Political Law - Legaspi vs. Comelec SCRA

7/30/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 768
G.R. No. 216572. September 1, 2015.*

FELICIANO P. LEGASPI, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS, ALFREDO GERMAR, and ROGELIO P.
SANTOS, JR., respondents.
Constitutional Law; Election Law; Commission on Elections;

Section 7 of Article IX-A of the Constitution obliges the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC), like the other
constitutional commissions, to decide all cases or matters before it
by a “majority vote of all its members.” When such majority vote
cannot be mustered by the COMELEC En Banc, Section 6, Rule 18
of the COMELEC Rules provides the mechanism to avert a non-
decision.—Section 7 of Article IX-A of the Constitution obliges the
COMELEC, like the other constitutional commissions, to decide
all cases or matters before it by a “majority vote of all its
[m]embers.” When such majority vote cannot be mustered by the
COMELEC En Banc, Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules
provides the mechanism to avert a non-decision. Thus: Sec. 6.
Procedure if Opinion is Equally Divided.—When the Commission
En Banc is equally divided in opinion, or the necessary majority
cannot be had, the case shall be reheard, and if on rehearing no
decision is reached, the action or proceeding shall be dismissed if
originally commenced in the Commission; in appealed cases, the
judgment or order appealed from shall stand affirmed; and in all
incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be denied. Verily,
under the cited provision, the COMELEC En Banc is first
required to rehear the case or matter that it cannot decide or
resolve by the necessary majority. When a majority still cannot be
had after the rehearing, however, there results a failure to decide
on the part of the COMELEC En Banc. The provision then
specifies the effects of the COMELEC En Banc’s failure to
decide: 1. If the action or proceeding is originally commenced in
the COMELEC, such action or proceeding shall be
dismissed; 2. In appealed cases, the judgment or order
appealed from shall stand affirmed; or 3. In incidental
matters, the petition or motion shall be denied.
_______________
* EN BANC.

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Legaspi vs. Commission on Elections
Same; Same; The Supreme Court (SC) held that the failure of
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc to decide the
motion for reconsideration would result — not in the denial of the
said motion or the affirmance of the division’s decision — but in
the dismissal of the electoral protest itself, pursuant to the first
effect under Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules.—We held
that the first effect applied because the case before the
COMELEC En Banc was an electoral protest that was “originally
commenced” in the commission. We noted that while the electoral
protest only reached the COMELEC En Banc through the motion
for reconsideration of the decision of a division, the same did not
change the nature of the case before it; the motion for
reconsideration not being an appeal. Thus, we held that the
failure of the COMELEC En Banc to decide the motion for
reconsideration would result — not in the denial of the said
motion or the affirmance of the division’s decision — but in the
dismissal of the electoral protest itself, pursuant to the first effect
under Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules.
Same; Same; In his concurring opinion in Mendoza v.
Commission on Elections, 616 SCRA 443 (2010), Justice Presbitero
J. Velasco, Jr. described the act of filing a motion for
reconsideration with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
En Banc from a decision of a division in an election case as but
“part” of such single and integrated process and is “not an appeal”
from the latter to the former.—In his concurring opinion in
Mendoza v. Commission on Elections, 616 SCRA 443 (2010),
Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (Justice Velasco) described the
act of filing a motion for reconsideration with the COMELEC En
Banc from a decision of a division in an election case as but “part”
of such single and integrated process and is “not an appeal” from
the latter to the former: At best, the filing of a motion for
reconsideration with the COMELEC En Banc of a decision
or resolution of the division of the COMELEC should be
viewed as part of one integrated process. Such motion for
reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc is a
constitutionally guaranteed remedial mechanism for parties
aggrieved by a division decision or resolution. However, at the
risk of repetition, it is not an appeal from the COMELEC division
to the En Banc.
Same; Same; When an election case originally filed with the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) is first decided by a
division, the subsequent filing of a motion for reconsideration from
that deci-


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486 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

sion before the En Banc does not signify the initiation of a new
action or case, but rather a mere continuation of an existing
process.—Verily, when an election case originally filed with the
COMELEC is first decided by a division, the subsequent filing of a
motion for reconsideration from that decision before the En Banc
does not signify the initiation of a new action or case, but rather a
mere continuation of an existing process. The motion for
reconsideration — not being an appeal from the decision of the
division to the En Banc — only thus serves as a means of having
the election case decided by the COMELEC En Banc. Under this
view, therefore, the nature of the election case as it was before the
division remains the same even after it is forwarded to the En
Banc through a motion for reconsideration. Hence, the failure of
the COMELEC En Banc to decide a motion for reconsideration
from the decision of a division in an original election case would
unquestionably bring to the fore the application of the first effect
under Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules.
VELASCO, JR., J., Dissenting Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Election Law; Commission on Elections;
View that it is clear from the literal wording of Sec. 7, Article IX-A
of the 1987 Constitution that “a majority vote of all its Members” is
required for the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc to
issue a decision or resolution of a case or matter brought before it.
—Anent the first issue, it is clear from the literal wording of Sec.
7, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution that “a majority vote of all
its Members” is required for the COMELEC En Banc to issue a
decision or resolution of a case or matter brought before it.
Consistently, Sec. 5(a), Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure reads: Section 5. Quorum; Votes Required.—(a) When
sitting En Banc, four (4) Members of the Commission shall
constitute a quorum for the purpose of transacting business. The
concurrence of a majority of the Members of the
Commission shall be necessary for the pronouncement of a
decision, resolution, order or ruling. (emphasis and
underscoring added) As can be gleaned, both the adverted
constitutional and COMELEC rule provisions, as couched, require
not a simple majority of the participating members constituting
a quorum, but an absolute majority. In the concrete, of the
seven-man commission, as held in Sevilla, Jr. v. COMELEC
(Sevilla), 693 SCRA 622 (2013), the vote of four (4) members must

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VOL. 768, SEPTEMBER 1, 2015 487

always be attained to render a decision, irrespective of the

number of commissioners in actual attendance.
Same; Same; Same; Verba Legis; View that the four (4)-vote
requirement is the result of applying the plain meaning rule or
verba legis in interpreting Sec. 7, Article IX-A of the 1987
Constitution.—Verily, the four-vote requirement is the result of
applying the plain meaning rule or verba legis in interpreting Sec.
7, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution. This rule in statutory
construction is expressed in the maxim, index animi sermo, or
“speech is the index of intention.” Furthermore, there is the
maxim verba legis non est recedendum, or “from the words of a
statute there should be no departure.” As the statute is clear,
plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal
meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.
Same; Same; Same; View that settled then is the rule that Sec.
7, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution, as couched, requires at
least four (4) votes of the seven (7) members of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) En Banc to rule on a pending incident
before it.—Settled then is the rule that Sec. 7, Article IX-A of the
1987 Constitution, as couched, requires at least four (4) votes of
the seven (7) members of the COMELEC En Banc to rule on a
pending incident before it. Failure to muster the threshold four (4)
votes brings into play the application of Sec. 6, Rule 18 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, which calls for a rehearing of the
case.
Same; Same; Same; View that the Constitution no less bestows
on the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) divisions the
authority to decide election cases. Their decisions arrived are
capable of attaining finality, without need of any affirmative or
confirmatory action on the part of the COMELEC En Banc.—
Clearly then, the Constitution no less bestows on the COMELEC
divisions the authority to decide election cases. Their decisions
arrived are capable of attaining finality, without need of any
affirmative or confirmatory action on the part of the COMELEC
En Banc. For instance, if no motion for reconsideration is filed by
the aggrieved party within five (5) days from the promulgation of
the decision, the ruling becomes final and executory. In this sense,
the process before the division should be deemed complete,
although it can also be considered, in the bigger picture, as part of
the integrated process of resolving an election case from start to
finish, as when the case was originally initiated before the trial
court.

488

Same; Same; Same; View that the fact that the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) division’s decision may be referred to the
En Banc via a motion for reconsideration should in no way be
considered as a diminution of its adjudicatory powers; That the
decision of a division virtually amounts to a decision of the En
Banc and, as such, is potentially binding and conclusive on the
parties.—The fact that the COMELEC division’s decision may be
referred to the En Banc via a motion for reconsideration should in
no way be considered as a diminution of its adjudicatory powers.
Worth maintaining is this doctrine in Mendoza v. COMELEC, 616
SCRA 443 (2010): a motion for reconsideration is a
constitutionally guaranteed remedial mechanism for parties
aggrieved by a division decision or resolution, but not an appeal.
In the same vein, it was held in Apo Fruits Corporation v. Court of
Appeals (Apo Fruits Corporation), 553 SCRA 237 (2008), that
“[t]he Supreme Court sitting En Banc is not an appellate court
vis-à-vis its Divisions, and it exercises no appellate jurisdiction
over the latter. Each division of the Court is considered not a body
inferior to the Court En Banc, and sits veritably as the Court En
Banc itself.” This particular doctrine in Mendoza and Apo Fruits
Corporation should be understood to have strengthened, rather
than rendered nugatory, the adjudicatory powers of the
COMELEC’s and that of the Court’s divisions — that the
decision of a division virtually amounts to a decision of the
En Banc and, as such, is potentially binding and
conclusive on the parties.
Same; Same; Same; Election Contests; Jurisdiction; View that
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) is a constitutional
commission vested with the exclusive original jurisdiction over
election contests, involving regional, provincial and city officials,
as well as appellate jurisdiction over election protests involving
elective municipal and barangay officials.—In distinguishing an
action originally commenced with the COMELEC from an
appealed case, reference should be made to Article IX- C, Sec. 2(2)
of the Constitution. According to the provision, the COMELEC is
a constitutional commission vested with the exclusive original
jurisdiction over election contests, involving regional, provincial
and city officials, as well as appellate jurisdiction over election
protests involving elective municipal and barangay officials. Thus,
in the case at bar, the petition for disqualification filed by Legaspi
was correctly categorized by the ponencia as an election case
originally commenced in the Commission because (1) private
respondents were candidates for posts in the city govern-

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VOL. 768, SEPTEMBER 1, 2015 489

ment, (2) there is no trial court ruling elevated to the

Commission to speak of, and (3) the motion for reconsideration
filed by private respondents with the COMELEC En Banc, as
earlier stated, does not amount to an appeal.
Election Law; Commission on Elections; View that for cases
originally filed before it, the failure of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) to muster the required majority vote after rehearing
would lead to the dismissal of the action or proceeding pending
before it.—It is beyond cavil that for cases originally filed before
it, the failure of the COMELEC to muster the required majority
vote after rehearing would lead to the dismissal of the action or
proceeding pending before it. The conjunctive word “or” clearly
indicates that there is an intended distinction between the words
“action” and “proceeding,” such that in not all instances would the
“action” originally commenced before the COMELEC will be
dismissed in their entirety. Otherwise, to treat them similarly
would mean that the words are superfluous, which is not the case.
Constitutional Law; Election Law; View that the “action” to be
dismissed in cases originally commenced before the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) under Sec. 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure pertains to those originally and directly filed
with the COMELEC division or En Banc.—It is the considered
view that the “action” to be dismissed in cases originally
commenced before the COMELEC under Sec. 6, Rule 18 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure pertains to those originally and
directly filed with the COMELEC division or En Banc. As
taught in San Juan v. COMELEC, 531 SCRA 178 (2007), the
division has jurisdiction to hear and decide election cases, but as
for motions for reconsideration of decisions rendered by the
division, the COMELEC En Banc has jurisdiction over the
matter. On the other hand, the cases directly filed with the
COMELEC En Banc are those specifically provided in the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, such as petitions for
postponement of elections under Sec. 1, Rule 26, petitions for
failure of election under Sec. 2, Rule 26, complaints or charges for
indirect contempt under Sec. 2, Rule 29, preliminary investigation
of election offenses under Sec. 1, Rule 34, and all other cases
where the COMELEC division is not authorized to act.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.

