, VENANCIO APANG, MADION MALID, SUKIM MALID,
NENENG MALID, MANGKATADONG AUGUSTO DIANO, JOSEPHINE M. ALBESO, MORENO MALID, MARIO MANGCAL,
FELAY DIAMILING, SALOME P. SARZA, FELIPE P. BAGON, SAMMY SALNUNGAN, ANTONIO D. EMBA, NORMA
MAPANSAGONOS, ROMEO SALIGA, SR., JERSON P. GERADA, RENATO T. BAGON, JR., SARING MASALONG, SOLEDAD M.
GERARDA, ELIZABETH L. MENDI, MORANTE S. TIWAN, DANILO M. MALUDAO, MINORS MARICEL MALID, represented
by her father CORNELIO MALID, MARCELINO M. LADRA, represented by her father MONICO D. LADRA, JENNYLYN
MALID, represented by her father TONY MALID, ARIEL M. EVANGELISTA, represented by her mother LINAY
BALBUENA, EDWARD M. EMUY, SR., SUSAN BOLANIO, OND, PULA BATO B'LAAN TRIBAL FARMER'S ASSOCIATION,
INTER-PEOPLE'S EXCHANGE, INC. and GREEN FORUM-WESTERN VISAYAS, intervenors.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, intervenor.
IKALAHAN INDIGENOUS PEOPLE and HARIBON FOUNDATION FOR THE CONSERVATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES,
INC., intervenor.

RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing
the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371), otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples
Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (Implementing Rules).
In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required respondents to comment.1 In compliance, respondents Chairperson
and Commissioners of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), the government agency created under the
IPRA to implement its provisions, filed on October 13, 1998 their Comment to the Petition, in which they defend the
constitutionality of the IPRA and pray that the petition be dismissed for lack of merit.
On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and Secretary
of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) filed through the Solicitor General a consolidated Comment. The
Solicitor General is of the view that the IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership over natural
resources to indigenous peoples and prays that the petition be granted in part.
On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors, composed of Sen. Juan Flavier, one of the authors of the IPRA, Mr. Ponciano
Bennagen, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, and the leaders and members of 112 groups of indigenous
peoples (Flavier, et. al), filed their Motion for Leave to Intervene. They join the NCIP in defending the constitutionality of IPRA
and praying for the dismissal of the petition.
On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) likewise filed a Motion to Intervene and/or to Appear as Amicus
Curiae. The CHR asserts that IPRA is an expression of the principle of parens patriae and that the State has the responsibility
to protect and guarantee the rights of those who are at a serious disadvantage like indigenous peoples. For this reason it prays
that the petition be dismissed.
On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the Ikalahan Indigenous People and the Haribon Foundation for the
Conservation of Natural Resources, Inc. (Haribon, et al.), filed a motion to Intervene with attached Comment-in-
Intervention. They agree with the NCIP and Flavier, et al. that IPRA is consistent with the Constitution and pray that the
petition for prohibition and mandamus be dismissed.
The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and organizations were granted.
Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999. Thereafter, the parties and intervenors filed their respective memoranda in
which they reiterate the arguments adduced in their earlier pleadings and during the hearing.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA and its Implementing Rules on the ground that
they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other
natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution:
"(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral domains, and Section 3(b) which, in turn, defines ancestral
lands;
"(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral domains including inalienable public lands, bodies of
water, mineral and other resources found within ancestral domains are private but community property of the indigenous
peoples;
"(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the composition of ancestral domains and ancestral lands;
"(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the ancestral domains;
(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the ancestral lands;
"(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples in the harvesting, extraction, development or
exploration of minerals and other natural resources within the areas claimed to be their ancestral domains, and the right to
enter into agreements with nonindigenous peoples for the development and utilization of natural resources therein for a
period not exceeding 25 years, renewable for not more than 25 years; and
"(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to maintain, develop, protect and conserve the ancestral
domains and portions thereof which are found to be necessary for critical watersheds, mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries,
wilderness, protected areas, forest cover or reforestation."2
Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of "ancestral domains" and "ancestral lands"
which might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate the rights of private
landowners.3
In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP and making
customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands on the ground that
these provisions violate the due process clause of the Constitution.4
These provisions are:
"(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of delineation and recognition of ancestral domains and which vest on
the NCIP the sole authority to delineate ancestral domains and ancestral lands;
"(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the NCIP that a particular area is an ancestral domain and upon
notification to the following officials, namely, the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, Secretary of Interior and
Local Governments, Secretary of Justice and Commissioner of the National Development Corporation, the jurisdiction of said
officials over said area terminates;
"(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions and practices of indigenous peoples shall be applied first with
respect to property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary succession and settlement of land disputes, and that any doubt or
ambiguity in the interpretation thereof shall be resolved in favor of the indigenous peoples;
"(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and practices shall be used to resolve disputes involving indigenous peoples;
and
"(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of the indigenous
peoples."5
Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998,
which provides that "the administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President is characterized as a lateral but
autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and program coordination." They contend that said Rule infringes upon the
President’s power of control over executive departments under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution.6
Petitioners pray for the following:
"(1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57, 58, 59, 63, 65 and 66 and other related provisions of R.A. 8371 are
unconstitutional and invalid;
"(2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Chairperson and Commissioners of the NCIP to cease and desist from
implementing the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371 and its Implementing Rules;
"(3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources to
cease and desist from implementing Department of Environment and Natural Resources Circular No. 2, series of 1998;
"(4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of Budget and Management to cease and desist from
disbursing public funds for the implementation of the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371; and
"(5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources to comply with his
duty of carrying out the State’s constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization and
conservation of Philippine natural resources."7
After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted as follows:
Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which the Chief Justice and Justices Bellosillo,
Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the validity of the challenged provisions of R.A. 8371. Justice Puno also filed a
separate opinion sustaining all challenged provisions of the law with the exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP
Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules and Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the IPRA
which he contends should be interpreted as dealing with the large-scale exploitation of natural resources and should be read
in conjunction with Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. On the other hand, Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss the
petition solely on the ground that it does not raise a justiciable controversy and petitioners do not have standing to question
the constitutionality of R.A. 8371.
Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. Justice Panganiban filed a separate opinion expressing the
view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. He reserves judgment on
the constitutionality of Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66 of the law, which he believes must await the filing of specific cases by those
whose rights may have been violated by the IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections
3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon join in the separate
opinions of Justices Panganiban and Vitug.
As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not obtained, the case was redeliberated upon.
However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.
Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are the separate opinions of Justices Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, and
Panganiban.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Panganiban JJ., see separate opinion

