B G.R. No.
135385 December 6, 2000 IPRA is consistent with the Constitution and pray that the petition for prohibition and mandamus be
ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners,
vs.
SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT and CHAIRMAN and COMMISSIONERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, respondents.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens
and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A.
8371), otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing
Rules and Regulations (Implementing Rules).
In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required respondents to comment.1 In compliance,
respondents Chairperson and Commissioners of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples
(NCIP), the government agency created under the IPRA to implement its provisions, filed on October
13, 1998 their Comment to the Petition, in which they defend the constitutionality of the IPRA and
pray that the petition be dismissed for lack of merit.
On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) and Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) filed through
the Solicitor General a consolidated Comment. The Solicitor General is of the view that the IPRA is
partly unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership over natural resources to indigenous
peoples and prays that the petition be granted in part.
On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors, composed of Sen. Juan Flavier, one of the authors of
the IPRA, Mr. Ponciano Bennagen, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, and the leaders
and members of 112 groups of indigenous peoples (Flavier, et. al), filed their Motion for Leave to
Intervene. They join the NCIP in defending the constitutionality of IPRA and praying for the dismissal
of the petition.
On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) likewise filed a Motion to Intervene
and/or to Appear as Amicus Curiae. The CHR asserts that IPRA is an expression of the principle of
parens patriae and that the State has the responsibility to protect and guarantee the rights of those
who are at a serious disadvantage like indigenous peoples. For this reason it prays that the petition
be dismissed.
On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the Ikalahan Indigenous People and the Haribon
Foundation for the Conservation of Natural Resources, Inc. (Haribon, et al.), filed a motion to
Intervene with attached Comment-in-Intervention. They agree with the NCIP and Flavier, et al. that
dismissed.
The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and organizations were granted.
Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999. Thereafter, the parties and intervenors filed their
respective memoranda in which they reiterate the arguments adduced in their earlier pleadings and
during the hearing.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA and its Implementing
Rules on the ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands
of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the
regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution:
"(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral domains, and Section 3(b) which,
in turn, defines ancestral lands;
"(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral domains including inalienable
public lands, bodies of water, mineral and other resources found within ancestral domains are private
but community property of the indigenous peoples;
"(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the composition of ancestral domains
and ancestral lands;
"(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the
ancestral domains;
(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the ancestral
lands;
"(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples in the harvesting,
extraction, development or exploration of minerals and other natural resources within the areas
claimed to be their ancestral domains, and the right to enter into agreements with nonindigenous
peoples for the development and utilization of natural resources therein for a period not exceeding
25 years, renewable for not more than 25 years; and
"(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to maintain, develop, protect
and conserve the ancestral domains and portions thereof which are found to be necessary for critical
watersheds, mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest cover or
reforestation."2
1
Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of "ancestral domains"
and "ancestral lands" which might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a)
and 3(b) violate the rights of private landowners.3
In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and jurisdiction of the
NCIP and making customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains
and ancestral lands on the ground that these provisions violate the due process clause of the
Constitution.4
These provisions are:
"(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of delineation and recognition of ancestral
domains and which vest on the NCIP the sole authority to delineate ancestral domains and ancestral
lands;
"(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the NCIP that a particular area is an
ancestral domain and upon notification to the following officials, namely, the Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources, Secretary of Interior and Local Governments, Secretary of Justice
and Commissioner of the National Development Corporation, the jurisdiction of said officials over
said area terminates;
"(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions and practices of indigenous peoples shall
be applied first with respect to property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary succession and
settlement of land disputes, and that any doubt or ambiguity in the interpretation thereof shall be
resolved in favor of the indigenous peoples;
"(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and practices shall be used to resolve disputes
involving indigenous peoples; and
"(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of
the indigenous peoples."5
Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP Administrative Order
No. 1, series of 1998, which provides that "the administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of
the President is characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and
program coordination." They contend that said Rule infringes upon the President’s power of control
over executive departments under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution.6
Petitioners pray for the following:
"(1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57, 58, 59, 63, 65 and 66 and other related provisions
of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional and invalid;
"(2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Chairperson and Commissioners of the NCIP to
cease and desist from implementing the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371 and its Implementing Rules;
"(3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources to cease and desist from implementing Department of Environment and
Natural Resources Circular No. 2, series of 1998;
"(4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of Budget and Management to cease
and desist from disbursing public funds for the implementation of the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371;
and
"(5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources to comply with his duty of carrying out the State’s constitutional mandate to control and
supervise the exploration, development, utilization and conservation of Philippine natural
resources."7
After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted as follows:
Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which the Chief Justice and
Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the validity of the challenged provisions
of R.A. 8371. Justice Puno also filed a separate opinion sustaining all challenged provisions of the law
with the exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, the
Rules and Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the IPRA which he contends should
be interpreted as dealing with the large-scale exploitation of natural resources and should be read in
conjunction with Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. On the other hand, Justice Mendoza
voted to dismiss the petition solely on the ground that it does not raise a justiciable controversy and
petitioners do not have standing to question the constitutionality of R.A. 8371.
Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. Justice Panganiban filed a separate
opinion expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related provisions of R.A. 8371
are unconstitutional. He reserves judgment on the constitutionality of Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66 of
the law, which he believes must await the filing of specific cases by those whose rights may have been
violated by the IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3(a),
7, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon
join in the separate opinions of Justices Panganiban and Vitug.
2
As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not obtained, the case was A. The Laws of the Indies
redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the same. Accordingly,
pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED. B. Valenton v. Murciano

Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are the separate opinions of Justices Puno, Vitug, C. The Public Land Acts and the Torrens System
Kapunan, Mendoza, and Panganiban.
D. The Philippine Constitutions
SO ORDERED.
II. The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA).
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De
Leon, Jr., JJ., concur. A. Indigenous Peoples
Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Panganiban JJ., see separate opinion
1. Indigenous Peoples: Their History
SEPARATE OPINION
PUNO, J.: 2. Their Concept of Land
PRECIS
A classic essay on the utility of history was written in 1874 by Friedrich Nietzsche entitled "On the III. The IPRA is a Novel Piece of Legislation.
Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life." Expounding on Nietzsche's essay, Judge Richard Posner1
wrote:2 A. Legislative History

"Law is the most historically oriented, or if you like the most backward-looking, the most 'past- IV. The Provisions of the IPRA Do Not Contravene the Constitution.
dependent,' of the professions. It venerates tradition, precedent, pedigree, ritual, custom, ancient
practices, ancient texts, archaic terminology, maturity, wisdom, seniority, gerontocracy, and A. Ancestral domains and ancestral lands are the private property of indigenous peoples and do not
interpretation conceived of as a method of recovering history. It is suspicious of innovation, constitute part of the land of the public domain.
discontinuities, 'paradigm shifts,' and the energy and brashness of youth. These ingrained attitudes
are obstacles to anyone who wants to re-orient law in a more pragmatic direction. But, by the same 1. The right to ancestral domains and ancestral lands: how acquired
token, pragmatic jurisprudence must come to terms with history."
2. The concept of native title
When Congress enacted the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA), it introduced radical concepts into
the Philippine legal system which appear to collide with settled constitutional and jural precepts on (a) Cariño v. Insular Government
state ownership of land and other natural resources. The sense and subtleties of this law cannot be
appreciated without considering its distinct sociology and the labyrinths of its history. This Opinion (b) Indian Title to land
attempts to interpret IPRA by discovering its soul shrouded by the mist of our history. After all, the
IPRA was enacted by Congress not only to fulfill the constitutional mandate of protecting the (c) Why the Cariño doctrine is unique
indigenous cultural communities' right to their ancestral land but more importantly, to correct a grave
historical injustice to our indigenous people. 3. The option of securing a torrens title to the ancestral land

This Opinion discusses the following: B. The right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains is a limited form
of ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same.
I. The Development of the Regalian Doctrine in the Philippine Legal System.
1. The indigenous concept of ownership and customary law

3

C. Sections 7 (a), 7 (b) and 57 of the IPRA do not violate the Regalian Doctrine enshrined in Section 2,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
1. The rights of ICCs/IPs over their ancestral domains and lands
2. The right of ICCs/IPs to develop lands and natural resources within the ancestral domains does not
deprive the State of ownership over the natural resources, control and supervision in their
development and exploitation.
(a) Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules goes beyond the parameters of Section 7(a)
of the law on ownership of ancestral domains and is ultra vires.
(b) The small-scale utilization of natural resources in Section 7 (b) of the IPRA is allowed under
Paragraph 3, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Consitution.
(c) The large-scale utilization of natural resources in Section 57 of the IPRA may be harmonized with
Paragraphs 1 and 4, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
V. The IPRA is a Recognition of Our Active Participation in the International Indigenous Movement.
DISCUSSION
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE REGALIAN DOCTRINE IN THE PHILIPPINE LEGAL SYSTEM.
A. The Laws of the Indies
The capacity of the State to own or acquire property is the state's power of dominium.3 This was the
foundation for the early Spanish decrees embracing the feudal theory of jura regalia. The "Regalian
Doctrine" or jura regalia is a Western legal concept that was first introduced by the Spaniards into the
country through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas. The Laws of the Indies, i.e., more
specifically, Law 14, Title 12, Book 4 of the Novisima Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias, set the policy
of the Spanish Crown with respect to the Philippine Islands in the following manner:
"We, having acquired full sovereignty over the Indies, and all lands, territories, and possessions not
heretofore ceded away by our royal predecessors, or by us, or in our name, still pertaining to the royal
crown and patrimony, it is our will that all lands which are held without proper and true deeds of
grant be restored to us as they belong to us, in order that after reserving before all what to us or to
our viceroys, audiencias, and governors may seem necessary for public squares, ways, pastures, and
commons in those places which are peopled, taking into consideration not only their present
condition, but also their future and their probable increase, and after distributing to the natives what
may be necessary for tillage and pasturage, confirming them in what they now have and giving them
more if necessary, all the rest of said lands may remain free and unencumbered for us to dispose of
as we may wish.
We therefore order and command that all viceroys and presidents of pretorial courts designate at
such time as shall to them seem most expedient, a suitable period within which all possessors of
tracts, farms, plantations, and estates shall exhibit to them and to the court officers appointed by
them for this purpose, their title deeds thereto. And those who are in possession by virtue of proper
deeds and receipts, or by virtue of just prescriptive right shall be protected, and all the rest shall be
restored to us to be disposed of at our will."4
The Philippines passed to Spain by virtue of "discovery" and conquest. Consequently, all lands became
the exclusive patrimony and dominion of the Spanish Crown. The Spanish Government took charge
of distributing the lands by issuing royal grants and concessions to Spaniards, both military and
civilian.5 Private land titles could only be acquired from the government either by purchase or by the
various modes of land grant from the Crown.6
The Laws of the Indies were followed by the Ley Hipotecaria, or the Mortgage Law of 1893.7 The
Spanish Mortgage Law provided for the systematic registration of titles and deeds as well as
possessory claims. The law sought to register and tax lands pursuant to the Royal Decree of 1880. The
Royal Decree of 1894, or the "Maura Law," was partly an amendment of the Mortgage Law as well as
the Laws of the Indies, as already amended by previous orders and decrees.8 This was the last Spanish
land law promulgated in the Philippines. It required the "adjustment" or registration of all agricultural
lands, otherwise the lands shall revert to the state.
Four years later, by the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898, Spain ceded to the government of the
United States all rights, interests and claims over the national territory of the Philippine Islands. In
1903, the United States colonial government, through the Philippine Commission, passed Act No. 926,
the first Public Land Act.
B. Valenton v. Murciano
In 1904, under the American regime, this Court decided the case of Valenton v. Murciano.9
Valenton resolved the question of which is the better basis for ownership of land: long-time
occupation or paper title. Plaintiffs had entered into peaceful occupation of the subject land in 1860.
Defendant's predecessor-in-interest, on the other hand, purchased the land from the provincial
treasurer of Tarlac in 1892. The lower court ruled against the plaintiffs on the ground that they had
lost all rights to the land by not objecting to the administrative sale. Plaintiffs appealed the judgment,
asserting that their 30-year adverse possession, as an extraordinary period of prescription in the
4
Partidas and the Civil Code, had given them title to the land as against everyone, including the State;
and that the State, not owning the land, could not validly transmit it.
The Court, speaking through Justice Willard, decided the case on the basis of "those special laws which
from earliest time have regulated the disposition of the public lands in the colonies."10 The question
posed by the Court was: "Did these special laws recognize any right of prescription as against the
State as to these lands; and if so, to what extent was it recognized?"
Prior to 1880, the Court said, there were no laws specifically providing for the disposition of land in
the Philippines. However, it was understood that in the absence of any special law to govern a specific
colony, the Laws of the Indies would be followed. Indeed, in the Royal Order of July 5, 1862, it was
decreed that until regulations on the subject could be prepared, the authorities of the Philippine
Islands should follow strictly the Laws of the Indies, the Ordenanza of the Intendentes of 1786, and
the Royal Cedula of 1754.11
Quoting the preamble of Law 14, Title 12, Book 4 of the Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias, the court
interpreted it as follows:
"In the preamble of this law there is, as is seen, a distinct statement that all those lands belong to the
Crown which have not been granted by Philip, or in his name, or by the kings who preceded him. This
statement excludes the idea that there might be lands not so granted, that did not belong to the king.
It excludes the idea that the king was not still the owner of all ungranted lands, because some private
person had been in the adverse occupation of them. By the mandatory part of the law all the
occupants of the public lands are required to produce before the authorities named, and within a
time to be fixed by them, their title papers. And those who had good title or showed prescription
were to be protected in their holdings. It is apparent that it was not the intention of the law that mere
possession for a length of time should make the possessors the owners of the land possessed by them
without any action on the part of the authorities."12
The preamble stated that all those lands which had not been granted by Philip, or in his name, or by
the kings who preceded him, belonged to the Crown.13 For those lands granted by the king, the
decree provided for a system of assignment of such lands. It also ordered that all possessors of
agricultural land should exhibit their title deed, otherwise, the land would be restored to the
Crown.14
The Royal Cedula of October 15, 1754 reinforced the Recopilacion when it ordered the Crown's
principal subdelegate to issue a general order directing the publication of the Crown's instructions:
"x x x to the end that any and all persons who, since the year 1700, and up to the date of the
promulgation and publication of said order, shall have occupied royal lands, whether or not x x x
cultivated or tenanted, may x x x appear and exhibit to said subdelegates the titles and patents by
virtue of which said lands are occupied. x x x. Said subdelegates will at the same time warn the parties
interested that in case of their failure to present their title deeds within the term designated, without
a just and valid reason therefor, they will be deprived of and evicted from their lands, and they will
be granted to others."15
On June 25, 1880, the Crown adopted regulations for the adjustment of lands "wrongfully occupied"
by private individuals in the Philippine Islands. Valenton construed these regulations together with
contemporaneous legislative and executive interpretations of the law, and concluded that plaintiffs'
case fared no better under the 1880 decree and other laws which followed it, than it did under the
earlier ones. Thus as a general doctrine, the Court stated:
"While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to a deed if he proves a possession
for a sufficient length of time, yet it has always insisted that he must make that proof before the
proper administrative officers, and obtain from them his deed, and until he did that the State
remained the absolute owner."16
In conclusion, the Court ruled: "We hold that from 1860 to 1892 there was no law in force in these
Islands by which the plaintiffs could obtain the ownership of these lands by prescription, without any
action by the State."17 Valenton had no rights other than those which accrued to mere possession.
Murciano, on the other hand, was deemed to be the owner of the land by virtue of the grant by the
provincial secretary. In effect, Valenton upheld the Spanish concept of state ownership of public land.
As a fitting observation, the Court added that "[t]he policy pursued by the Spanish Government from
earliest times, requiring settlers on the public lands to obtain title deeds therefor from the State, has
been continued by the American Government in Act No. 926."18
C. The Public Land Acts and the Torrens System
Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the provisions of the the Philippine
Bill of 1902. The law governed the disposition of lands of the public domain. It prescribed rules and
regulations for the homesteading, selling, and leasing of portions of the public domain of the
Philippine Islands, and prescribed the terms and conditions to enable persons to perfect their titles
to public lands in the Islands. It also provided for the "issuance of patents to certain native settlers
upon public lands," for the establishment of town sites and sale of lots therein, for the completion of
imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or confirmation of Spanish concessions and grants in the
Islands." In short, the Public Land Act operated on the assumption that title to public lands in the
Philippine Islands remained in the government;19 and that the government's title to public land
sprung from the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties between Spain and the United
States.20 The term "public land" referred to all lands of the public domain whose title still remained
in the government and are thrown open to private appropriation and settlement,21 and excluded the
patrimonial property of the government and the friar lands.22
5

Act No. 926 was superseded in 1919 by Act 2874, the second Public Land Act. This new law was passed
under the Jones Law. It was more comprehensive in scope but limited the exploitation of agricultural
lands to Filipinos and Americans and citizens of other countries which gave Filipinos the same
privileges.23 After the passage of the 1935 Constitution, Act 2874 was amended in 1936 by
Commonwealth Act No. 141. Commonwealth Act No. 141 remains the present Public Land Law and it
is essentially the same as Act 2874. The main difference between the two relates to the transitory
provisions on the rights of American citizens and corporations during the Commonwealth period at
par with Filipino citizens and corporations.24
Grants of public land were brought under the operation of the Torrens system under Act 496, or the
Land Registration Law of 1903. Enacted by the Philippine Commission, Act 496 placed all public and
private lands in the Philippines under the Torrens system. The law is said to be almost a verbatim copy
of the Massachussetts Land Registration Act of 1898,25 which, in turn, followed the principles and
procedure of the Torrens system of registration formulated by Sir Robert Torrens who patterned it
after the Merchant Shipping Acts in South Australia. The Torrens system requires that the government
issue an official certificate of title attesting to the fact that the person named is the owner of the
property described therein, subject to such liens and encumbrances as thereon noted or the law
warrants or reserves.26 The certificate of title is indefeasible and imprescriptible and all claims to the
parcel of land are quieted upon issuance of said certificate. This system highly facilitates land
conveyance and negotiation.27
D. The Philippine Constitutions
The Regalian doctrine was enshrined in the 1935 Constitution. One of the fixed and dominating
objectives of the 1935 Constitutional Convention was the nationalization and conservation of the
natural resources of the country.28 There was an overwhelming sentiment in the Convention in favor
of the principle of state ownership of natural resources and the adoption of the Regalian doctrine.29
State ownership of natural resources was seen as a necessary starting point to secure recognition of
the state's power to control their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization.30 The
delegates to the Constitutional Convention very well knew that the concept of State ownership of
land and natural resources was introduced by the Spaniards, however, they were not certain whether
it was continued and applied by the Americans. To remove all doubts, the Convention approved the
provision in the Constitution affirming the Regalian doctrine.31
Thus, the 1935 Constitution, in Section 1 of Article XIII on "Conservation and Utilization of Natural
Resources," reads as follows:
"Sec. 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the
Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall
be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of
the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession
at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution. Natural
resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no license,
concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural resources
shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation,
water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases
beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant."
The 1973 Constitution reiterated the Regalian doctrine in Section 8, Article XIV on the "National
Economy and the Patrimony of the Nation," to wit:
"Sec. 8. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, wildlife, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to
the State. With the exception of agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, and resettlement
lands of the public domain, natural resources shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or
lease for the exploration, development, exploitation, or utilization of any of the natural resources
shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five
years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the
grant."
The 1987 Constitution reaffirmed the Regalian doctrine in Section 2 of Article XII on "National
Economy and Patrimony," to wit:
"Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural
resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources
shall not be alienated. The exploration, development and utilization of natural resources shall be
under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities
or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino
citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such
citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not
more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In
cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.
x x x."
6
Simply stated, all lands of the public domain as well as all natural resources enumerated therein,
whether on public or private land, belong to the State. It is this concept of State ownership that
petitioners claim is being violated by the IPRA.
II. THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT.
Republic Act No. 8371 is entitled "An Act to Recognize, Protect and Promote the Rights of Indigenous
Cultural Communities/ Indigenous Peoples, Creating a National Commission on Indigenous Peoples,
Establishing Implementing Mechanisms, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes." It is
simply known as "The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997" or the IPRA.
The IPRA recognizes the existence of the indigenous cultural communities or indigenous peoples
(ICCs/IPs) as a distinct sector in Philippine society. It grants these people the ownership and
possession of their ancestral domains and ancestral lands, and defines the extent of these lands and
domains. The ownership given is the indigenous concept of ownership under customary law which
traces its origin to native title.
Other rights are also granted the ICCs/IPs, and these are:
- the right to develop lands and natural resources;
- the right to stay in the territories;
- the right in case of displacement;
- the right to safe and clean air and water;
- the right to claim parts of reservations;
- the right to resolve conflict;32
- the right to ancestral lands which include
a. the right to transfer land/property to/among members of the same ICCs/IPs, subject to customary
laws and traditions of the community concerned;
b. the right to redemption for a period not exceeding 15 years from date of transfer, if the transfer is
to a non-member of the ICC/IP and is tainted by vitiated consent of the ICC/IP, or if the transfer is for
an unconscionable consideration.33
Within their ancestral domains and ancestral lands, the ICCs/IPs are given the right to self-governance
and empowerment,34 social justice and human rights,35 the right to preserve and protect their
culture, traditions, institutions and community intellectual rights, and the right to develop their own
sciences and technologies.36
To carry out the policies of the Act, the law created the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples
(NCIP). The NCIP is an independent agency under the Office of the President and is composed of seven
(7) Commissioners belonging to ICCs/IPs from each of the ethnographic areas- Region I and the
Cordilleras; Region II; the rest of Luzon; Island groups including Mindoro, Palawan, Romblon, Panay
and the rest of the Visayas; Northern and Western Mindanao; Southern and Eastern Mindanao; and
Central Mindanao.37 The NCIP took over the functions of the Office for Northern Cultural
Communities and the Office for Southern Cultural Communities created by former President Corazon
Aquino which were merged under a revitalized structure.38
Disputes involving ICCs/IPs are to be resolved under customary laws and practices. When still
unresolved, the matter may be brought to the NCIP, which is granted quasi-judicial powers.39 The
NCIP's decisions may be appealed to the Court of Appeals by a petition for review.
Any person who violates any of the provisions of the Act such as, but not limited to, unauthorized
and/or unlawful intrusion upon ancestral lands and domains shall be punished in accordance with
customary laws or imprisoned from 9 months to 12 years and/or fined from ₱100,000.00 to
₱500,000.00 and obliged to pay damages.40
A. Indigenous Peoples
The IPRA is a law dealing with a specific group of people, i.e., the Indigenous Cultural Communities
(ICCs) or the Indigenous Peoples (IPs). The term "ICCs" is used in the 1987 Constitution while that of
"IPs" is the contemporary international language in the International Labor Organization (ILO)
Convention 16941 and the United Nations (UN) Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples.42
ICCs/IPs are defined by the IPRA as:
"Sec. 3 [h]. Indigenous Cultural Communities/ Indigenous Peoples- refer to a group of people or
homogeneous societies identified by self-ascription and ascription by others, who have continuously
lived as organized community on communally bounded and defined territory, and who have, under
claims of ownership since time immemorial, occupied, possessed and utilized such territories, sharing
common bonds of language, customs, traditions and other distinctive cultural traits, or who have,
through resistance to political, social and cultural inroads of colonization, non-indigenous religions
and cultures, became historically differentiated from the majority of Filipinos. ICCs/IPs shall likewise
include peoples who are regarded as indigenous on account of their descent from the populations
7
which inhabited the country, at the time of conquest or colonization, or at the time of inroads of non-
indigenous religions and cultures, or the establishment of present state boundaries, who retain some
or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions, but who may have been
displaced from their traditional domains or who may have resettled outside their ancestral domains."
Indigenous Cultural Communities or Indigenous Peoples refer to a group of people or homogeneous
societies who have continuously lived as an organized community on communally bounded and
defined territory. These groups of people have actually occupied, possessed and utilized their
territories under claim of ownership since time immemorial. They share common bonds of language,
customs, traditions and other distinctive cultural traits, or, they, by their resistance to political, social
and cultural inroads of colonization, non-indigenous religions and cultures, became historically
differentiated from the Filipino majority. ICCs/IPs also include descendants of ICCs/IPs who inhabited
the country at the time of conquest or colonization, who retain some or all of their own social,
economic, cultural and political institutions but who may have been displaced from their traditional
territories or who may have resettled outside their ancestral domains.
1. Indigenous Peoples: Their History
Presently, Philippine indigenous peoples inhabit the interiors and mountains of Luzon, Mindanao,
Mindoro, Negros, Samar, Leyte, and the Palawan and Sulu group of islands. They are composed of
110 tribes and are as follows:
1. In the Cordillera Autonomous Region- Kankaney, Ibaloi, Bontoc, Tinggian or Itneg, Ifugao, Kalinga,
Yapayao, Aeta or Agta or Pugot, and Bago of Ilocos Norte and Pangasinan; Ibanag of Isabela, Cagayan;
Ilongot of Quirino and Nueva Vizcaya; Gaddang of Quirino, Nueva Vizcaya, Itawis of Cagayan; Ivatan
of Batanes, Aeta of Cagayan, Quirino and Isabela.
2. In Region III- Aetas.
3. In Region IV- Dumagats of Aurora, Rizal; Remontado of Aurora, Rizal, Quezon; Alangan or Mangyan,
Batangan, Buid or Buhid, Hanunuo and Iraya of Oriental and Occidental Mindoro; Tadyawan of
Occidental Mindoro; Cuyonon, Palawanon, Tagbanua and Tao't bato of Palawan.
4. In Region V- Aeta of Camarines Norte and Camarines Sur; Aeta-Abiyan, Isarog, and Kabihug of
Camarines Norte; Agta, and Mayon of Camarines Sur; Itom of Albay, Cimaron of Sorsogon; and the
Pullon of Masbate and Camarines Sur.
5. In Region VI- Ati of Negros Occidental, Iloilo and Antique, Capiz; the Magahat of Negros Occidental;
the Corolano and Sulod.
6. In Region VII- Magahat of Negros Oriental and Eskaya of Bohol.
7. In Region IX- the Badjao numbering about 192,000 in Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del Sur; the Kalibugan
of Basilan, the Samal, Subanon and Yakat.
8. Region X- Numbering 1.6 million in Region X alone, the IPs are: the Banwaon, Bukidnon, Matigsalog,
Talaanding of Bukidnon; the Camiguin of Camiguin Island; the Higa-unon of Agusan del Norte, Agusan
del Sur, Bukidnon and Misamis Occidental; the Tigwahanon of Agusan del Sur, Misamis Oriental and
and Misamis Occidental, the Manobo of the Agusan provinces, and the Umayamnon of Agusan and
Bukidnon.
9. In Region XI- There are about 1,774,065 IPs in Region XI. They are tribes of the Dibabaon, Mansaka
of Davao del Norte; B'laan, Kalagan, Langilad, T'boli and Talaingod of Davao del Sur; Mamamanua of
Surigao del Sur; Mandaya of the Surigao provinces and Davao Oriental; Manobo Blit of South
Cotabato; the Mangguangon of Davao and South Cotabato; Matigsalog of Davao del Norte and Del
Sur; Tagakaolo, Tasaday and Ubo of South Cotabato; and Bagobo of Davao del sur and South
Cotabato.
10. In Region XII- Ilianen, Tiruray, Maguindanao, Maranao, Tausug, Yakan/Samal, and Iranon.43
How these indigenous peoples came to live in the Philippines goes back to as early as 25,000 to 30,000
B.C.
Before the time of Western contact, the Philippine archipelago was peopled largely by the Negritos,
Indonesians and Malays.44 The strains from these groups eventually gave rise to common cultural
features which became the dominant influence in ethnic reformulation in the archipelago. Influences
from the Chinese and Indian civilizations in the third or fourth millenium B.C. augmented these ethnic
strains. Chinese economic and socio-cultural influences came by way of Chinese porcelain, silk and
traders. Indian influence found their way into the religious-cultural aspect of pre-colonial society.45
The ancient Filipinos settled beside bodies of water. Hunting and food gathering became
supplementary activities as reliance on them was reduced by fishing and the cultivation of the soil.46
From the hinterland, coastal, and riverine communities, our ancestors evolved an essentially
homogeneous culture, a basically common way of life where nature was a primary factor. Community
life throughout the archipelago was influenced by, and responded to, common ecology. The generally
benign tropical climate and the largely uniform flora and fauna favored similarities, not differences.47
Life was essentially subsistence but not harsh.48
The early Filipinos had a culture that was basically Malayan in structure and form. They had languages
that traced their origin to the Austronesian parent-stock and used them not only as media of daily
communication but also as vehicles for the expression of their literary moods.49 They fashioned
concepts and beliefs about the world that they could not see, but which they sensed to be part of
8
their lives.50 They had their own religion and religious beliefs. They believed in the immortality of the
soul and life after death. Their rituals were based on beliefs in a ranking deity whom they called
Bathalang Maykapal, and a host of other deities, in the environmental spirits and in soul spirits. The
early Filipinos adored the sun, the moon, the animals and birds, for they seemed to consider the
objects of Nature as something to be respected. They venerated almost any object that was close to
their daily life, indicating the importance of the relationship between man and the object of nature.51
The unit of government was the "barangay," a term that derived its meaning from the Malay word
"balangay," meaning, a boat, which transported them to these shores.52 The barangay was basically
a family-based community and consisted of thirty to one hundred families. Each barangay was
different and ruled by a chieftain called a "dato." It was the chieftain's duty to rule and govern his
subjects and promote their welfare and interests. A chieftain had wide powers for he exercised all the
functions of government. He was the executive, legislator and judge and was the supreme
commander in time of war.53
Laws were either customary or written. Customary laws were handed down orally from generation
to generation and constituted the bulk of the laws of the barangay. They were preserved in songs and
chants and in the memory of the elder persons in the community.54 The written laws were those that
the chieftain and his elders promulgated from time to time as the necessity arose.55 The oldest
known written body of laws was the Maragtas Code by Datu Sumakwel at about 1250 A.D. Other old
codes are the Muslim Code of Luwaran and the Principal Code of Sulu.56 Whether customary or
written, the laws dealt with various subjects, such as inheritance, divorce, usury, loans, partnership,
crime and punishment, property rights, family relations and adoption. Whenever disputes arose,
these were decided peacefully through a court composed by the chieftain as "judge" and the
barangay elders as "jury." Conflicts arising between subjects of different barangays were resolved by
arbitration in which a board composed of elders from neutral barangays acted as arbiters.57
Baranganic society had a distinguishing feature: the absence of private property in land. The chiefs
merely administered the lands in the name of the barangay. The social order was an extension of the
family with chiefs embodying the higher unity of the community. Each individual, therefore,
participated in the community ownership of the soil and the instruments of production as a member
of the barangay.58 This ancient communalism was practiced in accordance with the concept of
mutual sharing of resources so that no individual, regardless of status, was without sustenance.
Ownership of land was non-existent or unimportant and the right of usufruct was what regulated the
development of lands.59 Marine resources and fishing grounds were likewise free to all. Coastal
communities depended for their economic welfare on the kind of fishing sharing concept similar to
those in land communities.60 Recognized leaders, such as the chieftains and elders, by virtue of their
positions of importance, enjoyed some economic privileges and benefits. But their rights, related to
either land and sea, were subject to their responsibility to protect the communities from danger and
to provide them with the leadership and means of survival.61
Sometime in the 13th century, Islam was introduced to the archipelago in Maguindanao. The
Sultanate of Sulu was established and claimed jurisdiction over territorial areas represented today by
Tawi-tawi, Sulu, Palawan, Basilan and Zamboanga. Four ethnic groups were within this jurisdiction:
Sama, Tausug, Yakan and Subanon.62 The Sultanate of Maguindanao spread out from Cotabato
toward Maranao territory, now Lanao del Norte and Lanao del Sur.63
The Muslim societies evolved an Asiatic form of feudalism where land was still held in common but
was private in use. This is clearly indicated in the Muslim Code of Luwaran. The Code contains a
provision on the lease of cultivated lands. It, however, has no provision for the acquisition, transfer,
cession or sale of land.64
The societies encountered by Magellan and Legaspi therefore were primitive economies where most
production was geared to the use of the producers and to the fulfillment of kinship obligations. They
were not economies geared to exchange and profit.65 Moreover, the family basis of barangay
membership as well as of leadership and governance worked to splinter the population of the islands
into numerous small and separate communities.66
When the Spaniards settled permanently in the Philippines in 1565, they found the Filipinos living in
barangay settlements scattered along water routes and river banks. One of the first tasks imposed on
the missionaries and the encomenderos was to collect all scattered Filipinos together in a
reduccion.67 As early as 1551, the Spanish government assumed an unvarying solicitous attitude
towards the natives.68 The Spaniards regarded it a sacred "duty to conscience and humanity to civilize
these less fortunate people living in the obscurity of ignorance" and to accord them the "moral and
material advantages" of community life and the "protection and vigilance afforded them by the same
laws."69
The Spanish missionaries were ordered to establish pueblos where the church and convent would be
constructed. All the new Christian converts were required to construct their houses around the
church and the unbaptized were invited to do the same.70 With the reduccion, the Spaniards
attempted to "tame" the reluctant Filipinos through Christian indoctrination using the convento/casa
real/plaza complex as focal point. The reduccion, to the Spaniards, was a "civilizing" device to make
the Filipinos law-abiding citizens of the Spanish Crown, and in the long run, to make them ultimately
adopt Hispanic culture and civilization.71
All lands lost by the old barangays in the process of pueblo organization as well as all lands not
assigned to them and the pueblos, were now declared to be crown lands or realengas, belonging to
the Spanish king. It was from the realengas that land grants were made to non-Filipinos.72
The abrogation of the Filipinos' ancestral rights in land and the introduction of the concept of public
domain were the most immediate fundamental results of Spanish colonial theory and law.73 The
9
concept that the Spanish king was the owner of everything of value in the Indies or colonies was
imposed on the natives, and the natives were stripped of their ancestral rights to land.74
Increasing their foothold in the Philippines, the Spanish colonialists, civil and religious, classified the
Filipinos according to their religious practices and beliefs, and divided them into three types . First
were the Indios, the Christianized Filipinos, who generally came from the lowland populations.
Second, were the Moros or the Muslim communities, and third, were the infieles or the indigenous
communities.75
The Indio was a product of the advent of Spanish culture. This class was favored by the Spaniards and
was allowed certain status although below the Spaniards. The Moros and infieles were regarded as
the lowest classes.76
The Moros and infieles resisted Spanish rule and Christianity. The Moros were driven from Manila
and the Visayas to Mindanao; while the infieles, to the hinterlands. The Spaniards did not pursue
them into the deep interior. The upland societies were naturally outside the immediate concern of
Spanish interest, and the cliffs and forests of the hinterlands were difficult and inaccessible, allowing
the infieles, in effect, relative security.77 Thus, the infieles, which were peripheral to colonial
administration, were not only able to preserve their own culture but also thwarted the
Christianization process, separating themselves from the newly evolved Christian community.78 Their
own political, economic and social systems were kept constantly alive and vibrant.
The pro-Christian or pro-Indio attitude of colonialism brought about a generally mutual feeling of
suspicion, fear, and hostility between the Christians on the one hand and the non-Christians on the
other. Colonialism tended to divide and rule an otherwise culturally and historically related populace
through a colonial system that exploited both the virtues and vices of the Filipinos.79
President McKinley, in his instructions to the Philippine Commission of April 7, 1900, addressed the
existence of the infieles:
"In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the Islands, the Commission should adopt the same course
followed by Congress in permitting the tribes of our North American Indians to maintain their tribal
organization and government, and under which many of those tribes are now living in peace and
contentment, surrounded by civilization to which they are unable or unwilling to conform. Such tribal
government should, however, be subjected to wise and firm regulation; and, without undue or petty
interference, constant and active effort should be exercised to prevent barbarous practices and
introduce civilized customs."80
Placed in an alternative of either letting the natives alone or guiding them in the path of civilization,
the American government chose "to adopt the latter measure as one more in accord with humanity
and with the national conscience."81
The Americans classified the Filipinos into two: the Christian Filipinos and the non-Christian Filipinos.
The term "non-Christian" referred not to religious belief, but to a geographical area, and more
directly, "to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization, usually living in tribal
relationship apart from settled communities."82
Like the Spaniards, the Americans pursued a policy of assimilation. In 1903, they passed Act No. 253
creating the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes (BNCT). Under the Department of the Interior, the BNCT's
primary task was to conduct ethnographic research among unhispanized Filipinos, including those in
Muslim Mindanao, with a "special view to determining the most practicable means for bringing about
their advancement in civilization and prosperity." The BNCT was modeled after the bureau dealing
with American Indians. The agency took a keen anthropological interest in Philippine cultural
minorities and produced a wealth of valuable materials about them.83
The 1935 Constitution did not carry any policy on the non-Christian Filipinos. The raging issue then
was the conservation of the national patrimony for the Filipinos.
In 1957, the Philippine Congress passed R.A. No. 1888, an "Act to effectuate in a more rapid and
complete manner the economic, social, moral and political advancement of the non-Christian
Filipinos or national cultural minorities and to render real, complete, and permanent the integration
of all said national cultural minorities into the body politic, creating the Commission on National
Integration charged with said functions." The law called for a policy of integration of indigenous
peoples into the Philippine mainstream and for this purpose created the Commission on National
Integration (CNI).84 The CNI was given, more or less, the same task as the BNCT during the American
regime. The post-independence policy of integration was like the colonial policy of assimilation
understood in the context of a guardian-ward relationship.85
The policy of assimilation and integration did not yield the desired result. Like the Spaniards and
Americans, government attempts at integration met with fierce resistance. Since World War II, a tidal
wave of Christian settlers from the lowlands of Luzon and the Visayas swamped the highlands and
wide open spaces in Mindanao.86 Knowledge by the settlers of the Public Land Acts and the Torrens
system resulted in the titling of several ancestral lands in the settlers' names. With government
initiative and participation, this titling displaced several indigenous peoples from their lands. Worse,
these peoples were also displaced by projects undertaken by the national government in the name
of national development.87
It was in the 1973 Constitution that the State adopted the following provision:
"The State shall consider the customs, traditions, beliefs, and interests of national cultural
communities in the formulation and implementation of State policies."88
10
For the first time in Philippine history, the "non-Christian tribes" or the "cultural minorities" were
addressed by the highest law of the Republic, and they were referred to as "cultural communities."
More importantly this time, their "uncivilized" culture was given some recognition and their
"customs, traditions, beliefs and interests" were to be considered by the State in the formulation and
implementation of State policies. President Marcos abolished the CNI and transferred its functions to
the Presidential Adviser on National Minorities (PANAMIN). The PANAMIN was tasked to integrate
the ethnic groups that sought full integration into the larger community, and at the same time
"protect the rights of those who wish to preserve their original lifeways beside the larger
community."89 In short, while still adopting the integration policy, the decree recognized the right of
tribal Filipinos to preserve their way of life.90
In 1974, President Marcos promulgated P.D. No. 410, otherwise known as the Ancestral Lands Decree.
The decree provided for the issuance of land occupancy certificates to members of the national
cultural communities who were given up to 1984 to register their claims.91 In 1979, the Commission
on the Settlement of Land Problems was created under E.O. No. 561 which provided a mechanism for
the expeditious resolution of land problems involving small settlers, landowners, and tribal
Filipinos.92
Despite the promulgation of these laws, from 1974 to the early 1980's, some 100,000 Kalingas and
Bontoks of the Cordillera region were displaced by the Chico River dam project of the National Power
Corporation (NPC). The Manobos of Bukidnon saw their land bulldozed by the Bukidnon Sugar
Industries Company (BUSCO). In Agusan del Sur, the National Development Company was authorized
by law in 1979 to take approximately 40,550 hectares of land that later became the NDC-Guthrie
plantation in Agusan del Sur. Most of the land was possessed by the Agusan natives.93 Timber
concessions, water projects, plantations, mining, and cattle ranching and other projects of the
national government led not only to the eviction of the indigenous peoples from their land but also
to the reduction and destruction of their natural environment.94
The Aquino government signified a total shift from the policy of integration to one of preservation.
Invoking her powers under the Freedom Constitution, President Aquino created the Office of Muslim
Affairs, Office for Northern Cultural Communities and the Office for Southern Cultural Communities
all under the Office of the President.95
The 1987 Constitution carries at least six (6) provisions which insure the right of tribal Filipinos to
preserve their way of life.96 This Constitution goes further than the 1973 Constitution by expressly
guaranteeing the rights of tribal Filipinos to their ancestral domains and ancestral lands. By
recognizing their right to their ancestral lands and domains, the State has effectively upheld their right
to live in a culture distinctly their own.
2. Their Concept of Land
Indigenous peoples share distinctive traits that set them apart from the Filipino mainstream. They are
non-Christians. They live in less accessible, marginal, mostly upland areas. They have a system of self-
government not dependent upon the laws of the central administration of the Republic of the
Philippines. They follow ways of life and customs that are perceived as different from those of the
rest of the population.97 The kind of response the indigenous peoples chose to deal with colonial
threat worked well to their advantage by making it difficult for Western concepts and religion to erode
their customs and traditions. The "infieles societies" which had become peripheral to colonial
administration, represented, from a cultural perspective, a much older base of archipelagic culture.
The political systems were still structured on the patriarchal and kinship oriented arrangement of
power and authority. The economic activities were governed by the concepts of an ancient
communalism and mutual help. The social structure which emphasized division of labor and
distinction of functions, not status, was maintained. The cultural styles and forms of life portraying
the varieties of social courtesies and ecological adjustments were kept constantly vibrant.98
Land is the central element of the indigenous peoples' existence. There is no traditional concept of
permanent, individual, land ownership. Among the Igorots, ownership of land more accurately applies
to the tribal right to use the land or to territorial control. The people are the secondary owners or
stewards of the land and that if a member of the tribe ceases to work, he loses his claim of ownership,
and the land reverts to the beings of the spirit world who are its true and primary owners. Under the
concept of "trusteeship," the right to possess the land does not only belong to the present generation
but the future ones as well.99
Customary law on land rests on the traditional belief that no one owns the land except the gods and
spirits, and that those who work the land are its mere stewards.100 Customary law has a strong
preference for communal ownership, which could either be ownership by a group of individuals or
families who are related by blood or by marriage,101 or ownership by residents of the same locality
who may not be related by blood or marriage. The system of communal ownership under customary
laws draws its meaning from the subsistence and highly collectivized mode of economic production.
The Kalingas, for instance, who are engaged in team occupation like hunting, foraging for forest
products, and swidden farming found it natural that forest areas, swidden farms, orchards, pasture
and burial grounds should be communally-owned.102 For the Kalingas, everybody has a common
right to a common economic base. Thus, as a rule, rights and obligations to the land are shared in
common.
Although highly bent on communal ownership, customary law on land also sanctions individual
ownership. The residential lots and terrace rice farms are governed by a limited system of individual
ownership. It is limited because while the individual owner has the right to use and dispose of the
property, he does not possess all the rights of an exclusive and full owner as defined under our Civil
Code.103 Under Kalinga customary law, the alienation of individually-owned land is strongly
discouraged except in marriage and succession and except to meet sudden financial needs due to
sickness, death in the family, or loss of crops.104 Moreover, and to be alienated should first be offered
11
to a clan-member before any village-member can purchase it, and in no case may land be sold to a
non-member of the ili.105
Land titles do not exist in the indigenous peoples' economic and social system. The concept of
individual land ownership under the civil law is alien to them. Inherently colonial in origin, our national
land laws and governmental policies frown upon indigenous claims to ancestral lands. Communal
ownership is looked upon as inferior, if not inexistent.106
III. THE IPRA IS A NOVEL PIECE OF LEGISLATION.
A. The Legislative History of the IPRA
It was to address the centuries-old neglect of the Philippine indigenous peoples that the Tenth
Congress of the Philippines, by their joint efforts, passed and approved R.A. No. 8371, the Indigenous
Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) of 1997. The law was a consolidation of two Bills- Senate Bill No. 1728 and
House Bill No. 9125.
Principally sponsored by Senator Juan M. Flavier,107 Senate Bill No. 1728 was a consolidation of four
proposed measures referred to the Committees on Cultural Communities, Environment and Natural
Resources, Ways and Means, as well as Finance. It adopted almost en toto the comprehensive version
of Senate Bill Nos. 1476 and 1486 which was a result of six regional consultations and one national
consultation with indigenous peoples nationwide.108 At the Second Regular Session of the Tenth
Congress, Senator Flavier, in his sponsorship speech, gave a background on the situation of indigenous
peoples in the Philippines, to wit:
"The Indigenous Cultural Communities, including the Bangsa Moro, have long suffered from the
dominance and neglect of government controlled by the majority. Massive migration of their
Christian brothers to their homeland shrunk their territory and many of the tribal Filipinos were
pushed to the hinterlands. Resisting the intrusion, dispossessed of their ancestral land and with the
massive exploitation of their natural resources by the elite among the migrant population, they
became marginalized. And the government has been an indispensable party to this insidious
conspiracy against the Indigenous Cultural Communities (ICCs). It organized and supported the
resettlement of people to their ancestral land, which was massive during the Commonwealth and
early years of the Philippine Republic. Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine first introduced to our system
by Spain through the Royal Decree of 13 February 1894 or the Maura Law, the government passed
laws to legitimize the wholesale landgrabbing and provide for easy titling or grant of lands to migrant
homesteaders within the traditional areas of the ICCs."109
Senator Flavier further declared:
"The IPs are the offsprings and heirs of the peoples who have first inhabited and cared for the land
long before any central government was established. Their ancestors had territories over which they
ruled themselves and related with other tribes. These territories- the land- include people, their
dwelling, the mountains, the water, the air, plants, forest and the animals. This is their environment
in its totality. Their existence as indigenous peoples is manifested in their own lives through political,
economic, socio-cultural and spiritual practices. The IPs culture is the living and irrefutable proof to
this.
Their survival depends on securing or acquiring land rights; asserting their rights to it; and depending
on it. Otherwise, IPs shall cease to exist as distinct peoples."110
To recognize the rights of the indigenous peoples effectively, Senator Flavier proposed a bill based on
two postulates: (1) the concept of native title; and (2) the principle of parens patriae.
According to Senator Flavier, "[w]hile our legal tradition subscribes to the Regalian Doctrine
reinstated in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution," our "decisional laws" and jurisprudence
passed by the State have "made exception to the doctrine." This exception was first laid down in the
case of Cariño v. Insular Government where:
"x x x the court has recognized long occupancy of land by an indigenous member of the cultural
communities as one of private ownership, which, in legal concept, is termed "native title." This ruling
has not been overturned. In fact, it was affirmed in subsequent cases."111
Following Cariño, the State passed Act No. 926, Act No. 2874, C.A. No. 141, P.D. 705, P.D. 410, P.D.
1529, R.A. 6734 (the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao). These laws,
explicitly or implicitly, and liberally or restrictively, recognized "native title" or "private right" and the
existence of ancestral lands and domains. Despite the passage of these laws, however, Senator Flavier
continued:
"x x x the executive department of government since the American occupation has not implemented
the policy. In fact, it was more honored in its breach than in its observance, its wanton disregard
shown during the period unto the Commonwealth and the early years of the Philippine Republic when
government organized and supported massive resettlement of the people to the land of the ICCs."
Senate Bill No. 1728 seeks to genuinely recognize the IPs right to own and possess their ancestral
land. The bill was prepared also under the principle of parens patriae inherent in the supreme power
of the State and deeply embedded in Philippine legal tradition. This principle mandates that persons
suffering from serious disadvantage or handicap, which places them in a position of actual inequality
in their relation or transaction with others, are entitled to the protection of the State.
12
Senate Bill No. 1728 was passed on Third Reading by twenty-one (21) Senators voting in favor and
none against, with no abstention.112
House Bill No. 9125 was sponsored by Rep. Zapata, Chairman of the Committee on Cultural
Communities. It was originally authored and subsequently presented and defended on the floor by
Rep. Gregorio Andolana of North Cotabato.113
Rep. Andolana's sponsorhip speech reads as follows:
"This Representation, as early as in the 8th Congress, filed a bill of similar implications that would
promote, recognize the rights of indigenous cultural communities within the framework of national
unity and development.
Apart from this, Mr. Speaker, is our obligation, the government's obligation to assure and ascertain
that these rights shall be well-preserved and the cultural traditions as well as the indigenous laws that
remained long before this Republic was established shall be preserved and promoted. There is a need,
Mr. Speaker, to look into these matters seriously and early approval of the substitute bill shall bring
into reality the aspirations, the hope and the dreams of more than 12 million Filipinos that they be
considered in the mainstream of the Philippine society as we fashion for the year 2000." 114
Rep. Andolana stressed that H.B. No. 9125 is based on the policy of preservation as mandated in the
Constitution. He also emphasized that the rights of IPs to their land was enunciated in Cariño v. Insular
Government which recognized the fact that they had vested rights prior to the establishment of the
Spanish and American regimes.115
After exhaustive interpellation, House Bill No. 9125, and its corresponding amendments, was
approved on Second Reading with no objections.
IV. THE PROVISIONS OF THE IPRA DO NOT CONTRAVENE THE CONSTITUTION.
A. Ancestral Domains and Ancestral Lands are the Private Property of Indigenous Peoples and Do Not
Constitute Part of the Land of the Public Domain.
The IPRA grants to ICCs/IPs a distinct kind of ownership over ancestral domains and ancestral lands.
Ancestral lands are not the same as ancestral domains. These are defined in Section 3 [a] and [b] of
the Indigenous Peoples Right Act, viz:
"Sec. 3 a) Ancestral Domains. - Subject to Section 56 hereof, refer to all areas generally belonging to
ICCs/IPs comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein, held under a
claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs by themselves or through their ancestors,
communally or individually since time immemorial, continuously to the present except when
interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of
government projects or any other voluntary dealings entered into by government and private
individuals/corporations, and which are necessary to ensure their economic, social and cultural
welfare. It shall include ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential, agricultural, and other lands
individually owned whether alienable and disposable or otherwise, hunting grounds, burial grounds,
worship areas, bodies of water, mineral and other natural resources, and lands which may no longer
be exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs but from which they traditionally had access to for their
subsistence and traditional activities, particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic
and/or shifting cultivators;
b) Ancestral Lands.- Subject to Section 56 hereof, refers to land occupied, possessed and utilized by
individuals, families and clans who are members of the ICCs/IPs since time immemorial, by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, under claims of individual or traditional group
ownership, continuously, to the present except when interrupted by war, force majeure or
displacement by force, deceit, stealth, or as a consequence of government projects and other
voluntary dealings entered into by government and private individuals/corporations, including, but
not limited to, residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms and tree lots."
Ancestral domains are all areas belonging to ICCs/IPs held under a claim of ownership, occupied or
possessed by ICCs/IPs by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually since
time immemorial, continuously until the present, except when interrupted by war, force majeure or
displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of government projects or any other
voluntary dealings with government and/or private individuals or corporations. Ancestral domains
comprise lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein and includes ancestral
lands, forests, pasture, residential, agricultural, and other lands individually owned whether alienable
or not, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of water, mineral and other natural
resources. They also include lands which may no longer be exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs but from
which they traditionally had access to for their subsistence and traditional activities, particularly the
home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or shifting cultivators.116
Ancestral lands are lands held by the ICCs/IPs under the same conditions as ancestral domains except
that these are limited to lands and that these lands are not merely occupied and possessed but are
also utilized by the ICCs/IPs under claims of individual or traditional group ownership. These lands
include but are not limited to residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms
and tree lots.117
The procedures for claiming ancestral domains and lands are similar to the procedures embodied in
Department Administrative Order (DAO) No. 2, series of 1993, signed by then Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Angel Alcala.118 DAO No. 2 allowed the
delineation of ancestral domains by special task forces and ensured the issuance of Certificates of
Ancestral Land Claims (CALC's) and Certificates of Ancestral Domain Claims (CADC's) to IPs.
13

