THE ROLE OF ORGANIZATION OF THE ISLAMIC

COOPERATION (OIC) IN THE MUSLIM WORLD

Submitted by
Muhammad Ihsan
(M.A Regional Studies )
Submitted To
Zahid Ali
(Lecturer )

Department Of Regional Studies University Of Peshawar

Session 2016-2017
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER NO TITLE PAGE NO

ABSTRACT ......................................................................................... i

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT.................................................................. ii

ACRONYMS ....................................................................................... iii

CHAPTER-1 THE ROLE OF ORGANIZATION OF THE ISLAMIC

COOPERATION (OIC) IN THE MUSLIM WORLD ................... 1

1.1 Introduction...................................................................................... 1

1.2 Statement of the Problem ................................................................ 3

1.3 Aims and Objectives........................................................................ 3

1.4 Research Questions ......................................................................... 3

1.5 Methodology.................................................................................... 3

1.6 Significance of the Research ........................................................... 4

1.7 Tentative Chapters ........................................................................... 4

REFERENCES ...................................................................................... 5

BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................. 5

CHAPTER# 2 ROLE OF OIC IN THE MUSLIM WORLD..................... 6

2.1 Introduction...................................................................................... 6

2.2 History ............................................................................................. 6

2.3 Objectives ....................................................................................... 7

2.4 Principles ....................................................................................... 7

2.5 Structure and specialized organs……. ........................................... 8

2.6 OIC and the internarional protection of human rights.............. 10

 2.7 Islamic Declarations on Human Rights: The Shar’iah as basis and

boundary.................................................................................... 11

2.7 Rights recognized in OIC Declarations: disagreement and

concurrence with universal texts............................................... 14

2.8 Role of the OIC in the conflicts facing the ARAB/MUSLIM world

................................................................................................... 19

2.9 OIC and the conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa.................................. 20

2.10 OIC and the conflicts in the Middle East ...................................... 22

2.11 OIC AND KASHMIR ISSUE ...................................................... 24

2.12 CONCLUSIONS ........................................................................... 25

REFERENCES ...................................................................................... 27

BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................. 32

CHAPTER-3 FAILURE OF OIC IN ITS ATTEMPTS TO SECURE THE

INTEREST OF Muslim World .............................................................

3.1 Introduction ............................................................................... 37

3.2 OIC failed in resolving issues of Muslim world....................... 37

3.2.1 Failure to stop the US-led invasion of Iraq ............................... 37

3.2.2 Syrian Crisis and OIC ............................................................... 38

3.2.3 Bangladesh-Pakistan Conflict ................................................... 40

3.2.4 Iran-Iraq War............................................................................. 41

3.3.5 War On Terror And OIC ........................................................... 45

3.2.6 Afghanistan and OIC ................................................................ 47

3.2.7 Iran-Saudi Arabia Crisis And OIC............................................ 47

 3.3 Some Examples of failure of the Organization of the Islamic

Cooperation are given below in short points; ........................... 50

REFERENCES ...................................................................................... 52

BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................. 56

CHAPTER 4 RECOMMENDATIONS ........................................................ 59

4.1 OIC Charter ............................................................................... 63

4.2 Office of the Secretary General ................................................ 63

4.3 New Departments...................................................................... 64

4.4 Restructuring of Existing Departments .................................... 65

4.5 Implementation of Resolutions ................................................. 65

4.6 Some others recommendations are given in points below as well

................................................................................................... 66

CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION ....................................................................... 67

 DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this dissertation is the result of my individual

research and that it has not been submitted concurrently to any other
university for any other degree.
Muhammad Ihsan.
 The role of Organization of the Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in the
Muslim world

ABSTRACT

The Organization was established on 25 September 1969, as a result of criminal arson of

Al-Aqsa Mosque in occupied Jerusalem. The Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC)

(formerly Organization of the Islamic Conference) is the second largest inter-governmental

organization after the United Nations which has membership of 57 states spread over four

continents. The Organization is the collective voice of the Muslim world and ensuring to

safeguard and protect the interests of the Muslim world in the spirit of promoting

international peace and harmony among various people of the Muslim world. However,

this OIC is failed to solve the issues which are become prolong between its member states.

It didn’t solve till now the emerging middle East crisis. This institution, failed to share the

grief and pain of foreign activities with Palestine and Afghani peoples. Also, didn’t solve

out the Kashmir issue between India and Pakistan, even it is failed to defend the true and

genuine image of Islam and Muslims which is distorted worldwide under terrorism.

Nothing was done to contain the crises or avert the tragedies. The OIC remained merely a

silent spectator. This research will focus on the role of the OIC in the Muslim world, its

failure in the Muslim world.

i
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I have no words to express my deepest gratitude to Almighty Allah.

Who is the creator of whole universe, without whom no task is possible

and without whose name no endeavor is worth undertaking. Thank you

Almighty Allah for answering my prayers, for giving me the strength to

complete this research project successfully.

With profound gratitude and deep sense of devotion, I wish to thank my

supervisor, Zahid Ali Lecturer, Department of Regional Studies,

University of Peshawar for his guidance and positive criticism

throughout this research made my work achievable.

Furthermore, I would, also, like to extend my regards to all the staff

members of the Department of Regional Studies.

Lastly and most importantly, I would like to extend my deepest regards

to my parents, who supported me throughout my academic career both

morally and financially.

ii
 ACRONYMS

OIC Organization of the Islamic Cooperation

UN United Nations
US United States
CFM Council of Foreign Ministers
SG Secretory General
IICJ International Islamic Court of Justice
PLA Palestine Liberation Army
lDB Islamic Development Bank

iii
 CHAPTER-1
THE ROLE OF ORGANIZATION OF THE ISLAMIC
COOPERATION (OIC) IN THE MUSLIM WORLD

1.1 Introduction
This research analysis the role of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in the

Muslim world. The Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) (formerly Organization of

the Islamic Conference) is the second largest inter-governmental organization after the

United Nations which has membership of 57 states spread over four continents. The

Organization is the collective voice of the Muslim world and ensuring to safeguard and

protect the interests of the Muslim world in the spirit of promoting international peace and

harmony among various people of the world. The Organization was established upon a

decision of the historical summit which took place in Rabat, Kingdom of Morocco on 12th

Rajab 1389 Hijra (25 September 1969) as a result of criminal arson of Al-Aqsa Mosque in

occupied Jerusalem.1

The present Charter of the Organization was adopted by the Eleventh Islamic Summit held

in Dakar, Senegal on 13-14 March 2008 which laid down the objectives and principles of

the organization and fundamental purposes to strengthen the solidarity and cooperation

among the Member States. Over the last 40 years, the membership has grown from its

founding members of 25 to 57 states. The Organization has the singular honor to galvanize

the Ummah into a unified body and have actively represented the Muslims by espousing

all causes close to the hearts of over 1.5 billion Muslims of the world. The Organization

has consultative and cooperative relations with the UN and other inter-governmental

organizations to protect the vital interests of the Muslims and to work for the settlement of

1
conflicts and disputes involving Member States. In safeguarding the true values of Islam

and the Muslims, the organization has taken various steps to remove misperceptions and

have strongly advocated elimination of discrimination against the Muslims in all forms and

manifestations.2

The OIC today has 57 Muslim member-states and has held 10 summits in response to the

challenges confronting the Muslim world. Since its establishment, the Islamic world has

suffered many major catastrophes which have reduced it to almost a non-factor in

international politics. The breakup of Pakistan through armed intervention by India in 1971

, the invasion of Lebanon by Israel in 1982, the Iran-Iraq war, Iran- Saudi Arabia crisis,

Kashmir issue between Pakistan and India, the US occupation of Iraq, and terrorism have

dealt a mortal blow to the unity, dignity and sovereignty of the Muslim world. The OIC

has failed to respond meaningfully to any of these crises or demonstrate any unity of

thought and action apart from issuing high-sounding declarations at the end of each

summit. OIC has generally failed to identify problems of a particular member states as a

common problem of the Muslim community. This institution, failed to share the grief and

pain of foreign activities with Palestine and Afghani peoples. Also, didn’t solve out the

Kashmir issue between India and Pakistan, even it is failed to defend the true and genuine

image of Islam and Muslims which is distorted worldwide under terrorism. Nothing was

done to contain the crises or avert the tragedies. The OIC remained merely a silent

spectator. To make Organization of Islamic Council stronger, it is needed to solve out the

issues and crisis among the Muslim countries coherently and peacefully.3

2
1.2 Statement of the Problem

Since establishment, the role of OIC is not good in its attempt to solve out the disputes and

crisis emerged between the Muslim countries. There are some factors affecting the role of

OIC, which led to failure of the organization. These factors are cultural differences, blame

game of terrorism between member states, no harmony among them, and weak institutions

of the organization etc.

1.3 Aims and Objectives

1. To investigate the role of Organization of Islamic Cooperation in the Muslim

world.

2. To find out the failure of OIC.

3. To examine the level of cooperation among the member states.

1.4 Research Questions

1. Why the role of OIC is very weak in its attempt to solve the problems between the

Muslim countries?

2. What should be needed to make the role of OIC strong in the Muslim world?

1.5 Methodology

Qualitative method is used to collect data .The research project used descriptive

methodology to make analysis of the collected data from various national and international

sources. The sources include surveys, different books, articles journals, and different

papers.

3
1.6 Significance of the Research

This research project is significant. The project focuses on the role of OIC in the Muslim

world. It is to clarify the status, level, and dignity of the OIC in the Muslim world as well.

The study elaborates the level of failure of the organization while, also shows the factors

which is making the OIC stronger and energetic.

Literature Review:

IRAN AND SAUDI ARABIA IN THE MIDDLE EAST:

LEADERSHIP AND SECTARIANISM

(2011—2017)

Diansaei Behzad

RUDN University (Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia),

Moscow, Russia

Relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia have never been at a desirable level. Iran’s

1979 revolution, the fall of Saddam Hussein in Iraq and the Arab Spring in turn increased

the disagreement between the two regional powers. This article examines the relationship

between Iran and Saudi. Arabia in the Middle East between 2011 and 2017. Both countries

claim to have leadership over other. Islamic Muslim countries in the Middle East, in which

Iran as a Shia state and Saudi Arabia as a SunniWahhabi state have multiple ideological

and political conflicts that have drawn opposing interests for

each other. As a result, new multifactor regional international situation involving Iran and

Saudi Arabia arose, to analyze which it would make sense to apply the general scientific

analytical methods (logical, typological, inductive-deductive methods, etc.), and a number

4
of specific methods for direct study of international relations, including those based on a

systemic approach. The author examines the two powerful Middle Eastern countries with

an emphasis on instrumental sectarianism as an important component of the regional order

transformation proсess, understanding. Iran as one of the superior powers of the region in

the context of Islamic discourse and the same role of Saudi Arabia with strong tendency in

the framework of Arab discourse. It was concluded that Iran and Saudi Arabia have

ambitions for a larger share of the new Middle East and from the viewpoint of religious

perspective, are instrumental in expanding their influence in the Middle Eastern countries.

