Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 212398 November 25, 2014

EMILIO RAMON "E.R." P. EJERCITO, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EDGAR "EGA Y" S. SAN LUIS, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Contested in this petition for certiorari under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Rules), is the
May 21, 2014 Resolutio1 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc in SPA No. 13-306 (DC), which
affirmed the September 26, 2013 Resolution2 of the COMELEC First Division granting the petition for
disqualification filed by private respondent Edgar "Egay" S. San Luis (San Luis) against petitioner Emilio Ramon
"E.R." P. Ejercito (Ejercito). Three days prior to the May 13, 2013 National and Local Elections, a petition for
disqualification was filed by San Luis before the Office of the COMELEC Clerk in Manila against Ejercito, who was
a fellow gubernatorial candidate and, at the time, the incumbent Governor of the Province of Laguna. 3 Alleged in
his Petition are as follows:

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

5. [Ejercito], during the campaign period for 2013 local election, distributed to the electorates of the
province of Laguna the so-called "Orange Card" with an intent to influence, induce or corrupt the
voters in voting for his favor. Copy thereof is hereto attached and marked as Annex "C" and made
as an integral part hereof;

6. In furtherance of his candidacy for the position of Provincial Governor of Laguna, [Ejercito] and his
cohorts claimed that the said "Orange Card" could be used in any public hospital within the Province
of Laguna for their medical needs as declared by the statements of witnesses which are hereto
attached and marked as Annex "D" as integral part hereof;

7. The so-called "Orange Card" is considered a material consideration in convincing the voters to
cast their votes for [Ejercito’s] favor in clear violation of the provision of the Omnibus Election Code
which provides and I quote:

"Sec. 68. Disqualifications. – Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is
declared by final decision by a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a)
given money or other materialconsideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials
performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in
his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or
made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any of
Sections 80, 83, 85, 86, and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, subparagraph 6, shall be disqualified
from continuing as a candidate, or if hehas been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is
a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any
elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or
immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the
election laws." (emphasis ours)

8. Thus, pursuant to the mandate of the aforesaid law, [Ejercito] should be disqualified;

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

9. Based on the records of the Provincial COMELEC, the Province of Laguna has a total of 1,525,522
registered electorate. A certification issued by the Provincial Election Supervisor is hereto attached
and marked as Annex "E" as an integral part hereof;

10. In this regard, par. (a), Section 5 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615, otherwise known as the
Rules and Regulations Implementing FAIR ELECTION ACT provides and I quote:

"Authorized Expenses of Candidates and Parties. –The aggregate amount that a candidate or party
may spent for election campaign shall be as follows:

a. For candidates – Three pesos (₱3.00) for every voter currently registered in the
constituency where the candidate filed his certificate of candidacy.

b. For other candidates without any political party and without any support from any political
party – Five pesos (₱5.00) for every voter currently registered in the constituency where the
candidate filed his certificate of candidacy.

c. For Political Parties and party-list groups – Five pesos (₱5.00) for every voter currently
registered in the constituency or constituencies where it has official candidates. (underscoring
mine for emphasis)

11. Accordingly, a candidate for the position of Provincial Governor of Laguna is only authorized to
incur an election expense amounting to FOUR MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY-SIX
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED SIXTY-SIX (₱4,576,566.00) PESOS.

12. However, in total disregard and violation of the afore-quoted provision of law, [Ejercito] exceeded
his expenditures in relation to his campaign for the 2013 election. For television campaign
commercials alone, [Ejercito] already spent the sum of Ph₱23,730.784 based on our party’s official
monitoring on the following dates[:] April 28, May 4 & May 5, 2013.

Network Date Program Time Duration Amount*

ABS- April 28, 4 minutes
TV Patrol 5:58 p.m. ₱3,297,496
CBN 2013 (approximately)
 Sundays Best
ABS- April 28, 10:40 4 minutes
(local ₱3,297,496
CBN 2013 p.m. (approximately)
specials)
April 28, Sunday Night 10:46 3 minutes
GMA ₱2,635,200
2013 Box Office p.m. (approximately)
April 28, Sunday Night 11:06 4 minutes
GMA ₱2,635,200
2013 Box Office p.m. (approximately)
April 28, Sunday Night 11:18 4 minutes
GMA ₱2,635,200
2013 Box Office p.m. (approximately)
April 28, Sunday Night 11:47 4 minutes
GMA ₱2,635,200
2013 Box Office p.m. (approximately)
ABS- 11:26 4 minutes
May 4, 2013 TODA MAX ₱3,297,496
CBN p.m. (approximately)
ABS- 4 minutes
May 5, 2013 Rated K 8:06 p.m. ₱3,297,496
CBN (approximately)
Total ₱23,730.784

* Total cost based on published rate card;

13. Even assuming that [Ejercito] was given 30% discount as prescribed under the Fair Election Act,
he still exceeded in the total allowable expenditures for which he paid the sum of ₱16,611,549;

14. In view of the foregoing disquisitions, it is evident that [Ejercito] committed an election offense as
provided for under Section 35 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615, which provides and I quote:

"Election Offense. – Any violation of R.A. No. 9006 and these Rules shall constitute an election
offense punishable under the first and second paragraph of Section 264 of the Omnibus Election
Code in addition to administrative liability, whenever applicable. x x x"

15. Moreover, it is crystal clear that [Ejercito] violated Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code which
provides and I quote:

"Sec. 68. Disqualifications. – Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is
declared by final decision by a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a)
given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public
officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c)
spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited,
received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated
any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86, and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, subparagraph 6, shall be
disqualified from continuing asa candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any
person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to
 run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent
resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for
in the election laws." (emphasis ours)

16. On the other hand, the effect of disqualification is provided under Sec. 6 of Republic Act No.
6646, which states and I quote:

"Effect of Disqualification Case. – Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason
a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for
and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue
with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any
intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the evidence of [his] guilt is strong." (emphasis mine)

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:

1. Upon filing of this petition, a declaration by the Honorable Commission of the existence of probable
cause be made against [Ejercito] for violating the afore-quoted provisions of laws;

2. In the event that [Ejercito] will beable to get a majority vote of the electorate of the Province of
Laguna on May 13, 2013, his proclamation be suspended until further order of the Honorable
Commission pursuant to Sec. 6 of Republic Act No. 6646;

3. Lastly, a criminal case for VIOLATION OF ELECTION LAWS be filed against [Ejercito] before the
proper court[;] [and]

4. Other relief, just and equitable underthe premises, are also prayed for. 4

Subsequently, on May 16, 2013, San Luis filed a Very Urgent ExParte Motion to Issue Suspension of Possible
Proclamation of Respondent and Supplemental to the Very Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Issue Suspension of
Possible Proclamation of Respondent.5 However, these were not acted upon by the COMELEC. The next day,
Ejercito and Ramil L. Hernandez were proclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers as the duly-elected
Governor and Vice-Governor, respectively, of Laguna.6 Based on the Provincial/District Certificate of Canvass,
Ejercito obtained 549,310 votes compared with San Luis’ 471,209 votes. 7

The COMELEC First Division issued a Summons with Notice of Conference on June 4, 2013. 8 Ejercito then filed
his Verified Answeron June 13, 2013 that prayed for the dismissal of the petition due to procedural and substantive
irregularities and taking into account his proclamation as Provincial Governor.9 He countered that the petition was
improperly filed because, based on the averments and relief prayed for, it is in reality a complaint for election
offenses; thus, the case should have been filed before the COMELEC Law Department, or the election registrar,
provincial election supervisor or regional election director, or the state, provincial or city prosecutor in accordance
with Laurel v. Presiding Judge, RTC, Manila, Br. 10. 10 Assuming that the petition could be given due course,
Ejercito argued that San Luis failed to show, conformably with Codilla, Sr. v. Hon. De Venecia, 11 that he (Ejercito)
was previously convicted or declared by final judgment of a competent court for being guilty of, or found by the
COMELEC of having committed, the punishable acts under Section 68 of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Bilang 881, or
the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, as amended (OEC).12

As to the acts he allegedly committed, Ejercito claimed that the same are baseless, unfounded, and totally
speculative. He stated that the Health Access Program or the E.R. "Orange Card" was a priority project of his
administration as incumbent Governor of Laguna and was never intended to influence the electorate during the
May 2013 elections. He added that the "Orange Card," which addressed the increasing need for and the high cost
of quality health services, provides the Laguneños not only access to medical services but also the privilege to
avail free livelihood seminars to help them find alternative sources of income. With respect to the charge of having
exceeded the total allowable election expenditures, Ejercito submitted that the accusation deserves no
consideration for being speculative, self-serving, and uncorroborated by any other substantial evidence.

Citing Sinaca v. Mula,13 Ejercito asserted that the petition questioning his qualification was rendered moot and
academic by his proclamation as the duly-elected Provincial Governor ofLaguna for the term 2013-2016. He
perceived that his successful electoral bid substantiates the fact that he was an eligible candidate and that his
victory is a testament that he is more than qualified and competent to hold public office.

Lastly, Ejercito considered San Luis’ petition for disqualification as purely frivolous and with no plain and clear
purpose but to harass and cause undue hardship. According to him, the fact that it was filed only a few days before
the May 13, 2013 elections evidently shows that it was lodged as a last-ditch effort to baselessly derail and obstruct
his assumption of office and function as the duly-elected Laguna Governor.

The scheduled case conference between the parties on June 13, 2013 was reset to June 27, 2013.14 In the latter
date, all the documentary exhibits were marked in evidence and the parties agreed to file their respective
memorandum within ten (10) days.15

San Luis substantially reiterated the content of the Petitionin his Memorandum. 16 Additionally, he alleged that:

15. After the election, [San Luis] was able to secure documents from the Information and Education Department
of the Commission on Elections showing that [Ejercito] have incurred advertising expenses with ABS-CBN in the
amount of [₱20,197,170.25] not to mention his advertisement with GMA 7. Copies of the summary report, media
purchase order, advertising contract[,] and official receipt are marked as EXHS. "B-1", "B-2", "B-3", and"B-4"
(Annexes "A", "B", "C", and "D", supplemental to the very urgent ex-parte motion)[.]17

It was stressed that the case is a "Special Action for Disqualification" seeking to disqualify Ejercito as gubernatorial
candidate for violation of Section 68 (a) (c) of the OEC. He prayed that "[t]he Petition BE GRANTED [and] x x x
[Ejercito] BE DISQUALIFIED, and PREVENTED from further holding office as Governor of Laguna." 18 In refutation
of Ejercito’s defenses, San Luis argued that it is precisely because of the commission of the election offenses
under Section 68 of the OEC that he (Ejercito) should be disqualified. Also, citing Section 6 of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 6646,19 San Luis contended that Ejercito’s proclamation and assumption of office do not affect the COMELEC’s
jurisdiction to continue with the trial and hearing of the action until it is finally resolved.

For his part, Ejercito filed a Manifestation (In Lieu of Memorandum)20 restating all the arguments set forth in his
Verified Answer.
On September 26, 2013, the COMELEC First Division promulgated a Resolution, the dispositive portion of which
reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission (First Division) RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to:

(1) GRANTthe Petition for Disqualification filed against respondent Emilio Ramon "E.R." P. Ejercito;

(2) DISQUALIFY respondent Ejercito from holding the Office of the Provincial Governor of Laguna,
pursuant to Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code;

(3) ORDER respondent Ejercito to CEASE and DESIST from performing the functions of the Office
of the Provincial Governor of Laguna;

(4) DECLARE a permanent VACANCY in the Office of the Provincial Governor of Laguna;

(5) DIRECT the duly elected Vice Governor of Laguna to assume the Office of the Provincial
Governor by virtue of succession as provided in Section 44 of the Local Government Code; and

(6) DIRECT the Campaign Finance Unit to coordinate with the Law Department of this Commission
for the conduct of a preliminary investigation into the alleged violations of campaign finance laws,
rules and regulations committed by respondent Ejercito.

SO ORDERED.21

On procedural matters, the COMELEC First Division held that the title of San Luis’ petition and its reliance on
Section 68 (a) (c) of the OEC as grounds for his causes of action clearly show that the case was brought under
Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure,22 as amended by COMELEC Resolution No. 9523,23 which allows
petitions for disqualification to be filed "any day after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy, but not later
than the date of proclamation." No credence was given to Ejercito’s contention that the petition was mooted by his
proclamation as Governor of Laguna. The COMELEC First Division opined that the case of Sinacais inapplicable,
because it was not about Sinaca’s eligibility or whether he committed any of the acts enumerated in Section 68 of
the OEC. Consistent with Maquiling v. Commission on Elections,24 it was declared that Ejercito’s garnering of more
votes than San Luis in the May 2013 elections is not tantamount to condonation of any act or acts that he committed
which may be found to bea ground for disqualification or election offense.

The COMELEC First Division settled the substantive issues put forth in the petition for disqualification in this wise:

Anent [San Luis’] first cause of action, [San Luis] presented the Sworn Statement dated [May 7, 2013]of a certain
Mrs. Daisy A. Cornelio, together with the "Orange Card" issued to Mrs. Cornelio, marked respectively as Exhibits
"A-4" and "A-3" as per [San Luis’] Summary of Exhibits– to prove that [Ejercito] committed the act described in
Section 68 (a) of the OEC. After reviewing Mrs. Cornelio’s Sworn Statement, we do not find any averment to the
effect that the Orange Card was given to the affiant to influence or induce her to vote for [Ejercito]. Affiant only
stated that she was given the Orange Card "last April of this year" and that she was "not able to use it during those
times when [she] or one of [her] family members got sick and needed hospital assistance." Aside from Mrs.
Cornelio’s Sworn Statement, there is no other evidence to support [San Luis’] claim, leading us to reject[San Luis’]
first cause of action.

With respect to the second cause of action, [San Luis] presented Exhibits "B-1" to "B-4", which are submissions
made by the ABS-CBN Corporation as mandated by Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9006 ("RA 9006" or the "Fair
Election Act"), implemented through Section 9 (a) of Resolution No. 9615. Exhibit "B-3" is an Advertising
Contractbetween ABS-CBN Corporation and Scenema Concept International, Inc. ("SCI"). The details of the
Contractare as follows:

Payor/Advertiser Scenema Concept International, Inc.

Beneficiary
Broadcast Schedule
Number of Spots
Unit Cost per Spot
Total Cost of Contract
Jeorge "ER" Ejercito Estregan
April 27, 28, May 3, 4, 10 & 11, 2013
6 spots of 3.5 minutes each
PhP 3,366,195.04
PhP 20,197,170.25 plus VAT

The Contract contains the signature of [Ejercito] signifying his acceptance of the donation by SCI, the latter
represented by its Executive Vice President, Ms. Maylyn Enriquez. In addition to the advertising contract, Exhibit
"B-4" was submitted, which is a photocopy of an Official Receipt issued by ABS-CBN for the contract, with the
following details:

Date of the Receipt [April 26, 2013]

Received From Scenema Concept International, Inc.
Amount Received PhP 6,409,235.28
Official Receipt No. 278499

Upon verification of the submitted Exhibits "B-1" to "B-4" with this Commission’s Education and Information
Department (EID), the latter having custody of all advertising contracts submitted by broadcast stations and entities
in relation tothe [May 13, 2013] National and Local Elections, we find the said Exhibits tobe faithful reproductions
of our file copy of the same. A comparison of [Ejercito’s] signature on the Advertising Contractand that on his
Certificate of Candidacy show them to be identical to each other, leading us to the conclusion that [Ejercito] had
indeed accepted the PhP 20,197,170.25 donation in the form of television advertisements to be aired on ABS-
CBN’s Channel 2. Even if we were to assume that only PhP 6,409,235.28 was actually paid out of PhP
20,197,170.25 advertising contract, thisamount is still more than PhP 4,576,566.00, which is [Ejercito’s] total
authorized aggregate amount allowed for his election campaign, computed as follows:
 Number of registered Authorized expense Total amount of
voters for the whole x per voter registered = spending allowed
Province of Laguna in the constituency for election campaign
1,525,522 registered
x PhP 3.00 per voter = PhP 4,576,566.00
voters in Laguna

While not presented as evidence in this case, we cannot deny the existence of another Advertising Contract dated
[May 8, 2013]for one (1) spot of a 3.5-minute advertisement scheduled for broadcast on [May 9, 2013], amounting
to PhP 3,366,195.05. This Contract also contains the signature of [Ejercito] accepting the donation from SCI and
is accompanied by an ABS-CBN-issued Official Receipt No. 279513 dated [May 7, 2013] in SCI’s name for PhP
6,409,235.28. If we add the amounts from both contracts, we arrive at a total cost of PhP 23,563,365.29, which,
coincidentally, is the product of:

Number of spots x Unit cost per spot = Total contract cost

Seven (7) spots x PhP 3,366,195.04 = PhP 23,563,365.28

This matches the data gathered by the Commission’s EID from the reports and logs submitted by broadcast
stations as required by the Fair Election Act. According to the 99-page Daily Operations Log for Channel 2
submitted by ABS-CBN covering the period of [April 27, 2013] to [May 11, 2013], [Ejercito’s] 3.5-minute or 210-
second advertisement was aired seven (7) times. The specific details on the dates of airing, program or time slot
when the advertisements were aired, and the time when the advertisements as culled from the 99-page Daily
Operations Logare summarized as thus:

Date aired Program/Time Slot Airtime

28 Apr 2013 TV Patrol Linggo/5:20-5:30 pm 05:54:40 PM
28 Apr 2013 Harapan: Senatorial Debate/9:30-11:30 pm 10:40:13 PM
04 May 2013 TODA MAX/10:30-11:15 pm 11:26:43 PM
05 May 2013 Rated K-Handa Na Ba Kayo/7:15-8:15 pm 08:06:42 PM
09 May 2013 TV Patrol/6:30-7:45 pm 07:35:56 PM
10 May 2013 TV Patrol/6:30-7:45 pm 07:44:50 PM
11 May 2013 TV Patrol Sabado/5:30-6:00 pm 06:12:30 PM

Source: Pages 6, 8, 43, 47, 75, 84, and 93 of ABS-CBN Channel 2 Daily Operations Log for [April 27, 2013] to
[May 11, 2013].

Assuming arguendo, that the actual cost of both contracts only amounted to PhP 12,818,470.56 as substantiated
by the two (2) Official Receipt sissued by the ABS-CBN on [April 26] and [May 7, 2013], or even if we were only to
consider Exhibit ["B-4"] or the Php 6,409,235.28 payment to ABS-CBN on [April 26, 2013], it nevertheless supports
our finding that [Ejercito] exceeded his authorized expenditure limit of PhP 4,576,566.00 which is a ground for
disqualification under Section 68 (c) and concurrently an election offense pursuant to Section 100 in relation to
Section 262 of the Omnibus Election Code.25

Only Ejercito filed a Verified Motion for Reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc. 26 After the parties’
exchange of pleadings,27 the Resolution of the COMELEC First Division was unanimously affirmed on May 21,
2014.

The COMELEC En Bancagreed with the findings of its First Division that San Luis’ petition is an action to disqualify
Ejercito, reasoning that:

x x x First, the title of the petition indicating that it is a petition for disqualification clearly expresses the objective of
the action. Second, it is manifest from the language of the petition that the causes of action have relied primarily
on Section 68 (a) and (c) of the OEC[,] which are grounds for disqualification x x x. Third, notwithstanding that the
relief portion of the petition sounded vague in its prayer for the disqualification of Ejercito, the allegations and
arguments set forth therein are obviously geared towards seeking his disqualification for having committed acts
listed as grounds for disqualification in Section 68 of OEC. Lastly, as correctly observed by the COMELEC First
Division, San Luis’ Memorandum addresses and clarifies the intention of the petition when it prayed for Ejercito to
"be disqualified and prevented from holding office as Governor of Laguna." While there is a prayerseeking that
Ejercito be held accountable for having committed election offenses, there can be no doubt that the petition was
primarily for his disqualification.

Section 68 of the OEC expressly grants COMELEC the power to take cognizance of an action or protest seeking
the disqualification of a candidate who has committed any of the acts listed therein from continuing as one, or if he
or she has been elected, from holding office. One ground for disqualification listed in Section 68 is spending in an
election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by law. It is exactly on said ground that San Luis is seeking
the disqualification of Ejercito. The jurisdiction of COMELEC over the petition, therefore, is clear. 28

The alleged violation of Ejercito’s constitutional right to due process was also not sustained: Ejercito insists that he
was deprived of his right to notice and hearing and was not informed of the true nature of the case filed against
him when San Luis was allegedly allowed in his memorandum to make as substantial amendment in the reliefs
prayed for in his petition. San Luis was allegedly allowed to seek for Ejercito’s disqualification instead of the filing
of an election offense against him.

As discussed above, the allegations in the petition, particularly the causes of action, clearly show that it is not
merely a complaint for an election offense but a disqualification case against Ejercito as well. San Luis’
memorandum merely amplified and clarified the allegations and arguments in his petition. There was no change
in the cause or causes of action. Ejercito[,] therefore, cannot claim that he was not aware of the true nature of the
petition filed against him.

Likewise, Ejercito cannot complainthat he was deprived of his right to notice and hearing. He cannot feign
ignorance that the COMELEC First Division, throughout the trial, was hearing the petition as a disqualification case
and not as an election offense case. He was served with Summons with Notice of Conference on [June 4, 2013]
and was given a copy of the petition. He likewise submitted to the jurisdiction of the Commission when he filed his
Verified Answer. He also participated in the Preliminary Conference on [June 27, 2013] wherein he examined
evidence on record and presented his own documentary exhibits. Lastly, he filed a Manifestation (in lieu of
Memorandum) incorporating all his allegations and defenses.

Ejercito contends that amending the reliefs prayed for is prohibited under Section 2, Rule 9 of the 1993 COMELEC
Rules of Procedure. He asserts that the relief prayed for in the memorandum is not the same as that in the petition.
However, a scrutiny of said amendment shows that no new issues were introduced. Moreover, there was no
departure from the causes of action and no material alterations on the grounds of relief. The amendment[,]
therefore[,] is not substantial as it merely rectifies or corrects the true nature of reliefs being prayed for as set forth
in the petition. The records of the case will show that Ejercito has been afforded the opportunity to contest and
rebut all the allegations against him. He was never deprived of his right to have access to the evidence against
him. He was adequately aware of the nature and implication of the disqualification case against him. Thus, Ejercito
cannot say that he was denied of his constitutional right to due process.

It is important to note at this point that Ejercito, in his motion for reconsideration, deliberately did not tackle the
merit and substance of the charges against him. He limited himself to raising procedural issues. This is despite all
the opportunity that he was given to confront the evidence lodged against him. Therefore, there is no reason for
the COMELEC En Bancto disturb the findings of the COMELEC First Division on whether Ejercito indeed over-
spent in his campaign for governorship of Laguna in the [May 13, 2013] National and Local Elections. 29

Anchoring on the case of Lanot v. Commission on Elections,30 the COMELEC En Banclikewise debunked Ejercito’s
assertion that the petition was prematurely and improperly filed on the ground that the filing of an election offense
and the factual determination on the existence of probable cause are required before a disqualification case based
on Section 68 of the OEC may proceed. It held:

As discussed in the case of Lanot vs. Comelec, each of the acts listed as ground for disqualification under Section
68 of the OEC has two aspects – electoral and criminal which may proceed independently from each other, to wit:

x x x The electoral aspect of a disqualification case determines whether the offender should be disqualified from
being a candidate or from holding office. Proceedings are summary in character and require only clear
preponderance of evidence. An erring candidate may be disqualified even without prior determination of probable
cause in a preliminary investigation. The electoral aspect may proceed independently of the criminal aspect, and
vice-versa.

The criminal aspect of a disqualification case determines whether there is probable cause to charge a candidate
for an election offense. The prosecutor is the COMELEC, through its Law Department, which determines whether
probable cause exists. If there is probable cause, the COMELEC, through its Law Department, files the criminal
information before the proper court. Proceedings before the proper court demand a full-blown hearing and require
proof beyond reasonable doubt to convict. A criminal conviction shall result in the disqualification of the offender,
which may even include disqualification from holding a future public office." (Emphasis supplied) 31

The petition for disqualification against Ejercito for campaign over-spending before the Commission isheard and
resolved pursuant to the electoral aspect of Section 68 of the OEC. It is an administrative proceeding separate and
distinct from the criminal proceeding through which Ejercito may be made to undergo in order to determine whether
he can be held criminally liable for the same act of over-spending. It is through this administrative proceeding that
this Commission, initially through its divisions, makes a factual determination on the veracity of the parties’
respective allegations in a disqualification case. There is no need for a preliminary investigation finding on the
criminal aspect of the offenses in Section 68 before the Commission can act on the administrative or electoral
aspect of the offense. All that is needed is a complaint or a petition. As enunciated in Lanot, "(a)n erring candidate
may be disqualified even without prior determination of probable cause in a preliminary investigation. The electoral
aspect may proceed independently of the criminal aspect, and vice-versa."