The identification and delineation of these ancestral domains and lands is a power conferred by the
IPRA on the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP).119 The guiding principle in
identification and delineation is self-delineation.120 This means that the ICCs/IPs have a decisive role
in determining the boundaries of their domains and in all the activities pertinent thereto.121
The procedure for the delineation and recognition of ancestral domains is set forth in Sections 51 and
52 of the IPRA. The identification, delineation and certification of ancestral lands is in Section 53 of
said law.
Upon due application and compliance with the procedure provided under the law and upon finding
by the NCIP that the application is meritorious, the NCIP shall issue a Certificate of Ancestral Domain
Title (CADT) in the name of the community concerned.122 The allocation of lands within the ancestral
domain to any individual or indigenous corporate (family or clan) claimants is left to the ICCs/IPs
concerned to decide in accordance with customs and traditions.123 With respect to ancestral lands
outside the ancestral domain, the NCIP issues a Certificate of Ancestral Land Title (CALT).124
CADT's and CALT's issued under the IPRA shall be registered by the NCIP before the Register of Deeds
in the place where the property is situated.125
(1) Right to Ancestral Domains and Ancestral Lands: How Acquired
The rights of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains and ancestral lands may be acquired in two
modes: (1) by native title over both ancestral lands and domains; or (2) by torrens title under the
Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act with respect to ancestral lands only.
(2) The Concept of Native Title
Native title is defined as:
"Sec. 3 [l]. Native Title- refers to pre-conquest rights to lands and domains which, as far back as
memory reaches, have been held under a claim of private ownership by ICCs/IPs, have never been
public lands and are thus indisputably presumed to have been held that way since before the Spanish
Conquest."126
Native title refers to ICCs/IPs' preconquest rights to lands and domains held under a claim of private
ownership as far back as memory reaches. These lands are deemed never to have been public lands
and are indisputably presumed to have been held that way since before the Spanish Conquest. The
rights of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains (which also include ancestral lands) by virtue of native
title shall be recognized and respected.127 Formal recognition, when solicited by ICCs/IPs concerned,
shall be embodied in a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT), which shall recognize the title of
the concerned ICCs/IPs over the territories identified and delineated.128
Like a torrens title, a CADT is evidence of private ownership of land by native title. Native title,
however, is a right of private ownership peculiarly granted to ICCs/IPs over their ancestral lands and
domains. The IPRA categorically declares ancestral lands and domains held by native title as never to
have been public land. Domains and lands held under native title are, therefore, indisputably
presumed to have never been public lands and are private.
(a) Cariño v. Insular Government129
The concept of native title in the IPRA was taken from the 1909 case of Cariño v. Insular
Government.130 Cariño firmly established a concept of private land title that existed irrespective of
any royal grant from the State.
In 1903, Don Mateo Cariño, an Ibaloi, sought to register with the land registration court 146 hectares
of land in Baguio Municipality, Benguet Province. He claimed that this land had been possessed and
occupied by his ancestors since time immemorial; that his grandfather built fences around the
property for the holding of cattle and that his father cultivated some parts of the land. Cariño
inherited the land in accordance with Igorot custom. He tried to have the land adjusted under the
Spanish land laws, but no document issued from the Spanish Crown.131 In 1901, Cariño obtained a
possessory title to the land under the Spanish Mortgage Law.132 The North American colonial
government, however, ignored his possessory title and built a public road on the land prompting him
to seek a Torrens title to his property in the land registration court. While his petition was pending, a
U.S. military reservation133 was proclaimed over his land and, shortly thereafter, a military
detachment was detailed on the property with orders to keep cattle and trespassers, including Cariño,
off the land.134
In 1904, the land registration court granted Cariño's application for absolute ownership to the land.
Both the Government of the Philippine Islands and the U.S. Government appealed to the C.F.I. of
Benguet which reversed the land registration court and dismissed Cariño's application. The Philippine
Supreme Court135 affirmed the C.F.I. by applying the Valenton ruling. Cariño took the case to the U.S.
Supreme Court.136 On one hand, the Philippine government invoked the Regalian doctrine and
contended that Cariño failed to comply with the provisions of the Royal Decree of June 25, 1880,
which required registration of land claims within a limited period of time. Cariño, on the other,
asserted that he was the absolute owner of the land jure gentium, and that the land never formed
part of the public domain.
In a unanimous decision written by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, the U.S. Supreme Court held:
14
"It is true that Spain, in its earlier decrees, embodied the universal feudal theory that all lands were
held from the Crown, and perhaps the general attitude of conquering nations toward people not
recognized as entitled to the treatment accorded to those in the same zone of civilization with
themselves. It is true, also, that in legal theory, sovereignty is absolute, and that, as against foreign
nations, the United States may assert, as Spain asserted, absolute power. But it does not follow that,
as against the inhabitants of the Philippines, the United States asserts that Spain had such power.
When theory is left on one side, sovereignty is a question of strength, and may vary in degree. How
far a new sovereign shall insist upon the theoretical relation of the subjects to the head in the past,
and how far it shall recognize actual facts, are matters for it to decide."137
The U.S. Supreme Court noted that it need not accept Spanish doctrines. The choice was with the new
colonizer. Ultimately, the matter had to be decided under U.S. law.
The Cariño decision largely rested on the North American constitutionalist's concept of "due process"
as well as the pronounced policy "to do justice to the natives."138 It was based on the strong mandate
extended to the Islands via the Philippine Bill of 1902 that "No law shall be enacted in said islands
which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any
person therein the equal protection of the laws." The court declared:
"The acquisition of the Philippines was not like the settlement of the white race in the United States.
Whatever consideration may have been shown to the North American Indians, the dominant purpose
of the whites in America was to occupy land. It is obvious that, however stated, the reason for our
taking over the Philippines was different. No one, we suppose, would deny that, so far as consistent
with paramount necessities, our first object in the internal administration of the islands is to do justice
to the natives, not to exploit their country for private gain. By the Organic Act of July 1, 1902, chapter
1369, section 12 (32 Statutes at Large, 691), all the property and rights acquired there by the United
States are to be administered 'for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof.' It is reasonable to suppose
that the attitude thus assumed by the United States with regard to what was unquestionably its own
is also its attitude in deciding what it will claim for its own. The same statute made a bill of rights,
embodying the safeguards of the Constitution, and, like the Constitution, extends those safeguards
to all. It provides that 'no law shall be enacted in said islands which shall deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection
of the laws.' In the light of the declaration that we have quoted from section 12, it is hard to believe
that the United States was ready to declare in the next breath that "any person" did not embrace the
inhabitants of Benguet, or that it meant by "property" only that which had become such by
ceremonies of which presumably a large part of the inhabitants never had heard, and that it proposed
to treat as public land what they, by native custom and by long association,- of the profoundest
factors in human thought,- regarded as their own."139
The Court went further:
"Every presumption is and ought to be against the government in a case like the present. It might,
perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far back as testimony or memory goes, the land
has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have been
held in the same way from before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land. Certainly
in a case like this, if there is doubt or ambiguity in the Spanish law, we ought to give the applicant the
benefit of the doubt."140
The court thus laid down the presumption of a certain title held (1) as far back as testimony or
memory went, and (2) under a claim of private ownership. Land held by this title is presumed to
"never have been public land."
Against this presumption, the U.S. Supreme Court analyzed the Spanish decrees upheld in the 1904
decision of Valenton v. Murciano. The U.S. Supreme Court found no proof that the Spanish decrees
did not honor native title. On the contrary, the decrees discussed in Valenton appeared to recognize
that the natives owned some land, irrespective of any royal grant. The Regalian doctrine declared in
the preamble of the Recopilacion was all "theory and discourse" and it was observed that titles were
admitted to exist beyond the powers of the Crown, viz:
"If the applicant's case is to be tried by the law of Spain, we do not discover such clear proof that it
was bad by that law as to satisfy us that he does not own the land. To begin with, the older decrees
and laws cited by the counsel for the plaintiff in error seem to indicate pretty clearly that the natives
were recognized as owning some lands, irrespective of any royal grant. In other words, Spain did not
assume to convert all the native inhabitants of the Philippines into trespassers or even into tenants
at will. For instance, Book 4, title 12, Law 14 of the the Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias, cited for a
contrary conclusion in Valenton v. Murciano, 3 Philippine 537, while it commands viceroys and others,
when it seems proper, to call for the exhibition of grants, directs them to confirm those who hold by
good grants or justa prescripcion. It is true that it begins by the characteristic assertion of feudal
overlordship and the origin of all titles in the King or his predecessors. That was theory and discourse.
The fact was that titles were admitted to exist that owed nothing to the powers of Spain beyond this
recognition in their books." (Emphasis supplied).141
The court further stated that the Spanish "adjustment" proceedings never held sway over
unconquered territories. The wording of the Spanish laws were not framed in a manner as to convey
to the natives that failure to register what to them has always been their own would mean loss of
such land. The registration requirement was "not to confer title, but simply to establish it;" it was "not
calculated to convey to the mind of an Igorot chief the notion that ancient family possessions were in
danger, if he had read every word of it."
By recognizing this kind of title, the court clearly repudiated the doctrine of Valenton. It was frank
enough, however, to admit the possibility that the applicant might have been deprived of his land
under Spanish law because of the inherent ambiguity of the decrees and concomitantly, the various
15
interpretations which may be given them. But precisely because of the ambiguity and of the strong
"due process mandate" of the Constitution, the court validated this kind of title.142 This title was
sufficient, even without government administrative action, and entitled the holder to a Torrens
certificate. Justice Holmes explained:
"It will be perceived that the rights of the applicant under the Spanish law present a problem not
without difficulties for courts of a legal tradition. We have deemed it proper on that account to notice
the possible effect of the change of sovereignty and the act of Congress establishing the fundamental
principles now to be observed. Upon a consideration of the whole case we are of the opinion that law
and justice require that the applicant should be granted what he seeks, and should not be deprived
of what, by the practice and belief of those among whom he lived, was his property, through a refined
interpretation of an almost forgotten law of Spain."143
Thus, the court ruled in favor of Cariño and ordered the registration of the 148 hectares in Baguio
Municipality in his name.144
Examining Cariño closer, the U.S. Supreme Court did not categorically refer to the title it upheld as
"native title." It simply said:
"The Province of Benguet was inhabited by a tribe that the Solicitor-General, in his argument,
characterized as a savage tribe that never was brought under the civil or military government of the
Spanish Crown. It seems probable, if not certain, that the Spanish officials would not have granted to
anyone in that province the registration to which formerly the plaintiff was entitled by the Spanish
Laws, and which would have made his title beyond question good. Whatever may have been the
technical position of Spain it does not follow that, in the view of the United States, he had lost all
rights and was a mere trespasser when the present government seized his land. The argument to that
effect seems to amount to a denial of native titles through an important part of the Island of Luzon,
at least, for the want of ceremonies which the Spaniards would not have permitted and had not the
power to enforce."145
This is the only instance when Justice Holmes used the term "native title" in the entire length of the
Cariño decision. It is observed that the widespread use of the term "native title" may be traced to
Professor Owen James Lynch, Jr., a Visiting Professor at the University of the Philippines College of
Law from the Yale University Law School. In 1982, Prof. Lynch published an article in the Philippine
Law Journal entitled Native Title, Private Right and Tribal Land Law.146 This article was made after
Professor Lynch visited over thirty tribal communities throughout the country and studied the origin
and development of Philippine land laws.147 He discussed Cariño extensively and used the term
"native title" to refer to Cariño's title as discussed and upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in said case.
(b) Indian Title
In a footnote in the same article, Professor Lynch stated that the concept of "native title" as defined
by Justice Holmes in Cariño "is conceptually similar to "aboriginal title" of the American Indians.148
This is not surprising, according to Prof. Lynch, considering that during the American regime,
government policy towards ICCs/IPs was consistently made in reference to native Americans.149 This
was clearly demonstrated in the case of Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro.150
In Rubi, the Provincial Board of Mindoro adopted a Resolution authorizing the provincial governor to
remove the Mangyans from their domains and place them in a permanent reservation in Sitio Tigbao,
Lake Naujan. Any Mangyan who refused to comply was to be imprisoned. Rubi and some Mangyans,
including one who was imprisoned for trying to escape from the reservation, filed for habeas corpus
claiming deprivation of liberty under the Board Resolution. This Court denied the petition on the
ground of police power. It upheld government policy promoting the idea that a permanent settlement
was the only successful method for educating the Mangyans, introducing civilized customs, improving
their health and morals, and protecting the public forests in which they roamed.151 Speaking through
Justice Malcolm, the court said:
"Reference was made in the President's instructions to the Commission to the policy adopted by the
United States for the Indian Tribes. The methods followed by the Government of the Philippine Islands
in its dealings with the so-called non-Christian people is said, on argument, to be practically identical
with that followed by the United States Government in its dealings with the Indian tribes. Valuable
lessons, it is insisted, can be derived by an investigation of the American-Indian policy.
From the beginning of the United States, and even before, the Indians have been treated as "in a state
of pupilage." The recognized relation between the Government of the United States and the Indians
may be described as that of guardian and ward. It is for the Congress to determine when and how the
guardianship shall be terminated. The Indians are always subject to the plenary authority of the
United States.152
x x x.
As to the second point, the facts in the Standing Bear case and the Rubi case are not exactly identical.
But even admitting similarity of facts, yet it is known to all that Indian reservations do exist in the
United States, that Indians have been taken from different parts of the country and placed on these
reservations, without any previous consultation as to their own wishes, and that, when once so
located, they have been made to remain on the reservation for their own good and for the general
good of the country. If any lesson can be drawn from the Indian policy of the United States, it is that
the determination of this policy is for the legislative and executive branches of the government and
that when once so decided upon, the courts should not interfere to upset a carefully planned
governmental system. Perhaps, just as many forceful reasons exist for the segregation of the
Manguianes in Mindoro as existed for the segregation of the different Indian tribes in the United
States."153
16

Rubi applied the concept of Indian land grants or reservations in the Philippines. An Indian reservation
is a part of the public domain set apart by proper authority for the use and occupation of a tribe or
tribes of Indians.154 It may be set apart by an act of Congress, by treaty, or by executive order, but it
cannot be established by custom and prescription.155
Indian title to land, however, is not limited to land grants or reservations. It also covers the "aboriginal
right of possession or occupancy."156 The aboriginal right of possession depends on the actual
occupancy of the lands in question by the tribe or nation as their ancestral home, in the sense that
such lands constitute definable territory occupied exclusively by the particular tribe or nation.157 It
is a right which exists apart from any treaty, statute, or other governmental action, although in
numerous instances treaties have been negotiated with Indian tribes, recognizing their aboriginal
possession and delimiting their occupancy rights or settling and adjusting their boundaries.158
American jurisprudence recognizes the Indians' or native Americans' rights to land they have held and
occupied before the "discovery" of the Americas by the Europeans. The earliest definitive statement
by the U.S. Supreme Court on the nature of aboriginal title was made in 1823 in Johnson & Graham's
Lessee v. M'Intosh.159
In Johnson, the plaintiffs claimed the land in question under two (2) grants made by the chiefs of two
(2) Indian tribes. The U.S. Supreme Court refused to recognize this conveyance, the plaintiffs being
private persons. The only conveyance that was recognized was that made by the Indians to the
government of the European discoverer. Speaking for the court, Chief Justice Marshall pointed out
that the potentates of the old world believed that they had made ample compensation to the
inhabitants of the new world by bestowing civilization and Christianity upon them; but in addition,
said the court, they found it necessary, in order to avoid conflicting settlements and consequent war,
to establish the principle that discovery gives title to the government by whose subjects, or by whose
authority, the discovery was made, against all other European governments, which title might be
consummated by possession.160 The exclusion of all other Europeans gave to the nation making the
discovery the sole right of acquiring the soil from the natives and establishing settlements upon it. As
regards the natives, the court further stated that:
"Those relations which were to exist between the discoverer and the natives were to be regulated by
themselves. The rights thus acquired being exclusive, no other power could interpose between them.
In the establishment of these relations, the rights of the original inhabitants were, in no instance,
entirely disregarded; but were necessarily, to a considerable extent, impaired. They were admitted
to be the rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as just claim to retain possession of it, and
to use it according to their own discretion; but their rights to complete sovereignty, as independent
nations, were necessarily diminished, and their power to dispose of the soil at their own will, to
whomsoever they pleased, was denied by the fundamental principle that discovery gave exclusive
title to those who made it.
While the different nations of Europe respected the right of the natives as occupants, they asserted
the ultimate dominion to be in themselves; and claimed and exercised, as a consequence of this
ultimate dominion, a power to grant the soil, while yet in possession of the natives. These grants have
been understood by all to convey a title to the grantees, subject only to the Indian right of
occupancy."161
Thus, the discoverer of new territory was deemed to have obtained the exclusive right to acquire
Indian land and extinguish Indian titles. Only to the discoverer- whether to England, France, Spain or
Holland- did this right belong and not to any other nation or private person. The mere acquisition of
the right nonetheless did not extinguish Indian claims to land. Rather, until the discoverer, by
purchase or conquest, exercised its right, the concerned Indians were recognized as the "rightful
occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as just claim to retain possession of it." Grants made by the
discoverer to her subjects of lands occupied by the Indians were held to convey a title to the grantees,
subject only to the Indian right of occupancy. Once the discoverer purchased the land from the Indians
or conquered them, it was only then that the discoverer gained an absolute title unrestricted by Indian
rights.
The court concluded, in essence, that a grant of Indian lands by Indians could not convey a title
paramount to the title of the United States itself to other parties, saying:
"It has never been contended that the Indian title amounted to nothing. Their right of possession has
never been questioned. The claim of government extends to the complete ultimate title, charged with
this right of possession, and to the exclusive power of acquiring that right."162
It has been said that the history of America, from its discovery to the present day, proves the universal
recognition of this principle.163
The Johnson doctrine was a compromise. It protected Indian rights and their native lands without
having to invalidate conveyances made by the government to many U.S. citizens.164
Johnson was reiterated in the case of Worcester v. Georgia.165 In this case, the State of Georgia
enacted a law requiring all white persons residing within the Cherokee nation to obtain a license or
permit from the Governor of Georgia; and any violation of the law was deemed a high misdemeanor.
The plaintiffs, who were white missionaries, did not obtain said license and were thus charged with a
violation of the Act.
The U.S. Supreme Court declared the Act as unconstitutional for interfering with the treaties
established between the United States and the Cherokee nation as well as the Acts of Congress
17
regulating intercourse with them. It characterized the relationship between the United States
government and the Indians as:
"The Indian nations were, from their situation, necessarily dependent on some foreign potentate for
the supply of their essential wants, and for their protection from lawless and injurious intrusions into
their country. That power was naturally termed their protector. They had been arranged under the
protection of Great Britain; but the extinguishment of the British power in their neighborhood, and
the establishment of that of the United States in its place, led naturally to the declaration, on the part
of the Cherokees, that they were under the protection of the United States, and of no other power.
They assumed the relation with the United States which had before subsisted with Great Britain.
This relation was that of a nation claiming and receiving the protection of one more powerful, not
that of individuals abandoning their national character, and submitting as subjects to the laws of a
master."166
It was the policy of the U.S. government to treat the Indians as nations with distinct territorial
boundaries and recognize their right of occupancy over all the lands within their domains. Thus:
"From the commencement of our government Congress has passed acts to regulate trade and
intercourse with the Indians; which treat them as nations, respect their rights, and manifest a firm
purpose to afford that protection which treaties stipulate. All these acts, and especially that of 1802,
which is still in force, manifestly consider the several Indian nations as distinct political communities,
having territorial boundaries, within which their authority is exclusive, and having a right to all the
lands within those boundaries, which is not only acknowledged, but guaranteed by the United States.
x x x.
"The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, independent political communities,
retaining their original natural rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil from time immemorial,
with the single exception of that imposed by irresistible power, which excluded them from
intercourse with any other European potentate than the first discoverer of the coast of the particular
region claimed: and this was a restriction which those European potentates imposed on themselves,
as well as on the Indians. The very term "nation," so generally applied to them, means "a people
distinct from others." x x x.167
The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community, occupying its own territory, with boundaries
accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force, and which the citizens of Georgia
have no right to enter but with the assent of the Cherokees themselves or in conformity with treaties
and with the acts of Congress. The whole intercourse between the United States and this nation is,
by our Constitution and laws, vested in the government of the United States."168
The discovery of the American continent gave title to the government of the discoverer as against all
other European governments. Designated as the naked fee,169 this title was to be consummated by
possession and was subject to the Indian title of occupancy. The discoverer acknowledged the Indians'
legal and just claim to retain possession of the land, the Indians being the original inhabitants of the
land. The discoverer nonetheless asserted the exclusive right to acquire the Indians' land- either by
purchase, "defensive" conquest, or cession- and in so doing, extinguish the Indian title. Only the
discoverer could extinguish Indian title because it alone asserted ultimate dominion in itself. Thus,
while the different nations of Europe respected the rights of the natives as occupants, they all
asserted the ultimate dominion and title to be in themselves.170
As early as the 19th century, it became accepted doctrine that although fee title to the lands occupied
by the Indians when the colonists arrived became vested in the sovereign- first the discovering
European nation and later the original 13 States and the United States- a right of occupancy in the
Indian tribes was nevertheless recognized. The Federal Government continued the policy of
respecting the Indian right of occupancy, sometimes called Indian title, which it accorded the
protection of complete ownership.171 But this aboriginal Indian interest simply constitutes
"permission" from the whites to occupy the land, and means mere possession not specifically
recognized as ownership by Congress.172 It is clear that this right of occupancy based upon aboriginal
possession is not a property right.173 It is vulnerable to affirmative action by the federal government
who, as sovereign, possessed exclusive power to extinguish the right of occupancy at will.174 Thus,
aboriginal title is not the same as legal title. Aboriginal title rests on actual, exclusive and continuous
use and occupancy for a long time.175 It entails that land owned by Indian title must be used within
the tribe, subject to its laws and customs, and cannot be sold to another sovereign government nor
to any citizen.176 Such title as Indians have to possess and occupy land is in the tribe, and not in the
individual Indian; the right of individual Indians to share in the tribal property usually depends upon
tribal membership, the property of the tribe generally being held in communal ownership.177
As a rule, Indian lands are not included in the term "public lands," which is ordinarily used to designate
such lands as are subject to sale or other disposal under general laws.178 Indian land which has been
abandoned is deemed to fall into the public domain.179 On the other hand, an Indian reservation is
a part of the public domain set apart for the use and occupation of a tribe of Indians.180 Once set
apart by proper authority, the reservation ceases to be public land, and until the Indian title is
extinguished, no one but Congress can initiate any preferential right on, or restrict the nation's power
to dispose of, them.181
The American judiciary struggled for more than 200 years with the ancestral land claims of indigenous
Americans.182 And two things are clear. First, aboriginal title is recognized. Second, indigenous
property systems are also recognized. From a legal point of view, certain benefits can be drawn from
a comparison of Philippine IPs to native Americans.183 Despite the similarities between native title
and aboriginal title, however, there are at present some misgivings on whether jurisprudence on
American Indians may be cited authoritatively in the Philippines. The U.S. recognizes the possessory
18
rights of the Indians over their land; title to the land, however, is deemed to have passed to the U.S.
as successor of the discoverer. The aboriginal title of ownership is not specifically recognized as
ownership by action authorized by Congress.184 The protection of aboriginal title merely guards
against encroachment by persons other than the Federal Government.185 Although there are
criticisms against the refusal to recognize the native Americans' ownership of these lands,186 the
power of the State to extinguish these titles has remained firmly entrenched.187
Under the IPRA, the Philippine State is not barred form asserting sovereignty over the ancestral
domains and ancestral lands.188 The IPRA, however, is still in its infancy and any similarities between
its application in the Philippines vis-à-vis American Jurisprudence on aboriginal title will depend on
the peculiar facts of each case.
(c) Why the Cariño doctrine is unique
In the Philippines, the concept of native title first upheld in Cariño and enshrined in the IPRA grants
ownership, albeit in limited form, of the land to the ICCs/IPs. Native title presumes that the land is
private and was never public. Cariño is the only case that specifically and categorically recognizes
native title. The long line of cases citing Cariño did not touch on native title and the private character
of ancestral domains and lands. Cariño was cited by the succeeding cases to support the concept of
acquisitive prescription under the Public Land Act which is a different matter altogether. Under the
Public Land Act, land sought to be registered must be public agricultural land. When the conditions
specified in Section 48 [b] of the Public Land Act are complied with, the possessor of the land is
deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant of the land.189 The land ceases to
be part of the public domain,190 ipso jure,191 and is converted to private property by the mere lapse
or completion of the prescribed statutory period.
It was only in the case of Oh Cho v. Director of Lands192 that the court declared that the rule that all
lands that were not acquired from the government, either by purchase or grant, belong to the public
domain has an exception. This exception would be any land that should have been in the possession
of an occupant and of his predecessors-in-interest since time immemorial. It is this kind of possession
that would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it
had been private property even before the Spanish conquest.193 Oh Cho, however, was decided
under the provisions of the Public Land Act and Cariño was cited to support the applicant's claim of
acquisitive prescription under the said Act.
All these years, Cariño had been quoted out of context simply to justify long, continuous, open and
adverse possession in the concept of owner of public agricultural land. It is this long, continuous, open
and adverse possession in the concept of owner of thirty years both for ordinary citizens194 and
members of the national cultural minorities195 that converts the land from public into private and
entitles the registrant to a torrens certificate of title.
(3) The Option of Securing a Torrens Title to the Ancestral Land Indicates that the Land is Private.
The private character of ancestral lands and domains as laid down in the IPRA is further strengthened
by the option given to individual ICCs/IPs over their individually-owned ancestral lands. For purposes
of registration under the Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act, the IPRA expressly converts
ancestral land into public agricultural land which may be disposed of by the State. The necessary
implication is that ancestral land is private. It, however, has to be first converted to public agricultural
land simply for registration purposes. To wit:
"Sec. 12. Option to Secure Certificate of Title Under Commonwealth Act 141, as amended, or the Land
Registration Act 496- Individual members of cultural communities, with respect to their individually-
owned ancestral lands who, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in
continuous possession and occupation of the same in the concept of owner since time immemorial
or for a period of not less than thirty (30) years immediately preceding the approval of this Act and
uncontested by the members of the same ICCs/IPs shall have the option to secure title to their
ancestral lands under the provisions of Commonwealth Act 141, as amended, or the Land Registration
Act 496.
For this purpose, said individually-owned ancestral lands, which are agricultural in character and
actually used for agricultural, residential, pasture, and tree farming purposes, including those with a
slope of eighteen percent (18%) or more, are hereby classified as alienable and disposable agricultural
lands.
The option granted under this section shall be exercised within twenty (20) years from the approval
of this Act."196
ICCs/IPs are given the option to secure a torrens certificate of title over their individually-owned
ancestral lands. This option is limited to ancestral lands only, not domains, and such lands must be
individually, not communally, owned.
Ancestral lands that are owned by individual members of ICCs/IPs who, by themselves or through
their predecessors-in-interest, have been in continuous possession and occupation of the same in the
concept of owner since time immemorial197 or for a period of not less than 30 years, which claims
are uncontested by the members of the same ICCs/IPs, may be registered under C.A. 141, otherwise
known as the Public Land Act, or Act 496, the Land Registration Act. For purposes of registration, the
individually-owned ancestral lands are classified as alienable and disposable agricultural lands of the
public domain, provided, they are agricultural in character and are actually used for agricultural,
residential, pasture and tree farming purposes. These lands shall be classified as public agricultural
lands regardless of whether they have a slope of 18% or more.
19
The classification of ancestral land as public agricultural land is in compliance with the requirements
of the Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act. C.A. 141, the Public Land Act, deals specifically
with lands of the public domain.198 Its provisions apply to those lands "declared open to disposition
or concession" x x x "which have not been reserved for public or quasi-public purposes, nor
appropriated by the Government, nor in any manner become private property, nor those on which a
private right authorized and recognized by this Act or any other valid law x x x or which having been
reserved or appropriated, have ceased to be so."199 Act 496, the Land Registration Act, allows
registration only of private lands and public agricultural lands. Since ancestral domains and lands are
private, if the ICC/IP wants to avail of the benefits of C.A. 141 and Act 496, the IPRA itself converts his
ancestral land, regardless of whether the land has a slope of eighteen per cent (18%) or over,200 from
private to public agricultural land for proper disposition.
The option to register land under the Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act has nonetheless
a limited period. This option must be exercised within twenty (20) years from October 29, 1997, the
date of approval of the IPRA.
Thus, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public domain. They are
private and belong to the ICCs/IPs. Section 3 of Article XII on National Economy and Patrimony of the
1987 Constitution classifies lands of the public domain into four categories: (a) agricultural, (b) forest
or timber, (c) mineral lands, and (d) national parks. Section 5 of the same Article XII mentions ancestral
lands and ancestral domains but it does not classify them under any of the said four categories. To
classify them as public lands under any one of the four classes will render the entire IPRA law a nullity.
The spirit of the IPRA lies in the distinct concept of ancestral domains and ancestral lands. The IPRA
addresses the major problem of the ICCs/IPs which is loss of land. Land and space are of vital concern
in terms of sheer survival of the ICCs/IPs.201
The 1987 Constitution mandates the State to "protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities
to their ancestral lands" and that "Congress provide for the applicability of customary laws x x x in
determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domain."202 It is the recognition of the ICCs/IPs
distinct rights of ownership over their ancestral domains and lands that breathes life into this
constitutional mandate.
B. The right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited form
of ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same.
Registration under the Public Land Act and Land Registration Act recognizes the concept of ownership
under the civil law. This ownership is based on adverse possession for a specified period, and harkens
to Section 44 of the Public Land Act on administrative legalization (free patent) of imperfect or
incomplete titles and Section 48 (b) and (c) of the same Act on the judicial confirmation of imperfect
or incomplete titles. Thus:
"Sec. 44. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who is not the owner of more than twenty-four
hectares and who since July fourth, 1926 or prior thereto, has continuously occupied and cultivated,
either by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, a tract or tracts of agricultural public lands
subject to disposition, or who shall have paid the real estate tax thereon while the same has not been
occupied by any person shall be entitled, under the provisions of this chapter, to have a free patent
issued to him for such tract or tracts of such land not to exceed twenty-four hectares.
A member of the national cultural minorities who has continuously occupied and cultivated, either by
himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, a tract or tracts of land, whether disposable or not
since July 4, 1955, shall be entitled to the right granted in the preceding paragraph of this section:
Provided, That at the time he files his free patent application he is not the owner of any real property
secured or disposable under the provision of the Public Land Law.203
x x x.
"Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
(a) [perfection of Spanish titles] xxx.
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force
majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this Chapter.
(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of lands
of the public domain suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of
ownership for at least 30 years shall be entitled to the rights granted in sub-section (b) hereof."204
Registration under the foregoing provisions presumes that the land was originally public agricultural
land but because of adverse possession since July 4, 1955 (free patent) or at least thirty years (judicial
confirmation), the land has become private. Open, adverse, public and continuous possession is
sufficient, provided, the possessor makes proper application therefor. The possession has to be
confirmed judicially or administratively after which a torrens title is issued.
20
A torrens title recognizes the owner whose name appears in the certificate as entitled to all the rights
of ownership under the civil law. The Civil Code of the Philippines defines ownership in Articles 427,
428 and 429. This concept is based on Roman Law which the Spaniards introduced to the Philippines
through the Civil Code of 1889. Ownership, under Roman Law, may be exercised over things or rights.
It primarily includes the right of the owner to enjoy and dispose of the thing owned. And the right to
enjoy and dispose of the thing includes the right to receive from the thing what it produces,205 the
right to consume the thing by its use,206 the right to alienate, encumber, transform or even destroy
the thing owned,207 and the right to exclude from the possession of the thing owned by any other
person to whom the owner has not transmitted such thing.208
1. The Indigenous Concept of Ownership and Customary Law.
Ownership of ancestral domains by native title does not entitle the ICC/IP to a torrens title but to a
Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT). The CADT formally recognizes the indigenous concept of
ownership of the ICCs/IPs over their ancestral domain. Thus:
"Sec. 5. Indigenous concept of ownership.- Indigenous concept of ownership sustains the view that
ancestral domains and all resources found therein shall serve as the material bases of their cultural
integrity. The indigenous concept of ownership generally holds that ancestral domains are the
ICCs/IPs private but community property which belongs to all generations and therefore cannot be
sold, disposed or destroyed. It likewise covers sustainable traditional resource rights."
The right of ownership and possession of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains is held under the
indigenous concept of ownership. This concept maintains the view that ancestral domains are the
ICCs/IPs private but community property. It is private simply because it is not part of the public
domain. But its private character ends there. The ancestral domain is owned in common by the
ICCs/IPs and not by one particular person. The IPRA itself provides that areas within the ancestral
domains, whether delineated or not, are presumed to be communally held.209 These communal
rights, however, are not exactly the same as co-ownership rights under the Civil Code.210 Co-
ownership gives any co-owner the right to demand partition of the property held in common. The
Civil Code expressly provides that "no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership." Each
co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing in common, insofar as his share is
concerned.211 To allow such a right over ancestral domains may be destructive not only of customary
law of the community but of the very community itself.212
Communal rights over land are not the same as corporate rights over real property, much less
corporate condominium rights. A corporation can exist only for a maximum of fifty (50) years subject
to an extension of another fifty years in any single instance.213 Every stockholder has the right to
disassociate himself from the corporation.214 Moreover, the corporation itself may be dissolved
voluntarily or involuntarily.215
Communal rights to the land are held not only by the present possessors of the land but extends to
all generations of the ICCs/IPs, past, present and future, to the domain. This is the reason why the
ancestral domain must be kept within the ICCs/IPs themselves. The domain cannot be transferred,
sold or conveyed to other persons. It belongs to the ICCs/IPs as a community.
Ancestral lands are also held under the indigenous concept of ownership. The lands are communal.
These lands, however, may be transferred subject to the following limitations: (a) only to the
members of the same ICCs/IPs; (b) in accord with customary laws and traditions; and (c) subject to
the right of redemption of the ICCs/IPs for a period of 15 years if the land was transferred to a non-
member of the ICCs/IPs.
Following the constitutional mandate that "customary law govern property rights or relations in
determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domains,"216 the IPRA, by legislative fiat,
introduces a new concept of ownership. This is a concept that has long existed under customary
law.217
Custom, from which customary law is derived, is also recognized under the Civil Code as a source of
law.218 Some articles of the Civil Code expressly provide that custom should be applied in cases
where no codal provision is applicable.219 In other words, in the absence of any applicable provision
in the Civil Code, custom, when duly proven, can define rights and liabilities.220
Customary law is a primary, not secondary, source of rights under the IPRA and uniquely applies to
ICCs/IPs. Its recognition does not depend on the absence of a specific provision in the civil law. The
indigenous concept of ownership under customary law is specifically acknowledged and recognized,
and coexists with the civil law concept and the laws on land titling and land registration.221
To be sure, the indigenous concept of ownership exists even without a paper title. The CADT is merely
a "formal recognition" of native title. This is clear from Section 11 of the IPRA, to wit:
"Sec. 11. Recognition of Ancestral Domain Rights.- The rights of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains
by virtue of Native Title shall be recognized and respected. Formal recognition, when solicited by
ICCs/IPs concerned shall be embodied in a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title, which shall recognize
the title of the concerned ICCs/IPs over the territories identified and delineated."
The moral import of ancestral domain, native land or being native is "belongingness" to the land,
being people of the land- by sheer force of having sprung from the land since time beyond recall, and
the faithful nurture of the land by the sweat of one's brow. This is fidelity of usufructuary relation to
the land- the possession of stewardship through perduring, intimate tillage, and the mutuality of
blessings between man and land; from man, care for land; from the land, sustenance for man.222
21
C. Sections 7 (a), 7 (b) and 57 of the IPRA Do Not Violate the Regalian Doctrine Enshrined in Section
2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
1. The Rights of ICCs/IPs Over Their Ancestral Domains and Lands
The IPRA grants the ICCs/IPs several rights over their ancestral domains and ancestral lands. Section
7 provides for the rights over ancestral domains:
"Sec. 7. Rights to Ancestral Domains.- The rights of ownership and possession of ICCs/IPs to their
ancestral domains shall be recognized and protected. Such rights include:
a) Right of Ownership.- The right to claim ownership over lands, bodies of water traditionally and
actually occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and all
improvements made by them at any time within the domains;
b) Right to Develop Lands and Natural Resources.- Subject to Section 56 hereof, the right to develop,
control and use lands and territories traditionally occupied, owned, or used; to manage and conserve
natural resources within the territories and uphold the responsibilities for future generations; to
benefit and share the profits from allocation and utilization of the natural resources found therein;
the right to negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration of natural resources in the areas
for the purpose of ensuring ecological, environmental protection and the conservation measures,
pursuant to national and customary laws; the right to an informed and intelligent participation in the
formulation and implementation of any project, government or private, that will affect or impact
upon the ancestral domains and to receive just and fair compensation for any damages which they
may sustain as a result of the project; and the right to effective measures by the government to
prevent any interference with, alienation and encroachment upon these rights;"
c) Right to Stay in the Territories.- The right to stay in the territory and not to be removed therefrom.
No ICCs/IPs will be relocated without their free and prior informed consent, nor through any means
other than eminent domain. x x x;
d) Right in Case of Displacement.- In case displacement occurs as a result of natural catastrophes, the
State shall endeavor to resettle the displaced ICCs/IPs in suitable areas where they can have
temporary life support systems: x x x;
e) Right to Regulate the Entry of Migrants.- Right to regulate the entry of migrant settlers and
organizations into their domains;
f) Right to Safe and Clean Air and Water.-For this purpose, the ICCs/IPs shall have access to integrated
systems for the management of their inland waters and air space;
g) Right to Claim Parts of Reservations.- The right to claim parts of the ancestral domains which have
been reserved for various purposes, except those reserved and intended for common and public
welfare and service;
h) Right to Resolve Conflict.- Right to resolve land conflicts in accordance with customary laws of the
area where the land is located, and only in default thereof shall the complaints be submitted to
amicable settlement and to the Courts of Justice whenever necessary."
Section 8 provides for the rights over ancestral lands:
"Sec. 8. Rights to Ancestral Lands.- The right of ownership and possession of the ICCs/IPs to their
ancestral lands shall be recognized and protected.
a) Right to transfer land/property.- Such right shall include the right to transfer land or property rights
to/among members of the same ICCs/IPs, subject to customary laws and traditions of the community
concerned.
b) Right to Redemption.- In cases where it is shown that the transfer of land/property rights by virtue
of any agreement or devise, to a non-member of the concerned ICCs/IPs is tainted by the vitiated
consent of the ICCs/IPs, or is transferred for an unconscionable consideration or price, the transferor
ICC/IP shall have the right to redeem the same within a period not exceeding fifteen (15) years from
the date of transfer."
Section 7 (a) defines the ICCs/IPs the right of ownership over their ancestral domains which covers
(a) lands, (b) bodies of water traditionally and actually occupied by the ICCs/IPs, (c) sacred places, (d)
traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and (e) all improvements made by them at any time within
the domains. The right of ownership includes the following rights: (1) the right to develop lands and
natural resources; (b) the right to stay in the territories; (c) the right to resettlement in case of
displacement; (d) the right to regulate the entry of migrants; (e) the right to safe and clean air and
water; (f) the right to claim parts of the ancestral domains as reservations; and (g) the right to resolve
conflict in accordance with customary laws.
Section 8 governs their rights to ancestral lands. Unlike ownership over the ancestral domains, Section
8 gives the ICCs/IPs also the right to transfer the land or property rights to members of the same
ICCs/IPs or non-members thereof. This is in keeping with the option given to ICCs/IPs to secure a
torrens title over the ancestral lands, but not to domains.
2. The Right of ICCs/IPs to Develop Lands and Natural Resources Within the Ancestral Domains Does
Not Deprive the State of Ownership Over the Natural Resources and Control and Supervision in their
Development and Exploitation.
22
The Regalian doctrine on the ownership, management and utilization of natural resources is declared
in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, viz:
"Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural
resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources
shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be
under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities,
or, it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino
citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such
citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not
more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In
cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses
other than the development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the
grant.
The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and
exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.
The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well
as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes,
bays, and lagoons.
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical
or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals,
petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law,
based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such
agreements, the state shall promote the development and use of local scientific and technical
resources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this
provision, within thirty days from its execution."223
All lands of the public domain and all natural resources- waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and
other natural resources- are owned by the State. The Constitution provides that in the exploration,
development and utilization of these natural resources, the State exercises full control and
supervision, and may undertake the same in four (4) modes:
1. The State may directly undertake such activities; or
2. The State may enter into co-production, joint venture or production-sharing agreements with
Filipino citizens or qualified corporations;
3. Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens;
4. For the large-scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals, petroleum and other
mineral oils, the President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving
technical or financial assistance.
As owner of the natural resources, the State is accorded primary power and responsibility in the
exploration, development and utilization of these natural resources. The State may directly undertake
the exploitation and development by itself, or, it may allow participation by the private sector through
co-production,224 joint venture,225 or production-sharing agreements.226 These agreements may
be for a period of 25 years, renewable for another 25 years. The State, through Congress, may allow
the small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens. For the large-scale exploration of
these resources, specifically minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils, the State, through the
President, may enter into technical and financial assistance agreements with foreign-owned
corporations.
Under the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, (R.A. 7942) and the People's Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991
(R.A. 7076) the three types of agreements, i.e., co-production, joint venture or production-sharing,
may apply to both large-scale227 and small-scale mining.228 "Small-scale mining" refers to "mining
activities which rely heavily on manual labor using simple implements and methods and do not use
explosives or heavy mining equipment."229
Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural
resources within their ancestral domains. The right of ICCs/IPs in their ancestral domains includes
ownership, but this "ownership" is expressly defined and limited in Section 7 (a) as:
"Sec. 7. a) Right of ownership- The right to claim ownership over lands, bodies of water traditionally
and actually occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and all
improvements made by them at any time within the domains;"
The ICCs/IPs are given the right to claim ownership over "lands, bodies of water traditionally and
actually occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and all
improvements made by them at any time within the domains." It will be noted that this enumeration
does not mention bodies of water not occupied by the ICCs/IPs, minerals, coal, wildlife, flora and
fauna in the traditional hunting grounds, fish in the traditional fishing grounds, forests or timber in
the sacred places, etc. and all other natural resources found within the ancestral domains. Indeed,
the right of ownership under Section 7 (a) does not cover "waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and
other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna
23
and all other natural resources" enumerated in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution as
belonging to the State.
The non-inclusion of ownership by the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in Section 7(a) complies
with the Regalian doctrine.
(a) Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules Goes Beyond the Parameters of Sec. 7 (a) of
the IPRA And is Unconstitutional.
The Rules Implementing the IPRA230 in Section 1, Part II, Rule III reads:
"Section 1. Rights of Ownership. ICCs/IPs have rights of ownership over lands, waters, and natural
resources and all improvements made by them at any time within the ancestral domains/ lands. These
rights shall include, but not limited to, the right over the fruits, the right to possess, the right to use,
right to consume, right to exclude and right to recover ownership, and the rights or interests over
land and natural resources. The right to recover shall be particularly applied to lands lost through
fraud or any form or vitiated consent or transferred for an unconscionable price."
Section 1 of the Implementing Rules gives the ICCs/IPs rights of ownership over "lands, waters and
natural resources." The term "natural resources" is not one of those expressly mentioned in Section
7 (a) of the law. Our Constitution and jurisprudence clearly declare that the right to claim ownership
over land does not necessarily include the right to claim ownership over the natural resources found
on or under the land.231 The IPRA itself makes a distinction between land and natural resources.
Section 7 (a) speaks of the right of ownership only over the land within the ancestral domain. It is
Sections 7 (b) and 57 of the law that speak of natural resources, and these provisions, as shall be
discussed later, do not give the ICCs/IPs the right of ownership over these resources.
The constitutionality of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules was not specifically and
categorically challenged by petitioners. Petitioners actually assail the constitutionality of the
Implementing Rules in general.232 Nevertheless, to avoid any confusion in the implementation of the
law, it is necessary to declare that the inclusion of "natural resources" in Section 1, Part II, Rule III of
the Implementing Rules goes beyond the parameters of Section 7 (b) of the law and is contrary to
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
(b) The Small-Scale Utilization of Natural Resources In Sec. 7 (b) of the IPRA Is Allowed Under
Paragraph 3, Section 2 of Article XII of the Constitution.
Ownership over natural resources remain with the State and the IPRA in Section 7 (b) merely grants
the ICCs/IPs the right to manage them, viz:
"Sec. 7 (b) Right to Develop Lands and Natural Resources.- Subject to Section 56 hereof, right to
develop, control and use lands and territories traditionally occupied, owned, or used; to manage and
conserve natural resources within the territories and uphold the responsibilities for future
generations; to benefit and share the profits from allocation and utilization of the natural resources
found therein; the right to negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration of natural resources
in the areas for the purpose of ensuring ecological, environmental protection and the conservation
measures, pursuant to national and customary laws; the right to an informed and intelligent
participation in the formulation and implementation of any project, government or private, that will
affect or impact upon the ancestral domains and to receive just and fair compensation for any
damages which they may sustain as a result of the project; and the right to effective measures by the
government to prevent any interference with, alienation and encroachment upon these rights;"
The right to develop lands and natural resources under Section 7 (b) of the IPRA enumerates the
following rights:
a) the right to develop, control and use lands and territories traditionally occupied;
b) the right to manage and conserve natural resources within the territories and uphold the
responsibilities for future generations;
c) the right to benefit and share the profits from the allocation and utilization of the natural resources
found therein;
d) the right to negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration of natural resources for the
purpose of ensuring ecological, environmental protection and the conservation measures, pursuant
to national and customary laws;
e) the right to an informed and intelligent participation in the formulation and implementation of any
project, government or private, that will affect or impact upon the ancestral domains and to receive
just and fair compensation for any damages which they may sustain as a result of the project;
f) the right to effective measures by the government to prevent any interference with, alienation and
encroachment upon these rights.233
Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with the State and the
ICCs/IPs are merely granted the right to "manage and conserve" them for future generations, "benefit
and share" the profits from their allocation and utilization, and "negotiate the terms and conditions
for their exploration" for the purpose of "ensuring ecological and environmental protection and
conservation measures." It must be noted that the right to negotiate the terms and conditions over
the natural resources covers only their exploration which must be for the purpose of ensuring
24
ecological and environmental protection of, and conservation measures in the ancestral domain. It
does not extend to the exploitation and development of natural resources.
Simply stated, the ICCs/IPs' rights over the natural resources take the form of management or
stewardship. For the ICCs/IPs may use these resources and share in the profits of their utilization or
negotiate the terms for their exploration. At the same time, however, the ICCs/IPs must ensure that
the natural resources within their ancestral domains are conserved for future generations and that
the "utilization" of these resources must not harm the ecology and environment pursuant to national
and customary laws.234
The limited rights of "management and use" in Section 7 (b) must be taken to contemplate small-
scale utilization of natural resources as distinguished from large-scale. Small-scale utilization of
natural resources is expressly allowed in the third paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution "in recognition of the plight of forest dwellers, gold panners, marginal fishermen and
others similarly situated who exploit our natural resources for their daily sustenance and survival."235
Section 7 (b) also expressly mandates the ICCs/IPs to manage and conserve these resources and
ensure environmental and ecological protection within the domains, which duties, by their very
nature, necessarily reject utilization in a large-scale.
(c) The Large-Scale Utilization of Natural Resources In Section 57 of the IPRA Is Allowed Under
Paragraphs 1 and 4, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
Section 57 of the IPRA provides:
"Sec. 57. Natural Resources within Ancestral Domains.- The ICCs/IPs shall have priority rights in the
harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation of any natural resources within the ancestral
domains. A non-member of the ICCs/IPs concerned may be allowed to take part in the development
and utilization of the natural resources for a period of not exceeding twenty-five (25) years renewable
for not more than twenty-five (25) years: Provided, That a formal and written agreement is entered
into with the ICCs/IPs concerned or that the community, pursuant to its own decision-making process,
has agreed to allow such operation: Provided finally, That the NCIP may exercise visitorial powers and
take appropriate action to safeguard the rights of the ICCs/IPs under the same contract."
Section 57 speaks of the "harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation of natural resources
within ancestral domains" and "gives the ICCs/IPs 'priority rights' therein." The terms "harvesting,
extraction, development or exploitation" of any natural resources within the ancestral domains
obviously refer to large-scale utilization. It is utilization not merely for subsistence but for commercial
or other extensive use that require technology other than manual labor.236 The law recognizes the
probability of requiring a non-member of the ICCs/IPs to participate in the development and
utilization of the natural resources and thereby allows such participation for a period of not more
than 25 years, renewable for another 25 years. This may be done on condition that a formal written
agreement be entered into by the non-member and members of the ICCs/IPs.
Section 57 of the IPRA does not give the ICCs/IPs the right to "manage and conserve" the natural
resources. Instead, the law only grants the ICCs/IPs "priority rights" in the development or
exploitation thereof. Priority means giving preference. Having priority rights over the natural
resources does not necessarily mean ownership rights. The grant of priority rights implies that there
is a superior entity that owns these resources and this entity has the power to grant preferential rights
over the resources to whosoever itself chooses.
Section 57 is not a repudiation of the Regalian doctrine. Rather, it is an affirmation of the said doctrine
that all natural resources found within the ancestral domains belong to the State. It incorporates by
implication the Regalian doctrine, hence, requires that the provision be read in the light of Section 2,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Interpreting Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution237 in
relation to Section 57 of IPRA, the State, as owner of these natural resources, may directly undertake
the development and exploitation of the natural resources by itself, or in the alternative, it may
recognize the priority rights of the ICCs/IPs as owners of the land on which the natural resources are
found by entering into a co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreement with them.
The State may likewise enter into any of said agreements with a non-member of the ICCs/IPs, whether
natural or juridical, or enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either
technical or financial assistance for the large-scale exploration, development and utilization of
minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils, or allow such non-member to participate in its
agreement with the ICCs/IPs. If the State decides to enter into an agreement with a non-ICC/IP
member, the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) shall ensure that the rights of the
ICCs/IPs under the agreement shall be protected. The agreement shall be for a period of 25 years,
renewable for another 25 years.
To reiterate, in the large-scale utilization of natural resources within the ancestral domains, the State,
as owner of these resources, has four (4) options: (1) it may, of and by itself, directly undertake the
development and exploitation of the natural resources; or (2) it may recognize the priority rights of
the ICCs/IPs by entering into an agreement with them for such development and exploitation; or (3)
it may enter into an agreement with a non-member of the ICCs/IPs, whether natural or juridical, local
or foreign; or (4) it may allow such non-member to participate in the agreement with the ICCs/IPs.
The rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their ancestral domains
merely gives the ICCs/IPs, as owners and occupants of the land on which the resources are found, the
right to the small-scale utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large-
scale development and exploitation. Section 57 does not mandate the State to automatically give
priority to the ICCs/IPs. The State has several options and it is within its discretion to choose which
option to pursue. Moreover, there is nothing in the law that gives the ICCs/IPs the right to solely
undertake the large-scale development of the natural resources within their domains. The ICCs/IPs
25
must undertake such endeavour always under State supervision or control. This indicates that the
State does not lose control and ownership over the resources even in their exploitation. Sections 7
(b) and 57 of the law simply give due respect to the ICCs/IPs who, as actual occupants of the land
where the natural resources lie, have traditionally utilized these resources for their subsistence and
survival.
Neither is the State stripped of ownership and control of the natural resources by the following
provision:
"Section 59. Certification Precondition.- All departments and other governmental agencies shall
henceforth be strictly enjoined from issuing, renewing or granting any concession, license or lease, or
entering into any production-sharing agreement. without prior certification from the NCIP that the
area affected does not overlap with any ancestral domain. Such certification shall only be issued after
a field-based investigation is conducted by the Ancestral Domains Office of the area concerned:
Provided, That no certification shall be issued by the NCIP without the free and prior informed and
written consent of the ICCs/IPs concerned: Provided, further, That no department, government
agency or government-owned or -controlled corporation may issue new concession, license, lease, or
production sharing agreement while there is a pending application for a CADT: Provided, finally, That
the ICCs/IPs shall have the right to stop or suspend, in accordance with this Act, any project that has
not satisfied the requirement of this consultation process."
Concessions, licenses, lease or production-sharing agreements for the exploitation of natural
resources shall not be issued, renewed or granted by all departments and government agencies
without prior certification from the NCIP that the area subject of the agreement does not overlap
with any ancestral domain. The NCIP certification shall be issued only after a field-based investigation
shall have been conducted and the free and prior informed written consent of the ICCs/IPs obtained.
Non-compliance with the consultation requirement gives the ICCs/IPs the right to stop or suspend
any project granted by any department or government agency.
As its subtitle suggests, this provision requires as a precondition for the issuance of any concession,
license or agreement over natural resources, that a certification be issued by the NCIP that the area
subject of the agreement does not lie within any ancestral domain. The provision does not vest the
NCIP with power over the other agencies of the State as to determine whether to grant or deny any
concession or license or agreement. It merely gives the NCIP the authority to ensure that the ICCs/IPs
have been informed of the agreement and that their consent thereto has been obtained. Note that
the certification applies to agreements over natural resources that do not necessarily lie within the
ancestral domains. For those that are found within the said domains, Sections 7(b) and 57 of the IPRA
apply.
V. THE IPRA IS A RECOGNITION OF OUR ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN THE INDIGENOUS INTERNATIONAL
MOVEMENT.
The indigenous movement can be seen as the heir to a history of anti-imperialism stretching back to
prehistoric times. The movement received a massive impetus during the 1960's from two sources.
First, the decolonization of Asia and Africa brought into the limelight the possibility of peoples
controlling their own destinies. Second, the right of self-determination was enshrined in the UN
Declaration on Human Rights.238 The rise of the civil rights movement and anti-racism brought to
the attention of North American Indians, Aborigines in Australia, and Maori in New Zealand the
possibility of fighting for fundamental rights and freedoms.
In 1974 and 1975, international indigenous organizations were founded,239 and during the 1980's,
indigenous affairs were on the international agenda. The people of the Philippine Cordillera were the
first Asians to take part in the international indigenous movement. It was the Cordillera People's
Alliance that carried out successful campaigns against the building of the Chico River Dam in 1981-82
and they have since become one of the best-organized indigenous bodies in the world.240
Presently, there is a growing concern for indigenous rights in the international scene. This came as a
result of the increased publicity focused on the continuing disrespect for indigenous human rights
and the destruction of the indigenous peoples' environment, together with the national governments'
inability to deal with the situation.241 Indigenous rights came as a result of both human rights and
environmental protection, and have become a part of today's priorities for the international
agenda.242
International institutions and bodies have realized the necessity of applying policies, programs and
specific rules concerning IPs in some nations. The World Bank, for example, first adopted a policy on
IPs as a result of the dismal experience of projects in Latin America.243 The World Bank now seeks to
apply its current policy on IPs to some of its projects in Asia. This policy has provided an influential
model for the projects of the Asian Development Bank.244
The 1987 Philippine Constitution formally recognizes the existence of ICCs/IPs and declares as a State
policy the promotion of their rights within the framework of national unity and development.245 The
IPRA amalgamates the Philippine category of ICCs with the international category of IPs,246 and is
heavily influenced by both the International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 169 and the United
Nations (UN) Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.247
ILO Convention No. 169 is entitled the "Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in
Independent Countries"248 and was adopted on June 27, 1989. It is based on the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and many other international instruments on the
prevention of discrimination.249 ILO Convention No. 169 revised the "Convention Concerning the
Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent
Countries" (ILO No. 107) passed on June 26, 1957. Developments in international law made it
26
appropriate to adopt new international standards on indigenous peoples "with a view to removing
the assimilationist orientation of the earlier standards," and recognizing the aspirations of these
peoples to exercise control over their own institutions, ways of life and economic development."250
CONCLUSION
The struggle of the Filipinos throughout colonial history had been plagued by ethnic and religious
differences. These differences were carried over and magnified by the Philippine government through
the imposition of a national legal order that is mostly foreign in origin or derivation.251 Largely
unpopulist, the present legal system has resulted in the alienation of a large sector of society,
specifically, the indigenous peoples. The histories and cultures of the indigenes are relevant to the
evolution of Philippine culture and are vital to the understanding of contemporary problems.252 It is
through the IPRA that an attempt was made by our legislators to understand Filipino society not in
terms of myths and biases but through common experiences in the course of history. The Philippines
became a democracy a centennial ago and the decolonization process still continues. If the evolution
of the Filipino people into a democratic society is to truly proceed democratically, i.e., if the Filipinos
as a whole are to participate fully in the task of continuing democratization,253 it is this Court's duty
to acknowledge the presence of indigenous and customary laws in the country and affirm their co-
existence with the land laws in our national legal system.
With the foregoing disquisitions, I vote to uphold the constitutionality of the Indigenous Peoples
Rights Act of 1997.
SEPARATE OPINION
VITUG, J.:
An issue of grave national interest indeed deserves a proper place in any forum and, when it shows
itself in a given judicial controversy, the rules of procedure, like locus standi, the propriety of the
specific remedy invoked, or the principle of hierarchy of courts, that may ordinarily be raised by party-
litigants, should not be so perceived as good and inevitable justifications for advocating timidity, let
alone isolationism, by the Court.
A cardinal requirement, to which I agree, is that one who invokes the Court’s adjudication must have
a personal and substantial interest in the dispute;1 indeed, the developing trend would require a
logical nexus between the status asserted and the claim sought to be adjudicated in order to ensure
that one is the proper and appropriate party to invoke judicial power.2 The rule requires a party to
aptly show a personal stake in the outcome of the case or an injury to himself that can be redressed
by a favorable decision so as to warrant his invocation of the Court’s jurisdiction and to render legally
feasible the exercise of the Court’s remedial powers in his behalf. If it were otherwise, the exercise of
that power can easily become too unwieldy by its sheer magnitude and scope to a point that may, in
no small measure, adversely affect its intended essentiality, stability and consequentiality.
Nevertheless, where a most compelling reason exits, such as when the matter is of transcendental
importance and paramount interest to the nation,3 the Court must take the liberal approach that
recognizes the legal standing of nontraditional plaintiffs, such as citizens and taxpayers, to raise
constitutional issues that affect them.4 This Court thus did so in a case5 that involves the conservation
of our forests for ecological needs. Until and exact balance is struck, the Court must accept an eclectic
notion that can free itself from the bondage of legal nicety and hold trenchant technicalities
subordinate to what may be considered to be of overriding concern.
The petition seeks a declaration by the Court of unconstitutionality of certain provisions of Republic
Act No. 8371, a law that obviously is yet incapable of exact equation in its significance to the nation
and its people now and in the generations yet to come. Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise also known
as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 ("IPRA"), enacted into law in 1997 and made effective
on 22 November 1997, is apparently intended to be a legislative response to the 1987 Constitution
which recognizes the rights of indigenous cultural communities "within the framework of national
unity and development"6 and commands the State, "subject to the provisions of this Constitution and
national development policies and programs," to protect the rights of indigenous cultural
communities to their ancestral lands in order to ensure their economic, social, and cultural well-
being.7
Among the assailed provisions in IPRA is its Section 3(a) which defines "ancestral domains" to embrace
"all areas generally belonging to ICCs/IPs comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural
resources" including "ancestral lands, forest, pasture, residential, agricultural, and other lands
individually owned whether alienable and disposable or otherwise," over which indigenous cultural
communities/indigenous peoples ("ICCs/IPs") could exercise virtual ownership and control.
IPRA effectively withdraws from the public domain the so-called ancestral domains covering literally
millions of hectares. The notion of community property would comprehend not only matters of
proprietary interest but also some forms of self-governance over the curved-out territory. This
concept is elaborated in Section 7 of the law which states that the "rights of ownership and possession
of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains shall be recognized and protected," subsumed under which
would encompass the right of ownership (paragraph a); the right to develop, control and use lands
and natural resources, including "the right to negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration
of natural resources in the areas for the purpose of ensuring ecological, environmental protection
and the conservation measures, pursuant to national and customary laws;" (par. b); the right to stay
27
in the territories (par. c); the right to return to their abandoned lands in case of displacement (par.
d); the right to regulate entry of migrants (par. e); the right to claim parts of ancestral domains
previously reserved (par. g); and the right to resolve land conflicts in accordance primarily with
customary law (par. h). Concurrently, Section 57 states that ICCs/IPs shall be given "priority rights in
the harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation of any natural resources within the ancestral
domains." These provisions of IPRA, in their totality, are, in my view, beyond the context of the
fundamental law and virtually amount to an undue delegation, if not an unacceptable abdication, of
State authority over a significant area of the country and its patrimony.
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution expresses that all "lands of the public domain, waters, minerals,
coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forest or timber,
wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State," and, with the exception
of agricultural lands, "shall not be alienated." It ordains that the "exploration, development, and
utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State."8
These provisions had roots in the 1935 Constitution which, along with some other specific mandates
in the 1935 Constitution, forming Article XII under the title "Conservation and Utilization of Natural
Resources", were derived largely from the report of the Committee on Nationalization and
Preservation of Lands and other Natural Resources.9 According to the Committee report, among the
principles upon which these provisions were based, was "that the land, minerals, forest and other
natural resources constitute the exclusive heritage of the Filipino Nation," and should thereby "be
preserved for those under the sovereign authority of the Nation and for their posterity."10 The
delegates to the 1934 Constitutional Convention were of the unanimous view that the "policy on
natural resources, being fundamental to the nation’s survival should not be left to the changing mood
of the lawmaking body."11
The 1987 Constitution, like the precursor provisions in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, thus
expresses this regalian doctrine of the old, and the domainial doctrine of the new, that all lands and
natural resources belong to the state other than those which it recognizes to be of private ownership.
Except for agricultural lands of the public domain which alone may be alienated, forest or timber, and
mineral lands, as well as all other natural resources, of the country must remain with the state, the
exploration, development and utilization of which shall be subject to its full control and supervision
albeit allowing it to enter into co-production, joint venture or production-sharing agreements, or into
agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving technical or financial assistance for large-
scale exploration, development and utilization.12
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Cariño vs. Insular Government,13 holding that a
parcel of land held since time immemorial by individuals under a claim of private ownership is
presumed never to have been public land and cited to downgrade the application of the regalian
doctrine, cannot override the collective will of the people expressed in the Constitution. It is in them
that sovereignty resides and from them that all government authority emanates.14 It is not then for
a court ruling or any piece of legislation to be conformed to by the fundamental law, but it is for the
former to adapt to the latter, and it is the sovereign act that must, between them, stand inviolate.
The second paragraph of Section 5 of Article XII of the Constitution allows Congress to provide "for
the applicability of customary laws governing property rights or relations in determining the
ownership and extent of ancestral domains." I do not see this statement as saying that Congress may
enact a law that would simply express that "customary laws shall govern" and end it there. Had it
been so, the Constitution could have itself easily provided without having to still commission Congress
to do it. Mr. Chief Justice Davide has explained this authority of Congress, during the deliberations of
the 1986 Constitutional Convention, thus:
"Mr. Davide. x x x Insofar as the application of the customary laws governing property rights or
relations in determining the ownership and extent of the ancestral domain is concerned, it is
respectfully submitted that the particular matter must be submitted to Congress. I understand that
the idea of Comm. Bennagen is for the possibility of the codification of these customary laws. So
before these are codified, we cannot now mandate that the same must immediately be applicable.
We leave it to Congress to determine the extent of the ancestral domain and the ownership thereof
in relation to whatever may have been codified earlier. So, in short, let us not put the cart ahead of
the horse."15
The constitutional aim, it seems to me, is to get Congress to look closely into the customary laws and,
with specificity and by proper recitals, to hew them to, and make them part of, the stream of laws.
The "due process clause," as I so understand it in Tanada vs. Tuvera16 would require an apt
publication of a legislative enactment before it is permitted to take force and effect. So, also,
customary laws, when specifically enacted to become part of statutory law, must first undergo that
publication to render them correspondingly binding and effective as such.
Undoubtedly, IPRA has several good points, and I would respectfully urge Congress to re-examine the
law. Indeed, the State is exhorted to protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their
ancestral lands, a task that would entail a balancing of interest between their specific needs and the
imperatives of national interest.
WHEREFORE, I vote to grant the petition.
SEPARATE OPINION
KAPUNAN, J.:
You ask if we own the land. . . How can you own that which will outlive you? Only the race own the
land because only the race lives forever. To claim a piece of land is a birthright of every man. The
lowly animals claim their place; how much more man? Man is born to live. Apu Kabunian, lord of us
28
all, gave us life and placed us in the world to live human lives. And where shall we obtain life? From
the land. To work (the land) is an obligation, not merely a right. In tilling the land, you possess it. And
so land is a grace that must be nurtured. To enrich it and make it fructify is the eternal exhortation of
Apu Kabunian to all his children. Land is sacred. Land is beloved. From its womb springs …life.
- Macli-ing Dulag, Chieftain of the Kalinga Tribe (quoted in Ponciano L. Bennagen, "Tribal Filipinos" in
Indigenous View of Land and the Environment, ed. Shelton H. Davis, the World Bank Discussion
Papers, No. 188, pp. 71-72.)
It is established doctrine that a statute should be construed whenever possible in harmony with,
rather than in violation of, the Constitution.1 The presumption is that the legislature intended to
enact a valid, sensible and just law and one which operates no further than may be necessary to
effectuate the specific purpose of the law.2
The challenged provisions of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) must be construed in view of
such presumption of constitutionality. Further, the interpretation of these provisions should take into
account the purpose of the law, which is to give life to the constitutional mandate that the rights of
the indigenous peoples be recognized and protected.
The struggle of our indigenous peoples to reclaim their ancestral lands and domains and therefore,
their heritage, is not unique. It is one that they share with the red-skinned "Indians" of the United
States, with the aborigines of Australia, the Maori of New Zealand and the Sazmi of Sweden, to name
a few. Happily, the nations in which these indigenous peoples live all have enacted measures in an
attempt to heal an oppressive past by the promise of a progressive future. Thus has the international
community realized the injustices that have been perpetrated upon the indigenous peoples. This
sentiment among the family of nations is expressed in a number of documents, the most recent and
most comprehensive of which is the Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples which was adopted by the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities by its resolution on August 26, 1994. Among the rights recognized by the UN
Draft is the restitution of lands, territories and even the resources which the indigenous peoples have
traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used, and which have been confiscated, occupied, used
or damaged without the free and informed consent of the indigenous peoples.
A Historical Backdrop on the Indigenous Peoples
The term "indigenous" traces its origin to the Old Latin word indu, meaning "within." In the sense the
term has come to be used, it is nearer in meaning to the Latin word indigenus, which means "native."3
"Indigenous" refers to that which originated or has been produced naturally in a particular land, and
has not been introduced from the outside.4 In international law, the definition of what constitutes
"indigenous peoples" attains some degree of controversy. No definition of the term "indigenous
peoples" has been adopted by the United Nations (UN), although UN practice has been guided by a
working definition in the 1986 Report of UN Special Rapporteur Martinez Cobo:5
Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a historical continuity with pre-
invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories, consider themselves distinct
from other sections of the societies now prevailing in those territories, or parts of them. They form at
present non-dominant sections of society and are determined to preserve, develop and transmit to
future generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their continued
existence as peoples, in accordance with their own cultural patterns, social institutions and legal
systems.
This historical continuity may consist of the continuation, for an extended period reaching into the
present, of one or more of the following factors:
(a) Occupation of ancestral lands, or at least of part of them;
(b) Common ancestry with the original occupants of these lands;
(c) Culture in general, or in specific manifestations (such as religion, living under a tribal system,
membership of an indigenous community, dress, means of livelihood, life-style, etc.);
(d) Language (whether used as the only language, as mother-tongue, as the habitual means of
communication at home or in the family, or as the main, preferred, habitual, general or normal
language);
(e) Residence in certain parts of the country; or in certain regions of the world;
(f) Other relevant facts.6
In Philippine constitutional law, the term "indigenous peoples" pertains to those groups of Filipinos
who have retained a high degree of continuity from pre-Conquest culture.7 Philippine legal history,
however, has not been kind to the indigenous peoples, characterized them as "uncivilized,"8
"backward people,"9 with "barbarous practices"10 and "a low order of intelligence."11
Drawing inspiration from both our fundamental law and international law, IPRA now employs the
politically-correct conjunctive term "indigenous peoples/indigenous cultural communities" as
follows:
Sec. 3. Definition of Terms.- For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall mean:
xxx
29
(h) Indigenous peoples/Indigenous cultural communities. - refer to a group of people or homogenous
societies identified by self-ascription and ascription by others, who have continuously lived as
organized community on communally bounded and defined territory, and who have, under claims of
ownership since time immemorial, occupied, possessed and utilized such territories, sharing common
bonds of language, customs, traditions, and other distinctive cultural traits, or who have, through
resistance to political, social and cultural inroads of colonization, non-indigenous religions and
cultures, became historically differentiated from the majority of Filipinos. Indigenous peoples shall
likewise include peoples who are regarded as indigenous on account of their descent from the
populations which inhabited the country at the time of conquest or colonization, or at the time of
inroads of non-indigenous religions and cultures, or the establishment of present State boundaries,
who retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions, but who may
have been displaced from their traditional domains or who may have resettled outside their ancestral
domains x x x.
Long before the Spaniards set foot in these islands, the indigenous peoples were already plowing our
soil and hunting in our forests. The Filipinos of Aeta and Malay stock, who were the original
inhabitants of our archipelago, were, at that time, practicing a native culture. From the time the
Spaniards arrived up to the early part of the American regime,12 these native inhabitants resisted
foreign invasion, relentlessly fighting for their lands. Today, from the remote uplands of Northern
Luzon, to Palawan, Mindoro and Mindanao, the indigenous peoples continue to live on and cultivate
their ancestral lands, the lands of their forefathers.
Though Filipinos today are essentially of the same stock as the indigenous peoples, our national
culture exhibits only the last vestiges of this native culture. Centuries of colonial rule and neocolonial
domination have created a discernible distinction between the cultural majority and the group of
cultural minorities.13 The extant Philippine national culture is the culture of the majority; its
indigenous roots were replaced by foreign cultural elements that are decidedly pronounced, if not
dominant.14 While the culture of the majority reoriented itself to Western influence, the culture of
the minorities has retained its essentially native character.
One of every six Filipinos is a member of an indigenous cultural community. Around twelve million
Filipinos are members of the one hundred and ten or so indigenous cultural communities,15
accounting for more than seventeen per centum of the estimated seventy million Filipinos16 in our
country. Sadly, the indigenous peoples are one of the poorest sectors of Philippine society. The
incidence of poverty and malnutrition among them is significantly higher than the national average.
The indigenous peoples are also among the most powerless. Perhaps because of their inability to
speak the language of law and power, they have been relegated to the fringes of society. They have
little, if any, voice in national politics and enjoy the least protection from economic exploitation.
The Constitutional Policies on Indigenous Peoples
The framers of the 1987 Constitution, looking back to the long destitution of our less fortunate
brothers, fittingly saw the historic opportunity to actualize the ideals of people empowerment and
social justice, and to reach out particularly to the marginalized sectors of society, including the
indigenous peoples. They incorporated in the fundamental law several provisions recognizing and
protecting the rights and interests of the indigenous peoples, to wit:
Sec. 22. The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous peoples within the framework of
national unity and development.17
Sec. 5. The State, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national development policies and
programs, shall protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands to
ensure their economic, social, and cultural well-being.
The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws governing property rights and
relations in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domains.18
Sec. 1. The Congress shall give the highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and
enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic and political
inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the
common good.
To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use and disposition of property and
its increments.19
Sec. 6. The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship, whenever applicable in
accordance with law, in the disposition and utilization of other natural resources, including lands of
the public domain under lease or concession, subject to prior rights, homestead rights of small
settlers, and the rights of indigenous communities to their ancestral lands.20
Sec. 17. The State shall recognize, respect, and protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities
to preserve and develop their cultures, traditions, and institutions. It shall consider these rights in the
formulation of national plans and policies.21
Sec. 12. The Congress may create a consultative body to advise the President on policies affecting
indigenous cultural communities, the majority of the members of which shall come from such
communities.22
IPRA was enacted precisely to implement the foregoing constitutional provisions. It provides, among
others, that the State shall recognize and promote the rights of indigenous peoples within the
framework of national unity and development, protect their rights over the ancestral lands and
30
ancestral domains and recognize the applicability of customary laws governing property rights or
relations in determining the ownership and extent of the ancestral domains.23 Moreover, IPRA
enumerates the civil and political rights of the indigenous peoples;24 spells out their social and
cultural rights;25 acknowledges a general concept of indigenous property right and recognizes title
thereto;26 and creates the NCIP as an independent agency under the Office of the President.27
Preliminary Issues
A. The petition presents an actual controversy.
The time-tested standards for the exercise of judicial review are: (1) the existence of an appropriate
case; (2) an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the
plea that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the
constitutional question be passed upon in order to decide the case.28
Courts can only decide actual controversies, not hypothetical questions or cases.29 The threshold
issue, therefore, is whether an "appropriate case" exists for the exercise of judicial review in the
present case.
An "actual case or controversy" means an existing case or controversy which is both ripe for resolution
and susceptible of judicial determination, and that which is not conjectural or anticipatory,30 or that
which seeks to resolve hypothetical or feigned constitutional problems.31 A petition raising a
constitutional question does not present an "actual controversy," unless it alleges a legal right or
power. Moreover, it must show that a conflict of rights exists, for inherent in the term "controversy"
is the presence of opposing views or contentions.32 Otherwise, the Court will be forced to resolve
issues which remain unfocused because they lack such concreteness provided when a question
emerges precisely framed from a clash of adversary arguments exploring every aspect of a multi-
faceted situation embracing conflicting and demanding interests.33 The controversy must also be
justiciable; that is, it must be susceptible of judicial determination.34
In the case at bar, there exists a live controversy involving a clash of legal rights. A law has been
enacted, and the Implementing Rules and Regulations approved. Money has been appropriated and
the government agencies concerned have been directed to implement the statute. It cannot be
successfully maintained that we should await the adverse consequences of the law in order to
consider the controversy actual and ripe for judicial resolution. It is precisely the contention of the
petitioners that the law, on its face, constitutes an unconstitutional abdication of State ownership
over lands of the public domain and other natural resources. Moreover, when the State machinery is
set into motion to implement an alleged unconstitutional statute, this Court possesses sufficient
authority to resolve and prevent imminent injury and violation of the constitutional process.
B. Petitioners, as citizens and taxpayers, have the requisite standing to raise the constitutional
questions herein.
In addition to the existence of an actual case or controversy, a person who assails the validity of a
statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that, he has sustained, or will
sustain, a direct injury as a result of its enforcement.35 Evidently, the rights asserted by petitioners
as citizens and taxpayers are held in common by all the citizens, the violation of which may result only
in a "generalized grievance".36 Yet, in a sense, all citizen’s and taxpayer’s suits are efforts to air
generalized grievances about the conduct of government and the allocation of power.37
In several cases, the Court has adopted a liberal attitude with regard to standing.38 The proper party
requirement is considered as merely procedural,39 and the Court has ample discretion with regard
thereto.40 As early as 1910, the Court in the case of Severino vs. Governor General 41 held:
x x x When the relief is sought merely for the protection of private rights, the relator must show some
personal or special interest in the subject matter, since he is regarded as the real party in interest and
his right must clearly appear. Upon the other hand, when the question is one of public right and the
object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as
the real party in interest, and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not
show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a
citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws.42
This Court has recognized that a "public right," or that which belongs to the people at large, may also
be the subject of an actual case or controversy. In Severino, we ruled that a private citizen may
enforce a "public right" in behalf of other citizens. We opined therein that:
… The right which [petitioner] seeks to enforce is not greater or different from that of any other
qualified elector in the municipality of Silay. It is also true that the injury which he would suffer in
case he fails to obtain the relief sought would not be greater or different from that of the other
electors; but he is seeking to enforce a public right as distinguished from a private right. The real party
in interest is the public, or the qualified electors of the town of Silay. Each elector has the same right
and would suffer the same injury. Each elector stands on the same basis with reference to maintaining
a petition whether or not the relief sought by the relator should be granted.43
In Tañada v. Tuvera,44 the Court enforced the "public right" to due process and to be informed of
matters of public concern.
In Garcia vs. Board of Investments,45 the Court upheld the "public right" to be heard or consulted on
matters of national concern.
31
In Oposa v. Factoran,46 the Court recognized the "public right" of citizens to "a balanced and healthful
ecology which, for the first time in our nation’s constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the
fundamental law."47 Mr. Justice (now Chief Justice) Hilario G. Davide, Jr., delivering the opinion of
the Court, stated that:
Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-
preservation and self-perpetuation-aptly and fittingly stressed by petitioners-the advancement of
which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic
rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception
of humankind.48
Petitioners, as citizens, possess the "public right" to ensure that the national patrimony is not
alienated and diminished in violation of the Constitution. Since the government, as the guardian of
the national patrimony, holds it for the benefit of all Filipinos without distinction as to ethnicity, it
follows that a citizen has sufficient interest to maintain a suit to ensure that any grant of concessions
covering the national economy and patrimony strictly complies with constitutional requirements.
Thus, the preservation of the integrity and inviolability of the national patrimony is a proper subject
of a citizen’s suit.
In addition, petitioners, as taxpayers, possess the right to restrain officials from wasting public funds
through the enforcement of an unconstitutional statute. It is well-settled that a taxpayer has the right
to enjoin public officials from wasting public funds through the implementation of an unconstitutional
statute,49 and by necessity, he may assail the validity of a statute appropriating public funds.50 The
taxpayer has paid his taxes and contributed to the public coffers and, thus, may inquire into the
manner by which the proceeds of his taxes are spent. The expenditure by an official of the State for
the purpose of administering an invalid law constitutes a misapplication of such funds.51
The IPRA appropriates funds as indicated in its title: "An Act to Recognize, Protect and Promote the
Rights of Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples, Creating the National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples, Establishing Implementing Mechanisms, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for
Other Purposes." In the same manner, Section 79 authorizes for the expenditure of public funds by
providing that "the amount necessary to finance [its] initial implementation shall be charged against
the current year's appropriation for the Office for Northern Cultural Communities (the "ONCC") and
the Office for Southern Cultural Communities (the "OSCC"),"52 which were merged as organic offices
of the NCIP.53 Thus, the IPRA is a valid subject of a taxpayer’s suit.
C. The petition for prohibition and mandamus is not an improper remedy.
Prohibition is an extraordinary writ directed against any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, ordering said entity or
person to desist from further proceedings when said proceedings are without or in excess of said
entity’s or person’s jurisdiction, or are accompanied with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no
appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.54 Mandamus,
on the other hand, is an extraordinary writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person, immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done, when said
entity or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a
duty resulting from an office, trust or station, or when said entity or person unlawfully excludes
another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is
no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.55
In this case, the petitioners pray that respondents be restrained from implementing the challenged
provisions of the IPRA and its Implementing Rules and the assailed DENR Circular No. 2, series of 1998,
and that the same officials be enjoined from disbursing public funds for the implementation of the
said law and rules. They further ask that the Secretary of the DENR be compelled to perform his duty
to control and supervise the activities pertaining to natural resources.
Prohibition will lie to restrain the public officials concerned from implementing the questioned
provisions of the IPRA and from disbursing funds in connection therewith if the law is found to be
unconstitutional. Likewise, mandamus will lie to compel the Secretary of the DENR to perform his
duty to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization and conservation of the
country’s natural resources. Consequently, the petition for prohibition and mandamus is not an
improper remedy for the relief sought.
D. Notwithstanding the failure of petitioners to observe the hierarchy of courts, the Court assumes
jurisdiction over the petition in view of the importance of the issues raised therein.
Between two courts of concurrent original jurisdiction, it is the lower court that should initially pass
upon the issues of a case. That way, as a particular case goes through the hierarchy of courts, it is
shorn of all but the important legal issues or those of first impression, which are the proper subject
of attention of the appellate court. This is a procedural rule borne of experience and adopted to
improve the administration of justice.
This Court has consistently enjoined litigants to respect the hierarchy of courts. Although this Court
has concurrent jurisdiction with the Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals to issue writs of
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction,56 such concurrence
does not give a party unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. The resort to this Court’s primary
jurisdiction to issue said writs shall be allowed only where the redress desired cannot be obtained in
the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify such invocation.57
We held in People v. Cuaresma58 that:
A becoming regard for judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of
extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court,
32
and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s
original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only where there are special and important
reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy. It is a policy
necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court’s time and attention which are better
devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of
the Court’s docket x x x.59 (Emphasis supplied.)
IPRA aims to rectify the historical injustice inflicted upon indigenous peoples. Its impact upon the lives
not only of the indigenous peoples but also upon the lives of all Filipinos cannot be denied. The
resolution of this case by the Court at the earliest opportunity is necessary if the aims of the law are
to be achieved. This reason is compelling enough to allow petitioners’ invocation of this Court’s
jurisdiction in the first instance.
Substantive Issues
Primary Issue
The issue of prime concern raised by petitioners and the Solicitor General revolves around the
constitutionality of certain provisions of IPRA, specifically Sections 3(a), 3(b), 5, 6, 7, 8, 57, 58 and 59.
These provisions allegedly violate Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, which states:
Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural
resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources
shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be
under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities,
or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino
citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such
citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not
more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In
cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.
The State shall protect the nation’s marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and
exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.
The Congress, may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as
well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers,
lakes, bays and lagoons.
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical
or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals,
petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law,
based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such
agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local scientific and technical
resources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this
provision, within thirty days from its execution.
Under IPRA, indigenous peoples may obtain the recognition of their right of ownership60 over
ancestral lands and ancestral domains by virtue of native title.61 The term "ancestral lands" under
the statute refers to lands occupied by individuals, families and clans who are members of indigenous
cultural communities, including residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden
farms and tree lots. These lands are required to have been "occupied, possessed and utilized" by them
or through their ancestors "since time immemorial, continuously to the present".62 On the other
hand, "ancestral domains" is defined as areas generally belonging to indigenous cultural communities,
including ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential and agricultural lands, hunting grounds,
worship areas, and lands no longer occupied exclusively by indigenous cultural communities but to
which they had traditional access, particularly the home ranges of indigenous cultural communities
who are still nomadic or shifting cultivators. Ancestral domains also include inland waters, coastal
areas and natural resources therein.63 Again, the same are required to have been "held under a claim
of ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs, by themselves or through their ancestors,
communally or individually since time immemorial, continuously to the present".64 Under Section
56, property rights within the ancestral domains already existing and/or vested upon effectivity of
said law "shall be recognized and respected."
Ownership is the crux of the issue of whether the provisions of IPRA pertaining to ancestral lands,
ancestral domains, and natural resources are unconstitutional. The fundamental question is, who,
between the State and the indigenous peoples, are the rightful owners of these properties?
It bears stressing that a statute should be construed in harmony with, and not in violation, of the
fundamental law.65 The reason is that the legislature, in enacting a statute, is assumed to have acted
within its authority and adhered to the constitutional limitations. Accordingly, courts should presume
that it was the intention of the legislature to enact a valid, sensible, and just law and one which
operates no further than may be necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the law.66
A. The provisions of IPRA recognizing the ownership of indigenous peoples over the ancestral lands
and ancestral domains are not unconstitutional.
33
In support of their theory that ancestral lands and ancestral domains are part of the public domain
and, thus, owned by the State, pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, petitioners and
the Solicitor General advance the following arguments:
First, according to petitioners, the King of Spain under international law acquired exclusive dominion
over the Philippines by virtue of discovery and conquest. They contend that the Spanish King under
the theory of jura regalia, which was introduced into Philippine law upon Spanish conquest in 1521,
acquired title to all the lands in the archipelago.
Second, petitioners and the Solicitor General submit that ancestral lands and ancestral domains are
owned by the State. They invoke the theory of jura regalia which imputes to the State the ownership
of all lands and makes the State the original source of all private titles. They argue that the Philippine
State, as successor to Spain and the United States, is the source of any asserted right of ownership in
land.
Third, petitioners and the Solicitor General concede that the Cariño doctrine exists. However,
petitioners maintain that the doctrine merely states that title to lands of the public domain may be
acquired by prescription. The Solicitor General, for his part, argues that the doctrine applies only to
alienable lands of the public domain and, thus, cannot be extended to other lands of the public
domain such as forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks.
Fourth, the Solicitor General asserts that even assuming that native title over ancestral lands and
ancestral domains existed by virtue of the Cariño doctrine, such native title was extinguished upon
the ratification of the 1935 Constitution.
Fifth, petitioners admit that Congress is mandated under Section 5, Article XII of the Constitution to
protect that rights of indigenous peoples to their ancestral lands and ancestral domains. However,
they contend that the mandate is subject to Section 2, Article XII and the theory of jura regalia
embodied therein. According to petitioners, the recognition and protection under R.A. 8371 of the
right of ownership over ancestral lands and ancestral domains is far in excess of the legislative power
and constitutional mandate of Congress.
Finally, on the premise that ancestral lands and ancestral domains are owned by the State, petitioners
posit that R.A. 8371 violates Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution which prohibits the alienation of
non-agricultural lands of the public domain and other natural resources.
I am not persuaded by these contentions.
Undue reliance by petitioners and the Solicitor General on the theory of jura regalia is
understandable. Not only is the theory well recognized in our legal system; it has been regarded,
almost with reverence, as the immutable postulate of Philippine land law. It has been incorporated
into our fundamental law and has been recognized by the Court.67
Generally, under the concept of jura regalia, private title to land must be traced to some grant,
express or implied, from the Spanish Crown or its successors, the American Colonial government, and
thereafter, the Philippine Republic. The belief that the Spanish Crown is the origin of all land titles in
the Philippines has persisted because title to land must emanate from some source for it cannot issue
forth from nowhere.68
In its broad sense, the term "jura regalia" refers to royal rights,69 or those rights which the King has
by virtue of his prerogatives.70 In Spanish law, it refers to a right which the sovereign has over
anything in which a subject has a right of property or propriedad.71 These were rights enjoyed during
feudal times by the king as the sovereign.
The theory of the feudal system was that title to all lands was originally held by the King, and while
the use of lands was granted out to others who were permitted to hold them under certain conditions,
the King theoretically retained the title.72 By fiction of law, the King was regarded as the original
proprietor of all lands, and the true and only source of title, and from him all lands were held.73 The
theory of jura regalia was therefore nothing more than a natural fruit of conquest.74
The Regalian theory, however, does not negate native title to lands held in private ownership since
time immemorial. In the landmark case of Cariño vs. Insular Government75 the United States
Supreme Court, reversing the decision76of the pre-war Philippine Supreme Court, made the following
pronouncement:
x x x Every presumption is and ought to be taken against the Government in a case like the present.
It might, perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far back as testimony or memory goes,
the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have
been held in the same way from before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land. x
x x.77 (Emphasis supplied.)
The above ruling institutionalized the recognition of the existence of native title to land, or ownership
of land by Filipinos by virtue of possession under a claim of ownership since time immemorial and
independent of any grant from the Spanish Crown, as an exception to the theory of jura regalia.
In Cariño, an Igorot by the name of Mateo Cariño applied for registration in his name of an ancestral
land located in Benguet. The applicant established that he and his ancestors had lived on the land,
had cultivated it, and had used it as far they could remember. He also proved that they had all been
recognized as owners, the land having been passed on by inheritance according to native custom.
However, neither he nor his ancestors had any document of title from the Spanish Crown. The
government opposed the application for registration, invoking the theory of jura regalia. On appeal,
34
the United States Supreme Court held that the applicant was entitled to the registration of his native
title to their ancestral land.
Cariño was decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1909, at a time when decisions of the U.S. Court
were binding as precedent in our jurisdiction.78 We applied the Cariño doctrine in the 1946 case of
Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands,79 where we stated that "[a]ll lands that were not acquired from the
Government either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain, but [a]n exception to the
rule would be any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors
in interest since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that the land
had never been part of the public domain or that it had been private property even before the Spanish
conquest."80
Petitioners however aver that the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Cariño was premised on the fact that
the applicant had complied with the requisites of acquisitive prescription, having established that he
and his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the property since time immemorial. In
effect, petitioners suggest that title to the ancestral land applied for by Cariño was transferred from
the State, as original owner, to Cariño by virtue of prescription. They conclude that the doctrine
cannot be the basis for decreeing "by mere legislative fiat…that ownership of vast tracts of land
belongs to [indigenous peoples] without judicial confirmation."81
The Solicitor General, for his part, claims that the Cariño doctrine applies only to alienable lands of
the public domain and, as such, cannot be extended to other lands of the public domain such as forest
or timber, mineral lands, and national parks.
There is no merit in these contentions.
A proper reading of Cariño would show that the doctrine enunciated therein applies only to lands
which have always been considered as private, and not to lands of the public domain, whether
alienable or otherwise. A distinction must be made between ownership of land under native title and
ownership by acquisitive prescription against the State. Ownership by virtue of native title
presupposes that the land has been held by its possessor and his predecessors-in-interest in the
concept of an owner since time immemorial. The land is not acquired from the State, that is, Spain or
its successors-in-interest, the United States and the Philippine Government. There has been no
transfer of title from the State as the land has been regarded as private in character as far back as
memory goes. In contrast, ownership of land by acquisitive prescription against the State involves a
conversion of the character of the property from alienable public land to private land, which
presupposes a transfer of title from the State to a private person. Since native title assumes that the
property covered by it is private land and is deemed never to have been part of the public domain,
the Solicitor General’s thesis that native title under Cariño applies only to lands of the public domain
is erroneous. Consequently, the classification of lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or
timber, mineral lands, and national parks under the Constitution82 is irrelevant to the application of
the Cariño doctrine because the Regalian doctrine which vests in the State ownership of lands of the
public domain does not cover ancestral lands and ancestral domains.
Legal history supports the Cariño doctrine.
When Spain acquired sovereignty over the Philippines by virtue of its discovery and occupation
thereof in the 16th century and the Treaty of Tordesillas of 1494 which it entered into with
Portugal,83 the continents of Asia, the Americas and Africa were considered as terra nullius although
already populated by other peoples.84 The discovery and occupation by the European States, who
were then considered as the only members of the international community of civilized nations, of
lands in the said continents were deemed sufficient to create title under international law.85
Although Spain was deemed to have acquired sovereignty over the Philippines, this did not mean that
it acquired title to all lands in the archipelago. By virtue of the colonial laws of Spain, the Spanish
Crown was considered to have acquired dominion only over the unoccupied and unclaimed portions
of our islands.86
In sending the first expedition to the Philippines, Spain did not intend to deprive the natives of their
property. Miguel Lopez de Legazpi was under instruction of the Spanish King to do no harm to the
natives and to their property. In this regard, an authority on the early Spanish colonial period in the
Philippines wrote:
The government of [the King of Spain] Philip II regarded the Philippines as a challenging opportunity
to avoid a repetition of the sanguinary conquests of Mexico and Peru. In his written instructions for
the Adelantado Legazpi, who commanded the expedition, Philip II envisaged a bloodless pacification
of the archipelago. This extraordinary document could have been lifted almost verbatim from the
lectures of the Dominican theologian, Francisco de Vitoria, delivered in the University of Salamanca.
The King instructed Legazpi to inform the natives that the Spaniards had come to do no harm to their
persons or to their property. The Spaniards intended to live among them in peace and in friendship
and "to explain to them the law of Jesus Christ by which they will be saved." Although the Spanish
expedition could defend themselves if attacked, the royal instructions admonished the commander
to commit no aggressive act which might arouse native hostility.87
Spanish colonial laws recognized and respected Filipino landholdings including native land
occupancy.88 Thus, the Recopilación de Leyes de las Indias expressly conferred ownership of lands
already held by the natives.89 The royal decrees of 1880 and 1894 did not extinguish native title to
land in the Philippines. The earlier royal decree, dated June 25, 1880, provided that all those in
"unlawful possession of royal lands" must legalize their possession by means of adjustment
proceedings,90 and within the period specified. The later royal decree, dated February 13, 1894,
otherwise known as the Maura Law, declared that titles that were capable of adjustment under the
royal decree of 1880, but for which adjustment was not sought, were forfeited. Despite the harsh
35
wording of the Maura Law, it was held in the case of Cariño that the royal decree of 1894 should not
be construed as confiscation of title, but merely as the withdrawal of the privilege of registering such
title.91
Neither was native title disturbed by the Spanish cession of the Philippines to the United States,
contrary to petitioners’ assertion that the US merely succeeded to the rights of Spain, including the
latter’s rights over lands of the public domain.92 Under the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898, the
cession of the Philippines did not impair any right to property existing at the time.93 During the
American colonial regime, native title to land was respected, even protected. The Philippine Bill of
1902 provided that property and rights acquired by the US through cession from Spain were to be
administered for the benefit of the Filipinos.94 In obvious adherence to libertarian principles,
McKinley’s Instructions, as well as the Philippine Bill of 1902, contained a bill of rights embodying the
safeguards of the US Constitution. One of these rights, which served as an inviolable rule upon every
division and branch of the American colonial government in the Philippines,95 was that "no person
shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law."96 These vested rights
safeguarded by the Philippine Bill of 1902 were in turn expressly protected by the due process clause
of the 1935 Constitution. Resultantly, property rights of the indigenous peoples over their ancestral
lands and ancestral domains were firmly established in law.
Nonetheless, the Solicitor General takes the view that the vested rights of indigenous peoples to their
ancestral lands and domains were "abated by the direct act by the sovereign Filipino people of
ratifying the 1935 Constitution."97 He advances the following arguments:
The Sovereign, which is the source of all rights including ownership, has the power to restructure the
consolidation of rights inherent in ownership in the State. Through the mandate of the Constitutions
that have been adopted, the State has wrested control of those portions of the natural resources it
deems absolutely necessary for social welfare and existence. It has been held that the State may
impair vested rights through a legitimate exercise of police power.
Vested rights do not prohibit the Sovereign from performing acts not only essential to but
determinative of social welfare and existence. To allow otherwise is to invite havoc in the established
social system. x x x
Time-immemorial possession does not create private ownership in cases of natural resources that
have been found from generation to generation to be critical to the survival of the Sovereign and its
agent, the State.98
Stated simply, the Solicitor General’s argument is that the State, as the source of all titles to land, had
the power to re-vest in itself, through the 1935 Constitution, title to all lands, including ancestral lands
and ancestral domains. While the Solicitor General admits that such a theory would necessarily impair
vested rights, he reasons out that even vested rights of ownership over ancestral lands and ancestral
domains are not absolute and may be impaired by the legitimate exercise of police power.
I cannot agree. The text of the provision of the 1935 Constitution invoked by the Solicitor General,
while embodying the theory of jura regalia, is too clear for any misunderstanding. It simply declares
that "all agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the
Philippines belong to the State."99 Nowhere does it state that certain lands which are "absolutely
necessary for social welfare and existence," including those which are not part of the public domain,
shall thereafter be owned by the State. If there is any room for constitutional construction, the
provision should be interpreted in favor of the preservation, rather than impairment or
extinguishment, of vested rights. Stated otherwise, Section 1, Article XII of the 1935 Constitution
cannot be construed to mean that vested right which had existed then were extinguished and that
the landowners were divested of their lands, all in the guise of "wrest[ing] control of those portions
of the natural resources [which the State] deems absolutely necessary for social welfare and
existence." On the contrary, said Section restated the fundamental rule against the diminution of
existing rights by expressly providing that the ownership of lands of the public domain and other
natural resources by the State is "subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concessions." The
"existing rights" that were intended to be protected must, perforce, include the right of ownership
by indigenous peoples over their ancestral lands and domains. The words of the law should be given
their ordinary or usual meaning,100 and the term "existing rights" cannot be assigned an unduly
restrictive definition.
Petitioners concede that Congress is mandated under Section 5, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution101to protect the rights of indigenous peoples to their ancestral lands and ancestral
domains. Nonetheless, they contend that the recognition and protection under IPRA of the right of
ownership of indigenous peoples over ancestral lands and ancestral domains are far in excess of the
legislative power and constitutional mandate of the Congress,102 since such recognition and
protection amount to the alienation of lands of the public domain, which is proscribed under Section
2, Article XII of the Constitution.
Section 5, Article XII of the Constitution expresses the sovereign intent to "protect the rights of
indigenous peoples to their ancestral lands." In its general and ordinary sense, the term "right" refers
to any legally enforceable claim.103 It is a power, privilege, faculty or demand inherent in one person
and incident upon another.104 When used in relation to property, "right" includes any interest in or
title to an object, or any just and legal claim to hold, use and enjoy it.105 Said provision in the
Constitution cannot, by any reasonable construction, be interpreted to exclude the protection of the
right of ownership over such ancestral lands. For this reason, Congress cannot be said to have
exceeded its constitutional mandate and power in enacting the provisions of IPRA, specifically
Sections 7(a) and 8, which recognize the right of ownership of the indigenous peoples over ancestral
lands.
36