ISSUES AND CHALLENGES OF OIC IN THE 21 ST CENTURY

Preprint · March 2018

DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.25284.12165 Muhammad Jeffery Hizwan Bin Said publication at:

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/324056314.

The decline of Muslim power and prestige after World War II accompanied by the agony

caused by the creation of the state of Israel on Palestinian lands inspired Muslim

intellectuals and scholars to appeal for the creation of an institution to identify the

malaise afflicting the Islamic world and to seek strength through unity and solidarity

among Muslim ranks. Earlier, visionaries like Iqbal, Jamaludin Afghani and religious

scholars such as Syed Qutub and Hasan Al-Banna had fired the Muslim imagination with

precepts and schemes supported by Quranic injunctions as a panacea to the problems

besetting the ummah (Muslim community). However, ethnic differences, varied historical

experiences, political polarization and, above all, differing idealistic impulses rendered

them mere pious dreams. Historically, the Organization of Islamic Conference1 (OIC)

5
symbolizes the first tangible evidence of the yearning for Islamic unity. It came into

existence in response to the arson by Zionists in August 1969 of the Al-Aqsa Mosque in

occupied Jerusalem – the first qibla (direction of prayer) of the Muslims and their third

holiest shrine. Twenty-Five Muslim states participated in a summit convened by King

Hasan of Morocco in 1969. The outcome of the Rabat Summit was the establishment of the

OIC. Today, the organization has 57 members. The initial mandate of the OIC was to

liberate Jerusalem and Al-Aqsa from Zionist occupation. It’s Charter, adopted on 27

February 1970 stressed Islamic solidarity, strengthening of cooperation in the political,

economic, social, cultural and scientific fields and support for all Muslim peoples to

safeguard their dignity, independence and national rights. To achieve these objectives and

coordinate its actions, a secretariat was set up in Jeddah

and a number of committees were established to promote and accelerate cooperation in

diverse fields – political, economic, social and scientific. It was further decided that OIC

heads of states/governments would meet every three years to consider plans and

proposals for strengthening ties among member states and to coordinate their response to

contemporary developments, while preserving their individual political and cultural

identities.

INTELLECruAL D~COURSE,2004

VOL 12,NO 2, 137-157

Conflict among Muslim Nations: Role of the

OIC in Conflict Resolution

Abdullah al-Ahsan

6
The OIC has always attempted to resolve conflicts among its member

states by peaceful means. During the early years of its existence, the OIC

performed better particularly in resolving the conflicts between PLO and Jordan

and between Bangladesh and Pakistan perhaps because of capable and sincere

leadership. However, it failed miserably in the 1980sand 1990sto resolve conflicts

related to Iraq. Although the Qur>anic ideas of mediation within the members of

the ummah are generally understood by Muslims, the OIC has not always been

able to translate them into practice to bring peace among conflicting parties.

Had the OIC undertaken the task strictly on the basis of fairness and justice,

perhaps, the wars of 1991 and 2003 could have been avoided.

Although the Organization of the Islamic Conference(OIC) stands

to foster cooperation among Muslim states in economic, social, and

cultural fields, its prime objective is to "promote Islamic solidarity

among member states(Article II A-I)." Conflict resolution among

member states, therefore, is one of the principal functions of the

OIC. Since its inception, the OIC has witnessed a number of conflicts

between two or more of its member states including the conflicts

between Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Jordan,

Bangladesh and Pakistan, Iran and Iraq, and between Iraq and Kuwait.

While in some cases the OIC has successfully brought the two

conflicting parties together, in others it has failed to achieve its goal.

This paper examines some of these conflicts and analyses the role

played by the OIC in regulating conflicts among its member countries.

7
11-1-2012

Can the Organization of Islamic Cooperation

(OIC) Resolve Conflicts?

Ibrahim Sharqieh

Brookings Institution, isharqieh@brookings.edu

This article examines the potential of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) to

contribute to mediation of conflicts in the Muslim world. Based on interviews with OIC

senior officials and government officials from Iraq and the Philippines, as well as research

involving other primary and secondary sources, the

author analyzes four cases in which the OIC participated in mediation efforts: the

Philippines, Thailand, Iraq, and Somalia. The article concludes with an assessment of the

advantages and challenges of including the OIC in such mediation efforts, as well as

recommendations related to capacity-building and inter-organizational

partnerships that might enhance the potential for the OIC to play a constructive role in

conflicts involving the Muslim community.

1.7 Tentative Chapters

The study is organized in five different chapters. Chapter one is introduction and includes

introductory background of the study, statement of the problem, research objectives,

research questions, significance of the research, research methodology, and tentative

chapters. Chapter two will be divided into two parts in the first part introduction to the

study of the role of Organization of the Islamic Cooperation and second part will be history

of the establishment of the OIC and then complete explanation of the role of OIC in the

8
Muslim world. Chapter three will be the explanation of the factors of the failure of OIC.

Chapter four will be the explanation of the different steps which will be to make stronger

the OIC. And the final chapter will be conclusion of the research, which will conclude the

study based on what is mentioned in all the chapters. At the end of the study references

will be provided in Turabian style.

REFERENCES

1. Moshe Behar, `The Peace Process and Israeli Domestic Politics in the 1990s’,

Socialism and Democracy, 16, 2, summer 2002, http://gateway.proquest.com,

assessed at March 20, 2008.

2. Elizabeth Prodromou, ( May 2013).” WHAT IS THE ORGANIZATION OF

ISLAMIC COOPERATION (OIC)?” Harvard University. p3,

3. India rejects OIC statement on Kashmir, Express News , March 17, 2008.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

9
1. Behar Moshe `The Peace Process and Israeli Domestic Politics in the 1990s’,

Socialism and Democracy, 16, 2, summer 2002, http://gateway.proquest.com,

assessed at March 20, 2008.

2. India rejects OIC statement on Kashmir, Express News , March 17, 2008.

3. Prodromou Elizabeth ( May 2013).” WHAT IS THE ORGANIZATION OF

ISLAMIC COOPERATION (OIC)?” Harvard University. p3.

10
 CHAPTER# 2
ROLE OF OIC IN THE MUSLIM WORLD

2.1 Introduction

The Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) is the second largest intergovernmental

organization after the 193-member United Nations in terms of membership and is mantle

of collective voice of the Muslim world. The Organization has the mandate to safeguard

and protect the interests of the Muslim states in the spirit of promoting international peace

and harmony.1

2.2 History

On August 21, 1969, Dennis Michael Rohan, an Australian Jew, set on fire the

southeastern wing of the holy Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem, burning Salahudddin’s Pulpit

and destroying approximately one-third of the total area. Israeli occupying forces cut off

the water supply and prevented the fire engines from arriving on time to extinguish the

fire. This watershed event in Muslim history necessitated the formulation of an

organization for pragmatic handling of any such situation in future. Hence, on 12th Rajab

1389 Hijra (25 September 1969), the Organization of Islamic Conference was established

upon a decision of the historic summit held in Rabat, Kingdom of Morocco. The meeting

was the first unified expression of the Muslim Ummah of its determination to safeguard its

interests, speak with one voice and ensure the progress and well- being of the Muslims in

the world. The bloc changed its name to Organization of the Islamic Cooperation on 28

June 2011 during the 38th Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in Astana, Kazakhstan.2

11
 2.3 Objectives

1. To promote greater harmony and cooperation among the Muslim world in other

words Islamic Solidarity.

2. To protect the interest of the Muslims in the international community.

3. To make efforts for the advancement of economic cultural, social, scientific and

trade relations of the Islamic countries.

4. To promote the spirit of Islamic brotherhood which has existed for centuries

amongst the Muslims of the world.

5. To eliminate racial segregation and eradicate colonialism.

6. To support the people of Palestine in their struggle to establish a Palestinian state.

7. To support the struggle of all Muslim people with a view to safeguarding their

dignity and independence.

2.4 Principles

The O.I.C adheres to the following principles;

1. All member states have equal rights.

2. Member states respect the right of self-determination and the principle of non-

interference.

12
 3. Respect for sovereignty and independence of each other.

4. Member states agree to settle disputes by peaceful means.

5. They will abstain from the use of force to settle their disputes.

2.5 Structure and specialized organs

Regarding its internal structure, OIC consists of three bodies –two of them of a markedly

interstate nature– namely the Conference of Kings and Heads of State and Government,

known as Islamic Summit Conference (Article IV of the Charter), the Islamic Conference

of Foreign Ministers (Article V of the Charter) and the Secretary-General of the

Organization. The former can be considered the supreme authority of the organization and

its most important body, since it lays down the strategies to fulfill the OIC’s objectives.

The second could be described as an executive organ in charge of implementing OIC’s

policy and adopting all resolutions and recommendations. Finally, the General Secretariat,

located in Jeddah (Saudi Arabia), is elected by the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers

and entrusted with the task of representing the organization at international level.

Throughout history, several Conferences have made significant contributions to OIC’s

development,

among others those held in Lahore (1974), Mecca (1981), Casablanca (1984), Kuwait

(1987) and Dakar (1991). This being said, it is worth pointing out that the OIC’s Charter

did not set up its own judicial organ from the very outset. It was not until the 5th Islamic

Summit –held in Kuwait in January 1987– that the Draft Statute of the International

Islamic Court of Justice (IICJ) was conclusively approved.3

13
Despite the fact that the Court is yet to become active for lack of ratifications, its

significance and originality cannot be denied. As to its composition and functions,

Article3(a) of its Statutes establishes that it shall be composed of seven judges, each

elected to a four-year term and renewable only once. According to Article 4, these judges

must be Muslim nationals of high moral standards, Shar’iah jurists of recognized

competence, and experienced in international law. The jurisdiction of this organ, like other

international

courts, would be twofold: contentious and advisory, pursuant to Articles 21 and 42 of the

Statute, respectively. As to the sources of law, Article 27 states that the Islamic Shar’iah is

the fundamental law of the Court and can only abide by general sources of international

law (treaties, customs, general law principles, and international jurisprudence) as the

second choice. This means that, for the first time in international law, a court would adopt

the Shar’iah as applicable to solve international disputes.4

Regarding the functioning of the court, interesting scenarios began to take shape in

practice. For instance, if two Members States decided to solve a border-related problem in

this court, the judges would base their decisions on the sources of Islamic law: the Qur’an

(the verbatim word of God) and the Sunnah (the revelation of God through the teachings

and practices of the prophet Muhammad). Should they fail to find a principle they could

apply to the dispute at issue, then they would have recourse to the secondary sources, that

is, the classic codes of international law. Interestingly enough, however, the Statute makes

no reference whatsoever to the school of religious law to be observed by the judges in

court (maliki12, hanafi13, shâfi‘i14, hanbali15), which could forebode legal difficulties.5

