Professional Documents
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Ramkrishna Bhattacharya
Pavlov Institute, Kolkata
Born in Kolkata, 10 December 1947. Educated at the Scottish Church Collegiate School, Vidyasagar
College and the University of Calcutta, Kolkata. Graduated with Honours in English (1966); M.A. (1968) and
Ph.D. (1986). Retired on 31. 12. 2007 as Reader, Department of English, Anandamohan College, Kolkata 700
009 and Guest Lecturer, Post-graduate Faculty of English, University of Calcutta.
Author of 28 books and more than 175 research papers. Writes articles and reviews in both scholarly
journals and other periodicals on literature (Indian and European), text-criticism (Bangla and Sanskrit), the
history of ideas, the history of science in India, the history of modern India, and philosophy (specially the
Carvaka/Lokayata system, materialism and rationalism). Regularly participates in national seminars and
international conferences, workshops and across-the-board discussions. Lectures and acts as resource person
in refresher courses on various disciplines (Bangla, English, Sanskrit, Philosophy, Political Science, etc.)
organized by several universities in India.
Recent Works:
Bangla
Marxiya Nandantattva, Kolkata: Ababhas, 2015.
Prabandhasangraha. Kolkata: Ebong Mushayera, 2015.
Bankimer Mananjagat. Kolkata: Korak, 2016.
Marksbad Jijnasa. Kolkata: Ababhash, 2016.
Takkatakki Karte Hale O Darsaner Barnaparichay. Pratham Bhag. Kolkata: Thik Thikana, 2016.
Bangabhanga: Swadeshi: Biplabbaad. Kolkata: K. P. Bagchi, 2016.
English
Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata. Florence: Societa Editrice Fiorentina, 2009; London: Anthem Press, 2011.
Indian reprint: New Delhi: Anthem Press India, 2012.
Emergence of Materialism in India (Centre for Scientific Socialism, Occasional Lecture Series-9). Nagarjuna
Nagar (Gutur, Aandhra Pradesh 522510): K. R. R. Mohan Rao Centre for Scientific Socialism, Acharya
Nagarjuna University, 2013.
Present (residential) address: 3 Mohanlal Street, Kolkata 700 004 West Bengal India
Institutional address: Pavlov Institute, 98 Mahatma Gandhi Road, Kolkata 700007 India
Phone: 0091-33-2555-1288
e-mail;: < ramkrishna.bhattacharya@gmail.com> <purandara12@rediffmail.com>
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Background
In the Indian tradition the darśanas were classified under two heads: āstika
and nāstika. The division at first indicated two broad groups, one believing in the
existence of the Other World, the other, not (for details, see R. Bhattacharya
2009/2011 pp.227-231). This interpretation, current from at least the fourth century
BCE (see Paṇini, Aṣṭādhyāyī 4.4.60), was accepted in this sense by all brahmanical,
Buddhist and Jain schools of philosophy. So much so that Haribhadra declares the
Jain and Buddhist systems as āstikavādins (Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya verse 78d) along
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with Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya and Jaiminīya (Mīmāṃsa) matas. By nāstika they all
meant the materialists and the materialists alone (for instance, Śāntarakṣita,
Tattvasaṅgraha 22.1871: nāstikatā; Hemacandra, Anya-yoga-vyaveccheda-
dvātriṃśikā verse 20: nāstika; Sāyaṇa-Mādhava, Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha, chap.1:
nāstika-śiromaṇi, the crest jewel of the nāstikas).1
Afterwards, however, nāstika in the writings of brahmanical authors came to
signify the systems that did not adhere to the Veda, i.e., who did not accept the
status of the Veda as a means of cognition. Thus, along with the materialists, the
Buddhists and the Jains too were branded as nāstikas. It should, however, be borne
in mind that this second signification was confined to the brahamanical circles only.
The Jains and the Buddhists continued to employ the word nastika in the old sense.
Thus there emerged two sets: one set of six as Veda-abiding (the ṣaḍ-darśanāni)
and another set opposed to them. They include four schools of Buddhist philosophy,
the Jain and materialist mentioned mostly as the Cārvāka or Lokāyata (See
Madhusūdana Sarasvatī 1977 p. 3).
In whichever sense the word is taken, the division is basically religious, not
philosophical. Even though Nyāya pays homage to the Veda, it may very well be
regarded as ‘of the nature of ransom paid to the authorities for the purpose of
saving ānvīkṣikī ’ (Chattopadhyaya 1982 p.lxxxix). The brahmanical law books
condemn reasoners (tārkika, hetuka or haituka) in no uncertain terms (for instances,
see Bhattacharya 2009a pp.49-56).