Moreover, Ejercito’s reliance on Codilla is misplaced. The COMELEC En Banc opined that the portion of the Codilla
decision that referred to the necessity of the conduct of preliminary investigation pertains to cases where the
offenders are charged with acts not covered by Section 68 of the OEC, and are, therefore, beyond the ambit of the
COMELEC’s jurisdiction. It said that the decision refers to this type of cases as criminal (not administrative) in
nature, and,thus, should be handled through the criminal process.

Further rejected was Ejercito’s argument that the COMELEC lost its jurisdiction over the petition for disqualification
the moment he was proclaimed as the duly-elected Governor of Laguna. For the COMELEC En Banc, its First
Division thoroughly and sufficiently addressed the matter when it relied on Maquiling instead of Sinaca. It
maintained that Section 5 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9523, not COMELEC Resolution No. 2050, 32 is relevant
to the instant case as it states that the COMELEC shall continue the trial and hearing of a pending disqualification
case despite the proclamation of a winner. It was noted that the proper application of COMELEC Resolution No.
2050 was already clarified in Sunga v. COMELEC.33

Finally, the COMELEC En Bancruled on one of San Luis’ contentions in his Comment/Oppositionto Ejercito’s
motion for reconsideration. He argued that he becomes the winner in the gubernatorial election upon the
disqualification of Ejercito. Relying on Maquiling, San Luis declared that he was not the second placer as he
obtained the highest number of valid votes cast from among the qualified candidates. In denying that Maquiling is
on all fours with this case, the COMELEC En Bancsaid:

In the instant case, Ejercito cannot be considered as a noncandidate by reason of his disqualification under Section
68 of the OEC. He was a candidate who filed a valid certificate of candidacy which was never cancelled.

Ejercito was a bona fide candidate who was disqualified, not because of any ineligibility existing at the time of the
filing of the certificate of candidacy, but because he violated the rules of candidacy. His disqualifying circumstance,
thatis, his having over-spent in his campaign, did not exist at the time of the filing of his certificate of candidacy. It
did not affect the validity of the votes cast in his favor. Notwithstanding his disqualification, he remains the
candidate who garnered the highest number of votes.

Ejercito cannot be on the same footing with Arnado in the Maquiling case. Arnado was disqualified from running
for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao Del Sur because he was a dual citizen not qualified to run for election. His
disqualification existed at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy. The effect, pursuant to the Maquiling
case, is that the votes he garnered are void, which in turn resulted in having considered the "second placer" –
Maquiling – asthe candidate who obtained the highest number of valid votes cast.

San Luis is in a different circumstance. The votes for the disqualified winning candidate remained valid. Ergo, San
Luis, being the second placer in the vote count, remains the second placer. He cannot[,] thus[,] be named the
winner.
Section 6, Rule 25 of the COMELEC Resolution No. 9523, which governs Section 68 petitions for disqualification,
enunciates the rule succinctly, to wit:

Section 6. Effect of Granting of Petition.– In the event a Petition to disqualify a candidate is granted by final
judgment as defined under Section 8 of Rule 23 and the disqualified candidate obtains the highest number of
votes, the candidate with the second highest number of votes cannot be proclaimed and the rule of succession, if
allowed by law, shall be observed. In the event the rule of succession is not allowed, a vacancy shall exist for such
position.34

On May 23, 2014, Ejercito filed before this Court a Petition for certiorari with application for the issuance of a status
quo ante order or temporary restraining order (TRO)/writ of preliminary injunction (WPI).35 Without issuing a
TRO/WPI, the Honorable Chief Justice, Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno, issued on May 28, 2014 an order to
respondents to comment on the petition within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from notice. 36 Such order
was confirmed nunc pro tunc by the Court En Bancon June 3, 2014.37

Meantime, on May 26, 2014, Ejercito filed before the COMELEC En Bancan Omnibus Motion to suspend
proceedings and to defer the implementation of the May 21, 2014 Resolution.38 On the same day, San Luis also
filed an Extremely Urgent Motion to Declare COMELEC En Banc Resolution of May 21, 2014 and First Division
Resolution of September 26, 2013 Final and Executory and to Issue Forthwith Writ of Execution or Implementing
Order39 invoking Paragraph 2, Section 8 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9523, in relation to Section 13 (b), Rule 18
of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.40 On May 27, 2014, the COMELEC En Bancissued an Order denying
Ejercito’s omnibus motion, granted San Luis’ extremely urgent motion, and directedthe Clerk of the Commission
to issue the corresponding writ of execution.41 On even date, Vice-Governor Hernandez was sworn in as the
Governor of Laguna at the COMELEC Main Office in Manila. The service of the writ was deemed completed and
validly served upon Ejercito on May 28, 2014.42

In his petition before Us, Ejercito raised the following issues for resolution:

THE COMMISSION COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN THAT:

(I) IT VIOLATED THE RIGHT OF PETITIONER TO DUE PROCESS WHEN IT RULED FOR
THE DISQUALIFICATION OF PETITIONER EVEN IF IT WAS NEVER PRAYED FOR IN THE
PETITION. WORSE, THERE IS YET NO FINDING OFGUILT BY A COMPETENT COURT
OR A FINDING OF FACT STATING THAT PETITIONER ACTUALLY COMMITTED THE
ALLEGED ELECTION OFFENSE OF OVERSPENDING;

(II) IT RELIED ON A DOCUMENTARY EXHIBIT (ADVERTISING CONTRACT) WHICH WAS

NOT EVEN FORMALLY OFFERED AS EVIDENCE; [AND]

(III) IT DISQUALIFIED PETITIONER FOR AN ACT DONE BY A THIRD PARTY WHO SIMPLY
EXERCISED ITS RIGHT TO FREE EXPRESSION WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE AND
CONSENT OF PETITIONER[.]43

The petition is unmeritorious.

A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, is an independent action that is available
only if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 44 It is a
legal remedy that is limited to the resolution of jurisdictional issues and is not meant to correct simple errors of
judgment.45 More importantly, it will only prosper if grave abuse of discretion is alleged and isactually proved to
exist.46

Grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower court or tribunal violates the Constitution, the law or existing
jurisprudence. It means such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as would amount to lack of jurisdiction;
it contemplates a situation where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion
or personal hostility, so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform
the duty enjoined by law. x x x.47

Ejercito failed to prove that the COMELEC rendered its assailed Resolution with grave abuse of discretion.

We now explain.

The petition filed by San Luis

against Ejercito is for the
latter’s disqualification and
prosecution for election offense

Ejercito insists that his alleged acts of giving material consideration in the form of "Orange Cards" and election
overspending are considered as election offenses under Section 35 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615, 48 in
relation to Section 1349 of R.A. No. 9006, and punishable under Section 264 50 of the OEC. Considering that San
Luis’ petition partakes of the nature of a complaint for election offenses, the COMELEC First Division has no
jurisdiction over the same based on COMELEC Resolution No. 938651 and Section 26552 of the OEC.

Still, Ejercito contends that the COMELEC erroneously sanctioned a change in San Luis’ cause of action by the
mere expedient of changing the prayer in the latter’s Memorandum. According to him, San Luis’ additional prayer
for disqualification in the Memorandum is a substantial amendment to the Petitionas it constitutes a material
deviation from the original cause of action – from a complaint for election offenses to a petition for disqualification.
Since such substantial amendment was effected after the case was set for hearing, Ejercito maintains that the
same should have been allowed only with prior leave of the COMELEC First Division pursuant to Section 2, Rule
953 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, which San Luis never did.

The arguments are untenable.

The purpose of a disqualification proceeding is to prevent the candidate from running or, if elected, from serving,
or to prosecute him for violation of the election laws.54 A petition to disqualifya candidate may be filed pursuant to
Section 68 of the OEC, which states:

SEC. 68. Disqualifications.-- Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final
decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having: (a) given money or other material
consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (b)
committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of
that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97
and 104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6,
shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person
who is a permanent resident of or animmigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective
office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign
country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws.

The prohibited acts covered by Section 68 (e) refer to election campaign or partisan political activityoutside the
campaign period (Section 80); removal, destruction or defacement of lawful election propaganda (Section 83);
certain forms of election propaganda (Section 85); violation of rules and regulations on election propaganda
through mass media; coercion of subordinates (Section 261 [d]); threats, intimidation, terrorism, use of fraudulent
device or other forms of coercion (Section 261 [e]); unlawful electioneering (Section 261 [k]); release, disbursement
or expenditure of public funds (Section 261 [v]); solicitation of votes or undertaking any propaganda on the day of
the election within the restricted areas (Section 261 [cc], sub-par.6). All the offenses mentioned in Section 68 refer
to election offenses under the OEC, not toviolations of other penal laws. In other words, offenses that are punished
in laws other than in the OEC cannot be a ground for a Section 68 petition. Thus, We have held:

x x x [T]he jurisdiction of the COMELEC to disqualify candidates is limited to those enumerated in Section 68 of
the [OEC]. All other election offenses are beyond the ambit of COMELEC jurisdiction. They are criminal and not
administrative in nature. Pursuant to Sections 265 and 268 of the [OEC], the power of the COMELEC is confined
to the conduct of preliminary investigation on the alleged election offenses for the purpose of prosecuting the
alleged offenders before the regular courts of justice, viz:

"Section 265. Prosecution. – The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal officers, have the exclusive
power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under this Code, and to prosecute
the same. The Commission may avail of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government: Provided,
however, That in the event that the Commission fails to act on any complaint within four months from its filing, the
complainant may file the complaint with the office of the fiscal or with the Ministry of Justice for proper investigation
and prosecution, if warranted.

xxx xxx xxx

Section 268. Jurisdiction. – The regional trial court shall have the exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide
any criminal action orproceeding for violation of this Code, except those relating to the offense of failure to register
or failure to vote which shall be under the jurisdictions of metropolitan or municipal trial courts. From the decision
of the courts, appeal will lie as in other criminal cases."55

In the case at bar, the COMELEC First Division and COMELEC En Banc correctly ruled that the petition filed by
San Luis against Ejercito is not just for prosecution of election offense but for disqualification as well. Indeed, the
following are clear indications:

1. The title of San Luis’ petition shows that the case was brought under Rule 25 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure, as amended by COMELEC Resolution No. 9523.56 This expresses the objective
of the action since Rule 25 is the specific rule governing the disqualification of candidates.

2. The averments of San Luis’ petition rely on Section 68 (a) and (c) of the OEC as grounds for its
causes of action. Section 68 of the OEC precisely enumerates the grounds for the disqualification of
 a candidate for elective position and provides, as penalty, that the candidate shall be disqualified
from continuing as such, or if he or she has been elected, from holding the office.

3. Paragraph 2 of San Luis’ prayer in the petition states that "[in the event that [Ejercito] will be ableto
get a majority vote of the electorate of the Province of Laguna on May 13, 2013, his proclamation be
suspended until further order of the Honorable Commission." San Luis reiterated this plea when he
later filed a Very Urgent Ex-Parte Motion toIssue Suspension of Possible Proclamation of
Respondent and Supplemental to the Very Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Issue Suspension of Possible
Proclamation of Respondent. The relief sought is actually pursuant to Section 6 57 of R.A. No. 6646
and Section 5 Rule 2558 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9523, both of which pertain to the effect of a
disqualification case when the petition is unresolved by final judgment come election day.

4. San Luis’ Memorandum emphasized that the case is a "Special Action for Disqualification," praying
that "[t]he Petition BE GRANTED [and] x x x [Ejercito] BE DISQUALIFIED, and PREVENTED from
further holding office as Governor of Laguna."

With the foregoing, Ejercito cannot feign ignorance of the true nature and intent of San Luis’ petition. This
considering, it is unnecessary for Us to discuss the applicability of Section 2,Rule 9 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, there being no substantial amendment to San Luis’ petition that constitutes a material deviation from
his original causes of action. Likewise, COMELEC Resolution No. 9386 and Section 265 of the OEC do not apply
since both refer solely to the prosecution of election offenses. Specifically, COMELEC Resolution No. 9386 is an
amendment to Rule 34 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure on the prosecution of election offenses, while Section
265 of the OEC is found under Article XXII of said law pertaining also to election offenses.

The conduct of preliminary

investigation is not required in
the resolution of the electoral
aspect of a disqualification case

Assuming, arguendo, that San Luis’ petition was properly instituted as an action for disqualification, Ejercito asserts
that the conduct of preliminary investigation to determine whether the acts enumerated under Section 68 of the
OEC were indeed committed is a requirement prior to actual disqualification. He posits that Section 5, Rule 25 of
COMELEC Resolution No. 9523 is silent on the matter of preliminary investigation; hence, the clear import of this
is that the necessity of preliminary investigation provided for in COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 remains
undisturbed and continues to bein full force and effect.

We are not persuaded.

Section 5, Rule 25 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9523 states:

Section 5. Effect of Petition if Unresolved Before Completion of Canvass.– If a Petition for Disqualification is
unresolved by final judgment on the day of elections, the petitioner may file a motion with the Division or
Commission En Banc where the case is pending, to suspend the proclamation of the candidate concerned,
provided that the evidence for the grounds to disqualify is strong. For this purpose, atleast three (3) days prior to
any election, the Clerk of the Commission shall prepare a list of pending cases and furnish all Commissioners
copies of said the list.

In the event that a candidate with an existing and pending Petition to disqualify is proclaimed winner, the
Commission shall continue to resolve the said Petition.

It is expected that COMELEC Resolution No. 9523 is silent on the conduct of preliminary investigation because it
merely amended, among others, Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, which deals with disqualification
of candidates. In disqualification cases, the COMELEC may designate any of its officials, who are members of the
Philippine Bar, to hear the case and to receive evidence only in cases involving barangay officials. 59 As
aforementioned, the present rules of procedure in the investigation and prosecution of election offenses in the
COMELEC, which requires preliminary investigation, is governed by COMELEC Resolution No. 9386. Under said
Resolution, all lawyers in the COMELEC who are Election Officers in the National Capital Region ("NCR"),
Provincial Election Supervisors, Regional Election Attorneys, Assistant Regional Election Directors, Regional
Election Directors and lawyers of the Law Department are authorized to conduct preliminary investigation of
complaints involving election offenses under the election lawswhich may be filed directly with them, or which may
be indorsed to them by the COMELEC.60

Similarly, Ejercito’s reliance on COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 is misplaced. COMELEC Resolution No. 2050,
which was adopted on November 3, 1988, reads:

WHEREAS, there remain pending before the Commission, a number of cases of disqualification filed by virtue of
the provisions of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Codein relation to Section 6 of R.A. 6646, otherwise known
as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987;

WHEREAS, opinions of the members of the Commission on matters of procedure in dealing with cases of this
nature and the manner of disposing of the same have not been uniform;

WHEREAS, in order to avoid conflicts of opinion in the disposition [of] disqualification cases contemplated under
Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to Section 6 of Rep. Act 6646, there is a strongly felt need to
lay down a definite policy in the disposition of this specific class of disqualification cases;

NOW, THEREFORE, on motion duly seconded, the Commission en banc:

RESOLVED, as it hereby resolves, to formulate the following rules governing the disposition of cases of
disqualification filed by virtue of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646,
otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987:

1. Any complaint for the disqualification of a duly registered candidate based upon any of the grounds specifically
enumerated under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, filed directly with the Commission before an election
in which the respondent is a candidate, shall be inquired into by the Commission for the purpose of determining
whether the acts complained of have in fact been committed. Where the inquiry by the Commission results in a
finding before election, that the respondent candidate did in factcommit the acts complained, the Commission shall
order the disqualification of the respondent candidate from continuing as such candidate.
In case such complaint was not resolved before the election, the Commission may motu proprio, or [on] motion of
any of the parties, refer the complaint to the [Law] Department of the Commission as the instrument of the latter in
the exercise of its exclusive power to conduct a preliminary investigation of all cases involving criminal infractions
of the election laws. Such recourse may be availed of irrespective of whether the respondent has been elected
orhas lost in the election.

2. Any complaint for disqualification based on Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to Section 6 of
Rep. Act No. 6646 filed after the election against a candidate who has already been proclaimed as winner shall be
dismissed as a disqualification case. However, the complaint shall be referred for preliminary investigation to the
Law Department of the Commission.

Where a similar complaint is filed after election but before proclamation of the respondent candidate, the complaint
shall, nevertheless, be dismissed as a disqualification case. However, the complaint shall be referred for
preliminary investigation to the Law Department. If, before proclamation, the Law Department makes a prima
faciefinding of guilt and the corresponding information has been filed with the appropriate trial court, the
complainant may file a petition for suspension of the proclamation of the respondent with the court before which
the criminal case is pending and the said court may order the suspension of the proclamation ifthe evidence of
guilt is strong.

3. The Law Department shall terminate the preliminary investigation within thirty(30) days from receipt of the
referral and shall submit its study, report and recommendation to the Commission en banc within five (5) days from
the conclusion of the preliminary investigation. If it makes a prima faciefinding of guilt, it shall submit with such
study the Information for filing with the appropriate court.61

In Bagatsing v. COMELEC,62 the Court stated that the above-quoted resolution covers two (2) different scenarios:

First, as contemplated in paragraph 1, a complaint for disqualification filed before the election which must be
inquired into by the COMELEC for the purpose of determining whether the acts complained of have in fact been
committed. Where the inquiry results in a finding before the election, the COMELEC shall order the candidate's
disqualification. In case the complaint was not resolved before the election, the COMELEC may motu propioor on
motion of any of the parties, refer the said complaint to the Law Department of the COMELEC for preliminary
investigation.

Second, as laid down in paragraph 2, a complaint for disqualification filed after the election against a candidate (a)
who has not yet been proclaimed as winner, or (b) who has already been proclaimed as winner. In both cases, the
complaint shall be dismissed as a disqualification case but shall be referred to the Law Department of the
COMELEC for preliminary investigation. However, if before proclamation, the Law Department makes a prima
facie finding of guilt and the corresponding information has been filed with the appropriate trial court, the
complainant may file a petition for suspension of the proclamation of the respondent with the court before which
the criminal case is pending and the said court may order the suspension of the proclamation if the evidence of
guilt is strong.63

However, with respect to Paragraph 1 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2050, which is the situation in this case, We
held in Sunga:
x x x Resolution No. 2050 as interpreted in Silvestre v. Duavitinfringes on Sec. 6 of RA No. 6646, which provides:

SEC. 6. Effects of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is
not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning
number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action,
inquiry or protestand, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order
the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong (italics supplied).

Clearly, the legislative intentis that the COMELEC should continue the trial and hearing of the disqualification case
to its conclusion, i.e.,until judgment is rendered thereon. The word "shall" signifies that this requirement of the law
is mandatory, operating to impose a positive duty which must be enforced. The implication is that the COMELEC
is left with no discretion but to proceed with the disqualification case even after the election. Thus, in providing for
the outright dismissal of the disqualification case which remains unresolved after the election, Silvestre v. Duavitin
effect disallows what RA No. 6646 imperatively requires. This amounts to a quasi-judicial legislation by the
COMELEC which cannot be countenanced and is invalid for having been issued beyond the scope of its authority.
Interpretative rulings of quasi-judicial bodies or administrative agencies must always be in perfect harmony with
statutes and should be for the sole purpose of carrying their general provisions into effect. By such interpretative
or administrative rulings, of course, the scope of the law itself cannot be limited. Indeed, a quasi-judicial body or
an administrative agency for that matter cannot amend an act of Congress. Hence, in case of a discrepancy
between the basic law and an interpretative or administrative ruling, the basic law prevails.

Besides, the deleterious effect of the Silvestre ruling is not difficult to foresee. A candidate guilty of election offenses
would be undeservedly rewarded, instead of punished, by the dismissal of the disqualification case against him
simply because the investigating body was unable, for any reason caused upon it, to determine before the election
if the offenses were indeed committed by the candidate sought to be disqualified. All that the erring aspirant would
need to do is toemploy delaying tactics so that the disqualification case based on the commission of election
offenses would not be decided before the election. This scenario is productive of more fraud which certainly is not
the main intent and purpose of the law.64

The "exclusive power [of the COMELEC] to conduct a preliminary investigation of all cases involving criminal
infractions of the election laws" stated in Par. 1 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 pertains to the criminal aspect
of a disqualification case. It has been repeatedly underscored that an election offense has its criminal and electoral
aspects. While its criminal aspect to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused cannot be the subject of
summary hearing, its electoral aspect to ascertain whether the offender should be disqualified from office can be
determined in an administrative proceeding that is summaryin character. This Court said in Sunga:

It is worth to note that an election offense has criminal as well as electoral aspects. Its criminal aspect involves the
ascertainment of the guilt or innocence of the accused candidate. Like in any other criminal case, it usually entails
a full-blown hearing and the quantum of proof required to secure a conviction is beyond reasonable doubt. Its
electoral aspect, on the other hand, is a determination of whether the offender should be disqualified from office.
This is done through an administrative proceeding which is summary in character and requires only a clear
preponderance of evidence. Thus, under Sec. 4 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, petitions for disqualification
"shall be heard summarily after due notice." It is the electoral aspect that we are more concerned with, under which
an erring candidate may be disqualified even without prior criminal conviction. 65
and equally in Lanot:

x x x The electoral aspect of a disqualification case determines whether the offender should be disqualified from
being a candidate or from holding office. Proceedings are summary in character and require only clear
preponderance of evidence. An erring candidate may be disqualified even without prior determination of probable
cause in a preliminary investigation. The electoral aspect may proceed independently of the criminal aspect, and
vice-versa.

The criminal aspect of a disqualification case determines whether there is probable cause to charge a candidate
for an election offense. The prosecutor is the COMELEC, through its Law Department, which determines whether
probable cause exists. If there is probable cause, the COMELEC, through its Law Department, files the criminal
information before the proper court. Proceedings before the proper court demand a full-blown hearing and require
proof beyond reasonable doubt to convict. A criminal conviction shall result in the disqualification of the offender,
which may even include disqualification from holding a future public office.

The two aspects account for the variance of the rules on disposition and resolution of disqualification cases filed
before or after an election. When the disqualification case is filed before the elections, the question of
disqualification is raised before the voting public. If the candidate is disqualified after the election, those who voted
for him assume the risk that their votes may be declared stray or invalid. There isno such risk if the petition is filed
after the elections. x x x.66

We cannot accept Ejercito’s argument that Lanot did not categorically pronounce that the conduct of a preliminary
investigation exclusively pertains to the criminal aspect of anaction for disqualification or that a factual finding by
the authorized legal officers of the COMELEC may be dispensed with in the proceedings for the administrative
aspect of a disqualification case. According to him,a close reading of said case would reveal that upon filing of the
petition for disqualification with the COMELEC Division, the latter referred the matter to the Regional Election
Director for the purpose of preliminary investigation; therefore, Lanot contemplates two referrals for the conduct of
investigation – first, to the Regional Election Director, prior to the issuance of the COMELEC First Division’s
resolution, and second, to the Law Department, following the reversal by the COMELEC En Banc.