The second paragraph of Section 5, Article XII also grants Congress the power to "provide for the
applicability of customary laws governing property rights or relations in determining the ownership
and extent of ancestral domains." In light of this provision, does Congress have the power to decide
whether ancestral domains shall be private property or part of the public domain? Also, does
Congress have the power to determine whether the "extent" of ancestral domains shall include the
natural resources found therein?
It is readily apparent from the constitutional records that the framers of the Constitution did not
intend Congress to decide whether ancestral domains shall be public or private property. Rather, they
acknowledged that ancestral domains shall be treated as private property, and that customary laws
shall merely determine whether such private ownership is by the entire indigenous cultural
community, or by individuals, families, or clans within the community. The discussion below between
Messrs. Regalado and Bennagen and Mr. Chief Justice Davide, then members of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, is instructive:
MR. REGALADO. Thank you, Madame President. May I seek some clarifications from either
Commissioner Bennagen or Commissioner Davide regarding this phrase "CONGRESS SHALL PROVIDE
FOR THE APPLICABILITY OF CUSTOMARY LAWS GOVERNING PROPERTY RIGHTS OR RELATIONS in
determining the ownership and extent of the ancestral domain," because ordinarily it is the law on
ownership and the extent thereof which determine the property rights or relations arising therefrom.
On the other hand, in this proposed amendment the phraseology is that it is the property rights or
relations which shall be used as the basis in determining the ownership and extent of the ancestral
domain. I assume there must be a certain difference in the customary laws and our regular civil laws
on property.
MR. DAVIDE. That is exactly the reason, Madam President, why we will leave it to Congress to make
the necessary exception to the general law on property relations.
MR. REGALADO. I was thinking if Commissioner Bennagen could give us an example of such a
customary law wherein it is the property rights and relations that determine the ownership and the
extent of that ownership, unlike the basic fundamental rule that it is the ownership and the extent of
ownership which determine the property rights and relations arising therefrom and consequent
thereto. Perhaps, these customary laws may have a different provision or thrust so that we could
make the corresponding suggestions also by way of an amendment.
MR. DAVIDE. That is exactly my own perception.
MR. BENNAGEN. Let me put it this way.
There is a range of customary laws governing certain types of ownership. There would be ownership
based on individuals, on clan or lineage, or on community. And the thinking expressed in the
consultation is that this should be codified and should be recognized in relation to existing national
laws. That is essentially the concept. 106 (Emphasis supplied.)
The intention to treat ancestral domains as private property is also apparent from the following
exchange between Messrs. Suarez and Bennagen:
MR. SUAREZ. When we speak of customary laws governing property rights or relations in determining
the ownership and extent of the ancestral domain, are we thinking in terms of the tribal ownership
or community ownership or of private ownership within the ancestral lands or ancestral domain?
MR. BENNAGEN. The concept of customary laws is that it is considered as ownership by private
individuals, clans and even communities.
MR. SUAREZ. So, there will be two aspects to this situation. This means that the State will set aside
the ancestral domain and there is a separate law for that. Within the ancestral domain it could accept
more specific ownership in terms of individuals within the ancestral lands.
MR. BENNAGEN. Individuals and groups within the ancestral domain. 107 (Emphasis supplied.)
It cannot be correctly argued that, because the framers of the Constitution never expressly mentioned
Cariño in their deliberations, they did not intend to adopt the concept of native title to land, or that
they were unaware of native title as an exception to the theory of jura regalia.108 The framers of the
Constitution, as well as the people adopting it, were presumed to be aware of the prevailing judicial
doctrines concerning the subject of constitutional provisions, and courts should take these doctrines
into consideration in construing the Constitution.109
Having thus recognized that ancestral domains under the Constitution are considered as private
property of indigenous peoples, the IPRA, by affirming or acknowledging such ownership through its
various provisions, merely abides by the constitutional mandate and does not suffer any vice of
unconstitutionality.
Petitioners interpret the phrase "subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national
development policies and programs" in Section 5, Article XII of the Constitution to mean "as subject
to the provision of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution," which vests in the State ownership of all
lands of the public domain, mineral lands and other natural resources. Following this interpretation,
petitioners maintain that ancestral lands and ancestral domains are the property of the State.
This proposition is untenable. Indeed, Section 2, Article XII reiterates the declarations made in the
1935 and 1973 Constitutions on the state policy of conservation and nationalization of lands of the
37
public domain and natural resources, and is of paramount importance to our national economy and
patrimony. A close perusal of the records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission reveals that the
framers of the Constitution inserted the phrase "subject to the provisions of this Constitution" mainly
to prevent the impairment of Torrens titles and other prior rights in the determination of what
constitutes ancestral lands and ancestral domains, to wit:
MR. NATIVIDAD. Just one question. I want to clear this section protecting ancestral lands. How does
this affect the Torrens title and other prior rights?
MR. BENNAGEN. I think that was also discussed in the committee hearings and we did say that in
cases where due process is clearly established in terms of prior rights, these two have to be respected.
MR. NATIVIDAD. The other point is: How vast is this ancestral land? Is it true that parts of Baguio City
are considered as ancestral lands?
MR. BENNAGEN. They could be regarded as such. If the Commissioner still recalls, in one of the
publications that I provided the Commissioners, the parts could be considered as ancestral domain in
relation to the whole population of Cordillera but not in relation to certain individuals or certain
groups.
MR. NATIVIDAD. The Commissioner means that the whole Baguio City is considered as ancestral land?
MR. BENNAGEN. Yes, in the sense that it belongs to Cordillera or in the same manner that Filipinos
can speak of the Philippine archipelago as ancestral land, but not in terms of the right of a particular
person or particular group to exploit, utilize, or sell it.
MR. NATIVIDAD. But is clear that the prior rights will be respected.
MR. BENNAGEN. Definitely. 110
Thus, the phrase "subject to the provisions of this Constitution" was intended by the framers of the
Constitution as a reiteration of the constitutional guarantee that no person shall be deprived of
property without due process of law.
There is another reason why Section 5 of Article XII mandating the protection of rights of the
indigenous peoples to their ancestral lands cannot be construed as subject to Section 2 of the same
Article ascribing ownership of all public lands to the State. The Constitution must be construed as a
whole. It is a rule that when construction is proper, the whole Constitution is examined in order to
determine the meaning of any provision. That construction should be used which would give effect
to the entire instrument.111
Thus, the provisions of the Constitution on State ownership of public lands, mineral lands and other
natural resources should be read together with the other provisions thereof which firmly recognize
the rights of the indigenous peoples. These, as set forth hereinbefore,112 include: Section 22, Article
II, providing that the State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous peoples within the
framework of national unity and development; Section 5, Article XII, calling for the protection of the
rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands to ensure their economic, social,
and cultural well-being, and for the applicability of customary laws governing property rights and
relations in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domains; Section 1, Article XIII,
directing the removal or reduction of social, economic, political and cultural inequities and
inequalities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good; Section 6, Article
XIII, directing the application of the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship in the disposition and
utilization of other natural resources, subject to prior rights, homestead rights of small settlers, and
the rights of indigenous communities to their ancestral lands; Section 17, Article XIV, decreeing that
the State shall recognize, respect, and protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to
preserve and develop their cultures, traditions, and institutions; and Section 12, Article XVI,
authorizing the Congress to create a consultative body to advise the President on policies affecting
indigenous cultural communities.
Again, as articulated in the Constitution, the first goal of the national economy is the more equitable
distribution of opportunities, income, and wealth.113 Equity is given prominence as the first objective
of national economic development.114 The framers of the Constitution did not, by the phrase
"subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national development policies and programs,"
intend to establish a hierarchy of constitutional norms. As explained by then Commissioner (now
Chief Justice) Hilario G. Davide, Jr., it was not their objective to make certain interests primary or
paramount, or to create absolute limitations or outright prohibitions; rather, the idea is towards the
balancing of interests:
BISHOP BACANI. In Commissioner Davide’s formulation of the first sentence, he says: "The State,
SUBJECT TO THE provisions of this Constitution AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT POLICIES AND
PROGRAMS shall guarantee the rights of cultural or tribal communities to their ancestral lands to
insure their economic, social and cultural well-being." There are at least two concepts here which
receive different weights very often. They are the concepts of national development policies and
programs, and the rights of cultural or tribal communities to their ancestral lands, et cetera. I would
like to ask: When the Commissioner proposed this amendment, which was the controlling concept? I
ask this because sometimes the rights of cultural minorities are precisely transgressed in the interest
of national development policies and programs. Hence, I would like to know which is the controlling
concept here. Is it the rights of indigenous peoples to their ancestral lands or is it national
development policies and programs.
MR. DAVIDE. It is not really a question of which is primary or which is more paramount. The concept
introduced here is really the balancing of interests. That is what we seek to attain. We have to balance
38
the interests taking into account the specific needs and the specific interests also of these cultural
communities in like manner that we did so in the autonomous regions.115 (Emphasis supplied.)
B. The provisions of R.A. 8371 do not infringe upon the State’s ownership over the natural resources
within the ancestral domains.
Petitioners posit that IPRA deprives the State of its ownership over mineral lands of the public domain
and other natural resources,116 as well as the State’s full control and supervision over the
exploration, development and utilization of natural resources.117 Specifically, petitioners and the
Solicitor General assail Sections 3 (a),118 5,119 and 7120 of IPRA as violative of Section 2, Article XII
of the Constitution which states, in part, that "[a]ll lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife,
flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State."121 They would have the Court
declare as unconstitutional Section 3(a) of IPRA because the inclusion of natural resources in the
definition of ancestral domains purportedly results in the abdication of State ownership over these
resources.
I am not convinced.
Section 3(a) merely defines the coverage of ancestral domains, and describes the extent, limit and
composition of ancestral domains by setting forth the standards and guidelines in determining
whether a particular area is to be considered as part of and within the ancestral domains. In other
words, Section 3(a) serves only as a yardstick which points out what properties are within the
ancestral domains. It does not confer or recognize any right of ownership over the natural resources
to the indigenous peoples. Its purpose is definitional and not declarative of a right or title.
The specification of what areas belong to the ancestral domains is, to our mind, important to ensure
that no unnecessary encroachment on private properties outside the ancestral domains will result
during the delineation process. The mere fact that Section 3(a) defines ancestral domains to include
the natural resources found therein does not ipso facto convert the character of such natural
resources as private property of the indigenous peoples. Similarly, Section 5 in relation to Section 3(a)
cannot be construed as a source of ownership rights of indigenous people over the natural resources
simply because it recognizes ancestral domains as their "private but community property."
The phrase "private but community property" is merely descriptive of the indigenous peoples’
concept of ownership as distinguished from that provided in the Civil Code. In Civil Law, "ownership"
is the "independent and general power of a person over a thing for purposes recognized by law and
within the limits established thereby."122 The civil law concept of ownership has the following
attributes: jus utendi or the right to receive from the thing that which it produces, jus abutendi or the
right to consume the thing by its use, jus disponendi or the power to alienate, encumber, transform
and even destroy that which is owned and jus vidicandi or the right to exclude other persons from
the possession the thing owned.123 In contrast, the indigenous peoples’ concept of ownership
emphasizes the importance of communal or group ownership. By virtue of the communal character
of ownership, the property held in common "cannot be sold, disposed or destroyed"124 because it
was meant to benefit the whole indigenous community and not merely the individual member.125
That IPRA is not intended to bestow ownership over natural resources to the indigenous peoples is
also clear from the deliberations of the bicameral conference committee on Section 7 which recites
the rights of indigenous peoples over their ancestral domains, to wit:
CHAIRMAN FLAVIER. Accepted. Section 8126 rights to ancestral domain, this is where we transferred
the other provision but here itself -
HON. DOMINGUEZ. Mr. Chairman, if I maybe allowed to make a very short Statement. Earlier, Mr.
Chairman, we have decided to remove the provisions on natural resources because we all agree that
that belongs to the State. Now, the plight or the rights of those indigenous communities living in
forest and areas where it could be exploited by mining, by dams, so can we not also provide a
provision to give little protection or either rights for them to be consulted before any mining areas
should be done in their areas, any logging done in their areas or any dam construction because this
has been disturbing our people especially in the Cordilleras. So, if there could be, if our lawyers or the
secretariat could just propose a provision for incorporation here so that maybe the right to
consultation and the right to be compensated when there are damages within their ancestral lands.
CHAIRMAN FLAVIER. Yes, very well taken but to the best of my recollection both are already
considered in subsequent sections which we are now looking for.
HON. DOMINGUEZ. Thank you.
CHAIRMAN FLAVIER. First of all there is a line that gives priority use for the indigenous people where
they are. Number two, in terms of the mines there is a need for prior consultation of source which is
here already. So, anyway it is on the record that you want to make sure that the secretariat takes
note of those two issues and my assurance is that it is already there and I will make sure that they
cross check.
HON. ADAMAT. I second that, Mr. Chairman.
CHAIRMAN FLAVIER. Okay, thank you. So we now move to Section 8, there is a Senate version you do
not have and if you agree we will adopt that.127 (Emphasis supplied.)
Further, Section 7 makes no mention of any right of ownership of the indigenous peoples over the
natural resources. In fact, Section 7(a) merely recognizes the "right to claim ownership over lands,
bodies of water traditionally and actually occupied by indigenous peoples, sacred places, traditional
39
hunting and fishing grounds, and all improvements made by them at any time within the domains."
Neither does Section 7(b), which enumerates certain rights of the indigenous peoples over the natural
resources found within their ancestral domains, contain any recognition of ownership vis-a-vis the
natural resources.
What is evident is that the IPRA protects the indigenous peoples’ rights and welfare in relation to the
natural resources found within their ancestral domains,128 including the preservation of the
ecological balance therein and the need to ensure that the indigenous peoples will not be unduly
displaced when State-approved activities involving the natural resources located therein are
undertaken.
Finally, the concept of native title to natural resources, unlike native title to land, has not been
recognized in the Philippines. NCIP and Flavier, et al. invoke the case of Reavies v. Fianza129 in
support of their thesis that native title to natural resources has been upheld in this jurisdiction.130
They insist that "it is possible for rights over natural resources to vest on a private (as opposed to a
public) holder if these were held prior to the 1935 Constitution."131 However, a judicious
examination of Reavies reveals that, contrary to the position of NCIP and Flavier, et al., the Court did
not recognize native title to natural resources. Rather, it merely upheld the right of the indigenous
peoples to claim ownership of minerals under the Philippine Bill of 1902.
While as previously discussed, native title to land or private ownership by Filipinos of land by virtue
of time immemorial possession in the concept of an owner was acknowledged and recognized as far
back during the Spanish colonization of the Philippines, there was no similar favorable treatment as
regards natural resources. The unique value of natural resources has been acknowledged by the State
and is the underlying reason for its consistent assertion of ownership and control over said natural
resources from the Spanish regime up to the present.132 Natural resources, especially minerals, were
considered by Spain as an abundant source of revenue to finance its battles in wars against other
nations. Hence, Spain, by asserting its ownership over minerals wherever these may be found,
whether in public or private lands, recognized the separability of title over lands and that over
minerals which may be found therein. 133
On the other hand, the United States viewed natural resources as a source of wealth for its nationals.
As the owner of natural resources over the Philippines after the latter’s cession from Spain, the United
States saw it fit to allow both Filipino and American citizens to explore and exploit minerals in public
lands, and to grant patents to private mineral lands. A person who acquired ownership over a parcel
of private mineral land pursuant to the laws then prevailing could exclude other persons, even the
State, from exploiting minerals within his property.134 Although the United States made a distinction
between minerals found in public lands and those found in private lands, title in these minerals was
in all cases sourced from the State. The framers of the 1935 Constitution found it necessary to
maintain the State’s ownership over natural resources to insure their conservation for future
generations of Filipinos, to prevent foreign control of the country through economic domination; and
to avoid situations whereby the Philippines would become a source of international conflicts, thereby
posing danger to its internal security and independence.135
The declaration of State ownership and control over minerals and other natural resources in the 1935
Constitution was reiterated in both the 1973136 and 1987 Constitutions.137
Having ruled that the natural resources which may be found within the ancestral domains belong to
the State, the Court deems it necessary to clarify that the jurisdiction of the NCIP with respect to
ancestral domains under Section 52 [i] of IPRA extends only to the lands and not to the natural
resources therein.
Section 52[i] provides:
Turnover of Areas Within Ancestral Domains Managed by Other Government Agencies. - The
Chairperson of the NCIP shall certify that the area covered is an ancestral domain. The secretaries of
the Department of Agrarian Reform, Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Department
of Interior and Local Government, and Department of Justice, the Commissioner of the National
Development Corporation, and any other government agency claiming jurisdiction over the area shall
be notified thereof. Such notification shall terminate any legal basis for the jurisdiction previously
claimed.
Undoubtedly, certain areas that are claimed as ancestral domains may still be under the
administration of other agencies of the Government, such as the Department of Agrarian Reform,
with respect to agricultural lands, and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources with
respect to timber, forest and mineral lands. Upon the certification of these areas as ancestral domain
following the procedure outlined in Sections 51 to 53 of the IPRA, jurisdiction of the government
agency or agencies concerned over lands forming part thereof ceases. Nevertheless, the jurisdiction
of government agencies over the natural resources within the ancestral domains does not terminate
by such certification because said agencies are mandated under existing laws to administer the
natural resources for the State, which is the owner thereof. To construe Section 52[i] as divesting the
State, through the government agencies concerned, of jurisdiction over the natural resources within
the ancestral domains would be inconsistent with the established doctrine that all natural resources
are owned by the State.
C. The provisions of IPRA pertaining to the utilization of natural resources are not unconstitutional.
The IPRA provides that indigenous peoples shall have the right to manage and conserve the natural
resources found on the ancestral domains, to benefit from and share in the profits from the allocation
and utilization of these resources, and to negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration of
such natural resources.138 The statute also grants them priority rights in the harvesting, extraction,
development or exploitation of any natural resources within the ancestral domains.139 Before the
40
NCIP can issue a certification for the renewal, or grant of any concession, license or lease, or for the
perfection of any production-sharing agreement the prior informed written consent of the indigenous
peoples concerned must be obtained.140 In return, the indigenous peoples are given the
responsibility to maintain, develop, protect and conserve the ancestral domains or portions thereof
which are found to be necessary for critical watersheds, mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness,
protected areas, forest cover, or reforestation.141
The Solicitor General argues that these provisions deny the State an active and dominant role in the
utilization of our country’s natural resources. Petitioners, on the other hand, allege that under the
Constitution the exploration, development and utilization of natural resources may only be
undertaken by the State, either directly or indirectly through co-production, joint venture, or
production-sharing agreements.142 To petitioners, no other method is allowed by the Constitution.
They likewise submit that by vesting ownership of ancestral lands and ancestral domains in the
indigenous peoples, IPRA necessarily gives them control over the use and enjoyment of such natural
resources, to the prejudice of the State.143
Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution provides in paragraph 1 thereof that the exploration,
development and utilization of natural resources must be under the full control and supervision of
the State, which may directly undertake such activities or enter into co-production, joint venture, or
production-sharing agreements. This provision, however, should not be read in isolation to avoid a
mistaken interpretation that any and all forms of utilization of natural resources other than the
foregoing are prohibited. The Constitution must be regarded as consistent with itself throughout.144
No constitutional provision is to be separated from all the others, or to be considered alone, all
provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as
to effectuate the great purposes of the fundamental law.145
In addition to the means of exploration, development and utilization of the country’s natural
resources stated in paragraph 1, Section 2 of Article XII, the Constitution itself states in the third
paragraph of the same section that Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural
resources by its citizens.146 Further, Section 6, Article XIII, directs the State, in the disposition and
utilization of natural resources, to apply the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship.147
Similarly, Section 7, Article XIII mandates the State to protect the rights of subsistence fishermen to
the preferential use of marine and fishing resources.148 Clearly, Section 2, Article XII, when
interpreted in view of the pro-Filipino, pro-poor philosophy of our fundamental law, and in harmony
with the other provisions of the Constitution rather as a sequestered pronouncement,149 cannot be
construed as a prohibition against any and all forms of utilization of natural resources without the
State’s direct participation.
Through the imposition of certain requirements and conditions for the exploration, development and
utilization of the natural resources under existing laws,150 the State retains full control over such
activities, whether done on small-scale basis151 or otherwise.
The rights given to the indigenous peoples regarding the exploitation of natural resources under
Sections 7(b) and 57 of IPRA amplify what has been granted to them under existing laws, such as the
Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991 (R.A. 7076) and the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 (R.A. 7942). R.A.
7076 expressly provides that should an ancestral land be declared as a people’s small-scale mining
area, the members of the indigenous peoples living within said area shall be given priority in the
awarding of small-scale mining contracts.152 R.A. 7942 declares that no ancestral land shall be
opened for mining operations without the prior consent of the indigenous cultural community
concerned153 and in the event that the members of such indigenous cultural community give their
consent to mining operations within their ancestral land, royalties shall be paid to them by the parties
to the mining to the contract.154
In any case, a careful reading of Section 7(b) would reveal that the rights given to the indigenous
peoples are duly circumscribed. These rights are limited only to the following: "to manage and
conserve natural resources within territories and uphold it for future generations; to benefit and
share the profits from allocation and utilization of the natural resources found therein; to negotiate
the terms and conditions for the exploration of natural resources in the areas for the purpose of
ensuring ecological, environmental protection and the conservation measures, pursuant to national
and customary laws; to an informed and intelligent participation in the formulation and
implementation of any project, government or private, that will affect or impact upon the ancestral
domains and to receive just and fair compensation for any damages which they may sustain as a result
of the project, and the right to effective measures by the government to prevent any interference
with, alienation and encroachment of these rights."
It must be noted that the right to negotiate terms and conditions granted under Section 7(b) pertains
only to the exploration of natural resources. The term "exploration" refers only to the search or
prospecting of mineral resources, or any other means for the purpose of determining the existence
and the feasibility of mining them for profit.155 The exploration, which is merely a preliminary
activity, cannot be equated with the entire process of "exploration, development and utilization" of
natural resources which under the Constitution belong to the State.
Section 57, on the other hand, grants the indigenous peoples "priority rights" in the utilization of
natural resources and not absolute ownership thereof. Priority rights does not mean exclusive rights.
What is granted is merely the right of preference or first consideration in the award of privileges
provided by existing laws and regulations, with due regard to the needs and welfare of indigenous
peoples living in the area.
There is nothing in the assailed law which implies an automatic or mechanical character in the grant
of concessions. Nor does the law negate the exercise of sound discretion by government entities.
Several factors still have to be considered. For example, the extent and nature of utilization and the
consequent impact on the environment and on the indigenous peoples’ way of life are important
41
considerations. Moreover, the indigenous peoples must show that they live in the area and that they
are in the best position to undertake the required utilization.
It must be emphasized that the grant of said priority rights to indigenous peoples is not a blanket
authority to disregard pertinent laws and regulations. The utilization of said natural resources is
always subject to compliance by the indigenous peoples with existing laws, such as R.A. 7076 and R.A.
7942 since it is not they but the State, which owns these resources.
It also bears stressing that the grant of priority rights does not preclude the State from undertaking
activities, or entering into co-production, joint venture or production-sharing agreements with
private entities, to utilize the natural resources which may be located within the ancestral domains.
There is no intention, as between the State and the indigenous peoples, to create a hierarchy of
values; rather, the object is to balance the interests of the State for national development and those
of the indigenous peoples.
Neither does the grant of priority rights to the indigenous peoples exclude non-indigenous peoples
from undertaking the same activities within the ancestral domains upon authority granted by the
proper governmental agency. To do so would unduly limit the ownership rights of the State over the
natural resources.
To be sure, the act of the State of giving preferential right to a particular sector in the utilization of
natural resources is nothing new. As previously mentioned, Section 7, Article XIII of the Constitution
mandates the protection by the State of "the rights of subsistence fishermen, especially of local
communities, to the preferential use of communal marine and fishing resources, both inland and
offshore."
Section 57 further recognizes the possibility that the exploration and exploitation of natural resources
within the ancestral domains may disrupt the natural environment as well as the traditional activities
of the indigenous peoples therein. Hence, the need for the prior informed consent of the indigenous
peoples before any search for or utilization of the natural resources within their ancestral domains is
undertaken.
In a situation where the State intends to directly or indirectly undertake such activities, IPRA requires
that the prior informed consent of the indigenous peoples be obtained. The State must, as a matter
of policy and law, consult the indigenous peoples in accordance with the intent of the framers of the
Constitution that national development policies and programs should involve a systematic
consultation to balance local needs as well as national plans. As may be gathered from the discussion
of the framers of the Constitution on this point, the national plan presumably takes into account the
requirements of the region after thorough consultation.156 To this end, IPRA grants to the indigenous
peoples the right to an informed and intelligent participation in the formulation and implementation
of any project, government or private, and the right not to be removed therefrom without their free
and prior informed consent.157 As to non-members, the prior informed consent takes the form of a
formal and written agreement between the indigenous peoples and non-members under the proviso
in Section 57 in case the State enters into a co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing
agreement with Filipino citizens, or corporations. This requirement is not peculiar to IPRA. Existing
laws and regulations such as the Philippine Environmental Policy,158 the Environmental Impact
System,159 the Local Government Code160 and the Philippine Mining Act of 1995161already require
increased consultation and participation of stakeholders, such as indigenous peoples, in the planning
of activities with significant environment impact.
The requirement in Section 59 that prior written informed consent of the indigenous peoples must
be procured before the NCIP can issue a certification for the "issuance, renewal, or grant of any
concession, license or lease, or to the perfection of any production-sharing agreement," must be
interpreted, not as a grant of the power to control the exploration, development and utilization of
natural resources, but merely the imposition of an additional requirement for such concession or
agreement. The clear intent of the law is to protect the rights and interests of the indigenous peoples
which may be adversely affected by the operation of such entities or licensees.
Corollary Issues
A. IPRA does not violate the Due Process clause.
The first corollary issue raised by petitioners is whether IPRA violates Section 1, Article III of the
Constitution, which provides that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, nor shall any person be deprived the equal protection of the laws."
Petitioners maintain that the broad definition of ancestral lands and ancestral domains under Section
3(a) and 3(b) of IPRA includes private lands. They argue that the inclusion of private lands in the
ancestral lands and ancestral domains violates the due process clause.162 Petitioners’ contention is
erroneous.
Sections 3(a) and 3(b) expressly provide that the definition of ancestral lands and ancestral domains
are "subject to Section 56," which reads:
Sec. 56. Existing Property Rights Regimes. – Property rights within the ancestral domains already
existing and/or vested upon effectivity of this Act, shall be recognized and protected.
Petitioners, however, contend that Section 56 aims to protect only the vested rights of indigenous
peoples, but not those who are not members of such communities. Following their interpretation,
IPRA, under Section 56, recognizes the rights of indigenous peoples to their ancestral lands and
ancestral domains, subject to the vested rights of the same communities to such ancestral lands and
ancestral domains. Such interpretation is obviously incorrect.
42

