A.M. No. 03-8-22-SC.

September 16, 2003

RE: EM NO. 03-010 - ORDER OF THE FIRST DIVISION OF THE COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS DATED AUGUST 15, 2003.

EN BANC

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the Court En Banc dated 16 SEP
2003

A.M. No. 03-8-22 SC. (Re: EM No. 03-010 Order of the First Division of the Commission on
Elections dated August 15, 2003.)

On 10 September 2003, the First Division bf the Commission Elections (COMELEC)

promulgated a Resolution in EM Nos. 03-010 & 03-011, [1] which disposed thus:
cralaw

"WHEREFORE, for the reasons given, this Commission may

be persuaded to pronounce the existence of sufficient grounds to
declare respondents in contempt of this Commission and accordingly
impose the proper penalty. Nevertheless, we are constitutionally
enjoined from doing so without respondents first going through the
process of impeachment.
"As prayed for by Petitioner Rodolfo T. AIbano III and
Intervenor Rodrigo B. Gutang, let [a] copy of this resolution be
forwarded [to] the House of Representatives.
"However, in the light of the foregoing discussion, we find the
filing of the present petitions premature because of the authoritative
doctrine that impeachable officers must first be removed from office
by impeachment before any punitive measure may be imposed against
them. Consequently, the actions being untimely filed, as explained by
the Supreme Court, the Petitions for Indirect Contempt deserve
nothing less than outright dismissal. Let the above-captioned cases be,
as they are hereby ordered, DISMISSED.
"SO ORDERED."

On 26 August 2003, prior to the promulgation of the above Resolution of the COMELEC's
First Division, this Court en banc issued its own Resolution, quoted in full as follows:

"Acting on the Order of the Commission on Elections dated

August 15, 2003 signed by Presiding Commissioner Rufino SB. Javier
of the Comelec First Division addressed to Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide Jr. and Associate Justices Josue N. Bellosillo, Reynato S. Puno
 and Artemio V. Panganiban, sending them copies of Petition's for
Indirect Contempt filed against them in the Commission by the Malay
Democrats of the Philippines (signed by Ma. Linda Olaguer
Montayre), Rodolfo T. Albano III and Rodrigo B. Gutang, and
advising them that they may, if they so desire, send to (the)
Commission within a reasonable time their observation or comment on
the afore-enumerated pleadings to help the Commission in
intelligently disposing of them, the Court RESOLVED (1) to treat it as
an administrative matter cognizable by the Courts en banc as it affects
the entire Court, and (2.) to inform the Commission that the subject
matter of the Petitions involves a, review of the final decision and/or
official actions of this Court in G.R. Nos. 147589 and 147613, June
26, 2001 (Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. commission on
Elections, et al.), a review that is, unquestionably beyond the
jurisdiction of the Commission. Under the Constitution and pursuant
to the principle of separation of powers, decisions, orders and official
actions of the Supreme Court and its Members cannot be reviewed,
passed upon, modified, much less reversed by any department, agency
or branch of government, whether directly or indirectly under any
guise whatsoever. Accordingly, the Petitions for Indirect Contempt
deserve nothing less than outright dismissal.
"SO ORDERED"

While this Court does not fault the COMELEC's First Division for outrightly DISMISSING the
Petitions for Contempt, it cannot let the "reasons given" therefor pass unchallenged and
uncorrected. These reasons were proffered without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion, in clear contravention of the Constitution and the above-quoted Resolution.

In its 38-page Resolution, the COMELEC First Division basically insinuates two points as
follows:

(1) that it possesses the power to hold in contempt the

Chief Justice and some Associate Justices for their
participation and vote in decisions and orders of this
Court, which allegedly interfered with or impeded the
proceedings of the Commission; and
(2) that it had in fact determined the "existence of
sufficient grounds to declare respondents in contempt
of [the] Commission and to 'impose the proper
penalty," were it not for the fact that the Justices were
impeachable officers who "must first be removed from
office by impeachment before any punitive measure
may be imposed against them."

These ratiocinations constitute plain and simple legal balderdash.

FIRST, as already stated in our foregoing 26 August 2003 Resolution, the Commission has
no. jurisdiction to hold the Court or any of its Members in contempt for any, decision,
order or official action they issue. Initially, the COMELEC's First Division and its three
signatory Commissioners openly conceded that, indeed, they did not have any power to
review, alter or reverse such act. Yet, it did pass upon them in its Resolution and
concluded thereafter that the "June 6, 2001 Decision, Order of October 8, 2002, and
Resolution dated February 18, 2003 restrained the COMELEC from performing its
constitutional duties and prerogatives." That restraint allegedly constituted contempt of
the Commission.

