ity of those who disagreed with them . ihe
He was in command of the Roman forces
were often able to escape, but they were
19 to suffer the consequences if they were
te real targets were the entire Jewish popu-
thc region and potential opponents. As
( 1981 : 147), who was an observer on tbe
10 time, noted: "More terrible than the crimes
s was the fear they aroused.#
,man response to the campaign of assassi-
as initially subdued as tb_e local provincial
; sought to avoid inffaming local religious
s. Eventually, however, confrontations be-
iwds of demonstrators and Roman troops
n heightened tensions. Riots and panic
and many Jews lost their lives, further
local opinion (Rapoport 1990: 154-5).
, the rebellion that was sought by the Zealots
r. Tho opposition had been silenced and
r the revolt was solidified. When tbe fighting
. there was virtually no opposition from t~e
1 or pro-Roman elements. Thc, rebels quickly
•ntrol of Jerusalem and much of Judea, and
·ated the initial Roman force sent against
rebellion, however, was crushed. Jerusalem
red by the Roman legions in 70 CE, on.d the
iholds of the militants were taken in 71 CE.
s then reabsorbed into the Roman Empire.
volt, based in the religious values of the
d the population in general, ultimately failed
ih the terror campaign to generate the revolt
successful. The rebels could not maintain fh_c
1nce of tbe region in the face of tflie Roman
ad the revolt been assured of success, there
would have been very little opposition
: Jewish population. As it was, tho issue was
or at least the first years of the revolt. Tb_c
eakness of Jewish military resources vis-a·
pire eventually became obvious when Rome
sufficient resources to deal with tho uprising.
t took a major campaign t01'\d a long siege
m1 before the revolt was broken . During this
, was experiencing its own internal difficul-
CE a revolt by tbe legionary commander in
,lted in his overthrow of tbc Emperor Nero.
~mperor himself was overthrown in 69 CE,
, Vespasian became the generally accepted
emperor.
subduing Judea aod besieging Jerusalem when the
troubles began, but his departure for Rome did not
disrupt the campaign (Grant 1974: Chapter 7). Had
his task been more difficult or had he faced possible
defeat, the forces in Judea might have been withdrawn
(leaving Judea to be re-conquered a t some future
time). In later centuries, the civil wars and succession
struggles in tbe Roman Empire or pressures on the
imperial frontiers made it possible for provinces to
break away permanently or for periods of time.
Unfortunately for the Zealots, Roman politics were not
sufficien~y chaotic at the time of tb_e revolt to permit
success.
CASE STUDY 5.2
The Sikhs and Kholiston
India is a very diverse country. There are numerous
religious, linguistic, ethnic, and regional groups in the
state. When independence came in 1948, British Indio
was divided into Pakistan and India. Communal
violence broke out between Muslims .and Hindus; this
meant that many Muslims relocated to Pakistan and
virtually all Hindu residents in areas that became part
of Pakistan left those areas. In the new, smaller India,
there were still significant numbers of Muslims, who
constitute the single largest religious minority in tbe
country. Religious tensions between Muslims 0-1ld
Hindus have been present through ltle decades, and
there have been outbreaks of communal violence
between members of the two groups during that time.
In addition, there are other religious minorities in ib_e
countries, including the relatively small (in percentage
terms) Sikh aod Christian communities. The many
linguistic groups in India have caused problems as
well. There are over twenty languages that each have
at least l million speakers. In fho northern part of ibc
country, much of the population speaks Hindi or
related dialects and languages. In the southern part
of tbe country, the local languages are Dravidian, a
completely different language group that is unrelated
to Hindi. There have been efforts to promote Hindi as
a national language, and these efforts have naturally
generated tensions among the speakers of tbe other
76 RE LIG IO US J U S T I FICA T I ONS FO R TER ROR I SM
languages. English remains as an important de facto
national language that is understood by elites from
the different regions, and has the advantage of not
providing special advantages to any of the language
groups in the country.
Given the tremendous diversity of groups that exists
in India, it is not surprising that the country has had
to deal with communal tensions and violence. Various
groups have provided the personnel for attacks
against the government, and in some cases the com-
munities have targeted each other. The Sikhs have
been one of the religious groups that for a time
presented serious problems for the central government
and the preservation of national unity. While the Sikh
religion draws heavily upon Hinduism, it has other
elements included as well. Most, but not all Sikhs,
consider their religion to be distinctive from Hinduism
rather than simply a variation within that rather broad
religious community. Sikhism is monotheistic, and it
never accepted the Hindu caste system (Nandi 1996:
180). Under British rule and the early years of inde-
pendence, there was little conffict between the Sikh
and Hindu communities. In the 1970s, however, prob-
lems began to develop, especially in the province of
the Punjab. While Sikhs are present in many areas
of India, they were geographically concentrated in this
province. The cities contained Hindu majorities, but
the countryside was overwhelmingly Sikh. Elements of
the Sikh community came to see themselves as being
marginalized in their own land. Part of the reason for
concern among the Sikhs was the increasing demands
by some political parties to have Hinduism play a more
important part in the country. While this drive to
implant Hinduism in the state generated tensions prin-
cipally between the Muslim and Hindu communities,
the pattern was disturbing for the Sikhs as well
(Unnithan 1995).