G.R. No. 163509 December 6, 2006

PICOP RESOURCES, INC., petitioner,

vs.
BASE METALS MINERAL RESOURCES CORPORATION, and THE MINES ADJUDICATION BOARD, respondents.
A
DECISION

TINGA, J.:

PICOP Resources, Inc. (PICOP) assails the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated November 28, 2003 and its Resolution2
dated May 5, 2004, which respectively denied its petition for review and motion for reconsideration.

The undisputed facts quoted from the appellate court's Decision are as follows:

In 1987, the Central Mindanao Mining and Development Corporation (CMMCI for brevity) entered into a Mines Operating
Agreement (Agreement for brevity) with Banahaw Mining and Development Corporation (Banahaw Mining for brevity)
whereby the latter agreed to act as Mine Operator for the exploration, development, and eventual commercial operation of
CMMCI's eighteen (18) mining claims located in Agusan del Sur.

Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, Banahaw Mining filed applications for Mining Lease Contracts over the mining claims
with the Bureau of Mines. On April 29, 1988, Banahaw Mining was issued a Mines Temporary Permit authorizing it to extract
and dispose of precious minerals found within its mining claims. Upon its expiration, the temporary permit was subsequently
renewed thrice by the Bureau of Mines, the last being on June 28, 1991.

Since a portion of Banahaw Mining's mining claims was located in petitioner PICOP's logging concession in Agusan del Sur,
Banahaw Mining and petitioner PICOP entered into a Memorandum of Agreement, whereby, in mutual recognition of each
other's right to the area concerned, petitioner PICOP allowed Banahaw Mining an access/right of way to its mining claims.

In 1991, Banahaw Mining converted its mining claims to applications for Mineral Production Sharing Agreements (MPSA for
brevity).

While the MPSA were pending, Banahaw Mining, on December 18, 1996, decided to sell/assign its rights and interests over
thirty-seven (37) mining claims in favor of private respondent Base Metals Mineral Resources Corporation (Base Metals for
brevity). The transfer included mining claims held by Banahaw Mining in its own right as claim owner, as well as those
covered by its mining operating agreement with CMMCI.

Upon being informed of the development, CMMCI, as claim owner, immediately approved the assignment made by Banahaw
Mining in favor of private respondent Base Metals, thereby recognizing private respondent Base Metals as the new operator of
its claims.

On March 10, 1997, private respondent Base Metals amended Banahaw Mining's pending MPSA applications with the Bureau
of Mines to substitute itself as applicant and to submit additional documents in support of the application. Area clearances
from the DENR Regional Director and Superintendent of the Agusan Marsh and Wildlife Sanctuary were submitted, as
required.
On October 7, 1997, private respondent Base Metals' amended MPSA applications were published in accordance with the
requirements of the Mining Act of 1995.

On November 18, 1997, petitioner PICOP filed with the Mines Geo-Sciences Bureau (MGB), Caraga Regional Office No. XIII an
Adverse Claim and/or Opposition to private respondent Base Metals' application on the following grounds:

I. THE APPROVAL OF THE APPLICATION AND ISSUANCE OF THE MPSA OF BASE METALS WILL VIOLATE THE
CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE AGAINST IMPAIRMENT OF OBLIGATION IN A CONTRACT.

II. THE APPROVAL OF THE APPLICATION WILL DEFEAT THE RIGHTS OF THE HEREIN ADVERSE CLAIMANT AND/OR
OPPOSITOR.

In its Answer to the Adverse Claim and/or Opposition, private respondent Base Metals alleged that:

a) the Adverse Claim was filed out of time;

b) petitioner PICOP has no rights over the mineral resources on their concession area. PICOP is asserting a privilege which is
not protected by the non-impairment clause of the Constitution;

c) the grant of the MPSA will not impair the rights of PICOP nor create confusion, chaos or conflict.

Petitioner PICOP's Reply to the Answer alleged that:

a) the Adverse Claim was filed within the reglementary period;

b) the grant of MPSA will impair the existing rights of petitioner PICOP;

c) the MOA between PICOP and Banahaw Mining provides for recognition by Banahaw Mining of the Presidential Warranty
awarded in favor of PICOP for the exclusive possession and enjoyment of said areas.