There is no need to explain in detail or to defend the aforesaid three issuances of this
Court in G.R. Nos. 147589 and 147613, (Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v.
Commission on Elections), because they speak for themselves. Suffice it to say that they
were its official actions promulgated in appropriate certiorari proceedings, in, which the
Commission's previous Decision on the matter was, REVERSED. That the Supreme Court
has the authority to pass upon, modify or reverse the quasi-judicial actions of the
COMELEC is UNQUESTIONED.

Verily, under Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution "[j]udicial power includes the duty
of the courts of justice x x x to, determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government." More specifically, Article. IX, Section 7 of the
Constitution grants the Supreme Court the authority to pass upon on certiorari "any
decision, order or ruling" of the COMELEC and other constitutional commissions.

Giving flesh to these constitutional provisions is Rule 64 of the Rules of Court which
provides that" "[a] judgment or final order or resolution of the Commission on Elections x
x x may be brought x x x to .the Supreme Court on certiorari under Rule 65." On the other
hand, Rule 65 states: "When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions has acted Without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, x x x" the Supreme Court
may annul or modify the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and grant such
incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. Finally, Rules 135 and 136 list the
inherent powers of courts and judicial officers to ensure that their decisions or orders are:
carried out, including the power of meting out contempt.

True, the COMELEC -- along with the Commission on Audit, the Commission on Civil
Service and the, Ombudsman -- is a constitutionally created body with constitutionally
mandated functions. However, as already stated, the actions of all such constitutional,
bodies are subject to" certiorari review by the Supreme Court as was done in G.R. Nos.
147589 and 147613. Thus, the Court may intervene, strike down or modify COMELEC's
actions without itself incurring any liability for contempt; whether its Justices happen to be
impeachable officers or not if the Supreme Court (or its Members) can be held liable for
contempt for official actions, then it would cease to be "supreme" in its task of interpreting
the law and would become subordinate to whichever agency claims the power to cite the
Court or its Members for contempt.

In short, the fact that Supreme Court Justices are impeachable officers should not be the
ground for the COMELEC's dismissal of the contempt charges. Rather, they cannot be held
liable for contempt, because their herein questioned Decision, Resolution, and Order that
have allegedly interfered with, proceedings of the COMELEC were made pursuant to their
constitutional function. To stop or impede COMELEC's proceedings when these have been
conducted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion is not
merely a judicial prerogative; the Constitution mandates such move as a judicial duty."
The performance of this duty cannot subject the Court or its Members to contempt of the
COMELEC; otherwise, they would not be able to reverse or modify its abusive actions.

"The sound, salutary and self-evident principle, prevailing in

this as in most jurisdictions, is that judgments of the highest tribunal of
the land may not be reviewed by any other agency branch, department,
or official of Government. Once the Supreme Court has spoken, there
the matter must rest. Its decision should not and cannot be appealed to
or reviewed by any other entity, much less reversed or modified on the
ground that it is, tainted by error in its findings of fact or conclusions
of law, flawed in its logic or language, or otherwise erroneous in some
 other respect. This, on the indisputable and unshakeable foundation of
public policy, and constitutional and traditional principle." (In Re
Joaquin T. Borromeo, 311 Phil. 441, 509, February 21, 1995)

SECOND. The COMELEC's notion that impeachable officers cannot be held in contempt is
palpably incorrect or at least misleading. Maliciously implied in this notion is that the
Supreme Court erred in holding the Chairman and Members of the COMELEC in contempt
via its Resolution dated 18 February 2003 in the same G.R. Nos. 147589 and 147613.

As mentioned earlier, this Court has undisputed certiorari powers over the actions of the
Commission on Elections. As an incident of such prerogative, the Court has the inherent
authority to enforce its orders and to hold the COMELEC's Chairman and Commissioners in
contempt when they impede, obstruct, or degrade its proceedings or orders, or disobey,
ignore or otherwise offend its dignity.

Clearly, the COMELEC has no reciprocal constitutional power to pass upon the actions of
this Court or its Members Hence, the Commission has absolutely no authority to hold them
in contempt as an incident of its inexistent power of review. Even more clearly, it has no
right to recriminate or sulk when its imprudent actions are reversed, or its Members held
in contempt for their rash actions.