The "property rights" referred to in Section 56 belong to those acquired by individuals, whether
indigenous or non-indigenous peoples. Said provision makes no distinction as to the ethnic origins of
the ownership of these "property rights." The IPRA thus recognizes and respects "vested rights"
regardless of whether they pertain to indigenous or non-indigenous peoples. Where the law does not
distinguish, the courts should not distinguish.163 What IPRA only requires is that these "property
rights" already exist and/or vested upon its effectivity.
Further, by the enactment of IPRA, Congress did not purport to annul any and all Torrens titles within
areas claimed as ancestral lands or ancestral domains. The statute imposes strict procedural
requirements for the proper delineation of ancestral lands and ancestral domains as safeguards
against the fraudulent deprivation of any landowner of his land, whether or not he is member of an
indigenous cultural community. In all proceedings for delineation of ancestral lands and ancestral
domains, the Director of Lands shall appear to represent the interest of the Republic of the
Philippines.164 With regard to ancestral domains, the following procedure is mandatory: first,
petition by an indigenous cultural community, or motu proprio by the NCIP; second, investigation and
census by the Ancestral domains Office ("ADO") of the NCIP; third, preliminary report by the ADO;
fourth, posting and publication; and lastly, evaluation by the NCIP upon submission of the final report
of the ADO.165 With regard to ancestral lands, unless such lands are within an ancestral domain, the
statute imposes the following procedural requirements: first, application; second, posting and
publication; third, investigation and inspection by the ADO; fourth, delineation; lastly, evaluation by
the NCIP upon submission of a report by the ADO.166 Hence, we cannot sustain the arguments of the
petitioners that the law affords no protection to those who are not indigenous peoples.
Neither do the questioned sections of IPRA on the composition and powers and jurisdiction of the
NCIP167 and the application of customary law,168 violate the due process clause of the Constitution.
Petitioners point out that IPRA provides that the NCIP shall be composed exclusively of members of
indigenous peoples,169 and that the NCIP shall have jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving
indigenous peoples,170 including even disputes between a member of such communities and one
who is not a member, as well as over disputes in the delineation of ancestral domains.171 Petitioners
clarify that they do not claim that the members of the NCIP are incapable of being fair and impartial
judges. They merely contend that the NCIP will not appear to be impartial, because a party who is not
a member of an indigenous cultural community "who must defend his case against [one who is]
before judges who are all members of [indigenous peoples] cannot but harbor a suspicion that they
do not have the cold neutrality of an impartial judge."172
In addition, petitioners claim that IPRA prescribes that customary laws shall be applied first in disputes
involving property, succession and land,173 and that such laws shall likewise be used in disputes
involving indigenous peoples.174 They assert that "[w]hen the dispute involves a member of an
[indigenous cultural community and another who is not], a resolution of such a dispute based on
customary laws. . . would clearly be a denial of due process. . . [because those who are not indigenous
peoples] do not know what these customary laws are."175
Petitioners’ concerns are unfounded. The fact that the NCIP is composed of members of the
indigenous peoples does not mean that it (the NCIP) is incapable, or will appear to be so incapable,
of delivering justice to the non-indigenous peoples. A person’s possession of the trait of impartiality
desirable of a judge has nothing to do with his or her ethnic roots. In this wise, the indigenous peoples
are as capable of rendering justice as the non-indigenous peoples for, certainly, the latter have no
monopoly of the concept of justice.
In any case, there are sufficient checks in the law against any abuse by the NCIP of its quasi-judicial
powers. Section 67 states that the decision of the NCIP shall be appealable to the Court of Appeals by
petition for review. The regular remedies under our rules of procedure are likewise available to any
party aggrieved by the decision of the NCIP.
Anent the use of customary laws in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domains,
suffice it to say that such is allowed under paragraph 2, Section 5 of Article XII of the Constitution.
Said provision states, "The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws governing
property rights and relations in determining the ownership and extent of the ancestral domains."
Notably, the use of customary laws under IPRA is not absolute, for the law speaks merely of primacy
of use.176 The IPRA prescribes the application of such customary laws where these present a
workable solution acceptable to the parties, who are members of the same indigenous group. This
interpretation is supported by Section 1, Rule IX of the Implementing Rules which states:
RULE IX. JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURES FOR ENFORCEMENT OF RIGHTS
Section 1. Primacy of Customary Law. All conflicts related to ancestral domains and lands, involving
ICCs/IPs, such as but not limited to conflicting claims and boundary disputes, shall be resolved by the
concerned parties through the application of customary laws in the area where the disputed ancestral
domain or land is located.
All conflicts related to the ancestral domains or lands where one of the parties is a non-ICC/IP or
where the dispute could not be resolved through customary law shall be heard and adjudicated in
accordance with the Rules on Pleadings, Practice and Procedures Before the NCIP to be adopted
hereafter. (Emphasis supplied.)
The application of customary law is limited to disputes concerning property rights or relations in
determining the ownership and extent of the ancestral domains,177 where all the parties involved
are members of indigenous peoples,178 specifically, of the same indigenous group. It therefore
follows that when one of the parties to a dispute is a non-member of an indigenous group, or when
43
the indigenous peoples involved belong to different groups, the application of customary law is not
required.
Like any other law, the objective of IPRA in prescribing the primacy of customary law in disputes
concerning ancestral lands and domains where all parties involved are indigenous peoples is justice.
The utilization of customary laws is in line with the constitutional policy of recognizing the application
thereof through legislation passed by Congress.
Furthermore, the recognition and use of customary law is not a novel idea in this jurisdiction. Under
the Civil Code, use of customary law is sanctioned, as long as it is proved as a fact according to the
rules of evidence,179 and it is not contrary to law, public order or public policy.180 Moreover, the
Local Government Code of 1991 calls for the recognition and application of customary laws to the
resolution of issues involving members of indigenous peoples. This law admits the operation of
customary laws in the settling of disputes if such are ordinarily used in barangays where majority of
the inhabitants are members of indigenous peoples.181
B. Section 1, Part II, Rule VII of the Implementing Rules of IPRA does not infringe upon the President’s
power of control over the Executive Department.
The second corollary issue is whether the Implementing Rules of IPRA violate Section 17, Article VII
of the Constitution, which provides that:
The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall
ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
The assailed provision of the Implementing Rules provides:
Rule VII. The National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP)
xxx
Part II: NCIP as an Independent Agency Under the Office of the President
Section 1. The NCIP is the primary agency of government for the formulation and implementation of
policies, plans and programs to recognize, promote and protect the rights and well-being of
indigenous peoples. It shall be an independent agency under the Office of the President. As such, the
administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President is characterized as a lateral but
autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and program coordination. This relationship shall be
carried out through a system of periodic reporting. Matters of day-to-day administration or all those
pertaining to internal operations shall be left to the discretion of the Chairperson of the Commission,
as the Chief Executive Officer.
Petitioners asseverate that the aforecited rule infringes upon the power of control of the President
over the NCIP by characterizing the relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President as "lateral
but autonomous...for purposes of policy and program coordination."
Although both Section 40 of the IPRA and Section 1, Part II, Rule VII of the Implementing Rules
characterize the NCIP as an independent agency under the Office of the President, such
characterization does not remove said body from the President’s control and supervision.
The NCIP has been designated under IPRA as the primary government agency responsible for the
formulation and implementation of policies, plans and programs to promote and protect the rights
and well being of the indigenous peoples and the recognition of their ancestral domain as well as
their rights thereto.182 It has been granted administrative,183 quasi-legislative184 and quasi-judicial
powers185 to carry out its mandate. The diverse nature of the NCIP’s functions renders it impossible
to place said agency entirely under the control of only one branch of government and this, apparently,
is the reason for its characterization by Congress as an independent agency. An "independent agency"
is defined as an administrative body independent of the executive branch or one not subject to a
superior head of department, as distinguished from a "subordinate agency" or an administrative body
whose action is subject to administrative review or revision.186
That Congress did not intend to place the NCIP under the control of the President in all instances is
evident in the IPRA itself, which provides that the decisions of the NCIP in the exercise of its quasi-
judicial functions shall be appealable to the Court of Appeals,187 like those of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Nevertheless, the
NCIP, although independent to a certain degree, was placed by Congress "under the office of the
President" and, as such, is still subject to the President’s power of control and supervision granted
under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution188 with respect to its performance of administrative
functions, such as the following: (1) the NCIP must secure the President’s approval in obtaining loans
to finance its projects;189 (2) it must obtain the President’s approval for any negotiation for funds
and for the acceptance of gifts and/or properties in whatever from and from whatever source;190 (3)
the NCIP shall submit annual reports of its operations and achievements to the President, and advise
the latter on all matters relating to the indigenous peoples;191 and (4) it shall exercise such other
powers as may be directed by the President.192 The President is also given the power to appoint the
Commissioners of the NCIP193 as well as to remove them from office for cause motu proprio or upon
the recommendation of any indigenous community.194
To recapitulate:
(1) The provisions of the IPRA (specifically Sections 3, paragraphs (a) and (b), 5, 6, 7, and 8) affirming
the ownership by the indigenous peoples of their ancestral lands and domains by virtue of native title
do not diminish the State’s ownership of lands of the public domain, because said ancestral lands and
44
domains are considered as private land, and never to have been part of the public domain, following
the doctrine laid down in Cariño vs. Insular Government;195
(2) The constitutional provision vesting ownership over minerals, mineral lands and other natural
resources in the State is not violated by Sections 3, 5, 7, 56, 57, 58 and 59 of the IPRA which grant
certain rights to the indigenous peoples over the natural resources found within the ancestral
domains, e.g., to benefit from and share in the profits from the allocation and utilization of the same,
as well as priority rights in the harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation thereof. The State
retains full control over the exploration, development and utilization of natural resources even with
the grant of said rights to the indigenous peoples, through the imposition of requirements and
conditions for the utilization of natural resources under existing laws, such as the Small-Scale Mining
Act of 1991196and the Philippine Mining Act of 1995.197 Moreover, the rights granted to indigenous
peoples for the utilization of natural resources within their ancestral domains merely amplify what
has been earlier granted to them under the aforesaid laws;
(3) While the IPRA recognizes the rights of indigenous peoples with regard to their ancestral lands
and domains, it also protects the vested rights of persons, whether indigenous or non-indigenous
peoples, who may have acquired rights of ownership lands or rights to explore and exploit natural
resources within the ancestral lands and domains;198
(4) The Due Process Clause of the Constitution is not violated by the provisions (Sections 40, 51-54,
62, 63, 65 and 66) of the IPRA which, among others, establish the composition of the NCIP, and
prescribe the application of customary law in certain disputes involving indigenous peoples. The fact
the NCIP is composed wholly of indigenous peoples does not mean that it is incapable of being
impartial. Moreover, the use of customary laws is sanctioned by paragraph 2, Section 5 of Article XII
of the Constitution; and
(5) The provision of the Implementing Rules characterizing the NCIP as an independent agency under
the Office of the President does not infringe upon the President’s power of control under Section 17,
Article VII of the Constitution, since said provision as well as Section 40 of the IPRA expressly places
the NCIP under the Office of the President, and therefore under the President’s control and
supervision with respect to its administrative functions. However, insofar as the decisions of the NCIP
in the exercise of its quasi-judicial powers are concerned, the same are reviewable by the Court of
Appeals, like those of the NLRC and the SEC.
In view of the foregoing, I vote to DISMISS the petition.
SEPARATE OPINION
MENDOZA, J.:
This suit was instituted to determine the constitutionality of certain provisions of R.A. No. 8371,
otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act. Petitioners do not complain of any injury as a
result of the application of the statute to them. They assert a right to seek an adjudication of
constitutional questions as citizens and taxpayers, upon the plea that the questions raised are of
"transcendental importance."
The judicial power vested in this Court by Art. VIII, §1 extends only to cases and controversies for the
determination of such proceedings as are established by law for the protection or enforcement of
rights, or the prevention, redress or punishment of wrongs.1 In this case, the purpose of the suit is
not to enforce a property right of petitioners against the government and other respondents or to
demand compensation for injuries suffered by them as a result of the enforcement of the law, but
only to settle what they believe to be the doubtful character of the law in question. Any judgment
that we render in this case will thus not conclude or bind real parties in the future, when actual
litigation will bring to the Court the question of the constitutionality of such legislation. Such
judgment cannot be executed as it amounts to no more than an expression of opinion upon the
validity of the provisions of the law in question.2
I do not conceive it to be the function of this Court under Art. VIII, §1 of the Constitution to determine
in the abstract whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of the legislative and executive departments in enacting the IPRA. Our
jurisdiction is confined to cases or controversies. No one reading Art. VIII, §5 can fail to note that, in
enumerating the matters placed in the keeping of this Court, it uniformly begins with the phrase "all
cases. . . ."
The statement that the judicial power includes the duty to determine whether there has been a grave
abuse of discretion was inserted in Art. VIII, §1 not really to give the judiciary a roving commission to
right any wrong it perceives but to preclude courts from invoking the political question doctrine in
order to evade the decision of certain cases even where violations of civil liberties are alleged.
The statement is based on the ruling of the Court in Lansang v. Garcia,3 in which this Court, adopting
the submission of the Solicitor General, formulated the following test of its jurisdiction in such cases:
[J]udicial inquiry into the basis of the questioned proclamation can go no further than to satisfy the
Court not that the President’s decision is correct and that public safety was endangered by the
rebellion and justified the suspension of the writ, but that in suspending the writ, the President did
not act arbitrarily.
That is why Art. VII, §18 now confers on any citizen standing to question the proclamation of martial
law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. It is noteworthy that Chief Justice
Roberto Concepcion, who chaired the Committee on the Judiciary of the Constitutional Commission,
was the author of the opinions of the Court in Lopez v. Roxas and Lansang v. Garcia.
45

Indeed, the judicial power cannot be extended to matters which do not involve actual cases or
controversies without upsetting the balance of power among the three branches of the government
and erecting, as it were, the judiciary, particularly the Supreme Court, as a third branch of Congress,
with power not only to invalidate statutes but even to rewrite them. Yet that is exactly what we would
be permitting in this case were we to assume jurisdiction and decide wholesale the constitutional
validity of the IPRA contrary to the established rule that a party can question the validity of a statute
only if, as applied to him, it is unconstitutional. Here the IPRA is sought to be declared void on its face.
The only instance where a facial challenge to a statute is allowed is when it operates in the area of
freedom of expression. In such instance, the overbreadth doctrine permits a party to challenge the
validity of a statute even though as applied to him it is not unconstitutional but it might be if applied
to others not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected. Invalidation of the
statute "on its face" rather than "as applied" is permitted in the interest of preventing a "chilling"
effect on freedom of expression. But in other cases, even if it is found that a provision of a statute is
unconstitutional, courts will decree only partial invalidity unless the invalid portion is so far
inseparable from the rest of the statute that a declaration of partial invalidity is not possible.
For the Court to exercise its power of review when there is no case or controversy is not only to act
without jurisdiction but also to run the risk that, in adjudicating abstract or hypothetical questions,
its decision will be based on speculation rather than experience. Deprived of the opportunity to
observe the impact of the law, the Court is likely to equate questions of constitutionality with
questions of wisdom and is thus likely to intrude into the domain of legislation. Constitutional
adjudication, it cannot be too often repeated, cannot take place in a vacuum.
Some of the brethren contend that not deciding the constitutional issues raised by petitioners will be
a "galling cop out"4 or an "advocacy of timidity, let alone isolationism."5 To decline the exercise of
jurisdiction in this case is no more a "cop out" or a sign of "timidity" than it was for Chief Justice
Marshall in Marbury v. Madison6 to hold that petitioner had the right to the issuance of his
commission as justice of the peace of the District of Columbia only to declare in the end that after all
mandamus did not lie, because §13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which conferred original jurisdiction
on the United States Supreme Court to issue the writ of mandamus, was unconstitutional as the
court’s jurisdiction is mainly appellate.
Today Marbury v. Madison is remembered for the institution of the power of judicial review, and so
that there can be no doubt of this power of our Court, we in this country have enshrined its principle
in Art. VIII, §1. Now, the exercise of judicial review can result either in the invalidation of an act of
Congress or in upholding it. Hence, the checking and legitimating functions of judicial review so well
mentioned in the decisions7 of this Court.
To decline, therefore, the exercise of jurisdiction where there is no genuine controversy is not to show
timidity but respect for the judgment of a coequal department of government whose acts, unless
shown to be clearly repugnant to the fundamental law, are presumed to be valid. The polestar of
constitutional adjudication was set forth by Justice Laurel in the Angara case when he said that "this
power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full
opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or
the very lis mota, presented."8 For the exercise of this power is legitimate only in the last resort, and
as a necessity in the determination of real, earnest, and vital controversy between individuals.9 Until,
therefore, an actual case is brought to test the constitutionality of the IPRA, the presumption of
constitutionality, which inheres in every statute, must be accorded to it.
Justice Kapunan, on the other hand, cites the statement in Severino v. Governor General,10 reiterated
in Tanada v. Tuvera,11 that "when the question is one of public right and the object of mandamus to
procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest, and
the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal
or special interest in the result, it being sufficient that he is a citizen and as such is interested in the
execution of the laws." On the basis of this statement, he argues that petitioners have standing to
bring these proceedings.12
In Severino v. Governor General,13 the question was whether mandamus lay to compel the Governor
General to call a special election on the ground that it was his duty to do so. The ruling was that he
did not have such a duty. On the other hand, although mandamus was issued in Tanada v. Tuvera, it
was clear that petitioners had standing to bring the suit, because the public has a right to know and
the failure of respondents to publish all decrees and other presidential issuances in the Official
Gazette placed petitioners in danger of violating those decrees and issuances. But, in this case, what
public right is there for petitioners to enforce when the IPRA does not apply to them except in general
and in common with other citizens.
For the foregoing reasons I vote to dismiss the petition in this case.
SEPARATE OPINION
(Concurring and Dissenting)
PANGANIBAN, J.:
I concur with the draft ponencia of Mr. Justice Santiago M. Kapunan in its well-crafted handling of the
procedural or preliminary issues. In particular, I agree that petitioners have shown an actual case or
controversy involving at least two constitutional questions of transcendental importance,1 which
deserve judicious disposition on the merits directly by the highest court of the land.2 Further, I am
satisfied that the various aspects of this controversy have been fully presented and impressively
argued by the parties. Moreover, prohibition and mandamus are proper legal remedies3 to address
46
the problems raised by petitioners. In any event, this Court has given due course to the Petition, heard
oral arguments and required the submission of memoranda. Indeed, it would then be a galling copout
for us to dismiss it on mere technical or procedural grounds.
Protection of Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Must Be Within the Constitutional Framework
With due respect, however, I dissent from the ponencia’s resolution of the two main substantive
issues, which constitute the core of this case. Specifically, I submit that Republic Act (RA) No. 8371,
otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act (IPRA) of 1997, violates and contravenes the
Constitution of the Philippines insofar as -
1. It recognizes or, worse, grants rights of ownership over "lands of the public domain, waters, x x x
and other natural resources" which, under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, "are owned by
the State" and "shall not be alienated." I respectfully reject the contention that "ancestral lands and
ancestral domains are not public lands and have never been owned by the State." Such sweeping
statement places substantial portions of Philippine territory outside the scope of the Philippine
Constitution and beyond the collective reach of the Filipino people. As will be discussed later, these
real properties constitute a third of the entire Philippine territory; and the resources, 80 percent of
the nation's natural wealth.
2. It defeats, dilutes or lessens the authority of the State to oversee the "exploration, development,
and utilization of natural resources," which the Constitution expressly requires to "be under the full
control and supervision of the State."
True, our fundamental law mandates the protection of the indigenous cultural communities’ right to
their ancestral lands, but such mandate is "subject to the provisions of this Constitution."4 I concede
that indigenous cultural communities and indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs) may be accorded preferential
rights to the beneficial use of public domains, as well as priority in the exploration, development and
utilization of natural resources. Such privileges, however, must be subject to the fundamental law.
Consistent with the social justice principle of giving more in law to those who have less in life,
Congress in its wisdom may grant preferences and prerogatives to our marginalized brothers and
sisters, subject to the irreducible caveat that the Constitution must be respected. I personally believe
in according every benefit to the poor, the oppressed and the disadvantaged, in order to empower
them to equally enjoy the blessings of nationhood. I cannot, however, agree to legitimize perpetual
inequality of access to the nation's wealth or to stamp the Court's imprimatur on a law that offends
and degrades the repository of the very authority of this Court - the Constitution of the Philippines.
The Constitution Is a Compact
My basic premise is that the Constitution is the fundamental law of the land, to which all other laws
must conform.5 It is the people's quintessential act of sovereignty, embodying the principles upon
which the State and the government are founded.6 Having the status of a supreme and all-
encompassing law, it speaks for all the people all the time, not just for the majority or for the minority
at intermittent times. Every constitution is a compact made by and among the citizens of a State to
govern themselves in a certain manner.7 Truly, the Philippine Constitution is a solemn covenant made
by all the Filipinos to govern themselves. No group, however blessed, and no sector, however
distressed, is exempt from its compass.
RA 8371, which defines the rights of indigenous cultural communities and indigenous peoples,
admittedly professes a laudable intent. It was primarily enacted pursuant to the state policy enshrined
in our Constitution to "recognize and promote the rights of indigenous cultural communities within
the framework of national unity and development."8 Though laudable and well-meaning, this statute,
however, has provisions that run directly afoul of our fundamental law from which it claims origin and
authority. More specifically, Sections 3(a) and (b), 5, 6, 7(a) and (b), 8 and other related provisions
contravene the Regalian Doctrine - the basic foundation of the State's property regime.
Public Domains and Natural Resources Are Owned by the State and Cannot Be Alienated or Ceded
Jura regalia was introduced into our political system upon the "discovery" and the "conquest" of our
country in the sixteenth century. Under this concept, the entire earthly territory known as the
Philippine Islands was acquired and held by the Crown of Spain. The King, as then head of State, had
the supreme power or exclusive dominion over all our lands, waters, minerals and other natural
resources. By royal decrees, though, private ownership of real property was recognized upon the
showing of (1) a title deed; or (2) ancient possession in the concept of owner, according to which a
title could be obtained by prescription.9 Refusal to abide by the system and its implementing laws
meant the abandonment or waiver of ownership claims.
By virtue of the 1898 Treaty of Paris, the Philippine archipelago was ceded to the United States. The
latter assumed administration of the Philippines and succeeded to the property rights of the Spanish
Crown. But under the Philippine Bill of 1902, the US Government allowed and granted patents to
Filipino and US citizens for the "free and open x x x exploration, occupation and purchase [of mines]
and the land in which they are found."10 To a certain extent, private individuals were entitled to own,
exploit and dispose of mineral resources and other rights arising from mining patents.
This US policy was, however, rejected by the Philippine Commonwealth in 1935 when it crafted and
ratified our first Constitution. Instead, the said Constitution embodied the Regalian Doctrine, which
more definitively declared as belonging to the State all lands of the public domain, waters, minerals
and other natural resources.11 Although respecting mining patentees under the Philippine Bill of
1902, it restricted the further exploration, development and utilization of natural resources, both as
to who might be entitled to undertake such activities and for how long. The pertinent provision reads:
47

"SECTION 1 [Art. XIII]. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters,
minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural
resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or
utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty
per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease,
or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution.
Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and license,
concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural resources
shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five years,
except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the
grant."
The concept was carried over in the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions. Hence, Sections 8 and 9, Article
XIV of the 1973 Constitution, state:
"SEC. 8. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, wildlife, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to
the State. With the exception of agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, and resettlement
lands of the public domain, natural resources shall not be alienated and no license, concession, or
lease for the exploration, development, exploitation, utilization of any of the natural resources shall
be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years,
except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the
grant.
SEC. 9. The disposition, exploration, development, exploitation, or utilization of any of the natural
resources of the Philippines shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens. The National
Assembly, in the national interest, may allow such citizens, corporations, or associations to enter into
service contracts for financial, technical, management, or other forms of assistance with any foreign
person or entity for the exploration, development, exploitation, or utilization of any of the natural
resources. Existing valid and binding service contracts for financial, technical, management, or other
forms of assistance are hereby recognized as such."
Similarly, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, provides:
"SEC. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural
resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources
shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be
under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities,
or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino
citizen, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such
citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not
more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In
cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.
"The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and
exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.
"The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as
well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fish workers in rivers,
lakes, bays and lagoons.
"The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical
or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals,
petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law,
based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such
agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local scientific and technical
resources.
"The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this
provision, within thirty days from its execution."
The adoption of the Regalian Doctrine by the Philippine Commonwealth was initially impelled by the
desire to preserve the nation's wealth in the hands of the Filipinos themselves. Nationalism was
fervent at the time, and our constitutional framers decided to embody the doctrine in our
fundamental law. Charging the State with the conservation of the national patrimony was deemed
necessary for Filipino posterity. The arguments in support of the provision are encapsulated by
Aruego as follows: "[T]he natural resources, particularly the mineral resources which constituted a
great source of wealth, belonged not only to the generation then but also to the succeeding
generation and consequently should be conserved for them."12
Thus, after expressly declaring that all lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, all forces of
energy and other natural resources belonged to the Philippine State, the Commonwealth absolutely
prohibited the alienation of these natural resources. Their disposition, exploitation, development and
utilization were further restricted only to Filipino citizens and entities that were 60 percent Filipino-
owned. The present Constitution even goes further by declaring that such activities "shall be under
the full control and supervision of the State." Additionally, it enumerates land classifications and
48
expressly states that only agricultural lands of the public domain shall be alienable. We quote below
the relevant provision:13
"SEC. 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and
national parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further classified by law according to
the uses to which they may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to
agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public
domain except by lease, for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than
twenty-five years, and not to exceed one thousand hectares in area. x x x."
Mr. Justice Kapunan upholds private respondents and intervenors in their claim that all ancestral
domains and lands are outside the coverage of public domain; and that these properties - including
forests, bodies of water, minerals and parks found therein - are private and have never been part of
the public domain, because they have belonged to the indigenous people’s ancestors since time
immemorial.
I submit, however, that all Filipinos, whether indigenous or not, are subject to the Constitution.
Indeed, no one is exempt from its all-encompassing provisions. Unlike the 1935 Charter, which was
subject to "any existing right, grant, lease or concession," the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions spoke
in absolute terms. Because of the State’s implementation of policies considered to be for the common
good, all those concerned have to give up, under certain conditions, even vested rights of ownership.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals,14 this Court said that once minerals are found even in private land,
the State may intervene to enable it to extract the minerals in the exercise of its sovereign
prerogative. The land is converted into mineral land and may not be used by any private person,
including the registered owner, for any other purpose that would impede the mining operations. Such
owner would be entitled to just compensation for the loss sustained.
In Atok Big-Wedge Mining Company v. IAC,15 the Court clarified that while mining claim holders and
patentees have the exclusive right to the possession and enjoyment of the located claim, their rights
are not absolute or strictly one of ownership. Thus, failure to comply with the requirements of
pertinent mining laws was deemed an abandonment or a waiver of the claim.
Verily, as petitioners undauntedly point out, four hundred years of Philippine political history cannot
be set aside or ignored by IPRA, however well-intentioned it may be. The perceived lack of
understanding of the cultural minorities cannot be remedied by conceding the nation’s resources to
their exclusive advantage. They cannot be more privileged simply because they have chosen to ignore
state laws. For having chosen not to be enfolded by statutes on perfecting land titles, ICCs/IPs cannot
now maintain their ownership of lands and domains by insisting on their concept of "native title"
thereto. It would be plain injustice to the majority of Filipinos who have abided by the law and,
consequently, deserve equal opportunity to enjoy the country’s resources.
Respondent NCIP claims that IPRA does not violate the Constitution, because it does not grant
ownership of public domains and natural resources to ICCs/IPs. "Rather, it recognizes and mandates
respect for the rights of indigenous peoples over their ancestral lands and domains that had never
been lands of the public domain."16 I say, however, that such claim finds no legal support. Nowhere
in the Constitution is there a provision that exempts such lands and domains from its coverage. Quite
the contrary, it declares that all lands of the public domain and natural resources "are owned by the
State"; and "with the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be
alienated."
As early as Oh Cho v. Director of Lands,17 the Court declared as belonging to the public domain all
lands not acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant under laws, orders or decrees
promulgated by the Spanish government; or by possessory information under Act 496 (Mortgage
Law).
On the other hand, Intervenors Flavier et al.18 differentiate the concept of ownership of ICCs/IPs
from that which is defined in Articles 427 and 428 of the Civil Code. They maintain that "[t]here are
variations among ethnolinguistic groups in the Cordillera, but a fair synthesis of these refers to ‘x x x
the tribal right to use the land or to territorial control x x x, a collective right to freely use the particular
territory x x x [in] the concept of trusteeship.'"
In other words, the "owner" is not an individual. Rather, it is a tribal community that preserves the
property for the common but nonetheless exclusive and perpetual benefit of its members, without
the attributes of alienation or disposition. This concept, however, still perpetually withdraws such
property from the control of the State and from its enjoyment by other citizens of the Republic. The
perpetual and exclusive character of private respondents’ claims simply makes them repugnant to
basic fairness and equality.
Private respondents and intervenors trace their "ownership" of ancestral domains and lands to the
pre-Spanish conquest. I should say that, at the time, their claims to such lands and domains was
limited to the surfaces thereof since their ancestors were agriculture-based. This must be the
continuing scope of the indigenous groups’ ownership claims: limited to land, excluding the natural
resources found within.
In any event, if all that the ICCs/IPs demand is preferential use - not ownership - of ancestral domains,
then I have no disagreement. Indeed, consistent with the Constitution is IPRA’s Section 5719- without
the too-broad definitions under Section 3 (a) and (b) - insofar as it grants them priority rights in
harvesting, extracting, developing or exploiting natural resources within ancestral domains.
The concerted effort to malign the Regalian Doctrine as a vestige of the colonial past must fail. Our
Constitution vests the ownership of natural resources, not in colonial masters, but in all the Filipino
49
people. As the protector of the Constitution, this Court has the sworn duty to uphold the tenets of
that Constitution - not to dilute, circumvent or create exceptions to them.
Cariño v. Insular Government Was Modified by the Constitution
In this connection, I submit that Cariño v. Insular Government20 has been modified or superseded by
our 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Its ratio should be understood as referring only to a means
by which public agricultural land may be acquired by citizens. I must also stress that the claim of
Petitioner Cariño refers to land ownership only, not to the natural resources underneath or to the
aerial and cosmic space above.
Significantly, in Director of Land Management v. Court of Appeals,21 a Decision handed down after
our three Constitutions had taken effect, the Court rejected a cultural minority member's registration
of land under CA 141, Section 48 (c).22 The reason was that the property fell within the Central
Cordillera Forest Reserve. This Court quoted with favor the solicitor general’s following statements:
"3. The construction given by respondent Court of Appeals to the particular provision of law involved,
as to include even forest reserves as susceptible to private appropriation, is to unconstitutionally
apply such provision. For, both the 1973 and present Constitutions do not include timber or forest
lands as alienable. Thus, Section 8, Article XIV of 1973 Constitution states that ‘with the exception of
agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential and resettlement lands of the public domain, natural
resources shall not be alienated.’ The new Constitution, in its Article XII, Section 2, also expressly
states that ‘with the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be
alienated’."
Just recently, in Gordula v. Court of Appeals,23 the Court also stated that "forest land is incapable of
registration, and its inclusion in a title nullifies that title. To be sure, the defense of indefeasiblity of a
certificate of title issued pursuant to a free patent does not lie against the state in an action for
reversion of the land covered thereby when such land is a part of a public forest or of a forest
reservation, the patent covering forest land being void ab initio."
RA 8371 Violates the Inalienability of Natural Resources and of Public Domains
The ponencia theorizes that RA 8371 does not grant to ICCs/IPs ownership of the natural resources
found within ancestral domains. However, a simple reading of the very wordings of the law belies this
statement.
Section 3 (a)24 defines and delineates ancestral domains as "all areas generally belonging to ICCs/IPs
comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein, held under a claim of
ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs, by themselves or through their ancestors, communally
or individually since time immemorial, continuously to the present except when interrupted by war,
force majeure or displacement x x x. It shall include ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential,
agricultural, and other lands individually owned whether alienable and disposable or otherwise,
hunting grounds x x x bodies of water, mineral and other natural resources x x x." (Emphasis ours.)
Clearly, under the above-quoted provision of IPRA, ancestral domains of ICCs/IPs encompass the
natural resources found therein. And Section 7 guarantees recognition and protection of their rights
of ownership and possession over such domains.
The indigenous concept of ownership, as defined under Section 5 of the law, "holds that ancestral
domains are the ICC’s/IP’s private but community property which belongs to all generations and
therefore cannot be sold, disposed or destroyed." Simply put, the law declares that ancestral
domains, including the natural resources found therein, are owned by ICCs/IPs and cannot be sold,
disposed or destroyed. Not only does it vest ownership, as understood under the Civil Code; it adds
perpetual exclusivity. This means that while ICCs/IPs could own vast ancestral domains, the majority
of Filipinos who are not indigenous can never own any part thereof.
On the other hand, Section 3 (b)25 of IPRA defines ancestral lands as referring to "lands occupied,
possessed and utilized by individuals, families and clans of the ICCs/IPs since time immemorial x x x,
under claims of individual or traditional group ownership, x x x including, but not limited to, residential
lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms and tree lots." Section 8 recognizes and
protects "the right of ownership and possession of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral lands." Such ownership
need not be by virtue of a certificate of title, but simply by possession since time immemorial.
I believe these statutory provisions directly contravene Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, more
specifically the declaration that the State owns all lands of the public domain, minerals and natural
resources – none of which, except agricultural lands, can be alienated. In several cases, this Court has
consistently held that non-agricultural land must first be reclassified and converted into alienable or
disposable land for agricultural purposes by a positive act of the government.26 Mere possession or
utilization thereof, however long, does not automatically convert them into private properties.27 The
presumption is that "all lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to
belong to the State. Hence, x x x all applicants in land registration proceedings have the burden of
overcoming the presumption that the land thus sought to be registered forms part of the public
domain. Unless the applicant succeeds in showing by clear and convincing evidence that the property
involved was acquired by him or his ancestors either by composition title from the Spanish
Government or by possessory information title, or any other means for the proper acquisition of
public lands, the property must be held to be part of the public domain. The applicant must present
competent and persuasive proof to substantiate his claim; he may not rely on general statements, or
mere conclusions of law other than factual evidence of possession and title."28
Respondents insist, and the ponencia agrees, that paragraphs (a) and (b) of Sections 3 are merely
definitions and should not be construed independently of the other provisions of the law. But,
50
precisely, a definition is "a statement of the meaning of a word or word group."29 It determines or
settles the nature of the thing or person defined.30 Thus, after defining a term as encompassing
several items, one cannot thereafter say that the same term should be interpreted as excluding one
or more of the enumerated items in its definition. For that would be misleading the people who would
be bound by the law. In other words, since RA 8371 defines ancestral domains as including the natural
resources found therein and further states that ICCs/IPs own these ancestral domains, then it means
that ICCs/IPs can own natural resources.
In fact, Intervenors Flavier et al. submit that everything above and below these ancestral domains,
with no specific limits, likewise belongs to ICCs/IPs. I say that this theory directly contravenes the
Constitution. Such outlandish contention further disregards international law which, by constitutional
fiat, has been adopted as part of the law of the land.31
No Land Area Limits Are Specified by RA 8371
Under Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution, Filipino citizens may acquire no more than 12 hectares
of alienable public land, whether by purchase, homestead or grant. More than that, but not exceeding
500 hectares, they may hold by lease only.
RA 8371, however, speaks of no area or term limits to ancestral lands and domains. In fact, by their
mere definitions, they could cover vast tracts of the nation's territory. The properties under the
assailed law cover everything held, occupied or possessed "by themselves or through their ancestors,
communally or individually since time immemorial." It also includes all "lands which may no longer
be exclusively occupied by [them] but from which they traditionally had access to for their subsistence
and traditional activities, particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or
shifting cultivators."
Nomadic groups have no fixed area within which they hunt or forage for food. As soon as they have
used up the resources of a certain area, they move to another place or go back to one they used to
occupy. From year to year, a growing tribe could occupy and use enormous areas, to which they could
claim to have had "traditional access." If nomadic ICCs/IPs succeed in acquiring title to their enlarging
ancestral domain or land, several thousands of hectares of land may yet be additionally delineated as
their private property.
Similarly, the Bangsa Moro people's claim to their ancestral land is not based on compounded or
consolidated title, but "on a collective stake to the right to claim what their forefathers secured for
them when they first set foot on our country."32 They trace their right to occupy what they deem to
be their ancestral land way back to their ancient sultans and datus, who had settled in many islands
that have become part of Mindanao. This long history of occupation is the basis of their claim to their
ancestral lands.33
Already, as of June 1998, over 2.5 million hectares have been claimed by various ICCs/IPs as ancestral
domains; and over 10 thousand hectares, as ancestral lands.34 Based on ethnographic surveys, the
solicitor general estimates that ancestral domains cover 80 percent of our mineral resources and
between 8 and 10 million of the 30 million hectares of land in the country.35 This means that four
fifths of its natural resources and one third of the country's land will be concentrated among 12
million Filipinos constituting 110 ICCs,36 while over 60 million other Filipinos constituting the
overwhelming majority will have to share the remaining. These figures indicate a violation of the
constitutional principle of a "more equitable distribution of opportunities, income, and wealth"
among Filipinos.
RA 8371 Abdicates the State Duty to Take Full Control and Supervision of Natural Resources
Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, further provides that "[t]he exploration, development, and
utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State." The State
may (1) directly undertake such activities; or (2) enter into co-production, joint venture or production-
sharing agreements with Filipino citizens or entities, 60 percent of whose capital is owned by
Filipinos.37 Such agreements, however, shall not exceed 25 years, renewable for the same period and
under terms and conditions as may be provided by law.
But again, RA 8371 relinquishes this constitutional power of full control in favor of ICCs/IPs, insofar as
natural resources found within their territories are concerned. Pursuant to their rights of ownership
and possession, they may develop and manage the natural resources, benefit from and share in the
profits from the allocation and the utilization thereof.38 And they may exercise such right without
any time limit, unlike non-ICCs/IPs who may do so only for a period not exceeding 25 years, renewable
for a like period.39 Consistent with the Constitution, the rights of ICCs/IPs to exploit, develop and
utilize natural resources must also be limited to such period.
In addition, ICCs/IPs are given the right to negotiate directly the terms and conditions for the
exploration of natural resources,40 a right vested by the Constitution only in the State. Congress,
through IPRA, has in effect abdicated in favor of a minority group the State's power of ownership and
full control over a substantial part of the national patrimony, in contravention of our most
fundamental law.
I make clear, however, that to the extent that ICCs/IPs may undertake small-scale utilization of natural
resources and cooperative fish farming, I absolutely have no objection. These undertakings are
certainly allowed under the third paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
Having already disposed of the two major constitutional dilemmas wrought by RA 8371 – (1)
ownership of ancestral lands and domains and the natural resources therein; and (2) the ICCs/IPs'
control of the exploration, development and utilization of such resources – I believe I should no longer
tackle the following collateral issues petitioners have brought up:
51
 the nation's substantial wealth to them, to the exclusion of other Filipino citizens who have chosen
1. Whether the inclusion of private lands within the coverage of ancestral domains amounts to undue to live and abide by our previous and present Constitutions, would be not only unjust but also
deprivation of private property subversive of the rule of law.

2. Whether ICCs/IPs may regulate the entry/exit of migrants In giving ICCs/IPs rights in derogation of our fundamental law, Congress is effectively mandating
"reverse discrimination." In seeking to improve their lot, it would be doing so at the expense of the
3. Whether ancestral domains are exempt from real property taxes, special levies and other forms of majority of the Filipino people. Such short-sighted and misplaced generosity will spread the roots of
exaction discontent and, in the long term, fan the fires of turmoil to a conflagration of national proportions.

4. Whether customary laws and traditions of ICCs/IPs should first be applied in the settlements of
disputes over their rights and claims
5. Whether the composition and the jurisdiction of the National Commission of Indigenous Peoples
(NCIP) violate the due process and equal protection clauses
6. Whether members of the ICCs/IPs may be recruited into the armed forces against their will
I believe that the first three of the above collateral issues have been rendered academic or, at least,
no longer of "transcendental importance," in view of my contention that the two major IPRA
propositions are based on unconstitutional premises. On the other hand, I think that in the case of
the last three, it is best to await specific cases filed by those whose rights may have been injured by
specific provisions of RA 8371.
Peace cannot be attained by brazenly and permanently depriving the many in order to coddle the
few, however disadvantaged they may have been. Neither can a just society be approximated by
maiming the healthy to place them at par with the injured. Nor can the nation survive by enclaving
its wealth for the exclusive benefit of favored minorities.
Rather, the law must help the powerless by enabling them to take advantage of opportunities and
privileges that are open to all and by preventing the powerful from exploiting and oppressing them.
This is the essence of social justice – empowering and enabling the poor to be able to compete with
the rich and, thus, equally enjoy the blessings of prosperity, freedom and dignity.
WHEREFORE, I vote to partially GRANT the Petition and to DECLARE as UNCONSTITUTIONAL Sections
3(a) and (b), 5, 6, 7(a) and (b), 8 and related provisions of RA 8371.

Epilogue

Section 5, Article XII of the Constitution, provides:

"SEC. 5. The State, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national development policies
and programs, shall protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands to
ensure their economic, social, and cultural well being.

"The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws governing property rights and
relations in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domain."

Clearly, there are two parameters that must be observed in the protection of the rights of ICCs/IPs:
(1) the provisions of the 1987 Constitution and (2) national development policies and programs.

Indigenous peoples may have long been marginalized in Philippine politics and society. This does not,
however, give Congress any license to accord them rights that the Constitution withholds from the
rest of the Filipino people. I would concede giving them priority in the use, the enjoyment and the
preservation of their ancestral lands and domains.41 But to grant perpetual ownership and control of

52
G.R. No. 5246 September 16, 1910
MANUELA GREY ALBA, ET AL., petitioners-appellants,
vs.
ANACLETO R. DE LA CRUZ, objector-appellee.
Ramon Salinas, for appellants.
Aniceto G. Reyes, for appellee.
TRENT, J.:
These petitioners, Manuela, Jose, Juan, and Francisco, surnamed Grey y Alba, are the only heirs of
Doña Segunda Alba Clemente and Honorato Grey, deceased. Remedios Grey y Alba, a sister of the
petitioners, was married on the 21st day of March, 1903, to Vicente Reyes and died on the 13th of
July, 1905, without leaving any heirs except her husband. The four petitioners, as coowners, sought
to have registered the following-described property:
A parcel of land situated in the barrio of Talampas, municipality of Baliuag, Province of Bulacan, upon
which are situated three houses and one camarin of light material, having a superficial area of 52
hectares, 51 ares, and 22 centares; bounded on the north by the highway (calzada) of Talampas and
the lands of Rita Ruiz Mateo; on the east by the lands of the said Rita Ruiz Mateo, Hermenegildo
Prado, Policarpo de Jesus, and a stream called Sapang Buslut; on the south by the same stream and
the lands of the capellania; and on the west by the stream called Sapang Buslut, and the lands of
Vicente de la Cruz, Jose Camacho and Domingo Ruiz Mateo.
This parcel of agricultural land is used for the raising of rice and sugar cane and is assessed at $1,000
United States currency. The petition, which was filed on the 18th of December, 1906, was
accompanied by a plan and technical description of the above-described parcel of land.
After hearing the proofs presented, the court entered, on the 12th of February, 1908, a decree in
accordance with the provisions of paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926, directing that the land
described in the petitioner be registered in the names of the four petitioners, as coowners, subject to
the usufructuary right of Vicente Reyes, widower of Remedios Grey.
On the 16th of June, 1908, Anacleto Ratilla de la Cruz filed a motion in the Court of Land Registration
asking for a revision of the case, including the decision, upon the ground that he is the absolute owner
of the two parcels of land which are described in said motion, and which, according to his allegations,
are included in the lands decreed to the petitioners. He alleged that the decree of February 12, 1908,
was obtained maliciously and fraudulently by the petitioners, thereby depriving him of said two
parcels of land. He further alleged that he was the absolute owner of the two parcels of land, having
inherited them from his father, Baldomero R. de la Cruz, who had a state grant for the same. He
therefore asked, under the provisions of section 38 of the Land Registration Act (No. 496), a revision
of the case, and that the said decree be modified so as to exclude the two parcels of land described
in said motion. The Land Court upon this motion reopened the case, and after hearing the additional
evidence presented by both parties, rendered, on the 23rd of November, 1908, its decision modifying
the former decree by excluding from the same the two parcels of land claimed by Anacleto Ratilla de
la Cruz. From this decision and judgment the petitioners appealed and now insist, first, that the trial
court erred in reopening the case and modifying its decree dated the 12th of February, 1908, for the
reason that said decree was not obtained by means of fraud; and, second, that the court erred in
holding that the two parcels of land described in the appellee's motion are not their property.
It was agreed by counsel that the two small parcels now in dispute forma part of the land described
in the petition and were included in the decree of February 12, 1908, and that the petitioners are the
owners of the remainder of the land described in the said decree.
The petitioners inherited this land from their parents, who acquired the same, including the two small
parcels in question, by purchase, as is evidenced by a public document dated the 26th of November,
1864, duly executed before Francisco Iriarte, alcalde mayor and judge of the Court of First Instance
of the Province of Bulacan.
Baldomero R. de la Cruz, father of the appellee, obtained in march, 1895, a state grant for several
parcels of land, including the two parcels in question. This grant was duly inscribed in the old register
of property in Bulacan on the 6th of April of the same year.
It is admitted that at the time the appellants presented their petition in this case the appellee was
occupying the two parcels of land now in question. It is also admitted that the name of the appellee
does not appear in the said petition as an occupant of the said two parcels. The petitioners insist that
the appellee was occupying these parcels as their tenant and for this reason they did not include his
name in their petition, as an occupant, while the appellee contends that he was occupying the said
parcels as the absolute owner under the estate grant by inheritance.
The court below held that the failure on the part of the petitioners to include the name of the appellee
in their petition, as an occupant of these two parcels of land, was a violation of section 21 of Act No.
496, and that this constituted fraud within the meaning of section 38 of said Land Registration Act.
The trial court further held that the grant from the estate should prevail over the public document of
purchase of 1864.
The mother of the petitioners died on November 15, 1881; their father died prior to that time.
Manuela, the oldest of the petitioners, was about six years of age when their mother died. So these
children were minors when the father of the appellee obtained the estate grant.
53
On the 13th of June, 1882, Jose Grey, uncle and representative of the petitioners, who were then
minors, rented the land owned by the petitioners' deceased parents to one Irineo Jose for a period of
three years. On the 23d of March, 1895, the said Jose Grey, as the representative of the petitioners,
rented the same land for a period of six years to Baldomero R. de la Cruz, father of the appellee. This
rental contract was duly executed in writing. This land was cultivated during these six years by
Baldomero R. de la Cruz and his children, one of whom is the appellee. On the 14th of December,
1905, Jose Grey, for himself and the other petitioners, rented the same land to Estanislao R. de la
Cruz for a period of two years. Estanislao de la Cruz on entering into this rental contract with Jose
Grey did so for himself and his brothers, one of whom is the appellee. While the appellee admits that
his father and brother entered into these rental contracts and did, in fact, cultivate the petitioners'
land, nevertheless he insists that the two small parcels in question were not included in these
contracts. In the rental contract between the uncle of the petitioners and he father of the appellee
the land is not described. In the rental contract between Jose Grey, one of the petitioners, and
Estanislao R. de la Cruz, brother of the appellee, the two small parcels of land in question are included,
according to the description given therein. This was found to be true by the court below, but the said
court held that as this contract was made by Estanislao R. de la Cruz it was not binding upon Anacleto
R. de la Cruz, the appellee.
The two small parcels of land in question were purchased by the parents of the petitioners in 1864,
as is evidenced by the public document of purchase and sale of that year. The same two parcels of
land are included in the state grant issued in favor of Baldomero Ratilla de la Cruz in 1895. This grant
was obtained after the death of the petitioners' parents and while they were minors. So it is clear that
the petitioners honestly believed that the appellee was occupying the said parcels as their lessee at
the time they presented their application for registration. They did not act in bad faith, nor with any
fraudulent intent, when they omitted to include in their application the name of the appellee as one
of the occupants of the land. They believed that it was not necessary nor required that they include
in their application the names of their tenants. Under these circumstances, did the court below
commit an error in reopening this case in June, 1908, after its decree had been entered in February
of the same year?
The application for the registration is to be in writing, signed and sworn to by the applicant, or by
some person duly authorized in his behalf. It is to contain an accurate description of the land. It shall
contain the name in full and the address of the applicant, and also the names and addresses of all
occupants of land and of all adjoining owners, if known; and, if not known, it shall state what search
has been made to find them. In the form of notice given by statute, which shall be sworn to, the
applicant is required to state and set forth clearly all mortgages or encumbrances affecting said land,
if any, the rights and interests, legal or equitable, in the possession, remainder, reversion, or
expectancy of all persons, with their names in full, together with their place of residence and post
office addresses. Upon receipt of the application the clerk shall cause notice of the filling to be
published twice in the Official Gazette. This published notice shall be directed to all persons appearing
to have an interest in the land sought to be registered and to the adjoining owners, and also "to all
whom it may concern." In addition to the notice in the Official Gazette the Land Court shall, within
seven days after said publication, cause a copy of the notice, in Spanish, to be mailed by the clerk to
every person named in the application whose address is known; to cause a duly attested copy of the
notice, in Spanish, to be posted in a conspicuous place on every parcel of land included in the
application, and in a conspicuous place on the chief municipal building of the town in which the land
is situated. The court may also cause other or further notice of the application to be given in such
manner and to such persons as it may deem proper. The certificate of the clerk that he has served
the notice as directed by the court by publication or mailing shall be conclusive proof of such service.
Within the time allowed in the notices, if no person appears and answers, the court may at once,
upon motion of the applicant, no reason to the contrary appearing, order a general default. By the
description in the published notice "to all whom it may concern," and by express provisions of law "all
the word are made parties defendant and shall be concluded by the default an order." If the court,
after hearing, finds that the applicant has title, as stated in his application, a decree or registration
shall be entered.
Every decree of registration shall bind the land and quiet title thereto, subject only to the exceptions
stated in the following section. It shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular
Government, and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice, or
citation, or included in the general description "to all whom it may concern." Such decree shall not be
opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by
any proceedings in any court for reversing judgments or decrees; subject, however, to the right of
any person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by decree of registration obtained by
fraud to file in the Court of Land Registration a petition for review within one year. . . . (Sec. 38 of Act
No. 496.)
The appellee is not included in any of the exceptions named in section 38 referred to above.
It will be seen that the applicant is required to mention not only the outstanding interest which he
admits but also all claims of interest, though denied by him. By express provision of law the world are
made parties defendant by the description in the notice "to all whom it may concern."
Although the appellee, occupying the two small parcels of land in question under the circumstances
as we have set forth, was not served with notice, he was made a party defendant by publication; and
the entering of a decree on the 12th of February, 1908, must be held to be conclusive against all
persons, including the appellee, whether his (appellee's) name is mentioned in the application, notice,
or citation.
The said decree of February 12, 1908, should not have been opened on account of the absence,
infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby, and could have been opened only on the
ground that the said decree had been obtained by fraud. That decree was not obtained by fraud on
the part of the applicants, inasmuch as they honestly believed that the appellee was occupying these
54
two small parcels of land as their tenant. One of the petitioner went upon the premises with the
surveyor when the original plan was made.
Proof of constructive fraud is not sufficient to authorize the Court of Land Registration to reopen a
case and modify its decree. Specific, intentional acts to deceive and deprive anther of his right, or in
some manner injure him, must be alleged and proved; that is, there must be actual or positive fraud
as distinguished from constructive fraud.
The question as to the meaning of the word "fraud" in the Australian statutes has been frequently
raised. Two distinctions have been noted by the Australian courts; the first is the distinction between
the meaning of the word "fraud" in the sections relating to the conclusive effect of certificates of title,
and its meaning in the sections relating to the protection of bona fide purchasers from registered
proprietors. The second is the distinction between "legal," "equitable," or "constructive" fraud, and
"actual" or "moral" fraud. In none of the groups of the sections of the Australian statutes relating to
the conclusive effect of certificates of title, and in which fraud is referred to, is there any express
indication of the meaning of "fraud," with the sole exception of that of the South Australian group.
(Hogg on Australian Torrens System, p. 834.)
With regard to decisions on the sections relating to the conclusive effect of certificates of title, it has
been held in some cases that the "fraud" there mentioned means actual or moral fraud, not merely
constructive or legal fraud. In other cases "fraud" has been said to include constructive, legal, and
every kind of fraud. In other cases, against, knowledge of other persons' right, and the deliberate
acquisition of registered title in the face of such knowledge, has been held to be "fraud" which
rendered voidable the certificates of title so obtained; and voluntary ignorance is, for this purpose,
the same as knowledge. But in none of these three classes of cases was there absent the element of
intention to deprive another of just rights, which constitutes the essential characteristics of actual —
as distinguished from legal-fraud. (Id., p. 835, and cases cited in notes Nos. 85, 86, 87, 88, and 89 at
bottom of pages 835 and 836.)
By "fraud" is meant actual fraud-dishonesty of some sort. (Judgment of Privy Council in Assets Co. vs.
Mere Roihi, and Assets Co. vs. Panapa Waihopi, decided in March, 1905, cited by Hogg in his
Supplementary Addendum to his work on Australian Torrens System, supra.) The same meaning
should be given to the word "fraud" used in section 38 of our statutes (Act No. 496).
The question as to whether any particular transaction shows fraud, within the meaning of the word
as used in our statutes, will in each case be a question of fact. We will not attempt to say what acts
would constitutes this kind of fraud in other cases. This must be determined from the fact an
circumstances in each particular case. The only question we are called upon to determine, and have
determined, is whether or not, under the facts and circumstances in this case, the petitioners did
obtain the decree of February 12, 1908, by means of fraud.
It might be urged that the appellee has been deprived of his property without due process of law, in
violation of section 5 of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, known as the Philippine Bill," which
provides "that no law shall be enacted in the said Islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law."
The Land Registration Act requires that all occupants be named in the petition and given notice by
registered mail. This did not do the appellee any good, as he was not notified; but he was made a
party defendant, as we have said, by means of the publication "to all whom it may concern." If this
section of the Act is to be upheld this must be declared to be due process of law.
Before examining the validity of this part of the Act it might be well to note the history and purpose
of what is known as the "Torrens Land Registration System." This system was introduced in South
Australia by Sir Robert Torrens in 1857 and was there worked out in its practicable form.
The main principle of registration is to make registered titles indefeasible. As we have said, upon the
presentation in the Court of Land Registration of an application for the registration of the title to
lands, under this system, the theory of the law is that all occupants, adjoining owners, adverse
claimants, and other interested persons are notified of the proceedings, and have have a right to
appear in opposition to such application. In other words, the proceeding is against the whole word.
This system was evidently considered by the Legislature to be a public project when it passed Act No.
496. The interest of the community at large was considered to be preferred to that of private
individuals.
At the close of this nineteenth century, all civilized nations are coming to registration of title to land,
because immovable property is becoming more and more a matter of commercial dealing, and there
can be no trade without security. (Dumas's Lectures, p. 23.)
The registered proprietor will no longer have reasons to fear that he may evicted because his vendor
had, unknown to him, already sold the and to a third person. . . The registered proprietor may feel
himself protected against any defect in his vendor's title. (Id., p. 21.)
The following summary of benefits of the system of registration of titles, made by Sir Robert Torrens,
has been fully justified in its use:
First. It has substituted security for insecurity.
Second. It has reduced the costs of conveyances from pounds to shillings, and the time occupied from
months to days.
Third. It has exchanged brevity and clearness for obscurity and verbiage.
55
Fourth. It has so simplified ordinary dealings that he who has mastered the "three R's" can transact
his own conveyancing.
Fifth. It affords protection against fraud.
Sixth. It has restored to their just value many estates held under good holding titles, but depreciated
in consequence of some blur or technical defect, and has barred the reoccurrence of any similar faults.
(Sheldon on Land Registration, pp. 75, 76.)
The boldest effort to grapple with the problem of simplification of title to land was made by Mr.
(afterwards Sir Robert) Torrens, a layman, in South Australia in 1857. . . . In the Torrens system title
by registration takes the place of "title by deeds" of the system under the "general" law. A sale of
land, for example, is effected by a registered transfer, upon which a certificate of title is issued. The
certificate is guaranteed by statute, and, with certain exceptions, constitutes indefeasible title to the
land mentioned therein. Under the old system the same sale would be effected by a conveyance,
depending for its validity, apart from intrinsic flaws, on the correctness of a long series of prior deeds,
wills, etc. . . . The object of the Torrens system, them, is to do away with the delay, uncertainty, and
expense of the old conveyancing system. (Duffy & Eagleson on The Transfer of Land Act, 1890, pp. 2,
3, 5, 7.)
By "Torrens" system generally are meant those systems of registration of transactions with interest
in land whose declared object . . . is, under governmental authority, to establish and certify to the
ownership of an absolute and indefeasible title to realty, and to simplify its transfer. (Hogg on
Australian Torrens system, supra, pp. 1, 2.)
Compensation for errors from assurance funds is provided in all countries in which the Torrens system
has been enacted. Cases of error no doubt will always occur. The percentage of errors, as compared
with the number of registered dealings in Australia, is very small. In New South Wales there were, in
1889, 209, 894 registered dealings, the average risk of error being only 2 ½ cents for each dealing. In
Queensland the risk of error was only 1 ½ cents, the number of registered dealings being 233,309. In
Tasmania and in Western Australia not a cent was paid for compensation for errors during the whole
time of operation, (Dumas's Lectures, supra, p. 96.) This system has been adopted in various countries
of the civilized world, including some of the States of the American Union, and practical experience
has demonstrated that it has been successful as a public project.
The validity of some of the provisions of the statutes adopting the Torrens system has been the
subject of judicial decision in the courts of the United States. (People vs. Chase, 165 Ill., 527; State vs.
Guilbert, 56 Ohio St., 575; People vs. Simon, 176 Ill., 165; Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass., 71.)
Act No. 496 of the Philippine Commission, known as the "Land Registration Act," was copied
substantially from the Massachussetts law of 1898.
The Illinois and Massachusetts statutes were upheld by the supreme courts of those States.
It is not enough to show a procedure to be unconstitutional to say that we never heard of it before.
(Tyler vs. Judges, supra; Hurtado vs. California, 110 U. S., 516.)
Looked at either from the point of view of history or of the necessary requirements of justice, a
proceeding in rem dealing with a tangible res may be instituted and carried to judgment without
personal service upon claimants within the State or notice by name to those outside of it, and not
encounter any provision of either constitution. Jurisdiction is secured by the power of the court over
the res. As we have said, such a proceeding would be impossible, were this not so, for it hardly would
do to make a distinction between the constitutional rights of claimants who were known and those
who were not known to the plaintiff, when the proceeding is to bar all. (Tyler vs. Judges, supra.)
This same doctrine is annunciated in Pennoyer vs. Neff (95 U. S., 714); The Mary (9 Cranch, 126);
Mankin vs. Chandler (2 Brock., 125); Brown vs. Levee Commission (50 Miss., 468); 2 Freeman,
Judgments, 4th ed., secs. 606, 611.
If the technical object of the suit is to establish a claim against some particular person, with a
judgment which generally, in theory at least, binds his body, or to bar some individual claim or
objection, so that only certain persons are entitled to be heard in defense, the action is in personam,
although it may concern the right to or possession of a tangible thing. If, on the other hand, the object
is to bar indifferently all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right
sought to be established, and if anyone in the world has a right to be heard on the strenght of alleging
facts which, if true, show an inconsistent interest, the proceeding is in rem. (Tyler vs. Judges, supra.)
In the case of Hamilton vs. Brown (161 U. S., 256) a judgment of escheat was held conclusive upon
persons notified by advertisement to all persons interested. In this jurisdiction, by the provisions of
the Code of Civil Procedure, Act No. 190, a decree allowing or disallowing a will binds everybody,
although the only notice of the proceedings given is by general notice to all persons interested.
The supreme court Massachusetts, in the case of Tyler vs. Judges (supra), did not rest its judgment as
to the conclusive effect of the decree upon the ground that the State has absolute power to
determine the persons to whom a man's property shall go at his death, but upon the characteristics
of a proceeding in rem. So we conclude that the proceedings had in the case at bar, under all the facts
and circumstances, especially the absolute lack on the part of the petitioners of any dishonest intent
to deprive the appellee of any right, or in any way injure him, constitute due process of law.
As to whether or not the appellee can succesfully maintain an action under the provisions of sections
101 and 102 of the Land Registration Act (secs. 2365, 2366, Compilation) we do not decide.
56
For these reasons we are of the opinion, and so hold, that the judgment appealed from should be,
and the same is hereby reversed and judgment entered in favor of the petitioners in conformity with
the decree of the lower court of February 12, 1908, without special ruling as to costs. It is so ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson and Moreland, JJ., concur.