As a Rejoinder, private respondent Base Metals stated that:

1. it is seeking the right to extract the mineral resources in the applied areas. It is not applying for any right to the forest
resources within the concession areas of PICOP;

2. timber or forest lands are open to Mining Applications;

3. the grant of the MPSA will not violate the so called "presidential fiat";

4. the MPSA application of Base Metals does not require the consent of PICOP; and

5. it signified its willingness to enter into a voluntary agreement with PICOP on the matter of compensation for damages. In the
absence of such agreement, the matter will be brought to the Panel of Arbitration in accordance with law.

In refutation thereto, petitioner PICOP alleged in its Rejoinder that:

a) the Adverse Claim filed thru registered mail was sent on time and as prescribed by existing mining laws and rules and
regulations;

b) the right sought by private respondent Base Metals is not absolute but is subject to existing rights, such as those which the
adverse claimant had, that have to be recognized and respected in a manner provided and prescribed by existing laws as will
be expounded fully later;

c) as a general rule, mining applications within timber or forest lands are subject to existing rights as provided in Section 18 of
RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 and it is an admitted fact by the private respondent that petitioner PICOP had
forest rights as per Presidential Warranty;

d) while the Presidential Warranty did not expressly state exclusivity, P.D. 705 strengthened the right of occupation,
possession and control over the concession area;

e) the provisions of Section 19 of the Act and Section 15 of IRR expressly require the written consent of the forest right holder,
PICOP.

After the submission of their respective position paper, the Panel Arbitrator issued an Order dated December 21, 1998, the
dispositive portion of which reads as:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Mineral Production Sharing Agreement Application Nos. (XIII) 010, 011, 012 of Base Metal
Resources Corporation should be set aside.

The disapproval of private respondent Base Metals' MPSA was due to the following reasons:

Anent the first issue the Panel find (sic) and so hold (sic) that the adverse claim was filed on time, it being mailed on November
19, 1997, at Metro Manila as evidenced by Registry Receipt No. 26714. Under the law (sic) the date of mailing is considered the
date of filing.

As to whether or not an MPSA application can be granted on area subject of an IFMA3 or PTLA4 which is covered by a
Presidential Warranty, the panel believes it can not, unless the grantee consents thereto. Without the grantee's consent, the
area is considered closed to mining location (sec. 19) (b) (No. 2), DAO No. 96-40). The Panel believe (sic) that mining location
in forest or timberland is allowed only if such forest or timberland is not leased by the government to a qualified person or
entity. If it is leased the consent of the lessor is necessary, in addition to the area clearance to be issued by the agency
concerned before it is subjected to mining operation.

Plantation is considered closed to mining locations because it is off tangent to mining. Both are extremes. They can not exist at
the same time. The other must necessarily stop before the other operate.

On the other hand, Base Metals Mineral Resources Corporation can not insist the MPSA application as assignee of Banahaw.
PICOP did not consent to the assignment as embodied in the agreement. Neither did it ratify the Deed of Assignment.
Accordingly, it has no force and effect. Thus, for lack of consent, the MPSA must fall.

On January 11, 1999, private respondent Base Metals filed a Notice of Appeal with public respondent MAB and alleged in its
Appeal Memorandum the following arguments:

1. THE CONSENT OF PICOP IS NOT NECESSARY FOR THE APPROVAL OF BASE METALS' MPSA APPLICATION.

2. EVEN ASSUMING SUCH CONSENT IS NECESSARY, PICOP HAD CONSENTED TO BASE METALS' MPSA APPLICATION.

In Answer thereto, petitioner PICOP alleged that:

1. Consent is necessary for the approval of private respondent's MPSA application;

2. Provisions of Memorandum Order No. 98-03 and IFMA 35 are not applicable to the instant case;

3. Provisions of PD 7055 connotes exclusivity for timber license holders; and

4. MOA between private respondent's assignor and adverse claimant provided for the recognition of the latter's rightful claim
over the disputed areas.

Private respondent Base Metals claimed in its Reply that:

1. The withholding of consent by PICOP derogates the State's power to supervise and control the exploration, utilization and
development of all natural resources;

2. Memorandum Order No, 98-03, not being a statute but a mere guideline imposed by the Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), can be applied retroactively to MPSA applications which have not yet been
finally resolved;

3. Even assuming that the consent of adverse claimant is necessary for the approval of Base Metals' application (which is
denied), such consent had already been given; and

4. The Memorandum of Agreement between adverse claimant and Banahaw Mining proves that the Agusan-Surigao area had
been used in the past both for logging and mining operations.

After the filing of petitioner PICOP's Reply Memorandum, public respondent rendered the assailed decision setting aside the
Panel Arbitrator's order. Accordingly, private respondent Base Metals' MPSA's were reinstated and given due course subject to
compliance with the pertinent requirements of the existing rules and regulations.6

The Court of Appeals upheld the decision of the MAB, ruling that the Presidential Warranty of September 25, 1968 issued by
then President Ferdinand E. Marcos merely confirmed the timber license granted to PICOP and warranted the latter's peaceful
and adequate possession and enjoyment of its concession areas. It was only given upon the request of the Board of
Investments to establish the boundaries of PICOP's timber license agreement. The Presidential Warranty did not convert
PICOP's timber license into a contract because it did not create any obligation on the part of the government in favor of PICOP.
Thus, the non-impairment clause finds no application.

Neither did the Presidential Warranty grant PICOP the exclusive possession, occupation and exploration of the concession
areas covered. If that were so, the government would have effectively surrendered its police power to control and supervise
the exploration, development and utilization of the country's natural resources.