By voluntarily paying the fine imposed in our contempt Resolution of 18 February 2003,
the Chairman and all the Commissioners of the COMELEC displayed a becoming regard for
the rule of law in thereby recognizing this Court's authority to hold in contempt
impeachable officials like them. It is a source of wonder why the First Division composed of
only three -- a minority -- of the seven COMELEC members are now in a tantrum over a
final and executed contempt Order of this Court.

"x x x [T]he punishment for contempt of court is a remedial,

preservative or coercive act, rather than a vindictive or punitive one,
and is imposed for the benefit of complainant or the other party to the
suit who has been injured, and its object is to compel obedience to, or
the performance of, the court's orders or decrees, which the contemnor
refuses to obey although able to do so, and thus, to secure, preserve,
vindicate, enforce, or advance the rights of such private parties, as
well as to vindicate the court's authority." (Facinal vs. Cruz, 213
SCRA 23.8, 244-245, September 2, 1992)

As to the First division's reckless innuendo that. COMELEC Commissioners are exempt'
from criminal prosecution and thus from the criminal aspects of contempt, they should
read De. Venecia vs. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 130240, February 5, 2002), People vs.
Jalosjos (381 Phil. 6901, February .3, 2000), Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan; (363 Phil. 605,
March 8, 1999), Paredes, vs. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 118354, August 8, 1995), and
Martinez vs. Morfe (44 SCRA 22, March 24, 1972). In those Decisions, lawmakers are not
totally exempt from criminal proceedings; how then can the First Division Commissioners
pretend to be more special than they?

THIRD, under the doctrine of separation of powers, the three major branches of
government -- the Executive, the Legislative and the Judicial -- are coequal and coordinate
with each other. But none may interfere with, review or pass upon the exclusive powers
vested in each of them by the Constitution. Specifically, not even the other two great
branches of government may reverse or modify decisions and orders of the Supreme Court
in given case -- not the President, not Congress much less the COMELEC.

But, as part of the system of checks and balances, if. Congress does not agree with the
Court's interpretation of a law, it may repeal, modify or amend the statute; but it cannot
directly overturn the decision or hold the magistrates writing or voting thereon liable for
contempt or for any administrative, criminal, civil or any other liability. On the other hand,
the President may appoint justices who may change the interpretation in the future. But no
act of Congress or the President may alter a final and executory decision of this Court.

"Indeed, resolutions of the Supreme Court as a collegiate

court, whether en banc or division, speak for themselves and are
entitled to full faith and credence and are beyond investigation or
inquiry under the same principle of conclusiveness of enrolled bills of
the legislature. (U.S. vs. Pons, 34 Phil. 729; Gardiner, et al. vs.
Paredes, et al., 61 Phil. 118; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1) The
Supreme Court's pronouncement of the doctrine that (l)t is well settled
that the enrolled bill . . . is conclusive upon the courts as regards the
tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the
President. If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill
before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the
Executive [as claimed by petitioner-importer who unsuccessfully
sought refund of margin fees] - on which' we cannot speculate,
without jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and
undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system - the
remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree
is fully and reciprocally applicable to Supreme Court orders,
resolutions and decisions, mutatis mutandis. (Casco Phil. Chemical
Co., Inc. vs. Gimenez, 7 SCRA 347, 350. (Citing Primicias vs.
Paredes, 61 'Phil. 118, 120; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1;
Macias vs. Comelec, 3 SCRA 1)
"The Court has consistently stressed that the doctrine of
separation, of powers calls for the executive, legislative and judicial
departments being left alone to discharge their duties as they see fit
(Tan vs. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677). It has thus maintained in the same
way that the judiciary has a right to expect that neither the President
nor Congress would cast doubt on the mainspring of its orders or
decisions, it should refrain from speculating as to alleged hidden
forces at work that could have impelled either coordinate branch into
acting the way it did. The concept of separation of powers
presupposes mutual' respect by and between the three departments of
the government (Tecson vs. Salas, 34 SCRA 275, 286-287)
"To allow litigants to go beyond the Courts resolution and
claim that the members acted 'with deliberate bad faith' and rendered
(an) 'unjust resolution' in disregard or violation of the duty of their
high office to act upon their own independent consideration and
judgment of the matter at hand would be to destroy the authenticity,
integrity and conclusiveness of such collegiate acts and resolutions
and to disregard utterly' the presumption of regular performance' of
official duty. To allow such collateral attack would destroy the
separation of powers and undermine the role of the Supreme Court as
the final arbiter of all justiciable disputes." (In Re Wenceslao Laureta,
148 SCRA 382, 419-420, March 12, 1987; italics in original)

While the COMELEC is given specific powers and functions by the Constitution, the
Commission does not have the same level and standing as the three great branches of
government. Hence, erroneous and whimsical are all pretentions of equality, with those
three, as unabashedly propositioned directly or indirectly -- in the COMELEC Order of 10
September 2003.