For easy reference, the factual antecedents of Lanot are as follows:

On March 19, 2004, a little less than two months before the May 10, 2004 elections, Henry P. Lanot, et al. filed a
Petition for Disqualification under Sections 68 and 80 of the OEC against then incumbent Pasig City Mayor Vicente
P. Eusebio. National Capital Region Director Esmeralda Amora-Ladra conducted hearings on the petition. On May
4, 2004, she recommended Eusebio’s disqualification and the referral of the case to the COMELEC Law
Department for the conduct of a preliminary investigation on the possible violation of Section 261 (a) of the OEC.
When the COMELEC First Division issued a resolution adopting Director Ladra’s recommendations on May 5,
2004, then COMELEC Chairman Benjamin S. Abalos informed the pertinent election officers through an Advisory
dated May 8, 2004. Eusebio filed a Motion for Reconsideration on May 9, 2004. On election day, Chairman Abalos
issued a memorandum to Director Ladra enjoining her from implementing the May 5, 2004 COMELEC First Division
resolution. The petition for disqualification was not yet finally resolved at the time of the elections. Eusebio's votes
were counted and canvassed. After which, Eusebio was proclaimed as the winning candidate for city mayor. On
August 20, 2004, the COMELEC En Banc annulled the COMELEC First Division's order to disqualify Eusebio and
referred the case to the COMELEC Law Department for preliminary investigation.
When the issue was elevated to Us, the Court agreed with Lanot that the COMELEC En Banc committed grave
abuse of discretion when it ordered the dismissal of the disqualification case pending preliminary investigation of
the COMELEC Law Department. Error was made when it ignored the electoral aspect of the disqualification case
by setting aside the COMELEC First Division's resolution and referring the entire case to the COMELEC Law
Department for the criminal aspect. We noted that COMELEC Resolution No. 2050, upon which the COMELEC
En Banc based its ruling, is procedurally inconsistent with COMELEC Resolution No. 6452, which was the
governing rule at the time. The latter resolution delegated to the COMELEC Field Officials the hearing and
reception of evidence of the administrative aspect of disqualification cases in the May 10, 2004 National and Local
Elections. In marked contrast, in the May 2013 elections, it was only in cases involving barangay officials that the
COMELEC may designate any of its officials, who are members of the Philippine Bar, to hear the case and to
receive evidence.67

The COMELEC En Banc

properly considered as
evidence the Advertising
Contract dated May 8, 2013

Ejercito likewise asserts that the Advertising Contract dated May 8, 2013 should not have been relied upon by the
COMELEC. First, it was not formally offered in evidence pursuant to Section 34, Rule 132 68 of the Rules and he
was not even furnished with a copy thereof, depriving him of the opportunity to examine its authenticity and due
execution and object to its admissibility. Second, even if Section 34, Rule 132 does not apply, administrative bodies
exercising quasi-judicial functions are nonetheless proscribed from rendering judgment based on evidence that
was never presented and could not be controverted. There is a need to balance the relaxation of the rules of
procedure with the demands of administrative due process, the tenets of which are laid down in the seminal case
of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations.69 And third,the presentation of the advertising contracts, which are
highly disputable and on which no hearing was held for the purpose of taking judicial notice in accordance with
Section 3, Rule 12970 of the Rules, cannot be dispensed with by COMELEC’s claim that it could take judicial notice.
Contrary to Ejercito’s claim, Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules is inapplicable. Section 4, Rule 1 71 of the Rules of
Court is clear enough in stating that it shall not apply to election cases except by analogy or in a suppletory
character and whenever practicable and convenient. In fact, nowhere from COMELEC Resolution No. 9523
requires that documentary evidence should be formally offered in evidence. 72 We remind again that the electoral
aspect of a disqualification case is done through an administrative proceeding which is summary in character.

Granting, for argument’s sake, that Section 4, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court applies, there have been instances
when We suspended the strict application of the rule in the interest of substantial justice, fairness, and equity. 73
Since rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, it is well recognized that
the Court is empowered to suspend its rules or to exempt a particular case from the application of a general rule,
when the rigid application thereof tends to frustrate rather than promote the ends of justice. 74 The fact is, even
Sections 3 and 4, Rule 1 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure fittingly declare that "[the] rules shall be liberally
construed in order to promote the effective and efficient implementation of the objectives of ensuring the holding
of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections and to achieve just, expeditious and inexpensive
determination and disposition of every action and proceeding brought before the Commission" and that "[in] the
interest of justice and in order to obtain speedy disposition ofall matters pending before the Commission, these
rules or any portion thereof may be suspended by the Commission." This Court said in Hayudini v. Commission
on Elections:75
Settled is the rule that the COMELEC Rules of Procedure are subject to liberal construction. The COMELEC has
the power to liberally interpret or even suspend its rules of procedure in the interest of justice, including obtaining
a speedy disposition of all matters pending before it. This liberality is for the purpose of promoting the effective and
efficient implementation of its objectives – ensuring the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible
elections, as well as achieving just, expeditious, and inexpensive determination and disposition of every action and
proceeding brought before the COMELEC. Unlike an ordinary civil action, an election contest is imbued with public
interest. It involves not only the adjudication of private and pecuniary interests of rival candidates, but also the
paramount need of dispelling the uncertainty which beclouds the real choice of the electorate. And the tribunal has
the corresponding duty to ascertain, by all means withinits command, whom the people truly chose as their rightful
leader.76

Further, Ejercito’s dependence on Ang Tibay is weak. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be
heard, or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek
for a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.77 Any seeming defect in its observance is cured by the
filing of a motion for reconsideration and denial of due process cannot be successfully invoked by a party who had
the opportunity to be heard thereon.78 In this case, it is undisputed that Ejercito filed a motion for reconsideration
before the COMELEC En Banc. Despite this, he did not rebut the authenticity and due execution of the advertising
contracts when he decided not to discuss the factual findings of the COMELEC First Division on the alleged ground
that it may be construed as a waiver of the jurisdictional issues that he raised.79

We agree with San Luis and the Office of the Solicitor General that, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 129, 80 the
COMELEC has the discretion to properly take judicial notice of the Advertising Contract dated May 8, 2013. In
accordance with R.A. No. 9006, the COMELEC, through its Campaign Finance Unit, is empowered to:

a. Monitor fund raising and spending activities;

b. Receive and keep reports and statements of candidates, parties, contributors and election
contractors, and advertising contracts of mass media entities;

c. Compile and analyze the reports and statements as soon as they are received and make an initial
determination of compliance;

d. Develop and manage a recording system for all reports, statements, and contracts received by it
and todigitize information contained therein;

e. Publish the digitized information gathered from the reports, statements and contracts and make
themavailable to the public;

f. Develop a reportorial and monitoring system;

g. Audit all reports, statements and contracts and determine compliance by the candidates, parties,
contributors, and election contractors, including the inspection of Books and records of candidates,
parties and mass media entities and issue subpoenas in relation thereto and submit its findings to
the Commission En Banc;
 h. Coordinate with and/or assist other departments/offices of the Commission receiving related
reports on Campaign Finance including prosecution of violators and collection of fines and/or
imposition of perpetual disqualification; and

i. Perform other functions as ordered by the Commission.81

The COMELEC may properly takeand act on the advertising contracts without further proof from the parties herein.
Aside from being considered as an admission82 and presumed to be proper submissions from them, the COMELEC
already has knowledge of the contracts for being ascertainable from its very own records. Said contracts are ought
to be known by the COMELEC because of its statutory function as the legal custodian of all advertising contracts
promoting or opposing any candidate during the campaign period. As what transpired in this case, the COMELEC
has the authority and discretion to compare the submitted advertising contracts with the certified true copies of the
broadcast logs, certificates of performance or other analogous records which a broadcast station or entity is
required to submit for the review and verification of the frequency, date, time and duration of advertisements aired.

To be precise, R.A. No. 9006 provides:

Sec. 4. Requirements for Published or Printed and Broadcast Election Propaganda. –

xxxx

4.3 Print, broadcast or outdoor advertisements donated to the candidate or political party shall not be printed,
published, broadcast or exhibited without the written acceptance by the said candidate or political party. Such
written acceptance shall be attached to the advertising contract and shall be submitted to the COMELEC as
provided in Subsection 6.3 hereof.

Sec. 6. Equal Access to Media Time and Space. – All registered parties and bona fidecandidates shall have equal
access to media time and space. The following guidelines may be amplified on by the COMELEC:

xxxx

6.2

xxxx

(b.) Each bona fide candidate or registered political party for a locally elective office shall be entitled to not more
than sixty (60) minutes of television advertisement and ninety (90) minutes of radio advertisement whether by
purchase or donation.

For this purpose, the COMELEC shall require any broadcast station or entity to submit to the COMELEC a copy
of its broadcast logs and certificates of performance for the review and verification of the frequency, date, time and
duration of advertisements broadcast for any candidate or political party.
6.3 All mass media entities shall furnish the COMELEC with a copy of all contracts for advertising, promoting or
opposing any political party or the candidacy of any person for public office within five (5) days after its signing. x
x x.

The implementing guidelines of the above-quoted provisions are found in Rule 5 of COMELEC Resolution No.
9476 –

Section 2. Submission of Copies of Advertising Contracts. – All media entities shall submit a copy of its advertising
and or broadcast contracts, media purchase orders, booking orders, or other similar documents to the Commission
through its Campaign Finance Unit, accompanied by a summary report in the prescribed form (Annex "E") together
with official receipts issued for advertising, promoting or opposing a party, or the candidacy of any person for public
office, within five (5) days after its signing, through:

a. For Media Entities in the NCR The Education and Information Department (EID), which
shall furnish copies thereof to the Campaign Finance Unit of the Commission.

b. For Media Entities outside of the NCR The City/Municipal Election Officer (EO) concerned
who shall furnish copies thereof to the Education and Information Department of the
Commission within five (5) days after the campaign periods. The EID shall furnish copies
thereof to the Campaign Finance Unit of the Commission.

xxxx

It shall be the duty of the EID to formally inform media entities that the latter’s failure to comply with the mandatory
provisions of this Section shall be considered an election offense punishable pursuant to Section 13 of Republic
Act No. 9006. [RA 9006, Secs. 6.3 and 13] and in COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 –

SECTION 9. Requirements and/or Limitations on the Use of Election Propaganda through Mass Media. – All
parties and bona fide candidates shall have equal access to media time and space for their election propaganda
during the campaign period subject to the following requirements and/or limitations:

a. Broadcast Election Propaganda

xxx

Provided, further, that a copy of the broadcast advertisement contract be furnished to the Commission, thru the
Education and Information Department, within five (5) days from contract signing.

xxx

d. Common requirements/limitations:

xxx

(3) For the above purpose, each broadcast entity and website owner or administrator shall submit to the
Commission a certified true copy of its broadcast logs, certificates of performance, or other analogous record,
including certificates of acceptance as required in Section 7(b) of these Guidelines,for the review and verification
of the frequency, date, time and duration of advertisements aired for any candidate or party through:

For Broadcast Entities in the NCR – The Education and Information Department (EID) which in turn shall furnish
copies thereof to the Campaign Finance Unit (CFU) of the Commission within five days from receipt thereof.

For Broadcast Entities outside of the NCR – The City/Municipal Election Officer (EO) concerned, who in turn, shall
furnish copies thereof to the Education and Information Department (EID) of the Commission which in turn shall
furnish copies thereof to the Campaign Finance Unit (CFU) of the Commission within five (5) days from the receipt
thereof.

For website owners or administrators – The City/Municipal Election Officer (EO) concerned, who in turn, shall
furnish copies thereof to the Education and Information Department (EID) of the Commission which in turn shall
furnish copies thereof to the Campaign Finance Unit (CFU) of the Commission within five (5) days from the receipt
thereof.

All broadcast entities shall preserve their broadcast logs for a period of five (5) years from the date of broadcast
for submission to the Commission whenever required.

Certified true copies of broadcast logs, certificates of performance, and certificates of acceptance, or other
analogous record shall be submitted, as follows:

Candidates for National Positions 1st Report 3 weeks after start of campaign period March 4 - 11
2nd Report 3 weeks after 1st filing week April 3 - 10
3rd Report 1 week before election day May 2 - 9
Last Report Election week May 14 - 17
Candidates for Local Positions 1st Report 1 week after start of campaign period April 15 - 22
2nd Report 1 week after 1st filing week April 30 - May 8
3rd Report Election week May 9 - 15
Last Report 1 week after election day May 16 - 22

For subsequent elections, the schedule for the submission of reports shall be prescribed by the Commission.

Ejercito should be disqualified

for spending in his election
campaign an amount in excess
of what is allowed by the OEC

Ejercito claims that the advertising contracts between ABS-CBN Corporation and Scenema Concept International,
Inc. were executed by an identified supporter without his knowledge and consent as, in fact, his signature thereon
was obviously forged. Even assuming that such contract benefited him, Ejercito alleges that he should not be
penalized for the conduct of third parties who acted on their own without his consent. Citing Citizens United v.
Federal Election Commission83 decided by the US Supreme Court, he argues that every voter has the right to
support a particular candidate in accordance with the free exercise of his or her rights of speech and of expression,
which is guaranteed in Section 4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. 84 He believes that an advertising contract paid
for by a third party without the candidate’s knowledge and consent must be considered a form of political speech
that must prevail against the laws suppressing it, whether by design or inadvertence. Further, Ejercito advances
the view that COMELEC Resolution No. 947685 distinguishes between "contribution" and "expenditure" and makes
no proscription on the medium or amount of contribution.86 He also stresses that it is clear from COMELEC
Resolution No. 9615 that the limit set by law applies only to election expenditures of candidates and not to
contributions made by third parties. For Ejercito, the fact that the legislature imposes no legal limitation on
campaign donations is presumably because discussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of
candidates are integral to the operation of the government.

We refuse to believe that the advertising contracts between ABS-CBN Corporation and Scenema Concept
International, Inc. were executed without Ejercito’s knowledge and consent. As found by the COMELEC First
Division, the advertising contracts submitted in evidence by San Luis as well as those in legal custody of the
COMELEC belie his hollow assertion. His express conformity to the advertising contracts is actually a must
because non-compliance is consideredas an election offense.87

Notably, R.A. No. 9006 explicitly directs that broadcast advertisements donated to the candidate shall not be
broadcasted without the written acceptance of the candidate, which shall be attached to the advertising contract
and shall be submitted to the COMELEC, and that, in every case, advertising contracts shall be signed by the
donor, the candidate concerned or by the duly-authorized representative of the political party.88 Conformably with
the mandate of the law, COMELEC Resolution No. 9476 requires that election propaganda materials donated toa
candidate shall not be broadcasted unless it is accompanied by the written acceptance of said candidate, which
shall be in the form of an official receipt in the name of the candidate and must specify the description of the items
donated, their quantity and value, and that, in every case, the advertising contracts, media purchase orders or
booking orders shall be signed by the candidate concerned or by the duly authorized representative of the party
and, in case of a donation, should be accompanied by a written acceptance of the candidate, party or their
authorized representatives.89 COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 also unambiguously states thatit shall be unlawful
to broadcast any election propaganda donated or given free of charge by any person or broadcast entity to a
candidate withoutthe written acceptance of the said candidate and unless they bear and be identified by the words
"airtime for this broadcast was provided free of charge by" followed by the true and correct name and address of
the donor.90

This Court cannot give weight to Ejercito’s representation that his signature on the advertising contracts was a
forgery. The issue is a belated claim, raised only for the first time in this petition for certiorari. It is a rudimentary
principle of law that matters neither alleged in the pleadings nor raised during the proceedings below cannot be
ventilated for the first time on appeal before the Supreme Court. 91 It would be offensive to the basic rules of fair
play and justice to allow Ejercito to raise an issue that was not brought up before the COMELEC.92 While it is true
that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally truethat elementary considerations of due process require
that a party be duly apprised of a claim against him before judgment may be rendered. 93

Likewise, whether the advertising contracts were executed without Ejercito’s knowledge and consent, and whether
his signatures thereto were fraudulent, are issues of fact. Any factual challenge has no place in a Rule 65 petition.
This Court is nota trier of facts and is not equipped to receive evidence and determine the truth of factual
allegations.94

Instead, the findings of fact made by the COMELEC, or by any other administrative agency exercising expertise in
its particular field of competence, are binding on the Court. As enunciated in Juan v. Commission on Election: 95

Findings of facts of administrative bodies charged with their specific field of expertise, are afforded great weight by
the courts, and in the absence of substantial showing that such findings are made from an erroneous estimation
of the evidence presented, they are conclusive, and in the interest of stability of the governmental structure, should
not be disturbed. The COMELEC, as an administrative agency and a specialized constitutional body charged with
the enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite,
initiative, referendum, and recall, has more than enough expertise in its field that its findings orconclusions are
generally respected and even given finality. x x x.96

Having determined that the subject TV advertisements were done and broadcasted with Ejercito’s consent, it
follows that Citizens United does not apply. In said US case, a non-profit corporation sued the Federal Election
Commission, assailing, among others, the constitutionality of a ban on corporate independ entexpenditures for
electioneering communications under 2 U.S.C.S. § 441b. The corporation released a documentary film unfavorable
of then-Senator Hillary Clinton, who was a candidate for the Democratic Party's Presidential nomination. It wanted
to make the film available through video-on-demand withinthirty (30) days of the primary elections, and it produced
advertisements to promote the film. However, federal law prohibits all corporations – including non-profit advocacy
corporations – from using their general treasury funds to make independent expenditures for speech that is an
"electioneering communication"97 or for speech that expressly advocates the election or defeat of a candidate
within thirty (30) days of a primary election and sixty (60) days of a general election. The US Supreme Court held
that the ban imposed under § 441b on corporate independent expenditures violated the First Amendment 98
because the Government could not suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker's identity as a non-profit
or for-profit corporation. It was opined: Section 441b's prohibition on corporate independent expenditures is thus a
ban on speech. As a "restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on political communication
during a campaign," that statute "necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues
discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19,
96 S. Ct. 612, 46 L. Ed. 2d 659 (1976) (per curiam).Were the Court to uphold these restrictions, the Government
could repress speech by silencing certain voices at any of the various points in the speech process. See McConnell,
supra, at 251, 124 S. Ct. 619, 517 L. Ed. 2d 491 (opinion of Scalia, J.) (Government could repress speech by
"attacking all levels of the production and dissemination of ideas," for "effective public communication requires the
speaker to make use of the services of others"). If §441 be applied to individuals, no one would believe that it is
merely a time, place, or manner restriction on speech. Its purpose and effect are to silence entities whose voices
the Government deems to be suspect.

Speech is an essential mechanism of democracy, for it is the means to hold officials accountable to the people.
See Buckley, supra, at 14-15, 96 S. Ct. 612, 46 L. Ed. 2d 659 ("In a republic where the people are sovereign, the
ability of the citizenry to make informed choices among candidates for office is essential"). The right of citizens to
inquire, to hear, to speak, and to use information to reach consensus is a precondition to enlightened self-
government and a necessary means to protect it. The First Amendment "'has its fullest and most urgent application'
to speech uttered during a campaign for political office." Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Comm.,
489 U.S. 214, 223, 109 S. Ct. 1013, 103 L. Ed. 2d 271 (1989)(quoting Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265,
272, 91 S. Ct. 621, 28 L. Ed. 2d 35 (1971)); see Buckley, supra, at 14, 96 S. Ct. 612, 46 L. Ed. 2d 659 ("Discussion
of public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation of the system of
government established by our Constitution").

For these reasons, political speech must prevail against laws that would suppress it, whether by design
orinadvertence. Laws that burden political speech are "subject to strict scrutiny," which requires the Government
to prove that the restriction "furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest." WRTL,
551 U.S., at 464, 127 S. Ct. 2652, 168 L. Ed. 2d 329(opinion of Roberts, C. J.). While it might be maintained that
political speech simply cannot be banned or restricted as a categorical matter, see Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S.,
at 124, 112 S. Ct. 501, 116 L. Ed. 2d 476(Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment), the quoted language from WRTL
provides a sufficient framework for protecting the relevant First Amendment interests in this case. We shall employ
it here.

Premised on mistrust of governmental power, the First Amendment stands against attempts to disfavor certain
subjects or viewpoints. See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813, 120 S.
Ct. 1878, 146 L. Ed. 2d 865 (2000) (striking down content based restriction). Prohibited, too, are restrictions
distinguishing among different speakers, allowing speech by some but not others. See First Nat. Bank of Boston
v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784, 98 S. Ct. 1407, 55 L. Ed. 2d 707 (1978). As instruments to censor, these categories
are interrelated: Speech restrictions based on the identity of the speaker are all too often simply a means to control
content.

Quite apart from the purpose or effect of regulating content, moreover, the Government may commit a
constitutional wrong when by law it identifies certain preferred speakers. By taking the right to speak from some
and giving it to others, the Government deprives the disadvantaged person or class of the right to use speech to
strive to establish worth, standing, and respect for the speaker's voice. The Government may not by these means
deprive the public of the right and privilege to determine for itself what speech and speakers are worthy of
consideration. The First Amendment protects speech and speaker, and the ideas that flow from each.

The Court has upheld a narrow class of speech restrictions that operate to the disadvantage of certain persons,
but these rulings were based on an interest in allowing governmental entities to perform their functions. See, e.g.,
Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683, 106 S. Ct. 3159, 92 L. Ed. 2d 549 (1986) (protecting the
"function of public school education"); Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 129, 97
S. Ct. 2532, 53 L. Ed. 2d 629 (1977) (furthering "the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system"
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 759, 94 S. Ct. 2547, 41 L. Ed. 2d 439
(1974)(ensuring "the capacity of the Government to discharge its [military] responsibilities" (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Civil Service Comm'n v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 557, 93 S. Ct. 2880, 37 L. Ed. 2d 796
(1973)("[F]ederal service should depend upon meritorious performance rather than political service"). The
corporate independent expenditures at issue in this case, however, would not interfere with governmental
functions, so these cases are inapposite. These precedents stand only for the proposition that there are certain
governmental functions that cannot operate without some restrictions on particular kinds of speech. By contrast, it
is inherent in the nature of the political process that voters must be free to obtain information from diverse sources
in order to determine how to cast their votes. At least before Austin, the Court had not allowed the exclusion of a
class of speakers from the general public dialogue.

We find no basis for the proposition that, in the context of political speech, the Government may impose restrictions
on certain disfavored speakers. Both history and logic lead us to this conclusion.
The previous decisions of the US Supreme Court in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce 99 (which ruled that
political speech may be banned based on the speaker's corporate identity) and the relevant portion of McConnell
v. Federal Election Commission100 (which upheld the limits on electioneering communications in a facial challenge)
were, in effect, overruled by Citizens United.

Like Citizens Unitedis the 1976 case of Buckley v. Valeo.101 In this much earlier case, the US Supreme Court ruled,
among other issues elevated to it for resolution, on a provision of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as
amended, (FECA)102 which limits independent political expenditures by an individual or group advocating the
election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate for federal office to $1,000 per year. Majority of the US Supreme
Court expressed the view that the challenged provision is unconstitutional as it impermissibly burdens the right of
free expression under the First Amendment, and could not be sustained on the basis of governmental interests in
preventing the actuality or appearance of corruption or in equalizing the resources of candidates. 103

Even so, the rulings in Citizens United and Buckley find bearing only on matters related to "independent
expenditures," an election law concept which has no application in this jurisdiction. In the US context, independent
expenditures for or against a particular candidate enjoy constitutional protection. They refer to those expenses
made by an individual, a group or a legal entity which are not authorized or requested by the candidate, an
authorized committee of the candidate, oran agent of the candidate; they are expenditures that are not placed in
cooperation with or with the consent of a candidate, his agents, or an authorized committee of the candidate. 104 In
contrast, there is no similar provision here in the Philippines. In fact, R.A. No. 9006105 and its implementing rules
and regulations106 specifically make it unlawful to print, publish, broadcast or exhibit any print, broadcast or outdoor
advertisements donated to the candidate without the written acceptance of said candidate.

If at all, another portion of the Buckley decision is significant to this case. One of the issues resolved therein is the
validity of a provision of the FECA which imposes $1,000 limitation on political contributions by individuals and
groups to candidates and authorized campaign committees. 107 Five justices of the nine-member US Supreme
Court sustained the challenged provision on the grounds that it does not violate First Amendment speech and
association rights or invidiously discriminate against non-incumbent candidates and minority party candidates but
is supported by substantial governmental interests in limiting corruption and the appearance of corruption. It was
held:

As the general discussion in Part I-A, supra, indicated, the primary First Amendment problem raised by the Act's
contribution limitations is their restriction of one aspect of the contributor's freedom of political association. The
Court's decisions involving associational freedoms establish that the right of association is a "basic constitutional
freedom," Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. at 57, that is "closely allied to freedom of speech and a right which, like
free speech, lies at the foundation of a free society." Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 486 (1960). See, e.g., Bates
v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 522-523 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, supra at 460-461; NAACP v. Button, supra, at
452(Harlan, J., dissenting). In view of the fundamental nature of the rightto associate, governmental "action which
may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate is subject to the closest scrutiny." NAACP v. Alabama,
supra, at 460-461. Yet, it is clear that "[n]either the right to associate nor the right to participate in political activities
is absolute." CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 567 (1973). Even a "significant interference' with protected
rights of political association" may be sustained if the State demonstrates a sufficiently important interest and
employs means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational freedoms. Cousins v. Wigoda,
supra, at 488; NAACP v. Button, supra, at 438; Shelton v. Tucker, supra, at 488.
Appellees argue that the Act's restrictions on large campaign contributions are justified by three governmental
interests. According to the parties and amici, the primary interest served by the limitations and, indeed, by the Act
as a whole, is the prevention of corruption and the appearance of corruption spawned by the real or imagined
coercive influence of large financial contributions on candidates' positions and on their actions if elected to office.
Two "ancillary" interests underlying the Act are also allegedly furthered by the $ 1,000 limits on contributions. First,
the limits serve to mute the voices of affluent persons and groups in the election process and thereby to equalize
the relative ability of all citizens to affect the outcome of elections. Second, it is argued, the ceilings may to some
extent act as a brake on the skyrocketing cost of political campaigns and thereby serve to open the political
systemmore widely to candidates without access to sources of large amounts of money.

