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Airport system analysis: a probabilistic risk

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 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF SYSTEMS APPLICATIONS, ENGINEERING & DEVELOPMENT
Issue 2, Volume 2, 2008

the surrounding area so, people who lives in that area are Authority, provides sufficient assurance for th general public
unconsciously exposed to aircraft accidents risk. Actually, to use the services without having to worry about doing their
local risk levels are higher than might be expected. In fact, own risk assessments of the transport infrastructure before
even if it is true that the accident per flight index is very low deciding how to travel [31].
(typically 1 per 106), statistics demonstrate that accidents Currently, were moving to a wide adoption of Safety
mostly happen during take-off and landing phases and hence, Management Systems (SMS) which need to undertake risk
close to the airport (Fig. 2). assessment activities, either qualitative or quantitative.
As an example in the UK, the Civil Aviation Authority
Taxi, Climb
load,
Take- Initial
(flaps Cruise Desc.
Initial Final
Land.
(CAA) describes the means of implementation of SMS by an
off climb appr. app.
parked up) aircraft operator [8]. Risk assessment is an essential part of
Accidents 5% 12% 5% 8% 6% 3% 7% 6% 45%
such a system, and CAP712 therefore includes a risk
Fatalities 0% 8% 14% 25% 12% 8% 13% 16% 2% tolerability matrix for use when quantifying risk.
Exposure = % of flight
time based on flight TABLE 1 - WORLD WIDE AIR TRAFFIC
duration of 1,5 hours
(BLN. PASSENGERS/KM, NO CHARTER FLIGHTS), ICAO, 2006.

Effective Expected
1% 1% 14% 57% 11% 12% 3% 1% Air Company
and Mean Annual
1995 2005 2006 2007 2008
Geographic Area Variation (%)

Fig. 2 - Statistical Summary of Commercial Jet Airplane Accidents, Boeing, Africa 49,9 84,8 5,4 90,7 96,4 101,9
2005.
Asia/Pacific 556,5 967,4 5,7 1036,1 1105,5 1176,3

Europe 565,4 1004,9 5,9 1070,2 1136,6 1204,8

Moreover, the low probability of an accident per movement
Middle East 66,9 168,9 9,7 189,2 209,0 228,9
if combined with the high number of flight operations
(typically several hundreds of thousands) may suggest the North American 900,6 1334,5 4,0 1394,6 1454,5 1517,1
Latin America/
probability of one accident to be higher than we could expect. Carribean
108,9 159,2 3,9 167,2 175,0 182,4