Certiorari.

490

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Francisco B. Sibayan and Yasser B. Lumbos for
petitioner.
Edgardo Carlo L. Vistan for private respondents.
PEREZ, J.:

This is a Petition for Certiorari1 assailing the Order2
dated 28 January 2015 of respondent Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) En Banc in SPA No. 13-323 (DC).

The Parties

Respondents Alfredo Germar (Germar) and Rogelio P.
Santos, Jr. (Santos), along with one Roberto C. Esquivel
(Esquivel), were among the candidates fielded by the
Liberal Party (LP) to vie for local elective posts in
Norzagaray, Bulacan, during the 13 May 2013 elections.
Germar ran for the position of mayor, Santos ran for the
position of councilor, and Esquivel ran for the position of
vice mayor.
Petitioner Feliciano P. Legaspi, on the other hand, was
the National Unity Party’s (NUP’s) bet for mayor of
Norzagaray during the 2013 polls.

The Election Results and the Petition for
Disqualification

After the votes cast by the Norzagaray electorate were
tallied, Germar emerged as the highest vote getter in the
mayoralty race. Santos, for his part, also appeared to have
secured enough votes to be the second councilor of the
municipality. Esquivel, though, failed in his bid to become
vice mayor of Norzagaray.
_______________
1 Under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court; Rollo, pp.

3-58.
2 Id., at pp. 99-103.

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VOL. 768, SEPTEMBER 1, 2015 491

Upon learning about the results of the tally, petitioner

immediately filed before the Municipal Board of
Canvassers (MBC) of Norzagaray a motion to suspend the
proclamation of Germar and Santos as winning candidates.
Such motion, however, proved to be futile.
At exactly 7:45 a.m. on 14 May 2013, despite the
petitioner’s motion, the MBC proclaimed Germar and
Santos as duly elected mayor and councilor of the
municipality of Norzagaray, respectively.
A few hours3 after the said proclamation, petitioner filed
before the COMELEC a Petition for Disqualification
against Germar, Santos, and Esquivel. In it, petitioner
accused Germar, Santos, and Esquivel of having engaged
in rampant vote buying during the days leading to the
elections.
The Petition for Disqualification was docketed as SPA
No. 13-323 (DC) and was assigned to the COMELEC First
Division, then composed of Commissioners Lucenito N.
Tagle (Commissioner Tagle), Christian Robert S. Lim
(Commissioner Christian Lim) and Al A. Parreño
(Commissioner Parreño).

COMELEC First Division and Special First
Division

In due course, the COMELEC First Division took a vote
on SPA No. 13-323 (DC). The vote of the division was an
even 1-1 split, with Commissioner Tagle voting in favor of
granting the petition for disqualification, but with
Commissioner Christian Lim voting against it. The third
member of the division, i.e., Commissioner Parreño, was
not able to provide the potential tie-breaking vote as he
was then absent and attending to some other official
business.
Due to the impasse created by the absence of one of its
members, the COMELEC First Division called for the
constitution of a Special First Division through which
COMELEC
_______________
3 At 12:45 p.m. on 14 May 2013.

492

Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. sat in the First Division

as acting member vice the absent Commissioner Parreño
for purposes of SPA No. 13-323 (DC).4
On 3 October 2013, the COMELEC Special First
Division, by a 2 to 1 vote, rendered a resolution: (1)
disqualifying Germar and Santos for the positions of mayor
and councilor, respectively, of Norzagaray; and (2) referring
the criminal aspect of SPA No. 13-323 (DC) to the
COMELEC Law Department for preliminary
5
investigation.
Germar, Santos, and Esquivel filed a motion for
reconsideration with the COMELEC En Banc.
_______________
4 Via an Order dated 1 October 2013. The substitution of

Commissioner Parreño was made pursuant to Section 6, Rule 3 of the
COMELEC Rules, as amended by COMELEC Resolution No. 9636 dated
13 February 2013. That provision reads:
Sec. 6. Substitution of members of a Division.—
(a) Temporary vacancy.—Whenever a member of a Division is on
leave, seriously ill, temporarily disabled, is absent, inhibits himself, or is
disqualified from sitting in a case, the Chairman shall substitute him with
another Commissioner, or the Chairman shall sit in place of said
member, and[,] in that event[,] he will preside.
(b) x x x.
Under either of the foregoing substitutions, the Division where the
acting or signing member is assigned shall be designated as
“Special First Division” or “Special Second Division,” as the case
may be, for purposes of the pertinent cases therein pending.
(Emphases ours)
5 Rollo, pp. 59-73. The Resolution was penned by Presiding
Commissioner Lucenito N. Tagle, and concurred in by Chairman Sixto S.
Brillantes, Jr. Commissioner Christian Robert S. Lim registered the
dissent. The electoral aspect of the disqualification case was dismissed as
to Esquivel since the latter had lost during the 2013 election.

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VOL. 768, SEPTEMBER 1, 2015 493

The COMELEC En Banc and the Dismissal of the

Electoral Aspect of SPA No. 13-323 (DC)

On 10 July 2004, the COMELEC En Banc took a vote on

the motion for reconsideration. At that time, the
COMELEC En Banc had six (6) incumbent members.6 Of
the six (6), however, only five (5) members actually
participated in the deliberations and casted votes.
Commissioner Parreño opted to take no part and did not
vote.
The following were the results of the voting:
1. As to the electoral aspect of SPA No. 13-323
(DC), the vote was 3-2, i.e., 3 members voted in
favor of the disqualification of Germar and
Santos, and 2 dissented.7 Hence, a majority of at
least four (4) votes was not reached with respect
to the electoral aspect of the case.
2. As to the criminal aspect of SPA No. 13-323
(DC), the vote was 4-1, i.e., 4 members voted in
favor of the referral of the criminal aspect of the
disqualification case to the COMELEC Law
Department and 1 dissented.8 Hence, a majority
was reached with respect to the criminal aspect
of the case.
_______________
6 There was a vacancy created in the membership of the COMELEC

when the ad interim appointment of erstwhile commissioner Maria Gracia
Cielo Padaca automatically lapsed on 11 June 2014. Such vacancy would
only be filled on 28 July 2014, when then newly appointed Commissioner
Arthur D. Lim assumed office.
7 Those who voted in favor of granting the disqualification of Germar
and Santos were: Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners
Lucenito N. Tagle and Elias R. Yusoph. Commissioners Christian Robert
S. Lim and Luie Tito F. Guia, on the other hand, dissented.
8 Those who voted in favor of the referral to the COMELEC Law
Department were Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioners
Lucenito N. Tagle, Elias R. Yusoph and Luie Tito F. Guia. Commissioner
Christian Robert S. Lim, dissented.

494

In view of the foregoing, the COMELEC En Banc issued

a resolution9 denying the motion for reconsideration with
respect to the criminal aspect of SPA No. 13-323 (DC), but
ordering the conduct of a rehearing insofar as the electoral
aspect of the case was concerned.
After the rehearing, the COMELEC En Banc took

another vote but it still failed to muster a majority
consensus on the electoral aspect of SPA No. 13-323 (DC).10
The final vote of the COMELEC En Banc on the matter
remained at the exact 3-2 split that it was before the
rehearing.11 Commissioner Parreño maintained his “no
part” stance, while newly appointed Commissioner Arthur
D. Lim also opted to take no part and did not vote.
Thus, on 28 January 2015, the COMELEC En Banc
issued an Order12 directing the dismissal of the electoral
aspect of SPA No. 13-323 (DC) pursuant to Section 6, Rule
18 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure13
(COMELEC Rules), to wit:
Sec. 6. Procedure if Opinion is Equally Divided.—When the

Commission En Banc is equally divided in opinion, or the
necessary majority cannot be had, the case shall be
reheard, and if on rehearing no decision is reached, the
action or proceeding shall be dismissed if originally
commenced in the Commission; in appealed cases, the
judgment or order appealed from shall stand affirmed; and in all
incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be denied.
(Emphasis ours)
_______________
9 Rollo, pp. 84-93; p. 100.

10 At this time, the COMELEC En Banc already had seven (7)
incumbent members.
11 Supra note 7.
12 Rollo, pp. 99-103.
13 COMELEC Rules Governing Pleadings, Practice and Procedure
Before It or Any of Its Offices, dated 15 February 1993.

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VOL. 768, SEPTEMBER 1, 2015 495

Unconvinced, petitioner filed the present petition14

before this Court.

The Present Petition

Petitioner claims that COMELEC En Banc gravely
abused its discretion when it dismissed the electoral aspect
of SPA No. 13-323 (DC). He protests that the dismissal was
occasioned by a “misapplication” by the COMELEC En
Banc of Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules.15

Our Ruling

We dismiss the present petition.

I

Let us start with the basics.
Section 7 of Article IX-A of the Constitution obliges the
COMELEC, like the other constitutional commissions, to
decide all cases or matters before it by a “majority vote of
all its [m]embers.”16 When such majority vote cannot be
mustered by the COMELEC En Banc, Section 6, Rule 18 of
the COMELEC Rules provides the mechanism to avert a
non-decision. Thus:
_______________
14 Supra note 1.
15 Id.
16 The provision reads in full:
SECTION 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all
its Members any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from
the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is
deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last
pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the Commission
or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this
Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission
may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party
within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.

496

Sec. 6. Procedure if Opinion is Equally Divided.—When the

Commission En Banc is equally divided in opinion, or the
necessary majority cannot be had, the case shall be reheard, and
if on rehearing no decision is reached, the action or proceeding
shall be dismissed if originally commenced in the Commission; in
appealed cases, the judgment or order appealed from shall stand
affirmed; and in all incidental matters, the petition or motion
shall be denied.

Verily, under the cited provision, the COMELEC En
Banc is first required to rehear the case or matter that it
cannot decide or resolve by the necessary majority. When a
majority still cannot be had after the rehearing, however,

there results a failure to decide on the part of the
COMELEC En Banc. The provision then specifies the
effects of the COMELEC En Banc’s failure to decide:
1. If the action or proceeding is originally commenced in
the COMELEC, such action or proceeding shall
be dismissed;
2. In appealed cases, the judgment or order appealed
from shall stand affirmed; or
3. In incidental matters, the petition or motion shall
be denied.

