Balkan Wars and Indian Muslims

Background

• The Balkan Peninsula, once ruled by the Turks roused against the Turks to secede
in 1912. Vlachs, Greeks, Serbs, and Bulgars made an alliance and started revolting
against the Turkish Ottoman authority. The news of the Balkan wars and the implicit support
of the European nations to the “rebellions” worried the Indian Muslims.

• On the shocking news of the Turkish defeat in the Balkans, one of the leaders of Muslims,
Mohammad Ali, tried to The Muslim leaders appealed for financial help for the Turks. People

• Responded very actively and a Turkish Relief Fund was established.

• Surprisingly, the students of Aligarh College responded more positively. This institution was
considered to be loyal to the British government.

• Sir Sayyed Ahmad Khan, who was the founder of the college and a great leader of the Muslims,
was once a great admirer of Turkey.He, in the last days of his life expressed his displeasure over
the growing external territorial sympathies of Muslims. He thought that these feelings are not
beneficial for the Muslims of India. He warned his compatriots against a pan-Islamic adventure,
which instead of helping Turkey, could complicate their own loyalty as subjects of the British
Government.

• His close colleague and successor Nawab Muhsan ul Mulk went a step further and stated that the
term Khalifa denotes only the ruler of a Muslim country. Muslim history provides us that there
can be more than one Khalifa of the Muslims at the same time. For all those Muslims who are
residing in that country it is compulsory to obey the Khalifa, while rest of the Muslims are only to
extend their respect to that Khalifa. The case

• of the Indian Muslims was of the second category. Thus they should respect the Turkish Khalifa,
but have to follow their British Indian Government. In case of war between Turkey and British,
even though unhappily, the Indian Muslims are bound to support the British Indian government.

Medical Mission to Turkey and N.W.F.P. (1912)

• In the same sympathetic spirit, a meeting at Aligarh decided to send a medical mission to
Turkey to take care of the wounded soldiers. This mission was headed by Dr. Mukhtar
Ahmad Ansari and comprised twenty- four members including doctors and male nurses.

• One of the members of the medical mission was Abdur Rehman Peshawari from the NWFP. He
was a senior student in Aligarh, and on the call of religion, quit his studies. Due to shortage of
money, he sold all his belongings to meet the expenditures. He belonged to a well to do family of
Peshawar (His father Ghulam Samadani was an established government contractor), but he did
not contact his family because he thought his father would not permit him to proceed to Turkey.
• After the end of the war, Abdur Rehman did not return but stayed and remained active in Turkey.
It is reported that he sided with the Pan-Islamic forces, but did not indulge himself in politics;
rather he enlisted himself military to the serve the cause of the Khilafat.

• Later on in 1921 he was sent to Afghanistan as an ambassador of Turkey, which shows the trust
and confidence of the Turks on the ability and competence of Abdur Rehman Peshawari

• The medical mission rendered yeomen services to the wounded Turks at the war front.

• The Mission was invited by the Sultan in his palace to thank them for a job well done. The services
of the Mission had been constantly reported in the Indian press through letters of the mission
members. They claimed that they rendered better services to the war affected areas than many
of the missions sent by other nations including the Europeans. Some of the members such as
Abdur Rehman Siddiqi, Shuaib Quraishi, Chowdry Khaliquzman and Manzor Mehmad stayed in
Turkey, but after four months they returned to India except Manzoor Ahmad and Abdur Rehman
Peshawari. Soon after, Manzor Ahmad fell ill and had to return India, leaving only Abdur Rehman
Peshawari in Turkey.

Impacts

• Pan Islamic Feelings among the Muslims which greatly affected their politics in the subsequent
days.

• CENTRAL TREATY
ORGANIZATION
•
• CENTRAL TREATY ORGANIZATION (CENTO), a mutual defense and economic
cooperation pact among Persia, Turkey, and Pakistan, with the participation of the United
Kingdom and the United States as associate members. CENTO replaced the Baghdad
Pact Organization, after Iraq withdrew from it in Farvardīn 1338 Š./March 1959. The pro-
Soviet Iraqi “revolutionary” government that was established after the coup d’état of Tīr 1337
Š./1958 rejected the “defensive” strategy of the pro-Western Baghdad Pact and accused
Britain, the United States, and Turkey of imperialist designs in the Persian Gulf region
(Hadley, p. 6). The remaining members of the Baghdad Pact gathered in London, where they
decided to transfer the permanent secretariat from Baghdad to Ankara and established a
scientific secretariat in Tehran in late 1337 Š./1958 for research in agriculture and technical
expertise. The name change did not take effect until Šahrīvar 1338 Š./August 1959, when the
United States became an associate member, signing a series of bilateral defense agreements
with Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan.
• CENTO was created as a conventional military alliance in the Cold War climate of the 1950s
and served as the central link in the chain of strategic defense pacts against the Soviet Union
and its allies established by the Western powers from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) to the South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO). Although the fear of commu-
nist expansion in the Northern Tier region (i.e., Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan) was very
real, it was unlikely that Persia, Iraq, Turkey, and Pakistan would have come together on
their own initiative without British and American assurances. London in particular con-
sidered CENTO to be “vital” (Hadley, p. 3) to its security and ardently hoped that other states
would join in due time. For the British a Middle East security system required the
participation of Arab states, especially Egypt, to give it viability. Without the participation of
nationalist Arabs a defense pact associated with the West could not remain stable. After the
Iraqi withdrawal in 1959, in spite of serious efforts, CENTO failed to secure the cooperation
of any other Arab state (Hadley, pp. 3-4). This deprived the alliance of much of its
significance, and one might say that its sword lacked a cutting edge.
• Throughout the 1350s Š./1970s “détente” dominated American and Soviet policies. Moscow
in particular was concerned with the rising influence of the People’s Republic of China in
Asia. CENTO’s regional members no longer feared an outright Soviet attack, as they
improved political and economic relations with Moscow. The strategic reasons for creating
CENTO in the 1330s Š./1950s were no longer pertinent in the 1350s Š./1970s. But for
Moḥammad-Reżā Shah CENTO remained an important institution, because it provided
Persia with membership in an exclusive international club, which in addition to prestige gave
important economic benefits. Ironically, the Soviet threat of the 1330s Š./1950s was dwarfed
by more real challenges to CENTO’s regional members in the 1340s Š./1960s. Turkey’s
conflict with Greece over Cyprus (1964), Pakistan’s quarrel with India (1965), the border dis-
putes between Persia and Iraq (1989; see boundaries iv) left their marks on the long-term
relationships of CENTO members in the Middle East. Persia’s CENTO politics in particular
were perceived negatively by nationalist Arab states, who objected to Tehran’s pro-Western
policies (Hadley, pp. 5-6).
• CENTO had an elaborate organizational structure, including a council of ministers, a
secretariat, and an economic committee, with subcommittees in the health, trade, and
communications fields. The council of ministers, CENTO’s supreme source of authority, met
annually at the prime ministers’ or foreign ministers’ level, alternatively in Tehran,
Islamabad, Ankara, London, and Washington. A council of deputies held fortnightly
meetings at the Ankara headquarters at the ambassadorial level. The secretariat, composed
of approximately 200 individuals in the 1350s Š./1970s—including 50 military officers—
maintained close ties with both NATO and SEATO. A Secretary General, appointed by the
council of ministers for a renewable three years, oversaw CENTO activities. Six individuals
occupied the post after 1339 Š./1960: Osman Ali Baig (ʿOṯmān-ʿAlī Beyg; Pakistan), ʿAbbās-
ʿAlī Ḵaḷʿatbarī (Abbas Ali Khalatbary; Persia), Turgut Menemencioğlu (Turkey), Naṣīr ʿAṣṣār
 (Nassir Assar; Persia), Umit Haluk Baylken (Turkey), and Kamuran Gurun (Turkey). The
Secretariat had four divisions that carried out nonmilitary tasks. The Political and Ad-
ministrative Division prepared and serviced council meetings and implemented directives
from the Secretariat. The Economic Division prepared and serviced meetings of the
Economic Committee and administered the technical cooperation program, as well as the
Multilateral Technical Cooperation Fund. It also acted as liaison for technical exchanges
between member states, developed statistical materials, and worked in close cooperation
with the Agricultural Machinery and Soil Conservation Training Center in Persia. The Public
Relations Division promoted knowledge and understanding of CENTO purposes and
activities by distributing press releases, reports, and technical papers. Finally, the Security
Division oversaw the security of the Secretariat and its staff.
• CENTO was provided with a powerful military committee as well. Although no military
command structure or any combat troops were ever assigned to the organization, the military
committee was its pivotal arm, conducting periodic joint military exercises. Four annual
military exercises were held from 1339 Š./1960 to 1356 Š./1977, including a maritime
training program called MIDLINK held in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea for naval and air
forces; an air defense operation (Šahbāz) to coordinate the movement of aircraft with NATO;
a search and rescue exercise (Najāt) that simulated human disasters involving local police
and the gendarmerie, as well as the regular armed forces; and a small arms competition
(Nešān) to promote marksmanship. Biannual war games (Zanjīr) were also held to
streamline cooperation at the command levels.
• British and American defense agreements led to the creation of the Permanent Military
Deputies Group (PMDG), which oversaw, through the agency of a special committee, a
number of economic activities, including the completion of railway and telecommunications
links between the three regional states. Composed of five senior officers who represented the
military committee, the PMDG was mandated to advise on military problems in the Persian
Gulf and the Northern Tier regions and provide direction to the Combined Military Planning
Staff (Europa, p. 146). CENTO demonstrated a strong interest in subversion activities, most
of which were presumed to originate in the Soviet Union, and, accordingly, supported
counter-subversion activities (Ramazani, 1966, pp. 120-21). But it failed to meet the real
security needs of its members. In September 1965, for example, Pakistan invoked the treaty
in connection with its war with India. Persia and Turkey gave verbal support, whereas Britain
and the United States opted for neutrality (Ramazani, 1975, pp. 339-42). Because of such
failures, CENTO turned its attention more to economic development and technical
cooperation issues.
• In 1338 Š./1959 the United States established a special Development Loan Fund and
financed, among other projects, the Turkey-Persia railway. One of the most spectacular
achievements was the inauguration of a 7,925 km microwave telephone line linking Ankara,
Tehran, and Karachi, which was inaugurated in 1344 Š./1965 and which cost 30 million US
 dollars. In 1341 Š./1962 an industrial development wing was established within the
secretariat to finance numerous industrial projects. The port of Trabzon was enlarged in 1342
Š./1963 and that of Iskenderun completely reconstructed with CENTO funds in 1351 Š./1972.
Other projects included the 1,000-mile highway linking Pakistan, Persia, and Turkey, as well
as the CENTO airway system, which introduced international standards for the control and
surveillance of the air routes between Ankara, Tehran, and Karachi through air-navigational
aids, radar-equipped air traffic control centers, and modern meteorological services. By 1353
Š./1974 significant technical cooperation had been accomplished, causing high university
officials from CENTO regional countries to begin meeting annually (Europa, p. 147).
• Costs for CENTO-sponsored projects were drawn from the Multilateral Technical
Cooperation Fund and the Multilateral Scientific Fund, to which all members contributed,
even though London and Washington voluntarily assumed higher financial burdens. Indi-
vidual governments met all local expenses associated with conferences. Supplementary
payments were made voluntarily to cover substantial costs for nationals attending CENTO
meetings. The Secretariat budget covered salaries for most CENTO staff, except for military
personnel serving on the Combined Military Planning Staff, as well as the expenses incurred
by the headquarters in Ankara. CENTO budgets required 300,000 pounds sterling in 1970
and close to 500,000 in 1977 (Hadley, p. 25). All five countries contributed equally to the
financing of the headquarters.
• Because of its pro-Western leanings, CENTO caused serious disturbances throughout the
Middle East. Outside the organization, Arab leaders hoping for a neutral bloc between the
communist world and the West were bitterly opposed to the organization. But even inside the
organization, long-term regional interests persuaded Persia, Turkey, and Pakistan to operate
more independently from Britain and the United States, and in Mordād 1343 Š./July 1964
these three countries established the Organization for Regional Cooperation and
Development (ORCD) to satisfy their own nascent concerns.
• The twenty-fifth and last CENTO Ministerial Council meeting was held in 1357 Š./1978 in
London. By the fall of 1357 Š./1978 premonitions of revolution led Tehran to scale back its
participation, and in 1358 Š./1979, after the fall of Moḥammad-Reżā Shah, the government of
the Islamic Republic canceled its membership in CENTO. Thereby the organization lost its
central link and consequently its raison d’être. With the subsequent withdrawal of Turkey
and Pakistan in the same year the organization was dissolved formally.
•
• Bibliography:
• G. Hadley, CENTO—The Forgotton Alliance, Brighton, 1971.
• A. Khaleeli, “Some Aspects of Iran’s Foreign Relations,” Pakistan Horizon 21/1, 1968, pp. 14-
20.
• Europa Publications, The Middle East and North Africa 1978-79, London, 1978, pp. 146-48.
 • K. Qureshi, “Pakistan and Iran. A Study in Neighbourly Diplomacy,” Pakistan Horizon 21/1,
1968, pp. 33-39.
• R. K. Ramazani, “Iran, CENTO and the Soviet Union,” Free World Forum 2/4, 1960, pp. 52-
55.
• Idem, Iran’s Foreign Policy 1941-1973. A Study of Foreign Policy in Modernizing Nations,
Charlottesville, Virginia, 1975, pp. 340-44, 354-59.
• Idem, The Northern Tier. Afghanistan, Iran, and Turkey, New York, 1966, pp. 117-23.
• (