14
2.6 OIC AND THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

Human rights have become a topic of discussion that divides societies and affects the

policies developed by the governments of Islamic States and the international

organizations in which they participate. This division manifests itself in the drafts, projects

and final texts that private associations or public organizations have disseminated as

proposals of human rights in Islam. Some of them clearly come close to the rights

recognized in the classic universal texts of International Law, whereas others maintain that

all rights, be they individual or collective, must submit to Islam, breaking away from

international declarations that they only deem fit for the Western world’s secularized

culture. Accordingly, rather than human rights accepted and adopted by Islam as a whole,

there are only proposals made by ideologically committed sectors at variance with one

another. Be that as it may, and any difference notwithstanding, the fact that human rights

are captured in Declarations of international Islamic organizations highlights their

acceptance by Muslim countries and their adaptation to both a variety of cultures and,

especially, to the need to bring ad usum institutions and rights into line with the

idiosyncrasies of the Muslim world. Islam’s most liberal wing concurs with the universal

nature of human rights –which they consider compatible with the main tenets of Shar’iah–

and therefore reject the need to draft lists of Islamic human rights that, in the final analysis,

entail religion-based limitations and restrictions on international human rights.6 Here

three texts put forward by OIC. The first one is the “Draft declaration of fundamental

human rights and duties in Islam” (1979), followed by the “Draft document of human

rights in Islam” (1981), and finally, the “Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam”,

adopted on August 5, 1990 by the Nineteenth Islamic Conference and held to be the

15
ultimate proposal of Islamic Declaration. The ideology that promotes and makes these

Islamic declarations fruitful is the nonextreme traditionalistic line. In other words, one that

accepts human rights formulated in the style of international texts provided they be subject

to the religious law or Shar’iah, whose rules and principles condition, qualify, regulate and

limit the body of universal human rights. In fact, the true basis of these rights is said to be

addressed in the Shar’iah in their most refined and flawless conception, which effectively

reconciles faith and reason.

The result of this approach to Islam, as Mayer underscored, is a set of Declarations built

upon a mixture of international principles and standards and Islamic rules and concepts.

This explains why one of the most outstanding features of these Declarations is the

diversity of their formulation and the fact that their content is contingent on the

individual’s qualities, religion and sex. Consequently, we are faced with rights and duties

that differ depending as much on the individual’s gender as on whether or not he or she is a

believer (Muslim, Jewish, Christian, etc.).7

2.7 Islamic Declarations on Human Rights: The Shar’iah as basis and boundary

As we have seen, the common denominator of the OIC Member States, beyond any ethnic,

linguistic or cultural diversity, is their people’s Muslim beliefs and Islam’s status as an

official state religion. That is why, to some logical extent, Islam and the Shar’iah’s

principles, dictates and values are used as a point of reference to formulate means of

human rights protection. What scholars of OIC-approved texts do find definitely surprising

is how much they have made Islam dependent on the civil, political and social rights laid

down in international declarations.8

16
The three aforesaid Declarations open with a profession of faith in Islamic dogmas and the

Shar’iah’s moral tenets, and this makes them lean, surprisingly, towards the theological

basis of the human rights doctrine and, at the same time, conceal their real origins in the

schools of thought of the Enlightenment and ideological liberalism. The preambles to the

Second and Third Declarations suggest that people’s rights and liberties were enunciated

by Islam since its very inception and, therefore, their observance is a matter of necessity,

both ethical and religious. In fact, human rights in Islam are held to be superior to those

proclaimed by International Law in as much as they fulfill the mandates revealed by God,

and their commitment to spread Islamic concepts lies in the mission to help mankind

attend a true balance between faith and reason and overcome the materialistic nature of

today’s civilization. Underlying these Declarations, then, is the wish to constantly stress its

unswerving loyalty and orthodoxy to Islamic religion beyond any other considerations of

ethical or political convenience. Hence their leaning toward texts of a theological nature or

containing religious morality, which distinguishes them from and even challenge other

universal international declarations considered by some as Western ideological products.

This is somewhat contradictory if we bear in mind that the OIC Member States played an

active role in the drafting of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other

international texts on this topic.9

The divine basis of the rights recognized in every OIC Declaration is expressly asserted

therein. In the preamble to the First Declaration (1979) we read the following:

“ human rights and duties in Islam are guided by imperative texts provided by the Creator

in such a way that man shall not be able to infringe them.” And the Third Declaration

17
(1990), closely following the text of the Second Declaration (1981), emphasizes “ the

universal rights and fundamental liberties(stem from)inalterable divine rules contained in

the Book of God and transmitted to His Prophet to complete the preceding divine

messages”. This implies religious punishment in case of infringement. The above

Declarations state that the protection of these rights is an act of worship, so that any attack

against them is forbidden by religion. From all this we can deduce that these rights are also

subject to, and conditioned on, God’s law.10 Such a consequence –the subjugation of

rights and liberties to the Islamic Shar’iah– is found throughout the process of recognition

of the rights included in the OIC Declarations. From the standpoint of religious law, it

represents the superiority of the divine law of the Qur’an and the Sunnah, which conditions

and restrains the divine laws created by human legislators. This statement, shared by other

religions in their approach to human rights, is the key to understand the structure at the root

of the Islamic Declarations we have studied: they accept many international rights in their

original terminology (the rights to life, marriage, freedom of opinion and expression,

education, religious freedom, work, physical integrity, ownership...), except that their

content is limited and modified as a function of the content of the Shar’iahin its traditional

conception. This is further noticeable in the fact that the said Declarations fail to mention

rights that belie specific rules of the Shar’iah, thus limiting their exercise. This is the case,

for instance, of the right to marriage, the granting of legal capacity, parental rights to

choose their child’s education, freedoms of opinion and expression, religious freedom,

intellectual/scientific/artistic freedom, freedom of circulation, etc. In this way, Islamic

law’s role as limit and basis of the rights recognized in various Declarations is explicitly

acknowledged by the assertion that “all rights and freedoms stipulated in this document are

18
subject to the provisions of Islamic law” and the remark that Islam is the only possible

point of reference to interpret or clarify any article. Taking the aforesaid into account, there

is no doubt that by uplifting religion to a higher stage that restricts and regulates people’s

rights, Islam’s Declarations make a clean break from their recognition at international

level, where religious notions are never assumed as an element of human rights

authentication. In conclusion, it is safe to say that by making human rights contingent on

Islamic law rather than on people’s intrinsic dignity, the OIC Declarations end up

distorting their recognition and exercise. The “cultural factor” that in this case

distinguishes human rights in Islam from those proclaimed at universal

level involves restrictions and limitations religionis causae bound to be rebuffed as

contrary to international standards.11

2.7 Rights recognized in OIC Declarations: disagreement and concurrence with

universal texts

The basic principle of equality is covered by Islam’s three Declarations, although a

distinction is made between equality in dignity –based on the idea that man is God’s

creation– and equality before the law, which gives rise to different rights and obligations

depending on the individual’s religion and gender. This is particularly so in the case of the

rights within the family, whose importance in Muslim society becomes apparent in the

stress that the Declarations lay on this social group. For instance, man’s and woman’s roles

in the family are clearly differentiated in the Declarations. According to Article 6 of the

Third Declaration (1990), the male is responsible for the support and welfare of the family,

and no mention whatsoever is made of the female. Another gender-related distinction, in

this case with religious roots, is marriage. The obstacles to marriage recognized in the

19
Declarations are different for men and women, with religion at the core of the problem. On

the other hand, it is significant that all three Declarations regard as illicit to ban marriage

on grounds of race, color or nationality, but nowhere do they say anything about possible

limitations or prohibitions for religious reasons. Actually, the First Declaration (1979)

explicitly states that faith in God is a necessary condition and religious unity a requirement

in Muslim marriages (Article 9), which leaves the door open to religion-based legal

discrimination against marriage.12

Additionally, the religious element is also present in the regulation of the right to life in its

every form: dependent and independent. Its proclamation is linked to the ban on the

permanent interruption of fertility, abortion and infanticide. Again, religious law is what

essentially puts a limit on the right to life, as stipulated in Article 2 of the Third

Declaration (1990): “It is prohibited to take away life except for a Shar’iah-prescribed

reason. In this connection, the right to safety from bodily harm is no less conditional, since

it is the duty of the State to safeguard it and it cannot be breached “without a Shar’iah-

prescribed reason”.Sensu contrario, death penalty and bodily harm legalized by the Qur’an

or the Sunnahare justified in the said Declarations. Other civil rights recognized by these

Islamic Declarations are also conditioned by religious law. There are many examples:

people will enjoy legal capacity in accordance with the Shar’iah, which stands out as a

limitation to freedom of opinion and expression. Likewise, freedom of information may

not be “exploited or misused in such a way as may violate sanctities and the dignity of

Prophets”; the right to seek asylum is not guaranteed if the request is motivated by an act

which Shar’iah regards as a crime; the right to free movement is respected within the

context of Islamic law; the right to own property and to enjoy the fruits of scientific,

20
literary, artistic or technical production are not protected if they go against Islamic law;

and the right to resort to justice is equally subject to Islamic law, as per Article 19.4 of the

Third Declaration (1990): “There shall be no crime or punishment except as provided for

in the Shar’iah”.13

The right to religious freedom, subject as it is to the harsh and unequivocal limitations that

protecting Islamic faith entails, deserves a separate analysis. What the Second Declaration

(1981) calls “right to freedom of worship” is followed by the prohibition of atheism,

unlawful proselytism –ascertained through the use of coactive means– and the prohibition

to take advantage of an individual’s poverty or ignorance to convert him to another

religion. Actually, religious conversion is absolutely forbidden to Muslims, as laid down in

Article 10 of the Third Declaration (1990): “Islam is the religion of unspoiled nature”. As

far as the civil rights recognized in the Declarations are concerned, it should be

remembered that no mention is made of two rights essential to the development of an

individual’s social personality: the right of assembly and the freedom of association for

private or public purposes. However, the texts include the political rights to participate in

the administration of public affairs, assume public office, and exercise control over the

government, albeit nothing is explicitly said about the democratic means and channels

required by an election. As to social, economic or cultural rights, the Declarations

prescribe the rights to medical care and social assistance, the right to work and the State’s

obligation to safeguard people’s guarantees and provide for their self-development in fair

conditions. Yet, nowhere do they say anything about the right to strike. Other rights based

on and limited by the Shar’iah are also recognized, namely the individual’s right to

receive a decent burial and have his last will respected after his death “...in accordance

21
with the rules set out in the Qur’an and the Sunnah”. The right to privacy in business and

legitimate trade practices are also restricted by express order of the Shar’iah: usury is

absolutely prohibited.14

Religious inspiration is especially apparent with regard to the right to education, which is

one of the fundamental rights granted to children and exercised mostly in the bosom of the

family. The aforesaid Declarations point out that the father “ is the worthiest man capable

of assuring the child’s education” whereas the mother is assigned custody (hadana) or

material sustenance of the minor. The father has the right and obligation to choose the type

of education that he desires for the children in accordance with ethical values and the

principles of the Shar’iah. This religious aim of education is laid down in Article 9 of the

Third Declaration (1990), paragraph 1: “The State shall ensure the availability of ways and

means to acquire education and shall guarantee educational diversity in the interest of

society so as to enable man to be acquainted with the religion of Islam and the facts of the

Universe for the benefit of mankind.”. Paragraph 2 states that “ every human being has the

right to receive both religious and worldly education from the various institutions of

education and guidance and in such an integrated and balanced manner as to develop his

personality, strengthen his faith in God and promote his respect for and defense of both his

rights and obligations”.15

All of the above legalizes not only the teaching of Islamic religion at school but also the

teaching of every other religious subject in keeping with the principles and values of Islam.