As can be gleaned above, the effects of the COMELEC
En Banc’s failure to decide vary depending on the type of
case or matter that is before the commission. Thus, under
the provision, the first effect (i.e., the dismissal of the
action or proceeding) only applies when the type of case
before the COMELEC is an action or proceeding “originally
commenced in the commission”; the second effect (i.e., the
affirmance of a judgment or order) only applies when the
type of case before the COMELEC is an “appealed case”;
and the third effect (i.e., the denial of the petition or
motion) only applies when the case or matter before the
COMELEC is an “incidental matter.”

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VOL. 768, SEPTEMBER 1, 2015 497

Mendoza v. Commission on Elections, et al.17 gives us a

key illustration of an application of the first effect under
Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules.
Mendoza involved an electoral protest that was
originally filed before the COMELEC and which was
raffled to one of its divisions. The COMELEC division to
which the electoral protest was assigned granted that
protest, prompting the protestee to file a motion for
reconsideration with the COMELEC En Banc. When the
COMELEC En Banc took a vote on the motion for
reconsideration, however, it failed to obtain the necessary
majority vote. Consequently, the COMELEC En Banc
reheard the matter and then took another vote. However,
the second vote also lacked the necessary majority. The
final vote of the COMELEC En Banc was 3-1 (i.e., 3 in
support of granting the protest and 1 dissent), with 3
members taking no part.18 On the basis of the foregoing,
the COMELEC En Banc issued a resolution denying the
motion for reconsideration (in effect sustaining the
division’s decision). The protestee challenged the foregoing

resolution on the strength of the argument that the failure
of the COMELEC En Banc to obtain the necessary majority
should have resulted in the dismissal of the election protest
case itself pursuant to the first effect under Section 6, Rule
18 of the COMELEC Rules.
When that dispute reached this Court in Mendoza, we
sustained the protestee. We held that the first effect
applied because the case before the COMELEC En Banc
was an electoral protest that was “originally commenced”
in the commission. We noted that while the electoral
protest only reached the COMELEC En Banc through the
motion for reconsideration of the decision of a division, the
same did not change the nature of the case before it; the
motion for reconsideration not being an appeal.19 Thus, we
held that the failure of the COMELEC En Banc to decide
the motion for reconsideration
_______________
17 630 Phil. 432; 616 SCRA 443 (2010).

18 Id.
19 Id.

498

would result — not in the denial of the said motion or the

affirmance of the division’s decision — but in the dismissal
of the electoral protest itself, pursuant to the first effect
under Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules.20
Guided by the foregoing precepts, we shall now address
the issues at hand.

II

The main thrust of petitioner’s challenge is the supposed
error of the COMELEC En Banc in applying the first effect
under Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules (by
dismissing the electoral aspect of SPA No. 13-323 [DC])
when it was unable to reach a majority vote after the
rehearing.21 According to petitioner, the COMELEC En
Banc erred in treating SPA No. 13-323 (DC) as an action
that was “originally commenced in the commission” under
the said provision.22 As petitioner argues, an action can
only be considered as having been “originally commenced in
the commission” under Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC
Rules when that action was originally filed before the

COMELEC En Banc itself and, as such, is the very matter
pending before it.23
Petitioner then points out that, in this case, what was
before the COMELEC En Banc was not the main petition
itself but only a motion for reconsideration of the decision
of the division in SPA No. 13-323 (DC). Hence, petitioner
submits, the failure of the COMELEC En Banc to reach a
majority vote in this case should result, not in the
dismissal of the electoral aspect of SPA No. 13-323 (DC),
but merely in the denial of the motion for reconsideration
and the affirmance of the division’s decision.24
_______________
20 Id.
21 Supra note 1.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id.

499
VOL. 768, SEPTEMBER 1, 2015 499

We do not agree.
The COMELEC En Banc did not err when it dismissed
the electoral aspect of SPA No. 13-323 (DC) when it was
unable to reach a majority vote after the rehearing.
Contrary to what petitioner asserts, SPA No. 13-323 (DC)
is most definitely an action that was filed originally before
the COMELEC within the contemplation of the said
provision. While SPA No. 13-323 (DC) reached the
COMELEC En Banc only through a motion for
reconsideration of the decision of the Special First Division,
its character as an original case filed before the commission
remains the same. Hence, the failure of COMELEC En
Banc to decide in this case properly results in the
application of the first effect of Section 6, Rule 18 of the
COMELEC Rules.

SPA No. 13-323 (DC) is an Action
“Originally Commenced in the
Commission” Under Section 6,
Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules

Petitioner, to begin with, misconstrues Section 6, Rule
The phrase “originally commenced in the commission” in

Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules is worded in
plain language and, therefore, must be construed in its
ordinary and natural sense.25 It simply means what it says.
The phrase is meant to cover any action or proceeding that
is filed, at the first instance, before the COMELEC —
whether sitting in division or En Banc — as
contradistinguished from cases that are merely appealed to
it. Petitioner’s view that restricts such phrase to include
only those actions or proceedings that are originally filed
with the COMELEC En Banc itself (e.g., petition to declare
failure of elections) has no basis and only obscures the
otherwise clear import of the phrase’s language.
_______________
25 See Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 327 Phil. 217, 235;
257 SCRA 430, 448 (1996).

500

In this case, the fact that SPA No. 13-323 (DC) is an

action originally commenced in the COMELEC cannot at
all be doubted. The records are crystal clear that the
petition was first filed with the COMELEC and was raffled
to the First Division for decision. It is a fresh petition — as
it passed upon no other tribunal, body or entity prior to its
filing with the COMELEC. Hence, for all intents and
purposes, SPA No. 13-323 (DC) must be considered as an
action “originally commenced in the commission” under
Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules.

Single Process of COMELEC in
Deciding Election Cases; COME-
LEC En Banc Correctly Dis-
missed Electoral Aspect of SPA
No. 13-323 (DC)

Petitioner’s insistence that the first effect under Section
6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules ought not to be applied
since what was before the COMELEC En Banc was merely
a motion for reconsideration and not the petition for
disqualification itself, likewise has no merit. It is premised
on the assumption that the proceedings in election cases
before the COMELEC division are separate from those
before the En Banc — an assumption that has already been

discredited by Mendoza.
In Mendoza, we held that the COMELEC acts on
election cases under a single and integrated process, to wit:
[H]owever the jurisdiction of the COMELEC is involved, x x x, the

COMELEC will act on the case in one whole and single
process: to repeat, in division, and if impelled by a motion
for reconsideration, En Banc.26

In his concurring opinion in Mendoza, Justice Presbitero
J. Velasco, Jr. (Justice Velasco) described the act of filing a
mo-
_______________
26 Supra note 17 at p. 460; p. 460. (Emphasis ours)

501
VOL. 768, SEPTEMBER 1, 2015 501

tion for reconsideration with the COMELEC En Banc from

a decision of a division in an election case as but “part” of
such single and integrated process and is “not an appeal”
from the latter to the former:
At best, the filing of a motion for reconsideration with

the COMELEC En Banc of a decision or resolution of the
division of the COMELEC should be viewed as part of one
integrated process. Such motion for reconsideration before the
COMELEC En Banc is a constitutionally guaranteed remedial
mechanism for parties aggrieved by a division decision or
resolution. However, at the risk of repetition, it is not an appeal
from the COMELEC division to the En Banc.27

Verily, when an election case originally filed with the
COMELEC is first decided by a division, the subsequent
filing of a motion for reconsideration from that decision
before the En Banc does not signify the initiation of a new
action or case, but rather a mere continuation of an
existing process. The motion for reconsideration — not
being an appeal from the decision of the division to the En
Banc — only thus serves as a means of having the election
case decided by the COMELEC En Banc. Under this view,
therefore, the nature of the election case as it was before
the division remains the same even after it is forwarded to
the En Banc through a motion for reconsideration. Hence,

the failure of the COMELEC En Banc to decide a motion
for reconsideration from the decision of a division in an
original election case would unquestionably bring to the
fore the application of the first effect under Section 6, Rule
This is exactly what happened in this case. In this case,
SPA No. 13- 323 (DC) was filed, at the first instance, with
the COMELEC. Being a petition for disqualification filed
under
_______________
27 Id., at p. 484; p. 486. (Emphasis ours)

502

Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code,28 SPA No. 13-323

(DC) was initially raffled to and decided by a division of the
commission. From that point, however, SPA No. 13-323
(DC) found its way to the COMELEC En Banc after a
motion for reconsideration from the decision of the division
was filed. Hence, when the COMELEC En Banc twice
failed to reach the necessary majority to decide the
electoral aspect of SPA No. 13-323 (DC), it applied the first
effect under Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules. We
find absolutely nothing wrong with such application. It is,
in fact, reinforced by the very provisions of the COMELEC
Rules and by Mendoza.

III

We next address the contra argument raised by Justice
Velasco in his Dissenting Opinion.
Justice Velasco, in his dissent, shared petitioner’s
position that the failure of the COMELEC En Banc to
reach a necessary majority in this case should have
resulted merely in the denial of the motion for
reconsideration and not in the dismissal of SPA No. 13-323
(DC) itself. The learned justice, however, justified the said
position with an argument different from that advanced by
petitioner: Justice Velasco, in essence, concedes that the
first effect under Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC
Rules applies in this case, but contends that the
COMELEC En Banc erred in how it applied the said
provision.
Justice Velasco points out that the first effect under

Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules speaks of the
dismissal of either an “action” or a “proceeding” — which,
the good justice submits, supposedly pertains to different
cases or matters that may be brought before the
COMELEC En Banc. After identifying what those matters
are, Justice Velasco concluded that the word “action” as
used under the subject provision has reference
_______________
28 Batas Pambansa Bilang 881.

503
VOL. 768, SEPTEMBER 1, 2015 503

to the “cases originally filed before the COMELEC division

or En Banc” whilst the word “proceeding” under the same
rule has reference to “motions for reconsideration
challenging the rulings [of a division in election cases].”29
Thus, Justice Velasco opines, the failure of the COMELEC
En Banc to reach a majority vote on a mere motion for
reconsideration of a division decision in an original election
case would — under the first effect of Section 6, Rule 18 of
the COMELEC Rules — only lead to a dismissal of the
“proceeding” or of the motion for reconsideration; not the
dismissal of the “action” or of the election case itself.
Cognizant that the foregoing view is a betrayal of the
principles laid down by the Court in Mendoza, Justice
Velasco now clamors for a “modification” or an
abandonment of our ruling in the said case insofar as how
it applied the first effect under Section 6, Rule 18 of the
COMELEC Rules.30 Justice Velasco cautions the Court
that pursuing Mendoza’s interpretation of Section 6, Rule
18 of the COMELEC Rules is bound to lead to absurd and
illogical results — such as one wherein a decision of a
COMELEC division in an election case can simply be
overturned by the COMELEC En Banc even though the
latter is not able to reach a majority vote.31
The Court is not convinced.