57
G.R. No. L-8936 October 2, 1915
CONSUELO LEGARDA, with her husband MAURO PRIETO, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
N.M. SALEEBY, defendant-appellee.
Singson, Ledesma and Lim for appellants.
D.R. Williams for appellee.
JOHNSON, J.:
From the record the following facts appear:
First. That the plaintiffs and the defendant occupy, as owners, adjoining lots in the district of Ermita
in the city of Manila.
Second. That there exists and has existed a number of years a stone wall between the said lots. Said
wall is located on the lot of the plaintiffs.
Third. That the plaintiffs, on the 2d day of March, 1906, presented a petition in the Court of Land
Registration for the registration of their lot. After a consideration of said petition the court, on the
25th day of October, 1906, decreed that the title of the plaintiffs should be registered and issued to
them the original certificate provided for under the torrens system. Said registration and certificate
included the wall.
Fourth. Later the predecessor of the defendant presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration
for the registration of the lot now occupied by him. On the 25th day of March, 1912, the court decreed
the registration of said title and issued the original certificate provided for under the torrens system.
The description of the lot given in the petition of the defendant also included said wall.
Fifth. Several months later (the 13th day of December, 1912) the plaintiffs discovered that the wall
which had been included in the certificate granted to them had also been included in the certificate
granted to the defendant .They immediately presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration
for an adjustment and correction of the error committed by including said wall in the registered title
of each of said parties. The lower court however, without notice to the defendant, denied said
petition upon the theory that, during the pendency of the petition for the registration of the
defendant's land, they failed to make any objection to the registration of said lot, including the wall,
in the name of the defendant.
Sixth. That the land occupied by t he wall is registered in the name of each of the owners of the
adjoining lots. The wall is not a joint wall.
Under these facts, who is the owner of the wall and the land occupied by it?
The decision of the lower court is based upon the theory that the action for the registration of the lot
of the defendant was a judicial proceeding and that the judgment or decree was binding upon all
parties who did not appear and oppose it. In other words, by reason of the fact that the plaintiffs had
not opposed the registration of that part of the lot on which the wall was situate they had lost it, even
though it had been theretofore registered in their name. Granting that theory to be correct one, and
granting even that the wall and the land occupied by it, in fact, belonged to the defendant and his
predecessors, then the same theory should be applied to the defendant himself. Applying that theory
to him, he had already lost whatever right he had therein, by permitting the plaintiffs to have the
same registered in their name, more than six years before. Having thus lost hid right, may he be
permitted to regain it by simply including it in a petition for registration? The plaintiffs having secured
the registration of their lot, including the wall, were they obliged to constantly be on the alert and to
watch all the proceedings in the land court to see that some one else was not having all, or a portion
of the same, registered? If that question is to be answered in the affirmative, then the whole scheme
and purpose of the torrens system of land registration must fail. The real purpose of that system is to
quiet title to land; to put a stop forever to any question of the legality of the title, except claims which
were noted at the time of registration, in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. That
being the purpose of the law, it would seem that once a title is registered the owner may rest secure,
without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in the "mirador de su casa," to
avoid the possibility of losing his land. Of course, it can not be denied that the proceeding for the
registration of land under the torrens system is judicial (Escueta vs. .Director of Lands, 16 Phil. Rep.,
482). It is clothed with all the forms of an action and the result is final and binding upon all the world.
It is an action in rem. (Escueta vs. Director of Lands (supra); Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz, 17 Phil. rep., 49
Roxas vs. Enriquez, 29 Phil. Rep., 31; Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass., 51 American Land Co. vs. Zeiss, 219
U.S., 47.)
While the proceeding is judicial, it involves more in its consequences than does an ordinary action. All
the world are parties, including the government. After the registration is complete and final and there
exists no fraud, there are no innocent third parties who may claim an interest. The rights of all the
world are foreclosed by the decree of registration. The government itself assumes the burden of
giving notice to all parties. To permit persons who are parties in the registration proceeding (and they
are all the world) to again litigate the same questions, and to again cast doubt upon the validity of
the registered title, would destroy the very purpose and intent of the law. The registration, under the
torrens system, does not give the owner any better title than he had. If he does not already have a
perfect title, he can not have it registered. Fee simple titles only may be registered. The certificate of
registration accumulates in open document a precise and correct statement of the exact status of the
fee held by its owner. The certificate, in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of title and shows exactly
58
the real interest of its owner. The title once registered, with very few exceptions, should not
thereafter be impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged, or diminished, except in some direct
proceeding permitted by law. Otherwise all security in registered titles would be lost. A registered
title can not be altered, modified, enlarged, or diminished in a collateral proceeding and not even by
a direct proceeding, after the lapse of the period prescribed by law.
For the difficulty involved in the present case the Act (No. 496) providing for the registration of titles
under the torrens system affords us no remedy. There is no provision in said Act giving the parties
relief under conditions like the present. There is nothing in the Act which indicates who should be the
owner of land which has been registered in the name of two different persons.
The rule, we think, is well settled that the decree ordering the registration of a particular parcel of
land is a bar to future litigation over the same between the same parties .In view of the fact that all
the world are parties, it must follow that future litigation over the title is forever barred; there can be
no persons who are not parties to the action. This, we think, is the rule, except as to rights which are
noted in the certificate or which arise subsequently, and with certain other exceptions which need
not be dismissed at present. A title once registered can not be defeated, even by an adverse, open,
and notorious possession. Registered title under the torrens system can not be defeated by
prescription (section 46, Act No. 496). The title, once registered, is notice to the world. All persons
must take notice. No one can plead ignorance of the registration.
The question, who is the owner of land registered in the name of two different persons, has been
presented to the courts in other jurisdictions. In some jurisdictions, where the "torrens" system has
been adopted, the difficulty has been settled by express statutory provision. In others it has been
settled by the courts. Hogg, in his excellent discussion of the "Australian Torrens System," at page
823, says: "The general rule is that in the case of two certificates of title, purporting to include the
same land, the earlier in date prevails, whether the land comprised in the latter certificate be wholly,
or only in part, comprised in the earlier certificate. (Oelkers vs. Merry, 2 Q.S.C.R., 193; Miller vs. Davy,
7 N.Z.R., 155; Lloyd vs. Myfield, 7 A.L.T. (V.) 48; Stevens vs. Williams, 12 V.L. R., 152; Register of Titles,
vs. Esperance Land Co., 1 W.A.R., 118.)" Hogg adds however that, "if it can be very clearly ascertained
by the ordinary rules of construction relating to written documents, that the inclusion of the land in
the certificate of title of prior date is a mistake, the mistake may be rectified by holding the latter of
the two certificates of title to be conclusive." (See Hogg on the "Australian torrens System," supra,
and cases cited. See also the excellent work of Niblack in his "Analysis of the Torrens System," page
99.) Niblack, in discussing the general question, said: "Where two certificates purport to include the
same land the earlier in date prevails. ... In successive registrations, where more than one certificate
is issued in respect of a particular estate or interest in land, the person claiming under the prior
certificates is entitled to the estate or interest; and that person is deemed to hold under the prior
certificate who is the holder of, or whose claim is derived directly or indirectly from the person who
was the holder of the earliest certificate issued in respect thereof. While the acts in this country do
not expressly cover the case of the issue of two certificates for the same land, they provide that a
registered owner shall hold the title, and the effect of this undoubtedly is that where two certificates
purport to include the same registered land, the holder of the earlier one continues to hold the title"
(p. 237).
Section 38 of Act No. 496, provides that; "It (the decree of registration) shall be conclusive upon and
against all persons, including the Insular Government and all the branches thereof, whether
mentioned by name in the application, notice, or citation, or included in the general description "To
all whom it may concern." Such decree shall not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or
other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing
judgments or decrees; subject, however, to the right of any person deprived of land or of any estate
or interest therein by decree of registration obtained by fraud to file in the Court of Land Registration
a petition for review within one year after entry of the decree (of registration), provided no innocent
purchaser for value has acquired an interest.
It will be noted, from said section, that the "decree of registration" shall not be opened, for any
reason, in any court, except for fraud, and not even for fraud, after the lapse of one year. If then the
decree of registration can not be opened for any reason, except for fraud, in a direct proceeding for
that purpose, may such decree be opened or set aside in a collateral proceeding by including a portion
of the land in a subsequent certificate or decree of registration? We do not believe the law
contemplated that a person could be deprived of his registered title in that way.
We have in this jurisdiction a general statutory provision which governs the right of the ownership of
land when the same is registered in the ordinary registry in the name of two persons. Article 1473 of
the Civil Code provides, among other things, that when one piece of real property had been sold to
two different persons it shall belong to the person acquiring it, who first inscribes it in the registry.
This rule, of course, presupposes that each of the vendees or purchasers has acquired title to the
land. The real ownership in such a case depends upon priority of registration. While we do not now
decide that the general provisions of the Civil Code are applicable to the Land Registration Act, even
though we see no objection thereto, yet we think, in the absence of other express provisions, they
should have a persuasive influence in adopting a rule for governing the effect of a double registration
under said Act. Adopting the rule which we believe to be more in consonance with the purposes and
the real intent of the torrens system, we are of the opinion and so decree that in case land has been
registered under the Land Registration Act in the name of two different persons, the earlier in date
shall prevail.
In reaching the above conclusion, we have not overlooked the forceful argument of the appellee. He
says, among other things; "When Prieto et al. were served with notice of the application of Teus (the
predecessor of the defendant) they became defendants in a proceeding wherein he, Teus, was
seeking to foreclose their right, and that of orders, to the parcel of land described in his application.
Through their failure to appear and contest his right thereto, and the subsequent entry of a default
judgment against them, they became irrevocably bound by the decree adjudicating such land to Teus.
59
They had their day in court and can not set up their own omission as ground for impugning the validity
of a judgment duly entered by a court of competent jurisdiction. To decide otherwise would be to
hold that lands with torrens titles are above the law and beyond the jurisdiction of the courts".
As was said above, the primary and fundamental purpose of the torrens system is to quiet title. If the
holder of a certificate cannot rest secure in this registered title then the purpose of the law is
defeated. If those dealing with registered land cannot rely upon the certificate, then nothing has been
gained by the registration and the expense incurred thereby has been in vain. If the holder may lose
a strip of his registered land by the method adopted in the present case, he may lose it all. Suppose
within the six years which elapsed after the plaintiff had secured their title, they had mortgaged or
sold their right, what would be the position or right of the mortgagee or vendee? That mistakes are
bound to occur cannot be denied, and sometimes the damage done thereby is irreparable. It is the
duty of the courts to adjust the rights of the parties under such circumstances so as to minimize such
damages, taking into consideration al of the conditions and the diligence of the respective parties to
avoid them. In the present case, the appellee was the first negligent (granting that he was the real
owner, and if he was not the real owner he can not complain) in not opposing the registration in the
name of the appellants. He was a party-defendant in an action for the registration of the lot in
question, in the name of the appellants, in 1906. "Through his failure to appear and to oppose such
registration, and the subsequent entry of a default judgment against him, he became irrevocably
bound by the decree adjudicating such land to the appellants. He had his day in court and should not
be permitted to set up his own omissions as the ground for impugning the validity of a judgment duly
entered by a court of competent jurisdiction." Granting that he was the owner of the land upon which
the wall is located, his failure to oppose the registration of the same in the name of the appellants, in
the absence of fraud, forever closes his mouth against impugning the validity of that judgment. There
is no more reason why the doctrine invoked by the appellee should be applied to the appellants than
to him.
We have decided, in case of double registration under the Land Registration Act, that the owner of
the earliest certificate is the owner of the land. That is the rule between original parties. May this rule
be applied to successive vendees of the owners of such certificates? Suppose that one or the other
of the parties, before the error is discovered, transfers his original certificate to an "innocent
purchaser." The general rule is that the vendee of land has no greater right, title, or interest than his
vendor; that he acquires the right which his vendor had, only. Under that rule the vendee of the earlier
certificate would be the owner as against the vendee of the owner of the later certificate.
We find statutory provisions which, upon first reading, seem to cast some doubt upon the rule that
the vendee acquires the interest of the vendor only. Sections 38, 55, and 112 of Act No. 496 indicate
that the vendee may acquire rights and be protected against defenses which the vendor would not.
Said sections speak of available rights in favor of third parties which are cut off by virtue of the sale
of the land to an "innocent purchaser." That is to say, persons who had had a right or interest in land
wrongfully included in an original certificate would be unable to enforce such rights against an
"innocent purchaser," by virtue of the provisions of said sections. In the present case Teus had his
land, including the wall, registered in his name. He subsequently sold the same to the appellee. Is the
appellee an "innocent purchaser," as that phrase is used in said sections? May those who have been
deprived of their land by reason of a mistake in the original certificate in favor of Teus be deprived of
their right to the same, by virtue of the sale by him to the appellee? Suppose the appellants had sold
their lot, including the wall, to an "innocent purchaser," would such purchaser be included in the
phrase "innocent purchaser," as the same is used in said sections? Under these examples there would
be two innocent purchasers of the same land, is said sections are to be applied .Which of the two
innocent purchasers, if they are both to be regarded as innocent purchasers, should be protected
under the provisions of said sections? These questions indicate the difficulty with which we are met
in giving meaning and effect to the phrase "innocent purchaser," in said sections.
May the purchaser of land which has been included in a "second original certificate" ever be regarded
as an "innocent purchaser," as against the rights or interest of the owner of the first original
certificate, his heirs, assigns, or vendee? The first original certificate is recorded in the public registry.
It is never issued until it is recorded. The record notice to all the world. All persons are charged with
the knowledge of what it contains. All persons dealing with the land so recorded, or any portion of it,
must be charged with notice of whatever it contains. The purchaser is charged with notice of every
fact shown by the record and is presumed to know every fact which the record discloses .This rule is
so well established that it is scarcely necessary to cite authorities in its support (Northwestern
National Bank vs. Freeman, 171 U.S., 620, 629; Delvin on Real Estate, sections 710, 710 [a]).
When a conveyance has been properly recorded such record is constructive notice of its contents and
all interests, legal and equitable, included therein. (Grandin vs. Anderson, 15 Ohio State, 286, 289;
Orvis vs. Newell, 17 Conn., 97; Buchanan vs. Intentional Bank, 78 Ill., 500; Youngs vs. Wilson, 27 N.Y.,
351; McCabe vs. Grey, 20 Cal., 509; Montefiore vs. Browne, 7 House of Lords Cases, 341.)
Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has examined every instrument of record
affecting the title. Such presumption is irrebutable. He is charged with notice of every fact shown by
the record and is presumed to know every fact which an examination of the record would have
disclosed. This presumption cannot be overcome by proof of innocence or good faith. Otherwise the
very purpose and object of the law requiring a record would be destroyed. Such presumption cannot
be defeated by proof of want of knowledge of what the record contains any more than one may be
permitted to show that he was ignorant of the provisions of the law. The rule that all persons must
take notice of the facts which the public record contains is a rule of law. The rule must be absolute.
Any variation would lead to endless confusion and useless litigation.
While there is no statutory provision in force here requiring that original deeds of conveyance of real
property be recorded, yet there is a rule requiring mortgages to be recorded. (Arts. 1875 and 606 of
the Civil Code.) The record of a mortgage is indispensable to its validity. (Art .1875.) In the face of that
statute would the courts allow a mortgage to be valid which had not been recorded, upon the plea of
60
ignorance of the statutory provision, when third parties were interested? May a purchaser of land,
subsequent to the recorded mortgage, plead ignorance of its existence, and by reason of such
ignorance have the land released from such lien? Could a purchaser of land, after the recorded
mortgage, be relieved from the mortgage lien by the plea that he was a bona fide purchaser? May
there be a bona fide purchaser of said land, bona fide in the sense that he had no knowledge of the
existence of the mortgage? We believe the rule that all persons must take notice of what the public
record contains in just as obligatory upon all persons as the rule that all men must know the law; that
no one can plead ignorance of the law. The fact that all men know the law is contrary to the
presumption. The conduct of men, at times, shows clearly that they do not know the law. The rule,
however, is mandatory and obligatory, notwithstanding. It would be just as logical to allow the
defense of ignorance of the existence and contents of a public record.
In view, therefore, of the foregoing rules of law, may the purchaser of land from the owner of the
second original certificate be an "innocent purchaser," when a part or all of such land had theretofore
been registered in the name of another, not the vendor? We are of the opinion that said sections 38,
55, and 112 should not be applied to such purchasers. We do not believe that the phrase "innocent
purchaser should be applied to such a purchaser. He cannot be regarded as an "innocent purchaser"
because of the facts contained in the record of the first original certificate. The rule should not be
applied to the purchaser of a parcel of land the vendor of which is not the owner of the original
certificate, or his successors. He, in nonsense, can be an "innocent purchaser" of the portion of the
land included in another earlier original certificate. The rule of notice of what the record contains
precludes the idea of innocence. By reason of the prior registry there cannot be an innocent purchaser
of land included in a prior original certificate and in a name other than that of the vendor, or his
successors. In order to minimize the difficulties we think this is the safe rule to establish. We believe
the phrase "innocent purchaser," used in said sections, should be limited only to cases where
unregistered land has been wrongfully included in a certificate under the torrens system. When land
is once brought under the torrens system, the record of the original certificate and all subsequent
transfers thereof is notice to all the world. That being the rule, could Teus even regarded as the holder
in good fifth of that part of the land included in his certificate of the appellants? We think not.
Suppose, for example, that Teus had never had his lot registered under the torrens system. Suppose
he had sold his lot to the appellee and had included in his deed of transfer the very strip of land now
in question. Could his vendee be regarded as an "innocent purchaser" of said strip? Would his vendee
be an "innocent purchaser" of said strip? Certainly not. The record of the original certificate of the
appellants precludes the possibility. Has the appellee gained any right by reason of the registration of
the strip of land in the name of his vendor? Applying the rule of notice resulting from the record of
the title of the appellants, the question must be answered in the negative. We are of the opinion that
these rules are more in harmony with the purpose of Act No. 496 than the rule contended for by the
appellee. We believe that the purchaser from the owner of the later certificate, and his successors,
should be required to resort to his vendor for damages, in case of a mistake like the present, rather
than to molest the holder of the first certificate who has been guilty of no negligence. The holder of
the first original certificate and his successors should be permitted to rest secure in their title, against
one who had acquired rights in conflict therewith and who had full and complete knowledge of their
rights. The purchaser of land included in the second original certificate, by reason of the facts
contained in the public record and the knowledge with which he is charged and by reason of his
negligence, should suffer the loss, if any, resulting from such purchase, rather than he who has
obtained the first certificate and who was innocent of any act of negligence.
The foregoing decision does not solve, nor pretend to solve, all the difficulties resulting from double
registration under the torrens system and the subsequent transfer of the land. Neither do we now
attempt to decide the effect of the former registration in the ordinary registry upon the registration
under the torrens system. We are inclined to the view, without deciding it, that the record under the
torrens system, supersede all other registries. If that view is correct then it will be sufficient, in dealing
with land registered and recorded alone. Once land is registered and recorded under the torrens
system, that record alone can be examined for the purpose of ascertaining the real status of the title
to the land.
It would be seen to a just and equitable rule, when two persons have acquired equal rights in the
same thing, to hold that the one who acquired it first and who has complied with all the requirements
of the law should be protected.
In view of our conclusions, above stated, the judgment of the lower court should be and is hereby
revoked. The record is hereby returned to the court now having and exercising the jurisdiction
heretofore exercised by the land court, with direction to make such orders and decrees in the
premises as may correct the error heretofore made in including the land in the second original
certificate issued in favor of the predecessor of the appellee, as well as in all other duplicate
certificates issued.
Without any findings as to costs, it is so ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torrens, and Araullo, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
TRENT, J., dissenting:
I dissent.
In cases of double or overlapping registration, I am inclined to agree with the reasoning and authority
on which it is held in the majority opinion (first) that the original holder of the prior certificate is
entitled to the land as against the original holder of the later certificate, where there has been no
transfer of title by either party to an innocent purchaser; both, as is shown in the majority opinion,
being at fault in permitting the double registration to take place; (second) that an innocent purchaser
61
claiming under the prior certificate is entitled to the land as against the original holder of the later
certificate, and also as against innocent purchasers from the holder of the later certificate; the
innocent purchaser being in no wise at fault in connection with the issuance of the later certificate.
But I am of opinion that neither the authorities cited, nor the reasoning of the majority opinion
sustains the proposition that the original holder of the prior certificate is entitled to the land as against
an innocent purchaser from the holder of the later certificate.
As to the text-book authorities cited in the majority opinion, it is sufficient to say that the rules laid
down by both Hogg and Niblack are mere general rules, admittedly subject to exception, and of course
of no binding force or authority where the reasoning upon which these rules are based is applicable
to the facts developed in a particular case.
In its last analysis the general rule laid down in the majority opinion rests upon the proposition set
forth in the last page of the opinion wherein it is said that "it would seem to be a just and equitable
rule, when two persons have acquired equal rights in the same thing, to hold that the one who
acquired it first and who has complied with all the requirements of the law should be protected." The
rule, as applied to the matter in hand, may be stated as follows: It would seem to be a just and
equitable rule when two persons have acquired separate and independent registered titles to the
same land, under the Land Registration Act, to hold that the one who first acquired registered title
and who has complied with all the requirements of the law in that regard should be protected, in the
absence of any express statutory provision to the contrary.
Thus stated I have no quarrel with the doctrine as a statement of the general rule to be applied in
cases of double or overlapping registration under the Land Registration Act; for it is true as stated in
the majority opinion that in the adjudication and registration of titles by the Courts of Land
Registration "mistakes are bound to occur, and sometimes the damage done thereby is irreparable;"
and that in the absence of statutory provisions covering such cases, "it is the duty of the courts to
adjust the rights of the parties, under such circumstances, so as to minimize such damages, taking
into consideration all of the conditions, and the diligence of the respective parties to avoid them."
But like most such general rules, it has its exceptions and should not be applied in a case wherein the
reasons on which it is based do not exist, or in cases wherein still more forceful reasons demand the
application of a contrary rule.
The general rule relied upon in the majority opinion is a mere application of a well settled equity rule
that: "Where conflicting equities are otherwise equal in merit, that which first occurred will be given
the preference." But it is universally laid down by all the courts which have had occasion to apply this
equity rule that "it should be the last test resorted to," and that "it never prevails when any other
equitable ground for preference exists." (See 19 Cent. Dig., tit. Equity, par. 181; and may cases cited
in 16 Cyc., 139, note 57.) It follows that the general rules, that in cases of double or overlapping
registration the earlier certificate should be protected, ought not to prevail so as to deprive an
innocent purchaser under the later certificate of his title of the earlier certificate contributed to the
issuance of the later certificate. Hence the holder of the earlier certificate of title should not be heard
to invoke the "just and equitable rule" as laid down in the majority opinion, in order to have his own
title protected and the title of an innocent purchaser of a later certificate cancelled or annulled, in
any case wherein it appears that the holder of the later certificate was wholly without fault, while the
holder of the issuance of the later certificate, in that he might have prevented its issuance by merely
entering his appearance in court in response to lawful summons personally served upon him in the
course of the proceedings for the issuance of the second certificate, and pleading his superior rights
under the earlier certificate, instead of keeping silent and by his silence permitting a default judgment
to be entered against him adjudicating title in favor of the second applicant.
The majority opinion clearly recognizes the soundness of the principles I am contending for by
reasoning (with which I am inclined to agree) whereby it undertakes to demonstrate that as between
the original holders of the double or overlapping registration the general rule should prevail, because
both such original parties must held to have been fault and, their equities being equal, preference
should be given to the earlier title.
The majority opinion further recognizes the soundness of my contention by the reasoning whereby it
undertakes to sustain the application of the general rule in favor of the original holder of the earlier
certificate against purchasers from the original holder of the later certificate, by an attempt to
demonstrate that such purchasers can in no event be held to be innocent purchasers; because, as it
is said, negligence may and should always be imputed to such a purchaser, so that in no event can he
claim to be without fault when it appears that the lands purchased by him from the holder of a duly
registered certificate of title are included within the bounds of the lands described in a certificate of
title of an earlier date.
At considerable length the majority opinion (in reliance upon the general rule laid down under the
various systems of land registration, other than those based on the torrens system) insists that a
purchaser of land land duly registered in the Land Registration Court, is charged with notice of the
contents of each and every one of the thousands and tens of thousands of certificates of registry on
file in the land registry office, so that negligence may be imputed to him if he does not ascertain that
all or any part of the land purchased by him is included within the boundary lines of any one of the
thousands or tens of thousands of tracts of land whose original registry bears an earlier date than the
date of the original registry of the land purchased by him. It is contended that he cannot claim to be
without fault should he buy such land because, as it is said, it was possible for him to discover that
the land purchased by him had been made the subject of double or overlapping registration by a
comparison of the description and boundary lines of the thousands of tracts and parcels of land to be
found in the land registry office.
62
But such ruling goes far to defeat one of the principal objects sought to be attained by the
introduction and adoption of the so-called torrens system for the registration of land. The avowed
intent of that system of land registration is to relieve the purchase of registered lands from the
necessity of looking farther than the certificate of title of the vendor in order that he may rest secure
as to the validity of the title to the lands conveyed to him. And yet it is said in the majority opinion
that he is charged with notice of the contents of every other certificate of title in the office of the
registrar so that his failure to acquaint himself with its contents may be imputed to him as negligence.
If the rule announced in the majority opinion is to prevail, the new system of land registration, instead
of making transfers of real estate simple, expenditious and secure, and instead of avoiding the
necessity for expensive and oftimes uncertain searches of the land record and registries, in order to
ascertain the true condition of the title before purchase, will, in many instances, add to the labor,
expense and uncertainty of any attempt by a purchaser to satisfy himself as to the validity of the title
to lands purchased by him.
As I have said before, one of the principal objects, if not the principal object, of the torrens system of
land registration upon which our Land Registration Act is avowedly modelled is to facilitate the
transfer of real estate. To that end the Legislature undertakes to relieve prospective purchasers and
all others dealing in registered lands from the necessity of looking farther than the certificate of title
to such lands furnished by the Court of Land Registration, and I cannot, therefore, give my consent to
a ruling which charges a purchaser or mortgage of registered lands with notice of the contents of
every other certificate of title in the land registry, so that negligence and fault may be imputed to him
should he be exposed to loss or damages as a result of the lack of such knowledge.
Suppose a prospective purchaser of lands registered under the Land Registration Act desires to avoid
the imputation of negligence in the event that, unknown to him, such lands have been made the
subject of double or overlapping registration, what course should he pursue? What measures should
he adopt in order to search out the information with notice of which he is charged? There are no
indexes to guide him nor is there anything in the record or the certificate of title of the land he
proposes to buy which necessarily or even with reasonable probability will furnish him a clue as to
the fact of the existence of such double or overlapping registration. Indeed the only course open to
him, if he desires to assure himself against the possibility of double or overlapping registration, would
even seem to be a careful, laborious and extensive comparison of the registered boundary lines
contained in the certificate of title of the tract of land he proposes to buy with those contained in all
the earlier certificates of title to be found in the land registry. Assuredly it was never the intention of
the author of the new Land Registration Act to impose such a burden on a purchaser of duly registered
real estate, under penalty that a lack of the knowledge which might thus be acquired may be imputed
to him by this court as negligence in ruling upon the respective equities of the holders of lands which
have been the subject of double or overlapping registration.
On the other hand, I think that negligence and fault may fairly be imputed to a holder of a registered
certificate of title who stood supinely by and let a default judgment be entered against him,
adjudicating all or any part of his registered lands to another applicant, if it appears that he was served
with notice or had actual notice of the pendency of the proceedings in the Court of Land Registration
wherein such default judgment was entered.
The owner of land who enjoys the benefits secured to him by its registry in the Court of Land
Registration may reasonably be required to appear and defend his title when he has actual notice
that proceedings are pending in that court wherein another applicant, claiming the land as his own,
is seeking to secure its registry in his name. All that is necessary for him to do is to enter his
appearance in those proceedings, invite the court's attention to the certificate of title registered in
his name, and thus, at the cost of the applicant, avoid all the damage and inconvenience flowing from
the double or overlapping registration of the land in question. There is nothing in the new system of
land registration which seems to render it either expedient or necessary to relieve a holder of a
registered title of the duty of appearing and defending that title, when he has actual notice that it is
being attacked in a court of competent jurisdiction, and if, as a result of his neglect or failure so to do,
his lands become subject to double or overlapping registration, he should not be permitted to subject
an innocent purchaser, holding under the later certificate, to all the loss and damage resulting from
the double or overlapping registration, while he goes scot free and holds the land under a manifest
misapplication of the equitable rule that "where conflicting equities are otherwise equal in merit, that
which first accrued will be given the preference." It is only where both or neither of the parties are at
fault that the rule is properly applicable as between opposing claimants under an earlier and a later
certificate of registry to the same land.
Of course all that is said in the briefs of counsel and the majority opinion as to the right of the holder
of a certificate to rest secure in his registered title so that those dealing with registered lands can
confidently rely upon registry certificates thereto is equally forceful by way of argument in favor of
the holder of one or the other certificate in case of double or overlapping registration. The problem
is to determine which of the certificate holders is entitled to the land. The decision of that question
in favor of either one must necessarily have the effect of destroying the value of the registered title
of the other and to that extent shaking the public confidence in the value of the whole system for the
registration of lands. But, in the language of the majority opinion, "that mistakes are bound to occur
cannot be denied and sometimes the damage done thereby is irreparable. It is the duty of the courts
to adjust the rights of the parties under such circumstances so as to minimize the damages, taking
into consideration all the conditions and the diligence of the respective parties to avoid
them."lawphil.net
It will be observed that I limit the exception to the general equitable rule, as laid down in the majority
opinion, to case wherein the holder of the earlier certificate of title has actual notice of the pendency
of the proceedings in the course of which the latter certificate of title was issued, or to cases in which
he has received personal notice of the pendency of those proceedings. Unless he has actual notice of
63
the pendency of such proceedings I readily agree with the reasoning of the majority opinion so far as
it holds that negligence, culpable negligence, should not be imputed to him for failure to appear and
defend his title so as to defeat his right to the benefit of the equitable rule. It is true that the order of
publication in such cases having been duly complied with, all the world is charged with notice thereof,
but it does not necessarily follow that, in the absence of actual notice, culpable negligence in
permitting a default judgment to be entered against him may be imputed to the holder of the earlier
certificate so as to defeat his right to the land under the equitable rule favoring the earlier certificate.
Such a holding would have the effect (to quote the language of the majority opinion) of requiring the
holder of a certificate of title to wait indefinitely "in the portals of the court" and to sit in the "mirador
de su casa" in order to avoid the possibility of losing his lands; and I agree with the writer of the
majority opinion that to do so would place an unreasonable burden on the holders of such certificate,
which was not contemplated by the authors of the Land Registration Act. But no unreasonable burden
is placed upon the holder of a registered title by a rule which imputes culpable negligence to him
when he sits supinely by and lets a judgment in default be entered against him adjudicating title to
his lands in favor of another applicant, despite the fact that he has actual knowledge of the pendency
of the proceedings in which such judgment is entered and despite the fact that he has been personally
served with summons to appear and default his title.
"Taking into consideration all of the conditions and the diligence of the respective parties," it seems
to me that there is no "equality in merit" between the conflicting equities set up by an innocent
purchaser who acquires title to the land under a registered certificate, and the holder of an earlier
certificate who permitted a default judgment to be entered against him, despite actual notice of the
pendency of the proceedings in the course of which the later certificate was issued.
I am convinced, furthermore, that aside from the superior equities of the innocent purchaser in cases
such as that now under discussion, there are strong reasons of convenience and public policy which
militate in favor of the recognition of his title rather than that of the holder of the earlier title.
One ruling exposes all persons purchasing or dealing in registered lands to unknown, unspecified and
uncertain dangers, to guard against which all such persons will be put to additional cost, annoyance
and labor on every occasion when any transaction is had with regard to such lands; while the other
ruling tends to eliminate consequences so directly adverse to the purpose and object for which the
land registration law was enacted, and imposes no burden upon any holder of a certificate of
registered lands other than that of defending his title on those rare, definite and specific occasions
wherein he has actual notice that his title is being challenged in a Court of Land Registration, a
proceeding in which the cost and expense is reduced to the minimum by the conclusive character of
his certificate of title in support of his claim of ownership. Furthermore, judgment against the
innocent purchaser and in favor of the holder of the earlier certificate in a case such as that under
consideration must inevitably tend to increase the danger of double or overlapping registrations by
encouraging holders of registered titles, negligently or fraudulently and conclusively, to permit
default judgments to be entered against them adjudicating title to all or a part of their registered
lands in favor of other applicants, despite actual notice of the pendency of judicial proceedings had
for that purpose, and this, without adding in any appreciable degree to the security of thir titles, and
merely to save them the very slight trouble or inconvenience incident to an entry of appearance in
the court in which their own titles were secured, and inviting attention to the fact that their right,
title and ownership in the lands in questions has already been conclusively adjudicated.
The cases wherein there is a practical possibility of double or overlapping registration without actual
notice to the holder of the earlier certificate must in the very nature of things to be so rare as to be
practically negligible. Double or overlapping registration almost invariably occurs in relation to lands
held by adjoining occupants or claimants. It is difficult to conceive of a case wherein double
registration can take place, in the absence of fraud, without personal service of notice of the
pendency of the proceedings upon the holder of the earlier certificate, the statute requiring such
notice to be served upon the owner or occupant of all lands adjoining those for which application for
registration is made; and the cases wherein an adjoining land owner can, even by the use of fraud,
conduct proceedings for the registration of his land to a successful conclusion without actual notice
to the adjoining property owners must be rare indeed.
In the case at bar the defendant purchased the land in question from the original holder of a
certificate of title issued by the Court of Land Registration, relying upon the records of the Court of
Land Registration with reference thereto and with no knowledge that any part of the land thus
purchased was included in an earlier certificate of title issued to the plaintiff. The plaintiff, the holder
of the earlier certificate of title, negligently permitted a default judgment to be entered against him
in the Court of Land Registration, adjudicating part of the lands included in his own certificate of title
in favor of another applicant, from whom the defendant in this action acquired title, and this despite
the fact that he was an adjoining land owner, had actual notice of the pendency of the proceedings
and was personally served with summons to appear and defends his rights in the premises. It seems
to me that there can be no reason for doubt as to the respective merits of the equities of the parties,
and further that the judgment of the majority in favor of the plaintiff will inevitably tend to increase
the number of cases wherein registered land owners in the future will fail to appear and defend their
titles when challenged in other proceedings in the Courts of Land Registration, thereby enormously
increasing the possibility and probability of loss and damage to innocent third parties and dealers in
registered lands generally, arising out of erroneous, double or overlapping registration of lands by the
Courts of Land Registration.
Carson, J., concurs.
64
.R. No. 2869 March 25, 1907
MATEO CARIÑO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, respondent-appellee.
Coudert Brothers for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta for appellee.
ARELLANO, C.J.:
Mateo Cariño, the appellant herein, on the 23d of February, 1904, filed his petition in the Court of
Land Registration praying that there be granted to him title to a parcel of land consisting of 40
hectares, 1 are, and 13 centares, and situated in the town of Baguio, Province of Benguet, together
with a house erected thereon and constructed of wood and roofed with rimo, and bounded as
follows: On the north, in lines running 1,048 metes and 20 decimeters with the lands of Sepa Cariño,
H. Phelps Whitmarsh, and Calsi; on the east, in lines running 991 meters and 50 decimeters with the
land of Kuidno, Esteban Gonzales, and of the Civil Government; on the south, in lines of 115 meters
and 60 decimeters, with the lands of Talaca; and on the west, in lines running 982 meters and 20
decimeters, with the lands of Sisco Cariño and Mayengmeng.
By order of the court the hearing of this petition, No. 561, and that of Antonio Rebollo and Vicente
Valpiedad filed under No. 834, were heard together for the reason that the latter petition claimed a
small portion of land included in the parcel set out in the former petition.
The Insular Government opposed the granting of these petitions, alleging that the whole parcel of
land is public property of the Government and that the same was never acquired in any manner or
through any title of egresion from the State.
After trial, and the hearing of documentary and oral proof, the court of Land Registration rendered
its judgment in these terms:
Therefore the court finds that Cariño and his predecessors have not possessed exclusively and
adversely any part of the said property prior to the date on which Cariño constructed the house now
there — that is to say, for the years 1897 and 1898, and Cariño held possession for some years
afterwards of but a part of the property to which he claims title. Both petitions are dismissed and the
property in question is adjudged to be public land. (Bill of exceptions, p. 15.)
The conclusions arrived at the set forth in definite terms in the decision of the court below are the
following:
From the testimony given by Cariño as well as from that of several of the witnesses for the
Government it is deduced, that in or about the year 1884 Cariño erected and utilized as a domicile a
house on the property situated to the north of that property now in question, property which,
according to the plan attached to expediente No. 561, appears to be property belonging to Donaldson
Sim; that during the year 1893 Cariño sold said house to one Cristobal Ramos, who in turn sold the
same to Donaldson Sim, moving to and living on the adjoining property, which appears on the plan
aforesaid to be the property of H. Phelps Whitmarsh, a place where the father and the grandfather
of his wife, that is to say, Ortega and Minse, had lived . . ..
In or about the years 1898 Cariño abandoned the property of Whitmarsh and located on the property
described in the plan attached to expediente No. 561, having constructed a house thereon in which
he now lives, and which house is situated in the center of the property, as is indicated on the plan;
and since which time he has undoubtedly occupied some portion of the property now claimed by him.
(Bill of exceptions, pp. 11 and 12.)
1. Therefore it is evident that this court can not decree the registration of all of the superficial
extension of the land described in the petition and as appears on the plan filed herein, such extension
containing 40 hectares, 1 are, and 13 centares, inasmuch as the documentary evidence accompanying
the petition is conclusive proof against the petitioners; this documentary proof consists of a
possessory information under date of March 7, 1901, and registered on the 11th day of the same
month and year; and, according to such possessory information, the land therein described contains
an extension of only 28 hectares limited by "the country road to the barrio of Pias," a road appearing
on the plan now presented and cutting the land, as might be said, in half, or running through its center
from north to south, a considerable extension of land remaining on the other side of the said road,
the west side, and which could not have been included in the possessory information mentioned.
2. As has been shown during the trial of this case, this land, of which mention is made in said
possessory information, and upon which is situated the house now actually occupied by the
petitioner, all of which is set forth as argument as to the possession in the judgment, is "used for
pasture and sowing," and belongs to the class called public lands.
3. Under the express provisions of law, a parcel of land, being of common origin,
presumptively belonged to the State during its sovereignty, and, in order to perfect the legitimate
acquisition of such land by private persons, it was necessary that the possession of the same pass
from the State. And there is no evidence or proof of title of egresion of this land from the domain of
the Spanish Government, nor is there any possessory information equivalent to title by composicion
or under agreement. 4, The possessory information filed herein is not the title to property authorized
in substitution for that of adjustment by the royal decree of February 13, 1894, this being the last law
or legal disposition of the former sovereignty applicable to the present subject-matter of common
lands: First, for the reason that the land referred to herein is not covered nor does it come within any
one of the three conditions required by article 19 of the said royal decree, to wit, that the land has
65
been in an uninterrupted state of cultivation during a period of six years last past; or that the same
has been possessed without interruption during a period of twelve years and has been in a state of
cultivation up to the date of the information and during the three years immediately preceding such
information; or that such land had been possessed openly without interruption during a period of
thirty or more years, notwithstanding the land had not been cultivated; nor is it necessary to refer to
the testimony given by the two witnesses to the possessory information for the following reason:
Second, because the possessory information authorized by said royal decree or last legal disposition
of the Spanish Government, as title or for the purpose of acquiring actual proprietary right, equivalent
to that of adjustment with the Spanish Government and required and necessary at all times until the
publication of said royal decree was limited in time to one year, in accordance with article 21, which
is as follows: " A period of one year, not to be extended, is allowed to verify the possessory
informations which are referred to in articles 19 and 20. After the expiration of this period of the right
of the cultivators and persons in possession to obtain gratuitous title thereto lapses and the land
together with full possession reverts to the state, or, as the case may be, to the community, and the
said possessors and cultivators or their assigns would simply have rights under universal or general
title of average in the event that the land is sold within a period of five years immediately following
the cancellation. The possessors not included under this chapter can only acquire by time the
ownership and title to unappropriated or royal lands in accordance with common law."
5. In accordance with the preceding provisions, the right that remained to Cariño, if it be
certain that he was the true possessor of the land in question, was the right of average in case the
Government or State could have sold the same within the period of five years immediately following
for example, if the denouncement of purchase had been carried out by Felipe Zafra or any other
person, as appears from the record of the trial of the case. Aside from this right, in such event, his
possession as attested in the possessory information herein could not, in accordance with common
law, go to show any right of ownership until after the expiration of twenty years from the expiration
of twenty years from the verification and registry of the same in conformity with the provisions of
article 393 of the Mortgage Law and other conditions prescribe by this law.
6. The right of possession in accordance with common law — that is to say, civil law — remains
at all times subordinate to the Spanish administrative law, inasmuch as it could only be of force when
pertaining to royal transferable or alienable lands, which condition and the determination thereof is
reversed to the government, which classified and designated the royal alienable lands for the purpose
of distinguishing them from those lands strictly public, and from forestry lands which could at no time
pass to private ownership nor be acquired through time even after the said royal decree of February
13, 1894.
7. The advent of the new sovereignty necessarily brought a new method of dealing with lands
and particularly as to the classification and manner of transfer and acquisition of royal or common
lands then appropriated, which were thenceforth merely called public lands, the alienation of which
was reserved to the Government, in accordance with section 12 and 13 of the act of Congress of July
1, 1902,1 and in conformity with other laws enacted under this act of Congress by the Philippine
Commission prescribing rules for the execution thereof, one of which is Act No. 648,2 herein
mentioned by the petitioner, in connection with Act No. 627,3 which appears to be the law upon
which the petition herein is founded.
8. Section 6 of Act No. 627 admits prescription, in accordance with the provisions contained
in Act No. 190, as a basis for obtaining the right of ownership. "The petitioners claims title under the
period of prescription of ten years established by that act, as well as by reason of his occupancy and
use thereof from time immemorial." (Allegation 1.) But said act admits such prescription for the
purpose of obtaining title and ownership to lands "not exceeding more that sixteen hectares in
extent." (Sec. 6 of said act.) The land claimed by Cariño is 40 hectares in extent, if we take into
consideration his petition, or an extension of 28 hectares, according to the possessory information,
the only thing that can be considered. Therefore, it follows that the judgment denying the petition
herein and now appealed from was strictly in accordance with the law invoked herein.
9. And of the 28 hectares of land as set out in the possessory information, one part of same,
according to the testimony of Cariño, belongs to Vicente Valpiedad, the extent of which is not
determined. From all of which it follows that the precise extent has not been determined in the trial
of this case on which judgment might be based in the event that the judgment and title be declared
in favor of the petitioner, Mateo Cariño. And we should not lose sight of the fact that, considering the
intention of Congress in granting ownership and title to 16 hectares, that Mateo Cariño and his
children have already exceeded such amount in various acquirements of lands, all of which is shown
in different cases decided by the said Court of Land Registration, donations or gifts of land that could
only have been made efficacious as to the conveyance thereof with the assistance of these new laws.
By reason of the findings set forth it is clearly seen that the court below did not err:
1. In finding that Mateo Cariño and those from whom he claims his right had not possessed
and claimed as owners the lands in question since time immemorial;
2. In finding that the land in question did not belong to the petitioner, but that, on the
contrary, it was the property of the Government. (Allegation 21.)
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed with the costs of this instance against the
appellant. After the expiration of twenty days from the notification of this decision let judgment be
entered in accordance herewith, and ten days thereafter let the case be remanded to the court from
whence it came for proper action. So ordered.
Torres, Mapa, Willard, and Tracey, JJ., concur.
Johnson, J., reserves his vote.
66
G.R. No. 133250 July 9, 2002
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner,
vs.
PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY and AMARI COASTAL BAY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
CARPIO, J.:
This is an original Petition for Mandamus with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and a
temporary restraining order. The petition seeks to compel the Public Estates Authority ("PEA" for
brevity) to disclose all facts on PEA's then on-going renegotiations with Amari Coastal Bay and
Development Corporation ("AMARI" for brevity) to reclaim portions of Manila Bay. The petition
further seeks to enjoin PEA from signing a new agreement with AMARI involving such reclamation.
The Facts
On November 20, 1973, the government, through the Commissioner of Public Highways, signed a
contract with the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines ("CDCP" for brevity)
to reclaim certain foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay. The contract also included the
construction of Phases I and II of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road. CDCP obligated itself to carry out
all the works in consideration of fifty percent of the total reclaimed land.
On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1084
creating PEA. PD No. 1084 tasked PEA "to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas,"
and "to develop, improve, acquire, x x x lease and sell any and all kinds of lands."1 On the same date,
then President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1085 transferring to PEA the "lands reclaimed
in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay"2 under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and
Reclamation Project (MCCRRP).
On December 29, 1981, then President Marcos issued a memorandum directing PEA to amend its
contract with CDCP, so that "[A]ll future works in MCCRRP x x x shall be funded and owned by PEA."
Accordingly, PEA and CDCP executed a Memorandum of Agreement dated December 29, 1981, which
stated:
"(i) CDCP shall undertake all reclamation, construction, and such other works in the MCCRRP as may
be agreed upon by the parties, to be paid according to progress of works on a unit price/lump sum
basis for items of work to be agreed upon, subject to price escalation, retention and other terms and
conditions provided for in Presidential Decree No. 1594. All the financing required for such works shall
be provided by PEA.
xxx
(iii) x x x CDCP shall give up all its development rights and hereby agrees to cede and transfer in favor
of PEA, all of the rights, title, interest and participation of CDCP in and to all the areas of land reclaimed
by CDCP in the MCCRRP as of December 30, 1981 which have not yet been sold, transferred or
otherwise disposed of by CDCP as of said date, which areas consist of approximately Ninety-Nine
Thousand Four Hundred Seventy Three (99,473) square meters in the Financial Center Area covered
by land pledge No. 5 and approximately Three Million Three Hundred Eighty Two Thousand Eight
Hundred Eighty Eight (3,382,888) square meters of reclaimed areas at varying elevations above Mean
Low Water Level located outside the Financial Center Area and the First Neighborhood Unit."3
On January 19, 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517, granting and
transferring to PEA "the parcels of land so reclaimed under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and
Reclamation Project (MCCRRP) containing a total area of one million nine hundred fifteen thousand
eight hundred ninety four (1,915,894) square meters." Subsequently, on April 9, 1988, the Register of
Deeds of the Municipality of Parañaque issued Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 7309, 7311, and
7312, in the name of PEA, covering the three reclaimed islands known as the "Freedom Islands"
located at the southern portion of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road, Parañaque City. The Freedom
Islands have a total land area of One Million Five Hundred Seventy Eight Thousand Four Hundred and
Forty One (1,578,441) square meters or 157.841 hectares.
On April 25, 1995, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement ("JVA" for brevity) with AMARI, a
private corporation, to develop the Freedom Islands. The JVA also required the reclamation of an
additional 250 hectares of submerged areas surrounding these islands to complete the configuration
in the Master Development Plan of the Southern Reclamation Project-MCCRRP. PEA and AMARI
entered into the JVA through negotiation without public bidding.4 On April 28, 1995, the Board of
Directors of PEA, in its Resolution No. 1245, confirmed the JVA.5 On June 8, 1995, then President Fidel
V. Ramos, through then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, approved the JVA.6
On November 29, 1996, then Senate President Ernesto Maceda delivered a privilege speech in the
Senate and denounced the JVA as the "grandmother of all scams." As a result, the Senate Committee
on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises, and the Committee on Accountability of Public
Officers and Investigations, conducted a joint investigation. The Senate Committees reported the
results of their investigation in Senate Committee Report No. 560 dated September 16, 1997.7 Among
the conclusions of their report are: (1) the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the
JVA are lands of the public domain which the government has not classified as alienable lands and
therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands; (2) the certificates of title covering the Freedom Islands
are thus void, and (3) the JVA itself is illegal.
On December 5, 1997, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Presidential Administrative Order No.
365 creating a Legal Task Force to conduct a study on the legality of the JVA in view of Senate
Committee Report No. 560. The members of the Legal Task Force were the Secretary of Justice,8 the
67
Chief Presidential Legal Counsel,9 and the Government Corporate Counsel.10 The Legal Task Force
upheld the legality of the JVA, contrary to the conclusions reached by the Senate Committees.11
On April 4 and 5, 1998, the Philippine Daily Inquirer and Today published reports that there were on-
going renegotiations between PEA and AMARI under an order issued by then President Fidel V.
Ramos. According to these reports, PEA Director Nestor Kalaw, PEA Chairman Arsenio Yulo and retired
Navy Officer Sergio Cruz composed the negotiating panel of PEA.
On April 13, 1998, Antonio M. Zulueta filed before the Court a Petition for Prohibition with Application
for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction docketed as G.R. No.
132994 seeking to nullify the JVA. The Court dismissed the petition "for unwarranted disregard of
judicial hierarchy, without prejudice to the refiling of the case before the proper court."12
On April 27, 1998, petitioner Frank I. Chavez ("Petitioner" for brevity) as a taxpayer, filed the instant
Petition for Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary
Restraining Order. Petitioner contends the government stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale by
PEA of the reclaimed lands to AMARI. Petitioner prays that PEA publicly disclose the terms of any
renegotiation of the JVA, invoking Section 28, Article II, and Section 7, Article III, of the 1987
Constitution on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. Petitioner assails
the sale to AMARI of lands of the public domain as a blatant violation of Section 3, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution prohibiting the sale of alienable lands of the public domain to private corporations.
Finally, petitioner asserts that he seeks to enjoin the loss of billions of pesos in properties of the State
that are of public dominion.
After several motions for extension of time,13 PEA and AMARI filed their Comments on October 19,
1998 and June 25, 1998, respectively. Meanwhile, on December 28, 1998, petitioner filed an Omnibus
Motion: (a) to require PEA to submit the terms of the renegotiated PEA-AMARI contract; (b) for
issuance of a temporary restraining order; and (c) to set the case for hearing on oral argument.
Petitioner filed a Reiterative Motion for Issuance of a TRO dated May 26, 1999, which the Court
denied in a Resolution dated June 22, 1999.
In a Resolution dated March 23, 1999, the Court gave due course to the petition and required the
parties to file their respective memoranda.
On March 30, 1999, PEA and AMARI signed the Amended Joint Venture Agreement ("Amended JVA,"
for brevity). On May 28, 1999, the Office of the President under the administration of then President
Joseph E. Estrada approved the Amended JVA.
Due to the approval of the Amended JVA by the Office of the President, petitioner now prays that on
"constitutional and statutory grounds the renegotiated contract be declared null and void."14
The Issues
The issues raised by petitioner, PEA15 and AMARI16 are as follows:
I. WHETHER THE PRINCIPAL RELIEFS PRAYED FOR IN THE PETITION ARE MOOT AND ACADEMIC
BECAUSE OF SUBSEQUENT EVENTS;
II. WHETHER THE PETITION MERITS DISMISSAL FOR FAILING TO OBSERVE THE PRINCIPLE GOVERNING
THE HIERARCHY OF COURTS;
III. WHETHER THE PETITION MERITS DISMISSAL FOR NON-EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES;
IV. WHETHER PETITIONER HAS LOCUS STANDI TO BRING THIS SUIT;
V. WHETHER THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO INFORMATION INCLUDES OFFICIAL INFORMATION ON
ON-GOING NEGOTIATIONS BEFORE A FINAL AGREEMENT;
VI. WHETHER THE STIPULATIONS IN THE AMENDED JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT FOR THE TRANSFER
TO AMARI OF CERTAIN LANDS, RECLAIMED AND STILL TO BE RECLAIMED, VIOLATE THE 1987
CONSTITUTION; AND
VII. WHETHER THE COURT IS THE PROPER FORUM FOR RAISING THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE
AMENDED JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT IS GROSSLY DISADVANTAGEOUS TO THE GOVERNMENT.
The Court's Ruling
First issue: whether the principal reliefs prayed for in the petition are moot and academic because of
subsequent events.
The petition prays that PEA publicly disclose the "terms and conditions of the on-going negotiations
for a new agreement." The petition also prays that the Court enjoin PEA from "privately entering into,
perfecting and/or executing any new agreement with AMARI."
PEA and AMARI claim the petition is now moot and academic because AMARI furnished petitioner on
June 21, 1999 a copy of the signed Amended JVA containing the terms and conditions agreed upon in
the renegotiations. Thus, PEA has satisfied petitioner's prayer for a public disclosure of the
renegotiations. Likewise, petitioner's prayer to enjoin the signing of the Amended JVA is now moot
because PEA and AMARI have already signed the Amended JVA on March 30, 1999. Moreover, the
Office of the President has approved the Amended JVA on May 28, 1999.
68
Petitioner counters that PEA and AMARI cannot avoid the constitutional issue by simply fast-tracking
the signing and approval of the Amended JVA before the Court could act on the issue. Presidential
approval does not resolve the constitutional issue or remove it from the ambit of judicial review.
We rule that the signing of the Amended JVA by PEA and AMARI and its approval by the President
cannot operate to moot the petition and divest the Court of its jurisdiction. PEA and AMARI have still
to implement the Amended JVA. The prayer to enjoin the signing of the Amended JVA on
constitutional grounds necessarily includes preventing its implementation if in the meantime PEA and
AMARI have signed one in violation of the Constitution. Petitioner's principal basis in assailing the
renegotiation of the JVA is its violation of Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution, which prohibits the
government from alienating lands of the public domain to private corporations. If the Amended JVA
indeed violates the Constitution, it is the duty of the Court to enjoin its implementation, and if already
implemented, to annul the effects of such unconstitutional contract.
The Amended JVA is not an ordinary commercial contract but one which seeks to transfer title and
ownership to 367.5 hectares of reclaimed lands and submerged areas of Manila Bay to a single private
corporation. It now becomes more compelling for the Court to resolve the issue to insure the
government itself does not violate a provision of the Constitution intended to safeguard the national
patrimony. Supervening events, whether intended or accidental, cannot prevent the Court from
rendering a decision if there is a grave violation of the Constitution. In the instant case, if the Amended
JVA runs counter to the Constitution, the Court can still prevent the transfer of title and ownership of
alienable lands of the public domain in the name of AMARI. Even in cases where supervening events
had made the cases moot, the Court did not hesitate to resolve the legal or constitutional issues raised
to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, bar, and the public.17
Also, the instant petition is a case of first impression. All previous decisions of the Court involving
Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, or its counterpart provision in the 1973 Constitution,18
covered agricultural lands sold to private corporations which acquired the lands from private parties.
The transferors of the private corporations claimed or could claim the right to judicial confirmation
of their imperfect titles19 under Title II of Commonwealth Act. 141 ("CA No. 141" for brevity). In the
instant case, AMARI seeks to acquire from PEA, a public corporation, reclaimed lands and submerged
areas for non-agricultural purposes by purchase under PD No. 1084 (charter of PEA) and Title III of CA
No. 141. Certain undertakings by AMARI under the Amended JVA constitute the consideration for the
purchase. Neither AMARI nor PEA can claim judicial confirmation of their titles because the lands
covered by the Amended JVA are newly reclaimed or still to be reclaimed. Judicial confirmation of
imperfect title requires open, continuous, exclusive and notorious occupation of agricultural lands of
the public domain for at least thirty years since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Besides, the deadline for
filing applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect title expired on December 31, 1987.20
Lastly, there is a need to resolve immediately the constitutional issue raised in this petition because
of the possible transfer at any time by PEA to AMARI of title and ownership to portions of the
reclaimed lands. Under the Amended JVA, PEA is obligated to transfer to AMARI the latter's seventy
percent proportionate share in the reclaimed areas as the reclamation progresses. The Amended JVA
even allows AMARI to mortgage at any time the entire reclaimed area to raise financing for the
reclamation project.21
Second issue: whether the petition merits dismissal for failing to observe the principle governing the
hierarchy of courts.
PEA and AMARI claim petitioner ignored the judicial hierarchy by seeking relief directly from the
Court. The principle of hierarchy of courts applies generally to cases involving factual questions. As it
is not a trier of facts, the Court cannot entertain cases involving factual issues. The instant case,
however, raises constitutional issues of transcendental importance to the public.22 The Court can
resolve this case without determining any factual issue related to the case. Also, the instant case is a
petition for mandamus which falls under the original jurisdiction of the Court under Section 5, Article
VIII of the Constitution. We resolve to exercise primary jurisdiction over the instant case.
Third issue: whether the petition merits dismissal for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.
PEA faults petitioner for seeking judicial intervention in compelling PEA to disclose publicly certain
information without first asking PEA the needed information. PEA claims petitioner's direct resort to
the Court violates the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies. It also violates the rule that
mandamus may issue only if there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.
PEA distinguishes the instant case from Tañada v. Tuvera23 where the Court granted the petition for
mandamus even if the petitioners there did not initially demand from the Office of the President the
publication of the presidential decrees. PEA points out that in Tañada, the Executive Department had
an affirmative statutory duty under Article 2 of the Civil Code24 and Section 1 of Commonwealth Act
No. 63825 to publish the presidential decrees. There was, therefore, no need for the petitioners in
Tañada to make an initial demand from the Office of the President. In the instant case, PEA claims it
has no affirmative statutory duty to disclose publicly information about its renegotiation of the JVA.
Thus, PEA asserts that the Court must apply the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies to
the instant case in view of the failure of petitioner here to demand initially from PEA the needed
information.
The original JVA sought to dispose to AMARI public lands held by PEA, a government corporation.
Under Section 79 of the Government Auditing Code,26 the disposition of government lands to private
parties requires public bidding. PEA was under a positive legal duty to disclose to the public the terms
and conditions for the sale of its lands. The law obligated PEA to make this public disclosure even
without demand from petitioner or from anyone. PEA failed to make this public disclosure because
the original JVA, like the Amended JVA, was the result of a negotiated contract, not of a public bidding.
69
Considering that PEA had an affirmative statutory duty to make the public disclosure, and was even
in breach of this legal duty, petitioner had the right to seek direct judicial intervention.
Moreover, and this alone is determinative of this issue, the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies does not apply when the issue involved is a purely legal or constitutional question.27 The
principal issue in the instant case is the capacity of AMARI to acquire lands held by PEA in view of the
constitutional ban prohibiting the alienation of lands of the public domain to private corporations.
We rule that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply in the instant case.
Fourth issue: whether petitioner has locus standi to bring this suit
PEA argues that petitioner has no standing to institute mandamus proceedings to enforce his
constitutional right to information without a showing that PEA refused to perform an affirmative duty
imposed on PEA by the Constitution. PEA also claims that petitioner has not shown that he will suffer
any concrete injury because of the signing or implementation of the Amended JVA. Thus, there is no
actual controversy requiring the exercise of the power of judicial review.
The petitioner has standing to bring this taxpayer's suit because the petition seeks to compel PEA to
comply with its constitutional duties. There are two constitutional issues involved here. First is the
right of citizens to information on matters of public concern. Second is the application of a
constitutional provision intended to insure the equitable distribution of alienable lands of the public
domain among Filipino citizens. The thrust of the first issue is to compel PEA to disclose publicly
information on the sale of government lands worth billions of pesos, information which the
Constitution and statutory law mandate PEA to disclose. The thrust of the second issue is to prevent
PEA from alienating hundreds of hectares of alienable lands of the public domain in violation of the
Constitution, compelling PEA to comply with a constitutional duty to the nation.
Moreover, the petition raises matters of transcendental importance to the public. In Chavez v.
PCGG,28 the Court upheld the right of a citizen to bring a taxpayer's suit on matters of transcendental
importance to the public, thus -
"Besides, petitioner emphasizes, the matter of recovering the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses is an
issue of 'transcendental importance to the public.' He asserts that ordinary taxpayers have a right to
initiate and prosecute actions questioning the validity of acts or orders of government agencies or
instrumentalities, if the issues raised are of 'paramount public interest,' and if they 'immediately
affect the social, economic and moral well being of the people.'
Moreover, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest, when the
proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, such as in this case. He invokes several decisions
of this Court which have set aside the procedural matter of locus standi, when the subject of the case
involved public interest.
xxx
In Tañada v. Tuvera, the Court asserted that when the issue concerns a public right and the object of
mandamus is to obtain the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real parties
in interest; and because it is sufficient that petitioner is a citizen and as such is interested in the
execution of the laws, he need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result of the
action. In the aforesaid case, the petitioners sought to enforce their right to be informed on matters
of public concern, a right then recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, in
connection with the rule that laws in order to be valid and enforceable must be published in the
Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated. In ruling for the petitioners' legal standing, the
Court declared that the right they sought to be enforced 'is a public right recognized by no less than
the fundamental law of the land.'
Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, while reiterating Tañada, further declared that 'when a
mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal interest
is satisfied by the mere fact that petitioner is a citizen and, therefore, part of the general 'public' which
possesses the right.'
Further, in Albano v. Reyes, we said that while expenditure of public funds may not have been
involved under the questioned contract for the development, management and operation of the
Manila International Container Terminal, 'public interest [was] definitely involved considering the
important role [of the subject contract] . . . in the economic development of the country and the
magnitude of the financial consideration involved.' We concluded that, as a consequence, the
disclosure provision in the Constitution would constitute sufficient authority for upholding the
petitioner's standing.
Similarly, the instant petition is anchored on the right of the people to information and access to
official records, documents and papers — a right guaranteed under Section 7, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. Petitioner, a former solicitor general, is a Filipino citizen. Because of the satisfaction of
the two basic requisites laid down by decisional law to sustain petitioner's legal standing, i.e. (1) the
enforcement of a public right (2) espoused by a Filipino citizen, we rule that the petition at bar should
be allowed."
We rule that since the instant petition, brought by a citizen, involves the enforcement of
constitutional rights - to information and to the equitable diffusion of natural resources - matters of
transcendental public importance, the petitioner has the requisite locus standi.
Fifth issue: whether the constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going
negotiations before a final agreement.
70
Section 7, Article III of the Constitution explains the people's right to information on matters of public
concern in this manner:
"Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized.
Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law." (Emphasis supplied)
The State policy of full transparency in all transactions involving public interest reinforces the people's
right to information on matters of public concern. This State policy is expressed in Section 28, Article
II of the Constitution, thus:
"Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a
policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest." (Emphasis supplied)
These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote transparency in policy-making and in the
operations of the government, as well as provide the people sufficient information to exercise
effectively other constitutional rights. These twin provisions are essential to the exercise of freedom
of expression. If the government does not disclose its official acts, transactions and decisions to
citizens, whatever citizens say, even if expressed without any restraint, will be speculative and
amount to nothing. These twin provisions are also essential to hold public officials "at all times x x x
accountable to the people,"29 for unless citizens have the proper information, they cannot hold
public officials accountable for anything. Armed with the right information, citizens can participate in
public discussions leading to the formulation of government policies and their effective
implementation. An informed citizenry is essential to the existence and proper functioning of any
democracy. As explained by the Court in Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr.30 –
"An essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing dialogue or process of
communication between the government and the people. It is in the interest of the State that the
channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the government may perceive and
be responsive to the people's will. Yet, this open dialogue can be effective only to the extent that the
citizenry is informed and thus able to formulate its will intelligently. Only when the participants in the
discussion are aware of the issues and have access to information relating thereto can such bear
fruit."
PEA asserts, citing Chavez v. PCGG,31 that in cases of on-going negotiations the right to information
is limited to "definite propositions of the government." PEA maintains the right does not include
access to "intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or communications during the stage when
common assertions are still in the process of being formulated or are in the 'exploratory stage'."
Also, AMARI contends that petitioner cannot invoke the right at the pre-decisional stage or before
the closing of the transaction. To support its contention, AMARI cites the following discussion in the
1986 Constitutional Commission:
"Mr. Suarez. And when we say 'transactions' which should be distinguished from contracts,
agreements, or treaties or whatever, does the Gentleman refer to the steps leading to the
consummation of the contract, or does he refer to the contract itself?
Mr. Ople: The 'transactions' used here, I suppose is generic and therefore, it can cover both steps
leading to a contract and already a consummated contract, Mr. Presiding Officer.
Mr. Suarez: This contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation of the
transaction.
Mr. Ople: Yes, subject only to reasonable safeguards on the national interest.
Mr. Suarez: Thank you."32 (Emphasis supplied)
AMARI argues there must first be a consummated contract before petitioner can invoke the right.
Requiring government officials to reveal their deliberations at the pre-decisional stage will degrade
the quality of decision-making in government agencies. Government officials will hesitate to express
their real sentiments during deliberations if there is immediate public dissemination of their
discussions, putting them under all kinds of pressure before they decide.
We must first distinguish between information the law on public bidding requires PEA to disclose
publicly, and information the constitutional right to information requires PEA to release to the public.
Before the consummation of the contract, PEA must, on its own and without demand from anyone,
disclose to the public matters relating to the disposition of its property. These include the size,
location, technical description and nature of the property being disposed of, the terms and conditions
of the disposition, the parties qualified to bid, the minimum price and similar information. PEA must
prepare all these data and disclose them to the public at the start of the disposition process, long
before the consummation of the contract, because the Government Auditing Code requires public
bidding. If PEA fails to make this disclosure, any citizen can demand from PEA this information at any
time during the bidding process.
Information, however, on on-going evaluation or review of bids or proposals being undertaken by the
bidding or review committee is not immediately accessible under the right to information. While the
evaluation or review is still on-going, there are no "official acts, transactions, or decisions" on the bids
or proposals. However, once the committee makes its official recommendation, there arises a
"definite proposition" on the part of the government. From this moment, the public's right to
71
information attaches, and any citizen can access all the non-proprietary information leading to such
definite proposition. In Chavez v. PCGG,33 the Court ruled as follows:
"Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution, we believe that it is incumbent upon the
PCGG and its officers, as well as other government representatives, to disclose sufficient public
information on any proposed settlement they have decided to take up with the ostensible owners
and holders of ill-gotten wealth. Such information, though, must pertain to definite propositions of
the government, not necessarily to intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or
communications during the stage when common assertions are still in the process of being
formulated or are in the "exploratory" stage. There is need, of course, to observe the same restrictions
on disclosure of information in general, as discussed earlier – such as on matters involving national
security, diplomatic or foreign relations, intelligence and other classified information." (Emphasis
supplied)
Contrary to AMARI's contention, the commissioners of the 1986 Constitutional Commission
understood that the right to information "contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the
consummation of the transaction." Certainly, a consummated contract is not a requirement for the
exercise of the right to information. Otherwise, the people can never exercise the right if no contract
is consummated, and if one is consummated, it may be too late for the public to expose its
defects.1âwphi1.nêt
Requiring a consummated contract will keep the public in the dark until the contract, which may be
grossly disadvantageous to the government or even illegal, becomes a fait accompli. This negates the
State policy of full transparency on matters of public concern, a situation which the framers of the
Constitution could not have intended. Such a requirement will prevent the citizenry from participating
in the public discussion of any proposed contract, effectively truncating a basic right enshrined in the
Bill of Rights. We can allow neither an emasculation of a constitutional right, nor a retreat by the State
of its avowed "policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest."
The right covers three categories of information which are "matters of public concern," namely: (1)
official records; (2) documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions and decisions; and
(3) government research data used in formulating policies. The first category refers to any document
that is part of the public records in the custody of government agencies or officials. The second
category refers to documents and papers recording, evidencing, establishing, confirming, supporting,
justifying or explaining official acts, transactions or decisions of government agencies or officials. The
third category refers to research data, whether raw, collated or processed, owned by the government
and used in formulating government policies.
The information that petitioner may access on the renegotiation of the JVA includes evaluation
reports, recommendations, legal and expert opinions, minutes of meetings, terms of reference and
other documents attached to such reports or minutes, all relating to the JVA. However, the right to
information does not compel PEA to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like relating to the
renegotiation of the JVA.34 The right only affords access to records, documents and papers, which
means the opportunity to inspect and copy them. One who exercises the right must copy the records,
documents and papers at his expense. The exercise of the right is also subject to reasonable
regulations to protect the integrity of the public records and to minimize disruption to government
operations, like rules specifying when and how to conduct the inspection and copying.35
The right to information, however, does not extend to matters recognized as privileged information
under the separation of powers.36 The right does not also apply to information on military and
diplomatic secrets, information affecting national security, and information on investigations of
crimes by law enforcement agencies before the prosecution of the accused, which courts have long
recognized as confidential.37 The right may also be subject to other limitations that Congress may
impose by law.
There is no claim by PEA that the information demanded by petitioner is privileged information rooted
in the separation of powers. The information does not cover Presidential conversations,
correspondences, or discussions during closed-door Cabinet meetings which, like internal
deliberations of the Supreme Court and other collegiate courts, or executive sessions of either house
of Congress,38 are recognized as confidential. This kind of information cannot be pried open by a co-
equal branch of government. A frank exchange of exploratory ideas and assessments, free from the
glare of publicity and pressure by interested parties, is essential to protect the independence of
decision-making of those tasked to exercise Presidential, Legislative and Judicial power.39 This is not
the situation in the instant case.
We rule, therefore, that the constitutional right to information includes official information on on-
going negotiations before a final contract. The information, however, must constitute definite
propositions by the government and should not cover recognized exceptions like privileged
information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national security and public
order.40 Congress has also prescribed other limitations on the right to information in several
legislations.41
Sixth issue: whether stipulations in the Amended JVA for the transfer to AMARI of lands, reclaimed or
to be reclaimed, violate the Constitution.
The Regalian Doctrine
The ownership of lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas is rooted in the Regalian
doctrine which holds that the State owns all lands and waters of the public domain. Upon the Spanish
conquest of the Philippines, ownership of all "lands, territories and possessions" in the Philippines
passed to the Spanish Crown.42 The King, as the sovereign ruler and representative of the people,
72
acquired and owned all lands and territories in the Philippines except those he disposed of by grant
or sale to private individuals.
The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions adopted the Regalian doctrine substituting, however, the
State, in lieu of the King, as the owner of all lands and waters of the public domain. The Regalian
doctrine is the foundation of the time-honored principle of land ownership that "all lands that were
not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain."43
Article 339 of the Civil Code of 1889, which is now Article 420 of the Civil Code of 1950, incorporated
the Regalian doctrine.
Ownership and Disposition of Reclaimed Lands
The Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 was the first statutory law governing the ownership and
disposition of reclaimed lands in the Philippines. On May 18, 1907, the Philippine Commission enacted
Act No. 1654 which provided for the lease, but not the sale, of reclaimed lands of the government to
corporations and individuals. Later, on November 29, 1919, the Philippine Legislature approved Act
No. 2874, the Public Land Act, which authorized the lease, but not the sale, of reclaimed lands of the
government to corporations and individuals. On November 7, 1936, the National Assembly passed
Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public Land Act, which authorized the lease, but not
the sale, of reclaimed lands of the government to corporations and individuals. CA No. 141 continues
to this day as the general law governing the classification and disposition of lands of the public
domain.
The Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 and the Civil Code of 1889
Under the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, the shores, bays, coves, inlets and all waters within the
maritime zone of the Spanish territory belonged to the public domain for public use.44 The Spanish
Law of Waters of 1866 allowed the reclamation of the sea under Article 5, which provided as follows:
"Article 5. Lands reclaimed from the sea in consequence of works constructed by the State, or by the
provinces, pueblos or private persons, with proper permission, shall become the property of the party
constructing such works, unless otherwise provided by the terms of the grant of authority."
Under the Spanish Law of Waters, land reclaimed from the sea belonged to the party undertaking the
reclamation, provided the government issued the necessary permit and did not reserve ownership of
the reclaimed land to the State.
Article 339 of the Civil Code of 1889 defined property of public dominion as follows:
"Art. 339. Property of public dominion is –
1. That devoted to public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by
the State, riverbanks, shores, roadsteads, and that of a similar character;
2. That belonging exclusively to the State which, without being of general public use, is employed in
some public service, or in the development of the national wealth, such as walls, fortresses, and other
works for the defense of the territory, and mines, until granted to private individuals."
Property devoted to public use referred to property open for use by the public. In contrast, property
devoted to public service referred to property used for some specific public service and open only to
those authorized to use the property.
Property of public dominion referred not only to property devoted to public use, but also to property
not so used but employed to develop the national wealth. This class of property constituted property
of public dominion although employed for some economic or commercial activity to increase the
national wealth.
Article 341 of the Civil Code of 1889 governed the re-classification of property of public dominion into
private property, to wit:
"Art. 341. Property of public dominion, when no longer devoted to public use or to the defense of the
territory, shall become a part of the private property of the State."
This provision, however, was not self-executing. The legislature, or the executive department
pursuant to law, must declare the property no longer needed for public use or territorial defense
before the government could lease or alienate the property to private parties.45
Act No. 1654 of the Philippine Commission
On May 8, 1907, the Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 1654 which regulated the lease of
reclaimed and foreshore lands. The salient provisions of this law were as follows:
"Section 1. The control and disposition of the foreshore as defined in existing law, and the title to all
Government or public lands made or reclaimed by the Government by dredging or filling or otherwise
throughout the Philippine Islands, shall be retained by the Government without prejudice to vested
rights and without prejudice to rights conceded to the City of Manila in the Luneta Extension.
Section 2. (a) The Secretary of the Interior shall cause all Government or public lands made or
reclaimed by the Government by dredging or filling or otherwise to be divided into lots or blocks, with
the necessary streets and alleyways located thereon, and shall cause plats and plans of such surveys
to be prepared and filed with the Bureau of Lands.
73
(b) Upon completion of such plats and plans the Governor-General shall give notice to the public that
such parts of the lands so made or reclaimed as are not needed for public purposes will be leased for
commercial and business purposes, x x x.
xxx
(e) The leases above provided for shall be disposed of to the highest and best bidder therefore, subject
to such regulations and safeguards as the Governor-General may by executive order prescribe."
(Emphasis supplied)
Act No. 1654 mandated that the government should retain title to all lands reclaimed by the
government. The Act also vested in the government control and disposition of foreshore lands.
Private parties could lease lands reclaimed by the government only if these lands were no longer
needed for public purpose. Act No. 1654 mandated public bidding in the lease of government
reclaimed lands. Act No. 1654 made government reclaimed lands sui generis in that unlike other
public lands which the government could sell to private parties, these reclaimed lands were available
only for lease to private parties.
Act No. 1654, however, did not repeal Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866. Act No. 1654
did not prohibit private parties from reclaiming parts of the sea under Section 5 of the Spanish Law
of Waters. Lands reclaimed from the sea by private parties with government permission remained
private lands.
Act No. 2874 of the Philippine Legislature
On November 29, 1919, the Philippine Legislature enacted Act No. 2874, the Public Land Act.46 The
salient provisions of Act No. 2874, on reclaimed lands, were as follows:
"Sec. 6. The Governor-General, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, shall from time to time classify the lands of the public domain into –
(a) Alienable or disposable,
(b) Timber, and
(c) Mineral lands, x x x.
Sec. 7. For the purposes of the government and disposition of alienable or disposable public lands,
the Governor-General, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
shall from time to time declare what lands are open to disposition or concession under this Act."
Sec. 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession which have been officially
delimited or classified x x x.
xxx
Sec. 55. Any tract of land of the public domain which, being neither timber nor mineral land, shall be
classified as suitable for residential purposes or for commercial, industrial, or other productive
purposes other than agricultural purposes, and shall be open to disposition or concession, shall be
disposed of under the provisions of this chapter, and not otherwise.
Sec. 56. The lands disposable under this title shall be classified as follows:
(a) Lands reclaimed by the Government by dredging, filling, or other means;
(b) Foreshore;
(c) Marshy lands or lands covered with water bordering upon the shores or banks of navigable lakes
or rivers;
(d) Lands not included in any of the foregoing classes.
x x x.
Sec. 58. The lands comprised in classes (a), (b), and (c) of section fifty-six shall be disposed of to private
parties by lease only and not otherwise, as soon as the Governor-General, upon recommendation by
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall declare that the same are not necessary for
the public service and are open to disposition under this chapter. The lands included in class (d) may
be disposed of by sale or lease under the provisions of this Act." (Emphasis supplied)
Section 6 of Act No. 2874 authorized the Governor-General to "classify lands of the public domain
into x x x alienable or disposable"47 lands. Section 7 of the Act empowered the Governor-General to
"declare what lands are open to disposition or concession." Section 8 of the Act limited alienable or
disposable lands only to those lands which have been "officially delimited and classified."
Section 56 of Act No. 2874 stated that lands "disposable under this title48 shall be classified" as
government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands, as well as other lands. All these lands, however,
must be suitable for residential, commercial, industrial or other productive non-agricultural purposes.
These provisions vested upon the Governor-General the power to classify inalienable lands of the
public domain into disposable lands of the public domain. These provisions also empowered the
Governor-General to classify further such disposable lands of the public domain into government
reclaimed, foreshore or marshy lands of the public domain, as well as other non-agricultural lands.
74