Sikh concerns led to political protests. The Indian
government did make some concessions lo Sikh feel-
ings. Provincial boundaries were redrawn so that
a new, smaller Punjab province had a dear Sikh
majority. The Sikhs, however, remained divided
amongst themselves-sometimes on the basis of the
old caste lines, so the government and other parties
were able to divide the Sikh vote to prevent the Sikhs
from controlling the province (Nandi 1996: 184). For
example, the government headed by Indira Ghandi
and her Congress Party covertly supported Sant
Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale who created a new party
to challenge the dominant Akali Dal party. Support
for this party weakened the Akali Dal, which had
cooperated with other parties in opposing the
Congress Porty (Long 1990: 60). This effort lo divide
and conquer failed when Bhindranwale become the
leader of one of the more important terrorist groups.
In the early 1980s, after he failed to achieve a
dominant position in the province through electoral
politics, Bhindranwale advocated political violence. He
especially attracted as his followers the young and
educated, who hoped to re-create the former Sikh
periods of glory (Yaeger 1991 : 227). His followers
began to engage in terrorist actions. A large number
of other groups (well over a hundred) appeared
and become involved in terrorist actions in the 1980s
and the 1990s (Wallace 1995: 357). Many of the
groups sought to achieve on independent Sikh
Khalistan ('"Land of the Purell), while some appeared
willing to accept a de-centralized Indian state in which
the Punjab would be dominated by the Sikhs and
would have great control over domestic policies.
The various groups engaged in typical terrorist
operations, including bombings, kidnapping, assassi-
nations, and attacks on the security forces. Among
the targets were Hindu inhabitants in the Punjab. The
attacks were designed to force other Hindus to ffee the
area, and in this effort they were somewhat successful,
although the terrorist groups never were successful
in instigating full -scale communal violence between
the two religious commun ities. Various terrorist
groups also attacked moderate Sikhs who were willing
to compromise with the government. Bhindranwale
and his followers established their headquarters in
the compound containing the Golden Temple of
Amritsar, the most holy site for the Sikh religion . While
Indian authorities knew that members of the terrorist
group were present, action was deferred given the
religious significance of the temple to all Sikhs. After
the failure of negotiations Prime Minister Indira
Ghandi ordered a military attack (Operation Blue
Star) on the temple compound in 1984. After much
fighting and destruction the compound was captured.
More than 1,000 persons were killed, including Indian
 RELIGIOUS J USTIF I CAT I ONS FOR TERRORISM
troops, guerrillas, Bhindronwole and members of his
organization, and hundreds of Sikh pilgrims who
happened to be present at the time of the assault.
While the assault was a military success since it elim-
inated many guerrillas and terrorists and a key leader
of the dissidents, it was a political disaster since it
alienated many members of the Sikh community who
hod previously been neutral or even favorably
disposed towards the central government.
The assault on the Golden Temple led to additional
complications. Loter in 1984 Prime Minister Ghandi
was assassinated by two of her Sikh bodyguards in
retaliation for Operation Blue Star and the sacrilege
that it represented. In the aftermath of Ghandi' s death,
riots broke out in northern Indio in which Hindus
attacked Sikhs and their businesses. Thousands of
Sikhs died in the rioting, in many cases while the
police did nothing and the military remained in their
barracks !Pettigrew 1995: 8-9). These deaths hirther
increased the antagonisms between the Sikh and
Hindu communities and drove more recruits into the
ranks of the various independence organizations
that were practicing terror. The death of Ghandi had
another, somewhat indirect, effect. With her demise,
the ruling Congress Party lost some of its cohesion,
and various opposition parties gained ground. The
Congress Party hod generally tried, at least to some
extent, to generate mass appeal by crossing over
ethnic, religious, and regional boundaries. As such it
was often a force for integration in Indio, and it
usually, but not always, avoided appeals to specifi-
cally Hindu nationalist elements. In the troubled times
ofter Ghandi' s death , the party lost ground, and the
more parochial Hindu nationalist parties gained
strength . The presence of these parties that promoted
Hinduism as the national religion in government led
many Sikhs to see their religion as being placed in an
even more precarious position.
After the assault on the Golden Temple attacks
against Hindus escalated . Buses would be stopped and
the Hindu passengers would be removed and massa-
cred !Yaeger 1991: 228). Hindus were removed from
trains and killed as well !Hoffman 1995: 279). Bombs
were set off in New Delhi and other areas of India,
taking the battle outside Punjab. Assassinations
continued and included the retired general of the
Indian Army who hod been in charge of Operation
Blue Star. Sikhs placed a bomb on an Air India Right
in 1985 that exploded over the A~antic Ocean, killing
more than 300 persons. The terrorist attacks in the
Punjab also extended to Sikhs who did not support
the guerrilla and terrorist organizations and who
favored compromise with the government of Indio. The
targets included family members of Punjab police,
both Sikh and Hindu. In fact, by the 1990s the targets
of the terrorist more frequen~y included other Sikhs
rather than Hindus !Wallace 1995: 355, 399). The
leader of the Akali Doi, the large Sikh party favoring
"collaboration" with the government, was one of the
casualties. The fact that the terrorist groups had shifted
their targets to Sikhs in on effort to mobilize support
within their own community was one indication of
declining support among the very group that they
claimed to represent.