Such is the task that Muslim States undertake to carry out in public education and the role

of the public institutions in relation to social life, which is governed by religious morality.

22
In this connection, Article 17.1 of the Third Declaration (1990) states, “everyone shall

have

the right to live in a clean environment, away from vice and moral corruption, that would

foster his self-development; and it is incumbent upon the State and society in general to

afford that right”. Imposing religious morality on society is also a right granted to

individuals. Article 22.2 of the Third Declaration quotes an expression from the Qur’an

that says: “Everyone shall have the right to advocate what is right, propagate what is good,

and warn against what is wrong and evil according to the norms of Islamic Shar’iah.”

Understood literally, this precept empowers any Muslim to demand observance of

religious law in society if the relevant authority fails to do so.16

Finally, these Declarations recognize people’s right to freedom and self-determination and

to exercise control over their wealth and resources and decry colonialism –an evil suffered

by most Muslim States– in categorical terms in the Third Declaration (1990): “

Colonialism of all types, being one of the most evil forms of enslavement, is totally

prohibited. It is the duty of all States and peoples to support the struggle for the liquidation

of all forms of colonialism and occupation” (Article 11.2). Nor is there in the Declarations

any definite prohibition on war, either defensive or offensive, for religious

reasons (jihad), even if somewhere in a Declaration we either find a strong denunciation of

any attack against other people to appropriate their wealth or natural resources or confirm

the acceptance of certain humanitarian norms in case of armed conflict. The Declarations

never mention any means to protect and safeguard the said recognized rights. Only in the

First Declaration (1979) reference is made to people’s right to “ employ any means

necessary to guarantee and protect these rights” (Article 5). Therefore, it is understood that

23
the effective protection of these rights is made subordinate to whatever mechanism the

OIC Member States envisages in their respective codes.17

2.8 ROLE OF THE OIC IN THE CONFLICTS FACING THE ARAB/MUSLIM

WORLD

The social movements and conflicts that Africa and the Middle East have suffered in the

last few years have brought about political changes and clashes of undeniable international

repercussion. Among others, the Iraqi War and the conflicts that took place in Somalia,

Libya, Yemen, Mali, and Syria come to mind. In these cases, the role of the international

organizations has been (and still is) critical, as evidenced by the Resolutions of the United

Nations Security Council, which are not without controversy. Nonetheless, irrespective of

the stance taken by the UN and other Western bodies like the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization (NATO) or the European Union (EU), the role of regional organizations in

Member States –and especially the part played by OIC– that have been affected to a

greater or lesser extent by recent conflicts merits our full attention. In this respect, we must

bear in mind that OIC has tried to spearhead the efforts to manage regional conflicts, which

explains why its attempts at mediating have been a regular feature of the disharmony we

have witnessed in Africa and the Middle East. In fact, OIC’s role has been recognized by

the UN, with which it has intensely cooperated since 1975, the year when OIC was

accepted as an “observer member” pursuant to Resolution 3369 of October 10. Both

organizations have met at the highest level and extended these contacts to their specialized

agencies ever since, as unquestionably proved by Resolutions 61/49 of February 12, 2007;

63/114 of February 26, 2009; and 65/140 of April 5, 2011, all of which advocate mutual

cooperation to uphold international peace and security, foster free self-determination, and

24
promote fundamental human rights. There is also the report titled “Follow-up to the

cooperation between OIC and the United Nations” published by OIC itself.18

2.9 OIC and the conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa

Sub-Saharan Africa has seen two recent conflicts in which the religious factor has played a

key role, one in Somalia and another in Mali. State failure in Somalia in 1991 triggered a

civil war that claimed over a million lives and, together with the country’s political

instability, had considerable fallout worldwide, including the appearance of pirates in the

Gulf of Aden that seriously endangered international sea navigation. This state of affairs

led the UN to intervene in the conflict in 1993, albeit with little political success. OIC, in

turn, tried to contribute to the peace process by establishing a “Contact Group”, but its

efforts were no more successful. Following the failure of these initiatives, the regional

scuffles escalated into a military intervention by Ethiopia in 2006. In this context, OIC

took part in the talks that ended up in August 2008 with the “Djibouti Peace Agreement”,

signed by the countries involved and a number of international organizations that attended

the process as observers. Moreover, OIC played a very important role in coordinating relief

efforts in the Horn of Africa, stricken by a drastic shortage of food in 2011. In fact, under

OIC supervision, many Muslim NGOs provided assistance to the Somali people to round

off the international effort. After two tours in the field, OIC alerted the world to the

pressing need to fight famine and decided to open an Office for the Coordination of

Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in Mogadishu in charge of delivering food supplies to

affected areas. OIC’s outstanding involvement in the conflict is beyond any doubt, to the

extreme that since 2012 the organization has served as Somalia’s mouthpiece to report to

25
the international community about the situation in that country, which is still closely

monitoring.19

In March 2012, Malian president Amadou Toumani Touré, a retired general who had led

national democracy in 1991, was overthrown by a military coup d’état that unleashed a

bloody conflict in which rebel Tuareg groups opposed to Mali’s government since the

1950s were actively involved. After closing the borders and establishing a military junta,

the pro-coup faction within the army justified their actions by saying that a firmer hand

was needed to deal with the Tuareg separatists. Tension between the new government and

the rebel ethnic group increased as a result, and grew even worse after the ousting of

Libyan president Muammar al-Qaddafi, who had offered protection to the Tuaregsall

through his mandate but whose fall forced their tribes to return to Mali, where they linked

up with separatist movements in the northern part of the country. What followed was the

emergence of a self-proclaimed State –Azawad– that nowadays spreads over two thirds of

the national territory. In this sense, the "Islamization" of some Tuareg groups such as

Ansar al – Charia and its collaboration with jihadist groups like al - Qaeda of the Islamic

Maghreb (AQIM) also played an important role in the conflict. In September 2012, the

Malian government officially asked the United Nations to authorize a military intervention

in the area, a request leading up to Security Council Resolution 2085 of December 20,

2012 approving the deployment of the International Support Mission to Mali to help the

transitional government regain control over northern Mali. There had been no plans for an

intervention before the end of 2013, but on January 9 that year the Malian authorities

requested military assistance from France, which set off operation SERVAL.20

26
OIC’s position on this conflict has also been particularly interesting. On January 28, 2013

OIC Secretary-general Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu condemned the Malian radical force’s

behavior, and has often urged action against the war and for dialogue to attain a political

settlement in Mali. Besides, he tagged the UN Security Council’s decision as hastyand

made public the Final Communiqué of the Islamic Summit held in Cairo in February 2013

that describes terrorism as contrary to “the values of tolerance, peace and moderation

advanced by noble Islam”.21

2.10 OIC and the conflicts in the Middle East

Countless conflicts have shaken the Middle East in the last few decades, so it would be

impossible to review OIC’s role in every one of them. Therefore, we will restrict our study

to some of the most recent cases: Iraq, Syria, and the never-ending Palestinian conflict.

OIC has been actively and permanently involved in the Iraqi situation. In the wake of the

Gulf War –waged between Iraq and an international coalition headed by the UN following

the invasion of Kuwait in August 1990– OIC adopted a Resolution in its 1997 Summit

Conference in Tehran condemning the attack against Kuwait and appealing for respect of

all UN resolutions on the matter. In this context, the organization considered that Iraq’s

aggression violated Article II(A) of the OIC Charter that lays down the principle of

solidarity among Member States. The whole situation recurred years later on the occasion

of the attack launched by a second coalition under US command. This time, at the Islamic

Summit Conference held in Putrajaya (Malaysia) on October 16 to 18, OIC issued a

Declaration reaffirming the value of the principles of self-determination, sovereignty

independence and national integrity of the States. Additionally, the document stressed the

importance of the principle of non-intervention in Iraq’s internal affairs, openly

27
condemning any form of terrorism and calling upon all Member States to ratify the

Convention on Combatting International Terrorism, put forward by OIC itself.22

With regard to Syria, OIC has played a crucial role, both taking steps for cooperation and

approving sanctions. In this connection, and in order to twist (Syrian president) Bashar

alAssad’s arm, OIC seized upon the Islamic Summit held in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, in

August 2012, to suspend Syria’s membership in the organization. The move had been

previously approved at a preliminary meeting in the Saudi city of Jeddah and even

recommended months before by the Arab League, and it was adopted despite Iran’s

opposition, voiced by that country all through a Summit billed as a showdown between

Saudi Arabia –in favor of isolating Syria diplomatically– and the Iranians, who accused

Qatar, Turkey and Saudi Arabia of arming the Syrian rebels. The Summit also rubber-

stamped the so-called Mecca Letter to promote Islamic solidarity, which at once censured

human rights violations in Syria and underlined the need to “preserve the unity,

sovereignty and territorial integrity” of the Syrian nation, in light of rumors that the

country might end up partitioned. At the present time, OIC is playing a key role in

mediation and cooperation for development. To this end, the organization reached an

agreement with the Syrian authorities in December 2013 to send humanitarian aid and a

joint OIC-UN mission to Syria.23

Finally, on the subject of OIC’s stance on the Palestinian situation, we will restrict

ourselves to offer a few short sentences, taking into account the complexity and duration of

this case. Unlike other conflicts, the question of Palestine captured OIC’s attention and

became paramount to the organization since its very inception. We must not lose sight of

28
the fact that it was in the aftermath of the arson perpetrated against the Al-Aqsa Mosque in

Jerusalem on August 21, 1969, and precisely because of it, that the OIC was established.

Innumerable times throughout its history and that of the endless Arab-Israeli conflict, the

organization has made plain its rejection of the West Bank settlements, the boarding of the

French ship Dignité Al Karama, and the policy of demographic change and land

requisition. Besides, OIC was instrumental in the efforts leading up to the UN General

Assembly’s approval of Palestine as observer member and has made pressing appeals to

the international community to support the establishment of a an independent Palestinian

State.24

2.11 OIC AND KASHMIR ISSUE

The issue of Kashmir is intensely discussed in many conferences of OIC which were held

in Pakistan or with the close cooperation of Pakistan proved as millstone for the resolution

of Kashmir. OIC has been a forum of strong and credible political and economic support to

the Government of Pakistan on the issue of Kashmir. This relationship has gained strength

over a period of time. The meaningful struggle cannot be done without the proper funds

and assistance at the huge level. This support can only be sufficient when the international

community and especially Muslim world aid in this regard collect statistical and

informative data about where the help is required. 25

The OIC has extended strong and unanimous support to Pakistan on all issues of concern.