Risk level around large airports are, in effect, of the same
order as those associated with participation in road traffic.
An increase in airport capacity usually involves changes to
runways layout, route structures and traffic distribution, which
in turn effect the risk level around the airport. For these
reasons third party risk becomes an important issue in airports
development.
In the late 90’s the world’s airline fleet consisted of more
than 15.000 aircraft, flying a network of approximately 15
million km and serving nearly 10.000 airports. The sector
directly employed more than 3.3 million people, with over 1.4
million in USA (Table 1) [3]. About 12 billion people and 23
million tonnes of freight are being moved annually. The
freight part represents approximately one third of value of the
world’s manufactured exports.
A variety of international institutions, organisations and
agencies deal with forecasting future trends, including
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and
International Air Transport Association (IATA). The airspace
manufacturers such as Airbus Industry, Boeing and Rolls
Royce also make projections.
Historically, when there has been relatively rapid growth in
air transport, it has often been followed by a series of
accidents. The occurrence of such events has stimulated the
introduction of technical and operational measures. As a
result, overall safety has improved over time. However
technical and technological limits are near to be reached and
this is demonstrated by the slowdown of aviation safety
improvements in the last few decades [35]. A formal risk
assessment carried out by the service providers, with support
from equipment suppliers, and accepted by a Regulatory
53
WORLD 2248,2 3719, 5,2 3947,8 4177,0 4411,2
The discipline of risk assessment has been applied in the
aircraft systems as required for aircraft certification under
FAR23, FAR25 in U.S.A and under EASA Certification
Specification (CS)-23/25 in Europe. Techniques to
accomplish safety assessment are quoted by the SAE in their
Aerospace Recommended Practice (ARP)-4761.
Flight Operations Risk Assessment System, known as
FORAS [16], is a risk management tool to “encode” human
knowledge about a type of risk. The FORAS methodology
employs a fuzzy expert system to identify the factors which
have the greatest impact on overall risk.
A different approach has been adopted by Kawasaki [25]
who developed the Aviation Safety Risk Model (ASRM). This
system is based upon the Human Factors Analysis &
Classification System (HFACS) proposed in [35]. HFACS is a
classification scheme which has been developed to capture
and analyze the different types of human error that may occur.
The framework draws on [27], in which was developed the so-
called “Swiss-cheese” model of accident causation. ASRM
was originally developed for military use (US Naval
Aviation), but it has been used more widely within the
aviation industry. The ASRM uses Bayesian Belief Networks
to model the uncertainty within the model, using either data or
the opinion of “experts”.
An additional technique has been adopted by Bazargan and
Ross [5]. They used the proportional occurrence of causal
factors obtained from accidents reports, where fatalities or
serious injuries were reported. These information are then
combined with experts judgments on the relative importance
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of the flight attributes using the Analytical Hierarchy Process the fact that there is risk if there exists a potential source of
(AHP) by Thomas Saaty. damage, or hazard. When an hazard exists (e.g. a system
The purpose of this paper is to describe and analyze safety which in certain conditions may cause undesired
issues in airports paying attention to the following aspects: consequences), safeguards are typically devised to prevent the
occurrence of such hazardous conditions and its associated
• a strategic approach to improve airport safety, which undesired consequences.
includes the use of failure and hazard analysis
techniques and fast time simulation modeling; TABLE 2 - LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATE GUIDE
LIKELIHOOD
• safety of land side operations; RATING
DEFINITION
• certification aspects. Is expected to occur in most circumstances.
A Almost Certain
(100/year)
To avoid subjective interpretations and to increase model Will probably occur in most circumstances.
B Likely
(10/year)
accuracy, however, risk information were colleted turning to
Might occur at some time.
data records and statistically analyzed. Results were used to C Possible
(1/year)
draw risk contour maps so to provide a guide to local and Could occur at some time.
D Unlikely
national authorities, to population who live around the airport (1/10 years)
and to airports operators. May occur only in exceptional circumstances.
E Rare
(1/100 years)
The paper is organized as follows: in Section II some
definitions will be provided about risk management and risk TABLE 3 - CONSEQUENCE ESTIMATE GUIDE
assessment specifying some terms used in the civil aviation CONSEQUENCE
DEFINITION
field; in Section III gathered data will be analyzed using some RATING
safety data records and arranged in some useful tables; in Risk impact would be negligible or no risk
1 Insignificant impact can be identified to community or
Section IV the probabilistic model will be presented and
business.
remarked. Risk impact would result in few consequences,
2 Minor such as minor disruption to community and/or
II. DEFINITIONS business, but of limited overall consequence.
Risk impact would result in some
A risk is “the combination of the probability, or frequency, 3 Moderate consequences, such as short-term disruption to
of occurrence of a defined hazard and the magnitude of the community and/or business.
consequences of the occurrence” [8]. Risk impact would result in serious
The combination of these parameters determinates a two 4 Major consequences, such as medium-term disruption
dimensional quantity. So, if the risk is to be reduced, it can be to community and/or business.