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In his translation of the Tattvasaṅgraha, Ganganath Jha said:
This use of ‘nāstikatā’ [in TS 22.1871] is to be noted, as it affords another indication
of the truth that ‘nāstika’ is not the same as ‘Atheist’; ‘nāstikatā’ , as we find here is the view
that denies the other world. This is in agreement with the view of Vātsyāyana, who also sums
up the ‘Nāstika’ view in the words ‘Nāsti ātmā nāsti paralokaḥ’ , ‘There is no Soul, there is no
other world’ (onTS II:893n). Where? Definitely not in his commentary on the Nyāyasūtra ! In
his glosses on vipratipratti (NS 1.1.26), Vātsyāyana mentions the view, nāsti ātmā but not
nāsti paralokaḥ’.
See also Jha’s note on TS 7.348, I:224.
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Not all Western historians of Indian philosophy, however, have paid attention
to the āstika/nāstika division. Wilhelm Halbfass, for example, does not even mention
it in his discussion of darśana (1988 chap.15), although Max Müller noted it (1899
pp.98.279). More recently the division has been rubbished by Daya Krishna as a
’myth’ (1991 pp.3-15). Whether myth or reality, the fact remains that the traditional
adherents/interpreters of the darśanas of India used to take this division seriously.
In response to the criticism that Nyāya was not based on the Veda, such a
prodigious scholar as MM. Phanibhushana Tarkavagisa (1875–1941), following the
lead given by Udayana in the Nyāyakusumāñjali, cited a verse from the Śvetāśvatara
Upaniṣad (3.3). He then proved to his satisfaction that Nyāya indeed is a Vedic
system of philosophy, since the word, patatra, in that verse stands for atom (1978
p.65)!2 The division of the philosophical systems into āstika and nāstika, although
quite old, is not found formulated before the seventeenth century. Madhusūdana
Sarasvatī speaks of six nāstika systems, namely, Śūnyavāda (Mādhyamika),
Kṣaṇikavāda (Yogācāra), Vāhyārthavāda (Sautrāntika) and Pratyakṣa-svalakṣaṇa
(Vaibhāṣika), all belonging to the Saugata (Buddhist), Dehātmavāda (Cārvāka), and
finally Deha-vyatirikta-deha-pariṇāmātma-vāda (Digambara Jain): evaṃ militvā
nāstikānām ṣaṭprasthānāni (p.3).
2
The interpretation of patatra as atom in this verse seems, at least to me, extremely far-fetched and
altogether unconvincing. Elsewhere too the word means wing, pinion, feather etc. (Monier-Williams
1899/2002 s.v.). But that is beside the point. It is Tarkavagisa’s earnest endeavour to derive atomism
from the Veda itself that is to be noted.
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3
It may be mentioned in this connection that although the English translation of Abu’l FaḌl Allami’s
Āʿin-i Akbarī (Vol. III chap.5) uses the word cārvāka in the section entitled Nāstika, the Persian
original has sufistāʿī (sophists) to denote the Cārvākas. Abu’l FaḌl provides synoptic views of Nyāya,
Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsā, Vedānta, Sāṃkhya and Pātañjala (Yoga), all āstikas, and Jain, Buddhist and
Cārvāka, the nāstikas (chaps.4-5). Apparently, the scholars in the Mughal court were advised by some
brahamanical pundit/s.
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revelation and philosophy deals critically with the pursuit of knowledge and admits
no absolute authority (p.2). Warder is of the opinion that, in spite of the close
connection between religion and philosophy in India, it is possible to deal with
philosophy as an independent discipline.
this do I wish to know of thee (Yama). . .’ (Roby Datta’s trans. 1983 p.21)
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vedānta-nyāya-mīmāṃsā-tarka-naiyāyikas tathā |
cārvākādīni śāstrāni ṣaḍ-darśanam-api smṛtam ||
The exclusion of Sāṃkhya-yoga and three separate mentions of Nyāya, Tarka
and Naiyāyikas is inexplicable.4
Winternitz’s view
It will be rewarding in this context to consider the views of Maurice Winternitz (1863
–1937). He is known to Indian students chiefly as a historian of Indian literature (not
just of Sanskrit literature). Although, this was his magnum opus published over
many years (1908 –1922), he was a prolific writer both in German and English on
several aspects of Indology and an authority in the field of Sanskrit textual criticism.
Let us look at his views about the darśanas of ancient India.
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There is another verse in the Kapila-Gītā, which gives the following list of six ‘darśana’ s: Śaiva,
Śākta, Saura, Gāṇapatya, Jaina and Vaiṣṇava (ibid. folio 6b, qtd ibidem p.204 n161). This is nothing
but a list of the Hindu Pañcopāsakas with the Jains added but the Buddhists excluded.