Section 58 of Act No. 2874 categorically mandated that disposable lands of the public domain
classified as government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands "shall be disposed of to private
parties by lease only and not otherwise." The Governor-General, before allowing the lease of these
lands to private parties, must formally declare that the lands were "not necessary for the public
service." Act No. 2874 reiterated the State policy to lease and not to sell government reclaimed,
foreshore and marshy lands of the public domain, a policy first enunciated in 1907 in Act No. 1654.
Government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands remained sui generis, as the only alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain that the government could not sell to private parties.
The rationale behind this State policy is obvious. Government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy public
lands for non-agricultural purposes retain their inherent potential as areas for public service. This is
the reason the government prohibited the sale, and only allowed the lease, of these lands to private
parties. The State always reserved these lands for some future public service.
Act No. 2874 did not authorize the reclassification of government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy
lands into other non-agricultural lands under Section 56 (d). Lands falling under Section 56 (d) were
the only lands for non-agricultural purposes the government could sell to private parties. Thus, under
Act No. 2874, the government could not sell government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands to
private parties, unless the legislature passed a law allowing their sale.49
Act No. 2874 did not prohibit private parties from reclaiming parts of the sea pursuant to Section 5 of
the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866. Lands reclaimed from the sea by private parties with government
permission remained private lands.
Dispositions under the 1935 Constitution
On May 14, 1935, the 1935 Constitution took effect upon its ratification by the Filipino people. The
1935 Constitution, in adopting the Regalian doctrine, declared in Section 1, Article XIII, that –
"Section 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy and other natural resources of the
Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall
be limited to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of
the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession
at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution. Natural
resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no license,
concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural resources
shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five years,
except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the
grant." (Emphasis supplied)
The 1935 Constitution barred the alienation of all natural resources except public agricultural lands,
which were the only natural resources the State could alienate. Thus, foreshore lands, considered
part of the State's natural resources, became inalienable by constitutional fiat, available only for lease
for 25 years, renewable for another 25 years. The government could alienate foreshore lands only
after these lands were reclaimed and classified as alienable agricultural lands of the public domain.
Government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain, being neither timber nor mineral
lands, fell under the classification of public agricultural lands.50 However, government reclaimed and
marshy lands, although subject to classification as disposable public agricultural lands, could only be
leased and not sold to private parties because of Act No. 2874.
The prohibition on private parties from acquiring ownership of government reclaimed and marshy
lands of the public domain was only a statutory prohibition and the legislature could therefore
remove such prohibition. The 1935 Constitution did not prohibit individuals and corporations from
acquiring government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain that were classified as
agricultural lands under existing public land laws. Section 2, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution
provided as follows:
"Section 2. No private corporation or association may acquire, lease, or hold public agricultural lands
in excess of one thousand and twenty four hectares, nor may any individual acquire such lands by
purchase in excess of one hundred and forty hectares, or by lease in excess of one thousand and
twenty-four hectares, or by homestead in excess of twenty-four hectares. Lands adapted to grazing,
not exceeding two thousand hectares, may be leased to an individual, private corporation, or
association." (Emphasis supplied)
Still, after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, the legislature did not repeal Section 58 of Act No.
2874 to open for sale to private parties government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain.
On the contrary, the legislature continued the long established State policy of retaining for the
government title and ownership of government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain.
Commonwealth Act No. 141 of the Philippine National Assembly
On November 7, 1936, the National Assembly approved Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as
the Public Land Act, which compiled the then existing laws on lands of the public domain. CA No. 141,
as amended, remains to this day the existing general law governing the classification and disposition
of lands of the public domain other than timber and mineral lands.51
Section 6 of CA No. 141 empowers the President to classify lands of the public domain into "alienable
or disposable"52 lands of the public domain, which prior to such classification are inalienable and
75
outside the commerce of man. Section 7 of CA No. 141 authorizes the President to "declare what
lands are open to disposition or concession." Section 8 of CA No. 141 states that the government can
declare open for disposition or concession only lands that are "officially delimited and classified."
Sections 6, 7 and 8 of CA No. 141 read as follows:
"Sec. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, shall
from time to time classify the lands of the public domain into –
(a) Alienable or disposable,
(b) Timber, and
(c) Mineral lands,
and may at any time and in like manner transfer such lands from one class to another,53 for the
purpose of their administration and disposition.
Sec. 7. For the purposes of the administration and disposition of alienable or disposable public lands,
the President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time
to time declare what lands are open to disposition or concession under this Act.
Sec. 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession which have been officially
delimited and classified and, when practicable, surveyed, and which have not been reserved for public
or quasi-public uses, nor appropriated by the Government, nor in any manner become private
property, nor those on which a private right authorized and recognized by this Act or any other valid
law may be claimed, or which, having been reserved or appropriated, have ceased to be so. x x x."
Thus, before the government could alienate or dispose of lands of the public domain, the President
must first officially classify these lands as alienable or disposable, and then declare them open to
disposition or concession. There must be no law reserving these lands for public or quasi-public uses.
The salient provisions of CA No. 141, on government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands of the
public domain, are as follows:
"Sec. 58. Any tract of land of the public domain which, being neither timber nor mineral land, is
intended to be used for residential purposes or for commercial, industrial, or other productive
purposes other than agricultural, and is open to disposition or concession, shall be disposed of under
the provisions of this chapter and not otherwise.
Sec. 59. The lands disposable under this title shall be classified as follows:
(a) Lands reclaimed by the Government by dredging, filling, or other means;
(b) Foreshore;
(c) Marshy lands or lands covered with water bordering upon the shores or banks of navigable lakes
or rivers;
(d) Lands not included in any of the foregoing classes.
Sec. 60. Any tract of land comprised under this title may be leased or sold, as the case may be, to any
person, corporation, or association authorized to purchase or lease public lands for agricultural
purposes. x x x.
Sec. 61. The lands comprised in classes (a), (b), and (c) of section fifty-nine shall be disposed of to
private parties by lease only and not otherwise, as soon as the President, upon recommendation by
the Secretary of Agriculture, shall declare that the same are not necessary for the public service and
are open to disposition under this chapter. The lands included in class (d) may be disposed of by sale
or lease under the provisions of this Act." (Emphasis supplied)
Section 61 of CA No. 141 readopted, after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, Section 58 of Act
No. 2874 prohibiting the sale of government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy disposable lands of the
public domain. All these lands are intended for residential, commercial, industrial or other non-
agricultural purposes. As before, Section 61 allowed only the lease of such lands to private parties.
The government could sell to private parties only lands falling under Section 59 (d) of CA No. 141, or
those lands for non-agricultural purposes not classified as government reclaimed, foreshore and
marshy disposable lands of the public domain. Foreshore lands, however, became inalienable under
the 1935 Constitution which only allowed the lease of these lands to qualified private parties.
Section 58 of CA No. 141 expressly states that disposable lands of the public domain intended for
residential, commercial, industrial or other productive purposes other than agricultural "shall be
disposed of under the provisions of this chapter and not otherwise." Under Section 10 of CA No. 141,
the term "disposition" includes lease of the land. Any disposition of government reclaimed, foreshore
and marshy disposable lands for non-agricultural purposes must comply with Chapter IX, Title III of
CA No. 141,54 unless a subsequent law amended or repealed these provisions.
In his concurring opinion in the landmark case of Republic Real Estate Corporation v. Court of
Appeals,55 Justice Reynato S. Puno summarized succinctly the law on this matter, as follows:
"Foreshore lands are lands of public dominion intended for public use. So too are lands reclaimed by
the government by dredging, filling, or other means. Act 1654 mandated that the control and
disposition of the foreshore and lands under water remained in the national government. Said law
76
allowed only the 'leasing' of reclaimed land. The Public Land Acts of 1919 and 1936 also declared that
the foreshore and lands reclaimed by the government were to be "disposed of to private parties by
lease only and not otherwise." Before leasing, however, the Governor-General, upon
recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, had first to determine that
the land reclaimed was not necessary for the public service. This requisite must have been met before
the land could be disposed of. But even then, the foreshore and lands under water were not to be
alienated and sold to private parties. The disposition of the reclaimed land was only by lease. The land
remained property of the State." (Emphasis supplied)
As observed by Justice Puno in his concurring opinion, "Commonwealth Act No. 141 has remained in
effect at present."
The State policy prohibiting the sale to private parties of government reclaimed, foreshore and
marshy alienable lands of the public domain, first implemented in 1907 was thus reaffirmed in CA No.
141 after the 1935 Constitution took effect. The prohibition on the sale of foreshore lands, however,
became a constitutional edict under the 1935 Constitution. Foreshore lands became inalienable as
natural resources of the State, unless reclaimed by the government and classified as agricultural lands
of the public domain, in which case they would fall under the classification of government reclaimed
lands.
After the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, government reclaimed and marshy disposable lands of
the public domain continued to be only leased and not sold to private parties.56 These lands
remained sui generis, as the only alienable or disposable lands of the public domain the government
could not sell to private parties.
Since then and until now, the only way the government can sell to private parties government
reclaimed and marshy disposable lands of the public domain is for the legislature to pass a law
authorizing such sale. CA No. 141 does not authorize the President to reclassify government reclaimed
and marshy lands into other non-agricultural lands under Section 59 (d). Lands classified under
Section 59 (d) are the only alienable or disposable lands for non-agricultural purposes that the
government could sell to private parties.
Moreover, Section 60 of CA No. 141 expressly requires congressional authority before lands under
Section 59 that the government previously transferred to government units or entities could be sold
to private parties. Section 60 of CA No. 141 declares that –
"Sec. 60. x x x The area so leased or sold shall be such as shall, in the judgment of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, be reasonably necessary for the purposes for which such sale or
lease is requested, and shall not exceed one hundred and forty-four hectares: Provided, however,
That this limitation shall not apply to grants, donations, or transfers made to a province, municipality
or branch or subdivision of the Government for the purposes deemed by said entities conducive to
the public interest; but the land so granted, donated, or transferred to a province, municipality or
branch or subdivision of the Government shall not be alienated, encumbered, or otherwise disposed
of in a manner affecting its title, except when authorized by Congress: x x x." (Emphasis supplied)
The congressional authority required in Section 60 of CA No. 141 mirrors the legislative authority
required in Section 56 of Act No. 2874.
One reason for the congressional authority is that Section 60 of CA No. 141 exempted government
units and entities from the maximum area of public lands that could be acquired from the State. These
government units and entities should not just turn around and sell these lands to private parties in
violation of constitutional or statutory limitations. Otherwise, the transfer of lands for non-
agricultural purposes to government units and entities could be used to circumvent constitutional
limitations on ownership of alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. In the same manner,
such transfers could also be used to evade the statutory prohibition in CA No. 141 on the sale of
government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain to private parties. Section 60 of CA No.
141 constitutes by operation of law a lien on these lands.57
In case of sale or lease of disposable lands of the public domain falling under Section 59 of CA No.
141, Sections 63 and 67 require a public bidding. Sections 63 and 67 of CA No. 141 provide as follows:
"Sec. 63. Whenever it is decided that lands covered by this chapter are not needed for public
purposes, the Director of Lands shall ask the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce (now the
Secretary of Natural Resources) for authority to dispose of the same. Upon receipt of such authority,
the Director of Lands shall give notice by public advertisement in the same manner as in the case of
leases or sales of agricultural public land, x x x.
Sec. 67. The lease or sale shall be made by oral bidding; and adjudication shall be made to the highest
bidder. x x x." (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, CA No. 141 mandates the Government to put to public auction all leases or sales of alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain.58
Like Act No. 1654 and Act No. 2874 before it, CA No. 141 did not repeal Section 5 of the Spanish Law
of Waters of 1866. Private parties could still reclaim portions of the sea with government permission.
However, the reclaimed land could become private land only if classified as alienable agricultural land
of the public domain open to disposition under CA No. 141. The 1935 Constitution prohibited the
alienation of all natural resources except public agricultural lands.
The Civil Code of 1950
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The Civil Code of 1950 readopted substantially the definition of property of public dominion found in
the Civil Code of 1889. Articles 420 and 422 of the Civil Code of 1950 state that –
"Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed
by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public
service or for the development of the national wealth.
x x x.
Art. 422. Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service,
shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State."
Again, the government must formally declare that the property of public dominion is no longer
needed for public use or public service, before the same could be classified as patrimonial property
of the State.59 In the case of government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain, the
declaration of their being disposable, as well as the manner of their disposition, is governed by the
applicable provisions of CA No. 141.
Like the Civil Code of 1889, the Civil Code of 1950 included as property of public dominion those
properties of the State which, without being for public use, are intended for public service or the
"development of the national wealth." Thus, government reclaimed and marshy lands of the State,
even if not employed for public use or public service, if developed to enhance the national wealth,
are classified as property of public dominion.
Dispositions under the 1973 Constitution
The 1973 Constitution, which took effect on January 17, 1973, likewise adopted the Regalian doctrine.
Section 8, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution stated that –
"Sec. 8. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, wildlife, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to
the State. With the exception of agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, and resettlement
lands of the public domain, natural resources shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or
lease for the exploration, development, exploitation, or utilization of any of the natural resources
shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five
years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water power, in which cases, beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the
grant." (Emphasis supplied)
The 1973 Constitution prohibited the alienation of all natural resources with the exception of
"agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, and resettlement lands of the public domain." In
contrast, the 1935 Constitution barred the alienation of all natural resources except "public
agricultural lands." However, the term "public agricultural lands" in the 1935 Constitution
encompassed industrial, commercial, residential and resettlement lands of the public domain.60 If
the land of public domain were neither timber nor mineral land, it would fall under the classification
of agricultural land of the public domain. Both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, therefore, prohibited
the alienation of all natural resources except agricultural lands of the public domain.
The 1973 Constitution, however, limited the alienation of lands of the public domain to individuals
who were citizens of the Philippines. Private corporations, even if wholly owned by Philippine citizens,
were no longer allowed to acquire alienable lands of the public domain unlike in the 1935
Constitution. Section 11, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution declared that –
"Sec. 11. The Batasang Pambansa, taking into account conservation, ecological, and development
requirements of the natural resources, shall determine by law the size of land of the public domain
which may be developed, held or acquired by, or leased to, any qualified individual, corporation, or
association, and the conditions therefor. No private corporation or association may hold alienable
lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area nor may any
citizen hold such lands by lease in excess of five hundred hectares or acquire by purchase, homestead
or grant, in excess of twenty-four hectares. No private corporation or association may hold by lease,
concession, license or permit, timber or forest lands and other timber or forest resources in excess of
one hundred thousand hectares. However, such area may be increased by the Batasang Pambansa
upon recommendation of the National Economic and Development Authority." (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, under the 1973 Constitution, private corporations could hold alienable lands of the public
domain only through lease. Only individuals could now acquire alienable lands of the public domain,
and private corporations became absolutely barred from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the
public domain. The constitutional ban extended to all kinds of alienable lands of the public domain,
while the statutory ban under CA No. 141 applied only to government reclaimed, foreshore and
marshy alienable lands of the public domain.
PD No. 1084 Creating the Public Estates Authority
On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1084 creating
PEA, a wholly government owned and controlled corporation with a special charter. Sections 4 and 8
of PD No. 1084, vests PEA with the following purposes and powers:
78
"Sec. 4. Purpose. The Authority is hereby created for the following purposes:
(a) To reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas, by dredging, filling or other means, or
to acquire reclaimed land;
(b) To develop, improve, acquire, administer, deal in, subdivide, dispose, lease and sell any and all
kinds of lands, buildings, estates and other forms of real property, owned, managed, controlled
and/or operated by the government;
(c) To provide for, operate or administer such service as may be necessary for the efficient,
economical and beneficial utilization of the above properties.
Sec. 5. Powers and functions of the Authority. The Authority shall, in carrying out the purposes for
which it is created, have the following powers and functions:
(a)To prescribe its by-laws.
xxx
(i) To hold lands of the public domain in excess of the area permitted to private corporations by
statute.
(j) To reclaim lands and to construct work across, or otherwise, any stream, watercourse, canal, ditch,
flume x x x.
xxx
(o) To perform such acts and exercise such functions as may be necessary for the attainment of the
purposes and objectives herein specified." (Emphasis supplied)
PD No. 1084 authorizes PEA to reclaim both foreshore and submerged areas of the public domain.
Foreshore areas are those covered and uncovered by the ebb and flow of the tide.61 Submerged
areas are those permanently under water regardless of the ebb and flow of the tide.62 Foreshore and
submerged areas indisputably belong to the public domain63 and are inalienable unless reclaimed,
classified as alienable lands open to disposition, and further declared no longer needed for public
service.
The ban in the 1973 Constitution on private corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public
domain did not apply to PEA since it was then, and until today, a fully owned government corporation.
The constitutional ban applied then, as it still applies now, only to "private corporations and
associations." PD No. 1084 expressly empowers PEA "to hold lands of the public domain" even "in
excess of the area permitted to private corporations by statute." Thus, PEA can hold title to private
lands, as well as title to lands of the public domain.
In order for PEA to sell its reclaimed foreshore and submerged alienable lands of the public domain,
there must be legislative authority empowering PEA to sell these lands. This legislative authority is
necessary in view of Section 60 of CA No.141, which states –
"Sec. 60. x x x; but the land so granted, donated or transferred to a province, municipality, or branch
or subdivision of the Government shall not be alienated, encumbered or otherwise disposed of in a
manner affecting its title, except when authorized by Congress; x x x." (Emphasis supplied)
Without such legislative authority, PEA could not sell but only lease its reclaimed foreshore and
submerged alienable lands of the public domain. Nevertheless, any legislative authority granted to
PEA to sell its reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain would be subject to the constitutional
ban on private corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain. Hence, such
legislative authority could only benefit private individuals.
Dispositions under the 1987 Constitution
The 1987 Constitution, like the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions before it, has adopted the Regalian
doctrine. The 1987 Constitution declares that all natural resources are "owned by the State," and
except for alienable agricultural lands of the public domain, natural resources cannot be alienated.
Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution state that –
"Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils,
all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural
resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources
shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be
under the full control and supervision of the State. x x x.
Section 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands,
and national parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further classified by law according
to the uses which they may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to
agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public
domain except by lease, for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than
twenty-five years, and not to exceed one thousand hectares in area. Citizens of the Philippines may
lease not more than five hundred hectares, or acquire not more than twelve hectares thereof by
purchase, homestead, or grant.
Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology, and development, and subject to the
requirements of agrarian reform, the Congress shall determine, by law, the size of lands of the public
79
domain which may be acquired, developed, held, or leased and the conditions therefor." (Emphasis
supplied)
The 1987 Constitution continues the State policy in the 1973 Constitution banning private
corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Like the 1973
Constitution, the 1987 Constitution allows private corporations to hold alienable lands of the public
domain only through lease. As in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, the general law governing the
lease to private corporations of reclaimed, foreshore and marshy alienable lands of the public domain
is still CA No. 141.
The Rationale behind the Constitutional Ban
The rationale behind the constitutional ban on corporations from acquiring, except through lease,
alienable lands of the public domain is not well understood. During the deliberations of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, the commissioners probed the rationale behind this ban, thus:
"FR. BERNAS: Mr. Vice-President, my questions have reference to page 3, line 5 which says:
`No private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease,
not to exceed one thousand hectares in area.'
If we recall, this provision did not exist under the 1935 Constitution, but this was introduced in the
1973 Constitution. In effect, it prohibits private corporations from acquiring alienable public lands.
But it has not been very clear in jurisprudence what the reason for this is. In some of the cases decided
in 1982 and 1983, it was indicated that the purpose of this is to prevent large landholdings. Is that the
intent of this provision?
MR. VILLEGAS: I think that is the spirit of the provision.
FR. BERNAS: In existing decisions involving the Iglesia ni Cristo, there were instances where the Iglesia
ni Cristo was not allowed to acquire a mere 313-square meter land where a chapel stood because the
Supreme Court said it would be in violation of this." (Emphasis supplied)
In Ayog v. Cusi,64 the Court explained the rationale behind this constitutional ban in this way:
"Indeed, one purpose of the constitutional prohibition against purchases of public agricultural lands
by private corporations is to equitably diffuse land ownership or to encourage 'owner-cultivatorship
and the economic family-size farm' and to prevent a recurrence of cases like the instant case. Huge
landholdings by corporations or private persons had spawned social unrest."
However, if the constitutional intent is to prevent huge landholdings, the Constitution could have
simply limited the size of alienable lands of the public domain that corporations could acquire. The
Constitution could have followed the limitations on individuals, who could acquire not more than 24
hectares of alienable lands of the public domain under the 1973 Constitution, and not more than 12
hectares under the 1987 Constitution.
If the constitutional intent is to encourage economic family-size farms, placing the land in the name
of a corporation would be more effective in preventing the break-up of farmlands. If the farmland is
registered in the name of a corporation, upon the death of the owner, his heirs would inherit shares
in the corporation instead of subdivided parcels of the farmland. This would prevent the continuing
break-up of farmlands into smaller and smaller plots from one generation to the next.
In actual practice, the constitutional ban strengthens the constitutional limitation on individuals from
acquiring more than the allowed area of alienable lands of the public domain. Without the
constitutional ban, individuals who already acquired the maximum area of alienable lands of the
public domain could easily set up corporations to acquire more alienable public lands. An individual
could own as many corporations as his means would allow him. An individual could even hide his
ownership of a corporation by putting his nominees as stockholders of the corporation. The
corporation is a convenient vehicle to circumvent the constitutional limitation on acquisition by
individuals of alienable lands of the public domain.
The constitutional intent, under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, is to transfer ownership of only a
limited area of alienable land of the public domain to a qualified individual. This constitutional intent
is safeguarded by the provision prohibiting corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public
domain, since the vehicle to circumvent the constitutional intent is removed. The available alienable
public lands are gradually decreasing in the face of an ever-growing population. The most effective
way to insure faithful adherence to this constitutional intent is to grant or sell alienable lands of the
public domain only to individuals. This, it would seem, is the practical benefit arising from the
constitutional ban.
The Amended Joint Venture Agreement
The subject matter of the Amended JVA, as stated in its second Whereas clause, consists of three
properties, namely:
1. "[T]hree partially reclaimed and substantially eroded islands along Emilio Aguinaldo Boulevard in
Paranaque and Las Pinas, Metro Manila, with a combined titled area of 1,578,441 square meters;"
2. "[A]nother area of 2,421,559 square meters contiguous to the three islands;" and
80
3. "[A]t AMARI's option as approved by PEA, an additional 350 hectares more or less to regularize the
configuration of the reclaimed area."65
PEA confirms that the Amended JVA involves "the development of the Freedom Islands and further
reclamation of about 250 hectares x x x," plus an option "granted to AMARI to subsequently reclaim
another 350 hectares x x x."66
In short, the Amended JVA covers a reclamation area of 750 hectares. Only 157.84 hectares of the
750-hectare reclamation project have been reclaimed, and the rest of the 592.15 hectares are still
submerged areas forming part of Manila Bay.
Under the Amended JVA, AMARI will reimburse PEA the sum of P1,894,129,200.00 for PEA's "actual
cost" in partially reclaiming the Freedom Islands. AMARI will also complete, at its own expense, the
reclamation of the Freedom Islands. AMARI will further shoulder all the reclamation costs of all the
other areas, totaling 592.15 hectares, still to be reclaimed. AMARI and PEA will share, in the
proportion of 70 percent and 30 percent, respectively, the total net usable area which is defined in
the Amended JVA as the total reclaimed area less 30 percent earmarked for common areas. Title to
AMARI's share in the net usable area, totaling 367.5 hectares, will be issued in the name of AMARI.
Section 5.2 (c) of the Amended JVA provides that –
"x x x, PEA shall have the duty to execute without delay the necessary deed of transfer or conveyance
of the title pertaining to AMARI's Land share based on the Land Allocation Plan. PEA, when requested
in writing by AMARI, shall then cause the issuance and delivery of the proper certificates of title
covering AMARI's Land Share in the name of AMARI, x x x; provided, that if more than seventy percent
(70%) of the titled area at any given time pertains to AMARI, PEA shall deliver to AMARI only seventy
percent (70%) of the titles pertaining to AMARI, until such time when a corresponding proportionate
area of additional land pertaining to PEA has been titled." (Emphasis supplied)
Indisputably, under the Amended JVA AMARI will acquire and own a maximum of 367.5 hectares of
reclaimed land which will be titled in its name.
To implement the Amended JVA, PEA delegated to the unincorporated PEA-AMARI joint venture
PEA's statutory authority, rights and privileges to reclaim foreshore and submerged areas in Manila
Bay. Section 3.2.a of the Amended JVA states that –
"PEA hereby contributes to the joint venture its rights and privileges to perform Rawland Reclamation
and Horizontal Development as well as own the Reclamation Area, thereby granting the Joint Venture
the full and exclusive right, authority and privilege to undertake the Project in accordance with the
Master Development Plan."
The Amended JVA is the product of a renegotiation of the original JVA dated April 25, 1995 and its
supplemental agreement dated August 9, 1995.
The Threshold Issue
The threshold issue is whether AMARI, a private corporation, can acquire and own under the
Amended JVA 367.5 hectares of reclaimed foreshore and submerged areas in Manila Bay in view of
Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which state that:
"Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils,
all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural
resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources
shall not be alienated. x x x.
xxx
Section 3. x x x Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private
corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease,
x x x."(Emphasis supplied)
Classification of Reclaimed Foreshore and Submerged Areas
PEA readily concedes that lands reclaimed from foreshore or submerged areas of Manila Bay are
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. In its Memorandum,67 PEA admits that –
"Under the Public Land Act (CA 141, as amended), reclaimed lands are classified as alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain:
'Sec. 59. The lands disposable under this title shall be classified as follows:
(a) Lands reclaimed by the government by dredging, filling, or other means;
x x x.'" (Emphasis supplied)
Likewise, the Legal Task Force68 constituted under Presidential Administrative Order No. 365
admitted in its Report and Recommendation to then President Fidel V. Ramos, "[R]eclaimed lands are
classified as alienable and disposable lands of the public domain."69 The Legal Task Force concluded
that –
"D. Conclusion
81
Reclaimed lands are lands of the public domain. However, by statutory authority, the rights of
ownership and disposition over reclaimed lands have been transferred to PEA, by virtue of which PEA,
as owner, may validly convey the same to any qualified person without violating the Constitution or
any statute.
The constitutional provision prohibiting private corporations from holding public land, except by lease
(Sec. 3, Art. XVII,70 1987 Constitution), does not apply to reclaimed lands whose ownership has
passed on to PEA by statutory grant."
Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, the foreshore and submerged areas of Manila
Bay are part of the "lands of the public domain, waters x x x and other natural resources" and
consequently "owned by the State." As such, foreshore and submerged areas "shall not be alienated,"
unless they are classified as "agricultural lands" of the public domain. The mere reclamation of these
areas by PEA does not convert these inalienable natural resources of the State into alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain. There must be a law or presidential proclamation officially
classifying these reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable and open to disposition or concession.
Moreover, these reclaimed lands cannot be classified as alienable or disposable if the law has
reserved them for some public or quasi-public use.71
Section 8 of CA No. 141 provides that "only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or
concession which have been officially delimited and classified."72 The President has the authority to
classify inalienable lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain,
pursuant to Section 6 of CA No. 141. In Laurel vs. Garcia,73 the Executive Department attempted to
sell the Roppongi property in Tokyo, Japan, which was acquired by the Philippine Government for use
as the Chancery of the Philippine Embassy. Although the Chancery had transferred to another location
thirteen years earlier, the Court still ruled that, under Article 42274 of the Civil Code, a property of
public dominion retains such character until formally declared otherwise. The Court ruled that –
"The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual Embassy service does
not automatically convert it to patrimonial property. Any such conversion happens only if the
property is withdrawn from public use (Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co. v. Bercilles, 66 SCRA 481
[1975]. A property continues to be part of the public domain, not available for private appropriation
or ownership 'until there is a formal declaration on the part of the government to withdraw it from
being such' (Ignacio v. Director of Lands, 108 Phil. 335 [1960]." (Emphasis supplied)
PD No. 1085, issued on February 4, 1977, authorized the issuance of special land patents for lands
reclaimed by PEA from the foreshore or submerged areas of Manila Bay. On January 19, 1988 then
President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517 in the name of PEA for the 157.84
hectares comprising the partially reclaimed Freedom Islands. Subsequently, on April 9, 1999 the
Register of Deeds of the Municipality of Paranaque issued TCT Nos. 7309, 7311 and 7312 in the name
of PEA pursuant to Section 103 of PD No. 1529 authorizing the issuance of certificates of title
corresponding to land patents. To this day, these certificates of title are still in the name of PEA.
PD No. 1085, coupled with President Aquino's actual issuance of a special patent covering the
Freedom Islands, is equivalent to an official proclamation classifying the Freedom Islands as alienable
or disposable lands of the public domain. PD No. 1085 and President Aquino's issuance of a land
patent also constitute a declaration that the Freedom Islands are no longer needed for public service.
The Freedom Islands are thus alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, open to disposition
or concession to qualified parties.
At the time then President Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517, PEA had already reclaimed the
Freedom Islands although subsequently there were partial erosions on some areas. The government
had also completed the necessary surveys on these islands. Thus, the Freedom Islands were no longer
part of Manila Bay but part of the land mass. Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution classifies
lands of the public domain into "agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks."
Being neither timber, mineral, nor national park lands, the reclaimed Freedom Islands necessarily fall
under the classification of agricultural lands of the public domain. Under the 1987 Constitution,
agricultural lands of the public domain are the only natural resources that the State may alienate to
qualified private parties. All other natural resources, such as the seas or bays, are "waters x x x owned
by the State" forming part of the public domain, and are inalienable pursuant to Section 2, Article XII
of the 1987 Constitution.
AMARI claims that the Freedom Islands are private lands because CDCP, then a private corporation,
reclaimed the islands under a contract dated November 20, 1973 with the Commissioner of Public
Highways. AMARI, citing Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, argues that "if the ownership
of reclaimed lands may be given to the party constructing the works, then it cannot be said that
reclaimed lands are lands of the public domain which the State may not alienate."75 Article 5 of the
Spanish Law of Waters reads as follows:
"Article 5. Lands reclaimed from the sea in consequence of works constructed by the State, or by the
provinces, pueblos or private persons, with proper permission, shall become the property of the party
constructing such works, unless otherwise provided by the terms of the grant of authority." (Emphasis
supplied)
Under Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, private parties could reclaim from the sea only
with "proper permission" from the State. Private parties could own the reclaimed land only if not
"otherwise provided by the terms of the grant of authority." This clearly meant that no one could
reclaim from the sea without permission from the State because the sea is property of public
dominion. It also meant that the State could grant or withhold ownership of the reclaimed land
because any reclaimed land, like the sea from which it emerged, belonged to the State. Thus, a private
person reclaiming from the sea without permission from the State could not acquire ownership of
82
the reclaimed land which would remain property of public dominion like the sea it replaced.76 Article
5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 adopted the time-honored principle of land ownership that
"all lands that were not acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the
public domain."77
Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters must be read together with laws subsequently enacted on the
disposition of public lands. In particular, CA No. 141 requires that lands of the public domain must
first be classified as alienable or disposable before the government can alienate them. These lands
must not be reserved for public or quasi-public purposes.78 Moreover, the contract between CDCP
and the government was executed after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution which barred private
corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. This contract could not
have converted the Freedom Islands into private lands of a private corporation.
Presidential Decree No. 3-A, issued on January 11, 1973, revoked all laws authorizing the reclamation
of areas under water and revested solely in the National Government the power to reclaim lands.
Section 1 of PD No. 3-A declared that –
"The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, the reclamation of areas under water,
whether foreshore or inland, shall be limited to the National Government or any person authorized
by it under a proper contract. (Emphasis supplied)
x x x."
PD No. 3-A repealed Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 because reclamation of areas
under water could now be undertaken only by the National Government or by a person contracted
by the National Government. Private parties may reclaim from the sea only under a contract with the
National Government, and no longer by grant or permission as provided in Section 5 of the Spanish
Law of Waters of 1866.
Executive Order No. 525, issued on February 14, 1979, designated PEA as the National Government's
implementing arm to undertake "all reclamation projects of the government," which "shall be
undertaken by the PEA or through a proper contract executed by it with any person or entity." Under
such contract, a private party receives compensation for reclamation services rendered to PEA.
Payment to the contractor may be in cash, or in kind consisting of portions of the reclaimed land,
subject to the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public
domain. The reclaimed land can be used as payment in kind only if the reclaimed land is first classified
as alienable or disposable land open to disposition, and then declared no longer needed for public
service.
The Amended JVA covers not only the Freedom Islands, but also an additional 592.15 hectares which
are still submerged and forming part of Manila Bay. There is no legislative or Presidential act
classifying these submerged areas as alienable or disposable lands of the public domain open to
disposition. These submerged areas are not covered by any patent or certificate of title. There can be
no dispute that these submerged areas form part of the public domain, and in their present state are
inalienable and outside the commerce of man. Until reclaimed from the sea, these submerged areas
are, under the Constitution, "waters x x x owned by the State," forming part of the public domain and
consequently inalienable. Only when actually reclaimed from the sea can these submerged areas be
classified as public agricultural lands, which under the Constitution are the only natural resources that
the State may alienate. Once reclaimed and transformed into public agricultural lands, the
government may then officially classify these lands as alienable or disposable lands open to
disposition. Thereafter, the government may declare these lands no longer needed for public service.
Only then can these reclaimed lands be considered alienable or disposable lands of the public domain
and within the commerce of man.
The classification of PEA's reclaimed foreshore and submerged lands into alienable or disposable
lands open to disposition is necessary because PEA is tasked under its charter to undertake public
services that require the use of lands of the public domain. Under Section 5 of PD No. 1084, the
functions of PEA include the following: "[T]o own or operate railroads, tramways and other kinds of
land transportation, x x x; [T]o construct, maintain and operate such systems of sanitary sewers as
may be necessary; [T]o construct, maintain and operate such storm drains as may be necessary." PEA
is empowered to issue "rules and regulations as may be necessary for the proper use by private
parties of any or all of the highways, roads, utilities, buildings and/or any of its properties and to
impose or collect fees or tolls for their use." Thus, part of the reclaimed foreshore and submerged
lands held by the PEA would actually be needed for public use or service since many of the functions
imposed on PEA by its charter constitute essential public services.
Moreover, Section 1 of Executive Order No. 525 provides that PEA "shall be primarily responsible for
integrating, directing, and coordinating all reclamation projects for and on behalf of the National
Government." The same section also states that "[A]ll reclamation projects shall be approved by the
President upon recommendation of the PEA, and shall be undertaken by the PEA or through a proper
contract executed by it with any person or entity; x x x." Thus, under EO No. 525, in relation to PD No.
3-A and PD No.1084, PEA became the primary implementing agency of the National Government to
reclaim foreshore and submerged lands of the public domain. EO No. 525 recognized PEA as the
government entity "to undertake the reclamation of lands and ensure their maximum utilization in
promoting public welfare and interests."79 Since large portions of these reclaimed lands would
obviously be needed for public service, there must be a formal declaration segregating reclaimed
lands no longer needed for public service from those still needed for public service.1âwphi1.nêt
Section 3 of EO No. 525, by declaring that all lands reclaimed by PEA "shall belong to or be owned by
the PEA," could not automatically operate to classify inalienable lands into alienable or disposable
lands of the public domain. Otherwise, reclaimed foreshore and submerged lands of the public
83
domain would automatically become alienable once reclaimed by PEA, whether or not classified as
alienable or disposable.
The Revised Administrative Code of 1987, a later law than either PD No. 1084 or EO No. 525, vests in
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources ("DENR" for brevity) the following powers
and functions:
"Sec. 4. Powers and Functions. The Department shall:
(1) x x x
xxx
(4) Exercise supervision and control over forest lands, alienable and disposable public lands, mineral
resources and, in the process of exercising such control, impose appropriate taxes, fees, charges,
rentals and any such form of levy and collect such revenues for the exploration, development,
utilization or gathering of such resources;
xxx
(14) Promulgate rules, regulations and guidelines on the issuance of licenses, permits, concessions,
lease agreements and such other privileges concerning the development, exploration and utilization
of the country's marine, freshwater, and brackish water and over all aquatic resources of the country
and shall continue to oversee, supervise and police our natural resources; cancel or cause to cancel
such privileges upon failure, non-compliance or violations of any regulation, order, and for all other
causes which are in furtherance of the conservation of natural resources and supportive of the
national interest;
(15) Exercise exclusive jurisdiction on the management and disposition of all lands of the public
domain and serve as the sole agency responsible for classification, sub-classification, surveying and
titling of lands in consultation with appropriate agencies."80 (Emphasis supplied)
As manager, conservator and overseer of the natural resources of the State, DENR exercises
"supervision and control over alienable and disposable public lands." DENR also exercises "exclusive
jurisdiction on the management and disposition of all lands of the public domain." Thus, DENR decides
whether areas under water, like foreshore or submerged areas of Manila Bay, should be reclaimed or
not. This means that PEA needs authorization from DENR before PEA can undertake reclamation
projects in Manila Bay, or in any part of the country.
DENR also exercises exclusive jurisdiction over the disposition of all lands of the public domain. Hence,
DENR decides whether reclaimed lands of PEA should be classified as alienable under Sections 681
and 782 of CA No. 141. Once DENR decides that the reclaimed lands should be so classified, it then
recommends to the President the issuance of a proclamation classifying the lands as alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain open to disposition. We note that then DENR Secretary
Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr. countersigned Special Patent No. 3517 in compliance with the Revised
Administrative Code and Sections 6 and 7 of CA No. 141.
In short, DENR is vested with the power to authorize the reclamation of areas under water, while PEA
is vested with the power to undertake the physical reclamation of areas under water, whether directly
or through private contractors. DENR is also empowered to classify lands of the public domain into
alienable or disposable lands subject to the approval of the President. On the other hand, PEA is
tasked to develop, sell or lease the reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain.
Clearly, the mere physical act of reclamation by PEA of foreshore or submerged areas does not make
the reclaimed lands alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, much less patrimonial lands
of PEA. Likewise, the mere transfer by the National Government of lands of the public domain to PEA
does not make the lands alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, much less patrimonial
lands of PEA.
Absent two official acts – a classification that these lands are alienable or disposable and open to
disposition and a declaration that these lands are not needed for public service, lands reclaimed by
PEA remain inalienable lands of the public domain. Only such an official classification and formal
declaration can convert reclaimed lands into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, open
to disposition under the Constitution, Title I and Title III83 of CA No. 141 and other applicable laws.84
PEA's Authority to Sell Reclaimed Lands
PEA, like the Legal Task Force, argues that as alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, the
reclaimed lands shall be disposed of in accordance with CA No. 141, the Public Land Act. PEA, citing
Section 60 of CA No. 141, admits that reclaimed lands transferred to a branch or subdivision of the
government "shall not be alienated, encumbered, or otherwise disposed of in a manner affecting its
title, except when authorized by Congress: x x x."85 (Emphasis by PEA)
In Laurel vs. Garcia,86 the Court cited Section 48 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, which
states that –
"Sec. 48. Official Authorized to Convey Real Property. Whenever real property of the Government is
authorized by law to be conveyed, the deed of conveyance shall be executed in behalf of the
government by the following: x x x."
Thus, the Court concluded that a law is needed to convey any real property belonging to the
Government. The Court declared that -
84