FOURTH, citing the Separate Opinions of Justices Jose C. Vitug and, Vicente V. Mendoza in
the same cases (G.R. Nos. 147589 and 147613), the COMELEC's First division
peremptorily and erroneously charges the Chief Justice and the concerned Associate
Justices with "judicial legislation" allegedly constituting contempt. To begin with, the,
dissenting Justices, particularly Justice Vitug who is still a sitting Member, merely said that
the ponencia "x x x may unwittingly be crossing the limits of judicial legislation." The
Dissent advisedly used the words "may" and "unwittingly," but the First Division deviously
misinterpreted these terms to mean a positive charge of judicial lawmaking.

The main objection of the COMELEC's First Division which was earlier espoused by Justices
Vitug and Mendoza during 'the Court's deliberation namely, that the majority ignored the
alleged intent of the framers of the Constitution to open the party-list system to all groups,
and not exclusively to the "marginalized and underrepresented," has already been
adequately: addressed by the Court's 26 June 2001 Decision, from which we quote in part
as follows:

"The Separate Opinions of our distinguished colleagues,

Justices Jose C. Vitug and Vicente V. Mendoza, are anchored mainly
on the supposed intent of the framers of the Constitution as culled,
from their deliberations.
"The fundamental principle in constitutional construction,
however, is that the primary source from. Which to ascertain
constitutional intent or purpose is the language of the provision itself.
The presumption is that the words in which the constitutional
provisions are couched express the' objective sought to be attained. In
other words, verba legis still prevails. Only when the meaning of the
words used .is unclear and equivocal should resort be made to
extraneous aids of construction and interpretation, such as the
proceedings of the Constitutional Commission or Convention, in order
to shed light on and ascertain the true intent or purpose of the
provision being construed.
"Indeed, as cited in the Separate Opinion of Justice Mendoza,
this Court stated in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary that
'the debates and proceedings of the constitutional convention [may be
consulted in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting
Constitution x x x only when other guides fail as said proceedings are
powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is
clear. Debates in the constitutional convention 'are of value as showing
the views of the individual members, and as indicating the reason for
their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large
majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow citizens
whose votes at the polls that instrument the force of fundamental law.
We think it safer to construe the Constitution from what appears upon
its face.' The proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it
was understood by the people adopting it than in the framers'
understanding thereof.'
"Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, relatives to the
party-list system, is couched in clear terms: the mechanics of the
system shall be provided by law. Pursuant thereto, Congress enacted
 RA 7941. In understanding and implementing party-list representation,
we should therefore look at the law first. Only when we find its
provisions ambiguous should the use of extraneous aids of
construction be resorted to.
"But, as discussed earlier, the intent of the law is obvious and
clear from its plain words. Section 2 thereof unequivocally states that
the party-list system of electing congressional representatives was
designed to 'enable underrepresented sectors, organizations and
parties, and who lack well-defined political' constituencies but who
could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole x x x.' The criteria for
participation is well defined. .Thus, there is no need for recourse to
constitutional deliberations, not even to the proceedings of Congress.
In any event, the framers deliberations merely express their individual
opinions and are, at best, only persuasive in construing the meaning
and purpose of the constitution or statute.
"Be it remembered that the constitutionality or validity of
Sections 2 and 5 of RA 7941 is hot an issue here. Hence, they remain
parts of the law, which must be applied plainly and simply." (Citations
omitted.)

Also, the Opinions of' the two esteemed Justices were merely those of individual Members
But the Court's Decision, Resolution and Order impugned by the COMELEC's First Division
constituted the collective rulings of the Court, not individual opinions of those writing or
voting for them. Unlike the members of the First Division, the dissenting Justices have
graciously accepted without any complaint, rancor or tantrum these collective actions of
the Court which, to quote the First Division itself, "form part of the legal system of the
land."