• CENTRAL TREATY
ORGANIZATION
•

Berlin Blockade
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

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Berliners watch a Douglas C-54 Skymaster land at Tempelhof Airport, 1948

Part of a series on the

History of Berlin
 Margraviate of Brandenburg (1157–1806)

Kingdom of Prussia (1701–1918)

German Empire (1871–1918)

Weimar Republic (1919–1933)

 1920s Berlin
 Greater Berlin Act

Nazi Germany (1933–1945)

 Welthauptstadt Germania
 Bombing of Berlin in World War II
 Battle of Berlin

West Germany and East Germany (1945–1990)

 West Berlin and East Berlin

 Berlin Wall
 Berlin Blockade (1948–1949)
 Berlin Crisis of 1961
 "Ich bin ein Berliner" (1963)
 "Tear Down This Wall" (1987)

Federal Republic of Germany(1990–present)

 History of Germany and History of Europe

See also

 Timeline of Berlin
  v
 t
 e

The Berlin Blockade (24 June 1948 – 12 May 1949) was one of the first major international crises
of the Cold War. During the multinational occupation of post–World War II Germany, the Soviet
Union blocked the Western Allies' railway, road, and canal access to the sectors of Berlin under
Western control. The Soviets offered to drop the blockade if the Western Allies withdrew the newly
introduced Deutsche mark from West Berlin.
The Western Allies organized the Berlin airlift (26 June 1948–30 September 1949) to carry supplies
to the people of West Berlin, a difficult feat given the size of the city's population.[1][2] Aircrews from
the United States Air Force, the Royal Air Force, the French Air Force,[3] the Royal Canadian Air
Force, the Royal Australian Air Force, the Royal New Zealand Air Force, and the South African Air
Force[4]:338 flew over 200,000 sorties in one year, providing to the West Berliners up to 12,941 tons of
necessities in a day, such as fuel and food, with the original plan being to lift 3,475 tons of supplies.
However, by the end of the airlift, that number was often met twofold.[5] The Soviets did not disrupt
the airlift for fear this might lead to open conflict, even though they far outnumbered the allies in
Germany and especially Berlin.[6] [7]
By the spring of 1949, the airlift was clearly succeeding, and by April it was delivering more cargo
than had previously been transported into the city by rail. On 12 May 1949, the USSR lifted the
blockade of West Berlin, although for a time the U.S., U.K and France continued to supply the city by
air anyways because they were worried that the Soviets were simply going to resume the blockade
and were only trying to disrupt western supply lines. The Berlin Blockade served to highlight the
competing ideological and economic visions for postwar Europe and was the first major multinational
skirmish of the cold war.

Contents

 1Postwar division of Germany

o 1.1Soviet zone and the Allies' rights of access to Berlin
o 1.2Focus on Berlin and the elections of 1946
 2Political division
o 2.1Moves towards a West German state
o 2.2April Crisis and the Little Air Lift
o 2.3Currency crisis
 3Start of the Berlin Airlift
o 3.1Beginning of the Blockade
o 3.2Decision for an airlift
o 3.3Airlift begins
o 3.4Black Friday
o 3.5"Operation Little Vittles"
 4Soviet responses
o 4.1Initial reaction
o 4.2Attempted Communist putsch in the municipal government
o 4.3December elections
 5Winter 1948 to spring 1949
o 5.1Preparing for winter
 o 5.2Easter parade
 6End of the blockade
 7Subsequent events
 8Aircraft used in the Berlin Airlift
 9See also
 10Footnotes
 11References
 12Further reading
 13External links

Postwar division of Germany[edit]

The red area of Germany (above) is Soviet controlled East Germany. German territory east of the Oder-Neisse
line (light beige) was ceded to Poland, while a portion of the easternmost section of Germany East
Prussia, Königsberg, was annexed by the USSR, as the Kaliningrad Oblast.

From July 17 to August 2, 1945, the victorious Allies reached the Potsdam Agreement on the fate of
postwar Europe, calling for the division of defeated Germany into four temporary occupation zones
(thus re-affirming principles laid out earlier by the Yalta Conference). These zones were located
roughly around the then-current locations of the allied armies.[8] Also divided into occupation zones,
Berlin was located 100 miles (160 km) inside Soviet-controlled eastern Germany. The United States,
United Kingdom, and France controlled western portions of the city, while Soviet troops controlled
the eastern sector.[8]
Soviet zone and the Allies' rights of access to Berlin[edit]

Sectors of divided Berlin

The only three permissible air corridors to Berlin.

In the eastern zone, the Soviet authorities forcibly unified the Communist Party of
Germany and Social Democratic Party(SPD) in the Socialist Unity Party ("SED"), claiming at the time
that it would not have a Marxist–Leninist or Soviet orientation.[9]The SED leaders then called for the
"establishment of an anti-fascist, democratic regime, a parliamentary democratic republic" while the
Soviet Military Administration suppressed all other political activities.[10] Factories, equipment,
technicians, managers and skilled personnel were removed to the Soviet Union.[11]
In a June 1945 meeting, Stalin informed German communist leaders that he expected to slowly
undermine the British position within their occupation zone, that the United States would withdraw
within a year or two and that nothing would then stand in the way of a united Germany under
communist control within the Soviet orbit.[12] Stalin and other leaders told visiting Bulgarian and
Yugoslavian delegations in early 1946 that Germany must be both Soviet and communist.[12]
A further factor contributing to the Blockade was that there had never been a formal agreement
guaranteeing rail and road access to Berlin through the Soviet zone. At the end of the war, western
leaders had relied on Soviet goodwill to provide them with access.[13] At that time, the western allies
assumed that the Soviets' refusal to grant any cargo access other than one rail line, limited to ten
trains per day, was temporary, but the Soviets refused expansion to the various additional routes
that were later proposed.[14]
The Soviets also granted only three air corridors for access to Berlin from Hamburg, Bückeburg,
and Frankfurt.[14] In 1946 the Soviets stopped delivering agricultural goods from their zone in eastern
Germany, and the American commander, Lucius D. Clay, responded by stopping shipments of
dismantled industries from western Germany to the Soviet Union. In response, the Soviets started a
public relations campaign against American policy and began to obstruct the administrative work of
all four zones of occupation.
Until the blockade began in 1948, the Truman Administration had not decided whether American
forces should remain in West Berlin after the establishment of a West German government, planned
for 1949.[15]
Focus on Berlin and the elections of 1946[edit]
Berlin quickly became the focal point of both US and Soviet efforts to re-align Europe to their
respective visions. As Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov noted, "What happens to Berlin,
happens to Germany; what happens to Germany, happens to Europe."[16] Berlin had suffered
enormous damage; its prewar population of 4.3 million people was reduced to 2.8 million.
After harsh treatment, forced emigration, political repression and the particularly hard winter of
1945–1946, Germans in the Soviet-controlled zone were hostile to Soviet endeavours.[12] Local
elections in 1946 resulted in a massive anti-communist protest vote, especially in the Soviet sector
of Berlin.[12] Berlin's citizens overwhelmingly elected non-Communist members to its city government.