"It is not for the President to convey real property of the government on his or her own sole will. Any
such conveyance must be authorized and approved by a law enacted by the Congress. It requires
executive and legislative concurrence." (Emphasis supplied)
PEA contends that PD No. 1085 and EO No. 525 constitute the legislative authority allowing PEA to
sell its reclaimed lands. PD No. 1085, issued on February 4, 1977, provides that –
"The land reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore area of Manila Bay pursuant to the contract for the
reclamation and construction of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road Project between the Republic of the
Philippines and the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines dated November
20, 1973 and/or any other contract or reclamation covering the same area is hereby transferred,
conveyed and assigned to the ownership and administration of the Public Estates Authority
established pursuant to PD No. 1084; Provided, however, That the rights and interests of the
Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines pursuant to the aforesaid contract shall
be recognized and respected.
Henceforth, the Public Estates Authority shall exercise the rights and assume the obligations of the
Republic of the Philippines (Department of Public Highways) arising from, or incident to, the aforesaid
contract between the Republic of the Philippines and the Construction and Development Corporation
of the Philippines.
In consideration of the foregoing transfer and assignment, the Public Estates Authority shall issue in
favor of the Republic of the Philippines the corresponding shares of stock in said entity with an issued
value of said shares of stock (which) shall be deemed fully paid and non-assessable.
The Secretary of Public Highways and the General Manager of the Public Estates Authority shall
execute such contracts or agreements, including appropriate agreements with the Construction and
Development Corporation of the Philippines, as may be necessary to implement the above.
Special land patent/patents shall be issued by the Secretary of Natural Resources in favor of the Public
Estates Authority without prejudice to the subsequent transfer to the contractor or his assignees of
such portion or portions of the land reclaimed or to be reclaimed as provided for in the above-
mentioned contract. On the basis of such patents, the Land Registration Commission shall issue the
corresponding certificate of title." (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, Section 3 of EO No. 525, issued on February 14, 1979, provides that -
"Sec. 3. All lands reclaimed by PEA shall belong to or be owned by the PEA which shall be responsible
for its administration, development, utilization or disposition in accordance with the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 1084. Any and all income that the PEA may derive from the sale, lease or use
of reclaimed lands shall be used in accordance with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1084."
There is no express authority under either PD No. 1085 or EO No. 525 for PEA to sell its reclaimed
lands. PD No. 1085 merely transferred "ownership and administration" of lands reclaimed from
Manila Bay to PEA, while EO No. 525 declared that lands reclaimed by PEA "shall belong to or be
owned by PEA." EO No. 525 expressly states that PEA should dispose of its reclaimed lands "in
accordance with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1084," the charter of PEA.
PEA's charter, however, expressly tasks PEA "to develop, improve, acquire, administer, deal in,
subdivide, dispose, lease and sell any and all kinds of lands x x x owned, managed, controlled and/or
operated by the government."87 (Emphasis supplied) There is, therefore, legislative authority granted
to PEA to sell its lands, whether patrimonial or alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may sell to
private parties its patrimonial properties in accordance with the PEA charter free from constitutional
limitations. The constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public
domain does not apply to the sale of PEA's patrimonial lands.
PEA may also sell its alienable or disposable lands of the public domain to private individuals since,
with the legislative authority, there is no longer any statutory prohibition against such sales and the
constitutional ban does not apply to individuals. PEA, however, cannot sell any of its alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain to private corporations since Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution expressly prohibits such sales. The legislative authority benefits only individuals. Private
corporations remain barred from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain, including
government reclaimed lands.
The provision in PD No. 1085 stating that portions of the reclaimed lands could be transferred by PEA
to the "contractor or his assignees" (Emphasis supplied) would not apply to private corporations but
only to individuals because of the constitutional ban. Otherwise, the provisions of PD No. 1085 would
violate both the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.
The requirement of public auction in the sale of reclaimed lands
Assuming the reclaimed lands of PEA are classified as alienable or disposable lands open to
disposition, and further declared no longer needed for public service, PEA would have to conduct a
public bidding in selling or leasing these lands. PEA must observe the provisions of Sections 63 and 67
of CA No. 141 requiring public auction, in the absence of a law exempting PEA from holding a public
auction.88 Special Patent No. 3517 expressly states that the patent is issued by authority of the
Constitution and PD No. 1084, "supplemented by Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended." This is
an acknowledgment that the provisions of CA No. 141 apply to the disposition of reclaimed alienable
lands of the public domain unless otherwise provided by law. Executive Order No. 654,89 which
authorizes PEA "to determine the kind and manner of payment for the transfer" of its assets and
85
properties, does not exempt PEA from the requirement of public auction. EO No. 654 merely
authorizes PEA to decide the mode of payment, whether in kind and in installment, but does not
authorize PEA to dispense with public auction.
Moreover, under Section 79 of PD No. 1445, otherwise known as the Government Auditing Code, the
government is required to sell valuable government property through public bidding. Section 79 of
PD No. 1445 mandates that –
"Section 79. When government property has become unserviceable for any cause, or is no longer
needed, it shall, upon application of the officer accountable therefor, be inspected by the head of the
agency or his duly authorized representative in the presence of the auditor concerned and, if found
to be valueless or unsaleable, it may be destroyed in their presence. If found to be valuable, it may
be sold at public auction to the highest bidder under the supervision of the proper committee on
award or similar body in the presence of the auditor concerned or other authorized representative of
the Commission, after advertising by printed notice in the Official Gazette, or for not less than three
consecutive days in any newspaper of general circulation, or where the value of the property does
not warrant the expense of publication, by notices posted for a like period in at least three public
places in the locality where the property is to be sold. In the event that the public auction fails, the
property may be sold at a private sale at such price as may be fixed by the same committee or body
concerned and approved by the Commission."
It is only when the public auction fails that a negotiated sale is allowed, in which case the Commission
on Audit must approve the selling price.90 The Commission on Audit implements Section 79 of the
Government Auditing Code through Circular No. 89-29691 dated January 27, 1989. This circular
emphasizes that government assets must be disposed of only through public auction, and a
negotiated sale can be resorted to only in case of "failure of public auction."
At the public auction sale, only Philippine citizens are qualified to bid for PEA's reclaimed foreshore
and submerged alienable lands of the public domain. Private corporations are barred from bidding at
the auction sale of any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
PEA originally scheduled a public bidding for the Freedom Islands on December 10, 1991. PEA
imposed a condition that the winning bidder should reclaim another 250 hectares of submerged areas
to regularize the shape of the Freedom Islands, under a 60-40 sharing of the additional reclaimed
areas in favor of the winning bidder.92 No one, however, submitted a bid. On December 23, 1994,
the Government Corporate Counsel advised PEA it could sell the Freedom Islands through
negotiation, without need of another public bidding, because of the failure of the public bidding on
December 10, 1991.93
However, the original JVA dated April 25, 1995 covered not only the Freedom Islands and the
additional 250 hectares still to be reclaimed, it also granted an option to AMARI to reclaim another
350 hectares. The original JVA, a negotiated contract, enlarged the reclamation area to 750
hectares.94 The failure of public bidding on December 10, 1991, involving only 407.84 hectares,95 is
not a valid justification for a negotiated sale of 750 hectares, almost double the area publicly
auctioned. Besides, the failure of public bidding happened on December 10, 1991, more than three
years before the signing of the original JVA on April 25, 1995. The economic situation in the country
had greatly improved during the intervening period.
Reclamation under the BOT Law and the Local Government Code
The constitutional prohibition in Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is absolute and clear:
"Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except
by lease, x x x." Even Republic Act No. 6957 ("BOT Law," for brevity), cited by PEA and AMARI as
legislative authority to sell reclaimed lands to private parties, recognizes the constitutional ban.
Section 6 of RA No. 6957 states –
"Sec. 6. Repayment Scheme. - For the financing, construction, operation and maintenance of any
infrastructure projects undertaken through the build-operate-and-transfer arrangement or any of its
variations pursuant to the provisions of this Act, the project proponent x x x may likewise be repaid
in the form of a share in the revenue of the project or other non-monetary payments, such as, but
not limited to, the grant of a portion or percentage of the reclaimed land, subject to the constitutional
requirements with respect to the ownership of the land: x x x." (Emphasis supplied)
A private corporation, even one that undertakes the physical reclamation of a government BOT
project, cannot acquire reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain in view of the constitutional
ban.
Section 302 of the Local Government Code, also mentioned by PEA and AMARI, authorizes local
governments in land reclamation projects to pay the contractor or developer in kind consisting of a
percentage of the reclaimed land, to wit:
"Section 302. Financing, Construction, Maintenance, Operation, and Management of Infrastructure
Projects by the Private Sector. x x x
xxx
In case of land reclamation or construction of industrial estates, the repayment plan may consist of
the grant of a portion or percentage of the reclaimed land or the industrial estate constructed."
Although Section 302 of the Local Government Code does not contain a proviso similar to that of the
BOT Law, the constitutional restrictions on land ownership automatically apply even though not
expressly mentioned in the Local Government Code.
86

Thus, under either the BOT Law or the Local Government Code, the contractor or developer, if a
corporate entity, can only be paid with leaseholds on portions of the reclaimed land. If the contractor
or developer is an individual, portions of the reclaimed land, not exceeding 12 hectares96 of non-
agricultural lands, may be conveyed to him in ownership in view of the legislative authority allowing
such conveyance. This is the only way these provisions of the BOT Law and the Local Government
Code can avoid a direct collision with Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
Registration of lands of the public domain
Finally, PEA theorizes that the "act of conveying the ownership of the reclaimed lands to public
respondent PEA transformed such lands of the public domain to private lands." This theory is echoed
by AMARI which maintains that the "issuance of the special patent leading to the eventual issuance
of title takes the subject land away from the land of public domain and converts the property into
patrimonial or private property." In short, PEA and AMARI contend that with the issuance of Special
Patent No. 3517 and the corresponding certificates of titles, the 157.84 hectares comprising the
Freedom Islands have become private lands of PEA. In support of their theory, PEA and AMARI cite
the following rulings of the Court:
1. Sumail v. Judge of CFI of Cotabato,97 where the Court held –
"Once the patent was granted and the corresponding certificate of title was issued, the land ceased
to be part of the public domain and became private property over which the Director of Lands has
neither control nor jurisdiction."
2. Lee Hong Hok v. David,98 where the Court declared -
"After the registration and issuance of the certificate and duplicate certificate of title based on a
public land patent, the land covered thereby automatically comes under the operation of Republic
Act 496 subject to all the safeguards provided therein."3. Heirs of Gregorio Tengco v. Heirs of Jose
Aliwalas,99 where the Court ruled -
"While the Director of Lands has the power to review homestead patents, he may do so only so long
as the land remains part of the public domain and continues to be under his exclusive control; but
once the patent is registered and a certificate of title is issued, the land ceases to be part of the public
domain and becomes private property over which the Director of Lands has neither control nor
jurisdiction."
4. Manalo v. Intermediate Appellate Court,100 where the Court held –
"When the lots in dispute were certified as disposable on May 19, 1971, and free patents were issued
covering the same in favor of the private respondents, the said lots ceased to be part of the public
domain and, therefore, the Director of Lands lost jurisdiction over the same."
5.Republic v. Court of Appeals,101 where the Court stated –
"Proclamation No. 350, dated October 9, 1956, of President Magsaysay legally effected a land grant
to the Mindanao Medical Center, Bureau of Medical Services, Department of Health, of the whole lot,
validly sufficient for initial registration under the Land Registration Act. Such land grant is constitutive
of a 'fee simple' title or absolute title in favor of petitioner Mindanao Medical Center. Thus, Section
122 of the Act, which governs the registration of grants or patents involving public lands, provides
that 'Whenever public lands in the Philippine Islands belonging to the Government of the United
States or to the Government of the Philippines are alienated, granted or conveyed to persons or to
public or private corporations, the same shall be brought forthwith under the operation of this Act
(Land Registration Act, Act 496) and shall become registered lands.'"
The first four cases cited involve petitions to cancel the land patents and the corresponding
certificates of titles issued to private parties. These four cases uniformly hold that the Director of
Lands has no jurisdiction over private lands or that upon issuance of the certificate of title the land
automatically comes under the Torrens System. The fifth case cited involves the registration under
the Torrens System of a 12.8-hectare public land granted by the National Government to Mindanao
Medical Center, a government unit under the Department of Health. The National Government
transferred the 12.8-hectare public land to serve as the site for the hospital buildings and other
facilities of Mindanao Medical Center, which performed a public service. The Court affirmed the
registration of the 12.8-hectare public land in the name of Mindanao Medical Center under Section
122 of Act No. 496. This fifth case is an example of a public land being registered under Act No. 496
without the land losing its character as a property of public dominion.
In the instant case, the only patent and certificates of title issued are those in the name of PEA, a
wholly government owned corporation performing public as well as proprietary functions. No patent
or certificate of title has been issued to any private party. No one is asking the Director of Lands to
cancel PEA's patent or certificates of title. In fact, the thrust of the instant petition is that PEA's
certificates of title should remain with PEA, and the land covered by these certificates, being alienable
lands of the public domain, should not be sold to a private corporation.
Registration of land under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529 does not vest in the registrant private or public
ownership of the land. Registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership but is merely evidence of
ownership previously conferred by any of the recognized modes of acquiring ownership. Registration
does not give the registrant a better right than what the registrant had prior to the registration.102
The registration of lands of the public domain under the Torrens system, by itself, cannot convert
public lands into private lands.103
87

Jurisprudence holding that upon the grant of the patent or issuance of the certificate of title the
alienable land of the public domain automatically becomes private land cannot apply to government
units and entities like PEA. The transfer of the Freedom Islands to PEA was made subject to the
provisions of CA No. 141 as expressly stated in Special Patent No. 3517 issued by then President
Aquino, to wit:
"NOW, THEREFORE, KNOW YE, that by authority of the Constitution of the Philippines and in
conformity with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1084, supplemented by Commonwealth
Act No. 141, as amended, there are hereby granted and conveyed unto the Public Estates Authority
the aforesaid tracts of land containing a total area of one million nine hundred fifteen thousand eight
hundred ninety four (1,915,894) square meters; the technical description of which are hereto
attached and made an integral part hereof." (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the provisions of CA No. 141 apply to the Freedom Islands on matters not covered by PD No.
1084. Section 60 of CA No. 141 prohibits, "except when authorized by Congress," the sale of alienable
lands of the public domain that are transferred to government units or entities. Section 60 of CA No.
141 constitutes, under Section 44 of PD No. 1529, a "statutory lien affecting title" of the registered
land even if not annotated on the certificate of title.104 Alienable lands of the public domain held by
government entities under Section 60 of CA No. 141 remain public lands because they cannot be
alienated or encumbered unless Congress passes a law authorizing their disposition. Congress,
however, cannot authorize the sale to private corporations of reclaimed alienable lands of the public
domain because of the constitutional ban. Only individuals can benefit from such law.
The grant of legislative authority to sell public lands in accordance with Section 60 of CA No. 141 does
not automatically convert alienable lands of the public domain into private or patrimonial lands. The
alienable lands of the public domain must be transferred to qualified private parties, or to
government entities not tasked to dispose of public lands, before these lands can become private or
patrimonial lands. Otherwise, the constitutional ban will become illusory if Congress can declare lands
of the public domain as private or patrimonial lands in the hands of a government agency tasked to
dispose of public lands. This will allow private corporations to acquire directly from government
agencies limitless areas of lands which, prior to such law, are concededly public lands.
Under EO No. 525, PEA became the central implementing agency of the National Government to
reclaim foreshore and submerged areas of the public domain. Thus, EO No. 525 declares that –
"EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 525
Designating the Public Estates Authority as the Agency Primarily Responsible for all Reclamation
Projects
Whereas, there are several reclamation projects which are ongoing or being proposed to be
undertaken in various parts of the country which need to be evaluated for consistency with national
programs;
Whereas, there is a need to give further institutional support to the Government's declared policy to
provide for a coordinated, economical and efficient reclamation of lands;
Whereas, Presidential Decree No. 3-A requires that all reclamation of areas shall be limited to the
National Government or any person authorized by it under proper contract;
Whereas, a central authority is needed to act on behalf of the National Government which shall
ensure a coordinated and integrated approach in the reclamation of lands;
Whereas, Presidential Decree No. 1084 creates the Public Estates Authority as a government
corporation to undertake reclamation of lands and ensure their maximum utilization in promoting
public welfare and interests; and
Whereas, Presidential Decree No. 1416 provides the President with continuing authority to
reorganize the national government including the transfer, abolition, or merger of functions and
offices.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers
vested in me by the Constitution and pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1416, do hereby order and
direct the following:
Section 1. The Public Estates Authority (PEA) shall be primarily responsible for integrating, directing,
and coordinating all reclamation projects for and on behalf of the National Government. All
reclamation projects shall be approved by the President upon recommendation of the PEA, and shall
be undertaken by the PEA or through a proper contract executed by it with any person or entity;
Provided, that, reclamation projects of any national government agency or entity authorized under
its charter shall be undertaken in consultation with the PEA upon approval of the President.
x x x ."
As the central implementing agency tasked to undertake reclamation projects nationwide, with
authority to sell reclaimed lands, PEA took the place of DENR as the government agency charged with
leasing or selling reclaimed lands of the public domain. The reclaimed lands being leased or sold by
PEA are not private lands, in the same manner that DENR, when it disposes of other alienable lands,
does not dispose of private lands but alienable lands of the public domain. Only when qualified private
parties acquire these lands will the lands become private lands. In the hands of the government
88
agency tasked and authorized to dispose of alienable of disposable lands of the public domain, these
lands are still public, not private lands.
Furthermore, PEA's charter expressly states that PEA "shall hold lands of the public domain" as well
as "any and all kinds of lands." PEA can hold both lands of the public domain and private lands. Thus,
the mere fact that alienable lands of the public domain like the Freedom Islands are transferred to
PEA and issued land patents or certificates of title in PEA's name does not automatically make such
lands private.
To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to PEA as private lands
will sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring any
kind of alienable land of the public domain. PEA will simply turn around, as PEA has now done under
the Amended JVA, and transfer several hundreds of hectares of these reclaimed and still to be
reclaimed lands to a single private corporation in only one transaction. This scheme will effectively
nullify the constitutional ban in Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which was intended to
diffuse equitably the ownership of alienable lands of the public domain among Filipinos, now
numbering over 80 million strong.
This scheme, if allowed, can even be applied to alienable agricultural lands of the public domain since
PEA can "acquire x x x any and all kinds of lands." This will open the floodgates to corporations and
even individuals acquiring hundreds of hectares of alienable lands of the public domain under the
guise that in the hands of PEA these lands are private lands. This will result in corporations amassing
huge landholdings never before seen in this country - creating the very evil that the constitutional
ban was designed to prevent. This will completely reverse the clear direction of constitutional
development in this country. The 1935 Constitution allowed private corporations to acquire not more
than 1,024 hectares of public lands.105 The 1973 Constitution prohibited private corporations from
acquiring any kind of public land, and the 1987 Constitution has unequivocally reiterated this
prohibition.
The contention of PEA and AMARI that public lands, once registered under Act No. 496 or PD No.
1529, automatically become private lands is contrary to existing laws. Several laws authorize lands of
the public domain to be registered under the Torrens System or Act No. 496, now PD No. 1529,
without losing their character as public lands. Section 122 of Act No. 496, and Section 103 of PD No.
1529, respectively, provide as follows:
Act No. 496
"Sec. 122. Whenever public lands in the Philippine Islands belonging to the x x x Government of the
Philippine Islands are alienated, granted, or conveyed to persons or the public or private corporations,
the same shall be brought forthwith under the operation of this Act and shall become registered
lands."
PD No. 1529
"Sec. 103. Certificate of Title to Patents. Whenever public land is by the Government alienated,
granted or conveyed to any person, the same shall be brought forthwith under the operation of this
Decree." (Emphasis supplied)
Based on its legislative history, the phrase "conveyed to any person" in Section 103 of PD No. 1529
includes conveyances of public lands to public corporations.
Alienable lands of the public domain "granted, donated, or transferred to a province, municipality, or
branch or subdivision of the Government," as provided in Section 60 of CA No. 141, may be registered
under the Torrens System pursuant to Section 103 of PD No. 1529. Such registration, however, is
expressly subject to the condition in Section 60 of CA No. 141 that the land "shall not be alienated,
encumbered or otherwise disposed of in a manner affecting its title, except when authorized by
Congress." This provision refers to government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands of the public
domain that have been titled but still cannot be alienated or encumbered unless expressly authorized
by Congress. The need for legislative authority prevents the registered land of the public domain from
becoming private land that can be disposed of to qualified private parties.
The Revised Administrative Code of 1987 also recognizes that lands of the public domain may be
registered under the Torrens System. Section 48, Chapter 12, Book I of the Code states –
"Sec. 48. Official Authorized to Convey Real Property. Whenever real property of the Government is
authorized by law to be conveyed, the deed of conveyance shall be executed in behalf of the
government by the following:
(1) x x x
(2) For property belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, but titled in the name of any political
subdivision or of any corporate agency or instrumentality, by the executive head of the agency or
instrumentality." (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, private property purchased by the National Government for expansion of a public wharf may
be titled in the name of a government corporation regulating port operations in the country. Private
property purchased by the National Government for expansion of an airport may also be titled in the
name of the government agency tasked to administer the airport. Private property donated to a
municipality for use as a town plaza or public school site may likewise be titled in the name of the
municipality.106 All these properties become properties of the public domain, and if already
registered under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529, remain registered land. There is no requirement or
provision in any existing law for the de-registration of land from the Torrens System.
89

Private lands taken by the Government for public use under its power of eminent domain become
unquestionably part of the public domain. Nevertheless, Section 85 of PD No. 1529 authorizes the
Register of Deeds to issue in the name of the National Government new certificates of title covering
such expropriated lands. Section 85 of PD No. 1529 states –
"Sec. 85. Land taken by eminent domain. Whenever any registered land, or interest therein, is
expropriated or taken by eminent domain, the National Government, province, city or municipality,
or any other agency or instrumentality exercising such right shall file for registration in the proper
Registry a certified copy of the judgment which shall state definitely by an adequate description, the
particular property or interest expropriated, the number of the certificate of title, and the nature of
the public use. A memorandum of the right or interest taken shall be made on each certificate of title
by the Register of Deeds, and where the fee simple is taken, a new certificate shall be issued in favor
of the National Government, province, city, municipality, or any other agency or instrumentality
exercising such right for the land so taken. The legal expenses incident to the memorandum of
registration or issuance of a new certificate of title shall be for the account of the authority taking the
land or interest therein." (Emphasis supplied)
Consequently, lands registered under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529 are not exclusively private or
patrimonial lands. Lands of the public domain may also be registered pursuant to existing laws.
AMARI makes a parting shot that the Amended JVA is not a sale to AMARI of the Freedom Islands or
of the lands to be reclaimed from submerged areas of Manila Bay. In the words of AMARI, the
Amended JVA "is not a sale but a joint venture with a stipulation for reimbursement of the original
cost incurred by PEA for the earlier reclamation and construction works performed by the CDCP under
its 1973 contract with the Republic." Whether the Amended JVA is a sale or a joint venture, the fact
remains that the Amended JVA requires PEA to "cause the issuance and delivery of the certificates of
title conveying AMARI's Land Share in the name of AMARI."107
This stipulation still contravenes Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which provides that
private corporations "shall not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease." The
transfer of title and ownership to AMARI clearly means that AMARI will "hold" the reclaimed lands
other than by lease. The transfer of title and ownership is a "disposition" of the reclaimed lands, a
transaction considered a sale or alienation under CA No. 141,108 the Government Auditing Code,109
and Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
The Regalian doctrine is deeply implanted in our legal system. Foreshore and submerged areas form
part of the public domain and are inalienable. Lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas
also form part of the public domain and are also inalienable, unless converted pursuant to law into
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. Historically, lands reclaimed by the government
are sui generis, not available for sale to private parties unlike other alienable public lands. Reclaimed
lands retain their inherent potential as areas for public use or public service. Alienable lands of the
public domain, increasingly becoming scarce natural resources, are to be distributed equitably among
our ever-growing population. To insure such equitable distribution, the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions
have barred private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
Those who attempt to dispose of inalienable natural resources of the State, or seek to circumvent the
constitutional ban on alienation of lands of the public domain to private corporations, do so at their
own risk.
We can now summarize our conclusions as follows:
1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by
certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these
lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private
corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership limitations
in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws.
2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the
public domain until classified as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition and declared no
longer needed for public service. The government can make such classification and declaration only
after PEA has reclaimed these submerged areas. Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural lands
of the public domain, which are the only natural resources the government can alienate. In their
present state, the 592.15 hectares of submerged areas are inalienable and outside the commerce of
man.
3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34
hectares110 of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII
of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable
land of the public domain.
4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares111 of still
submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of
the public domain. PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can classify
the reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare them no longer needed for public
service. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain to AMARI will be void
in view of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
Clearly, the Amended JVA violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
Under Article 1409112 of the Civil Code, contracts whose "object or purpose is contrary to law," or
whose "object is outside the commerce of men," are "inexistent and void from the beginning." The
90
Court must perform its duty to defend and uphold the Constitution, and therefore declares the
Amended JVA null and void ab initio.

Seventh issue: whether the Court is the proper forum to raise the issue of whether the Amended JVA
is grossly disadvantageous to the government.

Considering that the Amended JVA is null and void ab initio, there is no necessity to rule on this last
issue. Besides, the Court is not a trier of facts, and this last issue involves a determination of factual
matters.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Public Estates Authority and Amari Coastal Bay
Development Corporation are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from implementing the Amended Joint
Venture Agreement which is hereby declared NULL and VOID ab initio.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-
Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, and Corona, JJ., concur.

91
G.R. No. 166865 March 2, 2007
ANGELITA F. BUENAVENTURA and PRECIOSA F. BUENAVENTURA, Petitioners,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
The case before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to annul and set aside the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 72925 entitled, Angelita F. Buenaventura and Preciosa F. Buenaventura vs.
Republic of the Philippines, dated 23 August 2004 and 25 January 2005, respectively, which granted
the appeal filed by the Republic of the Philippines (Republic) and declared the parcel of land subject
matter of this Petition as public land, thus, reversing the Order3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Parañaque City dated 29 October 2001, which recognized and confirmed the rights of herein
petitioners Angelita F. Buenaventura (Angelita) and Preciosa F. Buenaventura (Preciosa), over the
subject property, and issued a decree of registration of the same in their favor.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioners Angelita and Preciosa are the applicants for registration of title over the subject property.
They are the heirs of spouses Amado Buenaventura and Irene Flores (spouses Buenaventura) from
whom they acquired the subject property.
The facts reveal that the subject property was acquired by the spouses Buenaventura from the Heirs
of Lazaro de Leon, namely: Aurelio de Leon and his sister Rodencia Sta. Agueda even before World
War II. However, it was only on 30 January 1948 that the corresponding Deed of Sale4 was executed
in favor of the spouses Buenaventura. After the execution of the said Deed of Sale, the spouses
Buenaventura transferred the tax declaration in their name. Consequently, Tax Declaration (T.D.) No.
5492 covering the subject property in the names of Aurelio and Rodencia was cancelled and T.D. No.
61035 was issued in the name of spouses Buenaventura.
In 1978, the spouses Buenaventura transferred, by way of Deed of Sale,6 the subject property,
together with the adjacent property, which they previously acquired from Mariano Pascual, to their
children, among whom are herein petitioners. As a result thereof, a new tax declaration (T.D. No. A-
004-05698)7 was issued in the name of the spouses Buenaventura’s children.
Petitioners then filed an Application for Registration of Title on 5 June 2000 before the RTC of
Parañaque City of the subject property, more particularly described as Cadastral Lot No. 5001-B, Csd-
007604-000176-D, Parañaque Cadastre, located in San Dionisio, Parañaque City, with an area of
3,520.92 square meters, more or less. Petitioners alleged that "they and their predecessors-in-
interest acquired title to the said parcel of land thru inheritance, transfer, and possession as owners
of the same since time immemorial and/or within the period provided for by law."8
As the trial court found the application to be sufficient in form and substance, it thereby set the case
for hearing, and directed the service and publication of the notice thereof pursuant to Section 239 of
the Property Registration Decree (Presidential Decree No. 1529).
On 27 September 2001, when the case was called for hearing, no interested party appeared before
the trial court other than the petitioners. Consequently, petitioners proceeded to present several
documents in order to establish compliance with the jurisdictional requirements. The same were
marked and offered in evidence before the court a quo.
No formal opposition had been filed and no oppositor appeared in any of the previously set hearings
of the case; hence, petitioners’ counsel moved for the declaration of general default except for the
Republic. The same was granted by the court a quo. The case was then referred to a commissioner,
who directly received petitioners’ evidence in chief.
Petitioners presented five witnesses, namely: Aniceta C. Capiral, Engr. Teofilo R. La Guardia, Atty.
Reginald L. Hernandez, Ricardo H. Lopez, and herein petitioner Angelita, in order to establish the fact
that petitioners and their predecessors have acquired vested right over the subject property by their
open, continuous, and exclusive possession under a bona fide claim of ownership for over 50 years
completely unmolested by any adverse claim, meaning, their possession of the subject property was
in the manner and for the period required by law; likewise, to prove the alienable and disposable
character of the subject property.
Other than the respective testimonies of the above-named witnesses, they also presented and
identified several documents10 offered in evidence, which tend to establish further the following: (1)
petitioners’ fee simple title over the subject property; (2) the nature of the possession and occupation
of the property; (3) its classification as part of the alienable and disposable zone of the government;
and (4) the improvements introduced thereon and the taxes paid on the subject property. Said
documents were duly admitted by the trial court.
On 29 October 2001, based on the pieces of evidence presented by petitioners, the court a quo issued
an Order granting the application for registration of title of the subject property, the decretal portion
of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the application of registration of title to the subject parcel of land, known as Lot
5001-B Cad 299, Parañaque Cadastre, and more particularly described in approved Survey Plan Csd
007604-000176 is hereby confirmed and ordered registered in the names of [petitioners] Preciosa,
92
Angelita, [and in the names of their other siblings] Crisostomo, and Alfredo, all surnamed
Buenaventura, free from all liens and encumbrances.
ONCE THIS DECISION has become final, let another one issue directing the Land Registration Authority
to issue the corresponding decree.
Let copies of this [D]ecision be furnished to the adjoining owners, Land Registration Authority, Land
Management Bureau, Office of the Solicitor General, Sec. of Public Works and Highways, Department
of Agrarian Reform, the Director, Forest Management Bureau, Chairman Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority, DENR [Department of Environment and Natural Resources], South CENRO,
Land Management Sector, City Mayor of Parañaque and Registry of Deeds, Parañaque City.11
Feeling aggrieved with the aforementioned Order of the trial court, the Republic appealed to the
Court of Appeals. According to the Republic, petitioners failed to prove continuous, open, exclusive
and notorious possession by their predecessors-in-interest and by themselves; hence, the trial court
erred in granting petitioners’ application for registration of the subject property. The Republic prayed
for the reversal of the Order of the trial court and for the dismissal of the application for registration
filed by petitioners.
On 23 August 2004, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision in favor of the Republic, thus,
overturning the Order of the court a quo. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 274,
Parañaque City dated October 29, 2001 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the parcel of land subject
matter of the application is declared public land.12
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Decision on 20 September 2004. In a
Resolution dated 25 January 2005 rendered by the appellate court, said Motion for Reconsideration
was forthwith denied for lack of merit.
Hence, this Petition.
Petitioners raise the following issues for the resolution of this Court:
I. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in nullifying the Decision of the trial court confirming
petitioners’ title over the subject property for not being allegedly supported by substantial evidence
as required by law.
II. Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in declaring the subject property as pubic land
and ignoring petitioners’ evidence of over 50 year possession in the concept of an owner and
completely unmolested by any adverse claim.
In the Memorandum13 of the petitioners, they allege that the appellate court committed grave error
when it nullified the trial court’s Order dated 29 October 2001, which confirmed their title to the
subject property. Petitioners claim that contrary to the findings of the Court of Appeals that the
above-mentioned Order was not supported by evidence, the records of the case clearly speak of the
existence, not absence, of sufficient evidence to sustain the findings of the court a quo that
petitioners have established possession of the subject property in the manner and for the period
required by law, that is by open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession in the concept of an
owner since 12 June 1945 or earlier, to warrant the registration of their title to the subject property.
Petitioners likewise argue that the appellate court gravely erred when it declared as public land the
subject property despite the fact that they were able to prove by clear and convincing evidence that
their possession of the subject property was indeed in the manner and within the period required by
law. Having been in possession of the subject property for more than 30 years, they have already
acquired vested right or title over the subject property by operation of law based on the period
provided for under the prevailing land registration and property laws; hence, the Decision of the Court
of Appeals is inconsistent with the facts and the law.
The Petition is meritorious.
In resolving the issues involved in the present case, there is a need for this Court to re-examine the
facts of the case for the proper determination of the issues raised herein.
As a rule, in the exercise of the Supreme Court’s power of review, the Court is not a trier of facts and
does not normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties
during the trial of the case considering that the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive
and binding on the Court.14 However, the rule is not without exceptions. There are several recognized
exceptions15 in which factual issues may be resolved by this Court and two of these exceptions find
application in this present case, to wit: (1) when the findings of the appellate court are contrary to
those of the trial court; and (2) when the findings of fact of the appellate court are premised on the
supposed absence of evidence but contradicted by the evidence on record.
The issues presented by petitioners will be discussed concurrently, since they are interrelated.
In the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, it ruled that petitioners failed to show possession
and occupation of the subject property under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945 or
earlier as provided for in Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. It further said that the
testimonial evidence presented by petitioners was not sufficient to prove petitioners’ possession in
the manner and within the period required by the aforesaid law because petitioners’ witnesses
merely testified on their familiarity with the subject property.
93
Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree speaks of who may apply for registration of land. The
said provision of law refers to an original registration through ordinary registration proceedings.16 It
specifically provides:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. – The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance [now
Regional Trial Court] an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through
their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provisions of
existing laws.
From the aforesaid provisions of the Property Registration Decree, we can deduce that there are three
requisites for the filing of an application for registration of title under the first category, to wit: (1)
that the property in question is alienable and disposable land of the public domain; (2) that the
applicants by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation; and (3) that such possession is under a bona fide
claim of ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier.17 The second classification relates to the acquisition
of private lands by prescription.
In the case at bar, the Republic argues, through the Office of the Solicitor General, that petitioners’
own evidence tends to show that the subject property is not alienable and disposable because it was
a salt bed and a fishpond and under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, except for agricultural
lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. Likewise, under the Regalian Doctrine, all
lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the
State.
It is true that under the Regalian Doctrine all lands of the public domain belong to the State and all
lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the
State.18 However, such presumption is not conclusive. It can be rebutted by the applicant’s
presentation of incontrovertible evidence showing that the land subject of the application for
registration is alienable and disposable.19
After a thorough examination of the records of this case, this Court found out that petitioners offered
in evidence a certification20 from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, National
Capital Region dated 29 October 2001, to prove that the subject property was alienable and
disposable land of the public domain. The said certification contains the following statements:
This is to certify that the parcel of land as shown and described on the reverse side of this plan- Lot
5001-B, Cad-299, Parañaque Cadastre situated at San Dionisio, Parañaque City, Metro Manila
containing an area of 3,520.92 square meters as prepared by Geodetic Engineer Mariano V. Flotildes
for Amado Buenaventura, et al., was verified to be within the Alienable and Disposable Land per L.C.
Map 2623, Project No. 25 of Parañaque per Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1141 dated January
3, 1968.21 (Emphasis supplied.)
To our minds, the said certification is sufficient to establish the true nature or character of the subject
property. The certification enjoys a presumption of regularity in the absence of contradictory
evidence.22 As it is, the said certification remains uncontested and even the Republic itself did not
present any evidence to refute the contents of the said certification. Therefore, the alienable and
disposable character of the questioned parcel of land has been clearly established by the evidence of
the petitioners, by 3 January 1968, at the latest.
Now, going to the requisites of open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier, Republic alleges that no sufficient
evidence was adduced by petitioners to show that they and their predecessors-in-interest have been
in exclusive possession of the subject property since 12 June 1945 or earlier in the concept of an
owner, to which the Court of Appeals agreed. The Court of Appeals in its decision said that:
Although they were able to show possession by their parents, their predecessors-in-interest, since
1948, they failed to prove the fact of possession since [12 June 1945] before the filing of the
application.23
Emphasis should be given to the fact that the Court of Appeals, in its Decision, did not question
petitioners’ possession of the subject property since 1948. Verily, it even stated in the said Decision
that petitioners’ possession may be reckoned from 1948, the year of the execution of the Deed of
Sale. The only reason posited by the appellate court in denying the Order of the trial court which
granted the application for registration of title of the petitioners was the fact that petitioners’
evidence was not sufficient to prove that their possession of the subject property was since 12 June
1945 or earlier.
We agree with the findings of the Court of Appeals that the evidence presented by petitioners was
not enough to prove that their possession of the subject property started since 12 June 1945 or earlier
because the evidence established that the questioned parcel of land was acquired by petitioners’
parents only on 30 January 1948, the date of the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale by its previous
owners. They can neither tack their possession to that of the previous owners because they failed to
present any evidence of possession by those prior owners. Moreover, petitioners’ possession of the
subject property could only ripen into ownership on 3 January 1968, when the same became alienable
and disposable. "Any period of possession prior to the date when the [s]ubject [property was]
classified as alienable and disposable is inconsequential and should be excluded from the
94
computation of the period of possession; such possession can never ripen into ownership and unless
the land had been classified as alienable and disposable, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title
shall not apply thereto."24
Be that as it may, this will not be an insurmountable bar to the petitioners to have the title to the
subject property registered in their names.
In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals,25 this Court closely examined the land registration laws
governing land registration proceedings in the Philippines. In the aforesaid case, the Court made the
following pronouncements:
When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in 1936, the period of possession deemed necessary
to vest the right to register their title to agricultural lands of the public domain commenced from July
26, 1894. However, this period was amended by R.A. [Republic Act] No. 1942, which provided that
the bona fide claim of ownership must have been for at least thirty (30) years. Then in 1977, Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act was again amended, this time by P.D. No. 1073, which pegged the
reckoning date at June 12, 1945. This new starting point is concordant with Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree.
Indeed, there are no material differences between Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree
and Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended. True, the Public Land Act does refer to
"agricultural lands of the public domain," while the Property Registration Decree uses the term
"alienable and disposable lands of the public domain." It must be noted though that the Constitution
declares that "alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands." Clearly the
subject lands under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act and Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree are of the same type.
Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and the amendatory P.D. No. 1073 preclude
the application for registration of alienable lands of the public domain, possession over which
commenced only after June 12, 1945? It did not, considering Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree, which governs and authorizes the application of "those who have acquired
ownership of private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws."26 (Emphasis
supplied.)
It becomes crystal clear from the aforesaid ruling of the Court that even if the possession of alienable
lands of the public domain commenced only after 12 June 1945, application for registration of the
said property is still possible by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree which
speaks of prescription.
Under the Civil Code, prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership.27 Article 1106 of the
Civil Code provides:
By prescription, one acquires ownership and other real rights through the lapse of time in the manner
and under the conditions laid down by law.
Also in Article 1113 of the Civil Code, it is provided that:
All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of prescription, unless otherwise
provided. Property of the State or any of its subdivision not patrimonial in character shall not be the
object of prescription.
Likewise, Article 1137 of the Civil Code states that:
Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted adverse
possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith. (Emphasis supplied.)
It is well-settled that properties classified as alienable and disposable land may be converted into
private property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least 30 years.28 Such
property now falls within the contemplation of "private lands" under Section 14(2), over which title
by prescription can be acquired. Hence, because of Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529,
those who are in possession of alienable and disposable land, and whose possession has been
characterized as open, continuous and exclusive for 30 years or more, may have the right to register
their title to such land despite the fact that their possession of the land commenced only after 12
June 1945.29
The aforesaid jurisprudential rule truly demonstrates that, in the present case, while petitioners’
possession over the subject property can be reckoned only on 3 January 1968, the date when
according to evidence, the subject property became alienable and disposable, they can still have the
subject property registered in their names by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree.
The records, indeed, reveal that petitioners were in possession of the subject property for more than
30 years, 32 years to be exact, reckoned from the year 1968, when the subject property was finally
declared alienable and disposable by the DENR to the time they filed an application for registration
of title over the subject property on 5 June 2000. Petitioners’ possession of the subject property since
1968 has been characterized as open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
in the concept of an owner.
Petitioners presented as evidence their tax declarations covering the years from 1948 until the third
quarter of 2001. They also offered in evidence a certification30 from the Office of the Treasurer of
the City of Parañaque to prove that realty taxes over the subject property had been duly paid by
petitioners. As a rule, tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are not conclusive evidence
95
of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner, for no one
in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or constructive
possession. They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. The
voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests not only one’s sincere
and honest desire to obtain title to the property and announces his adverse claim against the State
and all other interested parties, but also the intention to contribute needed revenues to the
Government. Such an act strengthens one’s bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.31
In the same breath, it cannot be gainsaid that petitioners have been in actual possession of the subject
property since 1968, at the latest. According to the testimony of their witnesses, parts of the subject
property are planted with bananas and some vegetables, and a bamboo grove. The other parts of the
subject property were used as a fishpond, as well as devoted to salt making until 1990.32 However,
when the property was no longer suitable for agricultural purposes, for fishpond, and for salt making
because of its conversion to non-agricultural purposes consistent with the zonal development of the
area, the petitioners backfilled the subject property with gravel and sand, for which they paid their
farm helpers just compensation. Thereafter, they enclosed the property with perimeter fence,
installed guards and a caretaker to prevent potential squatters from penetrating the area.33 When
tax declarations and receipts are coupled with actual possession, they constitute evidence of great
weight and can be the basis of a claim of ownership through prescription.34
Conspicuously, the petitioners’ witnesses are one in pointing out that petitioners and their
predecessors-in-interest are the sole claimants of the subject property.
It bears stressing that the pieces of evidence submitted by petitioners are incontrovertible. No one,
not even the Republic, presented any evidence to contradict the claims of the petitioners that they
are in possession of the subject property and their possession of the same is open, continuous and
exclusive in the concept of an owner for over 30 years. Verily, even the appellate court mentioned in
its Decision that petitioners were able to show possession of the subject property as early as 1948,
the only basis for its Decision reversing the Order of the trial court being the insufficiency of the
evidence presented by petitioners to establish their possession of the subject property prior to 12
June 1945.
IN ALL, petitioners were able to prove sufficiently that they have been in possession of the subject
property for more than 30 years, which possession is characterized as open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious, in the concept of an owner. By this, the subject alienable and disposable public land
had been effectively converted into private property over which petitioners have acquired ownership
through prescription to which they are entitled to have title through registration proceedings.
Petitioners’ right to have their title to the subject property registered cannot be defeated simply
because the possession of petitioners commenced on a date later than 12 June 1945, for the law and
supplementing jurisprudence amply, justly and rightfully provides the necessary remedy to what
would otherwise result in an unjust and unwarranted situation. It would be the height of injustice if
petitioners’ registration of title over the said property will de denied solely on that ground.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 23 August 2004 and 25 January 2005, respectively, are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order of the trial court dated 29 October 2001 which granted
petitioners’ application for registration of the subject property and directing the issuance of a decree
of registration in petitioners’ favor once the judgment has become final and executory is hereby
REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No.. 195026
CENTRAL MINDANAO UNIVERSITY, represented by its President, DR. MARIA LUISA R. SO LIVEN,
Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
For this Court's resolution is a petition for review on certiorari dated January 14, 2011 filed by
petitioner Central Mindanao University (CMU), seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision1 dated
December 30, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA), which annulled the Decision2 dated December 22,
1971, the Amended Decision3 dated October 7, 1972 and the Second Amended Decision4 dated
September 12, 1974 rendered by the then Court of First Instance (CFI), 15th Judicial District, Branch
II of Bukidnon and annulled the Decrees No. N-154065, N-154066 and N-154067 issued in favor of
petitioner and the Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 0-160, OCT No. 0-161 and OCT No. 0-162
registered in petitioner's name on January 29, 1975.
The facts follow:
Petitioner Central Mindanao University (CMU) is an agricultural educational institution owned and
run by the State established by virtue of Republic Act No. 4498.5 It is represented by its President, Dr.
Maria Luisa R. So liven in accordance with CMU Board of Regents Resolution No. 02, s. 2011.6
96
The subjects of the controversy are two parcels of land situated at Musuan, Maramag, Bukidnon
identified as "Sheet 1, Lot 1 of Ir-1031-D" consisting of 20,619, 175 square meters, and "Sheet 2, Lot
2 of Ir-1031-D" consisting of 13,391,795 square meters, more or less.7
In 1946, CMU took possession of the subject parcels of land and started construction for the school
site upon the confirmation of the Secretary of Public Instruction. 8 However, during the final survey
in 1952, CMU discovered that there were several adverse claimants, holders, possessors and
occupants of the portions of lots identified as school sites. 9
On January 16, 1958, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources and pursuant to the provisions of Section 8310 of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141,
otherwise known as Public Land Act, President Carlos P. Garcia issued Proclamation No. 47611 which
reserved certain portions of the public domain in Musuan, Maramag, Bukidnon for petitioner CMU's
(formerly Mindanao Agricultural College) site purposes. 12 The said parcels of land were withdrawn
from sale or settlement and reserved for CMU's school site purposes, "subject to private rights, if any
there be."
In a letter dated October 27, 1960, the Director of Lands Zoilo Castrillo formally requested the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources that he be authorized under Section 87 of C.A. No.
141, to file in the CFI of Bukidnon an application for the compulsory registration of the parcels of land
reserved by President Garcia under Proclamation No. 476 as CMU's school site purposes. 13
In the first indorsement dated November 9, 1960, the Office of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, through its Undersecretary Salvador F. Cunanan, forwarded to the Executive
Secretary a recommendation that the Director of Lands be authorized to file the said application.14
Thereafter, the Office of the President, through the Assistant Executive Secretary Enrique C. Quema,
in the second indorsement dated December 12, 1960, authorized and directed the Director of Lands
to file the necessary petition in the CFI of Bukidnon for the compulsory registration of the parcels of
land reserved for CMU. 15
Department Legal Counsel Alejandro V. Recto, in the indorsement dated December 28, 1960,
communicated the said directive and authority granted to the Director of Lands to file the application
for compulsory registration.16
On January 31, 1961, the Director of Lands filed a petition with the then Court of First Instance of
Bukidnon for the settlement and adjudication of the title of the parcels of land reserved in favor of
CMU, and for the determination of the rights of adverse claimants in relation to the reservation of
the land. 17
The cadastral court, in its Decision dated December 22, 1971 in Land Registration Case Cadastral Rec.
No. 414, declared that the subject parcels of land as public land included in the reservation for CMU,
and be registered in its name, except for specified portions adjudicated to other persons. 18 The court
also gave the other 18 claimants an opportunity to acquire full ownership in the subject parcels of
land. 19 Hence, the court reduced the claim of CMU to 3,041 hectares of total land area. 20 The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
In view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered declaring Lot No. 1 containing
an approximate area of 20,619,175 square meters and Lot No. 2 containing an area of 13,391,795
square meters, both situated in the barrio of Musuan, municipality of Maramag, Bukidnon, as
described in the survey plans and technical descriptions approved by the Director of Lands as IR-1031-
D, marked as Exhibits "D" and "D-1" of the Central Mindanao University, as public land included in the
reservation in favor of said University by virtue of Proclamation No. 476, series of 1958, of the
President of the Philippines, which may be registered in its name, except such portions hereinbelow
specified which are adjudicated in favor of the following:
1. Venancio Olohoy, married, and Esmeralda Lauga, married to Julio Sagde, both of legal ages and
residents of Valencia, Bukidnon- 17.75 hectares of Lot No.1 as shown in the survey plan (Exh. "D");
2. Martina Songkit, of legal age, married to Martin Binanos and resident of Maramag, Bukidnon - 3
hectares of Lot No. 2 as shown in the plan Exh. "D-1 ";
3. Pablo Saldivar, widower, of legal age and resident of Dologon, Maramag, Bukidnon- 12 hectares of
Lot No. 2 as indicated in the survey plan Exh. "D-1" abovementioned;
4. Fernando Bungcas, married to Feliciana Gayonan and resident of Dologon, Maramag- 6 hectares of
Lot No. 2;
5. Cerilo Salicubay, married to Valentina Bento, and Virginia Salicubay, married to Ricardo Tunasan,
both of legal ages and residents of Panalsalan, Maramag, Bukidnon, share and share alike, -4 hectares
of Lot No. 2
6. Rosita Lupiahan, of legal age, married to Simplicio Alba and resident of Maramag, Bukidnon - 4
hectares of Lot No. 2.
The areas herein adjudicated to the above-named private individuals should be surveyed and each
lot given a separate number with their corresponding technical descriptions. Considering, however,
that the Court rejected most of the claim due to the dubious nature of the occupation of the claimants
prior to the take-over by the College, now University, in 1946 but most of them remained on the land
up to the present time, in order to avoid possible injustice and in line with the national objective of
providing land for the landless, it is hereby recommended that the claimants enumerated hereunder
97
who filed answers and presented evidence which, nevertheless, was found short of the requirements
for a decree of registration, be given the opportunity to acquire full ownership thereof through a
homestead, or free patent application if they are landless persons, otherwise by means of a sales
application if they are already owners of other pieces of real estate, after a corresponding
amendment of the Executive Proclamation through the avenues allowed by law. The following
claimants may be considered for that purpose, namely:
1. Geronimo Aniceto and his sister Francisca Aniceto- 12 hectares of Lot No. 2;
2. Bonifacio Aniceto- 6 hectares of Lot No. 2;
3. Julita Aniceto- 12 hectares of Lot No. 2;
4. Maximo Nulo- 5 hectares of Lot No. 2;
5. Magno Sepada- 3 hectares of Lot No. 1;
6. Eulogio Guimba- 12 hectares of Lot No. 2;
18. Dativa P. Velez- 18 hectares of Lot No. 1.
Should the above recommendation be given due course, it is further suggested that those claimants
included in the said recommendation who are now occupying portions of Lot No. 2 situated above
the university grounds on the hillside which they have already denuded, should be transferred to the
lower portions of the land near or along the Pulangi river in order to enable the University to reforest
the hillside to protect the watershed of its irrigation system and water supply.
After this decision become final and the portions adjudicated to private persons have been
segregated and their corresponding technical descriptions provided, the order of the issuance of the
corresponding decree and the certificates of title shall be issued.
SO ORDERED.21
Upon the submission of the parties of the compromise agreement through a Joint Manifestation, the
cadastral court rendered its Amended Decision dated October 7, 1972 adjudicating in full ownership
of some portions of the subject lots to the 29 groups of claimants.22 A portion of the fallo of the
amended decision reads:

7. Mario Baguhin and his wife, Treponia Dagoplo 18 hectares of Lot No. 2; WHEREFORE, pursuant to the evidence presented and the compromise agreement submitted by the
parties, the decision rendered by this Court on December 22, 1971 is hereby AMENDED and another
8. Aniceto Nayawan- 12 hectares of Lot No. 2; one entered ADJUDICATING in full ownership to the claimants hereinbelow specified the following
portions of the lots in questions, to wit:
9. Eduardo Saloay-ay- 13 hectares of Lot No. 2;
xxxx
10. Arcadio Belmis and his wife Beatriz Lauga- 24 hectares of Lot No. 1;
The remaining portions of Lots 1 and 2 not otherwise adjudicated to any of the above-named private
11. Vitaliano Lauga- 24 hectares of Lot No. 1; claimants are hereby ADJUDICATED in full ownership to the Central Mindanao State University. It is
hereby directed that the different portions of Lots 1 and 2 hereinabove granted to private claimants
12. Procopio Abellar- 12 hectares of Lot No. 1; must [be segregated] by a competent surveyor and given their technical descriptions and
corresponding lot numbers for purposes of the issuance of certificates of title in their favor.
13. Rufino Dador- 12 hectares of Lot No. l;
It is, however, ordered that the area adjacent and around or near the watersheds or sources of Lot
14. Roque Larayan- 12 hectares of Lot No. 1; No. 2 adjudicated to any of the private claimants specified in the foregoing paragraph may be replaced
or substituted to the Central Mindanao State University with other areas of equal extent in either Lot
15. Benito Lutad- 12 hectares of Lot No. l; 1 or 2, should said University desire to do so in order to protect and conserve the watersheds.