Risk impact would result in disastrous
either be done on the severity axis, on the likelihood axis, or
5 Catastrophic consequences, such as long-term disruption to
considering both of these dimensions. The last approach may community and/or business.
be considered the best one to risk reduction.
For natural hazards such as an earthquake, typically we However, the presence of an hazard does not suffice itself
cannot do anything to reduce the likelihood, but there is much to define a condition of risk. Indeed, there is the possibility
that can be done to reduce the consequences: special building that the hazard evolves from potential to actual damage. Thus,
regulations can be put in place and “earthquake kits” can be the notion of risk involves some kind of loss or damage that
pre-distributed to inhabitants. Alternatively, there is much that might be received and the uncertainty of its transformation in
can be done to reduce the chances of happening of a mid–air an actual loss or damage so:
collision of two aircraft: the air traffic control system and on-
board radars deal with monitoring and maintaining both Risk = Damage + Uncertainty
vertical and horizontal separation.
Generally speaking, risk assessment procedure aims [30]: This qualitative analysis is reflected in various dictionary
definitions of risk, such as: “possibility of loss or injury and
• to derive the likelihood value and the severity of the degree of probability of such loss”.
consequences value for each hazard; However, let x and p respectively be a given damage and
• to use gathered information as a means of prioritizing the probability of receiving such damage. From a quantitative
actions, for example i.e. which hazard is more time point of view, a measure of the associated risk R is:
consuming and should be tackled as first one?;
• to specify mitigating features as appropriate to each R = x⋅ p (1)
hazard;
• to predict the effectiveness of those features in
In practice, the perception of risk is such that the relevance
reducing the risk.
given to the damage x is far greater than that one given to its
probability of occurrence p so that (1) is slightly modified to:
A first, intuitive definition of the term “risk”, comes from
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R = p ⋅ x , k >1
k
By so doing, numerically larger values of risk are
associated to larger consequences.
Fig. 3 – A simple scheme to evaluate risk magnitude and likelihood, European
Cooperation for Space Standardization [29]
When considering complex systems, the above quantitative
definitions must be extended to account for the fact that
typically more than one undesirable events exist and could
happen. With n undesirable events associated with the
considered activity, with a part of a given system or with a
specified worker (composite risk), (1) changes in:
n we will refer to them simply as risk of accident. In the case in
R = ∑ xt ⋅ pt
t =1
and similarly it is done for (2).
These quantitative definitions of risk are easily shown to be
little informative for the purposes of risk analysis, risk
management and regulation definition.
Suppose we’re considering two different systems A and B
and let it be RA = RB as defined by (1). Let the risk of A be due
to a potentially large consequence xA occurring with small
probability pA and vice-versa for the risk of B. Then, if we
wish to act on the design, operation and regulation of the two
systems in order to reduce the associated risks, we will act
differently knowing the different nature of the risk in those
cases. To reduce RA we would implement mitigation and
restraining systems/politics which to limit its consequences
(protection), on the contrary, if we were to reduce RB we
would allocate additional redundancies and improve the
reliability of the components so to reduce the probability of an
accident (prevention). Thus, if we simply know the value of R,
we may not be effective in reducing it by limiting its
probability or by mitigating its consequences; hence, the
importance of keeping separate the two terms of the risk, p
and x. The situation is, naturally, worse in the case of the
composite risk. Note also that, generally speaking, a good
approach to risk reduction is: prevention, mitigation,
protection, residual risk management. Finally, an informative
(2) and operative definition of risk should allow answering the
following questions:
• Which sequences of undesirable events transform the
hazard into an actual damage?
• What is the probability of each of these sequences?
• What are the consequences of each of these
sequences?
The risk is, then, defined in terms of a set of triplets:
R = {( St , Pt , X t )} (3)
where si is the sequence of undesirable events leading to
damage, pi is the associated probability and xi is the
consequence.
In relationship to the kind of event, it is possible to define
three typologies of risk:
• Conventional risks: they are relative to very frequent
events and they interest one or two people;
• Specific risks: they are relative to continuous or
frequent events with modest damages in brief times;
• Great potential risks: they are connected to very rare
events with serious damages.
The last category is the object of the proposed model and
(3) which the risk index was higher than a specified threshold,
some actions will be highlighted to attenuate its value
accordingly to the previously mentioned approach.
In this paper, events are classified according to the
definitions furnished by the National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB) and the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO):
• Airplane accident: this is an occurrence associated
with the operation of an aircraft where as a result of
the operation of an aircraft, any person (either inside
or outside the aircraft) receives fatal or serious injury
or any aircraft receives substantial damage. The
occurrence is also not caused by the deliberate action
of one or more persons and that leads to damage or
injury;
• Hull loss (Serious Incident): An aircraft damaged to