Political division[edit]
Moves towards a West German state[edit]
Meanwhile, to coordinate the economies of the British and United States occupation zones, these
were combined on 1 January 1947 into what was referred to as the Bizone[12] (renamed "the Trizone"
when France joined on 1 June 1948). After March 1946 the British zonal advisory board
(Zonenbeirat) was established, with representatives of the states, the central offices, political parties,
trade unions, and consumer organisations. As indicated by its name, the zonal advisory board had
no legislative power, but was merely advisory. The Control Commission for Germany – British
Element made all decisions with its legislative power. In reaction to the Soviet and British advances,
in October 1945 the Office of Military Government, United States (OMGUS) encouraged the states in
the US zone to form a co-ordinating body, the so-called Länderrat (council of states), with the power
to legislate for the entire US zone. It created its own central bodies (Ausschüsse or joint interstate
committees) headed by a secretariat seated in Stuttgart. While the British and Soviet central
administrations were allied institutions, these US zone committees were not OMGUS subdivisions,
but instead were autonomous bodies of German self-rule under OMGUS supervision.
Representatives of these three governments, along with the Benelux nations, met twice in London
(London 6-Power Conference) in the first half of 1948 to discuss the future of Germany, going ahead
despite Soviet threats to ignore any resulting decisions.[17][18] Eventually the London Agreement on
German External Debts, also known as the London Debt Agreement (German: Londoner
Schuldenabkommen), was concluded. Under the London Debts Agreement of 1953, the repayable
amount was reduced by 50% to about 15 billion marks and stretched out over 30 years, and
compared to the fast-growing German economy were of minor impact.[19]
In response to the announcement of the first of these meetings, in late January 1948, the Soviets
began stopping British and American trains to Berlin to check passenger identities.[20] As outlined in
an announcement on 7 March 1948, all of the governments present approved the extension of
the Marshall Plan to Germany, finalised the economic merger of the western occupation zones in
Germany and agreed upon the establishment of a federal system of government for them.[17][18]
After a 9 March meeting between Stalin and his military advisers, a secret memorandum was sent to
Molotov on 12 March 1948, outlining a plan to force the policy of the western allies into line with the
wishes of the Soviet government by "regulating" access to Berlin.[21] The Allied Control Council (ACC)
met for the last time on 20 March 1948, when Vasily Sokolovsky demanded to know the outcome of
the London Conference and, on being told by negotiators that they had not yet heard the final results
from their governments, he said, "I see no sense in continuing this meeting, and I declare it
adjourned."[21]
The entire Soviet delegation rose and walked out. Truman later noted, "For most of Germany, this
act merely formalized what had been an obvious fact for some time, namely, that the four-power
control machinery had become unworkable. For the city of Berlin, however, this was an indication for
a major crisis."[22]
April Crisis and the Little Air Lift[edit]
On 25 March 1948, the Soviets issued orders restricting Western military and passenger traffic
between the American, British and French occupation zones and Berlin.[20] These new measures
began on 1 April along with an announcement that no cargo could leave Berlin by rail without the
permission of the Soviet commander. Each train and truck was to be searched by the Soviet
authorities.[20] On 2 April, General Clay ordered a halt to all military trains and required that supplies
to the military garrison be transported by air, in what was dubbed the "Little Lift".[20]
The Soviets eased their restrictions on Allied military trains on 10 April 1948, but continued
periodically to interrupt rail and road traffic during the next 75 days, while the United States
continued supplying its military forces by using cargo aircraft.[23] Some 20 flights a day continued
through June, building up stocks of food against future Soviet actions,[24] so that by the time the
blockade began at the end of June, at least 18 days supply per major food type, and in some types,
much more, had been stockpiled that provided time to build up the ensuing airlift.[25]
At the same time, Soviet military aircraft began to violate West Berlin airspace and would harass, or
what the military called "buzz", flights in and out of West Berlin.[26] On 5 April, a Soviet Air
Force Yakovlev Yak-3 fighter collided with a British European Airways Vickers Viking 1B airliner
near RAF Gatow airfield, killing all aboard both aircraft. The Gatow air disaster exacerbated tensions
between the Soviets and the other allied powers.[27][28][29] Internal Soviet reports in April stated that
"Our control and restrictive measures have dealt a strong blow to the prestige of the Americans and
British in Germany" and that the Americans have "admitted" that the idea of an airlift would be too
expensive.[30]
On 9 April, Soviet officials demanded that American military personnel maintaining communication
equipment in the Eastern zone must withdraw, thus preventing the use of navigation beacons to
mark air routes.[23] On 20 April, the Soviets demanded that all barges obtain clearance before
entering the Soviet zone.[31]
Currency crisis[edit]
Further information: Heinrich Rau, East German mark, and Deutsche Mark

Creation of an economically stable western Germany required reform of the

unstable Reichsmark German currency introduced after the 1920s German inflation. The Soviets
had debased the Reichsmark by excessive printing, resulting in Germans using cigarettes as a de
facto currency or for bartering.[32][33] The Soviets opposed western plans for a reform.[32][33] They
interpreted the new currency as an unjustified, unilateral decision, and responded by cutting all land
links between West Berlin and West Germany. The Soviets believed that the only currency that
should be allowed to circulate was the currency that they issued themselves.[34] In February 1948, the
Americans and British had proposed to the ACC that a new German currency be created, replacing
the over-circulated and devalued Reichsmark. The Soviets refused to accept this proposal, hoping to
continue the German recession, in keeping with their policy of a weak Germany.[35]
Anticipating the introduction of a new currency by the other countries in the non-Soviet zones, the
Soviet Union in May 1948 directed its military to introduce its own new currency and to permit only
the Soviet currency to be used in their sector of Berlin, if the other countries brought in a different
currency there.[32] On 18 June the United States, Britain and France announced that on 21 June
the Deutsche Mark would be introduced, but the Soviets refused to permit its use as legal tender in
Berlin.[32] The Allies had already transported 250,000,000 Deutsche marks into the city and it quickly
became the standard currency in all four sectors. Against the wishes of the Soviets, the new
currency, along with the Marshall Plan that backed it, appeared to have the potential to revitalise
Germany. Stalin looked to force the Western nations to abandon Berlin.

Start of the Berlin Airlift[edit]

Beginning of the Blockade[edit]
Eastern Bloc

Soviet Socialist Republics[show]

Allied states[show]

Related organizations[show]

Dissent and opposition[show]

Cold War events[show]

Decline[show]
  v
 t
 e

The day after the 18 June 1948 announcement of the new Deutsche Mark, Soviet guards halted all
passenger trains and traffic on the autobahn to Berlin, delayed Western and German freight
shipments and required that all water transport secure special Soviet permission.[32]On 21 June, the
day the Deutsche Mark was introduced, the Soviet military halted a United States military supply
train to Berlin and sent it back to western Germany.[32] On 22 June, the Soviets announced that they
would introduce a new currency in their zone.[36]
That same day, a Soviet representative told the other three occupying powers that "We are warning
both you and the population of Berlin that we shall apply economic and administrative sanctions that
will lead to the circulation in Berlin exclusively of the currency of the Soviet occupation zone."[36] The
Soviets launched a massive propaganda campaign condemning Britain, the United States and
France by radio, newspaper and loudspeaker.[36] The Soviets conducted well-advertised military
maneuvers just outside the city. Rumors of a potential occupation by Soviet troops spread quickly.
German communists demonstrated, rioted and attacked pro-West German leaders attending
meetings for the municipal government in the Soviet sector.[36]
On 24 June, the Soviets severed land and water connections between the non-Soviet zones and
Berlin.[36] That same day, they halted all rail and barge traffic in and out of Berlin.[36] The West
answered by introducing a counter-blockade, stopping all rail traffic into East Germany from the
British and US zones. Over the following months this counter-blockade would have a damaging
impact on East Germany, as the drying up of coal and steel shipments seriously hindered industrial
development in the Soviet zone.[37][38] On 25 June, the Soviets stopped supplying food to the civilian
population in the non-Soviet sectors of Berlin.[36] Motor traffic from Berlin to the western zones was
permitted, but this required a 23-kilometer (14.3-mile) detour to a ferry crossing because of alleged
"repairs" to a bridge.[36] They also cut off the electricity relied on by Berlin, using their control over the
generating plants in the Soviet zone.[33]
Surface traffic from non-Soviet zones to Berlin was blockaded, leaving open only the air
corridors.[36] The Soviets rejected arguments that the occupation rights in the non-Soviet sectors of
Berlin and the use of the supply routes during the previous three years had given Britain, France and
the United States a legal claim to use of the highways, tunnels, railroads, and canals. Relying on
Soviet goodwill after the war, Britain, France, and the United States had never negotiated an
agreement with the Soviets to guarantee these land-based rights of access to Berlin through the
Soviet zone.[13]
At the time, West Berlin had 36 days' worth of food, and 45 days' worth of coal. Militarily, the
Americans and British were greatly outnumbered because of the postwar scaling back of their
armies. The United States, like other western countries, had disbanded most of its troops and was
largely inferior in the European theatre.[39] The entire United States Army had been reduced to
552,000 men by February 1948.[40] Military forces in the western sectors of Berlin numbered only
8,973 Americans, 7,606 British and 6,100 French.[41] Of the 98,000 American troops in West
Germany in March 1948, only 31,000 were combat forces, and only one reserve division was
immediately available in the United States.[42] Soviet military forces in the Soviet sector that
surrounded Berlin totaled 1.5 million.[43] The two United States regiments in Berlin could have
provided little resistance against a Soviet attack.[44] Because of the imbalance, U.S. war plans were
based on using hundreds of atomic bombs, but only about 50 Fat Man-specification bombs, the only
version available to the U.S. military, existed in mid-1948. In March 1948, only 35 "Silverplate"
atomic-capable Boeing B-29 Superfortress bombers—just over half of the
65 Silverplate specification B-29 aircraft built through the end of 1947—and a few trained flight and
assembly crews were available. Three B-29 groups arrived in Europe in July and August 1948.[45][nb
 Despite the intention to signal the threat of the West's ability to retaliate with nuclear weapons if
1]