On PICOP's contention that its consent is necessary for the grant of Base Metals' MPSA, the appellate court ruled that the
amendment to PTLA No. 47 refers to the grant of gratuitous permits, which the MPSA subject of this case is not. Further, the
amendment pertains to the cutting and extraction of timber for mining purposes and not to the act of mining itself, the
intention of the amendment being to protect the timber found in PICOP's concession areas.

The Court of Appeals noted that the reinstatement of the MPSA does not ipso facto revoke, amend, rescind or impair PICOP's
timber license. Base Metals still has to comply with the requirements for the grant of a mining permit. The fact, however, that
Base Metals had already secured the necessary Area Status and Clearance from the DENR means that the areas applied for are
not closed to mining operations.

In its Resolution7 dated May 5, 2004, the appellate court denied PICOP's Motion for Reconsideration. It ruled that PICOP failed
to substantiate its allegation that the area applied for is a forest reserve and is therefore closed to mining operations because it
did not identify the particular law which set aside the contested area as one where mining is prohibited pursuant to applicable
laws.

The case is now before us for review.

In its Memorandum8 dated April 6, 2005, PICOP presents the following issues: (1) the 2,756 hectares subject of Base Metals'
MPSA are closed to mining operations except upon PICOP's written consent pursuant to existing laws, rules and regulations
and by virtue of the Presidential Warranty; (2) its Presidential Warranty is protected by the non-impairment clause of the
Constitution; and (3) it does not raise new issues in its petition.
PICOP asserts that its concession areas are closed to mining operations as these are within the Agusan-Surigao-Davao forest
reserve established under Proclamation No. 369 of then Gov. Gen. Dwight Davis. The area is allegedly also part of permanent
forest established under Republic Act No. 3092 (RA 3092),9 and overlaps the wilderness area where mining applications are
expressly prohibited under RA 7586.10 Hence, the area is closed to mining operations under Sec. 19(f) of RA 7942.11

PICOP further asserts that to allow mining over a forest or forest reserve would allegedly be tantamount to changing the
classification of the land from forest to mineral land in violation of Sec. 4, Art. XII of the Constitution and Sec. 1 of RA 3092.

According to PICOP, in 1962 and 1963, blocks A, B and C within the Agusan-Surigao-Davao forest reserve under Proclamation
No. 369 were surveyed as permanent forest blocks in accordance with RA 3092. These areas cover PICOP's PTLA No. 47, part
of which later became IFMA No. 35. In turn, the areas set aside as wilderness as in PTLA No. 47 became the initial components
of the NIPAS under Sec. 5(a) of RA 7586. When RA 7942 was signed into law, the areas covered by the NIPAS were expressly
determined as areas where mineral agreements or financial or technical assistance agreement applications shall not be
allowed. PICOP concludes that since there is no evidence that the permanent forest areas within PTLA No. 47 and IFMA No. 35
have been set aside for mining purposes, the MAB and the Court of Appeals gravely erred in reinstating Base Metals' MPSA
and, in effect, allowing mining exploration and mining-related activities in the protected areas.

PICOP further argues that under DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 96-40 implementing RA 7942, an exploration permit
must be secured before mining operations in government reservations may be undertaken. There being no exploration permit
issued to Banahaw Mining or appended to its MPSA, the MAB and the Court of Appeals should not have reinstated its
application.

PICOP brings to the Court's attention the case of PICOP Resources, Inc. v. Hon. Heherson T. Alvarez,12 wherein the Court of
Appeals ruled that the Presidential Warranty issued to PICOP for its TLA No. 43 dated July 29, 1969, a TLA distinct from PTLA
No. 47 involved in this case, is a valid contract involving mutual prestations on the part of the Government and PICOP.

The Presidential Warranty in this case is allegedly not a mere confirmation of PICOP's timber license but a commitment on the
part of the Government that in consideration of PICOP's investment in the wood-processing business, the Government will
assure the availability of the supply of raw materials at levels adequate to meet projected utilization requirements. The
guarantee that PICOP will have peaceful and adequate possession and enjoyment of its concession areas is impaired by the
reinstatement of Base Metals' MPSA in that the latter's mining activities underneath the area in dispute will surely undermine
PICOP's supply of raw materials on the surface.

Base Metals' obtention of area status and clearance from the DENR is allegedly immaterial, even misleading. The findings of
the DENR Regional Disrector and the superintendent of the Agusan Marsh and Wildlife Sanctuary are allegedly misplaced
because the area applied for is not inside the Agusan Marsh but in a permanent forest. Moreover, the remarks in the area
status itself should have been considered by the MAB and the appellate court as they point out that the application encroaches
on surveyed timberland projects declared as permanent forests/forest reserves.

Finally, PICOP insists that it has always maintained that the forest areas of PTLA No. 47 and IFMA No. 35 are closed to mining
operations. The grounds relied upon in this petition are thus not new issues but merely amplifications, clarifications and
detailed expositions of the relevant constitutional provisions and statutes regulating the use and preservation of forest
reserves, permanent forest, and protected wilderness areas given that the areas subject of the MPSA are within and overlap
PICOP's PTLA No. 47 and IFMA No. 35 which have been classified and blocked not only as permanent forest but also as
protected wilderness area forming an integral part of the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve.