the extent that it is not economically feasible to repair
it. This would include aircraft that are destroyed or
aircraft that are missing.;
• Substantial damage (Incident): Damage or structural
failure that negatively affects an aircraft’s structural
strength, performance, or flying characteristics, and
which would require significant repair or
replacement of the affected component or system.
Substantial damage excludes damage to landing gear,
55
 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF SYSTEMS APPLICATIONS, ENGINEERING & DEVELOPMENT
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wheels, tires, and flaps. It also excludes bent
aerodynamic fairings, dents in the aircraft skin, small
punctures in the aircraft skin, ground damage to
propeller blades, or damage to only a single engine;
• Fatal accident: An accident that results in fatal
injury;
• Fatal injury: An injury that results in death within 30
days as a result of an accident;
• Serious injury: An injury sustained in an accident
that:
9 Requires hospitalization for more than 48 hours
that begins within 7 days of the date of injury;
9 Results in a fracture of any bone (except simple
fractures of fingers, toes, or nose);
9 Produces lacerations that result in severe
hemorrhages or nerve, muscle, or tendon
damage;
9 Involves injury to any internal organ;
9 Involves second or third degree burns over 5%
or more of the body;
9 Involves verified exposure to infectious
substance or injurious radiation.
Moreover, when building a large system from a number of
smaller ones we find that many of the hazards arise from the
intra-system interfaces [30].
When performing a risk assessment, then, we can start
identifying those interfaces and the hazards arising from them.
Where a system is made up of subsystems from different
suppliers their domains of influence also need to be
considered. An airport has a lot of interfaces with outside
world: air traffic control has radio and telephones, there are
navigational aids that communicate with aircraft (instrumental
landing systems), there are road/rail links, etc. We will
consider only one airside interface, the runway (Fig. 4): which
is the interface between the air navigation system and the
ground handling area.
Fig. 4 – Perth airport runway
56
III. SAFETY DATA RECORDS
The airport risk assessment includes a series of connected
activity:
• events historical analysis;
• accident frequencies determination;
• magnitude and the risk evaluation.
Information were acquired investigating:
• aircraft accidents causes;
• accident location;
• accident consequences.
In terms of data used in this phase, one the most regular
sources of accident data is the Statistical Summary of
Commercial Jet Accidents [6]. This data represents
information drawn from worldwide aircraft operations from
1959 to 2003. It presents data on the types of accidents and
the phase of flight in which they occurred. Similar reports are
available from the UK CAA Safety Regulation Group, which
has produced reports containing data drawn from accident and
incident sources world-wide, in the Global Fatal Accident
Review CAP681 [7]. This report is significant in that it
contains judgments of the causal factors of each fatal accident
to aircraft >5.7 tonnes. It also contains circumstantial factors
which could have had a bearing on each accident.
So, accident data are obtained, when available, from
government accident reports. Otherwise, information is
solicited from operators, manufacturers, various government
and private information services (Table 4).
Such information is inferred by a historical analysis of the
events, making reference to:
1. local files (ANSV);
2. world files (AAIB, AAIU; ATSB; NTSB; TSB, etc.).
In order to structure a tool which could allow a brief, but
exhaustive, description of the analyzed data and could be a
useful support to record the first news of our investigations, a
report has been compiled (Fig. 5).
In this report the ID_NUMBER is the code of the analyzed
report whereas the field DATE AND HOUR indicates the date
and the time in which the accident has happened (in
conformity with the prescriptions of the ICAO Annex 13, it is
express in local or coordinated universal schedule UTC,
Universal Time Coordinated). LOCATION is the place in
which the accident is occurred and AIRCRAFT_ID is the
typology of aircraft interested by the accident (in our case
commercial airplanes such as: Boeing, Airbus, Mac Douglas).
The field CLASS indicates the class of the aircraft defined
in relationship to its maximum take-off weight (MTOW),
identified by the following letters:
• A: aircrafts with MTOW < 6.750 Kg with only one
 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF SYSTEMS APPLICATIONS, ENGINEERING & DEVELOPMENT
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engine;
• B: aircrafts with MTOW < 6.750 Kg and two • run off: it is frequent in the case of long landing or
engines; aborted take-off;
• C: aircrafts with 6.750 kg < MTOW < 136.000 kg; • veer off: it is relative to an aircraft side off and can
• D: aircrafts with MTOW > 136000 Kg and more than happen both in take-off phase and landing. It can be
two engines. due to a high value of the transverse component of
the wind, to a mechanical breakdown, etc;
TABLE 4 – THE 15 WORST AVIATION DISASTERS (2007-1995), BOEING • short landing: it happens when an airplane touch the
STATISTICS
ground before the runway threshold. It is mainly due
Fatal Date Location Carrier Type to bad meteorological conditions;
349 11/12/1996 New Delhi, India Saudi / Kazastan B747 / Il76 • run incursion: it occurs both in take-off phase and
Islamic Revolution's
landing phase. It can concern both aircrafts or other
275 02/19/2003 Shahdad, Iran Il-76MD
Guards Co. vehicles.
265 11/12/2001 Queens, New York American Airlines A300
Buah Nabar, Garuda Indonesia
234 09/26/1997 A300
Indonesia Airlines
East Moriches, New
230 07/17/1996 Trans World Airlines B747
York
Off Nova Scotia,
229 09/02/1998 Swissair MD11
Canada
228 08/06/1997 Agana, Guam Korean Airlines B747