necessary, the Soviets possibly knew that none of the bombers were atomic-capable. The first
Silverplate bombers only arrived to Europe near the end of the crisis in April 1949.[46]
General Lucius D. Clay, in charge of the U.S. Occupation Zone in Germany, summed up the
reasons for not retreating in a cable to Washington, D.C. on 13 June 1948: "There is no practicability
in maintaining our position in Berlin and it must not be evaluated on that basis.... We are convinced
that our remaining in Berlin is essential to our prestige in Germany and in Europe. Whether for good
or bad, it has become a symbol of the American intent."[47]
Believing that Britain, France, and the United States had little option than to acquiesce, the Soviet
Military Administration in Germany celebrated the beginning of the blockade.[48]General Clay felt that
the Soviets were bluffing about Berlin since they would not want to be viewed as starting a Third
World War. He believed that Stalin did not want a war and that Soviet actions were aimed at exerting
military and political pressure on the West to obtain concessions, relying on the West's prudence
and unwillingness to provoke a war.[41]Commander of United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE)
General Curtis LeMay reportedly favoured an aggressive response to the blockade, in which his B-
29s with fighter escort would approach Soviet air bases while ground troops attempted to reach
Berlin; Washington vetoed the plan.[46]
Decision for an airlift[edit]
Although the ground routes had never been negotiated, the same was not true of the air. On 30
November 1945, it had been agreed in writing that there would be three twenty-mile-wide air
corridors providing free access to Berlin.[49] Additionally, unlike a force of tanks and trucks, the
Soviets could not claim that cargo aircraft were a military threat. In the face of unarmed aircraft
refusing to turn around, the only way to enforce the blockade would have been to shoot them down.
An airlift would put the Soviet Union in the position of either shooting down unarmed humanitarian
aircraft, thus breaking their own agreements, or backing down.
The airlift option critically depended on scale and effectiveness. If the supplies could not be flown in
fast enough, Soviet help would eventually be needed to prevent starvation. Clay was told to take
advice from General LeMay to see if an airlift was possible. Initially taken aback by the inquiry, which
was "Can you haul coal?", LeMay replied "We can haul anything."[49]
When American forces consulted Britain's Royal Air Force (RAF) about a possible joint airlift, they
learned the RAF was already running an airlift in support of British troops in Berlin. General Clay's
counterpart, General Sir Brian Robertson, was ready with some concrete numbers. During the Little
Lift in April 1948,[20] British Air Commodore Reginald Waite had calculated the resources required to
support the entire city.[citation needed]
The American military government, based on a minimum daily ration of 1,990 kilocalories (July
1948),[50] set a total of daily supplies needed at 646 tons of flour and wheat, 125 tons of cereal, 64
tons of fat, 109 tons of meat and fish, 180 tons of dehydrated potatoes, 180 tons of sugar, 11 tons of
coffee, 19 tons of powdered milk, 5 tons of whole milk for children, 3 tons of fresh yeast for baking,
144 tons of dehydrated vegetables, 38 tons of salt and 10 tons of cheese. In all, 1,534 tons were
required each day to sustain the over two million people of Berlin.[49][51] Additionally, for heat and
power, 3,475 tons of coal, diesel and petrol were also required daily.[52]
C-47 Skytrains unloading at Tempelhof Airport during the Berlin Airlift.

Carrying all this in would not be easy. The postwar demobilisation left the US forces in Europe with
only two groups[53] of C-47 Skytraintransports (the military version of the Douglas DC-3, which the
British called "Dakota"), nominally 96 aircraft, each of which could carry about 3.5 tons of cargo.
LeMay believed that "with an all-out effort" of 100 daily round trips these would be able to haul about
300 tons of supplies a day.[54] The RAF was somewhat better prepared, since it had already moved
some aircraft into the German area, and they expected to be able to supply about 400 tons a day.
This was not nearly enough to move the 5,000 tons a day that would be needed, but these numbers
could be increased as new aircraft arrived from the United Kingdom, the United States, and France.
The RAF would be relied on to increase its numbers quickly. It could fly additional aircraft in from
Britain in a single hop, bringing the RAF fleet to about 150 Dakotas and 40 of the larger Avro
Yorks with a 10-ton payload.
With this fleet, the British contribution was expected to rise to 750 tons a day in the short term, a
month, but even that at the cost of suspending all air traffic except for the airlift to Berlin and
Warsaw.[54] For a longer-term operation, the US would have to add additional aircraft as soon as
possible, and those would have to be as large as possible while still able to fly into the Berlin
airports. Only one aircraft type was suitable, the four-engined C-54 Skymaster and its US
Navy equivalent, the R5D, of which the US military had approximately 565, with 268 Air Force and
Navy Skymasters in MATS, 168 in the troop carrier groups, and 80 Navy R5Ds in miscellaneous
commands. Planners calculated that including C-54s already ordered to Germany and drawing on
those flying with civilian carriers, 447 Skymasters could be available for an "extreme emergency."[55]
Given the feasibility assessment made by the British, an airlift appeared to be the best course of
action. One remaining concern was the population of Berlin. Clay called in Ernst Reuter, the mayor-
elect of Berlin, accompanied by his aide, Willy Brandt. Clay told Reuter, "Look, I am ready to try an
airlift. I can't guarantee it will work. I am sure that even at its best, people are going to be cold and
people are going to be hungry. And if the people of Berlin won't stand that, it will fail. And I don't want
to go into this unless I have your assurance that the people will be heavily in approval." Reuter,
although sceptical, assured Clay that Berlin would make all the necessary sacrifices and that the
Berliners would support his actions.[47]
General Albert Wedemeyer, the US Army Chief of Plans and Operations, was in Europe on an
inspection tour when the crisis broke out. He had been the commander of the US China-Burma-India
Theater in 1944–45 and he had a detailed knowledge of the previously-largest airlift—the World War
II American airlift from India over the Hump of the Himalayasto China. His endorsement of the airlift
option gave it a major boost.[47] The British and Americans agreed to start a joint operation without
delay; the US action was dubbed "Operation Vittles,"[56][nb 2] while the British action was called
"Operation Plainfare".[57][nb 3] The Australian contribution to the airlift, begun in September 1948, was
designated "Operation Pelican."[58]
The British asked Canada to contribute planes and crews. It refused, primarily on the grounds that
the operation risked war and Canada had not been consulted.[59]
Airlift begins[edit]

Loading milk on a West Berlin-bound aircraft

On 24 June 1948 LeMay appointed Brigadier General Joseph Smith, headquarters commandant for
USAFE at Camp Lindsey, as the Provisional Task Force Commander of the airlift. Smith had been
chief of staff in LeMay's B-29 command in India during World War II and had no airlift
experience.[citation needed] On 25 June 1948 Clay gave the order to launch Operation Vittles. The next day
32 C-47s lifted off for Berlin hauling 80 tons of cargo, including milk, flour, and medicine. The first
British aircraft flew on 28 June. At that time, the airlift was expected to last three weeks.[citation needed]
On 27 June, Clay cabled William Draper with an estimate of the current situation:
I have already arranged for our maximum airlift to start on Monday [June 28]. For a sustained effort,
we can use seventy Dakotas [C-47s]. The number which the British can make available is not yet
known, although General Robertson is somewhat doubtful of their ability to make this number
available. Our two Berlin airports can handle in the neighborhood of fifty additional airplanes per day.
These would have to be C-47s, C-54s or planes with similar landing characteristics, as our airports
cannot take larger planes. LeMay is urging two C-54 groups. With this airlift, we should be able to
bring in 600 or 700 tons a day. While 2,000 tons a day is required in normal foods, 600 tons a day
(utilizing dried foods to the maximum extent) will substantially increase the morale of the German
people and will unquestionably seriously disturb the Soviet blockade. To accomplish this, it is urgent
that we be given approximately 50 additional transport planes to arrive in Germany at the earliest
practicable date, and each day's delay will of course decrease our ability to sustain our position in
Berlin. Crews would be needed to permit maximum operation of these planes.

— Lucius D. Clay, June 1948[47]

By 1 July, the system was getting under way. C-54s were starting to arrive in quantity, and Rhein-
Main Air Base became exclusively a C-54 hub, while Wiesbaden retained a mix of C-54s and C-47s.
Aircraft flew northeast through the American air corridor into Tempelhof Airport, then returned due
west flying out on through the British air corridor. After reaching the British Zone, they turned south
to return to their bases.[citation needed]
Germans watching supply planes at Tempelhof.

1950s film by the British Government about the Berlin airlift

The British ran a similar system, flying southeast from several airports in the Hamburg area through
their second corridor into RAF Gatow in the British Sector, and then also returning out on the center
corridor, turning for home or landing at Hanover. However, unlike the Americans, the British also ran
some round-trips, using their southeast corridor. To save time many flights didn't land in Berlin,
instead air dropping material, such as coal, into the airfields. On 6 July the Yorks and Dakotas were
joined by Short Sunderland flying boats. Flying from Finkenwerder on the Elbe near Hamburg to
the Havel river next to Gatow, their corrosion-resistant hulls suited them to the particular task of
delivering baking powder and other salt into the city.[60]
Accommodating the large number of flights to Berlin of dissimilar aircraft with widely varying flight
characteristics required close co-ordination. Smith and his staff developed a complex timetable for
flights called the "block system": three eight-hour shifts of a C-54 section to Berlin followed by a C-47
section. Aircraft were scheduled to take off every four minutes, flying 1,000 feet higher than the flight
in front. This pattern began at 5,000 feet and was repeated five times. (This system of stacked
inbound serials was later dubbed "the ladder.")[61][62][63]
During the first week the airlift averaged only ninety tons a day, but by the second week it reached
1,000 tons. This likely would have sufficed had the effort lasted only a few weeks, as originally
believed. The Communist press in East Berlin ridiculed the project. It derisively referred to "the futile
attempts of the Americans to save face and to maintain their untenable position in Berlin."[64]
Despite the excitement engendered by glamorous publicity extolling the work (and over-work) of the
crews and the daily increase of tonnage levels, the airlift was not close to being operated to its
capability because USAFE was a tactical organisation without any airlift expertise. Maintenance was
barely adequate, crews were not being efficiently used, transports stood idle and disused, necessary
record-keeping was scant, and ad hoc flight crews of publicity-seeking desk personnel were
disrupting a business-like atmosphere.[65] This was recognised by the United States National Security
Council at a meeting with Clay on 22 July 1948, when it became clear that a long-term airlift was
necessary. Wedemeyer immediately recommended that the deputy commander for operations of
the Military Air Transport Service (MATS), Maj. Gen. William H. Tunner, command the operation.
When Wedemeyer had been the commander of US forces in China during World War II, Tunner, as
commander of the India-China Division of the Air Transport Command, had reorganised the Hump
airlift between India and China, doubling the tonnage and hours flown. USAF Chief of Staff Hoyt S.
Vandenberg endorsed the recommendation.[61]
Black Friday[edit]
On 28 July 1948, Tunner arrived in Wiesbaden to take over the operation.[66] He revamped the entire
airlift operation, reaching an agreement with LeMay to form the Combined Air Lift Task
Force (CALTF) to control both the USAFE and RAF lift operations from a central location, which
went into effect in mid-October 1948. MATS immediately deployed eight squadrons of C-54s—72
aircraft to Wiesbaden and Rhein-Main Air Base to reinforce the 54 already in operation, the first by
30 July and the remainder by mid-August, and two-thirds of all C-54 aircrew worldwide began
transferring to Germany to allot three crews per aircraft.[67]

A C-74 Globemaster plane at Gatow airfield on 19 August with more than 20 tons of flour from the United
States.