It is unnecessary to look beyond the Act's primary purpose -- to limit the actuality and appearance of corruption
resulting from large individual financial contributions -- in order to find a constitutionally sufficient justification for
the $ 1,000 contribution limitation. Under a system of private financing of elections, a candidate lacking immense
personal or family wealth must depend on financial contributions from others to provide the resources necessary
to conduct a successful campaign. The increasing importance of the communications media and sophisticated
mass-mailing and polling operations to effective campaigning make the raising of large sums of money an ever
more essential ingredient of an effective candidacy. To the extent that large contributions are given to secure
political quid pro quo's from current and potential office holders, the integrity of our system of representative
democracy is undermined. Although the scope of such pernicious practices can never be reliably ascertained, the
deeply disturbing examples surfacing after the 1972 election demonstrate that the problem is not an illusory one.
Of almost equal concern as the danger of actual quid pro quo arrangements is the impact of the appearance of
corruption stemming from public awareness of the opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large individual
financial contributions. In CSC v. Letter Carriers, supra, the Court found that the danger to "fair and effective
government" posed by partisan political conduct on the part of federal employees charged with administering the
law was a sufficiently important concern to justify broad restrictions on the employees' right of partisan political
association. Here, as there, Congress could legitimately conclude that the avoidance of the appearance of
improper influence "is also critical... if confidence in the system of representative Government is not to be eroded
to a disastrous extent." 413 U.S. at 565.

Appellants contend that the contribution limitations must be invalidated because bribery laws and narrowly drawn
disclosure requirements constitute a less restrictive means of dealing with "proven and suspected quid pro quo
arrangements." But laws making criminal the giving and taking of bribes deal withonly the most blatant and specific
attempts of those with money to influence governmental action. And while disclosure requirements serve the many
salutary purposes discussed elsewhere in this opinion, Congress was surely entitled to conclude that disclosure
was only a partial measure,and that contribution ceilings were a necessary legislative concomitant to deal with the
reality or appearance of corruption inherent in a system permitting unlimited financial contributions, even when the
identities of the contributors and the amounts of their contributions are fully disclosed.

The Act's $ 1,000 contribution limitation focuses precisely on the problem of large campaign contributions-- the
narrow aspect of political association where the actuality and potential for corruption have been identified -- while
leaving persons free to engage in independent political expression, to associate actively through volunteering their
services, and to assist to a limited but nonetheless substantial extent in supporting candidates and committees
with financial resources. Significantly, the Act's contribution limitations in themselves do not undermine to any
material degree the potential for robust and effective discussion of candidates and campaign issues by individual
citizens, associations, the institutional press, candidates, and political parties.
We find that, under the rigorous standard of review established by our prior decisions, the weighty interests served
by restricting the size of financial contributions to political candidates are sufficient to justify the limited effect upon
First Amendment freedoms caused by the $ 1,000 contribution ceiling. (Emphasis supplied)

Until now, the US Supreme Court has not overturned the ruling that, with respect to limiting political contributions
by individuals and groups, the Government’s interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption or its appearance was
"sufficiently important" or "compelling" so that the interest would satisfy even strict scrutiny. 108

In any event, this Court should accentuate that resort to foreign jurisprudence would be proper only if no law or
jurisprudence is available locally to settle a controversy and that even in the absence of local statute and case law,
foreign jurisprudence are merely persuasive authority at best since they furnish an uncertain guide. 109 We
prompted in Republic of the Philippines v. Manila Electric Company:110

x x x American decisions and authorities are not per se controlling in this jurisdiction. At best, they are persuasive
for no court holds a patent on correct decisions.Our laws must be construed in accordance with the intention of
our own lawmakers and such intent may be deduced from the language of each law and the context of other local
legislation related thereto. More importantly, they must be construed to serve our own public interest which is the
be-all and the end-all of all our laws. And it need not be stressed that our public interest is distinct and different
from others.111

and once more in Central Bank Employees Assoc., Inc. v. Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas: 112

x x x [A]merican jurisprudence and authorities, much less the American Constitution, are of dubious application for
these are no longer controlling within our jurisdiction and have only limited persuasive merit insofar as Philippine
constitutional law is concerned.... [I]n resolving constitutional disputes, [this Court] should not be beguiled by
foreign jurisprudence some of which are hardly applicable because they have been dictated by different
constitutional settings and needs." Indeed, although the Philippine Constitution can trace its origins to that of the
United States, their paths of development have long since diverged. 113

Indeed, in Osmeña v. COMELEC,114 this Court, in reaffirming its ruling in National Press Club v. Commission on
Elections115 that Section 11 (b) of R.A. No. 6646116 does not invade and violate the constitutional guarantees
comprising freedom of expression, remarked in response to the dissent of Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero:

On the other hand, the dissent of Justice Romero in the present case, in batting for an "uninhibited market place
of ideas," quotes the following from Buckley v. Valeo:

[T]he concept that the government may restrict the speech of some elements in our society in order to enhance
the relative voice of the others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment which was designed to "secure the widest
possible dissemination ofinformation from diverse and antagonistic sources" and "to assure unfettered interchange
of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people."

But do we really believe in that? That statement was made to justify striking down a limit on campaign expenditure
on the theory that money is speech. Do those who endorse the view that government may not restrict the speech
of some in order to enhance the relative voice of others also think that the campaign expenditure limitation found
in our election laws is unconstitutional? How about the principle of one person, one vote, is this not based on the
political equality of voters? Voting after all is speech. We speak of it as the voiceof the people – even of God. The
notion that the government may restrictthe speech of some in order to enhance the relative voice of othersmay be
foreign to the American Constitution. It is not to the Philippine Constitution, being in fact an animating principle of
that document.

Indeed, Art. IX-C, §4 is not the only provision in the Constitution mandating political equality. Art. XIII, §1 requires
Congress to give the "highest priority" to the enactment of measures designed to reduce political inequalities, while
Art. II, §26 declaresas a fundamental principle of our government "equal access to opportunities for public service."
Access to public office will be deniedto poor candidates if they cannot even have access to mass media in order
to reach the electorate. What fortress principle trumps or overrides these provisions for political equality? Unless
the idealism and hopes which fired the imagination of those who framed the Constitution now appeardim to us,
how can the electoral reforms adopted by them to implement the Constitution, of which §11(b) of R.A. No. 6646,
in relation to §§90 and 92 are part, be considered infringements on freedom of speech? That the framers
contemplated regulation of political propaganda similar to §11(b) is clear from the following portion of the
sponsorship speech of Commissioner Vicente B. Foz:

MR. FOZ. . . . Regarding the regulation by the Commission of the enjoyment or utilization of franchises or permits
for the operation of transportation and other public utilities, media of communication or information, all grants,
special privileges or concessions granted by the Government, there is a provision that during the election period,
the Commission may regulate, among other things, the rates, reasonable free space, and time allotments for public
information campaigns and forums among candidates for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly, honest and
peaceful elections. This has to do with the media of communication or information. 117 Proceeding from the above,
the Court shall now rule on Ejercito’s proposition that the legislature imposes no legal limitation on campaign
donations. He vigorously asserts that COMELEC Resolution No. 9476 distinguishes between "contribution" and
"expenditure" and makes no proscription on the medium or amount of contribution madeby third parties in favor of
the candidates, while the limit set by law, as appearing in COMELEC Resolution No. 9615, applies only to election
expenditures of candidates.

We deny.

Section 13 of R.A. No. 7166118 sets the current allowable limit on expenses of candidates and political parties for
election campaign, thus:

SEC. 13. Authorized Expenses of Candidates and Political Parties. – The aggregate amount that a candidate or
registered politicalparty may spend for election campaign shall be as follows:

(a) For candidates – Ten pesos (₱10.00) for President and Vice President; and for other candidates,
Three pesos (₱3.00) for every voter currently registered in the constituency where he filed his
certificate of candidacy: Provided, That, a candidate without any political party and without support
from any political party may be allowed to spend Five pesos (₱5.00) for every such voter; and

(b) For political parties - Five pesos (₱5.00) for every voter currently registered in the constituency
or constituencies where it has official candidates.
Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, any contribution in cash or in kind to any candidate or political
party or coalition of parties for campaign purposes, duly reported to the Commission, shall not be subject to the
payment of any gift tax.119

Sections 100, 101, and 103 of the OEC are not repealed by R.A. No. 7166.120 These provisions, which are merely
amended insofar as the allowable amount is concerned, read:

SECTION 100. Limitations upon expenses of candidates.– No candidate shall spend for his election campaign an
aggregate amount exceeding one peso and fifty centavos for every voter currently registered in the constituency
where he filed his candidacy: Provided, That the expenses herein referred to shall include those incurred or caused
to be incurred by the candidate, whether in cash or in kind, including the use, rental or hire of land, water or aircraft,
equipment, facilities, apparatus and paraphernalia used in the campaign: Provided, further, That where the land,
water or aircraft, equipment, facilities, apparatus and paraphernalia used is owned by the candidate, his contributor
or supporter, the Commission is hereby empowered toassess the amount commensurate with the expenses for
the use thereof, based on the prevailing rates in the locality and shall be included in the total expenses incurred
by the candidate.

SECTION 101. Limitations upon expenses of political parties.– A duly accredited political party may spend for the
election of its candidates in the constituency or constituencies where it has official candidates an aggregate amount
not exceeding the equivalent of one peso and fifty centavos for every voter currently registered therein. Expenses
incurred by branches, chapters, or committees of such political party shall be included in the computation of the
total expenditures of the political party.

Expenses incurred by other political parties shall be considered as expenses of their respective individual
candidates and subject to limitation under Section 100 of this Code.

SECTION 103. Persons authorized to incur election expenditures.– No person, except the candidate, the treasurer
of a political party or any person authorized by such candidate or treasurer, shall make any expenditure in support
of or in opposition to any candidate or political party. Expenditures duly authorized by the candidate or the treasurer
of the party shall be considered as expenditures of such candidate or political party.

The authority to incur expenditures shall be in writing, copy of which shall be furnished the Commission signed by
the candidate or the treasurer of the party and showing the expenditures so authorized, and shall state the full
name and exact address of the person so designated. (Emphasis supplied)121

The focal query is: How shall We interpret "the expenses herein referred to shall include those incurred or caused
to be incurred by the candidate"and "except the candidate, the treasurer of a political party or any person authorized
by such candidate or treasurer"found in Sections 100 and 103, respectively, of the OEC? Do these provisions
exclude from the allowable election expenditures the contributions of third parties made with the consent of the
candidate? The Court holds not.

When the intent of the law is not apparent as worded, or when the application of the law would lead to absurdity,
impossibility or injustice, extrinsic aids of statutory construction may be resorted to such as the legislative history
of the law for the purpose of solving doubt, and that courts may take judicial notice of the origin and history of the
law, the deliberations during the enactment, as well as prior laws on the same subject matter in order to ascertain
the true intent or spirit of the law.122

Looking back, it could be found that Sections 100, 101, and 103 of the OEC are substantially lifted from P.D. No.
1296,123 as amended. Sections 51, 52 and 54 of which specifically provide:

Section 51. Limitations upon expenses of candidates. No candidate shall spend for his election campaign an
amount more than the salary or the equivalent of the total emoluments for one year attached to the office for which
he is a candidate: Provided, That the expenses herein referred to shall include those incurred by the candidate,
his contributors and supporters,whether in cash or in kind, including the use, rental or hire of land, water or air
craft, equipment, facilities, apparatus and paraphernalia used in the campaign: Provided, further,That, where the
land, water or air craft, equipment, facilities, apparatus and paraphernalia used is owned by the candidate, his
contributor or supporter, the Commission is hereby empowered to assess the amount commensurate with the
expenses for the use thereof, based on the prevailing rates in the locality and shall be included in the total expenses
incurred by the candidate.

In the case of candidates for the interim Batasang Pambansa, they shall not spend more than sixty thousand pesos
for their election campaign.

Section 52. Limitation upon expenses of political parties, groups or aggrupations.A political party, group or
aggrupation may not spend for the election of its candidates in the constituency or constituencies where it has
official candidates anaggregate amount more than the equivalent of fifty centavos for every voter currently
registered therein: Provided, That expenses incurred by such political party, group or aggrupation not duly
registered with the Commission and/or not presenting or supporting a complete list of candidates shall be
considered as expenses of its candidates and subject to the limitation under Section 51 of this Code. Expenses
incurred by branches, chapters or committees of a political party, group or aggrupation shall be included in the
computation of the total expenditures of the political party, group or aggrupation. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 54. Persons authorized to incur election expenditures.No person, except the candidate or any person
authorized by him or the treasurer of a political party, group or aggrupation, shall make any expenditure in support
of, or in opposition to any candidate or political party, group or aggrupation. Expenditures duly authorized by the
candidate of the treasurer of the party, group or aggrupation shall be considered as expenditure of such candidate
or political party, group or aggrupation.

The authority to incur expenditures shall be in writing, copy of which shall be furnished the Commission, signed by
the candidate or the treasurer of the party, group or aggrupation and showing the expenditure so authorized, and
shall state the full nameand exact address of the person so designated. (Emphasis supplied)

Prior to P.D. No. 1296, R.A. No. 6388 (otherwise known as the "Election Code of 1971") was enacted.124 Sections
41 and 42 of which are relevant, to quote:

Section 41. Limitation Upon Expenses of Candidates.– No candidate shall spend for his election campaign more
than the total amount of salary for the full term attached to the office for which he is a candidate.

Section 42. Limitation Upon Expenses of Political Parties and Other Nonpolitical Organizations.– No political party
as defined in this Code shall spend for the election of its candidates an aggregate amount more than the equivalent
of one peso for every voter currently registered throughout the country in case of a regular election, orin the
constituency in which the election shall be held in case of a special election which is not held in conjunction with a
regular election. Any other organization not connected with any political party, campaigning for or against a
candidate, or for or against a political party shall not spend more than a total amount of five thousand pesos.
(Emphasis supplied)

Much earlier, Section 12 (G) of R.A. No. 6132,125 which implemented the resolution of both Houses ofCongress
calling for a constitutional convention, explicitly stated:

Section 12. Regulations of Election Spending and Propaganda. The following provisions shall govern election
spending and propaganda in the election provided for in this Act:

xxx

(G) All candidates and all other persons making or receiving expenditures, contributions or donations which in their
totality exceed fifty pesos, in order to further or oppose the candidacy of any candidate, shall file a statement of all
such expenditures and contributions made or received on such dates and withsuch details as the Commission on
Elections shall prescribe by rules. The total expenditures made by a candidate, or by any other person with the
knowledge and consent of the candidate, shall not exceed thirty-two thousand pesos. (Emphasis supplied)

In tracing the legislative history of Sections 100, 101, and 103 of the OEC, it can be said, therefore, that the intent
of our lawmakers has been consistent through the years: to regulate not just the election expenses of the candidate
but also of his or her contributor/supporter/donor as well as by including in the aggregate limit of the former’s
election expenses those incurred by the latter.1awp++i1 The phrase "those incurred or caused to be incurred by
the candidate"is sufficiently adequate to cover those expenses which are contributed or donated in the candidate’s
behalf. By virtue of the legal requirement that a contribution or donation should bear the written conformity of the
candidate, a contributor/supporter/donor certainly qualifies as "any person authorized by such candidate or
treasurer." Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus. 126 (Where the law does not distinguish, neither
should We.) There should be no distinction in the application of a law where none is indicated.

The inclusion of the amount contributed by a donor to the candidate’s allowable limit of election expenses does
not trample upon the free exercise of the voters’ rights of speech and of expression under Section 4, Artticle III of
the Constitution. As a content-neutral regulation,127 the law’s concern is not to curtail the message or content of
the advertisement promoting a particular candidate but to ensure equality between and among aspirants with "deep
pockets" and those with less financial resources. Any restriction on speech or expression is only incidentaland is
no more than necessary to achieve the substantial governmental interest of promoting equality of opportunity in
political advertising. It bears a clear and reasonable connection with the constitutional objectives set out in Section
26, Article II, Section 4, Article IX-C, and Section 1, Art. XIII of the Constitution.128

Indeed, to rule otherwise would practically result in an unlimited expenditure for political advertising, which skews
the political process and subverts the essence of a truly democratic form of government.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The May 21, 2014 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc in SPA No. 13-
306 (DC), which upheld the September 26, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division, granting the petition
 for disqualification filed by private respondent Edgar "Egay" S. San Luis against petitioner Emilio Ramon "E.R." P.
Ejercito, is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

EN BANC

G.R. No. 230249, April 24, 2018

ATTY. PABLO B. FRANCISCO, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND ATTY. JOHNIELLE

KEITH P. NIETO, Respondents.

DECISION

VELASCO JR., J.:

Nature of the Case

This treats of the petition for certiorari under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Rules
of Court filed by Atty. Pablo B. Francisco (Francisco), which seeks to nullify the February
2, 2017 Resolution1 of the public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En
Banc. The assailed ruling dismissed Francisco's Petition for Disqualification against
private respondent Atty. Johnielle Keith P. Nieto (Nieto).

The Facts

Francisco is a registered voter in Cainta, Rizal, while Nieto was elected as mayor of the
same municipality in 2013. Nieto filed a certificate of candidacy (COC) to signify his bid
for re-election for the 2016 National and Local Elections.

On April 8, 2016, Francisco filed before the COMELEC a Petition for Disqualification
against Nieto, docketed as SPA 16-062(DC), alleging that on April 1-2, 2016, respondent
made financial contributions out of the government coffers for the asphalt-paving of the
road entrance along Imelda Avenue of Cainta Green Park Village. This, according to
petitioner, amounted to the expending of public funds within forty-five (45) days before
the 2016 polls and to illegal contributions for road repairs, respectively punishable under
Sees. 261(v)2 and 1043 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus
Election Code (OEC). Petitioner further claimed that the said asphalt paving was one of
 the accomplishments that respondent reported on his Facebook page.

In his Answer filed on April 22, 2016, Nieto countered that the questioned asphalting
project was subjected to public bidding on March 15, 2016, with a Notice of Award issued
on March 21, 2016. Thus, the asphalting project falls within the excepted public works
mentioned in Sec. 261(v)(l)(b) of the OEC.

During the preliminary conference on May 5, 2016, the counsels for the parties marked
their respective pieces of evidence. Thereafter, an Order was issued giving them ten (10)
days to file their respective memoranda. The COMELEC would receive copies of the
memoranda on May 16, 2016 and, thereafter, the case was deemed submitted for
resolution. In the interim, Nieto would be re-elected as municipal mayor of Cainta, Rizal,
having garnered the plurality of votes upon the conclusion of the 2016 polls.

Ruling of the COMELEC

On August 16, 2016, the COMELEC Second Division promulgated a Resolution4

dismissing the Petition for Disqualification against Nieto, and ruled in the following wise:

From the foregoing, it is clear that a candidate cannot be disqualified without a prior finding that he or
she is suffering from a disqualification provided by law or the Constitution. To be sure, in
order to disqualify a candidate there must be a declaration by a final judgment of a
competent court that the candidate sought to be disqualified is guilty of or found by the
Commission to be suffering from any disqualification provided by law or the Constitution.

In the instant case, this Commission (Second Division) finds no such prior declaration by
a final judgment of a competent court or of a finding of the Commission that Respondent
is guilty of the acts complained of Whether or not the Respondent is guilty of the alleged
acts is a prejudicial question which should be determined first in a proper proceedings
(sic) before a tribunal with competent jurisdiction. In the absence of such prior finding of
a competent tribunal, the Commission has no basis to disqualify Respondent. That said,
the case must be dismissed.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.5

The COMELEC Second Division anchored its ruling on the Court's landmark decision in Poe-
Llamanzares v. COMELEC6 (Poe) wherein the Court enunciated thusly:

Clearly, the amendment done in 2012 is an acceptance of the reality of absence of an authorized
proceeding for determining before election the qualifications of candidate. Such that, as
presently required, to disqualify a candidate there must be a declaration by a final
judgment of a competent court that the candidate sought to be disqualified "is guilty of or
found by the Commission to be suffering from any disqualification provided by law or the
 Constitution."

Insofar as the qualification of a candidate is concerned, Rule 25 and Rule 23 are flipsides
of one to the other. Both do not allow, are not authorizations, are not vestment of
jurisdiction, for the COMELEC to determine the qualification of a candidate. The facts of
qualification must beforehand be established in a prior proceeding before an authority
properly vested with jurisdiction. The prior determination of qualification may be by
statute, by executive order or by a judgment of a competent court or tribunal. (emphasis
added)

On September 8, 2016, petitioner moved for reconsideration from the COMELEC Second Division's
Resolution before the COMELEC En Banc, arguing in the main that there need not be a
final judgment by a competent court that the candidate sought to be disqualified is guilty
of or is suffering from any disqualification. He also stressed that since the act complained
of can only be committed within forty-five (45) days before the election, it would be
impossible to secure a conviction prior to initiating the disqualification proceedings.

Despite these strong asseverations, however, the COMELEC En Banc found no reason
to disturb the ruling of the Second Division. Instead, the seven-person Commission
echoed the pronouncement that for a petition for disqualification to prosper, there must
be "a declaration by a final judgment of a competent court that the candidate sought to
be disqualified is guilty of or found by the Commission to be suffering from any
disqualification provided by law or the Constitution." The COMELEC En Banc then
deemed that the denial of the petition is the only course of action it could take under the
premises. Thus, in its assailed February 2, 2017 Resolution, the electoral tribunal held:

Although the ruling enunciated by the Supreme Court in [Poe] has effectively emasculated the
Commission's power under COMELEC Resolution No. 9523 to disqualify a candidate, it
cannot decline to apply such ruling in view of the principle that "judicial decisions applying
or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the
Philippines."

As such, Petitioner's reliance on the cases cited in the Motion for Reconsideration is
misplaced, considering that the Poe case is now the controlling doctrine on the matter
having been decided in 2016 and thus supersedes any previous ruling on the matter.

x x x x

Consequently, having no leg to stand on, the instant Motion for Reconsideration is
DENIED and the Resolution of the Commission (Second Division) is hereby AFFIRMED.7

Hence, the instant recourse.

The Issues
 The issues to be resolved by this Court can be condensed to the following:

I. Whether or not the COMELEC acted in grave abuse of discretion in ruling that a
petition for disqualification under Sec. 68 of the OEC cannot prosper without a prior
judgment finding the respondent guilty of an election offense.
II. Whether or not petitioner sufficiently established by substantial evidence that
respondent violated Secs. 261(v) and 104 of the OEC.

Petitioner bewails that the COMELEC abruptly dismissed the disqualification case. According to
petitioner, the situation ushered in by the COMELEC ruling would render toothless
Section 68 of the OEC against election irregularities because of the virtual impossibility
of compliance with the prior ruling requirement. He also asserts that Poe does not apply
to candidates for local posts.

In his Comment, respondent Nieto cited the Poe ruling and averred that since there was
no prior declaration by a final judgment of a competent court or of a finding of the
Commission that he is guilty of the acts complained of, the COMELEC Second Division
had no basis to disqualify him. Nieto likens the requirement of a prior ruling to a prejudicial
question that must first be determined in a proper proceeding before a tribunal with
competent jurisdiction.

Moreover, Nieto reiterated the defense that the asphalting project is outside the ambit of
the ban against the expenditure of public funds since it was contracted prior to the 45-day
period before the scheduled elections. It was, thus, an infrastructure activity lawfully
entered into by the local government unit of Cainta. In addition, no public funds were
disbursed for the project during the ban since all expenses were for the account of the
winning bidder, Franzcor Trading and Construction.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing the government, in its Comment
took a stance different from that of the COMELEC. The OSG argued that Article IX-C,
Section 2(2) and (3) of the Constitution granted the COMELEC the quasi-judicial power
to decide all questions affecting elections, except those involving the right to vote. This
power further finds legal mooring in the dual aspect of the prohibited acts constituting the
grounds for disqualification under Section 68 of the OEC. Lastly, the OSG posited that
the context of the Poe ruling bars its application to local elective officials since the
discussions were aptly made within the confines of a national candidate for the
presidency.