227 01/08/1996 Kinshasa, Zaire African Air AN32

225 05/25/2002 Off Penghu, Taiwan China Airlines B747

Nantucket,
217 10/31/1999 EgyptAir B767
Massachusetts
203 02/16/1998 Taipei, Taiwan China Airlines A300

199 07/17/2007 Sao Paulo, Brazil TAM Brazil A320

189 09/11/2001 Arlington, Virginia American Airlines B757

Puerto Plata, Alas Nacionales
189 02/06/1996
Dominican Republic (Birgenair)
170 08/22/2006 Donetsk, Ukraine Pulkovo Airlines
FLIGHT_CONDITIONS are the meteorological conditions
before and during the event distinguished in:
• VFR (Visual Flight Rules): it deals with a flight
performed with the visual references aid. Naturally
the possibility to effect visual flights is possible only
when there’s enough visibility (VMC, Visual
Meteorological Condition). In the checked aerial
spaces the least VMCs are: flight visibility in 8 Km,
distance from the clouds 1,5 Km in horizontal
direction and 300 m in vertical direction. In Italy the
visual flight rules are forbidden on the night time and
the flight have to sustain under the 600 ms of height,
cannot be landed in VFR with visibility to the ground
lesser than 8 Km and with ceiling lesser than 450m;
• IFR (Instrument Flight Rules): when the flight is
performed using radiofrequency aids (VOR, NDB,
DME, TACAN, etc.).
In the field MANOUVRE_CONDITIONS the maneuvers
that the aircraft was performing during the accident are
reported (landing and takeoff in IFR or VFR conditions, taxi,
etc.). The EVENT_TYPE is the typology of aircraft accident:
Fig. 5 - A synthetic scheme to collect a principal factors concerning aircraft
accident
B757
Tu-154M In the field FLIGHT PLAN there’s a synthetic description
of the flight plan performed by the plane. Particularly it
records the departure airport and his id code, intermediary
airports, the destination airport and the flight typology.
METEOROLOGICAL_CONDITIONS are the conditions
recorded in the site of the accident when the event occurred.
Particularly, they regard the presence and height of the clouds,
visibility, wind direction and intensity, precipitation,
temperature and dewy point. In the field SYNTETIC EVENT
DESCRIPTION there’s a brief but exhaustive description of
the accident dynamic. In such description they are underlined:
• in the landing phase, the touchdown point in which
the accident happened and the stop point in which the
aircraft or eventually major debris were reinvented;
• in the take-off phase, the point in which the airplane
withdrew its gears, the point in which the accident
happened and the stop point in which the aircraft or
eventually major debris were reinvented.
In this report the PROBABLE CAUSES that caused the
accident were reported too. In Table II a database built on
1,843 events involving commercial aircraft, world-wide, for
which a specific cause is known is reported. Military, private
plane, helicopter and small air taxi accidents are not included.
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Essentially we refer to human factors, mechanical factors or allows a precise approach without any decision
environmental factors. Even if these factors are not height and a RVR between 200 and 50 meters;
interdependent, they can interact. The reduction in accidents • the pavement conditions during the accident. To
attributable to human errors is not as much as function of define aforesaid conditions we referred to the ICAO
interventions aimed at aircrew, as it is improvements made to terminology. The followings terms have been used:
the aircraft. After all, it is known that the opportunities for
human errors considerably grow up when a mechanical failure 9 damp, to point out that the surface showed
occurs. So, it would appear that many of the interventions changes of color because of the damp;
aimed at reducing the occurrence or consequence of human 9 wet, to point out that the surface is full water,
errors have not been as effective as those directed at but there is no puddles;
mechanical failures [35] 9 water patches, to point out that on the surface
However, mechanical and environmental factors are they were visible puddles;
obviously unchangeable in the brief period: there’s only the 9 flooded, to point out that on the surface they
possibility to act on human errors applying preventive were visible ample zones covered with water.
measures that aim to reduce the accidents.
In case of some ice on the runway the terms used are: rime
TABLE 5 - CAUSES OF EVENTS (%) or frost, dry snow, wet snow, slush, ice, compacted or ruled
Cause 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s Total snow, frozen ruts or ridges.
Pilot Error 41 37 29 30 31 30 33
The EVENT_SCHETCH is a graphical representation of the
Pilot Error
11 17 15 16 19 19 16 accident in which the points discussed in the synthetic
(weather based )
Pilot Error description of the accident and some photographic
7 3 4 4 6 3 4
(mechanical based) documentation are reported.
Total Pilot Error 59 57 48 50 56 52 53
Other Human Errors 4 7 10 6 7 9 7
Weather 14 11 10 12 9 8 11 A. Experimental analysis: acquisition and elaboration data
Mechanical Failure 20 19 21 21 21 25 21 For each event the proposed report has been compiled.
Sabotage 3 4 9 10 7 6 7 Acquired data allowed to establish that the 46,4% of the 1.174
Other 0 2 2 1 1 0 1 commercial airplanes accidents concerned the airport (58,5%
concerning the RWY, 33,6% concerning the apron and 7,9%
As concern failures typology, the following classification concerning the TWY) and the 18,1% the approach paths.
can be made: As concern risk events typology: 40,1% are accident,
54,7% are incident and 5,2% are serious incident.
• active failures (errors or active drawbacks): errors or From these results emerges that during the taxing
drawbacks that have an immediate negative effect; maneuvers, from and for the runway, and those of standstill in
• latent failures: failures existing before the event. the terminal area, there aren’t human damages if we except for
fear or light injuries. On the other hand, the accidents during
A description of the features interested by the accident is the take-off or landing phases are characterized by an high
reported in the AIRPORT FEATURES INTERESTED field: percentage of injuries and deaths. Indeed, in this paper “apron
RWY, TWY, Apron or also the zone where the accident maneuvers” have not been considered.
occurred, as well as the state in which was found during the Investigating causes of those fatal aircraft accidents is
accident. Some interesting airport features about runways are: difficult because they generally stem from a complex system
of mutually dependent, sequential factors. These factors can
• a synthetic description of the geometric be classified in several ways. At first, according to the current
characteristics: length, width, longitudinal and state-of-knowledge, they can be categorized into:
transversal inclination, presence of stop way and his
dimensions, TORA (Take Off Run Available), TODA • known and avoidable;
(Take Off Distance Available), ASDA (Accelerate • unknown and unavoidable causes.
and Stop Distance Available), LDA (Landing
Distance Available), runway instrumentations, ILS The former should be considered conditionally in the sense
system for landing. Particularly, in relationship to the that immediately after an accident the real causes are seldom
runway visual range and to the decision height, the fully known but as the investigation progresses they become
ILS is divided in ILS of CAT I, it allows a precise known and avoidable. Then, with respect to accident type, the
approach till a height of decision of 60 meters and a main causes can conditionally be classified into:
RVR of the 800m, ILS of 2CAT II, it actually allows
a precise approach till a decision height of 30 meters • human errors;