Two weeks after his arrival, on 13 August, Tunner decided to fly to Berlin to grant an award to Lt.
Paul O. Lykins, an airlift pilot who had made the most flights into Berlin up to that time, a symbol of
the entire effort to date.[68] Cloud cover over Berlin dropped to the height of the buildings, and heavy
rain showers made radar visibility poor. A C-54 crashed and burned at the end of the runway, and a
second one landing behind it burst its tires while trying to avoid it. A third transport ground
looped after mistakenly landing on a runway under construction. In accordance with the standard
procedures then in effect, all incoming transports including Tunner's, arriving every three minutes,
were stacked above Berlin by air traffic control from 3,000 feet (910 m) to 12,000 feet (3,700 m) in
bad weather, creating an extreme risk of mid-air collision. Newly unloaded planes were denied
permission to take off to avoid that possibility and created a backup on the ground. While no one
was killed, Tunner was embarrassed that the control tower at Tempelhof had lost control of the
situation while the commander of the airlift was circling overhead. Tunner radioed for all stacked
aircraft except his to be sent home immediately. This became known as "Black Friday," and Tunner
personally noted it was from that date that the success of the airlift stemmed.[69][70]
As a result of Black Friday, Tunner instituted a number of new rules; instrument flight rules (IFR)
would be in effect at all times, regardless of actual visibility, and each sortie would have only one
chance to land in Berlin, returning to its air base if it missed its approach, where it was slotted back
into the flow. Stacking was completely eliminated. With straight-in approaches, the planners found
that in the time it had taken to unstack and land nine aircraft, 30 aircraft could be landed, bringing in
300 tons.[71] Accident rates and delays dropped immediately. Tunner decided, as he had done during
the Hump operation, to replace the C-47s in the airlift with C-54s or larger aircraft when it was
realised that it took just as long to unload a 3.5-ton C-47 as a 10-ton C-54. One of the reasons for
this was the sloping cargo floor of the "taildragger" C-47s, which made truck loading difficult.
The tricycle geared C-54's cargo deck was level, so that a truck could back up to it and offload cargo
quickly. The change went into full effect after 28 September 1948.[72]
Having noticed on his first inspection trip to Berlin on 31 July that there were long delays as the flight
crews returned to their aircraft after getting refreshments from the terminal, Tunner banned aircrew
from leaving their aircraft for any reason while in Berlin. Instead, he equipped jeeps as mobile snack
bars, handing out refreshments to the crews at their aircraft while it was being unloaded. Gail
Halvorsen later noted, "he put some beautiful German Fräuleins in that snack bar. They knew we
couldn't date them, we had no time. So they were very friendly."[52] Operations officers handed pilots
their clearance slips and other information while they ate. With unloading beginning as soon as
engines were shut down on the ramp, turnaround before takeoff back to Rhein-Main or Wiesbaden
was reduced to thirty minutes.[73]

An RAF Short Sunderland moored on the Havel near Berlin unloading salt during the airlift

To maximise the utilization of a limited number of aircraft, Tunner altered the "ladder" to three
minutes and 500 feet (150 m) of separation, stacked from 4,000 feet (1,200 m) to 6,000 feet
(1,800 m).[62] Maintenance, particularly adherence to 25-hour, 200-hour, and 1000-hour inspections,
became the highest priority and further maximised utilization.[74] Tunner also shortened block times to
six hours to squeeze in another shift, making 1440 (the number of minutes in a day) landings in
Berlin a daily goal.[nb 4] His purpose, illustrating his basic philosophy of the airlift business, was to
create a "conveyor belt" approach to scheduling that could be sped up or slowed down as situations
might dictate. The most effective measure taken by Tunner, and the most initially resisted until it
demonstrated its efficiency, was creation of a single control point in the CALTF for controlling all air
movements into Berlin, rather than each air force doing its own.
The Berliners themselves solved the problem of the lack of manpower. Crews unloading and making
airfield repairs at the Berlin airports were made up of almost entirely by local civilians, who were
given additional rations in return. As the crews increased in experience, the times for unloading
continued to fall, with a record set for the unloading of an entire 10-ton shipment of coal from a C-54
in ten minutes, later beaten when a twelve-man crew unloaded the same quantity in five minutes and
45 seconds.
By the end of August 1948, after two months, the Airlift was succeeding; daily operations flew more
than 1,500 flights a day and delivered more than 4,500 tons of cargo, enough to keep West Berlin
supplied. From January 1949 onwards, 225 C-54s (40% of USAF and USN Skymasters
worldwide)[67] were devoted to the lift.[75][nb 5] Supplies improved to 5,000 tons a day.
"Operation Little Vittles"[edit]

US Air Force pilot Gail Halvorsen, who pioneered the idea of dropping candy bars and bubble gum with
handmade miniature parachutes, which later became known as "Operation Little Vittles".

Gail Halvorsen, one of the many Airlift pilots, decided to use his off-time to fly into Berlin and make
movies with his hand-held camera. He arrived at Tempelhof on 17 July 1948 on one of the C-54s
and walked over to a crowd of children who had gathered at the end of the runway to watch the
aircraft. He introduced himself and they started to ask him questions about the aircraft and their
flights. As a goodwill gesture, he handed out his only two sticks of Wrigley's Doublemint Gum. The
children quickly divided up the pieces as best they could, even passing around the wrapper for
others to smell. He was so impressed by their gratitude and that they didn't fight over them, that he
promised the next time he returned he would drop off more. Before he left them, a child asked him
how they would know it was him flying over. He replied, "I'll wiggle my wings."[49]

A Douglas C-54 Skymasterdropping candy over Berlin, c. 1948/49

The next day on his approach to Berlin, he rocked the aircraft and dropped some chocolate bars
attached to a handkerchief parachute to the children waiting below. Every day after that, the number
of children increased and he made several more drops. Soon, there was a stack of mail in Base Ops
addressed to "Uncle Wiggly Wings", "The Chocolate Uncle" and "The Chocolate Flier". His
commanding officer was upset when the story appeared in the news, but when Tunner heard about
it, he approved of the gesture and immediately expanded it into "Operation Little Vittles". Other pilots
participated, and when news reached the US, children all over the country sent in their own candy to
help out. Soon, major candy manufacturers joined in. In the end, over twenty three tons of candy
were dropped on Berlin[49] and the "operation" became a major propaganda success. German
children christened the candy-dropping aircraft "raisin bombers".[76]
Soviet responses[edit]
The Soviets had an advantage in conventional military forces, but were preoccupied with rebuilding
their war-torn economy and society. The US had a stronger navy and air force, and had nuclear
weapons. Neither side wanted a war; the Soviets did not disrupt the airlift.[77]
Initial reaction[edit]
As the tempo of the Airlift grew, it became apparent that the Western powers might be able to pull off
the impossible: indefinitely supplying an entire city by air alone. In response, starting on 1 August
1948, the Soviets offered free food to anyone who crossed into East Berlin and registered
their ration cards there, but West Berliners overwhelmingly rejected Soviet offers of food.[78]
Throughout the airlift, Soviet and German communists subjected the hard-pressed West Berliners to
sustained psychological warfare.[78] In radio broadcasts, they relentlessly proclaimed that all Berlin
came under Soviet authority and predicted the imminent abandonment of the city by the Western
occupying powers.[78] The Soviets also harassed members of the democratically elected citywide
administration, which had to conduct its business in the city hall located in the Soviet sector.[78]
During the early months of the airlift, the Soviets used various methods to harass allied aircraft.
These included buzzing by Soviet planes, obstructive parachute jumps within the corridors, and
shining searchlights to dazzle pilots at night. Although the USAFE reported 733 separate harassing
events, including flak, air-to-air fire, rocketing, bombing, and explosions, this is now considered to be
exaggerated. None of these measures were effective.[79][80] Former RAF Dakota pilot Dick Arscott
described one "buzzing" incident. "Yaks(Soviet plane) used to come and buzz you and go over the
top of you at about twenty feet which can be off putting. One day I was buzzed about three times.
The following day it started again and he came across twice and I got a bit fed up with it. So when he
came for the third time, I turned the aircraft into him and it was a case of chicken, luckily he was the
one who chickened out." [81]
Attempted Communist putsch in the municipal government[edit]
In the autumn of 1948 it became impossible for the non-Communist majority in Greater Berlin's
citywide parliament to attend sessions at city hall within the Soviet sector.[78] The parliament
(Stadtverordnetenversammlung von Groß-Berlin) had been elected under the provisional constitution
of Berlin two years earlier (20 October 1946). As SED-controlled policemen looked on passively,
Communist-led mobs repeatedly invaded the Neues Stadthaus, the provisional city hall (located on
Parochialstraße since all other central municipal buildings had been destroyed in the War),
interrupted the parliament's sessions, and physically menaced its non-Communist members.[78] The
Kremlin organised an attempted putsch for control of all of Berlin through a 6 September takeover of
the city hall by SED members.[82]
Three days later RIAS Radio urged Berliners to protest against the actions of the communists. On 9
September 1948 a crowd of 500,000 people gathered at the Brandenburg Gate, next to the
ruined Reichstag in the British sector. The Airlift was working so far, but many West Berliners feared
that the Allies would eventually discontinue it. Then-SPD city councillor Ernst Reuter took the
microphone and pleaded for his city, "You peoples of the world, you people of America, of England,
of France, look on this city, and recognise that this city, this people, must not be abandoned—cannot
be abandoned!".[52]
The crowd surged towards the Soviet-occupied sector and someone climbed up and ripped down
the Soviet flag flying from atop the Brandenburg Gate. Soviet military police (MPs) quickly
responded, resulted in the killing of one in the unruly crowd.[52] The tense situation could have
escalated further and ended up in more bloodshed but a British deputy provostthen intervened and
pointedly pushed the Soviet MPs back with his swagger stick.[83] Never before this incident had so
many Berliners gathered in unity. The resonance worldwide was enormous, notably in the United
States, where a strong feeling of solidarity with Berliners reinforced a general widespread
determination not to abandon them.[82]
Berlin's parliament decided to meet instead in the canteen of the Technical College of Berlin-
Charlottenburg in the British sector, boycotted by the members of SED, which had gained 19.8% of
the electoral votes in 1946. On 30 November 1948 the SED gathered its elected parliament
members and 1,100 further activists and held an unconstitutional so-called "extraordinary city
assembly" (außerordentliche Stadtverordnetenversammlung) in East Berlin's Metropol-Theater
which declared the elected city government (Magistrat) and its democratically-elected city councillors
to be deposed and replaced it with a new one led by Oberbürgermeister Friedrich Ebert Jr. and
consisting only of Communists.[82] This arbitrary act had no legal effect in West Berlin, but the Soviet
occupants prevented the elected city government for all of Berlin from further acting in the eastern
sector.
December elections[edit]
The city parliament, boycotted by its SED members, then voted for its re-election on 5 December
1948, however, inhibited in the eastern sector and defamed by the SED as a Spalterwahl ("divisive
election"). The SED did not nominate any candidates for this election and appealed to the electorate
in the western sectors to boycott the election, while the democratic parties ran for seats. The turnout
amounted to 86.3% of the western electorate with the SPD gaining 64.5% of the votes (= 76 seats),
the CDU 19.4% (= 26 seats), and the Liberal-Demokratische Partei (LDP, merged in the FDP in
1949) 16.1% (= 17 seats).[78]
On 7 December the new, de facto West-Berlin-only city parliament elected a new city government in
West Berlin headed by Lord Mayor Reuter, who had already once been elected lord mayor in early
1946 but prevented from taking office by a Soviet veto.[82] Thus two separate city governments
officiated in the city divided into East and West versions of its former self. In the east, a communist
system supervised by house, street, and block wardens was quickly implemented.
West Berlin's parliament accounted for the de facto political partition of Berlin and replaced the
provisional constitution of Berlin by the Verfassung von Berlin (constitution of Berlin), meant for all
Berlin, with effect of 1 October 1950 and de facto restricted to the western sectors only, also
renaming city parliament (from Stadtverordnetenversammlung von Groß-
Berlin to Abgeordnetenhaus von Berlin), city government (from Magistrat von Groß-Berlin to Senate
of Berlin), and head of government (from Oberbürgermeister to Governing Mayor of Berlin).[84]

Winter 1948 to spring 1949[edit]

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Preparing for winter[edit]

Although the early estimates were that about 4,000 to 5,000 tons per day would be needed to supply
the city, this was made in the context of summer weather, when the Airlift was only expected to last
a few weeks. As the operation dragged on into autumn, the situation changed considerably. The
food requirements would remain the same (around 1,500 tons), but the need for additional coal to
heat the city dramatically increased the total amount of cargo to be transported by an additional
6,000 tons a day.
To maintain the Airlift under these conditions, the current system would have to be greatly
expanded. Aircraft were available, and the British started adding their larger Handley Page
Hastings in November, but maintaining the fleet proved to be a serious problem. Tunner looked to
the Germans once again, hiring (plentiful) ex-Luftwaffe ground crews.