Meaning of the Words “Action”
and “Proceeding” Determinable
From Other Provisions of the
COMELEC Rules; Justice Velasco’s
Interpretation of the Word “Pro-
ceeding” Contradicted By COME-
LEC Rules, Taken As A Whole
_______________
29 Dissenting Opinion of J. Velasco, p. 528.

30 Id., at pp. 529-533.
31 Id., at pp. 533-536.

504

The pin that holds Justice Velasco’s argument is his

interpretation of the terms “action” and “proceeding” under
Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules. While an
isolated view of the contested terms does lend some degree
of reason to the respected justice’s interpretation, a more
careful consideration of such terms in the context of the
other parts of the COMELEC Rules, however, will quickly
reveal the interpretation’s fault. Verily, we are unable to
accept it.
The words “action” and “proceeding” and even the entire
phrase “action or proceeding” are not exclusive to Section 6,
Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules. Such words and phrase,
in fact, appear in other parts of the COMELEC Rules, most
notably in Part V thereof. To our minds, an examination of
how the words “action” and “proceeding” and the phrase
“actions or proceedings” were used in Part V of the
COMELEC Rules is telling of how the COMELEC Rules
actually intended such terms and phrase to be understood,
which is, in the context of its other provisions.32
Part V of the COMELEC Rules, which is aptly titled
“Particular Actions or Proceedings,” is one of the nine
major parts of the COMELEC Rules. It is composed of
Rules 20 to 34 of the COMELEC Rules, wherein each rule
covers a specific “action or proceeding” that the COMELEC
can take cognizance of, thus:

_______________
32 See the “Whole Act Rule” in statutory construction. The rule

provides that when a certain term or phrase is used multiple times in a
statute, such term or phrase is assumed to have the same meaning
throughout the whole statute (A Guide To Reading, Interpreting and
Applying Statutes by Katharine Clark and Matthew Connolly [2006],
accessed through http://www.law.georgetown.edu/academics/academic-
programs/legal-writing-scholarship/writing-
center/upload/statutoryinterpretation.pdf). The rule is a necessary
component of the principle that statutes ought to be interpreted

holistically.

505
VOL. 768, SEPTEMBER 1, 2015 505

COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE – PART V

PARTICULAR ACTIONS OR PROCEEDINGS
A. ORDINARY ACTIONS
Rule 20 – Election Protests

Rule 21 – Quo Warranto
Rule 22 – Appeals from Decisions of Courts in Election Protest
Cases
B. SPECIAL ACTIONS
Rule 23 – Petition to Deny Due Course To or Cancel Certificates

of Candidacy
Rule 24 – Proceedings Against Nuisance Candidates
Rule 25 – Disqualification of Candidates
Rule 26 – Postponement of Suspension of Elections
C. SPECIAL CASES
Rule 27 – Pre-proclamation Controversies
D. SPECIAL RELIEFS
Rule 28 – Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus

Rule 29 – Contempt
E. PROVISIONAL REMEDIES
Rule 30 – Injunction
F. SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
Rule 31 – Annulment of Permanent List of Voters

Rule 32 – Registration of Political Parties or Organization
Rule 33 – Accreditation of Citizens’ Arms of the Commission
G. ELECTION OFFENSES
Rule 34 – Prosecution of Election Offenses

506

Evidently, what Part V actually discloses are the

particular cases or matters that may be considered as
“actions or proceedings” for purposes of the COMELEC
Rules. Notably, all the actions or proceedings identified
thereunder, save for the provisional remedy of injunction,
are all main cases cognizable by the COMELEC. Notable
too is that a motion for reconsideration from a decision of a
division — which is but a part of a main case — is not
among those included in Part V.33

Accordingly, we find Justice Velasco’s formulation
linking the term “proceeding” under Section 6, Rule 18 of
the COMELEC Rules with “motions for reconsideration
challenging the rulings [of a division in election cases]”34 to
be inconsistent with how such term was actually intended
to be understood by the COMELEC Rules. Such a
formulation, rooted as it was in an isolated analysis of the
contested term, is out of touch with the rest of the
provisions of the COMELEC Rules.

Pursuing Mendoza Ruling
Will Not Lead to Absurdity

We likewise rebut Justice Velasco’s submission that
continuing with Mendoza’s interpretation of the first effect
under Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules is bound
to lead to absurd results.
To our minds, there is no “absurdity” in the fact that the
decision of a division in an election case ceases to be a
COMELEC decision as a consequence of the failure of the
COMELEC En Banc to reach a majority vote on
reconsidera-
_______________
33 A motion for reconsideration, in the scheme of the COMELEC

Rules, is included in Part IV thereof under Rule 19. Part IV of the
COMELEC Rules is titled “Dispositions of Actions or Proceedings,” which
actually reinforces the conclusion that the COMELEC Rules does not treat
a motion for reconsideration as an action or proceeding in itself, but
merely as a part of how an action or a proceeding may be disposed of.
34 Supra note 29.

507
VOL. 768, SEPTEMBER 1, 2015 507

tion. That fact, far from being absurd, is nothing but the
natural and logical consequence of the application of the
first effect under Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC
Rules which, in turn, only complements our Constitution.

IV

All told, we found no indications that the COMELEC En
Banc had acted with grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the electoral aspect of SPA No. 13-323 (DC). On
the contrary, what we found is that such dismissal was
perfectly in accord with the provisions of its own rules of
procedure and is consistent with established jurisprudence
on the matter. Mendoza, to our minds, remains good law.
Certainly, the extraordinary writ of certiorari does not lie
here.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition is
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Brion, Bersamin, Villarama, Jr., Mendoza,

Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
Sereno, CJ., I join the dissent of J. Velasco.
Velasco, Jr., J., I dissent. (Please see Dissenting
Opinion)
Leonardo-De Castro, J., I join the dissent of Justice
Velasco.
Peralta, J., I join the Dissenting Opinion of J. Velasco.
Del Castillo, J., I join the dissent of J. Velasco.
Reyes, J., On Leave.

508

DISSENTING OPINION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

Nature of the Case

For resolution is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 64
of the Rules of Court assailing the January 28, 2015 Order1
of public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC)

in SPA No. 13-353 (DC). Said Order dismissed petitioner
Feliciano Legaspi’s Petition for Disqualification lodged
against private respondents.

The Facts

Petitioner and private respondent Alfredo D. Germar
(Germar) both ran as mayoralty candidates in Norzagaray,
Bulacan in the May 13, 2013 elections. Meanwhile, private
respondent Rogelio Santos (Santos) was a candidate for
councilor in that electoral exercise of the same local
government unit.
Petitioner averred that respondents’ political leaders
engaged in massive vote-buying from May 11, 2013 until
election day. According to his witnesses’ accounts, said
political leaders, while camped inside the North Hills
Village Homeowners Association Office in the locality, were
distributing to voters envelopes containing Five Hundred
Pesos (P500) each and a sample ballot containing the
names of respondents. Through military efforts, so
petitioner alleged, the vote-buying was foiled and the office,
which served as the venue for distribution, padlocked. In
spite of an attempt by the newly-minted Chief of Police,
P/Supt. Dale Soliba, and his subordinates to force open the
office and retrieve from inside four (4) boxes containing the
remaining undistributed enve-
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 99-103.

509
VOL. 768, SEPTEMBER 1, 2015 509

lopes with an estimated aggregate amount of Eight

Hundred Thousand Pesos (P800,000), a group of concerned
citizens were able to thwart their plan in flagrante delicto
and intercept the said evidence of vote-buying.2
Because the widespread vote-buying was discovered only
on May 11, 2013 and continued up to the day of the
elections, petitioner urgently moved for the Municipal
Board of Canvassers (MBOC) to suspend the proclamation
of the election results. Despite the motion, however, private
respondents Germar and Santos were nevertheless
proclaimed as the duly elected mayor and 2nd councilor of
Norzagaray, Bulacan on May 14, 2013, the day after the
elections.3 On even date, petitioner filed the Petition for

Disqualification4 against private respondents, docketed as
SPA No. 13-353 (DC).5
In answer, private respondents denied the allegations of
vote-buying and raised the alibi that, from 3:00 o’clock to
11:00 o’clock in the evening of May 11, 2013, they attended
the Liberal Party’s meeting de avance at the San Andres
Parish church grounds, and that they did not go to or visit
the office of the Homeowners Association of North Hills
Village, Brgy. Bitungol, Norzagaray at the time the election
offenses were allegedly committed.6 They likewise raised
the following procedural defenses: that the petition had
been filed out of time; that the petitioner allegedly failed to
incorporate a proper certification against forum shopping
in his petition; and that that there must be prior conviction
by final judgment in a criminal case for the election offense
of vote-buying before they can be disqualified to run.7
_______________
2 Id., at p. 60.
3 Id., at pp. 60-61.
4 Id., at pp. 178-181.
5 Entitled “Feliciano Legaspi v. Alfredo M. Germar, Roberto C.
Esquivel and Rogelio Santos, Jr.” The case against Esquivel was mooted
by his lost in the vice mayoralty race.
6 Rollo, p. 61.
7 Id.

510

Ruling of the COMELEC Special First Division

By a 2-1 vote, the COMELEC Special First Division8
granted the Petition for Disqualification through its
October 3, 2013 Resolution9 in SPA No. 13-353 (DC), the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission

RESOLVED as it hereby RESOLVES to:
(1) DISQUALIFY Respondents Alfredo M. [Germar] and
Rogelio C. Santos, Jr. for the positions of Mayor and Councilor
of Norzagaray, Bulacan;
(2) REFER the criminal aspect of this case against [Germar],
Roberto Esquivel, Rogelio Santos, Jr., Dale Saliba, Dominador
Rayo, Marivic Nunez, Adelaida Auza, Amelia Cruz, and
Leonardo Ignacio to the Law Department for preliminary

investigation; and
(3) ORDER the Regional Election Director of COMELEC
Region III to implement this Resolution, following the rules on
succession as provided in R.A. 7160.
SO ORDERED.

In first disposing the procedural issues raised by private
respondents, the COMELEC division held:
[I]t must be noted that the instant petition was filed on the very date of
the proclamation of respondents on May 14, 2013. Prior to that and
towards the end of the canvassing, however, petitioner had already filed
an Urgent Motion to Suspend Proclamation before the MBOC, in the light
of the vote-buying activities which were being perpetrated earlier but
discovered only two days before the elections and continued up to the
election day itself.
_______________
8 With Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. substituting Commissioner

Christian Robert S. Lim, who was absent via an Order dated October 1,
2013.
9 Rollo, pp. 59-73.