The government of India was eventually able to
control and contain the worst of the violence in the
Punjab, although it has yet to eliminate all the terrorist
groups !Wallace 1997: 480). A number of factors
come into ploy in accounting for the eventual success
of the government forces . One factor undoubtedly was
a certain amount of weariness with the unending
violence and uncertainty on the port of the popula-
tion in general. The government also committed
more regular troops and police units to the Punjab,
and paramilitary forces were raised to provide some
protection against the guerrilla and terrorist forces.
Government counter-terrorist techniques also im -
proved. The government relied increasingly on the use
of former members of the resistance movements to
supply information on their colleagues by either
offering rewards or threatening severe punish-
ments. There was also some effort to be more aware
of the sensibilities of the Sikh population . A second
operation !Operation Black Thunder) to dear the
Golden Temple of new concentrations of resistance
fighters was undertaken with more care and minimal
damage and loss of life to innocent bystanders
(Wallace 1995: 398). The government also em-
ployed less praiseworthy methods of dealing with the
dissidents. There is considerable evidence that
the government relied on murders and assassinations
(i.e. death squads) to remove leaders and members
'8 RE LIGIOUS JU S T IF I CATIONS FO R TER ROR I SM
of the dissident organizations, avoiding the necessity
of supplying proof in any judicial setting. There were
even questionable deaths among many human rights
activists and others who queried the government
methods for dealing with the dissident movements
in the Punjab (Gossman 2000; Pettigrew 1995:
Chapter 1).
The government also attempted to maintain better
control on the border with Pakistan. Punjab province
borders on Pakistan, and the Indian government long
claimed that Pakistan was supplying arms to the
organ ization5 oppo5in9 the central government
(thereby explaining the persistence of the dissident
Sikh groups). There was relatively little evidence to
indicate that Pakistan consistendy supplied arms or
major support to the various movements in the Punjab
as a matter of policy. On the other hand, looking the
other way when Sikhs acquired arms in Pakistan was
an effective and inexpensive way of discomforting a
potential enemy. A number of Sikh separatist organ·
izations in exile also currendy have headquarters in
Pakistan (Chima 2002: 33). A more important source
of aid for the dissidents over tlhe years came from the
Sikh communities in Europe and North America. Sikhs
in these areas have provided funds and other aid for
the groups opposed to the central government. Such
support, while important in the armed struggle, was
insufficient to achieve victory or to make continuation
of the baffle an attractive alternative.
By the mid-1990s the Sikh insurrection and attacks
had largely been contained. The violence and efforts
to create an independent Khalistan had failed . While
immensely disruptive of the ordinary routine of govern-
ment of the Punjab province, little was ultimately
accomplished. Sikh parties returned to the political
arena and participated in the usual political ex·
changes. They bargained with the other large parties,
trading their support in the national legislature for
projects and other benefits for the Punjab. It was poli-
tics as usual, with vote trading and efforts at gaining
more national funds for local projects, something that
is often the core of political comprom ise in democra-
cies. Some armed groups still remain, but they largely
become bandits rather than groups of political dissi-
dents (Chima 2002: 33) . Dissident Sikhs assassinated
Punjab's chief minister in 1995 (Juergensmeyer 2000:
91 I, but the attack did not trigger a new outbreak of
violence. Many or most Sikhs could again become
concerned about their future or the future of their reli-
gion in India. The rise in strength of Hindu nationalist
parties, seeking to impose national policies that would
limit the religious minorities in the country, or the
increase in violence by Hindu fundamentalists could
create the necessary concern and foster new violence.
Should some dynamic leader arise to unite the
frequently d ivided Sikhs in order to achieve short-term
goals such as greater local control of provincial
rewurce5 or long term 90015 5uch a5 autonomy or
even independence, violence could erupt again .
CASE STUDY 5.3
Algeria in the 1990s
Algeria has suffered from political violence and
terrorism on two occasions in its recent history.
During the struggle for independence from France in
the late 1950s and early 1960s, the Algerian National
Liberation Front engaged in both guerrilla warfare
and terrorism in its efforts to become independent. By
1962 independence was achieved, and a civilian
government was installed. In 1965, the military inter·
vened to establish an authoritarian system of govern ·
ment that continued to be dominated by officer corps.
Until 1989, Algeria was officially a one party system
under a series of presidents, all of whom had been
former officers. During this period the higher-ranking
officers as a group were really the key decision
makers in the country. By the late 1980s, economic
problems led to increasing domestic unrest, and
Islamic movements appeared that gained support
among the groups left behind by modernization . Prices
were increasing and there was significant unemploy·
ment in the country. Declining prices for petroleum
products had led to an economic downturn, and there
were also problems with corruption and inadequate
provision of services for the population (Fuller 1996:
24-6). In an effort to open the political system to
greater input, the government permitted the forma ·
tion of opposition parties and scheduled elections.
One of the more important opposition parties formed