In its undated Memorandum,13 Base Metals contends that PICOP never made any reference to land classification or the
exclusion of the contested area from exploration and mining activities except in the motion for reconsideration it filed with the
Court of Appeals. PICOP's object to the MPSA was allegedly based exclusively on the ground that the application, if allowed to
proceed, would constitute a violation of the constitutional proscription against impairment of the obligation of contracts. It
was upon this issue that the appellate court hinged its Decision in favor of Base Metals, ruling that the Presidential Warranty
merely confirmed PICOP's timber license. The instant petition, which raises new issues and invokes RA 3092 and RA 7586, is
an unwarranted departure from the settled rule that only issues raised in the proceedings a quo may be elevated on appeal.

Base Metals notes that RA 7586 expressly requires that there be a prior presidential decree, presidential proclamation, or
executive order issued by the President of the Philippines, expressly proclaiming, designating, and setting aside the wilderness
area before the same may be considered part of the NIPAS as a protected area. Allegedly, PICOP has not shown that such an
express presidential proclamation exists setting aside the subject area as a forest reserve, and excluding the same from the
commerce of man.

PICOP also allegedly misquoted Sec. 19 of RA 7942 by placing a comma between the words "watershed" and "forest" thereby
giving an altogether different and misleading interpretation of the cited provision. The cited provision, in fact, states that for
an area to be closed to mining applications, the same must be a watershed forest reserve duly identified and proclaimed by the
President of the Philippines. In this case, no presidential proclamation exists setting aside the contested area as such.

Moreover, the Memorandum of Agreement between Banahaw Mining and PICOP is allegedly a clear and tacit recognition by
the latter that the area is open and available for mining activities and that Banahaw Mining has a right to enter and explore the
areas covered by its mining claims.

Base Metals reiterates that the non-impairment clause is a limit on the exercise of legislative power and not of judicial or
quasi-judicial power. The Constitution prohibits the passage of a law which enlarges, abridges or in any manner changes the
intention of the contracting parties. The decision of the MAB and the Court of Appeals are not legislative acts within the
purview of the constitutional proscription. Besides, the Presidential Warranty is not a contract that may be impaired by the
reinstatement of the MPSA. It is a mere confirmation of PICOP's timber license and draws its life from PTLA No. 47.
Furthermore, PICOP fails to show how the reinstatement of the MPSA will impair its timber license.

Following the regalian doctrine, Base Metals avers that the State may opt to enter into contractual arrangements for the
exploration, development, and extraction of minerals even it the same should mean amending, revising, or even revoking
PICOP's timber license. To require the State to secure PICOP's prior consent before it can enter into such contracts allegedly
constitutes an undue delegation of sovereign power.

Base Metals further notes that Presidential Decree No. 705 (PD 705), under which PTLA No. 47, IFMA No. 35 and the
Presidential Warranty were issued, requires notice to PICOP rather than consent before any mining activity can be
commenced in the latter's concession areas.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Memorandum14 dated April 21, 2005 on behalf of the MAB, contending that
PICOP's attempt to raise new issues, such as its argument that the contested area is classified as a permanent forest and hence,
closed to mining activities, is offensive to due process and should not be allowed.

The OSG argues that a timber license is not a contract within the purview of the due process and non-impairment clauses. The
Presidential Warranty merely guarantees PICOP's tenure over its concession area and covers only the right to cut, collect and
remove timber therein. It is a mere collateral undertaking and cannot amplify PICOP's rights under its PTLA No. 47 and IFMA
No. 35. To hold that the Presidential Warranty is a contract separate from PICOP's timber license effectively gives the latter
PICOP an exclusive, perpetual and irrevocable right over its concession area and impairs the State's sovereign exercise of its
power over the exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources.

The case of PICOP Resources, Inc. v. Hon. Heherson T. Alvarez, supra, cited by PICOP cannot be relied upon to buttress the
latter's claim that a presidential warranty is a valid and subsisting contract between PICOP and the Government because the
decision of the appellate court in that case is still pending review before the Court's Second Division.

The OSG further asserts that mining operations are legally permissible over PICOP's concession areas. Allegedly, what is closed
to mining applications under RA 7942 are areas proclaimed as watershed forest reserves. The law does not totally prohibit
mining operations over forest reserves. On the contrary, Sec. 18 of RA 7942 permits mining over forest lands subject to
existing rights and reservations, and PD 705 allows mining over forest lands and forest reservations subject to State regulation
and mining laws. Sec. 19(a) of RA 7942 also provides that mineral activities may be allowed even over military and other
government reservations as long as there is a prior written clearance by the government agency concerned.

The area status clearances obtained by Base Metals also allegedly show that the area covered by the MPSA is within
timberland, unclassified public forest, and alienable and disposable land. Moreover, PICOP allegedly chose to cite portions of
Apex Mining Corporation v. Garcia,15 to make it appear that the Court in that case ruled that mining is absolutely prohibited in
the Agusan-Surigao-Davao Forest Reserve. In fact, the Court held that the area is not open to mining location because the
proper procedure is to file an application for a permit to prospect with the Bureau of Forest and Development.

In addition, PICOP's claimed wilderness area has not been designated as a protected area that would operate to bar mining
operations therein. PICOP failed to prove that the alleged wilderness area has been designated as an initial component of the
NIPAS pursuant to a law, presidential decree, presidential proclamation or executive order. Hence, it cannot correctly claim
that the same falls within the coverage of the restrictive provisions of RA 7586.