511
VOL. 768, SEPTEMBER 1, 2015 511

Under such circumstance, therefore, we cannot simply brush

aside the overwhelming evidence and dismiss this petition
outright on mere procedural grounds. For, it has previously been
held in Nolasco v. COMELEC that where the evidence of guilt for
violation of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code committed
immediately before the election as a ground for disqualification
filed after the election but before proclamation is overwhelming,
the COMELEC in the exercise of its sound discretion may assume
jurisdiction, suspend the proclamation and disqualify the winning
candidate, for the COMELEC cannot always be straitjacketed by
procedural rule.
While it may be true that respondents Germar and Santos
were already proclaimed, we should not lose sight of the fact that
this instant petition for disqualification was filed on the very date
of their proclamation. Even before that, an Urgent Motion to
Suspend Proclamation was already instituted before the MBOC.10

The division likewise did not give credence to private

respondents’ argument on the need for a final conviction
before they can be disqualified from holding public office. It
emphasized that the electoral aspect of a disqualification
case is separate and distinct from the criminal aspect, and
that as an administrative proceeding that is summary in
character, the quantum of proof required to be overcome for
a petition for disqualification to prosper is substantial
evidence.11
In the case at bar, the pieces of evidence submitted to
the COMELEC consisted of the following:12
1) Sinumpaang Salaysay of Kagawad Helen Viola,
Ma. Joanna Abesamis, Jaimenito Magat, Danny
Mendoza and Teodorico Tuazon who witnessed
the vote-buying activities during the morning of
May 11, 2013, the forced opening of the HOA
office around
_______________
10 Id., at p. 62.

11 Id., at p. 63.
12 Id., at pp. 64-65.

512

12:00 AM of May 12, 2013 by P/Supt. Soliba and

subsequent interception of the latter by the
affiants, who seized the plastic bag containing 4
boxes of money and sample ballots of
respondents;
2) Report of the Turnover of Confiscated/Recovered
Items by P/Supt. Soliba to the Municipal
Treasurer of Norzagaray, Bulacan, detailing the
number of envelopes and sample ballots of
Germar-Esquivel Team (FB Team) and amounts
of money found inside each of the 4 boxes;
3) Pictures during the opening of the seized items
before the Norzagaray Municipal Police Station
and photos taken during the vote-buying
incident at the HOA office where respondent
Esquivel was seen going out of the premises in
the morning of May 11, 2013;
4) Certified True Copies of the Police Blotter
Entries regarding the vote-buying incidents
which happened on May 12-13, 2013, as
reported to the police by Retired Col. Bruno

Paler Viola, Jr. and Alma Rulida;
5) Sworn Statements of 194 voters who testified
that they were offered and/or given the amount
ranging from Php250.00-Php500.00 each in
exchange of their votes for the respondents, and
were thus issued yellow stubs that they received
such amount;
6) Sworn Statements of several witnesses, attesting
that during election day, respondents’ team
promised them to pay Php500.00-Php1,000.00
each on condition that they will not vote and
their right point fingers will be marked with ink;
and
7) Minutes of Voting of the Board of Election
Inspectors of Cluster Precinct No. 60, allowing
three voters to cast their vote upon verifying
that the ink marked on their fingers was not
that of the COMELEC’s indelible ink and that
they have not yet voted.

513
VOL. 768, SEPTEMBER 1, 2015 513

The COMELEC Special First Division ruled that the

totality of the evidence petitioner thus presented was
sufficient to disqualify private respondents from holding
office.13

Ruling of the COMELEC En Banc

Private respondents timely moved for reconsideration,
but the COMELEC En Banc denied the motion through its
July 10, 2014 Resolution,14 thus:

RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES to DENY this Motion for
Reconsideration for LACK OF MERIT. Consequently, the October
3, 2013 Resolution of the Special First Division (1) disqualifying
respondents Alfredo M. Germar and Rogelio C. Santos, Jr. for the
positions of Mayor and Councilor of Norzagaray, Bulacan; (2)
referring the criminal aspect of this case against Alfredo M.
Germar, Roberto Esquivel, Rogelio Santos, Jr., Dale Soliba,
Dominador Rayo, Marivic Nunez, Adelaida Auza, Amelia Cruz
and Leonardo Ignacio to the Law Department for preliminary
investigation and (3) ordering the Regional Election Director of
COMELEC Region III to implement this Resolution, following the
Rules on Succession as provided under R.A. 7160 is hereby

AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

The adverted En Banc Resolution had a vote of 3-2-1-1,
as follows: three (3) commissioners, namely Chairman
Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and commissioners Lucenito N.
Tagle and Elias R. Yusoph, voted for the denial of the
motion, while two (2) commissioners, Christian Robert S.
Lim and Luie Tito F. Guia, dissented. Commissioner Al A.
Parreño took no part in the deliberations and
Commissioner Maria Grace Cielo M.
_______________
13 Id., at p. 66.

14 Id., at pp. 84-92.

514

Padaca did not vote as her ad interim appointment had

already expired, vacating a seat in the electoral tribunal.15
Because the Resolution was not concurred in by a
majority of all the members of the COMELEC, a re-
deliberation of the administrative aspect of the case was
conducted pursuant to Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure. The re-deliberation resulted in the
issuance of the assailed Order dated January 28, 2015 with
a vote of 3-2-2 whereby new Commissioner Arthur D. Lim
took no part in the deliberations and abstained from voting.
Citing the same above quoted rule, the COMELEC En
Banc dismissed the original Petition for Disqualification
filed by Legaspi. The dispositive portion of the challenged
Order reads:

RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES to DISMISS the
administrative aspect of this Petition for Disqualification for
FAILURE TO OBTAIN THE NECESSARY MAJORITY VOTES
AFTER RE -DELIBERATION/REHEARING by the members of
the Commission En Banc.
SO ORDERED.16

The Issues

Confounded by the dismissal of his petition despite
having secured a favorable vote from majority of the
members of the COMELEC Special First Division and,
subsequently, from three (3) out of the five (5) participating
and voting Commissioners from the COMELEC En Banc,
Legaspi interposed the instant recourse ascribing grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC arising
from the following acts:
a. When it deliberately misapplied Section 6, Rule
18 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure;
_______________
15 Id., at pp. 32-33.

16 Id., at pp. 102-103.

515
VOL. 768, SEPTEMBER 1, 2015 515

b. When it construed the “NO PART” positions of

the two commissioners as votes together with
the dissenting commissioners resulting in the
dismissal, not of the Motion for Reconsideration,
but the dismissal of the entire administrative
case of disqualification case against
respondents;
c. When it finally decided to favor the respondents
despite only two (2) votes favoring them,
contrary to what is required under Section 5(a),
Rule 3 in relation to Section 4, Rule 18 of the
COMELEC Rules where four (4) votes are
actually required.17

Petitioner’s main postulation is that on private
respondents rest the burden to prove that the COMELEC
Special First Division committed reversible error in
granting the petition for disqualification, and that since
majority of the COMELEC En Banc remained unconvinced
by the private respondents’ motion, the division ruling
should be deemed affirmed. To rule as the COMELEC
herein did — that the entire case, not just the motion for
reconsideration, should be dismissed — would be
tantamount to reversing the division ruling without
obtaining the necessary majority vote required by the
Constitution to overturn the same.
In their Comment,18 private respondents assert that the
COMELEC En Banc’s ruling is in line with Sec. 7, Article
IX-A of the 1987 Constitution, which requires an absolute

majority vote of four (4) members.19 And citing Mendoza v.
COMELEC (Mendoza),20 private respondents claim that
failure of the En Banc to muster the required majority vote
of four (4) would result in the dismissal of the election
protest originally filed with the COMELEC.21
_______________
17 Id., at pp. 37-38.

18 Id., at pp. 145-174.
19 Id., at p. 157; citing Sevilla, Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 203833,
March 19, 2013, 693 SCRA 622.
20 G.R. No. 191084, March 25, 2010, 616 SCRA 443, 458.
21 Rollo, p. 158.

516

For its part, public respondent COMELEC, represented

by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), through its
Comment,22 countered that petitioner does not have the
legal standing to file the instant petition since he does not
stand to be injured or benefited by the outcome of the case
because under Sec. 44 of Republic Act No. (RA) 7160,23
otherwise known as the Local Government Code, it is the
duly-elected vice mayor who will succeed the mayoralty
post in case of permanent vacancy.24 Additionally, the OSG
argued that the COMELEC properly applied Sec. 6, Rule
18 of its rules, in line with the ruling in Mendoza.
Evidently, the crux of the controversy revolves around
the interpretation of Sec. 7, Article IX-A of the 1987
Constitution and the complementary Sec. 6, Rule 18 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, to wit:

ARTICLE IX
Constitutional Commissions
A. COMMON PROVISIONS
x x x
Section 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of
all its Members, any case or matter brought be-
_______________
22 Id., at pp. 121-139.
23 Section 44. Permanent Vacancies in the offices of the Governor,

Vice Governor, Mayor, and Vice Mayor.—(a) If a permanent vacancy
occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice governor or vice
mayor concerned shall become the governor or mayor. If a permanent
vacancy occurs in the offices of the governor, vice governor, mayor, or vice
mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian member or, in case of his
permanent inability, the second highest ranking sanggunian member,
shall become the governor, vice governor, mayor or vice mayor, as the case
may be. Subsequent vacancies in the said office shall be filled
automatically by the other sanggunian members according to their
ranking as defined herein.
24 Rollo, p. 130.

517
VOL. 768, SEPTEMBER 1, 2015 517

fore it within sixty days from the date of its submission for
decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed
submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the
last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules
of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless
otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any
decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be
brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the
aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy
thereof.

Sec. 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
provides:
Section 6. Procedure if Opinion is Equally Divided.—

When the Commission En Banc is equally divided in opinion, or
the necessary majority cannot be had, the case shall be reheard,
and if on rehearing no decision is reached, the action or
proceeding shall be dismissed if originally commenced in the
Commission; in appealed cases, the judgment or order appealed
from shall stand affirmed; and all incidental matters, the petition
or motion shall be denied.

In essence, the Court is asked to determine (1) the
number of votes necessary for the COMELEC En Banc to
resolve a case, and (2) the effect of the En Banc’s failure to
muster the required number of votes.

The Dissent

The petition is impressed with merit.