The fact that the dissenters touched on the subject of judicial legislation means that the
issue had been thoroughly discussed by the Justices; but that after meticulous deliberation
and judicious study, the Court by majority vote held that its carefully crafted Decision did
not amount to usurpation of legislative' functions.

Despite the foregoing explanation, the C0MELEC First Division still condemned the Court
for .championing "the cause of the marginalized and underrepresented sectors [and]
judicially [giving] them a better chance to win the elections by prescribing that "nominees
x x x must [also] belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors." It likewise
contended that by disqualifying parties that received funding, from the government (and
not just from foreign governments), the Court had unconstitutionally expanded the
grounds for disqualification of party-list candidates.

Again, our 26 June 2001 Decision has adequately taken up these concerns quite
extensively. We need not repeat here the lengthy discussions therein, except to say that:

(1) The Court's conclusion that the party-list system was intended for the marginalized and
underrepresented was, painstakingly and carefully culled from the Constitution and the
law. It was made only after, debate, discussion and a long study, as can be gleaned from
even a cursory reading of our Decision. That there were dissents even among the justices
themselves is proof enough of these spirited Deliberations. Finally, in consonance with the
social justice principle espoused by the partly-list law, the Court said:
 "In the end, the role of the Comelec is to see to it that only
those Filipinos who are marginalized and underrepresented' become
members of Congress under the party list system, Filipino-style.
"The intent of the Constitution is clear to give genuine power
to the people, not only by giving more law to those who have less in
life, but more so by enabling them to become veritable Lawmakers
themselves Consistent with this intent, the policy of the implementing
law, we repeat, is likewise clear 'to enable Filipino citizens belonging
to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and
parties, x x x, to become members of the House of Representatives.'
Where the language of the law is clear, it must be applied according to
its express terms. (Citation omitted)

Additionally, to stress the social Justice rationale of the law, the Court observed, as
follows:

"It is ironic, therefore, that the marginalized and

underrepresented in our midst are the majority who wallow in poverty,
destitution and infirmity It was for them that the party-list system was
enacted - to give them not only genuine hope, but genuine power; to
give them the opportunity to be elected and to represent the specific
concerns of their constituencies, and simply to give them a direct
voice in Congress and in the larger affairs of the State In its noblest
sense, the patty-list system truly empowers the masses and ushers a
new hope for genuine change. Verily, it invites those marginalized and
under represented in the past - the farm hands, the fisher folk, the
urban poor, even those in the underground movement to come out and
participate, as indeed many of them came out and participated during
the last elections. The State cannot now disappoint and frustrate them
by disabling and desecrating this social justice vehicle."

(2) Citing Section 2(4) of Article IX (B) of the Constitution and Article 261(o) of B.P.
Big. 881, the Court held that "the participation of the government or its officials in the
affairs of a party-list candidate is not only illegal and unfair to other parties, but also
deleterious to the objective of the law to enable citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors and organizations to be elected to the House of
Representatives." Thus, in formulating one of the guidelines for determining the
qualifications of a party-list candidate, the Court ruled that the "party or organization must
not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an entity funded or assisted by, the
government"

FIFTH, the COMELEC'S First Division ruled that in the same cases (G.R. Nos. 147589 and
1 4761 3), the Court had allegedly degraded the Commission by making the latter a mere
recommendatory body" and thus deprived it of its constitutional powers to enforce election
laws. Again, this is pure legal heresy.

In our 26 June 2001 Decision in those cases, a fact-finding task was delegated to the
COMELEC: to determine which of the party-list candidates had complied with the eight-
point guideline we had issued. This task had to be delegated because the Court is not a
trier of facts, and' the Corn mission is' precisely the constitutional agency that is
supposedly knowledgeable of election matters and the principal trier thereof.

Clearly delineated in our Decision was the specific work remanded to the COMELEC fact-
findings It did not involve, much less impair, the normal powers and duties of the poll
body. To stress, its task of fact-finding was specific and limited, one that accrued only as a
direct result of the disposition" in the said cases. In other words, its authority in this
specific instance was coextensive only with that which, was delegated to it to implement
the Decision.

To its credit, it performed its delegated task without much ado and later submitted its
three Compliance Reports, which were subsequently affirmed by this Court.