C-54s stand out against the snow at Wiesbaden Air Base during the Berlin Airlift in the Winter of 1948–49.

Another problem was the lack of runways in Berlin to land on: two at Tempelhof and one at Gatow—
neither of which was designed to support the loads the C-54s were putting on them. All of the
existing runways required hundreds of labourers, who ran onto them between landings and dumped
sand into the runway's Marston Mat (pierced steel planking) to soften the surface and help the
planking survive. Since this system could not endure through the winter, between July and
September 1948 a 6,000 ft.-long asphalt runway was constructed at Tempelhof.
Far from ideal, with the approach being over Berlin's apartment blocks, the runway nevertheless was
a major upgrade to the airport's capabilities. With it in place, the auxiliary runway was upgraded from
Marston Matting to asphalt between September and October 1948. A similar upgrade program was
carried out by the British at Gatow during the same period, also adding a second runway, using
concrete.
The French Air Force, meanwhile, had become involved in the First Indochina War, so it could only
bring up some old Junkers Ju 52s to support its own troops and they were too small and slow to be
of much help. However, France agreed to build a complete, new and larger airport in its sector on
the shores of Lake Tegel. French military engineers, managing German construction crews, were
able to complete the construction in under 90 days. The airport was mostly built by hand, by
thousands of mostly female labourers who worked day and night.[85]
Heavy equipment was needed to level the ground, equipment that was too large and heavy to fly in
on any existing cargo aircraft. The solution was to dismantle large machines and then re-assemble
them. Using the five largest American C-82 Packet transports, it was possible to fly the machinery
into West Berlin. This not only helped to build the airfield, but also demonstrated that the Soviet
blockade could not keep anything out of Berlin. The Tegel airfield was subsequently developed
into Berlin-Tegel Airport.
To improve air traffic control, which would be critical as the number of flights grew, the newly
developed Ground Controlled Approach radar system (GCA) was flown to Europe for installation at
Tempelhof, with a second set installed at Fassberg in the British Zone in West Germany. With the
installation of GCA, all-weather airlift operations were assured.
None of these efforts could fix the weather, which became the biggest problem. November and
December 1948 proved to be the worst months of the airlift operation. One of the longest-lasting
fogs ever experienced in Berlin blanketed the entire European continent for weeks. All too often,
aircraft would make the entire flight and then be unable to land in Berlin. On 20 November 1948, 42
aircraft departed for Berlin, but only one landed there. At one point, the city had only a week's supply
of coal left. However, the weather eventually improved, and more than 171,000 tons were delivered
in January 1949, 152,000 tons in February, and 196,223 tons in March.[64]
Easter parade[edit]
By April 1949, airlift operations were running smoothly and Tunner wanted to shake up his command
to discourage complacency. He believed in the spirit of competition between units and, coupled with
the idea of a big event, felt that this would encourage them to greater efforts. He decided that, on
Easter Sunday, the airlift would break all records. To do this, maximum efficiency was needed and
so, to simplify cargo-handling, only coal would be airlifted. Coal stockpiles were built up for the effort
and maintenance schedules were altered so that the maximum number of aircraft were available.[86]
From noon on 15 April to noon on 16 April 1949, crews worked around the clock. When it was over,
12,941 tons of coal had been delivered in 1,383 flights, without a single accident.[86] A welcome side
effect of the effort was that operations in general were boosted, and tonnage increased from 6,729
tons to 8,893 tons per day thereafter. In total, the airlift delivered 234,476 tons in April.[64]
On 21 April, the tonnage of supplies flown into the city exceeded that previously brought by rail.[citation
needed]

End of the blockade[edit]

Berlin Airlift Monument in Berlin-Tempelhof with inscription "They gave their lives for the freedom of Berlin in
service of the Berlin Airlift 1948/49".

On 15 April 1949, the Soviet news agency TASS reported a willingness by the Soviets to lift the
blockade. The next day, the US State Department stated that the "way appears clear" for the
blockade to end. Soon afterwards, the four powers began serious negotiations, and a settlement
was reached on Western terms. On 4 May 1949, the Allies announced an agreement to end the
blockade in eight days.
Berlin Airlift Monument in Berlin-Tempelhof, displaying the names of the 39 British and 31 American airmen
who lost their lives during the operation. Similar monuments can be found at the military airfield of
Wietzenbruch near the former RAF Celle and at Rhein-Main Air Base.

The Soviet blockade of Berlin was lifted at one minute after midnight on 12 May 1949.[87] A British
convoy immediately drove through to Berlin, and the first train from West Germany reached Berlin at
5:32 A.M. Later that day, an enormous crowd celebrated the end of the blockade. General Clay,
whose retirement had been announced by US President Truman on 3 May 1949, was saluted by
11,000 US soldiers and dozens of aircraft. Once home, Clay received a ticker-tape parade in New
York City, was invited to address the US Congress, and was honoured with a medal from President
Truman.
Nevertheless, supply flights to Berlin continued for some time to build up a comfortable surplus,
though night flying and then weekend flights could be eliminated once the surplus was large enough.
By 24 July 1949, three months' worth of supplies had been amassed, ensuring that there was ample
time to restart the Airlift if needed.
On 18 August 1949, Flt Lt Roy Mather DFC AFC and his crew of Flt Lt Roy Lewis Stewart Hathaway
AFC, Flt Lt Richardson and Royston William Marshall AFM of 206 squadron, flew back to Wunstorf
for the 404th time during the blockade, the record number of flights for any pilot of any nationality,
either civilian or military.[88]
The Berlin Airlift officially ended on 30 September 1949, after fifteen months. In total, the USAF
delivered 1,783,573 tons and the RAF 541,937 tons,[nb 6] totalling 2,326,406 tons, nearly two-thirds of
which was coal, on 278,228 flights to Berlin.[89] The Royal Australian Air Force delivered 7,968 tons of
freight and 6,964 passengers during 2,062 sorties. The C-47s and C-54s together flew over 92
million miles in the process, almost the distance from Earth to the Sun.[89] At the height of the Airlift,
one plane reached West Berlin every thirty seconds.[87]
Pilots came from the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and South
Africa.[90][91]
A total of 101 fatalities were recorded as a result of the operation, including 40 Britons and 31
Americans,[87] mostly due to non-flying accidents.[92]One Royal Australian Air Force member was
killed in an aircraft crash at Lubeck while attached to No. 27 Squadron RAF.[93] Seventeen American
and eight British aircraft crashed during the operation.
The cost of the Airlift was shared between the US, UK, and Germany. Estimated costs range from
approximately US$224 million[94] to over US$500 million (equivalent to approximately $2.3 billion to
$5.14 billion now).[95][90][96]

Subsequent events[edit]
Operational control of the three Allied air corridors was assigned to BARTCC (Berlin Air Route
Traffic Control Center) air traffic control located at Tempelhof. Diplomatic approval was granted by a
four-power organisation called the Berlin Air Safety Center, also located in the American sector.
Tegel was developed into West Berlin's principal airport. In 2007, it was joined by a re-
developed Berlin-Schönefeld International Airport in Brandenburg. As a result of the development of
these two airports, Tempelhof was closed in October 2008,[97] while Gatow is now home of the
Museum of the German Luftwaffe and a housing development. During the 1970s and 1980s
Schönefeld had its own crossing points through the Berlin Wall and communist fortifications for
western citizens.
The Soviets' contravention by the blockade of the agreement reached by the London 6-Power
Conference, and the Czechoslovak coup d'état of 1948, convinced Western leaders that they had to
take swift and decisive measures to strengthen the portions of Germany not occupied by the
Soviets.[87].
The US, British and French authorities also agreed to replace their military administrations in their
occupation zones with High Commissioners operating within the terms of a three-power occupation
statute.[98] The Blockade also helped to unify German politicians in these zones in support of the
creation of a West German state; some of them had hitherto been fearful of Soviet opposition.[98] The
blockade also increased the perception among many Europeans that the Soviets posed a danger,
helping to prompt the entry into NATO of Portugal, Iceland, Italy, Denmark, and Norway.[99]
Animosities between Germans and the Western Allies—Britain, France, and the United States—
were greatly reduced by the airlift, with the former enemies recognizing common interests, namely
freedom and capitalism, shared values and mutual respect.[100] Although this may have just been a
"The Enemy of my Enemy is my Friend" situation seeing as only a couple of years earlier Soviet
forces had ravaged the city. </ref>"BBC - History - World Wars: The Battle For Berlin In World War
Two." Bbc.co.uk. N. p., 2018. Web. 27 Sept. 2018.</ref> The Soviets refused to return to the Allied
Control Council in Berlin, rendering the four-power occupation authority set up at the Potsdam
Conference useless.[87] It has been argued that the events of the Berlin Blockade are proof that the
Allies conducted their affairs within a rational framework, since they were keen to avoid war.[101]

Aircraft used in the Berlin Airlift[edit]

A Douglas C-54 Skymaster, called Spirit of Freedom, operated as a flying museum. It is owned and operated
by the Berlin Airlift Historical Foundation.

A British Avro York transport aircraft.

A British Short Sunderland flying boat.