The OIC has three Jammu & Kashmir related Summits and Ministerial resolutions. These

resolutions expressed the Islamic world's solidarity with the Government of Pakistan and

the Kashmiri people in their struggle for the right of self-determination and called for a

29
peaceful settlement of the Jammu & Kashmir Dispute in accordance with the United

Nations Security Council resolutions. This was said in the sixth summit of Islamic

conference in Dakar and Pakistan sponsored resolution on Kashmir was adopted

unanimously in the summit.26

The OIC resolutions also condemned the continued massive violations of human rights and

called for the respect of the human rights of the Kashmiri people. This resolution appeared

during the formation of OIC Commission of Eminent Persons in Islamabad. In a resolution

passed in 9th Islamic Summit in Doha, (2000). Islamic leaders reportedly "condemned

flagrant violations of human rights in Kashmir and called on member states to take all

necessary measures to convince India to put an immediate end to these violations". The

resolution also called for "the people of Kashmir to exercise their inalienable right to self-

determination". New Delhi has dismissed such resolutions, which it said mooted by

Pakistan, over the years.27

2.12 CONCLUSIONS

By way of conclusion, it is worth pointing out that the role of international organizations of

a regional nature is becoming ever significant in the peace and conflict management

processes taking place in African and Middle Eastern countries. Even if there are many

regional international organizations operating in these badly affected continents, the OIC

has set the pace of the race to cope with the conflicts facing the Arab/Muslim world. The

reason for the creation of the OIC is often explained by pointing to the need for Muslim

solidarity following two events in recent history: the Arab loss of the Six Day War in 1967,

and the 1969 arson attack against the Al-Aqsa Mosque, a holy site in Sunni Islam. As a

30
result of these two incidents the OIC, we learn, was created to safeguard the interests of the

Muslim world. Its ability as mediator has been acknowledged as much by its Member

States as by the international community. Suffice it to mention the free-flowing relations it

has kept and still keeps with the United Nations, as is evident from their joint missions in

the Syrian conflict and the action OIC has undertaken together with regional organizations

such as the Arab League and the European Union. OIC’s leadership in the Muslim world

has become all the more noticeable in the last decade on account of a number of

circumstances, including a) its manifest independence from other regional organizations;

b) the criticism leveled at the UN Security Council for its discretionary attitude towards

certain international conflicts; and d) the decisions that it has adopted in spite of the

rivalries existing among its Member States over religion –Shiites vs. Sunnis– politics –

Qatar’s pretensions to regional leadership– or economics. As a result of all these

determining factors, OIC’s voice has become pivotal around the world, which explains

why various international organizations and even non-Muslim States like Russia have

shown great interest in the process to be granted OIC observer status or that China has

signed framework cooperation agreements with this organization.

31
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charts-onthesecurity-council-0-82/subjects-of-un-security-council-vetoes.html.

14. Hinnebusch, R. (2014). The Arab Uprisings and The MENA Regional States

System. Uluslararasi iliskiler- International relations, 11(42), 7—27.

15. Hinnebusch, R.A. (2016). The Sectarian Revolution in the Middle East.

R/Evolutions: Global Trends & Regional Issues, 4(1), 120—152.

16. HRW. (2008). Organisation of the Islamic Conference: Improve

andStrengthenthe199OIC Convention on Combating International

Terrorism.HumanRightsWatch.Retrievedfromhttps://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/

03/10/letter-secretarygeneral-organisation-islamic-conference

17. Ikenberry, J. G. & Slaughter, A-M. (2006) Forging A World of Liberty under

Law: U.S. National Security in the 21st Century. Cambridge, MA: The Woodrow

Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University.

18. Khalid, A. (2011). Iran calls on Syrian President to consider

protestersdemands.Independent.URL:http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/

middle-east/iran-calls-on-syrian-president-toconsider-protesters-demands-

2345536.html (accessed: 12.07.2016).

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19. Keynoush, Banafshe. (2016). Saudi Arabia and Iran: Friends or Foes? London:

Pallgrave and Macmillan.

20. Khoury, N.A. (2013). The Arab Cold War Revisited: The Regional Impact of the

Arab Uprising.Middle East Policy, 20 (2), 73—87.

21. Kurzman, C. (2012). The Arab Spring: Ideals of the Iranian Green Movement,

Methods of the Iranian Revolution. International Journal of

MiddleEastStudies,44(1),162.165.DOI:https://doi.org/10.1017/S00207438110013

46.

22. OIC Convention on Combating International Terrorism". OICUN. Retrieved

from:http://www.oicun.org/articles/55/1/OIC-Convention-on-Combating-

InternationalTerrorism/1.html.

23. Mabon, S. (2012). The Battle for Bahrain: Iranian-Saudi Rivalry. East Policy,

19(2), 84—97. DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-4967.2012.00537.x.

24. Malt Zahn, N.V. (2015). The Syria-Iran Axis: Cultural Diplomacy and

International Relations in the Middle East (Library of Modern Middle East

Studies). London, New York: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd.

25. Matthiesen, T. (2015). Transnational Identities after the Arab Uprising. In: The

Gulf Monarchies beyond the Arab spring: changes and challenges. Ed. by L.

Narbone & M. Lestra. Florence: European University Institute, p. 32—36. DOI:

10.2870/930212.

40
26. Mohseni, P. (2015). Iran and the Arab World after the Nuclear Deal: Rivalry and

Engagement in a New Era. Belfer Center for Science

and.InternationalAffairs.URL:https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legac

y/files/Impact%20on%20Arab%20World%20-%20Web.pdf

(accessed:22.08.2017).

27. Narbone, L. & Lestra, M. (2015). The Gulf Monarchies beyond the Arab spring:

changes and challenges. Florence: European University Institute. DOI:

10.2870/930212 URL: http://cadmus.eui.eu/

handle/1814/37734 (accessed: 12.08. 2016).

41
 CHAPTER-3

FAILURE OF OIC IN ITS ATTEMPTS TO SECURE THE

INTEREST OF MUSLIM WORLD
3.1 Introduction

Organization of the Islamic Cooperation came into being in 1969 to be a solid voice of the

Muslim world. Also, will bring solidarity among Muslim states and will make strong

economic, social, cultural and technological connections among its member states.

However, across the world the Muslims are accused of sponsoring terrorism and

extremism in this regards OIC didn’t take concrete steps to present the true and pure shape

of Muslims and Islam. Although there are interstate crisis and conflict among its member

states includes Syrian crisis, Iran-Saudi crisis, Kashmir issue, Iran-Iraq war and Palestine

issue and Afghanistan crisis as well. Organization of the Islamic Cooperation since its

establishment has been passed many resolutions to solve the problems of the Muslim world

but all in vain.1

3.2 OIC failed in resolving issues of Muslim world

The formation of the OIC happened shortly after the 1969 Arab-Israel war. Leaders of

Muslim nations met in Rabat to establish the OIC on September 25, 1969 in order to

preserve Islamic social and economic values and promote trade and bilateral cooperation

among each other. Its motto is very good to improve trade and protection of member states

but recent times we would not see any sign that OIC is doing the work for which it was

created. USA imposed a war against Iraq and OIC was mere a spectator. Onward, they

attacked Afghanistan nothing was done. Tunis being a prominent member of OIC

42
experiences a mass of people against their king. And daily strikes and killing were seen but

the OIC was a spectator it didn’t pay any attention to resolve the issue from the platform of

OIC and thus this cancer spread throughout the main Arab states. Libya had seen its worse

days but the OIC didn’t take steps to resolve the crisis by means of talks. Libyan rebels

were supported by NATO and French Air Force and OIC did not move to take even a

notice of what is going around and why NATO is doing all this.2

OIC has generally failed to identify problems of a particular member states as a common

problem of the Muslim community. This institution, failed to share the grief and pain of

foreign activities with Palestine and Afghani peoples. Also, didn’t solve out the Kashmir

issue between India and Pakistan, even it is failed to defend the true and genuine image of

Islam and Muslims which is distorted worldwide under terrorism.3

3.2.1 Failure to stop the US-led invasion of Iraq

OIC is providing zero or no support to its member countries in terms of protecting their

interests from foreign bodies. An example is when the US-led forces attacked on the

pretext of the presence of the weapons of mass destruction, OIC could not stop it. The US

and the UN inspectors could not find any weapon in Iraq but even then they inflicted heavy

loss on the country ruining its people, wealth and infrastructure OIC even did not protest

that uncalled-for attack by the US forces. So, in this way Middle East has become an

epicenter for terrorism and war. It is sending shockwaves all across the world. The internal

players - all members of the OIC have failed to resolve the issues and have themselves

paved way for external players to interfere in the region. The latter have their own vested

interests so a solution from their end is not possible.4

43
3.2.2 Syrian Crisis and OIC

The Syrian Civil War is a multi-party armed conflict that was triggered by the turmoil of

the 2011 Arab Spring. In this multi-party conflict, Iran, Russia, and Lebanon’s Hezbollah

support the government of Bashar al-Assad. On the other side, Turkey, Saudi Arabia,

France, Qatar, and the US support the opposition to the government. With the involvement

of multiple stakeholders, it is natural for a conflict to grow out of proportion. This has been

the case of the Syrian Civil War because, by the end of 2014, around 7.6 million Syrians

were internally displaced and additional 3.7 million took refuge in other countries. In

October 2016, UNHCR reported more than 4.7 million Syrian refugees, including 2.9

million in neighboring Muslim countries. This is in addition to a massive loss of human

lives that keep on rising due to the increasing intensity of war. According to an estimate,

470,000 Syrians had died by February 2016. The sudden influx of Syrian refugees has

placed enormous stress of resources in neighboring Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Egypt, and

Turkey. Since 2013, there has been a rapid escalation in number of Syrians refugees,

especially in neighboring countries.5

The absence of OIC role led to prolong the proxy war conducted by the United States and

Russia in Syria. Last year, the US, the United Kingdom and France launched more than

100 missiles at sites said to house chemical weapons, killing dozens. The action came in

the wake of accusation by the allies that the regime of Bashar al-Assad had used chemical

weapons in raids on Douma in Damascus a few weeks ago, which had killed civilians. The

conflict has been going on since 2011. In 2018, it entered its eighth year. The conflict

allows foreign powers to interfere in the country’s affairs. One cannot deny the fact that

44
foreign support for the Assad regime and the Syrian Free Army has prolonged the conflict.