and a RVR of the of 400 meters, ILS of CAT III, it • mechanical failures;
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Issue 2, Volume 2, 2008
• hazardous weather;
• sabotages or military operations.
Fig. 6 – Aircraft events distribution
Fig. 7 - Distribution of the ICAO events with respect to some airport intra-
systems
Fig. 8 – Distribution of the ICAO events with respect to RWY system
As concern data about the accidents happened on the
runway, a 75% of these ones happen in the landing phase and
the remaining 25% in the take-off phase. Considering the
single maneuvers:
• in the landing phase, the 66% of the accidents are
due to human errors, 20% to mechanical failures and
14% to meteorological conditions;
• in the take-off phase, the 45,5% of the accidents are
due to human error, 45,5% to mechanical failures and
9% to meteorological conditions.
Therefore, while in landing phase the main cause is
59
represented by human errors, in the take-off there’s no
difference between mechanical failures and human errors.
IV. RISK ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY
Data considered in this paper concern commercial aircrafts
involved in runway accidents during take-off or landing
phases. Specifically we’ve not considered:
• the missed collisions on the runway between two
aircrafts or between an aircraft and any other vehicle
on the runway;
• the accidents in the take-off phase that haven’t
brought any harmful effect;
• the accidents in which the aircrafts, during the
landing phase, suffered failures and went out the
runway without any other problem.
The model to assess airport risk around the runway is
composed by three main elements:
• the probability model to evaluate the occurrence of a
particular kind of aircraft accidents;
• the accident location probability model to determine
the frequency of an occurrence in order to evaluate
the index p in (1);
• the accident consequence probability model in order
to evaluate the index x in (1).
A. The aircraft accident probability model
The aim of the paper is to determine a partition of the area
surrounding the runway so to trace some isofrequency lines
characterized by the same aircraft accident probability (as
shown in figure 2).
The model is the result of a careful analysis of the
incidental phenomenon and particularly of the dynamics that
brought to the aircraft accident, both in the take-off and in the
landing phases. Gathered data analysis pointed out some
important variables to be considered in evaluating aircrafts
such as the touchdown point or the point in which there was
the interruption of the take-off phase, the aircraft (or major
debris) stop point. However an accident can occur randomly,
at any time and in any point of the space. Past aircraft
accidents had these features. Therefore it is possible to make a
dicretization of the considered area (the runway and its
surrounding) and to perform a frequency analysis for each
patch (Fig. 9).
Particularly, fixing a Cartesian reference system (x, y) with
the x axis lengthwise fixed on the runway, and y axis
orthogonally fixed at the beginning of the runway, we split the
area determining a squared/rectangular grids. So, it will be
possible to calculate the probability that an airplane (or major
debris), which belongs to the ith class, involved in a generic
accident, will stop in a specific point B (the center of the
generic patch of the grid) if the same airplane touched the
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Issue 2, Volume 2, 2008
ground or aborted the take-off in point A (the center of the
generic patch of the grid).
A
B
Fig. 9 - Discretization of the interested area. Capodichino Airport, Naples
Then we can assume:
ni
PrIi {B} = ⋅ Pr i {I }⋅ Pr i {A}⋅ Pr i {B / A}
∑ ni
where:
ni
• is the percentage of the airplanes belonging
∑ ni
to the ith weight class related that land or take-off
from the considered airport;
ni
• ⋅ Pr i {I } represents the proportion of aircraft
∑ ni
that crashed within the airport surrounding, that run-
off the runway, etc…So, this term represents the
particular type of accident the aircraft may have;
• Pr i {A} is the probability that the airplane belonging
to the ith weight class touches the ground in the
landing phase or aborts the take-off in a point of a
specific patch of the grid represented by the point A;
• Pr i {B / A} is the probability that the airplane
belonging to the ith weight class, departing from the
point A stops (or major debris stoop) in a point of a
specific patch of the grid represented by the point B.
Adding, for each point B, representative of a particular
patch of the grid, the probabilities determined with (4) and
considering each weight class category, cumulative
probabilities are calculated. Finally, the above mentioned
isofrequency lines were obtained enveloping the points
characterized by the same cumulative probability.
Since examined data interested different runways (with
different length and/or width), it was necessary to
adimensionalize distances information. To such purpose we
introduced the "standard runway" with a length of 10.000 ft
and a width of 150 ft. Comparing these dimensions with the
real ones, the scale coefficients (Cx and Cy) have been
obtained and used with the probability scheme. For example
on 11/07/2001 in Fiumicino Airport (Rome) an accident
interested a MD-11 airplane. Runway 16C dimensions were
9.850 ft (length) and 150 ft (width). Dividing these dimensions
by the "standard runway" dimensions it were obtained the
following values: Cx = 1,015, Cy= 1,000.
1) The proportional accident model
This model involves the statistical modeling of the
occurrence of air accidents over time. A Poisson process is
often deployed. Such a process is based on the following
assumptions:
• an event can occur randomly, at any time and in any
point of the space. Past aircraft accidents had these
features: they occurred in a random way in different
countries of the world;
• the occurrence of an event in a given time or space
(4) interval, is independent on what happened in any
other non-overlapping interval. Air accidents, except
very rare mid-air collisions, have occurred as the
series of independent events in time and space;
• the probability of an event occurring in a small
interval Δt is proportional to Δt and can be calculated
by λ · Δt where λ is the mean rate of occurrence of the
event. It is assumed constant and equal to 1/Ta, where
Ta is the average time interval between two
consecutive events. The probability of two or more
occurrences in Δt is negligible.
In Poisson processes the time intervals between two
consecutive events is exponentially distributed, indicating
non-memory properties: this means that future events do not
depend on the number of previous events or on the time in
which previous events happened. This would logically seem
to be the case with air accidents. Mathematically, let T be the
random variable representing the time interval between any
two consecutive events. This variable is exponentially
distributed. The probability that no accident will occur in a
time interval t is:
P (T > t ) ≅ P ( X t = 0 ) = e − λ ⋅t (5)
where, Xt is the number of air accidents in time interval t and λ
is the average accident rate. Similarly, the probability of the
occurrence of at least one event in time t is:
P (T ≤ t ) = 1 − P (T > t ) = P ( X t ≠ 0 ) = 1 − e − λ ⋅t (6)
The probabilistic assessment of accidents uses a sample of
101 accidents over the period 1995 - 2003. The distribution of
the time intervals between these events is shown in Fig. 10.
A simple calculation provides an estimation of the average
accident rate λ = 7.851 accidents per year.
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0 30 60 90 120 150 180 210 240 270 300 330 360