The OSG points out that the Administrative Code of 1917 which RA 3092 amended has been completely repealed by the
Administrative Code of 1978. Sec. 4, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution, on the other hand, provides that Congress shall
determine the specific limits of forest lands and national parks, marking clearly their boundaries on the ground. Once this is
done, the area thus covered by said forest lands and national parks may not be expanded or reduced except also by
congressional legislation. Since Congress has yet to enact a law determining the specific limits of the forest lands covered by
Proclamation No. 369 and marking clearly its boundaries on the ground, there can be no occasion that could give rise to a
violation of the constitutional provision.

Moreover, Clauses 10 and 14 of PICOP's IFMA No. 35 specifically provides that the area covered by the agreement is open for
mining if public interest so requires. Likewise, PTLA No. 47 provides that the area covered by the license agreement may be
opened for mining purposes.

Finally, the OSG maintains that pursuant to the State's policy of multiple land use, R.A. No. 7942 provides for appropriate
measures for a harmonized utilization of the forest resources and compensation for whatever damage done to the property of
the surface owner or concessionaire as a consequence of mining operations. Multiple land use is best demonstrated by the
Memorandum of Agreement between PICOP and Banahaw Mining.

First, the procedural question of whether PICOP is raising new issues in the instant petition. It is the contention of the OSG and
Base Metals that PICOP's argument that the area covered by the MPSA is classified as permanent forest and therefore closed to
mining activities was raised for the first time in PICOP's motion for reconsideration with the Court of Appeals.

Our own perusal of the records of this case reveals that this is not entirely true.

In its Adverse Claim and/or Opposition16 dated November 19, 1997 filed with the MGB Panel of Arbitrators, PICOP already
raised the argument that the area applied for by Base Metals is classified as a permanent forest determined to be needed for
forest purposes pursuant to par. 6, Sec. 3 of PD 705, as amended. PICOP then proceeded to claim that the area should remain
forest land if the purpose of the presidential fiat were to be followed. It stated:

Technically, the areas applied for by Base Metals are classified as a permanent forest being land of the public domain
determined to be needed for forest purposes (Paragraph 6, Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended) If these
areas then are classified and determined to be needed for forest purpose then they should be developed and should remain as
forest lands. Identifying, delineating and declaring them for other use or uses defeats the purpose of the aforecited
presidential fiats. Again, if these areas would be delineated from Oppositor's forest concession, the forest therein would be
destroyed and be lost beyond recovery.17

Base Metals met this argument head on in its Answer18 dated December 1, 1997, in which it contended that PD 705 does not
exclude mining operations in forest lands but merely requires that there be proper notice to the licensees of the area.
Again in its Petition19 dated January 25, 2003 assailing the reinstatement of Base Metals' MPSA, PICOP argued that RA 7942
expressly prohibits mining operations in plantation areas such as PICOP's concession area. Hence, it posited that the MGB
Panel of Arbitrators did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that without PICOP's consent, the area is closed to
mining location.

It is true though that PICOP expounded on the applicability of RA 3092, RA 7586, and RA 7942 for the first time in its motion
for reconsideration of the appellate court's Decision. It was only in its motion for reconsideration that PICOP argued that the
area covered by PTLA No. 47 and IFMA No. 35 are permanent forest lands covered by RA 7586 which cannot be entered for
mining purposes, and shall remain indefinitely as such for forest uses and cannot be excluded or diverted for other uses except
after reclassification through a law enacted by Congress.

Even so, we hold that that the so-called new issues raised by PICOP are well within the issues framed by the parties in the
proceedings a quo. Thus, they are not, strictly speaking, being raised for the first time on appeal.20 Besides, Base Metals and
the OSG have been given ample opportunity, by way of the pleadings filed with this Court, to respond to PICOP's arguments. It
is in the best interest of justice that we settle the crucial question of whether the concession area in dispute is open to mining
activities.

We should state at this juncture that the policy of multiple land use is enshrined in our laws towards the end that the country's
natural resources may be rationally explored, developed, utilized and conserved. The Whereas clauses and declaration of
policies of PD 705 state:

WHEREAS, proper classification, management and utilization of the lands of the public domain to maximize their productivity
to meet the demands of our increasing population is urgently needed;

WHEREAS, to achieve the above purpose, it is necessary to reassess the multiple uses of forest lands and resources before
allowing any utilization thereof to optimize the benefits that can be derived therefrom;

Sec. 2. Policies.—The State hereby adopts the following policies:

a) The multiple uses of forest lands shall be oriented to the development and progress requirements of the country, the
advancement of science and technology, and the public welfare;

In like manner, RA 7942, recognizing the equiponderance between mining and timber rights, gives a mining contractor the
right to enter a timber concession and cut timber therein provided that the surface owner or concessionaire shall be properly
compensated for any damage done to the property as a consequence of mining operations. The pertinent provisions on
auxiliary mining rights state:

Sec. 72. Timber Rights.—Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, a contractor may be granted a right to cut trees
or timber within his mining areas as may be necessary for his mining operations subject to forestry laws, rules and
regulations: Provided, That if the land covered by the mining area is already covered by existing timber concessions, the
volume of timber needed and the manner of cutting and removal thereof shall be determined by the mines regional director,
upon consultation with the contractor, the timber concessionair/permittee and the Forest Management Bureau of the
Department: Provided, further, That in case of disagreement between the contractor and the timber concessionaire, the matter
shall be submitted to the Secretary whose decision shall be final. The contractor shall perform reforestation work within his
mining area in accordance with forestry laws, rules and regulations.