The Court's Ruling

Petitioner is correct in his contention that a prior judgment is not a precondition to filing a
Petition for Disqualification. Nevertheless, the petition must necessarily fail for lack of
substantial evidence to establish that private respondent committed an election offense.
 Petitioner failed to comply with the material date rule

Before We discuss the merits of the case, the Court observes that petitioner failed to state
the material dates to establish that the instant recourse was timely interposed. The
petitioner merely stated that he received a copy of the COMELEC's Resolution denying
his motion for reconsideration on February 20, 2017, and that he was filing this petition
within thirty (30) days from the said date on March 22, 2017. 8

The allegation is not sufficient. Rule 64, Section 3 of the Rules of Court prescribes the
period for elevating the COMELEC's ruling to this Court thusly:

Section 3. Time to file petition. - The petition shall be filed within thirty (30) days from notice of the
judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed. The filing of a motion for new
trial or reconsideration of said judgment or final order or resolution, if allowed under the
procedural rules of the Commission concerned, shall interrupt the period herein fixed. If
the motion is denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period,
but which shall not be less than five (5) days in any event, reckoned from notice of denial.

Clear from the provision is that the intervening period petitioner utilized in moving for reconsideration
before the COMELEC must be deducted from the thirty (30)-day period for resorting to a
Rule 64 petition. As held in Pates v. COMELEC,9 the fresh period rule in Neypes v. Court
of Appeals10 that resets the period of the fi1ing of an appeal from the date of receipt of
the ruling on reconsideration is applicable only in civil cases, not in election controversies.
Filing a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC then almost guarantees that the
full 30-day period could not be availed of.

In the case at bar, petitioner failed to indicate when he received a copy of the August 16,
2016 Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division, from which he moved for
reconsideration on September 8, 2016. The Court is then unable to determine how many
days should be deducted from his period for filing a Rule 64 petition and, consequently,
if the instant recourse had been filed on time. The particular date of receipt is of utmost
significance in this case since petitioner cannot deny that he availed of the full 30-day
period from February 20, 2017 to March 22, 2017. This means that unless petitioner filed
his motion for reconsideration on the very same day he received the COMELEC's August
16, 2016 Resolution, the instant petition had been filed out of time. In any case, non-
compliance with the material date rule, in itself, is already a ground for dismissal. 11

Revisiting Poe and strengthening the jurisdiction of the COMELEC

Public respondent COMELEC relied heavily on the Court's pronouncement in Poe when
it dismissed the election controversy. The Court, however, takes this opportunity to rectify
Our position in Poe and to uphold the jurisdiction of the COMELEC as strengthened under
the present Constitution.

For perspective, the COMELEC was never part of the original version of the 1935
Constitution. Prior to its creation, it was the then Department of Interior, through an
 Executive Bureau then directly, that superintended the conduct of elections. 12 The Courts
were charged with resolving questions affecting the right to vote as well as contested
elections of local elective officials, while the Secretary of Interior was vested with the
authority to enforce the election laws and assign local authorities to perform ministerial
duties relative thereto.

The close official relationship between the President and the Secretary of Interior,
however, aroused suspicion that the latter had been administering election statutes not
for the purpose of securing honest and free elections, but to serve the political interest of
the party in power to which they belonged. They were never entirely free from suspicion
of acting with partisan bias. And this general dissatisfaction and distrust over the manner
the elections were conducted at that time impelled the National Assembly to propose the
creation of the COMELEC by constitutional amendment.13

Through a plebiscite held on June 17, 1940, several amendments were introduced to the
1935 Constitution: modifying the term of office of the President and the Vice-President
from six (6) years to four (4) years, but with re-election for another term establishing a
bicameral Congress composed of the Senate as the upper house and the House of
Representatives as the lower house; and creating an independent COMELEC.

Since its creation, the COMELEC's power had been increased in each incarnation of the
Constitution to reflect the country's awareness of the need to provide greater regulation
and protection to our electoral processes and to ensure their integrity. 14 To demonstrate,
Article X, Section 2 of the 1935 Constitution, as amended, declares the power of the
electoral commission thusly:

Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and
administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections and shall exercise all other
functions which may be conferred upon it by law. It shall decide, save those involving the
right to vote, all administrative questions affecting elections, including the determination
of the number and location of polling places, and the appointment of election inspectors
and of other election officials. All law enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the
Government, when so required by the Commission, shall act as its deputies for the
purpose of insuring free, orderly, and honest election. The decisions, orders, and rulings
of the Commission shall be subject to review by the Supreme Court.

No pardon, parole. or suspension of sentence for the violation of any election law may be
granted without the favorable recommendation of the Commission. (emphasis added)

Thus, the administrative control over the conduct of elections erstwhile exercised by the Secretary of
Interior was shifted to the COMELEC. Under its constitutional mandate, it was tasked with
"the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections" and
bestowed the power to "decide save those involving the right to vole, all administrative
questions affecting elections." But since its authority to decide was circumscribed to
administrative questions, the courts retained their original powers over local election
contests.
 It was not until the enactment of the 1973 Constitution when the power of the COMELEC
to resolve election controversies was institutionalized. Through Article XII (C), Section 2
of the 1973 Constitution. the powers of the COMELEC were expanded to the following:

SEC. 2. The Commission on Elections shall have the following powers and functions:

(1) Enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections.

(2) Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of
all Members of the Batasang Pambansa and elective provincial and city officials.

(3) Decide, save those involving the right to vote, administrative questions affecting
elections, including the determination of the number and location of polling places, the
appointment of election officials and inspectors, and the registration of voters.

(4) Deputize, with the consent or at the instance of the President, law enforcement
agencies and instrumentalities of the Government, including the armed forces of the
Philippines, for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly, and honest elections.

(5) Register and accredit political parties subject to the provisions of Section eight hereof

(6) Recommend to the Batasang Pambansa effective measures to minimize election

expenses and prohibit all forms of election frauds and malpractices, political opportunism,
guest or nuisance candidacy, or other similar acts.

(7) Submit to the President, the Prime Minister, and the Batasang Pambansa a report on
the conduct and manner of each election.

(8) Perform such other functions as may be provided by law. (emphasis added)

As aptly observed in Mendoza v. COMELEC (Mendoza),15 these powers of the COMELEC have been
enhanced in scope and details under the 1987 Constitution. Article X (C), Section 2 of the
Constitution embodies the myriad of powers bestowed upon the polling body, viz:

SECTION 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:

(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.

(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections,
returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and
appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial
courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts
of limited jurisdiction.
 Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving
elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable.

(3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections,
including determination of the number and location of polling places, appointment of
election officials and inspectors, and registration of voters.

(4) Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law enforcement agencies and
instrumentalities of the Government, including the Armed Forces of the Philippines, for
the exclusive purpose of ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.

(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions

which, in addition to other requirements, must present their platform or program of
government and accredit citizens' arms of the Commission on Elections. Religious
denominations and sects shall not be registered. Those which seek to achieve their goals
through violence or unlawful means, or refuse to uphold and adhere to this Constitution,
or which are supported by any foreign government shall likewise be refused registration.

Financial contributions from foreign governments and their agencies to political parties,
organizations, coalitions, or candidates related to elections constitute interference in
national affairs, and, when accepted, shall be an additional ground for the cancellation of
their registration with the Commission, in addition to other penalties that may be
prescribed by law.

(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court for inclusion
or exclusion of voters; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations
of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and
malpractices.

(7) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to minimize election spending,

including limitation of places where propaganda materials shall be posted, and to prevent
and penalize all forms of election frauds, offenses, malpractices, and nuisance
candidacies.

(8) Recommend to the President the removal of any officer or employee it has deputized,
or the imposition of any other disciplinary action, for violation or disregard of, or
disobedience to its directive, order, or decision.

(9) Submit to the President and the Congress a com prehensive report on the conduct of
each election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, or recall. (emphasis added)

Significantly, the present Constitution clarifies that the COMELEC retains its character as an
administrative agency notwithstanding its authority to resolve election contests. As held
in Mendoza:
As will be seen on close examination, the 1973 Constitution used the unique wording that the
COMELEC shall be the sole judge of all contests, thus giving the appearance that judicial
power had been conferred. This phraseology, however, was changed in the 1987
Constitution to give the COMELEC exclusive jurisdiction over all contests, thus removing
any vestige of exercising its adjudicatory power as a court and correctly aligning it with
what it is a quasi-judicial body.16

As enunciated, the COMELEC's adjudicative function over election contests is quasi-judicial in

character since the COMELEC is a governmental body, other than a court, that is vested
with jurisdiction to decide the specific class of controversies it Is charged with resolving.
In adjudicating the rights of persons before it, the COMELEC is not just empowered but
is in fact required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings,
weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis for their official action and
exercise of discretion in a judicial nature.17 This is simply in congruence with the concept
of due process that all administrative adjudicatory bodies are enjoined to observe.

The COMELEC is, thus, fully-clothed with authority to make factual determinations in
relation to the election contests before it. This has been the thrust of the decades worth
of constitutional revisions that transformed the COMELEC from a purely administrative
body, whose scope of decision making is limited to those incidental to its duty to enforce
election laws, to a polling commission that also exercises original and exclusive, as well
as appellate, jurisdiction over election contests.

Considering the historical evolution of the COMELEC, the Court now declares that the
polling body has full adjudicatory powers to resolve election contests outside the
jurisdiction of the electoral tribunals. To rule otherwise would be an act of regression,
contrary to the intent behind the constitutional innovations creating and further
strengthening the Commission. There is no novelty in this pronouncement, but merely a
reinstatement of Our consistent jurisprudence prior to Poe.

In the landmark case of Aratea v. COMELEC,18 for instance, the COC of Romeo D.
Lonzanida was cancelled and declared void ab initio because of his misrepresentation as
to his eligibility. He knew fully well that he had been elected, and had served, as mayor
of San Antonio, Zambales for more than three consecutive terms yet he still certified that
he was eligible to run for mayor for the next succeeding term, thus constituting false
material representation. No prior judgment recognizing Lonzanida's service for three
terms was necessary to effect the cancellation of his COC.

In Maquiling v. COMELEC,19 Linog G. Balua, through a petitiOn treated as one for

cancellation and/or denial of due course of COC, contended that Rommel Arnado is not
a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that the latter is a foreigner based on a
certification by the Bureau of Immigration indicating that Amado is American. The Court
did not find issue in the COMELEC's authority to make a factual determination as to
Amado's citizenship and residence, though We eventually reversed the COMELEC En
Banc's ruling and reinstated that of its First Division based on Our own appreciation of
the evidence on record.
 And in Cerafica v. COMELEC (Cerafica),20 the Court reversed the COMELEC's mling not
because of any alleged lack of authority to make factual determinations as to the eligibility
of a candidate, but, quite the contrary, because it did not make use of the same authority.

To reiterate, the COMELEC, as an adjunct to its adjudicatory power. may investigate facts
or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings. weigh evidence, and draw conclusions
from them as basis for their official action. As held in Cerafica:21

The determination of whether a candidate is eligible for the position he is seeking involves a
determination of fact where parties must be allowed to adduce evidence in support of
their contentions. We thus caution the Comelec against its practice of impetuous
cancellation of COCs via minute resolutions adopting the recommendations of its Law
Department when the situation properly calls for the case's referral to a Division for
summary hearing.

It may be true that the sole ground for Petitions to Deny Due Course or to Cancel COC is false material
representation compounded by intent to deceive on the part of the candidate and that the
intent to deceive or mislead will be difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain absent an
established fact that the candidate deviated from. Contrary to Poe, the Court
categorical1y rules herein that the COMELEC can be the proper body to make the
pronouncement against which the truth or falsity of a material representation in a COC
can be measured. But lest it be misunderstood, these disquisitions will not by any means
alter the outcome of Poe, for even if We dispense the requirement of a predicate judgment
therein and uphold the jurisdiction of the COMELEC, the Court's conclusion would still
find mooring on the factual findings on Poe's Filipino blood relation and residency. 22

A predicate judgment is not required in Petitions for Disqualification

Moreover, the Commission gravely abused its discretion when it failed to appreciate the
characteristics that distinguish Poe from the case at bar. It must be stressed that there is
a world of difference between the remedies availed of in Poe and in the instant case.
What is involved herein is a Petition for Disqualification under Sec. 68 of the OEC,
whereas Poe was initiated by multiple Petitions to Deny Due Course or Cancel COC
under Sec. 78 of the OEC.23

The statutory bases for the two distinct remedies read:

Sec. 68. Disqualifications. - Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared
by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having

xxxx

d. solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or
 e. violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, subparagraph 6,
shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from
holding the office. x x x

x x x x

Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. - A verified
petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed
by the person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained
therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time
not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy
and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the
election. (emphasis added)

The essence of a disqualification proceeding that invokes Sec. 68 of the OEC is to bar an individual
from becoming a candidate or from continuing as a candidate for public office based not
on the candidate's lack of qualification, but on his possession of a disqualification as
declared by a final decision of a competent court, or as found by the Commission. 24 The
jurisdiction of the COMELEC to disqualify candidates is limited to those enumerated in
Section 68 of the OEC. All other election offenses are beyond the ambit of COMELEC
jurisdiction.25

Meanwhile, for a Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel COC under Sec. 78 of the
OEC to prosper, the candidate must have made a material misrepresentation involving
his eligibility or qualification for the office to which he seeks election, such as the requisite
residency, age, citizenship or any other legal qualification necessary to run for elective
office26 enumerated under Sec. 74 of the OEC.27 Moreover, the false representation
under Sec. 78 must consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact
which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible.28 The relief is granted not because
of the candidate's lack of eligibility per se, but because of his or her false
misrepresentation of possessing the statutory qualifications.

The doctrine in Poe was never meant to apply to Petitions for Disqualification. A prior
court judgment is not required before the remedy under Sec. 68 of the OEC can prosper.
This is highlighted by the provision itself, which contemplates of two scenarios: first, there
is a final decision by a competent court that the candidate is guilty of an election offense
and second, it is the Commission itself that found that the candidate committed any of the
enumerated prohibited acts. Noteworthy is that in the second scenario, it is not required
that there be a prior final judgment; it is sufficient that the Commission itself made the
determination. The conjunction "or" separating "competent court" and "the Commission"
could only mean that the legislative intent was for bot/1 bodies to be clothed with authority
to ascertain whether or not there is evidence that the respondent candidate ought to be
disqualified.

Furthermore, the quantum of proof necessary in election cases is, as in all administrative
cases, substantial evidence. This is defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable
 mind will accept as adequate to support a conclusion.29 To impose prior conviction of an
election offense as a condition sine qua non before a Petition for Disqualification can be
launched would be tantamount to requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, which is
significantly beyond what our laws require.

Jurisprudence is rife with teachings on the separability of the criminal prosecution for
election offenses or even t he determination for probable cause to criminally charge a
candidate for any election violation, from the administrative proceeding for
disqualification. The Court even elucidated on the concept of this twin aspect in the case
of Ejercito v. COMELEC,30 viz:

x x x It has been repeatedly underscored that an election offense has its criminal and electoral aspects.
While its criminal aspect to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused cannot be the
subject of summary hearing, its electoral aspect to ascertain whether the offender should
be disqualified from office can be determined in an administrative proceeding that is
summary in character. This Court said in Sunga [v. COMELEC]:

It is worth to note that an election offense has criminal as well as electoral aspects. Its
criminal aspect involves the ascertainment of the guilt or innocence of the accused
candidate. Like in any other criminal case, it usually entails a full-blown hearing and the
quantum of proof required to secure a conviction is beyond reasonable doubt. Its electoral
aspect, on the other hand, is a determination of whether the offender should be
disqualified from office. This is done through an administrative proceeding which is
summary in character and requires only a clear preponderance of evidence. Thus, under
Sec. 4 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, petitions for disqualification "shall be heard
summarily after due notice." It is the electoral aspect that we are more concerned with,
under which an erring candidate may be disqualified even without prior criminal
conviction.

and equally in Lanot [v. COMELEC]:

x x x The electoral aspect of a disqualification case determines whether the offender

should be disqualified from being a candidate or from holding office. Proceedings are
summary in character and require only clear preponderance of evidence. An erring
candidate may be disqualified even without prior determination of probable cause in a
preliminary investigation. The electoral aspect may proceed independently of the criminal
aspect, and vice-versa.

The criminal aspect of a disqualification case determines whether there is probable cause
to charge a candidate for an election offense. The prosecutor is the COMELEC, through
its Law Department, which determines whether probable cause exists. If there is probable
cause, the COMELEC, through its Law Department, files the criminal information before
the proper court. Proceedings before the proper court demand a full-blown hearing and
require proof beyond reasonable doubt to convict. A criminal conviction shall result in the
disqualification of the offender, which may even include disqualification from holding a
future public office.
The Court's disquisitions in Sunga v. COMELEC31 and Lanot v. COMELEC32 centered on whether or
not the polling body has the discretion to proceed with disqualification cases even after
the elections had been concluded.

In Sunga, petitioner Manuel C. Sunga was a mayoralty candidate in the Municipality of

Iguig, Cagayan in the May 1995 Elections. He filed a complaint accusing respondent,
then incumbent mayor Ferdinand B. Trinidad, of using threats, intimidation, terrorism or
other forms of coercion, in violation of the OEC. The COMELEC denied the complaint,
ruling that petitions for disqualification filed after the conduct of the elections ought to be
dismissed. In reversing the ruling of the tribunal, the Court held that neither the conclusion
of the elections nor Trinidad's proclamation and assumption of office divested the
COMELEC of authority and jurisdiction to decide the disqualification case.

Meanwhile, in Lanot, therein petitioners led by Henry P. Lanot filed a Petition for
Disqualification against then incumbent Pasig City Mayor Vicente P. Eusebio for allegedly
violating Section 261(a) of the OEC on the prohibition against vote-buying. The
COMELEC First Division granted the petition, prompting Eusebio to move for
reconsideration. At the time of the elections, the disqualification case was not yet resolved
with finality. Thus, Eusebio's votes were still counted and canvassed, and he was
proclaimed city mayor of Pasig. Thereafter, the COMELEC En Banc annulled the
COMELEC First Division's disqualification order and referred the case to the COMELEC
Law Department for preliminary investigation.

The Court agreed with Lanot that the COMELEC En Banc gravely abused its discretion
when it ordered the dismissal of the disqualification case because of Eusebio's
proclamation as city mayor and at the same time allowed the criminal aspect to proceed
with preliminary investigation. Lanot highlighted the inconsistency by citing the teaching
in Sunga that:

A candidate guilty of election offenses would be undeservedly rewarded, instead of punished, by the
dismissal of the disqualification case against him simply because the investigating body
was unable, for any reason caused upon it, to determine before the election if the offenses
were indeed committed by the candidate sought to be disqualified. All that the erring
aspirant would need to do is to employ delaying tactics so that the disqualification case
based on the commission of election offenses would not be decided before the election.
This scenario is productive of more fraud which certainly is not the main intent and
purpose of the law.33

To then avoid the above-illustrated deleterious scenario, the Court instructed that the COMELEC
should continue the trial and hearing of the disqualification case until judgment is
rendered thereon, and to treat the criminal aspect of the case as a separate issue
altogether.

The distinction between the electoral aspect from the criminal one was further amplified
in Ejercito. There, the Court rebuked therein petitioner's assertion that the conduct of
preliminary investigation to determine whether the acts enumerated under Section 68 of
 the OEC were indeed committed is a requirement prior to actual disqualification.
Resultantly, the Court upheld the COMELEC's disqualification of petitioner Emilio Ramon
Ejercito even though there has yet to be any finding of probable cause, let alone guilt,
that he spent more than the threshold amount prescribed under Sections I00-103 of the
OEC, an election offense under Section 262 of the same code.

Neither a prior conviction nor even a determination of probable cause is then a

requirement before a Petition for Disqualification can be lodged. Credit must be given to
petitioner for his apt observation that to rule otherwise would render inutile the remedy
under Section 68 of the OEC insofar as the specific ground raised herein is concerned.
Pertinently, Section 261(v) of the OEC and Rule 25, Section 3 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure read:

Section 261. Prohibited Acts. - The following shall be guilty of an election offense:

x x x x

(v) Prohibition against release, disbursement or expenditure of public funds. - Any public
official or employee including barangay officials and those of government-owned or
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, who, during forty-five days before a regular
election and thirty days before a special election, releases, disburses or expends any
public funds x x x (emphasis added)

Rule 25 - Disqualification of Candidates

x x x x

Section 3. Period to File Petition. - The Petition shall be filed any day after the last day for
filing of certificates of candidacy, but not later than the date of proclamation. (emphasis
added)

Clearly, the particular election offense and ground for disqualification imputed on respondent must
necessarily be committed within forty-five (45) days before a regular election and within
thirty (30) days before a special election. Meanwhile, the window for filing a Petition for
Disqualification raising the same ground is between the day after the filing of a certificate
of candidacy until the date of proclamation, which in the advent of automated elections
could only take less than a week for local posts. Through its ruling, the COMELEC then
effectively required petitioner to secure against Nieto a final judgment of guilt within the
very limited timeframe, an almost impossible feat under the normal course of legal
procedure.

We are, therefore, constrained to rule that the COMELEC erred when, relying on Poe, it
imposed the requirement of a prior court judgment before resolving the current
controversy.
 The records are bereft of evidence to hold that respondent violated Secs. 261(v) and 104
of the Omnibus Election Code

Notwithstanding the COMELEC's error in applying Poe, the petition must nevertheless
fail. Though the COMELEC can properly take cognizance of the Petition for
Disqualification without issue, petitioner miserably failed to tender evidence that
respondent committed the election offenses imputed.

The quantum of proof necessary in election cases is substantial evidence, or such

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind will accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.34 Corollarily, the rule is that he who alleges must prove.35 Thus, the burden is
on Francisco to establish through substantial evidence that Nieto unlawfully disbursed
government funds during the election ban, a burden that Francisco failed to discharge.

There is simply a dearth of evidence to support petitioner's claim that respondent violated
Sec. 261(v) of the OEC. To be sure, petitioner merely submitted the following to support
his allegations:

1. Pictures of the asphalt-paving along Imelda Avenue of Cainta Green Park Village,
Barangay San Isidro, Cainta, Rizal;
2. Picture of the Facebook page of the respondent acknowledging the project as one
of the accomplishments of his administration; and
3. Picture of a tarpaulin banner expressing gratitude for the asphalt-paving.

The photographs36 petitioner presented depicting the construction and works done on the asphalting
project would only prove the fact of paving, which is not even contested. They do not,
however, establish that respondent expended public funds or made financial contributions
during the election prohibition.

On the other hand, respondent Nieto sufficiently parried the alleged commission of the
election offenses by proving that the asphalting project squarely falls under the exception
in Sec. 261 (v)(l)(b). The provision states:

v. Prohibition against release, disbursement or expenditure of public funds. - Any public official or
employee including barangay officials and those of government-owned or
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, who, during forty-five days before
a regular election and thirty days before a special election, releases, disburses or
expends any public funds for:

1. Any and all kinds of public works, except the following:

xxxx
 b. Work undertaken by contract through public bidding held, or by
negotiated contract awarded, before the forty-five day
period before election: Provided, That work for the
purpose of this section undertaken under the so-called
"takay" or "paquiao" system shall not be considered as
work by contract; (emphasis added)
The Court is in concurrence with the observations of Commissioners Luie Tito F. Guia and Ma. Rowena
Amelia V. Guanzon that the evidence on record sufficiently proved that the expenditure
for the road repair is exempted from the prohibition under Sec. 261(v) of the OEC. Private
respondent Nieto was able to show with competent evidence that the bidding for and the
award of the subject project were regular and done consistent with existing laws. The
charge for illegal contribution under Sec. 104 of the OEC has even less leg to stand on.
There was no contribution to speak of since it was established that the asphalting work
was a government project and not a contribution.

Notably, private respondent adduced the following pieces of evidence to support his
contention:

1. A copy of the posting of the project in the Philippine Government Electronic

Procurement System (PHILGEPS) website.37 This indicates that the Bid Notice
Abstract and Invitation to Bid for the subject project were posted on the website on
February 25, 2016;
2. A certified true copy of the Abstract of Bids38 attested by the members of the Bids
and Awards Committee, indicating that the bidding for the asphalting project was
held on March 15, 2016;
3. A certified true copy of the Notice of Award39 stating that, on March 21, 2016, the
project was awarded in favor of the winning bidder, contractor Franzcor Trading
and Construction;
4. A letter40 dated March 21, 2016 filed by respondent Nieto with the Acting Regional
Election Director of COMELEC in Region IV-A submitting to the Commission the
list of the infrastructure projects bid out, including the asphalting project, which
were awarded before March 25, 2016, the reckoning date of the forty-five day
prohibition period and
5. A certification41 from the Election Officer of the COMELEC Region IV-A office
acknowledging receipt of the letter.