In the early days, the Americans used their C-47 Skytrain or its civilian counterpart Douglas DC-3.
These machines could carry a payload of up to 3.5 tons, but were replaced by C-54
Skymasters and Douglas DC-4s, which could carry up to 10 tons and were faster. These made up a
total of 330 aircraft, which made them the most used types. Other American aircraft such as the
five C-82 Packets, and the one YC-97A Stratofreighter 45-59595, with a payload of 20 tons—a
gigantic load for that time—were only sparsely used.
The British used a considerable variety of aircraft types. Many aircraft were either former bombers or
civil versions of bombers. In the absence of enough transports, the British chartered many civilian
aircraft. British European Airways (BEA) coordinated all British civil aircraft operations. Apart from
BEA itself, the participating airlines included British Overseas Airways Corporation (BOAC) and most
British independent[nb 7] airlines of that era – e.g. Eagle Aviation,[102] Silver City Airways, British South
American Airways (BSAA), the Lancashire Aircraft Corporation, Airwork, Air Flight, Aquila
Airways, Flight Refuelling Ltd (which used their Lancaster tankers to deliver aviation
fuel), Skyways, Scottish Airlines and Ciro's Aviation.
Altogether, BEA was responsible to the RAF for the direction and operation of 25 British airlines
taking part in "Operation Plainfare".[103] The British also used flying boats, particularly for transporting
corrosive salt. These included civilian aircraft operated by Aquila Airways.[104] These took off and
landed on water and were designed to be corrosion-resistant. In winter, when ice covered the Berlin
rivers and made the use of flying boats difficult, the British used other aircraft in their place.

Deutsche Mark
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

(Redirected from Deutsche mark)

Jump to navigationJump to search

"DEM" redirects here. For other uses, see DEM (disambiguation).

This article is about the Deutsche mark issued by the Federal Republic of Germany. For the Deutsche
mark issued by the German Democratic Republic, see East German mark. For the currency of the
German Empire from 1873 to 1914, see German gold mark.

73 to 1914, see German gold mark.

Deutsche Mark

Deutsche Mark (German)

Marka Gjermane (Albanian)
Njemačka marka (Croatian)
Nemačka marka / Немачка марка (Serbian)
 DM 100 banknote

ISO 4217

Code DEM

Denominations

Subunit

⁄100
1 Pfennig

Plural Mark

Pfennig Pfennig

Symbol DM

Pfennig pf

Banknotes

Freq. used DM 10, DM 20, DM 50, DM 100, DM 200

Rarely used DM 5, DM 500, DM 1000

Coins

Freq. used 1 pf, 2 pf, 5 pf, 10 pf, 50 pf, DM 1, DM 2, DM

5
 Demographics

Official user(s) Germany[show]

Unofficial user(s) Kosovo (under UNMIK)[a](1999–2002)[1]

Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992–1998)

Montenegro (1999–2002, in parallel with

theyugoslav dinar until 2000)

Issuance

Central bank Deutsche Bundesbank

Website www.bundesbank.de

 Bundesdruckerei
Printer
 Giesecke & Devrient

Website  Bundesdruckerei

 Giesecke & Devrient

Mint show

List

Website show

List

Valuation

Inflation 1.4%, December 2001

Pegged by Bosnia and Herzegovina convertible

mark, Bulgarian lev at par

ERM

Since 13 March 1979

 Fixed rate since 31 December 1998

Replaced by €, 1 January 1999

non cash

Replaced by €, 1 January 2002/28 February 2002

cash

€= DM 1.95583

This infobox shows the latest status before this currency was rendered

obsolete.

The Deutsche Mark (German: [ˈdɔʏtʃə ˈmaɐ̯k] ( listen), "German mark"), abbreviated "DM" or "D-
Mark" (help·info), was the official currency of West Germany from 1948 until 1990 and later the
unified Germany from 1990 until 2002. It was first issued under Allied occupation in 1948 to replace
the Reichsmark, and served as the Federal Republic of Germany's official currency from its founding
the following year until the adoption of the euro. In English it is commonly called the "Deutschmark"
(/ˈdɔɪtʃmɑːrk/); this expression is unknown in Germany. The Germans usually called it D-Mark when
referring to the currency, and Mark when talking about individual sums.
In 1999, the Deutsche Mark was replaced by the Euro; its coins and banknotes remained in
circulation, defined in terms of euros, until the introduction of euro notes and coins on 1 January
2002. The Deutsche Mark ceased to be legal tender immediately upon the introduction of the euro
— in contrast to the other eurozone nations, where the euro and legacy currency circulated side by
side for up to two months. Mark coins and banknotes continued to be accepted as valid forms of
payment in Germany until 28 February 2002.
The Deutsche Bundesbank has guaranteed that all German marks in cash form may be changed
into euros indefinitely, and one may do so in person at any branch of the Bundesbank in Germany.
Banknotes and coins can even be sent to the Bundesbank by mail.[2] In 2012, it was estimated that
as many as 13.2 billion marks were in circulation, with one poll showing a narrow majority of
Germans favouring the currency's restoration (although a minority believed this wouldn't bring any
economic benefit).[3]
On 31 December 1998, the Council of the European Union fixed the irrevocable exchange rate,
effective 1 January 1999, for German mark to euros as DM 1.95583 = €1.[4]
One Deutsche Mark was divided into 100 Pfennige.

Deutsche Mark

Deutsche Mark (German)

Marka Gjermane (Albanian)
 Njemačka marka (Croatian)
Nemačka marka / Немачка марка (Serbian)

DM 100 banknote

ISO 4217

Code DEM

Denominations

Subunit

⁄100
1 Pfennig

Plural Mark

Pfennig Pfennig

Symbol DM

Pfennig pf

Banknotes

Freq. used DM 10, DM 20, DM 50, DM 100, DM 200

Rarely used DM 5, DM 500, DM 1000

Coins
 Freq. used 1 pf, 2 pf, 5 pf, 10 pf, 50 pf, DM 1, DM 2, DM 5

Demographics

Official user(s) Germany[show]

Unofficial user(s) Kosovo (under UNMIK)[a](1999–2002)[1]

Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992–1998)

Montenegro (1999–2002, in parallel with

theyugoslav dinar until 2000)

Issuance

Central bank Deutsche Bundesbank

Website www.bundesbank.de

 Bundesdruckerei
Printer
 Giesecke & Devrient

Website  Bundesdruckerei

 Giesecke & Devrient

Mint show

List

Website show

List

Valuation

Inflation 1.4%, December 2001

Pegged by Bosnia and Herzegovina convertible

mark, Bulgarian lev at par

ERM
 Since 13 March 1979

Fixed rate since 31 December 1998

Replaced by €, 1 January 1999

non cash

Replaced by €, 1 January 2002/28 February 2002

cash

€= DM 1.95583

This infobox shows the latest status before this currency was rendered obsolete.

The Deutsche Mark (German: [ˈdɔʏtʃə ˈmaɐ̯k] ( listen), "German mark"), abbreviated "DM" or "D-
Mark" (help·info), was the official currency of West Germany from 1948 until 1990 and later the
unified Germany from 1990 until 2002. It was first issued under Allied occupation in 1948 to replace
the Reichsmark, and served as the Federal Republic of Germany's official currency from its founding
the following year until the adoption of the euro. In English it is commonly called the "Deutschmark"
(/ˈdɔɪtʃmɑːrk/); this expression is unknown in Germany. The Germans usually called it D-Mark when
referring to the currency, and Mark when talking about individual sums.
In 1999, the Deutsche Mark was replaced by the Euro; its coins and banknotes remained in
circulation, defined in terms of euros, until the introduction of euro notes and coins on 1 January
2002. The Deutsche Mark ceased to be legal tender immediately upon the introduction of the euro
— in contrast to the other eurozone nations, where the euro and legacy currency circulated side by
side for up to two months. Mark coins and banknotes continued to be accepted as valid forms of
payment in Germany until 28 February 2002.
The Deutsche Bundesbank has guaranteed that all German marks in cash form may be changed
into euros indefinitely, and one may do so in person at any branch of the Bundesbank in Germany.
Banknotes and coins can even be sent to the Bundesbank by mail.[2] In 2012, it was estimated that
as many as 13.2 billion marks were in circulation, with one poll showing a narrow majority of
Germans favouring the currency's restoration (although a minority believed this wouldn't bring any
economic benefit).[3]
On 31 December 1998, the Council of the European Union fixed the irrevocable exchange rate,
effective 1 January 1999, for German mark to euros as DM 1.95583 = €1.[4]
One Deutsche Mark was divided into 100 Pfennige.

Contents

 1Before 1871
 21873–1948
 3Early military occupation following WWII
 4Currency reform of June 1948
 o 4.1Economics of 1948 currency reform
o 4.2Currency reform in the Soviet occupation zone
o 4.3Bank deutscher Länder and the Deutsche Bundesbank
o 4.4Currency Union with the Saarland
o 4.5German reunification
o 4.6Stability
 5Coins
o 5.1Colloquial expressions
 6Banknotes
o 6.1Banknotes of the fourth series
 7Spelling and pronunciation
 8Reserve currency
 9See also
 10Annotations
 11References
 12External links

Before 1871[edit]
A mark had been the currency of Germany since its original unification in 1871. Before that time, the
different German states issued a variety of different currencies, though most were linked to
the Vereinsthaler, a silver coin containing 16 2⁄3 grams of pure silver. Although the mark was based
on gold rather than silver, a fixed exchange rate between the Vereinsthaler and the mark of 3 marks
= 1 Vereinsthaler was used for the conversion.

1873–1948[edit]
The first mark, known as the Goldmark, was introduced in 1873. With the outbreak of World War I,
the mark was taken off the gold standard. The currency thus became known as the Papiermark,
especially as high inflation, then hyperinflation occurred and the currency became exclusively made
up of paper money. The Papiermark was replaced by the Rentenmark (RM) from November 15,
1923, and the Reichsmark (ℛℳ) in 1924.

Early military occupation following WWII[edit]

During the first two years of occupation the occupying powers of France, United Kingdom, United
States, and the Soviet Union were not able to successfully negotiate a possible currency reform in
Germany. Due to the strains between the Allies each zone was governed independently as regards
monetary matters. The US occupation policy was governed by the directive JCS 1067 (in effect until
July 1947), which forbade the US military governor "to take any steps to strengthen German financial
structure".[5] As a consequence a separate monetary reform in the U.S. zone was not
possible.[5] Each of the Allies printed its own occupation currency.