An absolute majority is
required for the COMELEC
En Banc to decide a case

Anent the first issue, it is clear from the literal wording
of Sec. 7, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution that “a
majority

518

vote of all its Members” is required for the COMELEC En

Banc to issue a decision or resolution of a case or matter
brought before it. Consistently, Sec. 5(a), Rule 3 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure reads:
Section 5. Quorum; Votes Required.—(a) When sitting En

Banc, four (4) Members of the Commission shall constitute a
quorum for the purpose of transacting business. The
concurrence of a majority of the Members of the
Commission shall be necessary for the pronouncement of a
decision, resolution, order or ruling. (emphasis and
underscoring added)

As can be gleaned, both the adverted constitutional and
COMELEC rule provisions, as couched, require not a
simple majority of the participating members
constituting a quorum, but an absolute majority. In the
concrete, of the seven-man commission, as held in Sevilla,
Jr. v. COMELEC (Sevilla), the vote of four (4) members
must always be attained to render a decision, irrespective
of the number of commissioners in actual attendance.25
The 1935 and 1973 Constitutions contained no provision
similar to Sec. 7, Article IX-A of the 1987 version.
Jurisprudence on the construction of the contested
provision, therefore, only came into view after the 1987
Constitution was ratified. Thus, prior to Sevilla, the Court,
at first, in the December 1987 case of Cua v. COMELEC
(Cua), ruled that only a simple majority of those voting on
the pending incident is necessary for a valid ruling, so long
as those who deliberated on the same constituted a
quorum.26 As held:
After considering the issues and the arguments raised by the

parties, the Court holds that the 2-1 decision rendered by the
First Division was a valid decision under Article IX-A, Section 7 of

the Constitution. Furthermore,
_______________
25 G.R. No. 203833, March 19, 2013, 693 SCRA 622, 630.
26 Nos. L-80519-21, December 17, 1987, 156 SCRA 582.

519
VOL. 768, SEPTEMBER 1, 2015 519

the three members who voted to affirm the First Division

constituted a majority of the five members who
deliberated and voted thereon En Banc and their decision
is also valid under the aforecited constitutional provision.
Hence, the proclamation of Cua on the basis of the two aforecited
decisions was a valid act that entitles him now to assume his seat
in the House of Representatives.27 (emphasis added)

It would not be until 2004 when this doctrine in Cua
would categorically be abandoned in Estrella v. COMELEC
(Estrella).28 Speaking through former Associate Justice,
now Ombudsman, Conchita Carpio- Morales (Carpio-
Morales), the Court ratiocinated:
The provision of the Constitution [Sec. 7, Article IX-A] is clear

that it should be the majority vote of all its members and not
only those who participated and took part in the deliberations.
Under the rules of statutory construction, it is to be assumed that
the words in which constitutional provisions are couched express
the objective sought to be attained. Since the above quoted
constitutional provision states “all of its members,” without any
qualification, it should be interpreted as such.
x x x
Even former Constitutional Commissioner Fr. Joaquin Bernas,
SJ, questions the Cua ruling in light of Section 7, which says
“majority of all the Members.” He thus concludes that “[t]hree is
not the majority of seven.”
Had the framers intended that it should be the majority of the
members who participated or deliberated, it would have clearly
phrased it that way as it did with respect to the Supreme Court in
Section 4(2), Article VIII of the Constitution:
x x x
_______________
27 Id., at p.584.

28 G.R. No. 160465, May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA 789.

520

For the foregoing reasons then, this Court hereby abandons the
doctrine laid down in Cua and holds that the COMELEC En Banc
shall decide a case or matter brought before it by a
majority vote of “all its members,” and NOT majority of the
members who deliberated and voted thereon.29 (words in
brackets added)

Justice Carpio-Morales would later on reiterate the
ruling in Estrella in Marcoleta v. COMELEC (Marcoleta),
to wit:
From the 2-3 voting, it is readily discerned that the COMELEC

En Banc cannot overturn the First Division on mere two
assenting votes. On the other hand, the same situation obtains in
the case of the dissenters, there being a shortage of one vote to
sustain the First Division’s findings.
x x x x
Majority, in this case, means a vote of four members of the
COMELEC. The Court in Estrella v. COMELEC pronounced that
Section 5(a) of Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure and
Section 7 of Article IX-A of the Constitution require that a
majority vote of all the members of the COMELEC, and not only
those who participated and took part in the deliberations, is
necessary for the pronouncement of a decision, resolution, order
or ruling.30

Verily, the four-vote requirement is the result of
applying the plain meaning rule or verba legis in
interpreting Sec. 7, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution.
This rule in statutory construction is expressed in the
maxim, index animi sermo, or “speech is the index of
intention.” Furthermore, there is the maxim verba legis
non est recedendum, or “from the words of a
_______________
29 Id., at pp. 792-793.

30 Marcoleta v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 181377, April 24,
2009, 586 SCRA 765, 773 -774.

521
VOL. 768, SEPTEMBER 1, 2015 521

statute there should be no departure.”31 As the statute is

clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its
literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation.32
Settled then is the rule that Sec. 7, Article IX-A of the
1987 Constitution, as couched, requires at least four (4)
votes of the seven (7) members of the COMELEC En Banc
to rule on a pending incident before it. Failure to muster
the threshold four (4) votes brings into play the application
of Sec. 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure,
which calls for a rehearing of the case.

The Decision of the COMELEC
division is affirmed by the fail-
ure to obtain the necessary ma-
jority vote from the COMELEC
En Banc

Recall that in dismissing the Petition for
Disqualification, public respondent COMELEC applied
Mendoza, wherein the Court ruled that the failure to
secure the majority vote of all the members, despite
rehearing, leads to the dismissal of the action, regardless of
the ruling of the division, and despite obtaining the
majority vote of those who participated in the
deliberations. In Mendoza, therein petitioner Joselito R.
Mendoza (Mendoza) was proclaimed winner of the 2007
gubernatorial election for the province of Bulacan, besting
respondent Roberto M. Pagdanganan (Pagdanganan). On
June 1, 2007, Pagdanganan filed an election protest that
the COMELEC Second Division eventually granted,
thereby annulling Mendoza’s proclamation. Aggrieved,
Mendoza moved for reconsideration with the En Banc, but
the COMELEC failed to reach a majority vote to either
grant or deny the motion. Pursuant to its rules, the
COMELEC En Banc reheard the case but
_______________
31 Bolos v. Bolos, G.R. No. 186400, October 20, 2010, 634 SCRA 429,
437.
32 Id.


522

was, nevertheless, unsuccessful in obtaining the required

majority vote for a ruling. Thus, in a 3-1 vote, with three
votes denying the motion, the COMELEC En Banc
sustained the ruling of its Second Division.33
On petition with the Court, Mendoza pointed out that
because the necessary majority vote of four (4) was not
obtained by the COMELEC En Banc, respondent
Pagdanganan’s election protest ought to be dismissed.
Agreeing, the Court, on March 25, 2010, ruled for Mendoza
and explained that as an original action before the
Commission, failure to muster the required majority vote
would lead to the election protest’s dismissal, not just of the
motion for reconsideration.34 As held:
There is a difference in the result of the exercise of jurisdiction

by the COMELEC over election contests. The difference inheres in
the kind of jurisdiction invoked, which in turn, is determined by
the case brought before the COMELEC. When a decision of a trial
court is brought before the COMELEC for it to exercise appellate
jurisdiction, the division decides the appeal but, if there is a
motion for reconsideration, the appeal proceeds to the Banc where
a majority is needed for a decision. If the process ends without the
required majority at the Banc, the appealed decision stands
affirmed. Upon the other hand, and this is what happened in the
instant case, if what is brought before the COMELEC is an
original protest invoking the original jurisdiction of the
Commission, the protest, as one whole process, is first
decided by the division, which process is continued in the
Banc if there is a motion for reconsideration of the
division ruling. If no majority decision is reached in the
En Banc, the protest, which is an original action, shall be
dismissed. There is no first instance decision that can be
deemed affirmed.35 (underscoring in the original; emphasis
added)
_______________
33 Mendoza v. Commission on Elections, supra note 20.

34 Id.
35 Id., at pp. 460-461.

523
VOL. 768, SEPTEMBER 1, 2015 523

It is this ruling in Mendoza that respondents urge Us to

apply to sustain the COMELEC En Banc’s dismissal of
Legaspi’s petition for disqualification. It bears stressing,
however, that the Court in Mendoza was deeply divided
insofar as this procedural aspect is concerned. The
doctrine, therefore, commands further scrutiny.

a. Dismissal of the action or
proceeding in original cases
filed with the COMELEC

To begin with, Sec. 3, Art. IX-C of the Constitution
pertinently provides:
Section 3. The Commission on Elections may sit En Banc or in

two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order
to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-
proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be
heard and decided in division, provided that motions for
reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the
Commission En Banc. (emphasis added)

Clearly then, the Constitution no less bestows on the
COMELEC divisions the authority to decide election cases.
Their decisions arrived are capable of attaining finality,
without need of any affirmative or confirmatory action on
the part of the COMELEC En Banc. For instance, if no
motion for reconsideration is filed by the aggrieved party
within five (5) days from the promulgation of the decision,
the ruling becomes final and executory.36 In this sense, the
process before the division should be deemed complete,
although it can also be considered, in the bigger picture, as
part of the integrated process of resolving an election case
from start to finish, as when the case was originally
initiated before the trial court.
_______________
36 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, Rule 19, Sec. 2. Promulgated on

February 15, 1993.

524

The fact that the COMELEC division’s decision may be

referred to the En Banc via a motion for reconsideration
should in no way be considered as a diminution of its
adjudicatory powers. Worth maintaining is this doctrine in
Mendoza: a motion for reconsideration is a
constitutionally guaranteed remedial mechanism for
parties aggrieved by a division decision or resolution, but
not an appeal.37 In the same vein, it was held in Apo
Fruits Corporation v. Court of Appeals (Apo Fruits
Corporation) that “[t]he Supreme Court sitting En Banc is
not an appellate court vis-à-vis its Divisions, and it
exercises no appellate jurisdiction over the latter. Each
division of the Court is considered not a body inferior to the
Court En Banc, and sits veritably as the Court En Banc
itself.”38 This particular doctrine in Mendoza and Apo
Fruits Corporation should be understood to have
strengthened, rather than rendered nugatory, the
adjudicatory powers of the COMELEC’s and that of the
Court’s divisions — that the decision of a division
virtually amounts to a decision of the En Banc and,
as such, is potentially binding and conclusive on the
parties.
The findings of the division can only be reversed and
their impacts be undone by the COMELEC En Banc on
reconsideration.39 The failure of the COMELEC En Banc to
attain the required number of votes to either reverse or
affirm the ruling of its division would, in turn, call for the
application of Sec. 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, to wit:
_______________
37 Mendoza v. Commission on Elections, supra note 20 at p. 486.

38 Apo Fruits Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 164195, April
30, 2008, 553 SCRA 237, citing Firestone Ceramics, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, 389 Phil. 810, 818; 334 SCRA 465, 478 (2000). In accordance with
Supreme Court Circular No. 2-89, providing Guidelines and Rules in the
Referral to the Court En Banc of Cases Assigned to A Division.
39 Thereafter, by the Supreme Court via a petition under Rule 64 of
the Rules of Court.