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In a footnote, he adds,
Then there are those who depend on the Hetuśāstra and on the Tarkaśāstra,
that is to say, those who are devoted to the study of the systems of logic and
dialectics. They are not referred to in respectful terms in orthodox
Brāhmaṇical literature (3:558 n3).
He also refers to several instances in this connection (3:559 n3).
Similarly, in Winternitz’s opinion, ‘Whilst Sāṃkhya has had its origin,
independent of ideas regarding religious belief, the system of Y o g a came into
being directly through religious necessity’ (3:552–553. Emphasis added.). Pūrva
Mīmāṃsa and Uttara Mīmāṃsa (Vedānta), he says, stand ‘[i]n closest relationship
with Vedic religion. . . . These two darśanas constitute the real orthodox
Brāhamaṇical philosophy for which the word of the Veda constitutes, as the
“revelation”, the highest authority for all knowledge’ (3:509–510).
Winternitz points out further that the schools of Vedānta are affiliated to one
religious cult or the other, either Viṣṇu or Śiva (3:537): ’[t]he followers of the
philosophy of Śaṅkara form simultaneously a religious sect, so [many] other schools
of Vedānta too represent many religious sects’ (3:531).
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Even if one does not accept Winternitz’s way of viewing the secular and the
religious origins of the philosophical systems in India, it cannot be denied that some
of the so-called secular systems, too, were forced to pay at least lip service to the
Vedas, and that is how the distinction between the āstika and the nāstika systems
came into being. It is not possible to locate the first occurrence of this division based
on acceptance or rejection of the Veda. However, it can be safely asserted that such
a division was already current by the eighth century CE, from when the philosophical
battle between the Vedists and the non-Vedists (not only the materialist but also the
Jains and the Buddhists) was in full swing.
without the separate mention of these (sc. doubt, etc.) it (Logic) would have
been mere ‘study of the self’ (adhyātma-vidyā), like Upaniṣad. Therefore, by
mentioning the categories like saṃśaya, etc., it is shown to have its unique
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Hiriyanna’s following observation too is worth noting: ‘The position [of Nyāya
concerning the theory of soul and consciousness] is scarcely distinguishable from
that of the Cārvākas’ (1956 p.260n).
There is a floating verse which says: describing the six categories, after
having proposed to describe the nature of dharma is comparable to a person,
intending to go to the Himālaya, going to the sea.
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There is variant reading in the last line of the verse:
Summing Up
The upshot of the above discussion then is that the āstika/nāstika division was
originally meant to isolate the materialists alone, who did not admit the existence of
the Other World. Not only the brahmanical writers but also the Buddhists and the
Jains accepted this division and continued to brand the materialists only as nāstika.
But, over time, under the pressure of Dharmaśāstra, particularly of the Manu, the
scope of nāstikavāda was extended to include Jain and Buddhist philosophical
systems as well, since they too did not adhere to the Vedic ritual theory and
practice. Thus, instead of the earlier, secular division based on ontology, the new
division based on religion – Vedic or non-Vedic – became thoroughly religious.
Dharmaśāstra came to rule over Mokṣaśāstra. The inclusion of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika
was made possible by grafting the aim of freedom to these otherwise secular
systems. Ṣaṭ-tarkī, a secular concept, was ultimately marginalized; the āstika/
nāstika division alone prevailed. The views of Frauwallner, Hiriyanna and
Chattopadhyaya thus were anticipated by Winternitz.
Works Cited
Abu’l FaḌl, Āʿin-i Akbarī. Edited by Navalakisore, Lucknow, 1297 AH/1880 CE.
Abu’l FaḌl. Āʿin-i Akbarī .Trans. Colonel H S Jarrett, Second corrected edition by Sir
Jadu-nath Sarkar. New Delhi: Crown Publications, 1988 (first ed. 1983-96,
second ed. 1947).
Bhattacharya, Ramkrishna. 2009/2011. Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata. Firenze:
Società Editrice Fiorentina, 2009; London: Anthem Press, 2011.
Bhattacharya, Ramkrishna. 2009a. Reasoners and Religious Law-makers: An Ancient Indian
Case Study, Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research, vol. 26, No. 3, July-
September 2009, pp. 49-56 (published in 2011).
Bhattacharya, Ramkrishna. 2013a. Development of Materialism in India: the Pre-Cārvākas
and the Cārvākas, Esercizi Filosofici 8, 2013, pp. 1-12. ISSN 1970-0164 Link:
http://www2.units.it/eserfilo/art813/bhattacharya813.pdf
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Acknowledgements Amitava Bhattacharyya, Chayan Samaddar and Siddhartha Dutta. The usual
disclaimers apply.