16. Juliana Pasamonte- 11 hectares of Lot No. 1; The findings and resolutions made by the Court in its original decision not affected by the
amendments incorporated elsewhere herein shall stand.
17. Tirso Pimentel- 19 hectares of Lot No. 1; and

98
The petition from relief from judgment presented by Lucio Butad which the Court finds without merit 7. To Triponia Dagoplo, Lot 1-G with an area of 60.001 square meters;
is hereby denied.1âwphi1
8. To Mario Baguhin, Lot 1-H with an area of 60.001 square meters;
Once the decision becomes final and the subdivision directed in the preceding paragraph has been
accomplished, the order for the issuance of the corresponding decree of registration and the 9. To Celerina Guimba, Lot 1-1 with an area of 30.001 square meters;
certificates of title in favor of each and every adjudicatee shall likewise issue.
10. To Constantino Baston, Lot 1-J with an area of 30.001 square meters;
SO ORDERED.23
11. To Maximo Nulo, Lot 1-K with an area of 49.999 square meters;
Based on the Order made by the court that those portions of the private claimants in the area
adjacent and around, or near the watersheds of Lot No. 2 may be replaced or substituted by CMU 12. To Beatriz Lauga, Lot 1-L with an area of 100.00 square meters;
with areas of equal extent, the 16 grantees entered into an agreement with CMU for the replacement
of the areas adjudicated to them with those outside the watershed vicinity or beyond the area 13. To Evorcio Olohoy, Lot 1-M with an area of 177.500 square meters;
necessary for the proper development, administration, supervision and utilization of the portion
adjudicated to CMU.24 14. To Arcadia Belmis, Lot 1-N with an area of 140.000 square meters;

Thereafter, the cadastral court, in its second amendment of the Decision dated September 12, 1974, 15. To Luciano Namuag, Lot 1-0 with an area of 240.000 square meters;
ordered that the specific portions of the subject lots be adjudicated to the 33 claimants as indicated
in their agreement.25 It also awarded to CMU Lot 1-S (18,531,671 square meters), Lot 2-A (10,001 16. To Vitaliano Lauga, Lot 1-P with an area of 240.000 square meters;
square meters), and Lot 2-Q (12,266,524 square meters).26 On January 25, 1975, the court issued
Decrees No. N-154065, N-154066, and N-154067 in favor of CMU.27 Consequently, OCT Nos. 0-160, 17. To Rufino Dador, Lot 1-Q with an area of 120.00 square meters;
0-161 and 0-162 were registered in the name of CMU on January 29, 1975. 28 The decretal portion
of the decision reads: 18. To Procopio Abellar, Lot 1-B with an area of 120.001 square meters;

WHEREFORE, finding said manifestation and agreement of the parties in order, the dispositive 19. To Eduardo Saloay-ay, Lot 2-B with an area of 130.000 square meters;
portions of the amended decision rendered by this Court on October 7, 1972 aforementioned is
further amended such that the lots specified hereunder and more particularly indicated in the revised 20. To Francisco Anecito, Lot 2-C with an area of 120.000 square meters;
plans and technical descriptions above-mentioned are hereby adjudicated as follows:
21. To Julita Anecito, Lot 2-D with an area of 60.000 square meters;
1. To Roque Larayan, Lot 1-A with an area of 120.001 square meters;
22. To Vicente Buntan, Lot 2-E with an area of 30.000 square meters;
2. To Fernanda Bungcas, Lot 1-B with an area of 60.00 square meters;
23. To Victoria.no Lacorda, Lot 2-F with an area of 130.000 square meters;
3. To Tirso Pimentel, Lot 1-C with an area of 190.000 square meters;
24. To Cerilo Salicubay, Lot 2-G with an area of 40.000 square meters;
4. To Juliana Pasamonte, Lot 1-D with an area of 109.999 square meters;
25. To Julita Anecito, Lot 2-H with an area of 60.000 square meters;
5. To Dativa Velez, Lot 1-E with an area of 180.00 square meters;
26. To Benito Butad, Lot 2-I with an area of 120.000 square meters;
6. To Mario Bagubin, Lot 1-F with an area of 60.00 square meters;
27. To Pablo Zaldivar, Lot 2-J with an area of 120.000 square meters;

99

28. To Magno Sepada, Lot 2-K with an area of 30.000 square meters;
29. To Anecito Nayawan, Lot 2-L with an area of 120.000 square meters;
30. To Bonifacio Anecito, Lot 2-M with an area of 60.001 square meters;
31. To Eulogio Guimba, Lot 2-N with an area of 120.001 square meters;
32. To Martina Songkit, Lot 2-0 with an area of 30.000 square meters;
33. To Rosita Lapianan, Lot 2-P with an area of 40.000 square meters;
34. To Central Mindanao State University; Lot 1-S with an area of 18,531.671 square meters;
35. To Central Mindanao State University; Lot 2-A with an area of 10.001 square meters;
36. To Central Mindanao State University, Lot 2-Q with an area of 12,266,524 square meters;
The findings and resolutions made by this Court in its original decision not affected by the
amendments incorporated herein shall remain in force.
Once this decision becomes final, the order for the issuance of the corresponding decrees of
registration and the certification of title in favor of each and every adjudicates shall likewise issue.
SO ORDERED.29
On December 15, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed before the
CA a petition for annulment of the Decision dated September 12, 1974 by the cadastral court granting
in favor of CMU the title to the subject parcels of land.
The Republic argued that the cadastral court should have summarily dismissed the registration
proceedings since the Solicitor General did not sign or file the petition for compulsory registration of
the parcels of I as provided in Sections 5330 and 8731 of Commonwealth Act No. 141. 32 It also alleged
that the subject parcels of land are inalienable lands of public domain.33 It maintained that the
cadastral court did not acquire jurisdiction over the res; hence, the entire proceedings of the case
should be null and void.
Accordingly, the CA ruled in favor of the respondent. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is GRANTED. The 1) Decision dated December 22, 1971, 2)
Amended Decision dated October 7, 1972 and 3) Second Amended Decision dated September 12, 197
4, all rendered by the Court of First Instance, 15th Judicial District, Branch II, Bukidnon Province, in
"L.R.C. Cad. Rec. No. 414, Sec. 87 of Commonwealth Act 141, Ir-1031-D (Lots 1 & 2), Maramag,
Bukidnon, insofar as they adjudicated a portion of the land covered by Proclamation No. 476 to the
Central Mindanao University, are declared NULL and VOID.
Consequently, 1) Decrees No. N-154065, N-154066 and N-154067 issued in favor of the University on
January 24, 1975; and 2) Original Certificates of Title (OCT) No. 0-160 (covering Lot 1-S), No. 0-161
(for Lot 2-A) and No. 0-162 (for Lot 2-Q) registered in the University's name on January 29, 1975, are
likewise declared NULL AND VOID.
SO ORDERED.34
The CA ruled that there was no sufficient proof of a positive act by the government, such as
presidential proclamation, executive order, administrative action, investigation reports of Bureau of
Lands investigators, or a legislative act or statute, which declared the land of the public domain
alienable and disposable.35 The documents adduced by CMU did not expressly declare that the
covered land is already alienable and disposable and that one of such documents was merely signed
by the Assistant Executive Secretary. 36
According to the CA, CMU was unable to prove that the subject land ceased to have the status of a
reservation.37 However, the CA clarified that despite nullification of the titles in its favor, CMU is still
the rightful possessor of the subject property by virtue of Proclamation No. 476.38
Hence, the petitioner CMU filed the present petition before this Court raising the sole issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals:
1. committed a serious and grave error and gravely abused its discretion on a question of law, and
2. ruled and decided a question of substance in a way and manner not in accord with law and
applicable decisions of this Honorable Court
in granting the petition for annulment of judgment filed by respondent on the ground that the
cadastral court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or the specific res of the subject matter of
the petition below for the reason that the subject lands are inalienable and non-disposable lands of
the public domain.39
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CMU maintains that the CA has completely misconstrued the facts of the cadastral proceedings since
the documents it presented showed that the subject property has already been declared, classified,
and certified by the Office of the President as alienable and disposable lands.40
Particularly, CMU alleges that the specific and express authorization and the directive, as embodied
in the Second Indorsement41 dated December 12, 1960, from the President, through the then
Assistant Executive Secretary Enrique C. Quema, authorizing the Director of Lands to file the
necessary petition in the CFI of Bukidnon for compulsory registration of the parcels of land reserved
for CMU's site purposes is equivalent to a declaration and certification by the Office of the President
that the subject parcels of land are alienable and disposable.42
CMU has cited the case of Republic v. Judge De la Rosa43 wherein the then President Quirino issued
on June 22, 1951 a directive authorizing the Director of Lands to file the necessary petition in the CFI
of Isabela for the settlement and adjudication of the titles to the tract of land involved in the Gamu
Public Lands Subdivision, Pls-62, Case 5. This Court held that the said presidential directive was
equivalent to a declaration and certification that the subject land area is alienable and disposable.44
This Court finds the instant petition without merit.
Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and that the State is
the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such
patrimony.45 Also, the doctrine states that all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within
private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.46 Consequently, the person applying for
registration has the burden of proof to overcome the presumption of ownership of lands of the public
domain.47
To prove that a land is alienable, the existence of a positive act of the government, such as presidential
proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators; and a legislative act or a statute declaring the land as alienable and disposable must be
established. 48 Hence, a public land remains part of the inalienable public domain unless it is shown
to have been reclassified and alienated by the State to a private person. 49
As noted, Proclamation No. 476 issued by then President Garcia, decreeing certain portions of the
public domain in Musuan, Maramag, Bukidnon for CMU's site purposes, was issued pursuant to
Section 83 of C.A. No. 141. Being reserved as CMU' s school site, the said parcels of land were
withdrawn from sale and settlement, and reserved for CMU. Under Section 88 of the same Act, the
reserved parcels of land would ordinarily be inalienable and not subject to occupation, entry, sale,
lease or other disposition, subject to an exception, viz.:
Section 88. The tract or tracts of land reserved under the provisions of section eighty-three shall be
non-alienable and shall not be subject to occupation, entry, sale, lease, or other disposition until again
declared alienable under the provisions of this Act or by proclamation of the President. (Emphasis
supplied)
In the case of Navy Officers' Village Association, Inc. v. Republic, 50 it was held that parcels of land
classified as reservations for public or quasi-public uses: (1) are non-alienable and non-disposable in
view of Section 88 (in relation with Section 8) of C.A. No. 141, specifically declaring them as non-
alienable and not subject to disposition; and (2) they remain public domain lands until they are
actually disposed of in favor of private persons. 51 In other words, lands of the public domain
classified as reservations remain to be property of the public dominion until withdrawn from the
public or quasi-public use for which they have been reserved, by act of Congress or by proclamation
of the President, or otherwise positively declared to have been converted to patrimonial property. 52
In the case at bar, CMU relies on the Court's ruling in the De la Rosa53 case that the directive from
the President authorizing the Director of Lands to file the necessary petition for the compulsory
registration of the parcels of land so reserved is the equivalent of the declaration and certification
that the subject land is alienable and disposable. As such, CMU avows that the subject lots, as declared
alienable and disposable, are properly registered in its name.
This Court finds that the De la Rosa case does not apply in the instant petition because of the varying
factual settings, to wit:
a. In De la Rosa, the Mallig Plains Reservation was reserved by the President for settlement purposes
under the administration of National Land Settlement Administration (NLSA), later replaced by Land
Settlement and Development Corporation (LASEDECO), while the subject lots in the present case was
reserved for educational purposes, e.g. as CMU's school site, under the administration of the Board
of Trustees of CMU.
b. The National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration, when it replaced LASEDECO,
excluded the Mallig Plains Reservation among the properties it needed in carrying out the purposes
and objectives of Republic Act No. 1160,54 thus, the Reservation eventually reverted to and became
public agricultural land. There was no evidence that CMU ceased to use and occupy the reserved lots
in Musuan, Maramag, Bukidnon as its school site or that its public purpose is abandoned, for the lots
to revert to and become public agricultural land.
c. At the time that President Quirino issued the directive, the Gamu Public Land Subdivision in the
Mallig Plains Reservation was not reserved for public or quasi-public purpose or has ceased to be so.
On the other hand, the subject lots in Bukidnon are reserved for public purpose when the President,
through the Assistant Executive Secretary, issued the said directive.
101
d. In the De la Rosa case, the private respondent was a qualified private claimant with the requisite
period of possession of the subject residential lot in his favor.1avvphi1 Meanwhile, CMU is not a
private claimant of the land so reserved.
It was explicated in De la Rosa55 that the authority of the President to issue such a directive, held as
equivalent to a declaration and certification that the subject land area is alienable and disposable,
finds support in Section 7 of C.A. No. 141, to wit:
Sec. 7. For purposes of the administration and disposition of alienable or disposable public lands, the
President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time to
time declare what lands are open to disposition or concession under this Act. (Emphasis supplied).
However, the said directive by the President is limited to those enumerated in Section 8 of C.A.
No.141, which provides that:
Section 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession which have been
officially delimited and classified and, when practicable, surveyed, and which have not been reserved
for public or quasi-public uses, nor appropriated by the Government, nor in any manner become
private property, nor those on which a private right authorized and recognized by this Act or any other
valid law may be claimed, or which, having been reserved or appropriated, have ceased to be so.
However, the President may, for reasons of public interest, declare lands of the public domain open
to disposition before the same have had their boundaries established or been surveyed, or may, for
the same reason, suspend their concession or disposition until they are again declared open to
concession or disposition by proclamation duly published or by Act of the National Assembly.
(Emphases supplied)
As can be gleaned from the above provision, the lands which can be declared open to disposition or
concession are those which have been officially delimited and classified, or when practicable
surveyed; those not reserved for public or quasi-public purpose; those not appropriated by the
Government; those which have not become private property in any manner; those which have no
private right authorized and recognized by C.A. No. 141 or any other valid law may be claimed; or
those which have ceased to be reserved or appropriated.
For the said President's directive to file the necessary petition for compulsory registration of parcels
of land be considered as an equivalent of a declaration that the land is alienable and disposable, the
subject land, among others, should not have been reserved for public or quasi-public purposes.
Therefore, the said directive on December 12, 1960 cannot be considered as a declaration that said
land is alienable and disposable. Unlike in De la Rosa, the lands, having been reserved for public
purpose by virtue of Proclamation No. 476, have not ceased to be so at the time the said directive
was made. Hence, the lots did not revert to and become public agricultural land for them to be the
subject of a declaration by the President that the same are alienable and disposable.
We have ruled in the case of CMU v. DARAB56 that the CMU land reservation is not alienable and
disposable land of public domain, viz.:
It is our opinion that the 400 hectares ordered segregated by the DARAB and affirmed by the Court
of Appeals in its Decision dated August 20, 1990, is not covered by the [Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program] CARP because:
(1) It is not alienable and disposable land of the public domain;
(2) The CMU land reservation is not in excess of specific limits as determined by Congress;
(3) It is private land registered and titled in the name of its lawful owner, the CMU;
(4) It is exempt from coverage under Section 10 of R.A. 6657 because the lands are actually, directly
and exclusively used and found to be necessary for school site and campus, including experimental
farm stations for educational purposes, and for establishing seed and seedling research and pilot
production centers.
The inalienable character of the lands as part of the long term functions of autonomous agricultural
educational institution is reiterated in CMU v. Executive Secretary: 57
It did not matter that it was President Arroyo who, in this case, attempted by proclamation to
appropriate the lands for distribution to indigenous peoples and cultural communities. As already
stated, the lands by their character have become inalienable from the moment President Garcia
dedicated them for CMU's use in scientific and technological research in the field of agriculture. They
have ceased to be alienable public lands.58
This Court is not unmindful of its earlier pronouncement in CMU v. DARAB that the land reservation
is a private land registered and titled in the name of its lawful owner, the CMU. This pronouncement,
which is now being argued by CMU as one of its bases in convincing this Court that the subject
property is owned by it and already alienable, is specious. The 1992 CMU case merely enumerated
the reasons why the said portion of the property is beyond the coverage of CARP. Moreover, the fact
that the Court had already settled the inalienable character of the subject property as part of the long
term functions of the autonomous agricultural educational institution in the case of CMU v. DARAB
and reiterated in CMU v. Executive Secretary, belies CMU's contention that this Court has recognized
that the said land is a private property or that the land is alienable and disposable.
102
As to what constitutes alienable and disposable land of the public domain, this Court expounds in its 15th Judicial District, Branch II of Bukidnon is NULL and VOID. Accordingly, Original Certificate of Title
pronouncements in Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources v. Yap: 59 Nos. 0-160, OCT No. 0-161 and OCT No. 0-162 issued in the name of petitioner, are CANCELLED. Sheet
1, Lot 1 of Ir-1031-D and Sheet 2, Lot 2 of Ir-1031-D are ORDERED REVERTED to the public domain.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the presumption
of State ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the
government, such as an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into disposable
land for agricultural or other purposes. In fact, Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits alienable or disposable
lands only to those lands which have been "officially delimited and classified."

The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public
domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the
land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is
alienable or disposable. There must still be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as
alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable,
the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the
government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the required number of years is
alienable and disposable.60

In the case at bar, CMU failed to establish, through incontrovertible evidence, that the land
reservations registered in its name are alienable and disposable lands of public domain. Aside from
the series of indorsements regarding the filing of the application for the compulsory registration of
the parcels of land and the said directive from the President, CMU did not present any proof of a
positive act of the government declaring the said lands alienable and disposable.

For lack of proof that the said land reservations have been reclassified as alienable and disposable,
the said lands remain part of inalienable public domain, hence; they are not registrable under Torrens
system.

This Court will not discuss the other issue raised by CMU, e.g., the filing of the petition for cadastral
proceeding was pursuant to the written consent, authorization and directive of the OSG, as the same
was not discussed in the assailed Decision of the CA. This Court also dismisses the other issue raised
- that the titles in CMU's name were singled out by respondent - for lack of evidence.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari dated January 14, 2011 filed by petitioner Central
Mindanao University is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated December 30, 2010 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 81301 is hereby AFFIRMED. The proceedings in the Court of First Instance,

103
G.R. No. 199537
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
ANDREA TAN, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by the Republic of the Philippines (Republic) from the
May 29, 2009 decision1 and October 18, 2011 resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-
CV No. 00702. The CA denied the Republic's appeal from LRC Case No. N-1443 wherein the Municipal
Trial Court in Consolacion, Cebu, granted respondent Andrea Tan's application for land title
registration.
Antecedents
On October 2, 2002, Tan applied for the original registration of title of Lot No. 4080, Cad. 545-D (new)
situated in Casili, Consolacion, Cebu (the subject lot). She alleged that she is the absolute owner in
fee simple of the said 7,807 square-meter parcel of residential land she purchased from a certain
Julian Gonzaga on September 17, 1992. Her application was docketed as LRC Case No. N-144.
After complying with the jurisdictional requirements, the land registration court issued an order of
general default, excepting the State which was duly represented by the Solicitor General.
During the trial, Tan proved the following facts:
1. The subject lot is within Block 1, Project No. 28, per LC Map No. 2545 of Consolacion, Cebu;
2. The subject lot was declared alienable and disposable on September 1, 1965, pursuant to Forestry
Administrative Order No. 4-1063;
3. Luciano Gonzaga who was issued Tax Declaration Nos. 01465 in 1965 and 02983 in 1972 initially
possessed the subject lot.
4. After Luciano’s death, Julian Gonzaga inherited the subject lot;
5. Andrea Tan purchased the subject lot from Julian Gonzaga on September 17, 1992;
6. She, through her predecessors, had been in peaceful, open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession of the subject lot in the concept of an owner for over thirty (30) years.
On 28 April 2004, the land registration court granted Tan’s application. The court confirmed her title
over the subject lot and ordered its registration.
The Republic appealed the case to the CA, arguing that Tan failed to prove that she is a Filipino citizen
who has been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject
lot, in the concept of an owner, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of
her application. The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CEB-CV No. 00702.
On May 29, 2009, the CA denied the appeal. The CA observed that under the Public Land Act, there
are two kinds of applicants for original registration: (1) those who had possessed the land since June
12, 1945; and (2) those who already acquired the property through prescription. The respondent’s
application fell under the second category.
The CA noted that before land of the public domain can be acquired by prescription, it must have
been declared alienable and disposable agricultural land. The CA pointed to the certification issued
by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) as evidence that the subject
was classified as alienable and disposable on September 1, 1965, pursuant to Land Classification
Project No. 28. The CA concluded that Tan had already acquired the subject lot by prescription.
On July 2, 2009, the Republic moved for reconsideration. Citing Republic v. Herbieto,4 it argued that
an applicant for judicial confirmation of title must have been in possession and occupation of the
subject land since June 12, 1945, or earlier, and that the subject land has been likewise already
declared alienable and disposable since June 12, 1945, or earlier.5
On October 18, 2011, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration citing the then recent case of
Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Rep. of the Philippines6 which abandoned the ruling in Herbieto.
Malabanan declared that our law does not require that the property should have been declared
alienable and disposable since June 12, 1945, as long as the declaration was made before the
application for registration is filed.7
On January 5, 2012, the Republic filed the present petition for review on certiorari.
The Petition
The Republic argues: (1) that the CA misapplied the doctrine in Malabanan; and (2) that the CENRO
certification and tax declarations presented were insufficient to prove that the subject lot was no
longer intended for public use.
104
Meanwhile, the respondent insists that she has already proven her title over the subject lot. She
maintains that the classification of the subject lot as alienable and disposable public land by the DENR
on September 1, 1965, per Land Classification Project No. 28, converted it into patrimonial property
of the State.
From the submissions, the lone issue is whether a declaration that Government-owned land has
become alienable and disposable sufficiently converts it into patrimonial property of the State,
making it susceptible to acquisitive prescription.
Our Ruling
We find the petition meritorious.
All lands of the public domain belong to the State. It is the fountain from which springs any asserted
right of ownership over land. Accordingly, the State owns all lands that are not clearly within private
ownership. This is the Regalian Doctrine which has been incorporated in all of our Constitutions and
repeatedly embraced in jurisprudence.8 Under the present Constitution, lands of the public domain
are not alienable except for agricultural lands.9
The Public Land Act10 (PLA) governs the classification, grant, and disposition of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain. It is the primary substantive law on this matter. Section 11
thereof recognizes judicial confirmation of imperfect titles as a mode of disposition of alienable public
lands.11 Relative thereto, Section 48(b) of the PLA identifies who are entitled to judicial confirmation
of their title:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force
majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
(As amended by PD 1073.)
The Property Registration Decree12 (PRD) complements the PLA by prescribing how registrable lands,
including alienable public lands, are brought within the coverage of the Torrens system. Section 14 of
the PRD enumerates the qualified applicants for original registration of title:
Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier;
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provision of
existing laws;
(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river beds by right of accession
or accretion under the existing laws;
(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided for by law.13
The PRD also recognizes prescription as a mode of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code.14
Nevertheless, prescription under Section 14(2) must not be confused with judicial confirmation of
title under Section 14(1). Judicial confirmation of title requires:
1. That the applicant is a Filipino citizen;15
2. That the applicant, by himself or through his predecessors-ininterest, has been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the property since June 12, 1945;16
3. That the property had been declared alienable and disposable as of the filing of the application.17
Only private property can be acquired by prescription. Property of public dominion is outside the
commerce of man.18 It cannot be the object of prescription 19 because prescription does not run
against the State in its sovereign capacity.20 However, when property of public dominion is no longer
intended for public use or for public service, it becomes part of the patrimonial property of the State.
21 When this happens, the property is withdrawn from public dominion and becomes property of
private ownership, albeit still owned by the State.22 The property is now brought within the
commerce of man and becomes susceptible to the concepts of legal possession and
prescription.1avvphi1
In the present case, respondent Tan’s application is not anchored on judicial confirmation of an
imperfect title because she does not claim to have possessed the subject lot since June 12, 1945. Her
application is based on acquisitive prescription on the claim that: (1) the property was declared
alienable and disposable on September 1, 1965; and (2) she had been in open continuous, public, and
notorious possession of the subject lot in the concept of an owner for over thirty (30) years.
In our 2009 decision and 2013 resolution23 in Malabanan, we already held en banc that a declaration
that property of the public dominion is alienable and disposable does not ipso facto convert it into
patrimonial property. We said:
105
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is
no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property
has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if
classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article
420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable
lands are expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for public service or for the
development of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such
declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in
cases where the President is duly authorized by law.24

While a prior declaration that the property has become alienable and disposable is sufficient in an
application for judicial confirmation of title under Section 14(1) of the PRD, it does not suffice for the
purpose of prescription under the Civil Code.25 Before prescription can even begin to run against the
State, the following conditions must concur to convert the subject into patrimonial property:

1. The subject lot must have been classified as agricultural land in compliance with Sections 2 and 3
of Article XII of the Constitution;

2. The land must have been classified as alienable and disposable;26

3. There must be a declaration from a competent authority that the subject lot is no longer intended
for public use, thereby converting it to patrimonial property.

Only when these conditions are met can applicants begin their public and peaceful possession of the
subject lot in the concept of an owner.

In the present case, the third condition is absent. Even though it has been declared alienable and
disposable, the property has not been withdrawn from public use or public service. Without this,
prescription cannot begin to run because the property has not yet been converted into patrimonial
property of the State. It remains outside the commerce of man and the respondent’s physical
possession and occupation thereof do not produce any legal effect. In the eyes of the law, the
respondent has never acquired legal possession of the property and her physical possession thereof,
no matter how long, can never ripen into ownership.

WHEREFORE, we hereby GRANT the petition. The May 29, 2009 decision and October 18, 2011
resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA- G.R. CEB-CV No. 00702 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
respondent's application for Land Registration is DENIED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to
costs.

SO ORDERED.

106
G.R. No. 133465 September 25, 2000
AMELITA DOLFO, petitioner,
vs.
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR THE PROVINCE OF CAVITE, TRECE MARTIRES CITY, THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, CESAR E. CASAL, RUSTICO A. CASAL, ERNESTO A.
CASAL, RODOLFO A. CASAL, ALFREDO A. CASAL, JR., EMMANUEL A. B. CASAL, RAFAEL S. CASAL, JR., C.
JOSEFINA S. CASAL, CELEDONIA S. CASAL, WILHELMINA S. CASAL, MELANIO MEDINA, ADELAIDA
MEDINA, AURORA MEDINA, C. P. G. AGRICOM CORPORATION and HEIRS OF DAMIAN ERMITANIO and
CELEDONIA MARTINEZ, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision1 of the Sixteenth Division of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 41896 entitled, "Amelita Dolfo v. Hon. Novato T. Cajigal, et al." Said decision
upheld the orders dated May 7, 1996 and August 22, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19,
Bacoor, Cavite, in LRC Case Nos. B-89-14 and B-90-6 denying petitioner's motion for leave to intervene
and/or admit complaint in intervention as well as her motion for reconsideration. The petition
likewise assails the appellate court's resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration and
the trial court's joint decision recognizing the rights of private respondents over a parcel of land
located in Barangay Lantic, Carmona, Cavite which is the subject of the abovesaid LRC Cases.
The pertinent facts are as follows:
On March 5, 1996, petitioner and Yangtze Properties, Inc. (Yangtze) filed a motion for leave to file
and/or admit complaint-in-intervention in LRC Cases Nos. B-94-60, B-89-14 and B-90-6 pending
before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Bacoor, Cavite. The first case is for reconstitution of
Original Certificate of Title No. 362 purportedly covering the subject real property, while the last two
were cases for registration of title. Petitioner alleged that she is the registered owner of the real
property subject of the said LRC Cases as shown by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-320601 issued
in her name by the Register of Deeds of Trece Martires City. Yangtze, petitioner's co-movant, had
earlier entered into a Contract to Sell with petitioner over the said property.2 In its order dated May
7, 1996, the trial court denied the aforementioned motion on the grounds that: 1) it is a procedural
error to file a complaint for intervention in cases involving original application for land registration,
the proceedings therein being in rem; and 2) there had already been an order of general default
entered by the court against those who failed to oppose the applications. The trial court noted
petitioner's failure to exercise any act of dominion over the subject property consistent with her
allegation of ownership.3 On May 15, 1996, petitioner and Yangtze filed a motion for reconsideration
of the May 7, 1996 order. The trial court, treating the motion as a motion to lift the order of general
default, denied the same in its order dated August 22, 1996. The trial court gave greater weight to
the report of the Land Registration Authority (LRA) that petitioner's certificate of title was issued
without any legal basis and the report of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) that the signature
of Antonia Cabuco, the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite signatory on the certificate, was a
forgery. This is notwithstanding the documents proffered by petitioner allegedly showing the
genuineness of the signature of Antonia Cabuco on the certificate of title. The trial court opined that
petitioner's title over the subject property was of doubtful nature and that allowing her to intervene
in the LRC cases would unduly delay the proceedings.4
Meanwhile, on August 1, 1996, Atty. Artemio Caña, in his capacity as Acting Register of Deeds of the
Province of Cavite, filed a complaint for the annulment of petitioner's certificate of title before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 89, Bacoor, Cavite.5 The matter remains pending in that court.
On the other hand, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Bacoor, Cavite rendered a joint decision
recognizing and confirming the rights of private respondents over the litigated property and ordered
the issuance of a Decree of Registration in their favor.6
Later, petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and mandamus to annul
and set aside the above orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Bacoor, Cavite. Petitioner also
prayed that the latter be compelled to give due course to her motion for leave to intervene and/or
admit complaint-in-intervention. The petition was later amended to include the LRA as party
respondent.7
On October 20, 1997, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision denying the petition due course, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and is DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.8
The Court of Appeals likewise denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration in its resolution dated
April 21, 1998.9
Petitioner now contends that:
I. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PROPER REMEDY IN
THE LAND REGISTRATION CASES IS AN OPPOSITION TO THE APPLICATION OF THE APPLICANTS, AND
NOT A MOTION TO INTERVENE IN THE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT.
107
II. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE RESPONDENT
TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT ADMITTING PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR INTERVENTION ON
THE BASIS OF PETITIONER'S POSSESSION OF HER INDEFEASIBLE TITLE OVER THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES.
III. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT UPHOLDING THE TITLE OF THE
PETITIONER, TCT NO. T-320601, OVER THE PROPERTIES IN QUESTION DESPITE PETITIONER'S
OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE TO PROVE THE GENUINENESS AND DUE EXECUTION OF HER TITLE, AND
DESPITE ITS EXPRESS AND CATEGORICAL ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF THE FACT THAT PETITIONER INDEED
PRESENTED NUMEROUS DOCUMENTS TO PROVE THE AUTHENTICITY OF HER TITLE.
We find petitioner's contentions unmeritorious.
First. The provisions of §§ 14 and 25 of P.D. No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree) show that the
applicant and the oppositor are the only parties in cases of original applications for land registration,
unlike in ordinary civil actions where parties may include the plaintiff, the defendant, third party
complainants, cross-claimants, and intervenors.
It is now settled that a motion to intervene in a land registration case cannot be allowed. A party
wishing to be heard should ask for the lifting of the order of general default, and then if lifted, file an
opposition to the application for registration. This is so because proceedings in land registration are
in rem and not in personam, the sole object being the registration applied for, not the determination
of any right connected with the registration.10
Second. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals made a factual finding that petitioner's title to
the land is of doubtful authenticity.
Having jurisdiction only to resolve questions of law, this Court is bound by the factual findings of the
trial court and the Court of Appeals.11 Even if intervention is allowed in cases of original registration
of title, petitioner cannot rely on her certificate of title in view of the evidence respecting its
genuineness. As correctly held by the Court of Appeals:
Moreover, even if intervention is proper, petitioner's reliance on her title is infirm. While she
presented numerous documents to prove its authenticity, however, they have been disputed by
Benjamin Flestado, Chief of the Inspection and Investigation Division of the Land Registration
Authority (LRA), in his Report showing that her T.C.T. No. T-320601 was issued without legal basis and
that no document was on file with the Primary Entry Book of the Registry of Deeds of Trece Martires
City to support the issuance thereof. This Report concludes that petitioner's T.C.T. No. T-320601 is
spurious. Such finding is reinforced by the NBI Report dated June 20, 1996 showing that the signature
of Register of Deeds Antonia Cabuco appearing on petitioner's title is a forgery. Consequently, Atty.
Artemio Cana, Acting Register of Deeds of Cavite, filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 89 at Bacoor for annulment of petitioner's title.12
The rule that a title issued under the Torrens System is presumed valid and, hence, is the best proof
of ownership of a piece of land does not apply where the certificate itself is faulty as to its purported
origin.13
In this case, petitioner anchors her arguments on the premise that her title to the subject property is
indefeasible because of the presumption that her certificate of title is authentic. However, this
presumption is overcome by the evidence presented, consisting of the LRA report dated May 24,
199614 that TCT No. T-320601 was issued without legal basis and the NBI report dated June 20,
199615 that the signature of Antonia Cabuco was a forgery. Although petitioner submitted
documents purporting to show the genuineness of Antonia Cabuco's signature, she has not refuted
the findings contained in the LRA report that her certificate of title has no legal basis. Thus, in its
report, the LRA stated:
Verification conducted in the Registry of Deeds of Cavite Province on 21 May 1996 disclosed that
there is no document on file in the registry vault to support the issuance of TCT No.T-320601 in favor
of Amelita Dolfo. Even the Primary Entry Book for Act 496 under the date 18 November 1991 does
not indicate that a document was presented for registration in favor of Amelita Dolfo affecting TCT
No. 11520 which resulted in the issuance of TCT No. T-320601. Instead, page 232 of the Primary Entry
Book, Volume 47 (Annex "B") shows that under the date - 18 November 1991 there appears no
document entered therein at 11:05 a.m. in favor of Amelita Dolfo or in her behalf affecting the parcel
of land described in TCT No. T-320601.
This Investigator also failed to locate despite the thorough search of the vault clerks, TCT No. 11520
the supposed title from whence the subject TCT No. T-320601 was derived. What are filed in the title
volume are certificates of titles, including TCT No. T-11519 and TCT No. T-11521 both issued by RD
Cuevas on 5 November 1964 at 9:00 a.m. (see Annexes "C" & "C-1"). In other words, TCT No. 11520
was supposed to have been issued by RD Cuevas in November 1964. In the absence of the title, it
cannot however be determined if TCT No. T-11520 covers the same parcel of land in the subject title
of Amelita Dolfo.
Records of this Authority show that Judicial Forms 109 and 109-D (CB printed) with Serial No. 2061717
were requisitioned by and issued to Cavite Registry of Deeds on 21 October 1991. There appears no
report of consumption pertaining to those title-forms was submitted by the Cavite Registry of Deeds
(see Annexes "D" to "D-5").
On the other hand, records of the Cavite Registry of Deeds show that Judicial Forms 109-109-D with
Serial No. 2061717 were consumed and used for a certificate and of title, TCT No. 322182, in favor of
Manuel dela Cruz and not for issuance of TCT No. T-320601 in favor of Amelita Dolfo. This is confirmed
by the Certification of Deputy Register of Deeds, dated 21 May 1996 (Annex "E"), which attests:
108
This is to certify that as per records on file in the issuance book dated October 25, 1991, Judicial Form
109-109-D with Serial No. 2061717 was issued to Manuel dela Cruz with corresponding TCT No.
322182 and not TCT No. T-320601 in favor of Amelita Dolfo.
It is, however, also unfortunate that TCT No. 322182 (with Serial No. 2061717) and the certificate of
title with Serial No. 2061716 are not also filed in the corresponding title (book) volume. What are filed
therein are certificates of title, including TCT No. T-322180 (with Serial No. 2061715) and TCT No. T-
322183 (with Serial No. 2061718) both issued by RD Cabuco on 8 August 1993 and 25 October 1991,
respectively (see Annexes "F" & "F-1").
The Issuance Book of title-forms on file in the Cavite RD, particularly page 134 (Annex "G"), also
confirms that Judicial Form 2061717 was issued or released for TCT No. 322182 and not for TCT No.
T-320601.
Furthermore, registry records show, particularly the same Issuance Book of title-forms, page 88
(Annex "H"), that the Judicial Forms 109 and 109-D used for the genuine TCT No. 320601 were with
Serial No. 2037534 (erroneously typed in the certification as 2037519); and that the said TCT No.
320601 was issued in the name of Molino Homes and not in favor of Amelita Dolfo. This is confirmed
by the Certification of DRD Diosdado A. Concepcion, dated 21 May 1996, which states (Annex "H-1"):
Thus, petitioner cannot invoke the indefeasibility of her certificate of title.1âwphi1 It bears emphasis
that the Torrens system does not create or vest title but only confirms and records one already
existing and vested.18 Thus, while it may be true, as petitioner argues, that a land registration court
has no jurisdiction over parcels of land already covered by a certificate of title, it is equally true that
this rule applies only where there exists no serious controversy as to the authenticity of the certificate.
Fourth. Indeed, to allow petitioner to intervene in the LRC cases would not avoid multiplicity of suits
in view of the case for annulment and cancellation of TCT No. T-320601 now pending before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 89, Bacoor, Cavite. It is premature for petitioner to intervene in the LRC
cases because her certificate of title, supposedly her best proof of ownership over the property
described therein, is questionable. Besides, inasmuch as the authenticity of her certificate of title is
also being questioned in the LRC cases, the evidence that she will present to the prove the contrary
would be the same evidence she will present in the case for annulment of title. At this point, where
there is already a decree of registration issued in favor of private respondents, it is moot and academic
to allow petitioner to participate in the LRC cases for the purpose of preventing possible double titling
of property. As the trial court correctly stated, petitioner is not left without remedy even if she was
not allowed to intervene. If it is shown that her certificate of title is genuine and that she is the true
owner of the litigated property, the proceedings in the land registration cases would then be null and
void because the trial court has no jurisdiction on the matter. Otherwise, she could sue for damages.

This is to certify that as per records on file in this registry, dated October 8, 1991 Judicial Form 109- WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision and the resolution of the Court of Appeals are
109-D with Serial Number 2037519 TCT No. 320601 Book No. 1701 Page 101 issued in the name of AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
Molino Homes and was received by Amania Jimenez.
SO ORDERED.
When interviewed, DRD Concepcion disclosed to this Investigator that the supposed original of TCT
No. T-320601 in the name of Amelita Dolfo is detached from the title volume. He could not tell where
it is now, not even the vault clerks of the registry. However, Atty. Concepcion surmised that the same
is in the possession/custody of Ms. Melany Victoria, OIC Deputy Registry of Deeds. Atty. Concepcion
furnished this Investigator a certified copy (of a xerox copy in his file) of the subject TCT No. T-320601
(see Annex "I"). He further intimated that based on his own personal verification he believes that the
supposed title in the name of Amelita Dolfo is of doubtful authenticity. In fact, Atty. Concepcion
further averred, that former Register of Deeds Antonia Cabuco disowned the signature above the
typewritten name "Antonia B. Cabuco, Register of Deeds" in the subject TCT No.T-320601.16

In an effort to remove any doubt on the veracity of her certificate of title, petitioner questioned the
credibility of Atty. Artemio Caña who filed an action for annulment of her title. However, her evidence
to prove the genuineness of her certificate of title was the letter of the LRA Administrator, Reynaldo
Maulit, who, in declaring the existence of TCT No. T-320601 in the vaults of the Register of Deeds of
the Province of Cavite, referred to the letter-report of the same Atty. Artemio Caña dated April 30,
1996.17

109
G.R. No. 171535 June 5, 2009
MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, Petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES EDITO and MERIAN TIROL and SPOUSES ALEJANDRO and MIRANDA NGO, Respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure seeking to reverse, annul and set aside (i) the May 27, 2005 Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals in CA–G.R. CV No. 72867 entitled "Spouses Edito and Merian Tirol, et al. v. Mactan-Cebu
International Airport Authority," and (ii) its February 17, 2006 Resolution2 denying petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration.
The instant case finds its genesis in a complaint for quieting of title filed on August 8, 1996 by
respondents, Spouses Edito and Merian Tirol and Spouses Alejandro and Miranda Ngo, against
petitioner Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA). The facts were aptly summarized by
the Court of Appeals as follows:
The instant appeal revolves around a certain parcel of land, Lot No. 4763-D, over which the parties to
the above-entitled case assert ownership and possession.
xxx xxx xxx
Plaintiffs-appellees and business partners, Edito P. Tirol and Alejandro Y. Ngo, along with their
respective spouses, claim to have purchased a 2,000 square meter parcel of land, Lot No. 4763-D,
from a certain Mrs. Elma S. Jenkins, a Filipino citizen married to a certain Mr. Scott Edward Jenkins,
an American citizen, per Deed of Absolute Sale dated September 15, 1993. Plaintiffs-appellees bought
the said property on the strength of the apparent clean title of vendor Jenkins as evidenced by the
Tax Declaration and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 18216, all under Mrs. Elma Jenkins’ name, which
bear no annotation of liens, encumbrances, lis pendens or any adverse claim whatsoever. After the
sale wherein plaintiffs-appellees were purportedly purchasers for value and in good faith, they
succeeded in titling the said lot under their names per Transfer Certificate of Title No. 27044 on
September 20, 1993, and further proceeded to pay realty taxes thereon. It was only in January 1996
that plaintiffs-appellees discovered a cloud on their title when their request for a Height Clearance
with the Department of Transportation and Communications was referred to the defendant-appellant
Mactan[-]Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA, for brevity), on account of the latter’s
ownership of the said lot by way of purchase thereof dating far back to 1958.
At this point, it becomes imperative to trace the chain of ownership over Lot No. 4763-D. It is
undisputed that the original owners of said property were the spouses Julian Cuison and Marcosa
Cosef, who owned the entire Lot No. 4763, of which Lot No. 4763-D is a portion of (sic). Unfortunately
for herein parties, this is where the similarity of facts end (sic), and the instant controversy begins.
According to plaintiffs-appellees: Originally, the entire Lot No. 4763 was decreed in the names of
spouses Julian Cuison and Marcosa Cosef under the provisions of the Land Registration Act on June
1, 1934. [In] January 1974, spouses Julian Cuison and Marcosa Cosef sold Lot No. 4763 to Spouses
Moises Cuizon and Beatriz Patalinghug. The latter spouses thereafter succeeded to secure the
reconstitution of Original Certificate of Title of Lot No. 4763, Opon Cadastre as evidenced by Court
Order dated July 3, 1986. Said Court Order subsequently became final and executory, thus a
reconstituted title, OCT No. RO-2754, was issued in the name of the original owners-spouses Julian
Cuison and Marcosa Cosef. On September 12, 1986, the Deed of Absolute Sale between spouses Julian
Cuison/Marcosa Cosef and spouses Moises Cuizon/Beatriz Patalinghug was registered and annotated
on OCT No. RO-2754, which was cancelled to give way to the issuance of TCT No. 16735 in the name
of spouses Moises Cuizon and Beatriz Patalinghug. Thereafter, the latter sold a portion, denominated
as Lot No. 4763-D, to Mrs. Elma Jenkins on December 15, 1987, who[,] as earlier discussed, sold the
same lot to herein plaintiffs-appellees on September 15, 1993. Plaintiffs-appellees contend that all
throughout the chain of ownership, the titles – albeit from a reconstituted one – of the previous
owners were absolutely devoid of any annotations of liens, encumbrances, lis pendens, adverse claim,
or anything that may cause a reasonable man of ordinary prudence and diligence to suspect the
contrary. Furthermore, plaintiffs-appellees have been in actual, uninterrupted and peaceful
possession of the property since 1993, and if the possession of their predecessors-in-interest be
tacked, plaintiffs-appellees would be in constructive, uninterrupted and peaceful possession for sixty-
two (62) long years as of the date of filing their Complaint for Quieting of Title in the court a quo.
According to the defendant-appellant: On March 23, 19863 , the original owners, spouses Julian
Cuison and Marcosa Cosef sold Lot No. 4763 to the government, through the [then] Civil Aeronautics
Administration (CAA, for brevity). In a Certificate dated March 19, 1959, vendor Julian Cuison
confirmed that he was the possessor and actual owner of Lot No. 4763 which was located within the
"Mactan Alternate International Airport" and that the duplicate copy of the certificate of title was lost
or destroyed during the last war without him or his predecessor(s)-in-interest having received a copy
thereof. Since then, the government, through defendant-appellant MCIAA, has been in open,
continuous, exclusive and adverse possession of the property in the concept of owner. Said lot
allegedly became part of the Clear Zone of Runway 22 for purposes of required clearance for take-off
and landing. Moreover, defendant-appellant asserts that plaintiffs-appellees are nothing more than
trustees of Lot No. 4763-D in favor of defendant-appellant MCIAA, being merely successors-in-
interest of the original owners, spouses Julian Cuison and Marcosa Cosef, who undertook in
paragraph 4 of the Deed of Absolute Sale, to assist in the reconstitution of title so that the land may
be registered in the name of vendee government, through defendant-appellant MCIAA. In paragraph
5 of the same Deed of Absolute Sale, the parties also agreed that the property be registered under
110
Act 3344 pending the reconstitution and issuance of title. Purportedly, in gross and evident bad faith
and in open violation of their Deed of Absolute Sale, the spouses Julian Cuison and Marcosa Cosef
again sold the same property to spouses Moises Cuizon and Beatriz Patalinghug, who in turn sold the
lot to Mrs. Elma Jenkins, who eventually sold the same to herein plaintiffs-appellees. Defendant-
appellant MCIAA further imputes bad faith to plaintiffs-appellees under the rationale that because
their title came from a reconstituted one and that Lot No. 4763 was within the Clear Zone of Runway
22 of the airport, plaintiffs-appellees should have exerted effort in researching the history of
ownership and cannot possibly claim to be innocent of MCIAA’s ownership and possession thereof.4
In its December 4, 2000 Decision,5 the trial court ruled in favor of petitioner MCIAA in this wise:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court rules in favor of defendant and thus DISMISSES the
complaint of plaintiffs for want of merit.
The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the defendant MCIAA, is adjudged as (sic) the lawful
owner of the entire Lot 4763, Opon Cadastre.
The Deed of Absolute Sale involving Lot 4763-D in favor of plaintiffs is hereby declared null and void.
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 27044 for Lot 4763-D under the names of plaintiffs is likewise deemed
null and void.
The Register of Deeds is directed to issue to the defendant MCIAA a transfer certificate of title
covering the whole Lot 4763.
The counterclaim of defendant, however, is denied for lack of merit.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
The trial court held that there was a valid transfer of title from Spouses Julian Cuison and Marcosa
Cosef to the Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA), and accordingly, the respondents did not buy Lot
No. 4763-D from a person who could validly dispose of it. It likewise ruled that the government
(through the CAA, and now respondent MCIAA) has been in possession of the disputed land since it
bought the same in 1958, when a public deed of absolute sale was executed in its favor. Lastly,
respondents were considered as having bought Lot No. 4763-D in bad faith since they ignored
circumstances that should have made them curious enough to investigate beyond the four corners of
the Transfer Certificate of Title. In the trial court’s view, the facts that Lot No. 4763-D (i) is only about
320 meters from the center of the runway and therefore part of the clear zone and (ii) has been
vacant for several decades should have alerted the respondents to the possibility that the lot could
be part of the airport complex and therefore owned by petitioner.
Respondents filed their Motion for Reconsideration6 on January 23, 2001, and a Supplemental (sic)
to Motion for Reconsideration7 on May 17, 2001. Petitioner duly filed its Opposition8 to the said
Motions on April 10, 2001 and June 13, 2001, respectively.
In an Order9 dated August 9, 2001, the trial court did a complete volte face and reversed its Decision.
Holding that Article 154410 of the New Civil Code – which set forth the rule on double sales – finds
application to the instant case, the trial court ratiocinated:
In the words of the Supreme Court in Cruz vs. Cabana, this Court finds that in the case of [a] double
sale of real property[,] Article 1544 of the New Civil Code applies. Defendant was certainly the first
buyer and the plaintiffs [were] the subsequent buyers, to be exact fourth (sic).
But who among the parties herein has a better right to Lot No. 4763-D? To answer this question, it is
necessary to determine first the issue [of] whether or not the plaintiffs were buyers in good
faith.lawphil
xxx xxx xxx
The Court is not convinced that indeed the plaintiffs were buyers in bad faith. xxx The registration of
the deed of absolute sale by the defendant at the Registry of Deeds under Act No. 3344 sometime in
1959 is not the registration being contemplated under the law. "Registration under Act No. 3344
differs materially from registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law and under the Land Registration
Act. In the Spanish Mortgage Law[,] there is [an] express provision (Article 17) to the effect that titles
recorded thereunder cannot be annulled or invalidated by prior unrecorded rights, while the Land
Registration Act (No. 496) contains a special disposition that only transactions noted on the certificate
of title and entered in the registry books can bind the land. On the other hand, transactions registered
under Act No. 3344 cannot defeat a third person with a better right. Of course[,] the law does not
define exactly what may be considered a better right, leaving the matter of its construction to the
courts. The main reason for the difference in the operation of Act No. 3344 compared with the other
systems of registration lies obviously in the fact that recordings under said Act No. 3344 are not
preceded by any investigation, judicial or administrative, as to the validity or efficacy of the title
sought to be recorded." It is undisputed that Lot No. 4763 was a registered land, only that at the time
of registering defendant’s document of sale there was no copy of the certificate of title because the
same was not available due to the after effect of the last global war.
Hence, the Court agrees with the plaintiffs when they contended that "even at the time when OCT
No. RO-2754 was issued[,] there was no document allegedly proving its (defendant) ownership being
annotated on the certificate of title." At the time when Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 16735, 18216
111
and 27044 were issued to the plaintiffs and their predecessors-in-interest, there were no annotations
of the alleged claim of the defendant. Thus, the plaintiffs have all the good reasons to rely on the
validity of the titles. xxx
xxx xxx xxx
xxx The fact that Lot No. 4763-D was within 320 meters from the center of the runway and within
airport premises, was part of the clear zone, and had long been vacant are not enough warning to
third persons dealing [with] such land. It was undisputed that the lot in controversy is outside the
perimeter fence of the defendant. The fact that the said lot was part of the clear zone is not sufficient
justification to warn the plaintiffs in (sic) buying it. Such fact was merely for the purpose of
construction of buildings, not for realty ownership.11 (italics in the original)
Aggrieved, petitioner then appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered a Decision12 on May 27,
2005, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. Accordingly, the assailed Order
dated August 9, 2001 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
On June 21, 2005, petitioner seasonably moved for its reconsideration but the Court of Appeals
denied the same in its February 17, 2006 Resolution.13
Hence this appeal under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, where petitioner argues that:
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE AUGUST 9,
2001 ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT EVEN IF THE SAME IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON
RECORD.14lavvphi1
Simply stated, the issue may be synthesized as follows: Between respondents Spouses Tirol and
Spouses Ngo, on the one hand, and petitioner MCIAA, on the other, who has the superior right to the
subject property?
We rule in favor of the respondents, but on grounds different than those relied upon by the Court of
Appeals and the trial court.
Preliminarily, reliance on Article 1544 of the New Civil Code is misplaced. In Cheng v. Genato, et al.,15
we enumerated the requisites that must concur for Article 1544 to apply, viz.:
(a) The two (or more) sales transactions must constitute valid sales;
(b) The two (or more) sales transactions must pertain to exactly the same subject matter;
(c) The two (or more) buyers at odds over the rightful ownership of the subject matter must each
represent conflicting interests; and
(d) The two (or more) buyers at odds over the rightful ownership of the subject matter must each
have bought from the very same seller.
Obviously, said provision has no application in cases where the sales involved were initiated not by
just one vendor but by several successive vendors.16 In the instant case, respondents and petitioner
had acquired the subject property from different transferors. Petitioner, through its predecessor-in-
interest (CAA), acquired the entire Lot No. 4763 from its original owners, spouses Julian Cuison and
Marcosa Cosef, on March 23, 1958. On the other hand, respondents acquired the subject parcel of
land, a portion of Lot No. 4763, from Mrs. Elma Jenkins, another transferee, some thirty-five years
later. The immediate transferors of Elma Jenkins were the spouses Moises Cuizon and Beatriz
Patalinghug who, in turn, obtained the subject property from spouses Julian Cuison and Marcosa
Cosef. Therefore, the instant controversy cannot be governed by Article 1544 since petitioner and
respondents do not have the same immediate seller.
This notwithstanding, we find that respondents have a better right to Lot No. 4763-D.
Petitioner does not contest that Lot No. 4763, of which the property subject of this case is a part, was
registered under Act No. 496 (the Land Registration Act) even before the Second World War.
Paragraph 4 of the Deed of Absolute Sale17 between petitioner and Spouses Julian Cuison and
Marcosa Cosef stipulates, in relevant part:
That since the Original/Transfer Certificate of Title of the aforementioned property has been lost
and/or destroyed, or since the said lot is covered by Cadastral Case No. 20 and a decree issued on July
29, 1930, xxx the VENDEE hereby binds itself to reconstitute said title at its own expense and that the
VENDOR, his heirs, successors and assigns bind themselves to help in the reconstitution of title so
that the said lot may be registered in the name of the VENDEE in accordance with law. (italics
supplied)
Additionally, in his Certification18 dated March 19, 1959, Julian Cuison stated that "the duplicate copy
of the certificate of title for [Lot No. 4763] was lost or destroyed during the last war without having
been received by [him] or [his] predecessor-in-interest."
In this regard, well-settled is the rule that registration of instruments must be done in the proper
registry in order to effect and bind the land.19 Prior to the Property Registration Decree of 1978, Act
No. 496 (or the Land Registration Act) governed the recording of transactions involving registered
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land, i.e., land with a Torrens title. On the other hand, Act No. 3344, as amended, provided for the
system of recording of transactions over unregistered real estate without prejudice to a third party
with a better right.20 Accordingly, if a parcel of land covered by a Torrens title is sold, but the sale is
registered under Act No. 3344 and not under the Land Registration Act, the sale is not considered
registered21 and the registration of the deed does not operate as constructive notice to the whole
world.22
Consequently, the fact that petitioner MCIAA was able to register its Deed of Absolute Sale under Act
No. 3344 is of no moment, as the property subject of the sale is indisputably registered land. Section
50 of Act No. 496 in fact categorically states that it is the act of registration that shall operate to
convey and affect the land; absent any such registration, the instrument executed by the parties
remains only as a contract between them and as evidence of authority to the clerk or register of deeds
to make registration, viz.:
SECTION 50. An owner of registered land may convey, mortgage, lease, charge, or otherwise deal with
the same as fully as if it had not been registered. He may use forms of deeds, mortgages, leases, or
other voluntary instruments like those now in use and sufficient in law for the purpose intended. But
no deed, mortgage, lease, or other voluntary instrument, except a will, purporting to convey or affect
registered land, shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only as a contract
between the parties and as evidence of authority to the clerk or register of deeds to make registration.
The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey and affect the land, and in all cases under
this Act the registration shall be made in the office of register of deeds for the province or provinces
or city where the land lies. (italics supplied)
Hence, respondents may not be characterized as buyers in bad faith for having bought the property
notwithstanding the registration of the first Deed of Absolute Sale under Act No. 3344. An improper
registration is no registration at all. Likewise, a sale that is not correctly registered is binding only
between the seller and the buyer, but it does not affect innocent third persons.23
Petitioner, however, is of the impression that registration under Act No. 3344 is permissible because
the duplicate copy of the certificate of title covering Lot No. 4763-D had been lost or destroyed. This
argument does not persuade. Our pronouncement in Amodia Vda. de Melencion, et al. v. Court of
Appeals, et al.24 is apropos:
In the case at bench, it is uncontroverted that the subject property was under the operation of the
Torrens System even before the respective conveyances to AZNAR and Go Kim Chuan were made.
AZNAR knew of this, and admits this as fact. Yet, despite this knowledge, AZNAR registered the sale
in its favor under Act 3344 on the contention that at the time of sale, there was no title on file. We
are not persuaded by such a lame excuse.
xxx xxx xxx
In this case, since the Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of
AZNAR was registered under Act No. 3344 and not under Act No. 496, the said document is deemed
not registered. Rather, it was the sale in favor of Go Kim Chuan which was registered under Act No.
496.
AZNAR insists that since there was no Torrens title on file in 1964, insofar as the vendors, AZNAR, and
the Register of Deeds are concerned, the subject property was unregistered at the time. The
contention is untenable. The fact that the certificate of title over the registered land is lost does not
convert it into unregistered land. After all, a certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or
title over the particular property described therein. This Court agrees with the petitioners that AZNAR
should have availed itself of the legal remedy of reconstitution of the lost certificate of title, instead
of registration under Act 3344. We note that in Aznar Brothers Realty Company v. Aying, AZNAR, beset
with the similar problem of a lost certificate of title over a registered land, sought the reconstitution
thereof. It is unfortunate that, in the instant case, despite the sale of the subject property way back
in 1964 and the existence of the remedy of reconstitution at that time, AZNAR opted to register the
same under the improper registry (Act 3344) and allowed such status to lie undisturbed.25 (italics
supplied)
In the instant case, petitioner MCIAA did not bother to have the lost title covering Lot No. 4763-D
reconstituted at any time, notwithstanding the fact that the Deed of Absolute Sale was executed in
1958, or more than fifty years ago. Vigilantibus, non dormientibus, jura subveniunt. Laws must come
to the assistance of the vigilant, not of the sleepy.26 As a matter of fact, this entire controversy may
very well have been avoided had it not been for petitioner’s negligence.
Furthermore, under the established principles of land registration, a person dealing with registered
land may generally rely on the correctness of a certificate of title and the law will in no way oblige
him to go beyond it to determine the legal status of the property,27 except when the party concerned
has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man to make
such inquiry.28 Applying this standard to the facts of this case, we rule that respondents exercised
the required diligence in ascertaining the legal condition of the title to the subject property as to be
considered innocent purchasers for value and in good faith. We quote with favor the factual findings
of the Court of Appeals in this respect:
Defendant-appellant MCIAA also asseverates that the close proximity of the property to the runway
of the airport (320 meters from the center line of the runway) and the fact that it has been vacant for
a considerable period should have caused [plaintiffs-appellees] to be dubious of the title of the
previous owners thereof. This was, in Our opinion, satisfactorily explained by plaintiffs-appellees
when witness Mr. Edito Tirol testified in open court that he never thought it strange that the land had
always been vacant, and that besides, there were private houses beside the vacant lot, suggesting
that the property must be of private ownership and not that of the airport. Furthermore, he testified
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that he undertook great care in verifying the clean title of the said land, [e.g.,] deputizing an employee
to do the necessary research, personally copying pertinent documents registered in the Registry of
Property and even consulting legal advice on the matter. These, for Us, are badges of good faith.
Besides, being allegedly part of the Clear Zone, ATO aviation rules proscribe merely the installation of
buildings and other physical structures, except landing facilities. Aviation rules (which, although
repeatedly invoked, interestingly were not presented before the court by defendant-appellant
MCIAA) do not prohibit realty ownership.29

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition is hereby DENIED. The May 27, 2005 Decision and the February 17,
2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

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