525
VOL. 768, SEPTEMBER 1, 2015 525

Section 6. Procedure if Opinion is Equally Divided.—

When the Commission En Banc is equally divided in opinion, or
the necessary majority cannot be had, the case shall be reheard,

and if on rehearing no decision is reached, the action or
proceeding shall be dismissed if originally commenced in
the Commission; in appealed cases, the judgment or order
appealed from shall stand affirmed; and all incidental matters,
the petition or motion shall be denied. (emphasis added)

As can be gleaned, the result of the rule’s application
would vary, depending on whether the pending case is an
original action, an appealed case, or an incidental matter.
It then behooves this Court to properly categorize the
petition for disqualification filed by Legaspi under either of
the three.
In distinguishing an action originally commenced with
the COMELEC from an appealed case, reference should be
made to Article IX -C, Sec. 2(2) of the Constitution.40
According to the provision, the COMELEC is a
constitutional commission vested with the exclusive
original jurisdiction over election contests, involving
regional, provincial and city officials, as well as appellate
jurisdiction over election protests involving elective
municipal and barangay officials.41 Thus, in the case at
bar, the petition for disqualification filed by Legaspi was
correctly categorized by the ponencia as an election case
originally com-
_______________
40 SECTION 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the

following powers and functions:
x x x x
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests
relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective
regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over
all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts
of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by
trial courts of limited jurisdiction. (emphasis added)
41 Saludaga v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 189431 and
191120, April 7, 2010, 617 SCRA 601, 621.

526

menced in the Commission because (1) private

respondents were candidates for posts in the city
government, (2) there is no trial court ruling elevated to
the Commission to speak of, and (3) the motion for

reconsideration filed by private respondents with the
COMELEC En Banc, as earlier stated, does not amount to
an appeal.
Now on to the effect of Sec. 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure.
It is beyond cavil that for cases originally filed before it,
the failure of the COMELEC to muster the required
majority vote after rehearing would lead to the dismissal of
the action or proceeding pending before it. The
conjunctive word “or” clearly indicates that there is an
intended distinction between the words “action” and
“proceeding,” such that in not all instances would the
“action” originally commenced before the COMELEC will
be dismissed in their entirety. Otherwise, to treat them
similarly would mean that the words are superfluous,
which is not the case.
It is the considered view that the “action” to be
dismissed in cases originally commenced before the
COMELEC under Sec. 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules
of Procedure pertains to those originally and directly
filed with the COMELEC division or En Banc. As
taught in San Juan v. COMELEC, the division has
jurisdiction to hear and decide election cases, but as for
motions for reconsideration of decisions rendered by the
division, the COMELEC En Banc has jurisdiction over the
matter.42 On the other hand, the cases directly filed with
the COMELEC En Banc are those specifically provided in
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, such as petitions for
postponement of elections under Sec. 1, Rule 26,43 petitions
for
_______________
42 G.R. No. 170908, August 24, 2007, 531 SCRA 178, 183.
43 Section 1. Postponement of Election.—When for any serious cause
such as violence, terrorism, loss or destruction of election paraphernalia or
records, force majeure, and other analogous causes of such nature that the
holding of a free, orderly, honest, peaceful and

527
VOL. 768, SEPTEMBER 1, 2015 527

failure of election under Sec. 2, Rule 26,44 complaints or

charges for indirect contempt under Sec. 2, Rule 29,45
preliminary investigation of election offenses under Sec. 1,
Rule 34,46
_______________
credible election should become impossible in any political subdivision. the

Commission, motu proprio, or upon a verified petition by any interested
party, and after due notice and hearing whereby all interested parties are
afforded equal opportunity to be heard, may postpone the election therein
to a date which should be reasonably close to the date of the election not
held, suspended, or which resulted in a failure of election, but not later
than thirty (30) days after the cessation of the cause of such postponement
or suspension of the election or failure to elect.
44 Section 2. Failure of Election.—If, on account of force majeure,
violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes the election in any
precinct has not been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before
the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and
during the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in
the custody of canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect,
and in any of such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect
the result of the election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified
petition by any interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for
the holding or continuation of the election not held, suspended or which
resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the date of the
election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not
later than thirty (30) days after the cessation of the cause of such
postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.
45 Sec. 2. Indirect Contempt.—After charge in writing has been filed
with the Commission or Division, as the case may be, and an opportunity
to the respondent to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of the
following acts may be punished for indirect contempt: x x x
46 Sec. 1. Authority of the Commission to Prosecute Election Offenses.
—The Commission shall have the exclusive power to conduct preliminary
investigation of all election offenses punishable under the election laws
and to prosecute the same, except as may otherwise be provided by law.

528

and all other cases where the COMELEC division is not

authorized to act.47
Meanwhile “proceeding” refers to a procedural step that
is part of a larger action or special proceeding.48 This
definition is broad enough to encompass the motion for
reconsideration challenging the rulings in the first
set of cases above described. With this interpretation,
the failure of the COMELEC En Banc to reach four (4)
votes would not necessarily result in the dismissal of the
original cases for it may be, as it is here, that only a
procedural step, a “proceeding,” the pending motion for
reconsideration, ought to be disposed. Stated in the

alternative, the failure of the COMELEC En Banc to reach
four (4) votes would result in the division ruling being
sustained. This interpretation is consistent with the
parallel procedure observed in the Court of Tax Appeals
mandating that “[n]o decision of a Division of the Court
may be reversed or modified except by the affirmative vote
of four justices of the Court En Banc acting on the case.”49
The ponencia, however, counters that the “action or
proceeding” referred to under Sec. 6, Rule 18 should be
interpreted in relation to Part V of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, covering Rules 20-34, entitled “Particular
Actions or Proceedings.” The ponencia adds that the
itemization therein does not include motions for
reconsideration that fall under Rule 18. It could not then be
claimed, according to the ponencia, that the
_______________
47 Sec. 2. The Commission En Banc.—The Commission shall sit En

Banc in cases hereinafter specifically provided, or in pre-proclamation
cases upon a vote of a majority of the members of the Commission, or in
all other cases where a division is not authorized to act, or where, upon a
unanimous vote of all the Members of a Division, an interlocutory matter
or issue relative to an action or proceeding before it is decided to be
referred to the Commission En Banc.
48 J. Conchita Carpio-Morales, Separate Opinion, Mendoza v.
COMELEC, supra note 20 at p. 475; citing Black’s Law Dictionary.
49 A.M. No. 05-11-07-CTA, Rule 2, Sec. 3. Promulgated on November
22, 2005.

529
VOL. 768, SEPTEMBER 1, 2015 529

motion for reconsideration is a “proceeding” within the

contemplation of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
I respectfully disagree.
The strict construction offered by the ponencia offends
the Constitution three times over: (i) it circumvents the
four-vote requirement under Sec. 7, Art. IX-A of the
Constitution, (ii) it diminishes the adjudicatory
powers of the COMELEC Divisions under Sec. 3,
Article IX-C of the Constitution, and (iii) it unduly
expands the jurisdiction of the COMELEC En Banc.
First, recall that under Sec. 3, Article IX-C of the 1987
Constitution,50 the COMELEC Divisions are granted
adjudicatory powers to decide election cases. Recall further
that under Sec. 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution,51 as

interpreted in Marcoleta and Estrella, four (4) votes are
necessary for the COMELEC En Banc to decide a case.
Naturally, the party moving for reconsideration, as the
party seeking affirmative relief, has the burden of evidence
in proving that the division
_______________
50 Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit En Banc or in two

divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite
disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All
such election cases shall be heard and decided in division,
provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be
decided by the Commission En Banc. (emphasis added)
51 Section 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote
of all its Members, any case or matter brought before it within sixty
days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or
matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of
the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the
Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by
this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each
Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the
aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.
(emphasis added)

530

committed reversible error.52 Additionally, he or she also

bears the corollary burden of convincing four (4)
Commissioners to grant his or her plea.
This voting threshold, however, is easily rendered
illusory by the application of the Mendoza ruling, which
virtually allows the grant of a motion for reconsideration
even though the movant fails to secure four votes in his or
her favor. As in this case, the ponencia suggests that in
spite of securing only two (2) votes to grant the
motion for reconsideration, the movants would
nevertheless be declared the victors in this legal
battle, in blatant violation of Sec. 7, Art. IX-A of the
Constitution.
Second, to exacerbate the situation, the circumvention of
the four-vote requirement, in turn, trivializes the
proceedings before the COMELEC divisions and presents
rather paradoxical scenarios, to wit:
i. The failure of the COMELEC En Banc to muster the

required majority vote only means that it could not
have validly decided the case. Yet curiously, it
managed to reverse the ruling of a body that
has properly exercised its adjudicatory powers;
and
ii. A motion for reconsideration may be filed on the
grounds that the evidence is insufficient to justify the
decision, order or ruling; or that the said decision,
order or ruling is contrary to law.53 If the COMELEC
En Banc does not find that either ground exists, there
would be no cogent reason to disturb the ruling of the
COMELEC division. Otherwise stated, failure to
muster four votes to sustain the motion for
reconsideration should be un-
_______________
52 Lim v. Equitable PCI Bank, now known as the Banco de Oro
Unibank, Inc., G.R. No. 183918, January 15, 2014, 713 SCRA 555.
53 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, Rule 19, Sec. 1.

530

derstood as tantamount to the COMELEC En Banc

finding no reversible error attributable to its
division’s ruling. Said decision, therefore, ought to be
affirmed, not reversed nor vacated.
These resultant paradoxes are patently absurd. Under
the majority’s interpretation of Sec. 6, Rule 18 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, a movant, in situations
such as this, need not even rely on the strength of
his or her arguments and evidence to win a case, and
may, instead, choose to rest on inhibitions and
abstentions of COMELEC members to produce the
same result. To demonstrate herein, it is as though the
ponencia counted the two (2) abstention votes in favor of
the respondents for a total of four (4). This impedes and
undermines the adjudicatory powers of the COMELEC
divisions by allowing their rulings to be overruled by the
En Banc without the latter securing the necessary numbers
to decide the case.
Third, to countenance the majority’s interpretation of
the rule would expand the jurisdiction of the COMELEC
En Banc beyond constitutional bounds. To illustrate, under
Sec. 3, Article IX-C, the jurisdiction of the COMELEC
En Banc in cases originally decided by the

COMELEC divisions is limited to resolving the
motions for reconsideration assailing the their
rulings. The dismissal by the COMELEC En Banc, in
applying Sec. 6, Rule 18 in election cases, should then be
limited only to what it has jurisdiction over — that is the
motion for reconsideration alone. To allow the COMELEC
En Banc to modify, if not reverse, the ruling of the division
when the Commission itself admitted that it failed to
muster the required number of votes to do so would then
run afoul the Constitution for it goes beyond dismissing the
motion for reconsideration, and extends to disposing the
originally filed petition in its entirety.
As a more viable alternative, this dissent submits that
when the petition for disqualification was elevated through
a motion

531
VOL. 768, SEPTEMBER 1, 2015 531

for reconsideration to the COMELEC En Banc, the decision

of the Special First Division could have only been set aside
by four votes in the COMELEC En Banc granting the
motion for reconsideration.54 And when no decision on the
motion was reached by the COMELEC En Banc even after
rehearing, what remains is the decision of the division,
which was validly rendered pursuant to the provisions of
the Constitution and the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.55
The ruling of the division should then be considered
affirmed, not vacated. Modifying the Mendoza doctrine to
produce such an effect does not require any far-fetched or
strained interpretation of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure. As discussed, it simply requires construing the
word “proceeding” in its plain meaning, beyond its alleged
specialized use in Part V of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure as what the ponencia suggested, so as to include
motions for reconsideration lodged with the COMELEC En
Banc.
This alternative interpretation follows the basic precept
in statutory construction that a statute should be construed
in harmony with the Constitution.56 Indeed, the Court has
not hesitated to declare unconstitutional and strike down
enactments that are impossible to reconcile with
Constitutional provisions. But when an interpretation is
available allowing for the challenged enactment or its
provisions to be salvaged, such alternative is more favored
and is pursued, rather than resorting to creating legal
vacuums. As in here, the interpretation offered in this

dissent resolves the paradoxes and constitutional violations
earlier outlined, without necessarily having to declare Sec.
6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
unconstitutional. Moreover, it gives meaning and
strengthens the adjudicatory powers bestowed on the
COMELEC divisions under Sec. 3, Article IX-C of the
Constitution,
_______________
54 J. Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, Dissenting Opinion, Mendoza v.

