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Intellectual Property Law Outline
Intellectual Property Law Outline
Introduction
The Intellectual Property Code took effect on January 1, 1998 and by its
express provision, repealed the Trademark Law, the Patent Law, Articles
188 and 189 of the Revised Penal Code, the Decree on Intellectual
Property, and the Decree on Compulsory Reprinting of Foreign
Textbooks. The Code was enacted to strengthen the intellectual and
industrial property system in the Philippines as mandated by the
country's accession to the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization (WTO).
SEC. 239. Repeals. – 239.1. All Acts and parts of Acts inconsistent
herewith, more particularly Republic Act No. 165, as amended; Republic
Act No. 166, as amended; and Articles 188 and 189 of the Revised Penal
Code; Presidential Decree No. 49, including Presidential Decree No. 285,
as amended, are hereby repealed.
Notably, the aforequoted clause did not expressly repeal R.A. No. 166 in
its entirety, otherwise, it would not have used the phrases “parts of Acts”
and “inconsistent herewith;” and it would have simply stated “Republic
Act No. 165, as amended; Republic Act No. 166, as amended; and Articles
188 and 189 of the Revised Penal Code; Presidential Decree No. 49,
including Presidential Decree No. 285, as amended are hereby repealed.”
It would have removed all doubts that said specific laws had been
rendered without force and effect. The use of the phrases “parts of Acts”
and “inconsistent herewith” only means that the repeal pertains only to
provisions which are repugnant or not susceptible of harmonization with
R.A. No. 8293.7 Section 27 of R.A. No. 166, however, is consistent and in
harmony with Section 163 of R.A. No. 8293. Had R.A. No. 8293 intended
to vest jurisdiction over violations of intellectual property rights with the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, it would have expressly stated so under
Section 163 thereof.
Preliminary Matters
Aiken did not infringe upon 20th Century exclusive right, under the
Copyright Act, "[t]o perform the copyrighted work publicly for profit,"
since the radio reception did not constitute a "performance" of the
copyrighted songs.
The limited scope of the copyright holder's statutory monopoly, like the
limited copyright duration required by the Constitution, reflects a
balance of competing claims upon the public interest: creative work is to
be encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately
serve the cause of promoting broad public availability of literature,
music, and the other arts. The immediate effect of our copyright law is to
secure a fair return for an "author's" creative labor. But the ultimate
aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general
public good. "The sole interest of the United States and the primary
object in conferring the monopoly," this Court has said, "lie in the
general benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors." When
technological change has rendered its literal terms ambiguous, the
Copyright Act must be construed in light of this basic purpose.
- Feist Publication, Inc. vs. Rural Tele. Servs. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 1991
The court rule that facts are not copyrightable; the other, that
compilations of facts generally are. There can be no valid copyright in
facts is universally understood. The most fundamental axiom of copyright
law is that "no author may copyright his ideas or the facts he narrates."
Rural wisely concedes this point, noting in its brief that "facts and
discoveries, of course, are not themselves subject to copyright
protection." However, it is beyond dispute that compilations of facts are
within the subject matter of copyright. Compilations were expressly
mentioned in the Copyright Act of 1909, and again in the Copyright Act
of 1976.
Facts are not copyrightable. The sine qua non of copyright is originality.
To qualify for copyright protection, a work must be original to the
author. See Harper Original, as the term is used in copyright, means only
that the work was independently created by the author (as opposed to
copied from other works), and that it possesses at least some minimal
degree of creativity. To be sure, the requisite level of creativity is
extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice. The vast majority of
works make the grade quite easily, as they possess some creative spark,
"no matter how crude, humble or obvious" it might be.
No one may claim originality as to facts. This is because facts do not owe
their origin to an act of authorship. The distinction is one between
creation and discovery: the first person to find and report a particular
fact has not created the fact; he or she has merely discovered its existence.
One who discovers a fact is not its "maker" or "originator." The
discoverer merely finds and records.
Kho has no right to support her claim for the exclusive use of the subject
trade name and its container. The name and container of a beauty cream
product are proper subjects of a trademark inasmuch as the same falls
squarely within its definition. In order to be entitled to exclusively use the
same in the sale of the beauty cream product, the user must sufficiently
prove that she registered or used it before anybody else did. The
petitioner’s copyright and patent registration of the name and container
would not guarantee her right to the exclusive use of the same for the
reason that they are not appropriate subjects of the said intellectual
rights. Consequently, a preliminary injunction order cannot be issued for
the reason that the petitioner has not proven that she has a clear right
over the said name and container to the exclusion of others, not having
proven that she has registered a trademark thereto or used the same
before anyone did.
- Pearl & Dean, Inc. vs. Shoemart, Inc., G.R. No. 148222, August 15, 2003
- Phil. Pharmawealth, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc. and Pfizer (Phil.), Inc., G.R. No.
167715, November 17, 2010
Thus, the Court agrees with petitioner that respondents are indeed guilty
of forum shopping.
ADOPTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POLICIES – Sec. 230 (New Provision
introduced by R.A. 10372)
The reason for this is expressed in Section 2 of the decree which prefaces
its enumeration of copyrightable works with the explicit statement that
“the rights granted under this Decree shall, from the moment of creation,
subsist with respect to any of the following classes of works.” This means
that under the present state of the law, the copyright for a work is
acquired by an intellectual creator from the moment of creation even in
the absence of registration and deposit. As has been authoritatively
clarified:
It is worthy to state that the works protected under the Law on Copyright
are: literary or artistic works (Sec. 172) and derivative works (Sec. 173).