Sec. 76. Entry into Private Lands and Concession Areas.—Subject to prior notification, holders of mining rights shall not be
prevented from entry into private lands and concession areas by surface owners, occupants, or concessionaires when
conducting mining operations therein: Provided, That any damage done to the property of the surface owner, occupant, or
concessionaire as a consequence of such operations shall be properly compensated as may be provided for in the
implementing rules and regulations: Provided, further, That to guarantee such compensation, the person authorized to
conduct mining operation shall, prior thereto, post a bond with the regional director based on the type of properties, the
prevailing prices in and around the area where the mining operations are to be conducted, with surety or sureties satisfactory
to the regional director.

With the foregoing predicates, we shall now proceed to analyze PICOP's averments.

PICOP contends that its concession area is within the Agusan-Surigao-Davao Forest Reserve established under Proclamation
No. 369 and is closed to mining application citing several paragraphs of Sec. 19 of RA 7942.

The cited provision states:

Sec. 19 Areas Closed to Mining Applications.—Mineral agreement or financial or technical assistance agreement applications
shall not be allowed:

(a) In military and other government reservations, except upon prior written clearance by the government agency concerned;

(d) In areas expressly prohibited by law;

(f) Old growth or virgin forests, proclaimed watershed forest reserves, wilderness areas, mangrove forests, mossy forests,
national parks, provincial/municipal forests, parks, greenbelts, game refuge and bird sanctuaries as defined by law in areas
expressly prohibited under the National Ingrated Protected Areas System (NIPAS) under Republic Act No. 7586, Department
Administrative Order No. 25, series of 1992 and other laws. [emphasis supplied]

We analyzed each of the categories under which PICOP claims that its concession area is closed to mining activities and
conclude that PICOP's contention must fail.

Firstly, assuming that the area covered by Base Metals' MPSA is a government reservation, defined as proclaimed reserved
lands for specific purposes other than mineral reservations,21 such does not necessarily preclude mining activities in the area.
Sec. 15(b) of DAO 96-40 provides that government reservations may be opened for mining applications upon prior written
clearance by the government agency having jurisdiction over such reservation.

Sec. 6 of RA 7942 also provides that mining operations in reserved lands other than mineral reservations may be undertaken
by the DENR, subject to certain limitations. It provides:

Sec. 6. Other Reservations.—Mining operations in reserved lands other than mineral reservations may be undertaken by the
Department, subject to limitations as herein provided. In the event that the Department cannot undertake such activities, they
may be undertaken by a qualified person in accordance with the rules and regulations promulgated by the Secretary. The right
to develop and utilize the minerals found therein shall be awarded by the President under such terms and conditions as
recommended by the Director and approved by the Secretary: Provided, That the party who undertook the exploration of said
reservations shall be given priority. The mineral land so awarded shall be automatically excluded from the reservation during
the term of the agreement: Provided, further, That the right of the lessee of a valid mining contract existing within the
reservation at the time of its establishment shall not be prejudiced or impaired.

Secondly, RA 7942 does not disallow mining applications in all forest reserves but only those proclaimed as watershed forest
reserves. There is no evidence in this case that the area covered by Base Metals' MPSA has been proclaimed as watershed
forest reserves.

Even granting that the area covered by the MPSA is part of the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve, such does not
necessarily signify that the area is absolutely closed to mining activities. Contrary to PICOP's obvious misreading of our
decision in Apex Mining Co., Inc. v. Garcia, supra, to the effect that mineral agreements are not allowed in the forest reserve
established under Proclamation 369, the Court in that case actually ruled that pursuant to PD 463 as amended by PD 1385, one
can acquire mining rights within forest reserves, such as the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve, by initially applying for a
permit to prospect with the Bureau of Forest and Development and subsequently for a permit to explore with the Bureau of
Mines and Geosciences.

Moreover, Sec. 18 RA 7942 allows mining even in timberland or forestty subject to existing rights and reservations. It
provides:

Sec. 18. Areas Open to Mining Operations.—Subject to any existing rights or reservations and prior agreements of all parties,
all mineral resources in public or private lands, including timber or forestlands as defined in existing laws, shall be open to
mineral agreements or financial or technical assistance agreement applications. Any conflict that may arise under this
provision shall be heard and resolved by the panel of arbitrators.

Similarly, Sec. 47 of PD 705 permits mining operations in forest lands which include the public forest, the permanent forest or
forest reserves, and forest reservations.22 It states:

Sec. 47. Mining Operations.—Mining operations in forest lands shall be regulated and conducted with due regard to protection,
development and utilization of other surface resources. Location, prospecting, exploration, utilization or exploitation of
mineral resources in forest reservations shall be governed by mining laws, rules and regulations. No location, prospecting,
exploration, utilization, or exploitation of mineral resources inside forest concessions shall be allowed unless proper notice
has been served upon the licensees thereof and the prior approval of the Director, secured.

Significantly, the above-quoted provision does not require that the consent of existing licensees be obtained but that they be
notified before mining activities may be commenced inside forest concessions.

DENR Memorandum Order No. 03-98, which provides the guidelines in the issuance of area status and clearance or consent for
mining applications pursuant to RA 7942, provides that timber or forest lands, military and other government reservations,
forest reservations, forest reserves other than critical watershed forest reserves, and existing DENR Project Areas within
timber or forest lands, reservations and reserves, among others, are open to mining applications subject to area status and
clearance.