To cast doubt on the sufficiency of respondent Nieto's evidence, petitioner Francisco points out that the
followin g were never offered in evidence: (a) an ordinance enacted by the Sangguniang
Bayan of Cainta authorizing the P6,000,000.00 expenditure for the project, (b) a
certification from the proper accounting official that there is an appropriation by law of
such am ou nt and that the fund is available, and (c) an affidavit from the editor or
publisher of a newspaper of general circulation that the Invitation to Bid had been
published. However, petitioner is not excused from shifting the burden of proof to private
respondent, especially since the latter has the presumption of regularity in his favor. 42
 bolstered by evidence proving that the project was contracted outside the period of
prohibition.

There being substantial evidence to support Nieto's defense that the construction
procurement for t he project was aboveboard, there is then no reason to disturb public
respondent's rulings. No abuse of discretion, let alone one that is grave, can be attributed
to the COMELEC Second Division in dismissing the Petition for Disqualification, nor to
the COMELEC En Banc in denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
The Court declares that in a Petition for Disqualification under Section 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code, a prior judgment by a competent court that the candidate is guilty of an
election offense is not required before the said petition can be entertained or given due
course by the Commission on Elections.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C. J., on leave.

Carpio,**Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen,
Jardeleza, Caguioa, Martires, Tijam, Reyes, Jr., and Gesmundo, JJ., concur.

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT

Sirs/Mesdames:

Please take notice that on April 24, 2018 a Decision/Resolution, copy attached herewith,
was rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which was
received by this Office on June 27, 2018 at 3:30 p.m.

Very truly yours,

(SGD)

EDGAR O. ARICHETA

Clerk of Court

Endnotes:
** Acting Chief Justice.
1Rollo, pp. 23 28.
2Section 261. Prohibited Acts. - The following shall be guilty of an election offense:

x x x x

v. Prohibition against release, disbursement or expenditure of public funds. - Any public

official or employee including bnrangay officials and those of government-owned or
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, who, during forty-five days before a regular
election and thirty days before a special election, releases, disburses or expends any
public funds for:

1. Any and all kinds of public works x x x

3 Sec. 104. Prohibited donations by candidates, treasurers of parties or their agents. - No
candidate x x x shall during the campaign period. x x x directly or indirectly, make any
donation, contribution or gift in cash or in kind, or undertake or contribute to the
construction or repair of roads, bridges, school buses, puericulture centers. medical
clinics and hospitals, churches or chapels cement pavements, or any structure for public
use or for the use of any religious or civic organization. x x x
4Rollo, pp. 87-92.
5 Id. at 91-92.
6 G.R. Nos. 221697 & 221698-700, March 8, 2016.
7Rollo, p. 27.
8 Id. at 4.
9 G.R. No. 184915, June 30, 2009.
10 G.R. No. 141524, September 15, 2005, 469 SCRA 633.
11Lapid v. Laurea, G.R. No. 139607, October 28, 2002.
12 See
<https://www.comelec.gov.ph/?r=AboutCOMELEC/CitizcnsChartcr/HistoryofCOMELEC
>.
13 Id.
14Mendoza v. Cmnmission on Election, G.R. No. 188308, October 15, 2009.
15 Supra note 14.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 G.R. No. 195229, October 9, 2012.
19 G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013.
20 G.R. No. 205136, December 2, 2014.
21 Id.
22 Poe's status as a natural-born Filipino was establishcd through the intent of the framers
of the 1935 Constitution, presumptions, and generally accepted principles of international
law. Meanwhile, her compliance with the residency requirement was founded on case law
and evidence.
23 a. SPA No. 15-001(DC) was a petition filed by Estrella Elamparo to deny due course
or cancel Poe's COC on the ground Poe allegedly committed material misrepresentation
in indicting in her COC that she is a natural-born Filipino and a resident of the Philippines
for at least ten (10) years and eleven (11) months up to the day before the May 9, 2016
elections;

b. SPA No. 15-002(DC) was a petition to disqualify filed by Francisco S. Tatad, alleging
that Poe lacks the requisite citizenship and residency to qualify her for the presidency.
Though denominated as a petition to disqualify, the grounds relied upon were not those
enumerated in either Sections 12 or 68 of the OEC;

c. SPA No. 15-007(DC) was a petition filed by Antonio P. Contreras to cancel Poe's COC
on the ground that she allegedly did not possess the ten-year residency required for the
candidacy; and

d. SPA No. 15-139(DC) was a petition filed by Amado D. Valdez to deny de course or
cancel the COC of Poe, alleging that her repatriation did not bestow upon her the status
of a natural-born citizen, and that she could not have established her residence in the
country prior to her repatriation.
24Fermin v. COMELEC, 595 Phil. 449 (2008).
25Ejercito v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 212398, November 25, 2014.
26Villafuerte v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206698, February 25, 2014.
27Section 74. Contents cf certificate of candidacy. - The certificate of candidacy shall state
that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that
he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province,
including its component cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to
represent; the political party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence;
his post office address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will
support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by
the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a pennancnt resident or immigrant to a
foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed volu ntarily, without
mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate of
candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.
28Villafuerte v. COMELEC, supra note 26.
29Sabili v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 193261, April 24, 2012.
30 Supra note 25.
31 G.R. No. 125629, March 25, 1998.
32 G.R. No. 164858, November 16, 2006.
33 Supra note 32.
34 Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court.
35Lim v. Equitable PCI Bank, G.R. No. 183918, January 15, 2014.
36Rollo, pp. 43-46.
37 Id. at 58.
38 Id. at 59.
39 Id. at 60.
40 Id. at 62.
41 Id. at 61.
42Rule 131, Section 3. Disputable presumptions. - The following presumptions nrc
satisfactory if uncontradicted.but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
 x x x x

(m) That official duty has been regularly performed.

EN BANC

G.R. No. 230744, September 26, 2017

MARIO O. SALVADOR, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND ALEXANDER S. BELENA,

Respondents.

DECISION

TIJAM, J.:

In this Petition for Certiorari1 under Rule 64, petitioner Mario O. Salvador (Salvador) challenges the
Resolutions dated November 2, 20152 and March 8, 20173 of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) En Banc, in E.O. Case No. 14-483, which found probable cause
against him for violation of Section 1004 in relation to Section 2625 of Batasang Pambansa
Blg. 881 or the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, as amended by Section 136 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7166 or An Act Providing for Synchronized National and Local
Elections and for Electoral Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations Therefor, and for Other
Purposes.

The Facts

Salvador, a member of the political party Bagong Lakas ng Nueva Ecija, was a mayoralty
candidate in San Jose City, Nueva Ecija in 2010. 7 Marivic Violago-Belena, private
respondent Alexander Belena's (Belena) wife, won over the petitioner in said mayoralty
election.8

On December 4, 2014, Belena filed a Complaint-Affidavit for overspending or violation of

Section 100 in relation to Section 262 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), as amended
by Section 13 of R.A. No. 7166 against Salvador. 9

According to Belena, Salvador exceeded the expenditure limit allowed by law for a
mayoralty candidate. Citing Salvador's Statement of Election Contribution and
Expenditure (SOCE), Belena averred that Salvador spent a total of P449,000.00 in the
2010 election, when the maximum expenditure allowed by law is P275,667.00.10

Belena averred that according to Section 13 of R.A. No. 7166, a candidate, other than for
presidency and vice presidency, is allowed to spend an amount of P3.00 for every voter
currently registered in the constituency where he filed his certificate of candidacy.
 However, if a candidate without any political party and without any support from any
political party, he may be allowed to spend P5.00 for every such voter. 11

Considering that the total number of registered voters in San Jose City, Nueva Ecija is
91,889 and that Salvador is a member of a political party, Belena contended that he was
only allowed to spend P275,667.00 only. 12

For his part, Salvador maintained that while he is a member of a political party, he argued
that he did not receive any support from any political party. Hence, the exception under
Section 13 of R.A. No. 7166 was applicable to him. 13

In a Resolution14 dated November 2, 2015, the COMELEC En Banc directed its Law
Department to file the appropriate information against Salvador for overspending. The
COMELEC En Banc disregarded the interpretation of Salvador and held that the P5.00
cap applies to a candidate who is not a member of a political party and who did not receive
any support from any political party, using the principle verba legis non est recedendum.
The fallo thereof reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission (En Banc) RESOLVED, as it hereby

RESOLVES, to DIRECT the Law Department to FILE AN INFORMATION against
[Salvador] for violation of Section 100, in relation to Section 262 of the [OEC], as amended
by Section 13 of [R.A.] No. 7166.

SO ORDERED.15

Undeterred, Salvador filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 16 which was denied in a Resolution17 dated
March 8, 2017. The COMELEC En Banc reiterated its earlier ruling that the provisions of
law under consideration require no interpretation as the law is clear and free from
ambiguity. The dispositive portion of the COMELEC En Banc resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission En Banc RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES,

to deny the Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.18

Hence, this petition.

The Issue

Did the COMELEC En Banc commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in
excess of jurisdiction when it recommended the filing of an appropriate information
against Salvador?

Ruling of the Court

 We rule in the negative.

Section 13 of R.A. No. 7166, a provision which provides for the allowable expenses of a
candidate and political parties, is an amendment to Section 100 of the OEC. The pertinent
provisions state:

Sec. 100. Limitations upon expenses of candidates. - No candidate shall spend for his election
campaign an aggregate amount exceeding one peso and fifty centavos for every voter
currently registered in the constituency where he filed his candidacy; Provided, That the
expenses herein referred to shall include those incurred or caused to be incurred by the
candidate, whether in cash or in kind, including the use, rental or hire of land, water, or
aircraft, equipment, facilities, apparatus and paraphernalia used in the campaign;
Provided, further, That where the land, water, aircraft, equipment, facilities, apparatus and
paraphernalia used is owned by the candidate, his contributor or supporter, the
Commission is hereby empowered to assess the amount commensurate with the
expenses for the use thereof, based on the prevailing rates in the locality and shall be
included in the total expenses incurred by the candidate.

While Section 13 of R.A. No. 7166 provides:

Sec. 13. Authorized Expenses of Candidates and Political Parties. - The aggregate amount that a
candidate or registered political party may spend for election campaign shall be as
follows:

1. For Candidates. - Ten pesos (P10.00) for President and Vice President; and for other
candidates Three Pesos (P3.00) for every voter currently registered in the constituency
where he filed his certificate of candidacy; Provided, That a candidate without any political
party and without support from any political party may be allowed to spend Five Pesos
(P5.00) for every such voter; and

2. For political parties. - Five pesos (P5.00) for every voter currently registered in the
constituency or constituencies where it has official candidates.

Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding any contribution in cash or in kind to
any candidate or political party or coalition of parties for campaign purposes, duly reported
to the Commission shall not be subject to the payment of gift tax.

It could be found that Section 100 of the OEC is substantially lifted from Section 51 of Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1296 or the 1978 Election Code, which provides:

Sec. 51. Limitations upon expenses of candidates. No candidate shall spend for his election campaign
an amount more than the salary or the equivalent of the total emoluments for one year
attached to the office for which he is a candidate: Provided, That the expenses herein
referred to shall include those incurred by the candidate, his contributors and
supporters,whether in cash or in kind, including the use, rental or hire of land, water or air
 craft, equipment, facilities, apparatus and paraphernalia used in the campaign: Provided,
further, That, where the land, water or air craft, equipment, facilities, apparatus and
paraphernalia used is owned by the candidate, his contributor or supporter, the
Commission is hereby empowered to assess the amount commensurate with the
expenses for the use thereof, based on the prevailing rates in the locality and shall be
included in the total expenses incurred by the candidate.

In the case of candidates for the interim Batasang Pambansa, they shall not spend more
than sixty thousand pesos for their election campaign.

Verily, Section 51 of P.D. No. 1296 and Section 100 of the OEC made a categorical declaration as to
the allowable expenditure by any kind of candidate, whether a member of a political party
or an independent candidate. With the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 7166, a
distinction was made between a candidate without a political party and without support
from any political party and a candidate with political party and who receives support from
a political party. The former is allowed to spend the P5.00 cap while the latter is allowed
to spend the P3.00 cap.

In enacting these provisions, the legislature intended to ensure equality between and
among aspirants with deep pockets and those with less financial resources, 19 as the
legislature understood the apparent disparity between candidates who are members of
political parties and candidates who are not members of political parties. The political
advantages which necessarily goes with a candidate's membership in a political party
include the machinery,20 goodwill, representation, and resources of the political party. 21
As said advantages are not enjoyed by non-members of a political party, it is necessary
that an independent candidate, whose candidacy does not evoke sympathy from any
political party or organized group, be afforded equal chances. 22

Thus, in construing Section 13 of R.A. No. 7166, We treat the word "and" between
"without political party" and "without support from any political party" as conjunctive. It
means in addition to. The word "and", whether it is used to connect words, phrases or full
sentences, must be accepted as binding together and as relating to one another. 23
Applying the foregoing to Section 13, the proper construction is that the allowable
expenditure for candidates without any political party and without support from any
political party is P3.00.

After all, the word "support," which is explicitly provided by the law, is not solely limited to
financial aid. As aforementioned, political parties are designed to assist a candidate in his
desire to win the vote of the populace. Political parties use its machinery and its resources
to achieve such end. For example, political parties put up banners or give out leaflets
containing the names of its members for the public to consider. In doing so, these
organizations effectively support each candidate belonging to its unit.

The law is clear — the candidate must both be without a political party and without support
from any political party for the P5.00 cap to apply. In the absence of one, the exception
does not apply. Thus, We do not subscribe with petitioner's assertion that there is a room
 for different interpretation in terms of constructing the provision of Section 13 of R.A. No.
7166, as amended. To allow Salvador's contention is to deviate from the intention of the
legislature in enacting the law, as the same would find all candidates on equal footing,
whether member of a political party or not.

Coming to the present case, it is undisputed that the current number of registered voters
in San Jose City, Nueva Ecija is 91,889. Following the provisions of the law and its proper
interpretation, Salvador is entitled to spend the amount of P275,667.00, as he is allowed
to spend P3.00 for each registered voter. However, Salvador spent the amount of
P449,000.00 as declared in bis SOCE. Clearly, he exceeded the allowable limit provided
by law. As such, it constitutes an election offense under Article 26224 in relation to Article
26325 of the OEC.

Hence, the COMELEC En Banc did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or in excess of jurisdiction in ordering its Law Department to file the appropriate
information against Salvador.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Resolutions dated

November 2, 2015 and March 8, 2017 of the Commission on Elections En Banc in E.O.
Case Case No. 14-483 are AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C. J., Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Perlas-
Bernabe, Leonen, Caguioa, Martires, Reyes, Jr., and Gesmundo, JJ., concur.
Carpio, J., on official leave.
Jardeleza, J., on official leave.

Endnotes:

1Rollo, pp. 3-17.

2Penned by Chairman J. Andres D. Bautista, concurred in by Commissioners Christian
Robert S. Lim, Luie Tito F. Guia, Ma. Rowena Amelia V. Guanzon, Al A. Parreño, Arthur
D. Lim and Sheriff M. Abas; id. at 20-25.
3 Id. at 36-40.
4 Sec. 100. Limitations upon expenses of candidates. - No candidate shall spend for his
election campaign an aggregate amount exceeding one peso and fifty centavos for every
voter currently registered in the constituency where he filed his candidacy: Provided, That
the expenses herein referred to shall include those incurred or caused to be incurred by
the candidate, whether in cash or in kind, including the use, rental or hire of land, water
or aircraft, equipment, facilities, apparatus and paraphernalia used in the campaign:
 Provided, further, That where the land, water or aircraft, equipment, facilities, apparatus
and paraphernalia used is owned by the candidate, his contributor or supporter, the
Commission is hereby empowered to assess the amount commensurate with the
expenses for the use thereof, based on the prevailing rates in the locality and shall be
included in the total expenses incurred by the candidate.
5 Sec. 262. Other election offenses. - Violation of the provisions, or pertinent portions, of
the following sections of this Code shall constitute election offenses: Sections 9, 18, 74,
75, 76, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104,
105, 106 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 122, 123, 127, 128, 129, 132, 134, 135, 145, 148,
150, 152, 172, 173, 174, 178, 180, 182, 184, 185, 186, 189, 190, 191, 192, 194, 195, 196,
197, 198, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217,
218, 219, 220, 223, 229, 230, 231, 233, 234, 235, 236, 239 and 240.
6 Sec. 13. Authorized Expenses of Candidates and Political Parties. - The aggregate
amount that a candidate or registered political party may spend for election campaign
shall be as follows:

) For Candidates. - Ten pesos (P10.00) for President and Vice President; and for other candidates
Three Pesos (P3.00) for every voter currently registered in the constituency where
he filed his certificate of candidacy; Provided, That a candidate without any political
party and without support from any political party may be allowed to spend Five
Pesos (P5.00) for every such voter; and

) For political parties. - Five pesos (P5.00) for every voter currently registered in the constituency
or constituencies where it has official candidates.

Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, any contribution in cash or in kind to
any candidate or political party or coalition of parties for campaign purposes, duly reported
to the Commission shall not be subject to the payment of any gift tax.
7Rollo, p. 184.
8 Id. at 5.
9 Id. at 20-21.
10 Id. at 21.
11 Id.
12 Id.
 13 Id. at 22.
14 Id. at 20-25.
15 Id. at 25.
16 Id. at 26-32.
17 Id. at 36-40.
18 Id. at 40.
19Ejercito v. Hon. COMELEC, et al., 748 Phil. 205, 279 (2014).
20Occeña v. COMELEC, 212 Phil. 368, 377 (1984).
21See Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen in Atong
Paglaum v. COMELEC, 707 Phil. 454 (2013).
22Imbong v. Ferrer, etc., et al., 146 Phil. 30, 55 (1970).
23Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Ariete, 624 Phil. 458, 467-468 (2010).
24Sec. 262. Other election offenses. - Violation of the provisions, or pertinent portions, of
the following sections of this Code shall constitute election offenses: Sections 9, 18, 74,
75, 76, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84,85,86,87,88, 89,95,96,97,98,99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105,
106 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 122, 123, 127, 128, 129, 132, 134, 135, 145, 148, 150,
152, 172, 173, 174, 178, 180, 182, 184, 185, 186, 189, 190, 191, 192, 194, 195, 196, 197,
198, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218,
219, 220, 223,229, 230, 231, 233, 234, 235, 236, 239 and 240.
25Sec. 263. Persons criminally liable. - The principals, accomplices, and accessories, as
defined in the Revised Penal Code, shall be criminally liable for election offenses. If the
one responsible be a political party or an entity, its president or head, the officials and
employees of the same, performing duties connected with the offense committed and its
members who may be principals, accomplices, or accessories shall be liable, in addition
to the liability of such party or entity.

EN BANC

G.R. No. 215847, January 12, 2016

GOV. EXEQUIEL B. JAVIER, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, CORNELIO P. ALDON,

AND RAYMUNDO T. ROQUERO, Respondents.

DECISION
BRION, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 in relation to Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, filed to challenge
the January 12, 2015 per curiam order of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC/The
Commission) en banc in SPA No. 13-254 (DC).1 The Commission granted the petition to
disqualify the petitioner Exequiel Javier and to annul his proclamation as the duly elected
governor of Antique.

THE ANTECEDENTS

On December 3, 1985, the Batasang Pambansa enacted the Omnibus Election Code
(Election Code)2Section 261(d) and (e) of this Code prescribe the following elements of
coercion as an election offense:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Section 261. Prohibited Acts. -The following shall be guilty of an election offense: x x x

(d) Coercion of subordinates. -

(1) Any public officer, or any officer of any public or private corporation or association, or
any head, superior, or administrator of any religious organization, or any employer or
landowner who coerces or intimidates or compels, or in any manner influence, directly or
indirectly, any of his subordinates or members or parishioners or employees or house
helpers, tenants, overseers, farm helpers, tillers, or lease holders to aid, campaign or vote
for or against any candidate or any aspirant for the nomination or selection of candidates.

(2) Any public officer or any officer of any commercial, industrial, agricultural, economic
or social enterprise or public or private corporation or association, or any head, superior
or administrator of any religious organization, or any employer or landowner who
dismisses or threatens to dismiss, punishes or threatens to punish by reducing his salary,
wage or compensation, or by demotion, transfer, suspension, separation,
excommunication, ejectment, or causing him annoyance in the performance of his job or
in his membership, any subordinate member or affiliate, parishioner, employee or house
helper, tenant, overseer, farm helper, tiller, or lease holder, for disobeying or not
complying with any of the acts ordered by the former to aid, campaign or vote for or
against any candidate, or any aspirant for the nomination or selection of candidates.

(e) Threats, intimidation, terrorism, use of fraudulent device or other forms of coercion. -
Any person who, directly or indirectly, threatens, intimidates or actually causes, inflicts or
produces any violence, injury, punishment, damage, loss or disadvantage upon any
person or persons or that of the immediate members of his family, his honor or property,
or uses any fraudulent device or scheme to compel or induce the registration or refraining
from registration of any voter, or the participation in a campaign or refraining or desistance
from any campaign, or the casting of any vote or omission to vote, or any promise of such
registration, campaign, vote, or omission therefrom, (emphases supplied)cralawlawlibrary
Coercion, as an election offense, is punishable by imprisonment of not less than one year
but not more than six years.3 Notably, Section 68 of the Election Code provides that the
Commission may administratively disqualify a candidate who violates Section 261(d) or
(e).

On February 20, 1995, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7890 amending the definition
of Grave Coercion under the Revised Penal Code.4 It increased the penalty for coercion
committed in violation of a person's right to suffrage to prision mayor. Further, Section 3
of R.A. 7890 expressly repealed Section 26, paragraphs (d)(l) and (2) of the Election
Code.

On April 3, 2012, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 93855 fixing the calendar of activities
for the May 2013 elections. The resolution set the election period from January 13, 2013
until June 12, 2013.

On September 3, 2012, Valderrama Municipal Vice-Mayor Christopher B. Maguad filed

an administrative complaint for Gross Misconduct/Dereliction of Duty and Abuse of
Authority against Valderrama Mayor Mary Joyce U. Roquero (Mayor Roquero). This
complaint was docketed as Administrative Case No. 05-2012.

On November 9, 2012, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) issued Resolution No. 291-
2012 recommending to Antique Governor Exequiel Javier (Gov. Javier) the preventive
suspension of Mayor Roquero.

On November 21, 2012, Mayor Roquero filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 12, Antique, against Gov. Javier and the members of the SP to
restrain them from proceeding with Administrative Case No. 05-2012. The petition was
docketed as Special Civil Action No. 12-11-86.

The case was re-raffled to the RTC, Branch 11 which issued a writ of preliminary
injunction.

Gov. Javier, Vice-Governor Dimamay, and the members of the SP filed a petition for
certiorari with urgent prayer for TRO and preliminary injunction before the CA, docketed
as CA-G.R. SP-07307.

On December 18, 2012, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 95816 prohibiting any public
official from suspending any elective provincial, city, municipal, or barangay officer during
the election period for the May 13, 2013 elections. This resolution implements Section
261 (x)7 of the Election Code.

On January 15, 2013, the CA issued a TRO in CA-G.R. SP-07307.

On January 16, 2013, the RTC, Branch 11 promulgated its judgment granting certiorari
and prohibition. It ordered the SP to cease and desist from further proceeding with
Administrative Case No. 05-2012. It likewise ordered Gov. Javier to refrain from
implementing SP Resolution No. 291-2012 and from preventively suspending Mayor
Roquero.

On January 23, 2013, Gov. Javier issued Executive Order No. 003, S. 2013, preventively
suspending Mayor Roquero for thirty (30) days.

On February 7, 2013, the SP of Antique issued a decision finding Mayor Roquero guilty
of Grave Misconduct in relation with Section 3(e) of R. A. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, and Grave Abuse of Authority in relation with Section 5(e) of R.A. No. 6713.
The SP suspended her for four (4) months.

Mayor Roquero filed an Election Offense complaint against Gov. Javier for violating
Section 261(x) of the Election Code. The case was filed before the COMELEC Law
Department and docketed as Election Offense Case (EOC) No. 13-025.

Meanwhile (or on March 15, 2013), the CA granted the writ of preliminary injunction filed
by Gov. Javier, et al., in CA-G.R. SP-07307. It enjoined Judge Nery Duremdes of the
RTC, Branch 11 from conducting further proceedings in SPL Civil Action No. 12-11-86.

On March 22, 2013, private respondents Cornelio P. Aldon (Aldon) and Raymundo T.
Roquero (Roquero) also filed a petition for disqualification before the Commission against
Gov. Javier, Vice-Governor Rosie A. Dimamay, and the other members of the SP. The
case was docketed as COMELEC Special Action (SPA) No. 13-254 (DC.)