The Leaf Spring Eye Bushing and Vehicle Bearing Cushion fall on
neither classification.
Being plain automotive spare parts that must conform to the original
structural design of the components they seek to replace, the Leaf Spring
Eye Bushing and Vehicle Bearing Cushion are not ornamental. They lack
the decorative quality or value that must characterize authentic works of
applied art. They are not even artistic creations with incidental utilitarian
functions or works incorporated in a useful article. In actuality, the
personal properties described in the search warrants are mechanical
works, the principal function of which is utility sans any aesthetic
embellishment.
Neither are we to regard the Leaf Spring Eye Bushing and Vehicle
Bearing Cushion as included in the catch-all phrase “other literary,
scholarly, scientific and artistic works” in Section 172.1(a) of R.A. No.
8293. Applying the principle of ejusdem generis which states that “where
a statute describes things of a particular class or kind accompanied by
words of a generic character, the generic word will usually be limited to
things of a similar nature with those particularly enumerated, unless
there be something in the context of the state which would repel such
inference,”[46] the Leaf Spring Eye Bushing and Vehicle Bearing
Cushion are not copyrightable, being not of the same kind and nature as
the works enumerated in Section 172 of R.A. No. 8293.
P.D. No. 49, §2, in enumerating what are subject to copyright, refers to
finished works and not to concepts. The copyright does not extend to an
idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle,
or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained,
illustrated, or embodied in such work.
Copyright, in the strict sense of the term, is purely a statutory right. Being a
mere statutory grant, the rights are limited to what the statute confers. It
may be obtained and enjoyed only with respect to the subjects and by the
persons, and on terms and conditions specified in the statute.7 Accordingly, it
can cover only the works falling within the statutory enumeration or
description.
In the case at bar, even as of this moment, there is no copyright for the design
in question. We are not also prepared to accept the contention of appellant
that the publication of the design was a limited one, or that there was an
understanding that only Ambassador Neri should, have absolute right to use
the same. In the first place, if such were the condition then Ambassador Neri
would be the aggrieved party, and not the appellant. In the second place, if
there was such a limited publication or prohibition, the same was not shown
on the face of the design. When the purpose is a limited publication, but the
effect is general publication, irrevocable rights thereupon become vested in
the public, in consequence of which enforcement of the restriction becomes
impossible.
9. Limitations of Copyright
- A & M Records Inc. vs. Napster Inc. No. 00-16401 (US Court Decision)
The court then turned to the three uses Napster identified as fair use in
the conduct of its users:
This is precisely what the law on copyright protected, under Section 184.1
(b). Quotations from a published work if they are compatible with fair
use and only to the extent justified by the purpose, including quotations
from newspaper articles and periodicals in the form of press summaries
are allowed provided that the source and the name of the author, if
appearing on the work, are mentioned.
- ABS-CBN vs. Phil. Multi-Media System Inc., G.R. No. 175769-70, Jan. 19,
2009
ABS-CBN creates and transmits its own signals; PMSI merely carries
such signals which the viewers receive in its unaltered form. PMSI does
not produce, select, or determine the programs to be shown in Channels 2
and 23. Likewise, it does not pass itself off as the origin or author of such
programs. Insofar as Channels 2 and 23 are concerned, PMSI merely
retransmits the same in accordance with Memorandum Circular 04-08-
88. With regard to its premium channels, it buys the channels from
content providers and transmits on an as-is basis to its viewers. Clearly,
PMSI does not perform the functions of a broadcasting organization;
thus, it cannot be said that it is engaged in rebroadcasting Channels 2 and
23.
Copyright infringement and unfair competition are not limited to the act
of selling counterfeit goods. They cover a whole range of acts, from
copying, assembling, packaging to marketing, including the mere offering
for sale of the counterfeit goods.
The presentation of the master tapes of the copyrighted films from which
the pirated films were allegedly copied, was necessary for the validity of
search warrants against those who have in their possession the pirated
films. The petitioner's argument to the effect that the presentation of the
master tapes at the time of application may not be necessary as these
would be merely evidentiary in nature and not determinative of whether
or not a probable cause exists to justify the issuance of the search
warrants is not meritorious. The court cannot presume that duplicate or
copied tapes were necessarily reproduced from master tapes that it owns.
The application for search warrants was directed against video tape
outlets which allegedly were engaged in the unauthorized sale and renting
out of copyrighted films belonging to the petitioner pursuant to P.D. 49.
Even as we find P & D indeed owned a valid copyright, the same could
have referred only to the technical drawings within the category of
"pictorial illustrations." It could not have possibly stretched out to
include the underlying light box. The strict application of the law’s
enumeration in Section 2 prevents us from giving petitioner even a little
leeway, that is, even if its copyright certificate was entitled "Advertising
Display Units." What the law does not include, it excludes, and for the
good reason: the light box was not a literary or artistic piece which could
be copyrighted under the copyright law. And no less clearly, neither
could the lack of statutory authority to make the light box copyrightable
be remedied by the simplistic act of entitling the copyright certificate
issued by the National Library as "Advertising Display Units.