COMELEC, supra note 20 at pp. 515-516.
55 Id., at p. 516.
56 Cagas v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 209185, October 25, 2013, 708 SCRA
672, 691.

533
VOL. 768, SEPTEMBER 1, 2015 533

and reinforces the fact that their rulings are potentially

binding and conclusive upon the parties, as earlier
discussed. Likewise, it guarantees observance to the long-
standing jurisprudence on the majority vote requirement
under Sec. 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution. And lastly, it
ensures that the COMELEC En Banc exercises its
jurisdiction within constitutional bounds.

b. Pursuing the interpreta-
tion of Sec. 6, Rule 18 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure
in Mendoza would lead to ab-
surd results

Further enlightening on this discussion is the Separate
Opinion in Mendoza of former Justice Carpio-Morales, who
coincidentally, if not ironically, also penned the cases
Mendoza was mainly predicated on: Estrella and
Marcoleta. While concurring in the result, the former
justice, in Mendoza, wrote:
The bone of contention is the manner of disposition of a motion

for reconsideration when in spite of rehearing, no decision is
reached by the COMELEC En Banc which remains equally
divided in opinion, or wherein the necessary majority still cannot
be had. The rule states that “the action or proceeding shall be
dismissed if originally commenced in the Commission.”
I respectfully differ from the ponencia.

There are cases which may be initiated at the
COMELEC En Banc, the voting in which could also result
to a stalemate. The COMELEC sits En Banc in cases
specifically provided by the Rules, pre-proclamation cases
upon a vote of a majority of its members, all other cases
where a Division is not authorized to act, inter alia. These
matters include election offense cases, contempt
proceedings, and postponement or declaration of failure of
elections

534

and the calling for a special elections. In such cases, when

the necessary majority in the COMELEC En Banc cannot
be had even after a rehearing of the action, the effect is
dismissal of the action.
In an election protest originally commenced in the
COMELEC and a decision is reached by the Division, it is,
as the ponencia correctly posits, the banc that shall
effectively “complete the process,” which position hews
well with Justice Presbitero Velasco, Jr.’s view of “one
integrated process,” to which I also agree. A motion for
reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc is one such
proceeding that is a part of the entire procedural
mechanism of election cases. Ergo, when the necessary
majority in the COMELEC En Banc cannot be had even
after a re hearing, the effect is dismissal of the proceeding.
The motion for reconsideration should be dismissed.
As defined by Black, the term “proceeding” may refer to a
procedural step that is part of a larger action or special
proceeding. Black defines “process” as a series of actions, motions
or occurrences.
The word “proceeding” could not have been used as an
innocuous term. It was used to refer to matters requiring the
resolution of the Banc in cases originally commenced in the
COMELEC that pass through a two-tiered process, as
differentiated from actions initiated and totally completed at the
Banc level. It is a universal rule of application that a construction
of a statute is to be favored, and must be adopted if reasonably
possible, which will give meaning to every word, clause, and
sentence of the statute and operation and effect to every part and
provision of it.
Following the position of the ponencia, it is observed that in
such cases where a COMELEC Division dismisses an election
protest and the necessary majority is not reached after the

rehearing of a motion for reconsideration, the COMELEC En
Banc, in effect, affirms such decision by similarly dismissing the
“action.” Under my submission, the result is the same but what is
dis-

535
VOL. 768, SEPTEMBER 1, 2015 535

missed is the “proceeding” which is the motion for

reconsideration. There should be no declaration of affirmance
since, as the ponencia concedes, there is “no conclusive result in
the form of a majority vote.” The COMELEC En Banc should
dismiss the proceeding at hand but not the action, petition or
case.
x x x
Since a majority vote was not attained after rehearing the Motion
for Reconsideration, the ponencia states that the COMELEC En
Banc should have dismissed the election protest itself or, in effect,
vacated the decision of the Division. Again I submit that it is the
Motion for Reconsideration that is the “proceeding” which should
be dismissed. First, it is absurd for a deliberating body
which arrived at “no conclusive result in the form of a
majority vote” to do something about a matter on the
table, much less to overturn it. Second, the resulting
tyranny of the minority is unjust for, in such cases where
the COMELEC En Banc has a quorum of four, the protestee
only needs to obtain the vote of just one Commissioner to
frustrate the protestant’s victory that was handed down by
three Commissioners. Third, the ponencia incorrectly
denotes that a body which could not pronounce a decision
can effectively pronounce one and even one contrary to
that of a body that could reach a decision. Otherwise
stated, it downplays the significance of “the concurrence
of a majority,” which breathes life to any handiwork of the
decision-making power of the COMELEC. Certainly, that
was not the purpose and principle envisioned by the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure.57 (emphasis added)

Echoing the sentiments of the esteemed Ombudsman, to
dismiss the entire case — the petition for disqualification
— because the majority vote at the En Banc level was not
mus-
_______________
57 J. Conchita Carpio-Morales, Separate Opinion, Mendoza v.

COMELEC, supra note 20 at pp. 474 -477.

536

tered is as absurd as it is illogical. As demonstrated in the

extant case, petitioner won before the COMELEC’s Special
First Division, which ruled to disqualify private
respondents in light of the overwhelming evidence of vote-
buying, their followers having been caught in flagrante
delicto. Accordingly, respondents moved for reconsideration
before the En Banc. Necessarily, therefore, it was
incumbent upon the private respondents to have the ruling
of the division overturned by the Commission as it is
elementary that the burden to prove a claim rests on the
party asserting it.58 Here, since Germar and Santos failed
to overcome such burden, the October 3, 2013 ruling of the
COMELEC First Division should be deemed affirmed,
binding and conclusive on the parties, lest private
respondents be declared the victors in the case without
themselves securing the required number of votes.
Applying the conclusions arrived at in the case at bar,
there is no logical result other than to modify the
doctrine laid down in Mendoza insofar as the effect of
the failure to muster the required majority vote in the
COMELEC En Banc even after rehearing is concerned, and
to grant the instant petition to set a new precedent to
govern cases lodged with the electoral tribunal.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
January 28, 2015 Order of the COMELEC En Banc in SPA
No. 13-353 (DC) ought to be REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, and the October 3, 2013 Resolution of the
COMELEC First Division should, accordingly, be
REINSTATED AND AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Petition dismissed.
Notes.—As the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)

is the specialized agency tasked with the supervision of
elections all over the country, its findings of fact when
supported
_______________
58 Supra note 52.

537
VOL. 768, SEPTEMBER 1, 2015 537

by substantial evidence are final, non-reviewable and binding

upon the Supreme Court. (Basmala vs. Commission on Elections,
567 SCRA 664 [2008])
The Supreme Court (SC) reminds the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) that, in the exercise of it adjudicatory or
quasi-judicial powers, the Constitution mandates it to hear and
decide cases first by Division and, upon motion for
reconsideration, by the En Banc; As cancellation proceedings
involve the exercise of quasi-judicial functions of the COMELEC,
the COMELEC in Division should have first decided this case.
(Cerafica vs. Commission on Elections, 743 SCRA 426 [2014])

——o0o——
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7/30/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 768

G.R. No. 216572. September 1, 2015.*

Constitutional Law; Election Law; Commission on Elections;

VOL. 768, SEPTEMBER 1, 2015 485

486 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 768, SEPTEMBER 1, 2015 487

always be attained to render a decision, irrespective of the

488 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 768, SEPTEMBER 1, 2015 489

ment, (2) there is no trial court ruling elevated to the

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.

490 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

1 Under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court; Rollo, pp.

VOL. 768, SEPTEMBER 1, 2015 491

Upon learning about the results of the tally, petitioner

3 At 12:45 p.m. on 14 May 2013.

492 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Legaspi vs. Commission on Elections

Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. sat in the First Division

4 Via an Order dated 1 October 2013. The substitution of

VOL. 768, SEPTEMBER 1, 2015 493

The COMELEC En Banc and the Dismissal of the

On 10 July 2004, the COMELEC En Banc took a vote on

6 There was a vacancy created in the membership of the COMELEC

494 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

In view of the foregoing, the COMELEC En Banc issued

After the rehearing, the COMELEC En Banc took

Sec. 6. Procedure if Opinion is Equally Divided.—When the

9 Rollo, pp. 84-93; p. 100.

VOL. 768, SEPTEMBER 1, 2015 495

Unconvinced, petitioner filed the present petition14

496 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Sec. 6. Procedure if Opinion is Equally Divided.—When the

majority still cannot be had after the rehearing, however,

VOL. 768, SEPTEMBER 1, 2015 497

Mendoza v. Commission on Elections, et al.17 gives us a

division’s decision). The protestee challenged the foregoing

17 630 Phil. 432; 616 SCRA 443 (2010).

498 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

would result — not in the denial of the said motion or the

Rules when that action was originally filed before the

VOL. 768, SEPTEMBER 1, 2015 499

The phrase “originally commenced in the commission” in

500 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

In this case, the fact that SPA No. 13-323 (DC) is an

before the En Banc — an assumption that has already been

[H]owever the jurisdiction of the COMELEC is involved, x x x, the

26 Supra note 17 at p. 460; p. 460. (Emphasis ours)

VOL. 768, SEPTEMBER 1, 2015 501

tion for reconsideration with the COMELEC En Banc from

At best, the filing of a motion for reconsideration with

the En Banc through a motion for reconsideration. Hence,

27 Id., at p. 484; p. 486. (Emphasis ours)

502 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code,28 SPA No. 13-323

Justice Velasco points out that the first effect under

28 Batas Pambansa Bilang 881.

VOL. 768, SEPTEMBER 1, 2015 503

to the “cases originally filed before the COMELEC division

29 Dissenting Opinion of J. Velasco, p. 528.

504 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The pin that holds Justice Velasco’s argument is his

32 See the “Whole Act Rule” in statutory construction. The rule