0,8
0,75
0,7
0,65
0,6
Relative number of observation

0,55
0,5
0,45
38 38 Empirical data
0,4
Theoretical data
0,35
0,3
0,25
0,2
14
0,15
0,1 6
4
0,05 0 1 0 0 0 0
0
15 45 75 105 135 165 195 225 255 285 315
The time between the air accidents (days)

Fig. 10 - Distribution of time intervals between consecutive air accidents

(1995 – 2003)

An analysis of the time intervals between accidents,

regardless of the aircrafts type, shows that they are
independent and exponentially distributed (a χ2 test confirms
the hypothesis matching the empirical and theoretical data
Fig. 11 – Touchdown points analysis, partial data.
set):

χ 02.(0510 ) = 16.9191; χ 2 = 15.706 ⇒ χ 2 < χ 02.(0510 ) (7)

So, the observed pattern of accidents can be treated as

Poisson processes. Using the exponential distribution showed
in Fig. 10, it is possible to assess the probability of an air
accident occurrence. If there will be any improvement in
safety features, then this distribution can be used for assessing
the probability of future events.
Fig. 12 – Global touchdown points distribution
2) Model formulation: Pri {A}, landing phase
Sample data relative to touchdown points (Fig. 12, Fig. 12)
is divided in two sub-sets corresponding to C (Fig. 13) and D
(Fig. 14) weight class.
To draw these distributions a fixed number of touchdown
distance intervals has been defined. In order to avoid having
empty intervals (a little number of intervals) or information
loss about the distribution function (an elevated number of
intervals) the number of intervals and their wideness were
defined by the relationships:

k = 1+ 3,3 log10 ni (8)

Fig. 13 – Touchdown points distribution, C weight class
x − xmin
Δx = max (9)
k
where ni is the total number of landings related to the above
mentioned weight aircraft classes.

Fig. 14 - Touchdown points distribution, D weight class

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Some statistical tests (χ2 and Kolomogorov-Smirnov) were e − x x α −1

performed to prove that these distribution could be considered f ( x;α ) = (13)
normal distribution with average and standard deviation
Γ(α )
varying according to the weight class:
1 ⎛ x−μ ⎞ 2
and:
1 − ⎜ ⎟
f ( x) = e 2⎝ σ ⎠
, − ∞ < μ < +∞; σ > 0 (9)
σ 2π • α = 6 for C weight class aircrafts, for any stop point
distance from the touchdown point A;
and: • α = 8 for D weight class aircrafts and touchdown
point distance lesser or equal to 2.000 ft.
• μ = 2,02, σ = 1,79 for the C weight class;
• μ = 1,58, σ = 1,16 for the D weight class.

Therefore the probability that an aircraft touches the

runway in the point A is obtained by the following relation:

⎧ Δx Δx ⎫
Pr i ( A) = Pr ⎨ x A − ≤ x ≤ xA + ⎬ =
⎩ 2 2⎭
Δx
xA + 1 ⎛ x − μ ⎞2 (10)
2 − ⎜
1 σ ⎟⎠
= ∫ Δx σ 2π ⋅ e ⎝
2
Fig. 15 – Stop point distribution for C weight class airplanes on x axis
xA −
2 For D weight class aircrafts accidents with a touchdown
point distance far than 2.000 ft, preliminary data distribution
3) Model formulation: Pri {B/A}, landing phase analysis suggest a normal approximation with μ = 8,05 and σ
Also in this case, to define a statistical model that could = 1,46.
allow determining the probability that an airplane of the ith Therefore the probability that an aircraft that touched the
weight class stops in point B, after it has touched the runway runway in point A stops in the point (xB; 0) is given by:
in point A, for each weight class of aircrafts and for each
touchdown zone, the stop distances were computed along the Δx
xB +
x and y axes in homogeneous intervals: e − x x α −1
2
Pr i {x B / A} = ∫Δx Γ(α ) dx (14)
xmax − xmin xB −
Δx = 2
k (11)
y − ymin for C weight class aircrafts and for D weight class aircrafts
Δy = max with stop distance lesser or equal to 2.000 ft. For D weight
k class aircrafts with stop distance higher than 2.000 ft, the same
probability is given as:
with:
Δx
xB + 1 ⎛ x−μ ⎞ 2
k = 1+ 3,3 log10 nij (12) 2 − ⎜ ⎟
Pr {x B / A} =
1
∫
i 2⎝ σ ⎠
e dx (15)
xB −
Δx σ 2π
where nij is the sample numerousness related to the ith weight 2
class and to the touchdown interval j.
So, as previously done, global distributions on x axis and y Likewise along the y axis, sample data are distributed as a
axis were divided in two sub-sets corresponding to C and D normal function with:
weight classes. For example Fig. 15 reports the stop point
distribution (airplane or major debris) for C weight class • μ = 0,856 and σ = 1,439 for C weight class aircrafts
airplanes. and touchdown point distance lesser or equal to 800
Statistical tests demonstrates that this distribution may be ft;
approximated by a standard Gamma function: • μ = 0,380 and σ = 1,434 for C weight class aircrafts
and touchdown point distance between 800 and
2.000 ft;
• μ = - 0,309 and σ = 2,408 for C weight class aircrafts