Currency reform of June 1948[edit]

The Deutsche Mark was officially introduced on Sunday, June 20, 1948 by Ludwig Erhard. The old
Reichsmark and Rentenmark were exchanged for the new currency at a rate of DM 1 = RM 1 for the
essential currency such as wages, payment of rents etc., and DM 1 = RM 10 for the remainder in
private non-bank credit balances, with half frozen.[clarification needed] Large amounts were exchanged for
RM 10 to 65 Pfennig. In addition, each person received a per capita allowance of DM 60 in two
parts, the first being DM 40 and the second DM 20.[6]
A few weeks later Erhard, acting against orders, issued an edict abolishing many economic controls
which had been originally implemented by the Nazis, and which the Allies had not removed. He did
this, as he often confessed, on Sunday because the offices of the American, British, and French
occupation authorities were closed that day. He was sure that if he had done it when they were
open, they would have countermanded the order.[7]
The introduction of the new currency was intended to protect western Germany from a second wave
of hyperinflation and to stop the rampant barter and black market trade (where American cigarettes
acted as currency). Although the new currency was initially only distributed in the three western
occupation zones outside Berlin, the move angered the Sovietauthorities, who regarded it as a
threat. The Soviets promptly cut off all road, rail and canal links between the three western zones
and West Berlin, starting the Berlin Blockade. In response, the U.S. and Britain launched an airlift of
food and coal and distributed the new currency in West Berlin as well.
Economics of 1948 currency reform[edit]
Since the 1930s, prices and wages had been controlled, but money had been plentiful. That meant
that people had accumulated large paper assets, and that official prices and wages did not reflect
reality, as the black market dominated the economy and more than half of all transactions were
taking place unofficially. The reform replaced the old money with the new Deutsche Mark at the rate
of one new per ten old. This wiped out 90% of government and private debt, as well as private
savings. Prices were decontrolled, and labor unions agreed to accept a 15% wage increase, despite
the 25% rise in prices. The result was the prices of German export products held steady, while
profits and earnings from exports soared and were poured back into the economy. The currency
reforms were simultaneous with the $1.4 billion in Marshall Plan money coming in from the United
States, which primarily was used for investment. In addition, the Marshall plan forced German
companies, as well as those in all of Western Europe, to modernize their business practices, and
take account of the wider market. Marshall plan funding overcame bottlenecks in the surging
economy caused by remaining controls (which were removed in 1949), and opened up a greatly
expanded market for German exports. Overnight, consumer goods appeared in the stores, because
they could be sold for higher prices.[8][9] While the availability of consumers goods is seen as a giant
success story by most historians of the present, the perception at the time was a different one:
prices were so high that average people could not afford to shop, especially since prices were free-
ranging but wages still fixed by law. Therefore, in the summer of 1948 a giant wave of strikes and
demonstrations swept over West Germany, leading to an incident in Stuttgart where strikers were
met by US tanks ("Stuttgarter Vorfälle"). Only after the wage-freeze was abandoned, Deutschmark
and free-ranging prices were accepted by the population.[10]
Currency reform in the Soviet occupation zone[edit]
In the Soviet occupation zone of Germany (later the German Democratic Republic), the East
German mark (also named "Deutsche Mark" from 1948 to 1964 and colloquially referred to as
the Ostmark — literally Eastmark) was introduced a few days afterwards in the form of Reichsmark
and Rentenmark notes with adhesive stamps to stop the flooding in of Reichsmark and Rentenmark
notes from the West. In July 1948, a completely new series of East German mark banknotes was
issued.
Bank deutscher Länder and the Deutsche Bundesbank[edit]
Later in 1948, the Bank deutscher Länder ("Bank of the German States") assumed responsibility,
followed in 1957 by the Deutsche Bundesbank. The Deutsche Mark earned a reputation as a
strong store of value at times when other national currencies succumbed to periods of inflation.[citation
needed]
It became a source of national pride and an anchor for the country's economic prosperity,[citation
needed]
particularly during the years of the Wirtschaftswunder in the 1950s. In the 1990s, opinion polls
showed a majority of Germans opposed to the adoption of the euro; polls today show a significant
number would prefer to return to the mark.[citation needed]
Currency Union with the Saarland[edit]
The population in the Saar Protectorate rejected in a referendum the proposal to turn it into a
"European territory". Despite French pre-referendum claims that a "no" vote would mean that the
Saar would remain a French protectorate it in fact resulted in the incorporation of the Saar into
the Federal Republic of Germany on January 1, 1957. The new German member state of
the Saarland maintained its currency, the Saar franc, which was in a currency union at par with
the French franc. On July 9, 1959 the Deutsche Mark replaced the Saar franc at a ratio of 100 francs
= DM 0.8507.
German reunification[edit]
The Deutsche Mark played an important role in the reunification of Germany. It was introduced as
the official currency of East Germany in July 1990, replacing the East German mark (Mark der
DDR), in preparation for unification on 3 October 1990. East German marks were exchanged for
German marks at a rate of 1:1 for the first 4000 marks and 2:1 for larger amounts. Before
reunification, each citizen of East Germany coming to West Germany was
given Begrüßungsgeld (welcome money), a per capita allowance of DM 100 in cash. The
government of Germany and the Bundesbank were in major disagreement over the exchange rate
between the East German mark and the German mark.
France and the United Kingdom were opposed to German reunification, and attempted to influence
the Soviet Union to stop it.[11] However, in late 1989 France extracted German commitment to
the Monetary Union in return for support for German reunification.[12]
Stability[edit]
The German mark had a reputation as one of the world's most stable currencies; this was based on
the monetary policy of the Bundesbank. The policy was "hard" in relation to the policies of certain
other central banks in Europe. The "hard" and "soft" was in respect to the aims of inflation and
political interference. This policy was the foundation of the European Central Bank's present
policy[clarification needed] towards the euro. The German mark's stability was greatly apparent in 1993, when
speculation on the French franc and other European currencies caused a change in the European
Exchange Rate Mechanism. However, it should be remembered that "hard" is relative only if it is
compared to other currencies, as in its 53-year history, the purchasing power of the German mark
was reduced by over 70%.

Coins[edit]
The first Deutsche Mark coins were issued by the Bank deutscher Länder in 1948 and 1949. From
1950, the inscription Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Federal Republic of Germany) appeared on the
coins. These coins were issued in denominations of 1, 2, 5, and 10 pfennigs. The 1- and 2-pfennig
coins were struck in bronze clad steel (although during some years the 2 pfennigs was issued in
solid bronze) while 5 and 10 pfennigs were brass clad steel. In 1950, cupronickel 50-pfennig and 1-
mark coins were released, while a cupronickel 2 marks and a .625 silver 5 marks were released in
1951. Cupronickel replaced silver in the 5 marks in 1975. The 2- and 5-mark coins have often been
used for commemorative themes, though typically only the generic design for the 5 marks is
intended for circulation. Commemorative silver 10-mark coins have also been issued which have
periodically found their way into circulation. Unlike other European countries, Germany retained the
use of the smallest coins (1 and 2 pfennigs) until adoption of the euro.

Dates
Image Denomination Composition Obverse[13] Reverse
issued
 1948–1949: Bronze-
1948– plated steel Denomination
1 pfennig Oak sprig
2001 1950–2001: Copper- between rye stalks
plated steel

1950–1968: Bronze
1950– Denomination
2 pfennigs 1968–2001: Bronze- Oak sprig
2001 between rye stalks
plated steel

1949– Denomination
5 pfennigs Brass-plated steel Oak sprig
2001 between rye stalks

1949– Denomination
10 pfennigs Brass-plated steel Oak sprig
2001 between rye stalks

1949– Woman planting

50 pfennigs Cupro-nickel Denomination
2001 an oak seedling[14]

1950– Denomination
DM 1 Cupro-nickel German eagle
2001 between oak leaves

Denomination
1951–
Cupro-nickel between rye stalks German eagle
1956
and grapes[15]

DM 2
German eagle,
1957–
Cupro-nickel Max Planck
1971
denomination
below
 1969–1987: Konrad
Adenauer
1970–
1987: Theodor
Heuss
German eagle,
1979–1993: Kurt
1969– Cupro-nickel
Schumacher
2001 (Cu 75% Ni 25%)
1988–2001: Ludwig denomination
Erhard below
1990–2001: Franz
Josef Strauss
1994–2001: Willy
Brandt

1951– .625 silver

Denomination German eagle
1974 (Ag 62.5% Cu 37.5%)

DM 5

1975– Cupro-nickel
Denomination German eagle
2001 (Cu 75% Ni 25%)

The weights and dimensions of the coins can be found in an FAQ of the Bundesbank.[16]
Unlike other countries (such as Australia) there was no attempt or proposal suggested for the
withdrawal of the 1- and 2-pfennig coins. Both coins were still in circulation in 2001 and
supermarkets in particular still marked prices to the nearest pfennig. This penchant for accuracy
continues with the euro (while Finland or the Netherlands for example, price to the nearest 5 cents)
with the 1-cent coin still encountered in Germany.
There were a considerable number of commemorative silver DM 5 and DM 10 coins, which actually
had the status of legal tender but were rarely seen outside of collectors' circles.
Obverse view of the 2001 special gold issue of the DM 1 coin

On 27 December 2000, the German government enacted a law authorizing the Bundesbank to
issue, in 2001, a special .999 pure gold 1-mark coin commemorating the end of the German mark.
The coin had the exact design and dimensions of the circulating cupro-nickel DM 1 coin, with the
exception of the inscription on the reverse, which read "Deutsche Bundesbank" (instead of
"Bundesrepublik Deutschland"), as the Bundesbank was the issuing authority in this case. A total of
one million gold 1-mark coins were minted (200,000 at each of the five mints) and were sold
beginning in mid-2001 through German coin dealers on behalf of the Bundesbank. The issue price
varied by dealer but averaged approximately 165 United States dollars.
German coins bear a mint mark, indicating where the coin was minted. D indicates Munich, F
Stuttgart, G Karlsruhe and J Hamburg. Coins minted during the Second World War include the mint
marks A (Berlin) and B (Vienna). The mint mark A was also used for German mark coins minted in
Berlin beginning in 1990 following the reunification of Germany. These mint marks have been
continued on the German euro coins.
Between July 1, 1990 (the currency union with East Germany) and July 1, 1991, East German coins
in denominations up to 50 pfennigs continued to circulate as Deutsche Mark coins at their face
value, owing to a temporary shortage of small coins. These coins were legal tender only in the
territory of the former East Germany.
Colloquial expressions[edit]
In colloquial German the 10-pfennig coin was sometimes called a groschen (cf. groat).
Likewise, sechser (sixer) could refer to a coin of 5 pfennigs. Both colloquialisms refer to several pre-
1871 currencies of the previously independent states (notably Prussia), where a groschen was
subdivided into 12 pfennigs, hence half a groschen into 6. After 1871, 12 old pfennigs would be
converted into 10 pfennigs of the mark, hence 10-pfennig coins inherited the "Groschen" name and
5-pfennig coins inherited the "sechser" name. Both usages are only regional and may not be
understood in areas where a Groschen coin did not exist before 1871. In particular, the usage of
"sechser" is less widespread. In northern Germany the 5-mark coin used to be also called
"Heiermann" (etymology is unclear), whereas in Bavaria the 2-mark coin was called "Zwickl" (as the
€2 coin is now).
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