Aldon and Roquero sought to disqualify Gov. Javier and the other incumbent officials from
running in the 2013 elections on the ground that the latter committed the election offenses
of Coercion of Subordinates [Sec. 261(d)] and Threats, Intimidation, Terrorism x x x or
Other Forms of Coercion [Sec. 261(e)] by suspending Mayor Roquero. They alleged that
the suspension was political harassment calculated to intimidate the Roqueros into
backing out of the 2013 elections.8

On April 29, 2013, the Clerk of the Commission conducted a conference hearing between
the parties.

On April 30, 2013, Gov. Javier (together with the SP Members) filed a motion to dismiss
with answer ex abundante ad cautelam.

After the May 13, 2013 Elections, only Gov. Javier and SP Members Tobias M. Javier,
Edgar D. Denosta, Teopisto C. Estaris, Jr., and Victor R. Condez were proclaimed
winners. Hence, the Commission considered the disqualification cases against the losing
candidates moot.

On October 3, 2014, the COMELEC Second Division issued a resolution in SPA No. 13-
254 (DC) disqualifying Gov. Javier and annulling his proclamation as the Governor of
 Antique. The resolution was penned by Commissioner Elias R. Yusoph.

The COMELEC held that the preventive suspension of Mayor Roquero under Executive
Order No. 003 violated the election period ban because it was not for the purpose of
applying the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. It also considered the Commission's
findings in EOC No. 13-025 that there was substantial evidence showing that Gov. Javier
acted in bad faith when he suspended Mayor Roquero as a form of punishment for
opposing him.9

The COMELEC ruled that Gov. Javier's act of preventively suspending Mayor Roquero
during the election period ban fell within the contemplation of Section 261 (d) of the
Election Code, which is a ground for disqualification under Section 68. It held that while
Section 261(d) of the Election Code was repealed by Republic Act No. 7890, it did not
remove coercion "as a ground per se for disqualification under [Section] 68." In fact, R.A.
7890 made Coercion (an election offense) a felony with a higher penalty. 10 The
COMELEC added that the general repealing clause of R.A. No. 7890 cannot impliedly
repeal Section 68 because the latter was "not absolutely and irreconcilably incompatible
with Article 286."11

Commissioner Luie Tito F. Guia dissented from the resolution. Commissioner Guia
reasoned that the legal basis to dismiss Gov. Javier no longer exists because Section 3
of Republic Act No. 7890 had repealed Section 261(d) of the Election Code.
Commissioner Arthur D. Lim took no part in the vote because he did not participate in the
deliberations.

With the votes tied at 1-1-1 (one voted to grant, one dissenting, and one not participating),
the case failed to obtain the necessary majority. Consequently on October 14, 2014, the
COMELEC Second Division issued an order elevating the case to the en bane for its
disposition.12

The Commission en banc agreed, as a matter of internal arrangement, to submit their

respective opinions explaining their respective votes or their concurrence with either
Commissioner Yusoph or Commissioner Guia.

Three (3) Commissioners concurred with Commissioner Yusoph: Chairman Sixto

Brillantes, Jr., Commissioner Lucenito Tagle, and Commissioner Arthur Lim.
Commissioner Christian Robert Lim joined Commissioner Guia's dissent. Commissioner
Al A. Parreno did not participate in the vote as he was away on official business. Thus,
the vote was 4-2-1 in favor of disqualification; in a per curiam order promulgated on
January 12, 2015, the Commission en banc disqualified Gov. Javier and annulled his
proclamation as the governor of Antique.

On January 20, 2015, Gov. Javier filed the present petition for certiorari under Rule 65 in
relation with Rule 64 of the Rules of Court.

THE PETITION
 The petitioner argues that the Commission en banc committed grave abuse of discretion
because: (1) its January 12, 2015 order was arrived at on the basis of an "internal
arrangement; and (2) the order did not obtain a majority vote because Commissioner
Arthur Lim should not have been allowed to participate.

The petitioner also asserts that the Commission erred in ruling that R.A. 7890 did not
remove Section 261(d) of the Election Code as a ground for administrative
disqualification. Finally, the petitioner maintains that the Commission unconstitutionally
set the Election Period for the May 13, 2013 elections in violation of Article IX-C, Section
9 of the Constitution, Sec. 62 (c) of the Local Government Code, and Section 8 of
Republic Act No. 7056.13

In its comment on the petition, COMELEC, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), counters that it did not abuse its discretion in issuing the January 12, 2015 order
disqualifying Gov. Javier. The Commission insists that the procedure observed during the
proceedings was not infirm and that there was no legal impediment for Commissioner
Arthur Lim to participate in the en banc vote.

On the alleged errors of law, the Commission insists that there was legal basis to
disqualify Gov. Javier under both Sections 261 (d) and (e) of the Election Code; the repeal
of Section 261(d) by R.A. 7890 did not ipso facto remove coercion as a ground for
disqualification under Section 68 of the Election Code. It added that Section 261(e), on
the other hand, has not been repealed, either expressly or impliedly.

Finally, the Commission asserts that COMELEC Resolution No. 9581 fixing the date of
the election period is expressly authorized by Article IX, Section 9 of the Constitution and
Section 8 of Republic Act No. 7056.

Based on these submissions, the following issues now confront the

Court:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

I.

Whether the Commission gravely abused its discretion when it issued Resolution No.
9581 fixing the 2013 election period from January 13, 2013 until June 12, 2013, for the
purpose of determining administrative and criminal liability for election offenses.

II.

Whether the Commission erred in ruling that R.A. No. 7890 did not remove coercion as a
ground for disqualification under Section 68 of the Election Code.

III.
 Whether the Commission en banc committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing its
Order dated January 12, 2015, disqualifying Gov. Javier and annulling his proclamation
as the governor of Antique.
cralawlawlibrary

OUR RULING:

After due consideration, we resolve to grant the petition.

The COMELEC is expressly

authorized to fix a different
date of the election period.

The petitioner contends that the election period for the reckoning of administrative and
criminal liabilities under election laws should always be the same-90 days before and 30
days after an election-fixed in Article IX-C, Section 9 of the Constitution and Section 8 of
Republic Act No. 7056.14 He argues that the Commission's authority to fix the pre-election
period refers only to the period needed to properly administer and conduct orderly
elections. The petitioner argues that by extending the period for incurring criminal liability
beyond the 90-day period, the Commission encroached on the legislature's prerogative
to impute criminal and administrative liability on mala prohibita acts. Therefore,
COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9385 and 9581 were issued ultra vires.

We do not find this argument meritorious.

No less than the Constitution authorizes the Commission to fix the dates of the election
period. Article IX-C, Section 9 provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Section 9. Unless otherwise fixed by the Commission in special cases, the election period shall
commence ninety days before the day of election and shall end thirty days
thereafter.15cralawlawlibrary

Congress, through the Election Code, explicitly recognizes this

authority:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Sec. 3. Election and campaign periods. - Unless otherwise fixed in special cases by the Commission
on Elections, which hereinafter shall be referred to as the Commission, the election period
shall commence ninety days before the day of the election and shall end thirty days
thereafter.16 (emphases supplied)cralawlawlibrary
Evidently, the 120-day period is merely the default election period. The Commission is
not precluded from fixing the length and the starting date of the election period to ensure
free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections. This is not merely a statutory but
a constitutionally granted power of the Commission.

Contrary to the petitioner's contention, the Commission's act of fixing the election period
does not amount to an encroachment on legislative prerogative. The Commission did not
prescribe or define the elements of election offenses. Congress already defined them
through the Omnibus Election Code, the Fair Elections Act, and other pertinent election
laws.

As defined by Congress, some election offenses and prohibited acts can only be
committed during the election period. An element of these offenses (i.e., that it be
committed during the election period) is variable, as election periods are not affixed to a
specific and permanent date. Nevertheless, the definition of the offense is already
complete. By fixing the date of the election period, the Commission did not change what
the offense is or how it is committed. There is thus no intrusion into the legislative sphere.

There is also no merit in the petitioner's argument that the extended election period only
applies to pre-election activities other than the determination of administrative or criminal
liability for violating election laws. Neither the law nor the Constitution authorizes the use
of two distinct election periods for the same election. The law does not distinguish
between election offenses and other pre-election activities in terms of the applicable
election period. Where the law does not distinguish, neither should this Court.

The Alleged Lack of Due Process

We find the petitioner's claim - that the Commission committed grave abuse of discretion
since there was no preliminary investigation as required under Section 265 of the
Omnibus Election Code - to be misplaced.17

SPA No. 13-254 was an administrative proceeding for disqualification and not a criminal
prosecution of an election offense. The due process requirements and the procedures for
these are not the same. Section 265 of the Election Code only applies to criminal
prosecutions. Disqualification cases are summary in nature and governed by Rule 25 of
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.

There is likewise no merit in the petitioner's allegation that he was denied due process
because the Commission adjudicated the issue without conducting any subsequent
hearings and without requiring the submission of position papers or memoranda,
notarized witness affidavits, or other documentary evidence aside from the annexes
included in the petition and the answer.

Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial
sense.18 A formal hearing is not always necessary and the observance of technical rules
 of procedure is not strictly applied in administrative proceedings.19 The essence of
administrative due process is the right to be heard and to be given an opportunity to
explain one's side.20 Where the Commission hears both sides and considers their
contentions, the requirements of administrative due process are complied with.

As we held in Lanot v. Commission on Elections:21chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The electoral aspect of a disqualification case determines whether the offender should be disqualified
from being a candidate or from holding office. Proceedings are summary in character and
require only clear preponderance of evidence. An erring candidate may be disqualified
even without prior determination of probable cause in a preliminary investigation. The
electoral aspect may proceed independently of the criminal aspect, and vice versa.

The criminal aspect of a disqualification case determines whether there is probable cause
to charge a candidate for an election offense. The prosecutor is the COMELEC, through
its Law Department, which determines whether probable cause exists. If there is probable
cause, the COMELEC, through its Law Department, files the criminal information before
the proper court. Proceedings before the proper court demand a full-blown hearing and
require proof beyond reasonable doubt to convict. A criminal conviction shall result in the
disqualification of the offender, which may even include disqualification from holding a
future public office.
cralawlawlibrary

Commissioner Arthur Lim's Participation in the En Bane Voting

The petitioner further argues that the Commission committed grave abuse of discretion
by allowing Commissioner Arthur D. Lim to participate in the proceedings before the
Commission en banc. The petitioner maintains that because Commissioner Arthur Lim
took no part in the proceedings before the COMELEC Second Division, then he should
have inhibited from the en banc proceedings pursuant to the ruling in Estrella v.
COMELEC.22 If we disregard Commissioner Arthur Lim's vote, then the Commission
would have failed to attain the necessary majority vote of all the members of the
Commission.

The petitioner's reliance on Estrella is misplaced because the facts of this case are
different from those of the present case. Estrella involved two related election cases
between the same parties: an election protest and an action for certiorari. One party
moved for Commissioner Lantion's inhibition which the Commission denied. However,
Commissioner Lantion later inhibited himself from the certiorari proceeding and was
substituted by another Commissioner.23 The substitution order was also adopted in the
election protest case. When the election protest was elevated to the COMELEC en banc,
Commissioner Lantion participated in the deliberations and voted despite his prior
inhibition. This Court granted certiorari and held that Commissioner Lantion's piecemeal
voluntary inhibition was illegal and unethical.
 In the present case, Commissioner Arthur Lim did not inhibit from the proceedings. If the
Commissioner had inhibited, there would have been a need to replace him pursuant to
Rule 3, Section 6 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure24 (as what happened in Estrella
where there was an issuance of an order designating Commissioner Borra as
Commissioner Lantion's substitute). Commissioner Arthur Lim only abstained from voting;
he did not participate in the deliberations. When the Commission en banc, as a matter of
internal arrangement, agreed among themselves to submit their own opinion explaining
their respective vote or merely their concurrence with either Commissioner Elias R.
Yusoph or Commissioner Luie Tito F. Guia's position on the matter, no legal or ethical
impediment existed preventing him (Commissioner Arthur Lim) from subsequently
participating in the deliberations and from casting his vote.

COMELEC's Internal Arrangement

The petitioner also maintains that the Commission gravely abused its discretion when it
set aside its own rules and resolved the case through an "internal arrangement." He
submits that the Commission should have waited for the assigned ponente to write an
opinion before agreeing to vote based on the positions of Commissioner Yusoph and
Commissioner Guia. The petitioner also claims that the assailed Order is a "midnight
decision" and cites the absence of a promulgation date on the front page and of a
certification signed by the Chairman as procedural infirmities.

The petitioner clearly refers to Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure which
states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Part IV
Rule 18 - Decisions

Sec. 1 Procedure in Making Decisions. - The conclusions of the Commission in any case
submitted to it for decision en banc or in Division shall be reached in consultation before
the case is assigned by raffle to a Member for the writing of the opinion of the Commission
or the Division and a certification to this effect signed by the Chairman or the Presiding
Commissioner, as the case may be, shall be incorporated in the decision. Any member
who took no part, dissented, or abstained from a decision or resolution must state the
reason therefor.

Every decision shall express therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which
it is based, (Emphasis supplied)
cralawlawlibrary

To our mind, the essence of this provision is: (1) that decisions of the Commission,
whether in Division or en banc, must be reached in consultation; and (2) that the decisions
must state their factual and legal bases. Moreover, Rule 18, Section 1 must be read
 together with the other provisions of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, particularly the
following related portions:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Rule 1 - Introductory Provisions

Sec. 3. Construction - These rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote the
effective and efficient implementation of the objectives of ensuring the holding of free,
orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections and to achieve just, expeditious and
inexpensive determination and disposition of every action and proceeding brought before
the Commission.

Sec. 4. Suspension of the Rules - In the interest of justice and in order to obtain speedy
disposition of all matters pending before the Commission, these rules or any portion
thereof may be suspended by the Commission.cralawlawlibrary

The COMELEC Rules specifically authorize the Commission to suspend the strict
application of its rules in the interest of justice and the speedy disposition of cases. In this
case, the Commission suspended Rule 18, Section 1. The Commission, as a body,
dispensed with the preparation of another ponencia and opted to vote on the legal
positions of Commissioners Yusoph and Guia. Nevertheless, the decision was evidently
reached through consultation. Then Chairman Sixto Brillantes, Jr., Commissioner
Lucenito Tagle, and Commissioner Arthur Lim concurred with Commissioner Yusoph.
Commissioner Christian Robert Lim joined Commissioner Guia's dissent. Chairman
Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioner Arthur Lim also wrote separate concurring opinions. The
Court does not see any arbitrariness or infirmity in this internal arrangement that would
have deprived the petitioner of due process.

Moreover, the Commission resorted to this arrangement because, as the petitioner

pointed out, three Commissioners were retiring soon. There was a need to resolve the
cases because the impending vacancies would have resulted in further delay. Contrary
to the petitioner's insinuations, "midnight decisions" are not illegal. Judges and other
quasi-judicial officers cannot sit back, relax, and refuse to do their work just because they
are nearing retirement or are near the end of their term. As civil servants, they are
expected to diligently carry out their duties until their separation from service. Thus, the
Commission's suspension of its rules and use of an internal arrangement to expedite its
internal proceedings is not at all unusual in collegial bodies. We note that the vote was
divided and dissents were filed, thereby indicating the absence of any malicious departure
from the usual procedures in arriving at the Commission's ruling on the case.

Absence of a Promulgated Date and Failure to Serve Advance Copy

With respect to the absence of a promulgation date on the first page of the assailed order,
this Court directs the petitioner's attention to the last page stating that the Order was
"Given this 12th day of January 2015, Manila, Philippines."25 Promulgation is the process
 by which a decision is published, officially announced, made known to the public, or
delivered to the clerk of court for filing, coupled with notice to the parties or their counsel. 26
The order was evidently promulgated on January 12, 2015.

The Commission does not deny that it failed to serve an advance copy of the order to the
petitioner as required under Rule 18, Section 527 of its Rules. But as we previously held
in the cases of Lindo v. COMELEC28 and Pimping v. COMELEC,29 this kind of procedural
lapse does not affect the validity of the order and is insufficient to warrant the grant of a
writ of certiorari in the absence of any grave abuse of discretion prejudicing the rights of
the parties.

Repeal of Section 261 (d) of Batas Pambansa Big. 881 by Republic Act No. 7890

No less than the Constitution empowers the Commission to decide all questions affecting
elections except those involving the right to vote.30 It is the sole arbiter of all issues
involving elections. Hence, unless tainted with grave abuse of discretion, simple errors of
judgment committed by COMELEC cannot be reviewed even by this Court. 31

An error of judgment is one that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction; 32
they only involve errors in the court or tribunal's appreciation of the facts and the law. 33
An error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court without
or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.34

A review of the October 3, 2014 COMELEC Second Division resolution (penned by

Commissioner Yusoph), however, showed that the main thrust of this resolution -to which
four Commissioners concurred in when the case was elevated to the en bane - is faulty.35
It considered the repeal of Section 261(d) by R.A. No.7890 to be an implied one, which
is contrary to the wordings of R.A. 7890.

For clarity, we reproduce the pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 7890,

thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

SECTION 1. Article 286, Section Three, Chapter Two, Title Nine of Act No. 3815, as amended, is
hereby further amended to read as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

"ART. 286. Grave Coercions. - The penalty of prision correccional and a line not
exceeding Six thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, without any
authority of law, shall, by means of violence, threats or intimidation, prevent another from
doing something not prohibited by law, or compel him to do something against his will,
whether it be right or wrong.

"If the coercion be committed in violation of the exercise of the right of suffrage, or for the
purpose of compelling another to perform any religious act, to prevent him from exercising
such right or from so doing such act, the penalty next higher in degree shall be imposed."
 SEC. 2. Section 261, Paragraphs (d)(l) and (2), Article XXII of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881
is hereby repealed.

SEC. 3. All other election laws, decrees, executive orders rules and regulations, or parts
thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed.

xxxx

cralawlawlibrary

A repeal may be express or implied.36 An express repeal is one wherein a statute

declares, usually in its repealing clause, that a particular and specific law, identified by its
number or title, is repealed.37 An implied repeal, on the other hand, transpires when a
substantial conflict exists between the new and the prior laws. In the absence of an
express repeal, a subsequent law cannot be construed as repealing a prior law unless an
irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and the old
laws.38

In the present case, it is clear that R.A. No. 7890 expressly repealed Section 261,
paragraphs (d)(l) and (2) of the Omnibus Election Code. The COMELEC Second
Division's October 3, 2014 resolution, however, treated this repeal as merely an implied
one. Commissioner Yusoph reasoned out as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Moreover, the general repealing clause in Section 3 of RA 7890 cannot impliedly repeal Section 68
because the latter is not absolutely and irreconcilably incompatible with Article 286, as
amended by RA 7890. Meaning, a case for disqualification due to coercion under Section
68 can very well stand apart from the criminal case for coercion under Article 286, as
amended. This is so because Section 68 involves an administrative proceeding intended
to disqualify a candidate whereas Article 286, supra, involves a criminal proceeding
intended to penalize coercion. Both laws, therefore, can be given effect without nullifying
the other, hence the inapplicability of implied repeal.

To firm up our stance against implied repeal of coercion as a ground for disqualification,
the following pronouncements of the Supreme Court are
guiding:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

"Implied repeal by irreconcilable inconsistency takes place when the two statutes cover
the same subject matter; they are so clearly inconsistent and incompatible with each other
that they cannot be reconciled or harmonized; and both cannot be given effect, that is,
that one law cannot be enforced without nullifying the other."

"Well-settled is the rule is statutory construction that implied repeals are disfavored. In
order to effect a repeal by implication, the latter statute must be so irreconcilably
inconsistent and repugnant with the existing law that they cannot be made to reconcile
and stand together. The clearest case possible must be made before the inference of
 implied repeal may be drawn, for inconsistency is never presumed, x x x
x"39cralawlawlibrary

We point out that this resolution and the dissenting opinion of Commissioner Guia
became the basis of the internal arrangement reached upon by the Commission en banc
whereby the commissioners agreed to submit their respective opinions explaining their
votes or their concurrence with either Commissioner Yusoph or Guia.

As earlier stated, the vote was 4-2-1 in favor of disqualification; in a per curiam order
promulgated on January 12, 2015, the Commission en banc disqualified Gov. Javier and
annulled his proclamation as the governor of Antique. Chairman Brillantes and
Commissioner Arthur Lim wrote their own opinions concurring with the position of
Commissioner Yusoph, while Commissioner Tagle submitted his vote concurring with the
opinions of Commissioner Yusoph and Chairman Brillantes.

In his Separate Opinion, Chairman Brillantes agreed with Commissioner Yusoph that the
repeal of Section 261(d) by R.A. No. 7890 was merely implied, and made the following
disquisition:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

xxxx

The Supreme Court, in a long line of cases, has constantly disfavored and struck down
the use of repeal by implication. Pursuant to jurisprudence, well entrenched is the rule
that an implied repeal is disfavored. The apparently conflicting provisions of a law or two
laws should be harmonized as much as possible, so that each shall be effective. For a
law to operate to repeal another law, the two laws must actually be inconsistent. The
former must be so repugnant as to be irreconcilable with the latter act. Stated plainly, a
petition for disqualification on the ground of coercion shall be taken differently and
distinctly from coercion punishable under the RPC for the two can very well stand
independently from each other, xxx Therefore, unless proven that the two are inconsistent
and would render futile the application and enforcement of the other, only then that a
repeal by implication will be preferred, x x x x40cralawlawlibrary

A law that has been expressly repealed ceases to exist and becomes inoperative from
the moment the repealing law becomes effective.41 The discussion on implied repeals by
the Yusoph resolution, (and the concurring opinion of Chairman Brillantes, Jr.), including
the concomitant discussions on the absence of irreconcilable provisions between the two
laws, were thus misplaced. The harmonization of laws can only be had when the repeal
is implied, not when it is express, as in this case.

The COMELEC's reasoning that coercion remains to be a ground for disqualification

under Section 68 of the Election Code despite the passage of R.A. No. 7890 is erroneous.
To the point of our being repetitive, R.A. No. 7890 expressly repealed Section 261 d(l)
 and (2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, rendering these provisions inoperative. The effect
of this repeal is to remove Section 261(d) from among those listed as ground for
disqualification under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code.

In his Memorandum/Concurring Opinion, Commissioner Arthur Lim stated that the petition
for disqualification is anchored not only on violation of Section 261 (d), but also on the
violation of Section 261(e) in relation to Section 68 of the OEC. We point out, however,
that the COMELEC Second Division's October 3, 2014 resolution in SPA No. 13-254
(disqualifying Gov. Javier and annulling his proclamation as the Governor of Antique) was
premised solely on violation of Section 261(d) of the OEC; it did not find that Gov. Javier
— even by substantial evidence —violated the provisions of Section 261(e). For clarity
and accuracy, we quote the pertinent portions of the COMELEC's (Second Division)
October 3, 2014 resolution:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Ineluctably, the act of Gov. Javier in preventively suspending Mayor Roquero during the Election period
ban falls within the contemplation of Section 261(d) of the Election Code which is a ground
for disqualification under Section 68, Election Code. That is, Gov. Javier issued Executive
Order No. 003 suspending Mayor Roquero to coerce, intimidate, compel, or influence the
latter to collaborate with or campaign for the former, or to punish the latter for having
manifested political opposition against the former. For that, he must be
disqualified.42cralawlawlibrary

With the express repeal of Section 261(d), the basis for disqualifying Javier no longer
existed. As we held in Jalosjos, Jr. v. Commission on Elections,43 [t]he jurisdiction of the
COMELEC to disqualify candidates is limited to those enumerated in Section 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code. All other election offenses are beyond the ambit of COMELEC
jurisdiction. They are criminal and not administrative in nature.44 Pursuant to sections 265
and 268 of the Omnibus Election Code, the power of the COMELEC is confined to the
conduct of preliminary investigation on the alleged election offenses for the purpose of
prosecuting the alleged offenders before the regular courts of justice. 45

There is grave abuse of discretion justifying the issuance of the writ of certiorari when
there is such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction,46 where power is exercised arbitrarily or in a despotic manner by reason of
passion, prejudice, or personal hostility amounting to an evasion of positive duty, or to
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion
and hostility.47

To our mind, the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it disqualified Gov. Javier
based on a provision of law that had already been expressly repealed. Its stubborn
insistence that R.A. No. 7890 merely impliedly repealed Section 261(d) despite the clear
wordings of the law, amounted to an arbitrary and whimsical exercise of judgment.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby GRANT the petition and SET ASIDE the
 January 12, 2015 per curiam order of the Commission on Elections en banc in SPA No.
13-254 (DC).

SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza Reyes,
Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
Velasco, Jr., Peralta, Bersamin, and Del Castillo, JJ., no part.

Endnotes:

1Rollo, pp. 10-42, 51-55, 63-82.

2 Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 881, (1985).
3 Sec. 264, Election Code.
4An Act Amending Article 286, Section Three, Chapter Two, Title Nine of Act No. 3815,
as Amended, Otherwise Known as the Revised Penal Code.
5Calendar of Activities and Periods of Certain Prohibited Acts in Connection with the May
13, 2013 National and Local Elections.
6 In the Matter of Enforcing the Prohibitions Against Appointment or Hiring of New
Employees, Creating or Filling of New Positions, Giving Any Salary Increase or
Transferring or Detailing Any Officer or Employee in the Civil Service and Suspension of
Elective Local Officials, in Connection with the May 13, 2013 Automated Synchronized
National, Local and ARMM Regional Elections.
7 Section 261. Prohibited Acts - the following shall be guilty of an election offense:

xxx

(x) Suspension of elective provincial, city, municipal or barangay officer -The provisions
of law to the contrary notwithstanding during the election period, any public official who
suspends, without prior approval of the Commission, any elective provincial, city,
municipal or barangay officer, unless said suspension be for purposes of applying the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act in relation to the suspension and removal of elective
officials; in which case the provision of this section shall be inapplicable.
8Aldon and Roquero were members of the United Nationalist Alliance (UNA) Coalition
while Gov. Javier and the SP members belonged to the Liberal Party. Aldon was the
candidate for governor running against Gov. Javier. On the other hand, Roquero, the
husband of suspended Mayor Roquero, was running against Congressman Paolo
Everardo S. Javier, the son of Gov. Javier, for a seat in the House of Representatives.
9Rollo, pp. 79-80.
10 Id. at 80.
11 Id. at 81.
12 Pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 9711 promulgated on May 28, 2013, in relation
to COMELEC Resolution No. 9145.
13An Act Providing for the National and Local Elections in 1992, Paving the Way for
Synchronized and Simultaneous Elections Beginning 1995, and Authorizing
Appropriations Therefor (1991).
14Rollo, p. 41.
15 Art. IX-C, Section 9, PHIL. CONST.
16 This provision would be subsequently reproduced in Republic Act No. 7056 (1991).
17 Sec. 265. Prosecution. - The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal
officers, have the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election
offenses punishable under this Code, and to prosecute the same. The Commission may
avail of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government: Provided, however,
That in the event that the Commission fails to act on any complaint within four months
from filing, the complainant may file the complaint with the office of the fiscal or with the
Ministry of Justice for proper investigation and prosecution, if warranted.
18Vivo v. PAGCOR, G.R. No. 187854, November 12, 2013, 709 SCRA 276, 281.
19Id. at 281 citing Imperial, Jr. v. GSIS, G.R. No. 191224, October 4, 2011, 658 SCRA
497, 505.
20Ombudsman v. Reyes, G.R. No. 170512, October 5, 2011, 658 SCRA 626, 640.
21 537 Phil. 332, 359-360 (2006).
22 G.R. No. 160465. April 28, 2004, 428 SCRA 315, 320.
23Commissioner Ressureccion Borra was designated in place of Commissioner Ralph
Lantion via an Order dated August 25, 2002.
24RULES GOVERNING PLEADINGS, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE BEFORE IT OR
ANY OF ITS OFFICES (1993).
Sec. 6. Change in Composition; Substitution. - The composition of a Division may be changed by the
Chairman of the Commission whenever necessary, Provided that no change shall be
made more than once every three (3) months; Provided Moreover, that notice thereof in
writing shall be furnished the parties in cases pending before the Division concerned.
Whenever there is a vacancy in a Division because a member inhibits himself, is absent,
or is disqualified from sitting in a case, or when a division has only two (2) regular
members, the Chairman may appoint a substitute Commissioner, or the Chairman himself
may sit as substitute or third member, and in that event he shall preside.
25Rollo, p. 55.
26Lindo v. COMELEC, 271 Phil. 844, 851 (1991) citing Neria v. Commissioner of
Immigration, 132 Phil. 276,284(1968).
27 Sec. 5. Promulgation - The promulgation of a decision or resolution of the Commission
or a Division shall be made on a date previously fixed, of which notice shall be served in
advance upon the parties or their attorneys personally or by registered mail or by
telegram.
28Supra note 26.
29 224 Phil. 326, 359 (1985).
30 Article IX-C, §2(3), PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION.
31See this Court's en bane ruling involving the review of Commission on Audit cases in
Reblora v. Armed Forces of the Philippines, G.R. No. 195842, June 18, 2013, 698 SCRA
727, 735.
32Fernando v. Vasquez, G.R. No. L-26417, January 30, 1970, 31 SCRA 288, 292.
33Villareal v. Aliga, G.R. No. 166995, January 13, 2014. 713 SCRA 52, 73 citing People
v. Hon. Tria-Tirona, 502 Phil. 31, 39 (2005).
34 Id.
35The COMELEC en bane's January 12, 2015 order essentially summarized the positions
and votes of the Chairman and the Commissioners en route to granting the petition for
disqualification.
36 See Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Solidbank Corp., 462 Phil. 96, 119 (2003).
37Penera v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 181613, September 11, 2009, 599 SCRA
609, 639- 640.
38 See Bank of Commerce v. Planters Development Bank, G.R. No. 154470-71,
 September 24, 2012, 681 SCRA 521, 545.
39Rollo, p. 81, emphasis ours.
40 Id. at 57.
41 See JG Summit Holdings, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 458 Phil. 581, 609-610 (2003).
42Rollo, p. 80.
43G.R. No. 193237, October 9, 2012, 683 SCRA 1, 29-30, citing Codilla, Sr. v. de
Venecia, 442 Phil. 139, 177-178, 393 SCRA 639. 670 (2002).
44 Id.
45See Blanco v. COMELEC, et al, 577 Phil. 622, 633 (2008), citing Codilla v. De Venecia,
G.R. No. 150605. December 10, 2002, 393 SCRA 639.
46Abad Santos v. Province of Tarlac, 67 Phil. 480 (1939); Tan v. People, 88 Phil. 609
(1951); Pajo v.Ago, 108 Phil. 905(1960).
47Tavera-Luna, Inc. v. Nable, 67 Phil. 341 (1939); Alafriz v. Nable, 72 Phil. 278 (1941);
Liwanag v. Castillo, 106 Phil. 375 (1959).

EN BANC

June 6, 2017

G.R. No. 226792

SOFRONIO B. ALBANIA, Petitioner

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS Promulgated: and EDGARDO A. TALLADO, Respondent

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Challenged in this petition for certiorari under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure is the
Resolution 1 dated August 24, 2016 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc which upheld the
Resolution 2 dated April 22, 2016 of the COMELEC Second Division dismissing the petition to deny due course
to or to cancel respondent Edgardo A. Tallado's Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for being filed out of time.

The facts are as follows:

In the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections, respondent Edgardo A. Tallado and Jesus O. Typoco were
both candidates for the position of Governor in Camarines Norte. After the counting and canvassing of votes,
Typoco was proclaimed as the winner. Respondent questioned Typoco's proclamation by filing with the
COMELEC, a petition for correction of a manifest error. The Petition was decided3 in respondent's favor on
March 5, 2010 and the latter assumed the position of Governor of Camarines Norte from March 22, 2010 to June
30, 2010, the end of the 2007-2010 term.

Respondent ran again in the 2010 4 and 2013 5 National and Local Elections where he won and served as
Governor of Camarines Norte, respectively.

On October 16, 2015, respondent filed his Certificate of Candidacy 6 as Governor of Camarines Norte in the May
9, 2016 National and Local elections

On November 13, 2015, petitioner, a registered voter of Poblacion Sta. Elena, Camarines Norte, filed a petition 7
for respondent's disqualification from running as Governor based on Rule 25 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9523
8 on two grounds: (1) he violated the three term limit I rule under Section 43 of RA No 7160, otherwise known as

the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC); and (2) respondent's suspension froni office for one year without
pay, together with its accessory penalties, after he was found guilty of oppression and grave abuse of authority in
the Ombudsman's Order9 dated October 2, 2015.

In his Verified Answer, respondent argued that since the petition was primarily based on his alleged violation of
the three-term limit rule, the same1 should have been filed as a petition to deny due course to or cancel
certificate of candidacy under Rule 23 of COMELEC Resolution 9523, in relation to Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code, as the ground cited affected a candidate's eligibility; that based on Section 23, the petition should
had been filed on November 10, 2015, but the petition was filed only on November 13, 2015, hence, the same
had already prescribed and must be dismissed. His suspension from office is also not a ground for a petition for
disqualification. On the substantive issues, he denied violating the three-term limit rule as he did not fully serve
three consecutive terms since he only served as Governor for the 2007 elections from March 22, 2010 to June
30, 2010.

On April 22, 2016, the COMELEC Second Division dismissed the petition for being filed out of time. It ruled that a
violation of the three-term limit rule and suspension from office as a result of an administrative case are not
grounds for disqualification of a candidate under the law; that the alleged violation of three-term limit rule is a
ground for ineligibility which constituted false material representation under Section 78 of the OEC; and such
petition must be filed within 25 days from the time of filing of the COC, which respondent failed to do.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration with the COMELEC En Banc, which dismissed the same in a
Resolution dated August 24, 2016.

The COMELEC En Banc echoed the Division's findings that the grounds relied upon by petitioner are not proper
for a petition for disqualification but one for denial of due course to or cancellation of respondent's COC, which
was filed out of time. It then continued to rule on the merits finding that respondent did not serve the full 2007-
2010 term as Governor of Camarines Norte, thus, cannot be considered as one term for purposes of counting
the three-term threshold; and that the ground for a candidate's disqualification referred to by Section 40 (b) of the
LGC is the actual removal from office as a result of an administrative case, and not mere suspension as imposed
by the Ombudsman.

Dissatisfied, petitioner is now before us in a petition for certiorari raising the following grounds, to wit: Whether or
not the respondent COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.: (1) in ruling
that the grounds relied upon are not proper grounds for a petition for disqualification; (2) in ruling that even if the
petition for disqualification is considered one for denial of due course to or cancellation of private respondent
Tallado's COC, the same is filed out of time; (3) in failing to rule that private respondent Tallado should be
disqualified pursuant to Section 43 of RA No. 7160 or the LGC; and (4) in failing to rule that private respondent
Tallado should be disqualified due to the Order dated October of the Ombudsman. 10

We find the petition without merit.

In a petition for certiorari under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the primordial issue to be
resolved is whether the respondent tribunal committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
ofjurisdiction in issuing the assailed resolution. 11 The term "grave abuse of discretion" is defined as a capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner
because of passion or hostility. 12 Grave abuse of discretion arises when a court or tribunal violates the
Constitution, the law or .existing jurisprudence. 13 and as a matter of policy, this Court will not interfere with the
resolutions of the Comelec unless it is shown that it had committed grave abuse of discretion. Thus, in the
absence of grave abuse of discretion, a Rule 64 petition will not prosper. 14

The grounds for disqualification of a candidate are found under Sections 12 and 68 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881,
as amended, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, as well as Section 40 of the
Local Government Code, which respectively provide:

SEC. 12. Disqualifications. Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or
has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for any offense for which he has
been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be
disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted
amnesty.

The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the declaration by
competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a period of
five years from his service or sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified.

xxxx

SEC. 68. Disqualifications. Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final
decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other material
consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (b)
committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of
that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96,
97 and 104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, subparagraph
6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any
person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any,
elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant
of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws.

xxxx

SECTION 40. Disqualifications - The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local
position:

(a) Those sentence by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an
offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after
serving sentence;

(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case; .

(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;

(d) Those with dual citizenship;

(e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or abroad;

(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside
abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and

(g) The insane or feeble-minded.

Petitioner filed the petition for disqualification of respondent on the grounds that he allegedly violated the three-
term limit rule provided under the Constitution and the LGC; and that he was suspended from office as a result of
an administrative case. Notably, however, a reading of the grounds enumerated under the above-quoted
provisions for a candidate's disqualification does not include the two grounds relied upon by petitioner. Thus, the
COMELEC Second Division was correct when it found that the petition was not based on any of the grounds for
disqualification as enumerated in the foregoing statutory provisions.

Respondent's suspension from office is indeed not a ground for a petition for disqualification as Section 40 (b)
clearly speaks of removal from office as a result of an administrative offense that would disqualify a candidate
from running for any elective local position. In fact, the penalty of suspension cannot be a bar to the candidacy of
the respondent so suspended as long as he meets the qualifications for the office as provided under Section
66(b) of R.A. No. 7160, to wit:

SEC. 66. Form and Notice of Decision. - x x x

(b) The penalty of suspension shall not exceed the unexpired term of the respondent or a period of six (6)
months for every administrative offense, nor shall said penalty be a bar to the candidacy of the respondent so
suspended as long as he meets the qualifications for the office.
While the alleged violation of the three-term limit rule is not a ground for a petition for disqualification, however,
the COMELEC Second Division found that it is an ineligibility which is a proper ground for a petition to deny due
course to or to cancel a Certificate of Candidacy under Section 78 of the OEC, hence considered the petition as
such.

The Constitution has vested in the COMELEC broad powers, involving not only the enforcement and
administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of elections, but also the resolution and
determination of election controversies. 15 It also granted the COMELEC the power and authority to promulgate
its rules of procedure, with the primary objective of ensuring the expeditious disposition of election cases. 16
Concomitant to such powers is the authority of the COMELEC to determine the true nature of the cases filed
before it. Thus, it examines the allegations of every pleading filed, obviously aware that in determining the nature
of the complaint or petition, its averments, rather than its title/caption, are the proper· gauges. 17

Since the petition filed was a petition to deny due course to or to cancel a certificate of candidacy, such petition
must be filed within 25 days from the time of filing of the COC, as provided under Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code. However, as the COMELEC found, the petition was filed beyond the reglementary period, and
dismissed the petition for being filed out time. The COMELEC En Banc affirmed such dismissal.

We agree.

The three-term limit rule is embodied in Section 8 of Article X of the Constitution, to wit:

Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by
law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his
service for the full term for which he was elected.

which is restated in Section 43 of the Local Government Code, thus:

Section 43. Term of Office. - (a) x x x

(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of
service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected.

Section 74 of the OEC provides that the certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing it is announcing
his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said office. The word "eligible" in Section 74
means having the right to run for elective public office, that is, having all the qualifications and none of the
ineligibilities to run for the public office. 20 And We had held 21 that a violation of the three-term limit rule is an
ineligibility which is a proper ground for a petition to deny due course to or to cancel a COC under Section 78 of
the Omnibus Election Code, to wit:

Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. - A verified petition seeking to deny
due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by the person exclusively on the ground that any
material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed
at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be
decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.

As the petition filed is indeed a petition under Section 78 of the OEC, the filing of the same must comply with the
period prescribed therein, i.e., the filing of the same must be made not later than twenty-five days from the time
of the filing of the certificate of candidacy. 22 In this ca.se, respondent filed his COC for Governor of Camarines
Norte for the 2016 elections on October 16, 2015, and he had 25 days therefrom to file the petition for denial of
due course or cancellation of COC on the ground of violation of the three-term limit rule, which fell on November
10, 2015. However, the petition was filed only on November 13, 2015 which was already beyond the period to file
the same; thus, find no grave abuse of discretion committed by the COMELEC in dismissing the petition for
being filed out of time.

Petitioner's insistence that the petition filed with the COMELEC was based on Rule 25 of COMELEC Resolution
No. 9523 which provides:

Rule 25 - Disqualification of Candidates

Section 1. Grounds. - Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party, is declared by final
decision of a competent court, guilty of, or found by the Commission to be suffering from any disqualification
provided by law or the Constitution.

x x xx

Section 3. Period to File Petition. - The Petition shall be filed any day after the last day for filing of certificates of
candidacy, but not later than the date of proclamation.

is not meritorious. Rule 25 of Comelec Resolution No. 9523 refers to disqualification of candidates and the
grounds thereof, which are those provided in Sections 12 and 68 of the OEC and Section 40 of the LGC, as
quoted in the early part of the decision. To reiterate, a violation of the three-term limit rule is not included among
the grounds for disqualification, but a ground for a petition to deny due course to or cancel certificate of
candidacy; thus, it is Rule 23 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9523 which is applicable, and We quote:

Rule 23 - Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificates of Candidacy

Section 1. Ground for Denial or Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy. - A verified Petition to Deny Due Course
to or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy for any elective office may be filed by any registered voter or a duly
registered political party, organization, or coalition of political parties on the exclusive ground that any material
representation contained therein as required by law is false.

Section 2. Period to File Petition. - The Petition must be filed within five (5) days from the last day for filing of
certificate of candidacy; but not later than twenty five (25) days from the time of filing of the certificate of
candidacy subject of the Petition. In case of a substitute candidate, the Petition must be filed within five (5) days
from the time the substitute candidate filed his certificate of candidacy.

We, likewise, find no grave abuse of discretion committed by the COMELEC En Banc when it found that the
petition to deny due course to or cancel a COC will not also prosper as there was no violation of the three-term
limit rule. Petitioner alleges that since respondent had already been elected and had served as Governor of
Camarines Norte for three consecutive terms, i.e., 2007, 2010, and 2013, he is proscribed from running for the
same position in the 2016 elections as it would already be his fourth consecutive term.

We are not convinced.

We held that two conditions must concur for the application of the disqualification of a candidate based on
violation of the three-term limit rule, which are: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three
consecutive terms in the same local government post, and (2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
23

In Aldovino, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 24 we said: As worded, the constitutional provision fixes the term of a
local elective office and limits an elective official's stay in office to no more than three consecutive terms. x x x

Significantly, this provision refers to a "term" as a period of time - three years - during which an official has title to
office and can serve. Appari v. Court of Appeals, a Resolution promulgated on November 28, 2007, succinctly
discusses what a term connotes, as follows:

The word "term" in a legal sense means a fixed and definite period of time which the law describes that an officer
may hold an office. According to Mechem, the term of office is the period during which an office may be held.
Upon expiration of the officer's term, unless he is authorized by law to holdover, his rights, duties and authority
as a public officer must ipso facto cease. In the law of public officers, the most and natural frequent method by
which a public officer ceases to be such is by the expiration of the terms for which he was elected or appointed.

A later case, Gaminde v. Commission on Audit, reiterated that he term means the time during which the officer
may claim to hold office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one
another. 25

In this case, while respondent ran as Governor of Camarines Norte in the 2007 elections, he did not win as such.
It was only after he filed la petition for correction of manifest error that he was proclaimed as the duly-elected
Governor. He assumed the post and served the unexpired term of his opponent from March 22, 2010 until June
30, 2010. Consequently, he did not hold the office for the full term of three years to which he was supposedly
entitled to. Thus, such period of time that respondent served as Governor did not constitute a complete and full
service of his term. The period when he was out of office involuntarily interrupted the continuity of his service as
Governor.26 As he had not fully served the 2007-2010 term, and had not been elected for three consecutive
terms as Governor, there was no violation of the three-term limit rule when he ran again in the 2016 elections.

We quote with approval the COMELEC En Banc's ruling on the matter as follows:

x x xx

The Supreme Court has ruled in several occasions that in.order for the ineligibility under the "three-term limit
rule" to apply, two conditions must concur: first, that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive
terms in the same local government post; and second, that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
While it is undisputed that respondent was duly elected as Governor of Camarines Norte for three consecutive
terms, the issue lies on whether he is deemed to have fully served his first term, specifically, whether the service
by an elected official of a term less than the full three years arising from his being declared as the duly elected
official in an election contest is considered full service of the term for purposes of counting the three-term
threshold.

The facts involved in the present case are similar to those involved

in Abundo v. COMELEC, where the Court declared:

There can be no quibbling that, during the term 2004-2007, and with the enforcement of the decision of the
election protest in his favor, Abundo assumed the mayoralty post only on May 9, 2006 and served the term until
June 30, 2007 or for a period of a little over one year and one month. xxx It cannot be said that Mayor Abundo
was able to serve fully the entire 2004-2007 term to which he was otherwise entitled.

Xxx

Needless to stress, the almost two-year period during which Abundo 's opponent actually served as Mayor is and
ought to be considered an involuntary interruption of Abundo 's continuity of service. An involuntary interrupted
term,

cannot, in the context of the disqualification rule, be considered as one term for purposes of counting the
threeterm threshold.

Xxx

As previously stated, the declaration of being the winner in an election protest grants the local elected official the
right to serve the unexpired portion of the term.1âwphi1 Verily, while he was declared the winner in the protest
for the mayoralty seat for the 2004-2007 term, Abundo's full term has been substantially reduced by the actual
service rendered by his dpponent (Torres). Hence, there was actual involuntary interruption in the term of
Abundo and he cannot be considered to have served the full 2004-2007 term.

Applying the foregoing in the instant case, since Respondent did not serve the full 2007-2010 term, it cannot be
considered as one term for purposes of counting the three-term threshold. Consequently, Respondent cannot be
said to have continuously served as Governor for three consecutive terms prior to the 2016 elections.

x x x 27

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Resolution dated August 24, 2016 of the Commission on Elections
En Banc is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Chairperson

ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

On welness leave
ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. CAGUIOA
SAMUEL R. MARTIREZ
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

NOEL GIMENEZ TIJAM

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes
* On official leave.
** On wellness leave.
1Per Commissioner Ma. Rowena Amelia V. Guanzon, concurred in by Chairman J. Andres D.
Bautista, Commissioners Christian Robert S. Lim, Al A. Parreflo, Luie Tito F. Guia, Arthur D. Lim,
and SheriffM. Ahas; rollo, pp. 43-52.

2Per Presiding Commissioner Al A. Parreflo, and concurred in by Commissioners Arthur D. Lim

and Sheriff M. Abas; id. at 31-38. ·
3 Typoco v. Commission on Elections, 628 Phil. 288 (2010).
4 Rollo, p. 76.
5 Id. at 71.
6 Id. at 70.
7 Id. at 53-68.
8JN THE MATTER OF THE AMENDMENT TO RULES 23, 24, AND 25 OF THE COMELEC
RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR PURPOSES OF THE 13 MAY 2013 NATIONAL, LOCAL AND
ARMM
9 Rollo, pp. 79-87
10 Id. at 7-8.
11 Arnado v. COMElEC, G.R. No. 210164, August 18, 2015, 767 SCRA 168, 195.
12 See Tan v. Spouses Antazo, 659 Phil. 400, 404 (2011), citing Office of the Ombudsman v.
Magno,i 592 Phil. 636, 652 (2008), citing Microsoft Corporation v. Best Deal Computer Center
Corporation, 438 Phil. 408, 414 (2002); Suliguin v. Commission on Elections, 520 Phil. 92, 107
(2006); Natalia Realty, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 440 Phil. 1, i9-20 (2002); Philippine Rabbit Bus
lines, Inc. v. Goimco, Sr., 512 Phil. 729,i733-734 (2005), citing land Bank of the Philippines v. Court
of Appeals, 456 Phil. 755, 786 (2003); Duerol v. Court of Appeals, 424 Phil. 12, 20 (2002), citing
Cuison v. Court of Appeals, 351 Phil. 1089;;;11021·. (1998).
13 Cabrera v. Commission on Elections, 588 Phil. 969, 974 (2008). ·
14 Arnado v. COMELEC, supra note 11
15 See Dela Liana v. Commission on Elections, 462 Phil. 355 (2003), citing Article IX (C). Section 2.
16 Id., citing A1iicle IX (C). Section 3.
17 Id., citing Enojas v. COMELEC, 347 Phil. 510 (1997).
18 Mayor Talaga v. COMELEC, 696 Phil. 786, 833-834 (2012).
19 Ar at ea v. Commission on Elections, 696 Phil. 700, 731-732 (2012).
20 Id. at 732.
21Id at 732-733, citing Latasa v. Commission on Elections, 463 Phil. 296 (2003), Atty. Rivera III
v.Commission on Elections (Rivera), 551 Phil. 37 (2007); Ong v. Alegre, 515 Phil. 442 (2006).
22 Aznar v. Commission on elections, 264 Phil. 307, 318 (1990).
23 Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections, 370 Phil. 625, 636 (1999).
24 Aldovino, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 623 Phil. 876 (2009).
25 Id. at 893-894. (Emphases omitted)
26 Adormeo v. Commission on Elections, 426 Phil. 472, 476 (2002).