Thus, the Court is now bewildered at these new sanctimonious perorations of the First
Division, complaining about the COMELEC being allegedly "scale(d) down to a mere
recommendatory body x x x virtually making it a mere rubber stamp" of the Court. These
complaints had never been aired by the Commission en banc which, as earlier stated, had
performed its fact-finding mission with commendable alacrity. Only when it overstepped as
very limited and delegated fact-finding authority and usurped the Court's work in relation
to the aforementioned cases (G.R. Nos. 147589 and 147613) did its attention have to be
called by way of our contempt Resolution dated 28 February 2003.

Incidentally, in this connection, the First Division is "astonished" at the fact that after
penalizing the COMELEC Commissioners for their improvident issuance of their Resolution
proclaiming certain party-list candidates, this Court did not void the proclamation. Plainly,
the answer is contained in our 25 June 2003 Resolution: The affected parties deserve due
process, and a decision or order affecting them may be issued only after they have
completed their arguments on the legal effects of the wrongful proclamation Indeed,
there is a distinction between holding in contempt the authors of an arbitrary proclamation
resolution, on the one hand, and, on the other, unseating those who have been
proclaimed, have taken their seats in Congress, and have begun performing their
lawmaking duties. Has the First Division, wallowing in its own tantrums, overlooked this
significant difference?

SIXTH. The First Division also raised a big fuss about the alleged deprivation of due
process and equal protection. Again, the Honorable Division may have overlooked the fact
that the basic requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard.
The COMELEC has had more than as just share of that opportunity. Prior to the Court's
imposition of a penalty on them, the COMELEC's Chairman and Members were asked to
show cause why they should not be cited for contempt via our rather lengthy Resolution
dated December 17, 2002. And they responded and tried vainly, it turned out in the end to
justify their contumacious actions.

Too, they were heard via their Motion for Reconsideration which, after due deliberation,
was denied by this Court. As already stated, all seven Members (including the Chairman)
of the Comelec paid the fine. Why are the three Members of, the First Division a minority
in the banc of seven now whining about their liability for contempt?

SEVENTH. That the official actions of this Court may be commented on or even criticized
is a right granted by the Constitution. But criticism that takes the form of malicious
insinuation, brazen ridicule or capricious innuendo has no place in a formal resolution of an
agency that seeks wrongly to hold in contempt this Court's Members for issuing decisions
and orders that have allegedly interfered with its proceedings. This truism remains clear
and untrammeled in our system of government, no matter how extravagantly the
Members of the Commission First Division may regard their own intellectual capacities and
how poorly those of others. They must bear in mind that there is only one Supreme Court
to which all judicial and quasi-judicial agencies must take their bearings. By their oath of
office, they are bound to respect and obey its decisions and orders, even if they may not
agree with them. They need only to be reminded of the following dictum which, though
issued by the Court many years ago, still holds sway up to now:

"We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual, endowment. That is his
privilege. And, he may suffer frustration at what he feels is others' lack of it. That is his
misfortune. x x x (S)uch frame of mind, however, should not be allowed to harden into a
belief that he may attack a court's decision in words calculated to jettison the time-
honored aphorism that courts are the temples of right." (Rheem of the Philippines vs.
Ferrer, 20 SCRA 441, 444, June 26, 1967)

WHEREFORE, the Resolution promulgated by the First Division of the Commission on

Elections in EM-03-010 and EM-03-01 1, is NOTED insofar as it DISMISSED the Petitions
for Contempt; but its "reasons given" therefor are DECLARED UTTERLY BASELESS for
having been 'palpably issued without jurisdiction, being in clear contravention of the
Constitution and, of our Resolution dated 26 August 2003.

Inasmuch as "the COMELEC's First Division forwarded September 2003 Resolution to the
House of Representatives, let a copy of this unanimous en banc' Resolution of the Court be
sent also to the House of Representatives as well as to- the Chairman of the Commission
on Elections.

Very truly yours,

LUZVIMINDA D. PUNO

Clerk of Court

Endnotes:

[1]
These are two Petitions for Indirect Contempt lodged by the Malay Democrats of the
cralaw

Philippines (signed by Ma. Linda Olaguer Montayre) and Rodolfo. T. Albano III against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. and Associate Justices Josue N. Bellosillo, Reynato S.
Puno and Artemio V. Panganiban before the First Division of Comelec on July 15, 2003 and
August 11, 2003, respectively. In its Order dated August 15, 2003, Commissioner Rufino
S. B. Javier, Presiding Officer of the First Division, granted the motion of Mr. Rodrigo
Gutang, member of the Veterans Federation Party, to intervene in the Petitions.