The Organization of the Islamic Cooperation just suspended the membership and not play

concrete role to solve to crisis of Syria and bring peace into the country. Meanings that

OIC failed to solve the Syrian crisis in the region and the proxy war fighting by external

powers in it.6

3.2.3 Bangladesh-Pakistan Conflict

The next challenge that the OIC encountered was the conflict between Bangladesh and

Pakistan. The conflict between the two countries originated when both entities constituted

one independent nation state from 1947 to 1971. Muslims from the extreme western and

extreme eastern parts of India jointly fought against the British colonial administration and

Indian nationalism. However, after independence, military and bureaucratic elite, who

came mainly from Western Pakistan, gained control over Pakistani politics, and deprived

the common people of their legitimate rights. Freedom loving East Pakistanis were the first

to rise against the military bureaucratic oligarchy of Pakistan. As early as 1948, it was

reported in the Constituent Assembly Debates that, "a feeling is growing among the

Eastern Pakistanis that the Eastern Pakistan is being neglected and treated merely as a

'colony' of Western Pakistan." Soon, East Pakistani representatives in the Constituent

Assembly identified two issues of disagreement with West Pakistani representatives. East

Pakistanis felt that, by declaring Urdu as the only official language of Pakistan, the

importance of their language (Bengali) was being undermined. Some also believed that

attempts were being made to transform the numerical majority of the Bengalis in Pakistan

to a minority status.7

45
The claim for Urdu being the only national language was supported by the fact that Urdu

was the only language that was generally understood in all regions, while it was not the

language of any particular region of Pakistan. On the other hand, the argument for Bengali

was that Bengali was the language of the majority of the population of Pakistan and in

many respects was a more developed language than Urdu. Therefore, many Bengalis

expected their language to be at least one of the official languages of Pakistan. However,

most leaders seemed to have been more concerned about the unity and stability of the new

country since it consisted of two separate territories divided by an enemy land. They

believed that a linguistic division would only set the two geographically divided territories

further apart. There was little discussion in the Constituent Assembly on the question of

language, and the bureaucracy dominated central government attempted to resolve the

issue by force. This eventually led to a civil war in 1971. During the civil war, the OIC

Secretary General, Tengku Abdul Rahman, former Prime Minister of Malaysia, visited

both parts of Pakistan in an effort to find a political solution to the conflict. The Secretary

General was accompanied by representatives from Kuwait and Iran. When the OIC

delegation attempted to visit India, where most of the leaders of de facto Bangladesh had

taken political refuge, the Indian authorities prevented them from entering the country on

the ground that the OIC had earlier expelled the Indian representative from its First Islamic

Conference in 1969. As a result, the mission failed.8

3.2.4 Iran-Iraq War

The OIC acted quickly to mediate between Iran and Iraq when they went into conflict in

the early 1980s. As soon as the war broke out between the two countries in September

46
1980, the Foreign Minister's Conference of the OIC met in an extraordinary session in New

York during the UN General Assembly session. A goodwill mission, headed by Pakistani

President Ziaul Haq, was formed "in the hopes of bringing the warring parties to

negotiations." ZiaulHaq immediately visited Tehran and Baghdad to persuade the leaders

of the two countries to settle their dispute peacefully. Ziaul Haq was joined by the PLO

leader, late Yasser Arafat, for the same purpose. But their attempts did not succeed.9

The OIC continued with its efforts, and during the Third Islamic Summit Conference, held

in Makkah/Taif in January 1981, the mission was reshuffled and renamed. Under its new

name, Islamic Peace Committee, now headed by the Guinean Revolutionary leader Ahmad

Sekou Toure, was composed of the heads of governments of Bangladesh, the Gambia,

Pakistan, the PLO, Senegal, and Turkey. After the death of President Sekou Toure in 1983,

the Gambian President Dawda Kairaba Jawara led the Islamic Peace Committee. The

Summit Conference called both parties to cease hostilities and declared that the OIC had

agreed to "form an Islamic emergency force entrusted with the task of ensuring the

implementation of the ceasefire, should the need arise."s Iran had already announced its

boycott of the conference on the ground that it would never sit with the representative of

what it called aggressor Iraqi regime. The Iraqis, on the other hand, not only tried to

convince the Summit Conference that Iran was responsible for the conflict; it also secured

OIC's approval to host the following Foreign Minister's Conference in Baghdad.10

The Islamic Peace Committee, however, went on with its efforts to bring the war to an end.

The powerful Committee visited both capitals and made a number of proposals based on

the principle of nation-state sovereignty. It identified that the Shafal-'Arab waterway was

47
the main issue of disagreement between the two countries. It, therefore, proposed that the

decision on the waterway be placed to a committee composed, of OIC members acceptable

to both parties; it also proposed to continue negotiations for peaceful settlement of other

disputes between the two countries. The Committee proposed a cease-fire date with a

timetable for the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Iranian territories. The Committee also

proposed that the ceasefire and the withdrawal "shall take place under the supervision of

military observers drawn from member countries of the OIC." It urged both countries to

exchange declarations of non-interference in internal affairs of the other country. The

Peace Committee firmly affirmed that the "OIC countries will guarantee the observance by

both sides of the commitments undertaken on the basis of the package peaceful settlement

and, if necessary, maintain observers on both sides of international frontier for a certain

period."11

Neither Iran nor Iraq paid much attention to these proposals. The Iranians demanded the

OIC to first identify and punish the aggressor in the conflict. Iran wanted the OIC to do

this without participating in its meetings. Iraq, on the other hand, remained part and parcel

of the OIC system. The 12th Foreign Minister's Conference was already scheduled to be

held in June, 1981 in Baghdad. The Iranians requested a neutral venue for the conference,

but the request was rejected on the ground that Iran had earlier boycotted the Third Islamic

Summit Conference, which was held in Makkah(Taif), Saudi Arabia. At the inaugural

session of the 12th Conference of Islamic Foreign Ministers, the Iraqi President declared

that: “Iraq is relieved of any moral or legal responsibility for the continuation of the

conflict: the responsibility lies squarely on the officials of Iran, for they have so far not

48
exerted any serious and sincere efforts to halt the conflict and reach a peaceful, just and

honorable settlement in this dispute.12

At the end of the conference, the OIC decided to make the statement of the Iraqi president

a part of its official document because it contained "useful guidance for the Organization."

Thus the OIC lost its credibility to be a mediator in the conflict. Yet, the OIC continued its

moribund efforts to bring an end to the war.13

Outside of the OIC's official efforts, one of its member states, Algeria, attempted to

mediate between the two conflicting parties as soon as the war began. However, its

Foreign Minister, Muhammad Benyahya, who had earlier brokered a major agreement

(1975) between the two countries, was killed in a plane crush in Iranian sky when he was

travelling from Istanbul to Tehran to discuss the matter with Iranian authorities. As a

result, the effort collapsed at a very early stage of the initiative.14

Other than the OIC, the UN was also involved in bringing an end to the war. The UN

Security Council adopted a number of resolutions beginning with the Resolution 479 of

September 1980 calling for the cease-fire. However, it too took almost eight years to really

make the cease-fire effective, through the Resolution 598 of 1987. In a resolution of its

own the OIC expressed its "satisfaction on ending the war," and "hoped that they (the

conflicting parties) redouble their efforts in their direct negotiations under the auspicious of

the UN Security Council and their strong determination to implement it thoroughly." The

OIC also expected a "just, permanent and comprehensive settlement of the conflict." It

emphasized the urgent need for the release of prisoners of war in accordance with the

49
Geneva Convention through the UN and other relevant international bodies. Thus, the OIC

acknowledged its inability to resolve a major conflict in the Muslim society.15

3.3.5 War On Terror And OIC

September I I attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in

Washington, D.C., considered these attacks as some sort of assaults on Modern, Western,

American, and Liberal values. But most certainly those attacks were not as simple as that.

Therefore, Anderson admits "in reality, the impacts of September 11 were far more

complex and contested than most of them [the authors] individually would likely

recognize." Daniel Philpott argued that the assault on the World Trade Center and the

Pentagon, and the killing of some three thousand civilians on September 11, 2001, was

motivated by a political that regards the Westphalian synthesis as despicably secularized.

This political theology, described by Philpott as "radical Islamic revivalism," began in the

early twentieth century as an internal moral critique of Islamic civilization, one that regards

it as having decayed to a state of barbarism. This is reflective of the theory of "clash of

civilizations" propounded by Samuel P. Huntington. This theory argues that the post-Cold

War era would be dominated by conflicts involving civilizations rather than nation states.

In this literature Islamic civilization emerges as the most potent remaining threat to

building a liberal international order. It may still be debated whether September 11 attacks

were an assault on Western values or the rejection of a secularized international system,

but there is no doubt that since those tumultuous events of September 11 much have been

said and made about the role of Islam and Muslims in the contemporary international

system. Evans points out that it has become a common-place theme in European and North

50
American society that Islam is dedicated to changing Western values. In this regard, he

notes that Islam is presented as a monolithic, proselytizing creed dedicated to undermining,

overturning, and eventually replacing the values that have sustained capital growth on a

global scale. However, the fact remains that Muslims around the world also joined the

chorus of condemnation of September 11 attack. Leading Muslim clerics in Egypt, Iran,

and other parts of the Middle East publicly and in stern language denounced the September

attacks, declaring them to be blatantly incompatible with Islamic religion and indeed with

any conceivable standards of ethics.16

In spite of these denunciations, negative views of Muslims among sections of Westerners

persist. In 2007, a Pew Center survey found that about 43% of Americans viewed Muslims

in positive light but 30% Americans used negative words to describe their impressions of

Muslims. Muslims were described as fanatic, violent and terrorists. Hence the observation

that not much has changed since Lapidus wrote in 1996, that to the Westerners, Islam calls

to mind puritanical holy warriors, fanatics, dervishes, suicide bombers, hijackers, and

human waves thrown into battle. Therefore, it is not surprising that an exasperated Aslam

Syed writes, "Muslim history, culture, religion, and politics are judged not through history

or proper context of their Holy Book but through the dusty clouds that followed the

destruction of the twin towers of the New York City and the attack on the Pentagon in

Washington, D.C." Two members of President George W. Bush's now infamous "Axis of

Evils" were Muslim majority states--Iran and Iraq. Syria has been placed on U.S. State

Department's list of states sponsoring terrorism. Libya also shared a place on that list until

the Tripoli authorities gave up their nuclear weapons and technology in 2003 and handed

them over to the United States. Pakistan has been described as a dishonest partner of the

51
U.S. in the Afghanistan War. Such views give rise to a general impression that the Muslim

majority states are not playing a positive role in international relations.17

3.2.6 Afghanistan and OIC

Afghanistan was one of the countries that put the foundation of OIC. During the Arab-

Israel war Afghanistan issued statements in support of the Arabs. After the Soviet invasion

of Afghanistan, Afghan-OIC relations improved and besides condemning Soviet

aggression, OIC provided Afghan Mujahedeen and Migrants with numerous aids.18

After withdrawal of the soviet force from Afghanistan, OIC made efforts to solve the

Afghan issue (civil war) but unfortunately was failed in its efforts. After the collapse of the

Taliban regime, OIC could not do anything about US attacks on Afghanistan and in thus

regard it did not declare its stance.19

After intensification of war and insecurity in Afghanistan, OIC several times suggested

peaceful settlement of the Afghan issue; therefore, it opened its office in Kabul in 2011,

but it is yet to play a significant role in the Afghan issue.20

3.2.7 Iran-Saudi Arabia Crisis And OIC

The relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran as it is evolving today appears to

incorporate elements of both sectarian confrontation and pragmatic rapprochement. As in

earlier periods (e.g., before the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and during the warming of

relations in the mid1990s), the two countries are showing their ability to reach an

accommodation on regional order while minimizing deeper ideological and structural