To this end, area status clearances or land status certifications have been issued to Base Metals relative to its mining right
application, to wit:

II. MPSA No. 010

1. Portion colored green is the area covered by the aforestated Timberland Project No. 31-E, Block A and Project No. 59-C,
Block A, L.C. Map No. 2466 certified as such on June 30, 1961; and

2. Shaded brown represent CADC claim.23

III. MPSA No. 011

1. The area applied covers the Timberland, portion of Project No. 31-E, Block-E, L.C. Map No. 2468 and Project No. 36-A Block
II, Alienable and Disposable Land, L.C. Map No. 1822, certified as such on June 30, 1961 and January 1, 1955, respectively;

2. The green shade is the remaining portion of Timber Land Project;

3. The portion colored brown is an applied and CADC areas;

4. Red shade denotes alienable and disposable land.24

IV. MPSA No. 012

Respectfully returned herewith is the folder of Base Metals Mineral Resources Corporation, applied under Mineral Production
Sharing Agreement (MPSA (XIII) 012), referred to this office per memorandum dated August 5, 1997 for Land status
certification and the findings based on available references file this office, the site is within the unclassified Public Forest of the
LGU, Rosario, Agusan del Sur. The shaded portion is the wilderness area of PICOP Resources Incorporated (PRI), Timber
License Agreement.25

V. MPSA No. 013

1. The area status shaded green falls within Timber Land, portion of Project No. 31-E, Block-A, Project No. 59-C, Block-A, L.C.
Map No. 2468 certified as such on June 30, 1961;

2. Colored brown denotes a portion claimed as CADC areas;

3. Violet shade represent a part of reforestation project of PRI concession; and

4. The yellow color is identical to unclassified Public Forest of said LGU and the area inclosed in Red is the wilderness area of
PICOP Resources, Inc. (PRI), Timber License Agreement.26

Thirdly, PICOP failed to present any evidence that the area covered by the MPSA is a protected wilderness area designated as
an initial component of the NIPAS pursuant to a law, presidential decree, presidential proclamation or executive order as
required by RA 7586.

Sec. 5(a) of RA 7586 provides:

Sec. 5. Establishment and Extent of the System.—The establishment and operationalization of the System shall involve the
following:

(a) All areas or islands in the Philippines proclaimed, designated or set aside, pursuant to a law, presidential decree,
presidential proclamation or executive order as national park, game refuge, bird and wildlife sanctuary, wilderness area, strict
nature reserve, watershed, mangrove reserve, fish sanctuary, natural and historical landmark, protected and managed
landscape/seascape as well as identified virgin forests before the effectivity of this Act are hereby designated as initial
components of the System. The initial components of the System shall be governed by existing laws, rules and regulations, not
inconsistent with this Act.

Although the above-cited area status and clearances, particularly those pertaining to MPSA Nos. 012 and 013, state that
portions thereof are within the wilderness area of PICOP, there is no showing that this supposed wilderness area has been
proclaimed, designated or set aside as such, pursuant to a law, presidential decree, presidential proclamation or executive
order. It should be emphasized that it is only when this area has been so designated that Sec. 20 of RA 7586, which prohibits
mineral locating within protected areas, becomes operational.

From the foregoing, there is clearly no merit to PICOP's contention that the area covered by Base Metals' MPSA is, by law,
closed to mining activities.

Finally, we do not subscribe to PICOP's argument that the Presidential Warranty dated September 25, 1968 is a contract
protected by the non-impairment clause of the 1987 Constitution.

An examination of the Presidential Warranty at once reveals that it simply reassures PICOP of the government's commitment
to uphold the terms and conditions of its timber license and guarantees PICOP's peaceful and adequate possession and
enjoyment of the areas which are the basic sources of raw materials for its wood processing complex. The warranty covers
only the right to cut, collect, and remove timber in its concession area, and does not extend to the utilization of other
resources, such as mineral resources, occurring within the concession.

The Presidential Warranty cannot be considered a contract distinct from PTLA No. 47 and IFMA No. 35. We agree with the
OSG's position that it is merely a collateral undertaking which cannot amplify PICOP's rights under its timber license. Our
definitive ruling in Oposa v. Factoran27 that a timber license is not a contract within the purview of the non-impairment
clause is edifying. We declared:

Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property
right protected by the due process clause of the Constitution. In Tan vs. Director of Forestry, this Court held:

"x x x A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the
end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause; it is only a
license or a privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case.

'A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority,
federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it a property or a property right, nor
does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation' (C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the granting of license does not create
irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576). x x x"

We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary:
"x x x Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State regulates the
utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that
they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or
irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest products therein. They may be validly amended, modified,
replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within
the purview of the due process of law clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v.
Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302]."

Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:

"Sec. 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed."

cannot be invoked.28 [emphasis supplied]

The Presidential Warranty cannot, in any manner, be construed as a contractual undertaking assuring PICOP of exclusive
possession and enjoyment of its concession areas. Such an interpretation would result in the complete abdication by the State
in favor of PICOP of the sovereign power to control and supervise the exploration, development and utilization of the natural
resources in the area.

In closing, we should lay emphasis on the fact that the reinstatement of Base Metals' MPSA does not automatically result in its
approval. Base Metals still has to comply with the requirements outlined in DAO 96-40, including the
publication/posting/radio announcement of its mineral agreement application.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals November 28, 2003 is
AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Quisumbing, J., Chairperson, Carpio, Carpio Morales, and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.