52
tensions. This hybrid approach plays out in different ways throughout the regions where

the two countries come into contact—in Iraq, the Gulf, and the Levant.21

Since 2003, the fundamental driver of the relationship is a struggle to shape the regional

balance of power. Each state sees the expansion of regional influence by the other as a net

loss for itself, whether in Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq, or the Gulf littoral. This game of

geopolitics is aided by the fact that the regional landscape is defined by weak states and

contending local factions that invite outside meddling. In many cases, these factions line

up along the Shi’a-Sunni divide, and thus Saudi and Iranian patronage invariably

exacerbates a dangerous form of sectarian politics, whether or not this is the original intent

of policymakers in Riyadh and Tehran.22

In maneuvering on this landscape, Saudi Arabia and Iran wield asymmetrical policy tools;

neither is likely to confront the other on the conventional battlefield. Iran is more adept at

backing militant nonstate actors and playing a rejectionist trump card on issues such as

Palestine and the U.S. presence in the region—a tactic that has formed an indirect critique

of U.S.-allied regimes and in particular Gulf states that have adopted increasingly

accommodating stances toward Israel. For its part, Saudi Arabia brings to bear greater

financial resources, control of pan-Arab media outlets, and the backing of the region’s key

external power. However, as we argue in this report, these attributes do not translate into

greater regional legitimacy for the al-Saud or unwavering Arab consensus for Saudi

leadership against Iran. Rather, quite the opposite may be true. Riyadh has therefore been

careful to balance alignment with U.S. initiatives with its own unilateral diplomacy—both

53
for symbolic reasons and because it has increasingly perceived U.S. policy toward Iran to

be in disarray.23

However, inter-state tensions between member states have caused many problems. Saudi

Arabia and Iran both are an integral part of the OIC. Both also vie for regional supremacy.

Tensions between both the countries have always existed, but recently, they have hit an all-

time high. Anybody studying the architecture of the ongoing conflicts in the Middle East

would not be surprised at Saudi Arabia announcing the severing of diplomatic relations

with Iran in the aftermath of the burning of the Saudi embassy in Tehran by violent

protestors, who were demonstrating against the execution of Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr. In a

domino effect, Gulf countries and Saudi allies broke off or downgraded their relations with

Tehran, including Kuwait, the UAE and even Sudan. Recently, Iran’s supreme leader

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei issued an angry rebuke to “blasphemous” Saudi Arabia, calling

on the Muslim world to question its management of Islam’s holiest sites ahead of Hajj

2016. In response, Saudi Arabia's top cleric stated that Iranians are “not Muslims”.

Consequently, after the two regional rivals failed to agree on security and logistics, for the

first time in nearly three decades, Iran’s 64,000 pilgrims did not attend the hajj in Saudi

Arabia. Unfortunately, OIC has been silent since the crisis emerged between the two.

However, in this crisis most member of the OIC are siding Saudi Arabia so that’s why the

OIC’s role is negligible in this regard, and OIC didn’t take any serious action to take them

to a peace table.24

54
3.3 Some Examples of failure of the Organization of the Islamic Cooperation are
given below in short points;

 Lack of Cohesion and Unity— Inter-state differences among Member States; Shia-

Sunni conflict; contentious foreign policy; Western influence; territorial disputes

and intra-Arab conflicts have eclipsed OIC’s efficacy.

 Rising Islamophobia— In the West, Islam is (wrongly) perceived as a threat to

Western values such as liberalism, democracy, individualism, women emancipation,

etc. The OIC has failed to counter this flawed and bogged narrative

 Terrorism and Fundamentalism — These burning issues of the modern world have

stigmatized the image of Islam. Growing incidence of violence, suicide attacks,

sectarian cleavages and increasing popularity of the religious-political parties are the

main features of negative Western approach about Islam. The OIC has failed to devise

any effective strategies to curb these.

 Inter- and Intra-state Conflicts— Unresolved conflicts e.g. Arab-Iran-Turk, Libya-

Chad, Armenia-Azerbaijan, Afghanistan-Pakistan are the flagrant examples of OIC’s

failure.

 Deprivation of Human Development — OIC members represent 22 percent of the

world population, but have only 2 percent of the world’s GDP, 1.3 percent of the world

trade and only 1.5 percent of the investments. Twenty-five percent of OIC population

does not have access to medical facilities or safe drinking water. No Muslim country is

in the top list of the Human Development Index or in any other global economic

indicators. But, OIC is still dormant and no proper solutions to these issues have been

carved out yet.

55
 Neglecting Education — The OIC member countries possess 70 percent of the world’s

energy resources and 40 percent of available raw material but their GDP is only 5

percent of the world GDP. Still, Muslim countries miserably lag behind in education

and technology. They produce only 500 PhDs each year as compared to 3,000 in India

and 5,000 in the United Kingdom. None of their educational or research institutions or

centers of excellence finds place in the top 100 in the world. But, OIC seems

completely oblivious to this fact.25

56
 REFERENCES

1. Quoted in Khalid B. Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan (Boston:

Houghton Mifflin, 1967),64.

2. On the occasion of the First Islamic Surnrnitt Conference in Rabat, India had

expressed its desire to join the OIC which was granted. However, the membership

was cancelled when a non-Muslim appeared to represent Muslims of India at the

conference venue. For details, see Shameem Akhter, "The Rabat Conference,

"Pakistan Horizon XXII (1389/1969),336-340.

3. During the early days of Bangladesh's existence, most official communications

with the Bangladesh authorities were made through the Indian Foreign Office. For

the Secretary General's interview, see Impact International (9 -22 June1972),8-9.

4. Abdullah al-Ahsan, The Organization of the Islamic Conference: An Introduction

to an Islamic Political Institution (Herndon, VA: lIlT, 1988),79.

5. OIC Final Communique of the 12th Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers,

Baghdad, Republic ofIraq, 28 Rajab-3 Shaban1401,1-5 June 1981.Annexv,lCFM/

12-81/FC/1.

6. Majid Khadduri, The Gulf War: The Origins and Implications of the Iraq-Iran

Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 14-28;

7. Ibed.7.

57
8. Ibed,85.

9. Ami Aylon, 2008 "The Iraqi Iranian War," in Crisis and Conflicts in the Middle

East: The Changing Strategy from Iran to Afghanistan, ed.ColinLegurn(NewYork:

Holmes & Meier, 198,36-39.

10. Gary Sick, "Trial by Error: Reflections on the Iran-Iraq War," in Middle East

Journal. Vol. 43,No.2 (Spring 1989),233.

11. The Texts of Letters Exchanged between the Presidents of the Islamic Republic

ofIran and the Republic of Iraq 1990, tr. Maryam Daftari, (Tehran: Institute of

Political and International Studies, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic

Republic of Iran, 1995),10.

12. The translation is of Muhammad Asad, “The Meaning of the Qur 'an” (Gibraltar:

Dar al-Andalus, 1980).

13. Arni Aylon,(1995) "The Iraqi Iranian War," 45 by referring to an interview by the

Saudi Foreign Minister with the American media CBS.

14. Glen Balfour-Paul, "The Prospects for Peace," in The Iran-Iraq War: An Historic,

Economic and Political Analysis (Now York: 8t Martins, Press, 1994),

15. Majid Khadduri,(1989). The Gulf War: The Origins and Implications of the Iraq-

Iran Conflict, 80-81.

58
16. OIC Final Communique of the 12th Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers,

Baghdad, Republic of Iraq, 28 Rajab-3 Shaban1401,1-5 June 1981.Annexv,lCFM/

12-81/FC/1.

17. Al-Ahsan, The Organization of the Islamic Conference: An Introduction to an

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19. Meena, “Saudi Arabia: Buying Food Security With Petrodollars”,

16June2008:http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/saudi_arabia_buying_food_security

_petrodollars.

20. Tanvir Ahmad Khan, "Gulf-Pakistan Relations: A Political Perspective",in Faryal

Leghari (ed.) Gulf-Pakistan Strategic Relations (Dubai, Gulf Research Center,

2008): 23-50.

21. Varma, K J M. “Pak disapproves Saudi King’s comments on

India’s.OICentry”:http://www.rediff.com/news/2006/jan/23saudi1.htm.

22. BabriMosque:OIC”,IslamicVoice,January2001:http://www.islamicvoice.com/janua

ry.2001/news.htm.

23. Hardy, Rogers. “Migrants demand labour rights in Gulf”, BBC

News(London),February27,2008:http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7266610.s

tm.

59
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Center, 2008): 23-24

25. Wilson, T. 2009. Extending the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mendanao to Moro

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 BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Abdullah al-Ahsan, The Organization of the Islamic Conference: An Introduction

to an Islamic Political Institution (Herndon, VA: lIlT, 1988),79.

2. Arni Aylon,(1995) "The Iraqi Iranian War," 45 by referring to an interview by the

Saudi Foreign Minister with the American media CBS.

3. Al-Ahsan, The Organization of the Islamic Conference: An Introduction to an

Islamic Political Institution (Herndon, VA: lIlT, 1988),81.

4. Arni Aylon,(1995) "The Iraqi Iranian War," 45 by referring to an interview by the

Saudi Foreign Minister with the American media CBS.

5. BabriMosque:OIC”,IslamicVoice,January2001:http://www.islamicvoice.com/janua

ry.2001/news.htm.

6. During the early days of Bangladesh's existence, most official communications

with the Bangladesh authorities were made through the Indian Foreign Office. For

the Secretary General's interview, see Impact International (9 -22 June1972),8-9.

7. For the complete text of the OIC peace proposal, see"Text: the OIC Peace

Proposals," in Impact (March 27 -April 9, 1981).

8. Faryal Leghari. ”Gulf-Pakistan Strategic Relations” (Dubai, Gulf Research

Center, 2008): 23-24.

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9. Ibed.7

10. Ibed. 85.

11. Glen Balfour-Paul, "The Prospects for Peace," in The Iran-Iraq War: An Historic,

Economic and Political Analysis (Now York: 8t Martins, Press, 1994),

12. Gary Sick, "Trial by Error: Reflections on the Iran-Iraq War," in Middle East

Journal. Vol. 43,No.2 (Spring 1989),233.

13. Hardy, Rogers. “Migrants demand labour rights in Gulf”, BBC

News(London),February27,2008:http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7266610.s

tm.

14. Janardhan, “Gulf eyes oil-for-food pacts”, Asia Times (Hong Kong) June 21, 2008.

15. J.M. Abdulghani, Iraq & Iran: The Years of Crisis (London: Croom Helm,

1984),1-7.

16. Majid Khadduri, The Gulf War: The Origins and Implications of the Iraq-Iran

Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 14-28.

17. Meena, “Saudi Arabia: Buying Food Security With

Petrodollars”,16June2008;http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/saudi_arabia_buying_f

ood_security_petodollars.

18. Majid Khadduri,(1989). The Gulf War: The Origins and Implications of the Iraq-

Iran Conflict”, 80-81.

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19. OIC Final Communique of the 12th Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers,

Baghdad, Republic of Iraq, 28 Rajab-3 Shaban1401,1-5 June 1981.Annexv,lCFM/

12-81/FC/1.

20. On the occasion of the First Islamic Surnrnitt Conference in Rabat, India had

expressed its desire to join the OIC which was granted. However, the membership

was cancelled when a non-Muslim appeared to represent Muslims of India at the

conference venue. For details, see Shameem Akhter, "The Rabat Conference,

"Pakistan Horizon XXII (1389/1969),336-340.

21. Quoted in Khalid B. Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan (Boston:Houghton

Mifflin, 1967),64.

22. Tanvir Ahmad Khan, "Gulf-Pakistan Relations: A Political Perspective",in Faryal

Leghari (ed.) Gulf-Pakistan Strategic Relations (Dubai, Gulf Research Center,

2008): 23-50.

23. Varma, K J M. “Pak disapproves Saudi King’s comments on India’s OIcentry”:

http://www.rediff.com/news/2006/jan/23saudi1.htm.

24. Wilson, T. 2009. Extending the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mendanao to Moro

Islamic Liberation Front a Catalyst for Peace. Kansas: School of Advanced

Military Studies.

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 CHAPTER 4

RECOMMENDATIONS
 OIC should take serious measures to preach the true concept of Islamic teachings as

Islam is the religion of peace and tolerance. The parties involved in killing

activities and suicide bombing are not performing some religious act or ritual and

the whole nation or Ummah should not be blamed for falsified actions. It has

become a major challenge for OIC to portray the true image of Islamic teachings in

member and non-member states alike so that they could practice Islam in true spirit

and non-Muslims may get the true picture of Islamic teaching. Any movement

proved involved in extremism and terrorist activities should be penalized. False

propaganda should be strictly controlled and only authentic information should be

broadcast.

 The last OIC summit held in Putrajaya, Malaysia in 2003 was a milestone in the

history of the OIC. Under the dynamic leadership of then Prime Minister Mahathir

Mohammad, the leaders decided to make a realistic appraisal of the international

situation and the role that the OIC could play to preserve and protect the interests of

member-states against a sustained negative media campaign and political pressures

circumscribing their economic and political rights. It was decided to

dispassionately analyses the causes of decline and decay of Muslim societies and

the political marginalization of the member-states, and evolve a comprehensive

strategy to pull them out of this morass. These are remarkable words, the OIC must

act upon this and implement it.

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 The OIC needs to recognize its responsibility. It must acknowledge its duty to its

member states by contributing to lasting solutions to their conflicts. The OIC

should realize that it is mediating not only to benefit these countries, but also to

justify its existence and long-term interest in functioning as a forum for member

states to meet and work to solve their problems.

 Emulate and implement universal good practices including combating corruption,

and promoting accountability and transparency in the public and private sectors.

 Study good practices among OIC members on governance including ways of

promoting capacity building among less developed OIC countries.

 Strengthen democracy, civil society, political participation and respect for human

rights.

 Members should increase activity of member states in the UN and other

organizations.

 OIC should support candidates of member countries to positions in international

organizations.

 Should increase activity in the UN reform process including endeavors to seek

adequate representation in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC);

 More proactive coordination should be made to promote the just causes of the

occupied Muslim peoples.

 OIC should improve the situation of Muslim communities/minorities outside OIC

membership.

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 OIC should draw up a plan for OIC unity to gradually integrate in the future like

other regional entities which could enable Ummah to meet the challenges and

demands of globalization in the 21stcentury.

 Promote Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) and develop a system of

collective security that all Muslim countries could bind themselves together

internationally to avoid border disputes and conflict.

 OIC should reactivate the decision to establish an Islamic Court of Justice.

 Check the tendency of a fringe within the Ummah to resort to terrorism and

violence through various means, including: Encouraging interpretations of Islam

which emphasize peace and non-violence and popularizing principles or programs

which promote a balanced, contemporary comprehensive and inclusive Islamic

civilization.

 Address poverty eradication through measures such as capacity building, micro

credit schemes, small and medium enterprises and land reform among other

programs.

 OIC should promote economic cooperation and coordination among member

countries to enable them to plan and sustainably manage their environment and

natural resources efficiently, leading eventually to greater economic integration.

 Sign and ratify all existing intra-OIC trade and economic agreements.

 Encourage economic regional integration and development through free trade

agreements, customs unions, common markets and other activities aimed at

enhancing intra OIG trade and development.

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  Promote endeavors for institutionalized cooperation between OIC members and

UN, Islamic Development Bank, World Bank, World Trade Organization, and G-8.

 Secretary General should be a member of the board of governors of the Islamic

Development Bank (lDB).

 Should strengthen understanding and interpretation of the Muslim faith and religion

to improve its image and understanding by others.

 Should consider an appropriate media strategy including the engagement of

professional entities to improve the image of Islam and Muslims in the west and

other parts of non-Muslim world;

 Should establish a working relationship and better coordination between the

Information Department of the OIC and national media of Member States.

4.1 OIC Charter

 OIC must be restructured, reformed and revitalized including necessary changes in

OIC charter and its name.

 Maintenance of criteria for membership to preserve and promote its Islamic

character.

4.2 Office of the Secretary General

 OIC Secretary General’s role should both be strengthened and fully supported. He

should be given the full authority both to employ and terminate the services of OIG

personnel including restructuring existing departments.

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  OIC General Secretariat should recruit officials on merit, nominated by those

Member States, which make regular contributions and should be offered attractive

financial incentives.

 The Secretary General of OIC should consider appointing his Special

Representatives both for fact finding as well as resolution of conflicts/disputes.

OIC’s relations with important international / regional organizations should be

strengthened and fully utilized to actively voice all Muslim causes

4.3 New Departments

 The OIC should renew its emphasis on issues such as conflict resolution; inter-faith

dialogue; human rights; democracy; good governance and combating

Islamophobia, etc.

 The OIC General Secretariat should enhance the capacity of the General Secretariat

through restructuring to deal effectively with subjects such as, Islamic thought;

enlightened moderation, higher education with a focus on science and technology,

health care and women’s development.

 Therefore, the OIC General Secretariat would establish departments of Conflict

Resolution, Enlightened Moderation, Women Development, NGOs and Muslim

Minorities and a Strategic Planning Unit, and Consortium of Higher Education.

 An OIC think tank to promote Islamic thought to respond effectively to ideological

and intellectual challenges of the 21 Century and to interact more proactively with

universities and intellectuals in the West. Members of the think tank should also

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 include personalities who have expert knowledge of the problems of Muslim

communities in their particular regions and countries.

4.4 Restructuring of Existing Departments

 Restructuring of Dawa department and establish Dawa and Islamophobia

department.

 International Islamic News Agency (IINA) should be activated for projection of

OIC position.

 A strong Information Department at the OIC Secretariat should be established to

assist the OIC Secretary General for projection of OIC and updating of the OIC

website.

 Strengthening the Department of Palestine and Jerusalem in the light of new OIC

vision.

4.5 Implementation of Resolutions

 Member States must demonstrate strong political commitment and provide the

requisite financial backing to implement Summit and Ministerial resolutions,

within specified time frame.

 An executive body, comprising Summit and Ministerial Troikas, the OIC host

country and the Secretary General, should be expeditiously established to

implement Summit and Ministerial resolutions. The concerned Member States

should be invited to participate in the deliberations of these meetings.

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  A Council of Permanent Representatives of OIC member states in Jeddah should be

established for an effective coordination, implementation and follow – up.

4.6 Some others recommendations are given in points below as well;

 Pluralistic norms; promotion of accountability and transparency; and promotion of

human rights are significant political traits for the refinement of this legal body.

 Promotion of CBM’s (confidence- building measures) conflict prevention and

conflict management strategies should be followed to release ethnic, sectarian and

racial tensions are needed.

 Collective security system and counter-terrorism strategies would increase the

value of OIC in the eyes of Western world which have tarnished or abused the true

image of Islam.

 Moreover, OIC should establish its own Muslim Court of Justice on the line of

International Court of Justice to resolve their contentions.

 There should be the formulation and execution of sustainable economic policies—

capacity- building, micro credit schemes, intra-state trade and optimal use of

resources—minerals, human resource, fiscal resources to eradicate economic and

social miseries among member states.

 Budgetary allocation should be made to work on research and development, science

and technology, and academic opportunities. A consortium should be developed for

the spread of education in form of universities and scholarships.

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 OIC must establish its media channel to represent the true image of the Muslim

world.

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 CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION
This research is based on” the Role of the OIC in the Muslim World”. Organization of

Islamic Cooperation (OIC) is the second largest intergovernmental organization after the

193-member United Nations in terms of membership and is mantle of collective voice of

the Muslim world. The Organization has the mandate to safeguard and protect the interests

of the Muslim states in the spirit of promoting international peace and harmony. On

August 21, 1969, Dennis Michael Rohan, an Australian Jew, set on fire the southeastern

wing of the holy Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem, burning Salahudddin’s Pulpit and

destroying approximately one-third of the total area. Israeli occupying forces cut off the

water supply and prevented the fire engines from arriving on time to extinguish the fire.

This watershed event in Muslim history necessitated the formulation of an organization for

pragmatic handling of any such situation in future. Hence, on 12th Rajab 1389 Hijra (25

September 1969), the Organization of Islamic Conference was established upon a decision

of the historic summit held in Rabat, Kingdom of Morocco. The meeting was the first

unified expression of the Muslim Ummah of its determination to safeguard its interests,

speak with one voice and ensure the progress and well- being of the Muslims in the world.

The bloc changed its name to Organization of the Islamic Cooperation on 28 June 2011

during the 38th Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in Astana, Kazakhstan.

It was prevailed that, OIC would bring solidarity among Muslim states and would make

strong economic, social, cultural and technological connections among its member states.

However, across the world the Muslims are accused of sponsoring terrorism and

extremism in this regards OIC didn’t take concrete steps to present the true and pure shape

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of Muslims and Islam. Although there are interstate crisis and conflict among its member

states includes Syrian crisis, Iran-Saudi crisis, Kashmir issue, Iran-Iraq war and Palestine

issue and Afghanistan crisis as well. Organization of the Islamic Cooperation since its

establishment has been passed many resolutions to solve the problems of the Muslim world

but all in vain.

To make it strong and solid, the member states of OIC should take some concrete steps.

The OIC needs to recognize its responsibility. It must acknowledge its duty to its member

states by contributing to lasting solutions to their conflicts. It should establish a media

channel to preach the true image of the Islamic religion and play vital role in establishing

cultural, social and technological connections among member states. Moreover, it should

make stronger institutions to solve the issues between the member states without any

hesitations. It should make an executive parliament and court and make it powerful will be

proved benefit for the organization in the upcoming years.

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