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and touchdown point distance far than 2.000 ft; and touchdown point distance far than 4.500;
• μ = - 0,248 and σ = 2,321 for D weight class aircrafts • μ = 1,563 and σ = 3,898 for D weight class aircrafts
and touchdown point distance lesser or equal to and touchdown point distance lesser or equal to
2.000 ft; 4.500 ft;
• μ = - 0,44 and σ = 0,983 for D weight class aircrafts • μ = 0,167 and σ = 0,518 for D weight class aircrafts
and touchdown point distance far than 2.000 ft. and touchdown point distance far than 4.500 ft.
Therefore the probability that an aircraft that touched the and the probability function is as in (18).
runway in point A stops in the point (0; yB) is given by:
Δy 2
yB + 1 ⎛ y −μ ⎞
2 − ⎜ ⎟
Pr i {y B / A} =
1
∫
2⎝ σ ⎠ (18)
e dy
Δy σ 2π
yB −
2

Finally, the probability that a C weight class airplane, which

touched the runway in point A, will stop in the point B (xB; yB)
is given by:

Δx Δy 2
xB + yB + 1⎛ y−μ ⎞
2 − x α −1 2 − ⎜ ⎟
e x 1
Pri {B / A} = ∫Δx dx ⋅ ∫Δy e 2⎝ σ ⎠
dy (19)
Γ(α ) σ 2π
xB − yB − ∞
2 2

instead, for D weight class airplane the same probability is

given by:
Δx 2 Δy 2
xB + 1⎛ x−μ ⎞ yB + 1⎛ y−μ ⎞
2 − ⎜ ⎟ 2 − ⎜ ⎟
Pri {B/ A} =
1 1
∫ ∫
2⎝ σ ⎠ 2⎝ σ ⎠
e dx⋅ e dy (20)
Δx σ 2π Δy σ 2π
xB − yB −
2 2

4) Model formulation: Pri { A} and Pri {B/A},take-off

phase
Following an analogous procedure, it has been possible to
verify that the distances at which the take-off was aborted are
distributed according to a normal function, with:
Fig. 16 – Take-off abort points analysis, partial data

• μ = 5,09 and σ = 2,72 for C weight class aircrafts;

Finally, the probability that an aircraft, which aborted the
• μ = 5,16 and σ = 3,17 for D weight class aircrafts
take-off manoeuvre in A, will stop in the point B (xB; yB) is
Then, the probability function is expressed as in (10). given by:
Δx Δy
As it concerns the probability function that determines the xB + yB + 1 ⎛ y −μ ⎞ 2
2 − x α −1 2 − ⎜ ⎟
Pr {B / A} = ∫
e x 1
∫Δy σ 2π ⎝
σ ⎠
aircrafts (or major debris) stop points distribution, statistical i
dx ⋅ e 2
dy (21)
Δx Γ(α )
tests indicates that it may be approximated by a standard
xB − yB −
Gamma function with: 2 2

• α = 5 for C weight class aircrafts α = 5 ; B. Results analysis

• α = 4 for D weight class aircrafts α = 4 . The model we described in the previous sections,
determines the probability that an airplane (or major debris) of
The probability function is then as in (14). the ith weight class, that touched the ground in a point of a
Along the y axis data are distributed as normal function specific grid patch, which is represented by its center (A), will
with: be found in another grid patch, represented by its center (B).
The same approach could be used for an airplane taking-off
• μ = 0,050 and σ = 1,464 for C weight class aircrafts from the runway.
and touchdown point distance lesser or equal to If we consider a specific airport (in our case we considered
4.500 ft; Capodichino Airport, Naples, Fig. 17) cumulating risk
• μ = -0,428 and σ = 0,920 for C weight class aircrafts
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accident probabilities we drew some isofrequency lines to
identify area with higher accident probabilities (Fig. 18).
Fig. 17 – Capodichino Airport, Naples (Google Map shoot)
Particularly we considered the following air traffic:
• 68% aircrafts belonging to C weight class airplanes;
• 32% aircrafts belonging to D weight class airplanes.
If the above repartition changes the boundaries may change
too.
Fig. 18 - Isofrequency lines around the airport applying the model
In fact in the aircraft accident probability model it is
hypothesized a relation between the probability of finding the
wreckage in the point B (P(B)) and the mix index traffic
k Data confirms that in the airports case the runway is the
( ni / ∑ ni ).
i =1
C. Evaluation of accidents consequences
There are many different ways in order to assess the
consequences of an airplane accident, either qualitative or
quantitative, even if it is rather a difficult issue. We may
64
propose a magnitude scale based on the number of people who
live in the area surrounding the airport, which has to take in
account their staying time too. Particularly as concern the area
surrounding Capodichino airport, we determined the number
of people inside each possible accident location multiplying
the housing density of the area (ISTAT data, mean Naples
density = 8.315 inhabitants/km2), by the size of the area.
Fig. 19 – Housing density, Campania, ISTAT 2005.
Such value was multiplied by the permanence coefficient
(CP) given by the ratio between the effective permanence time
(PT, hours), established on the basis of the inhabitants class,
and the twentyfour hours in the day, multiplied by 1000.
Therefore, for the resident people it will be CP = 1000, for the
students it will be CP = 660, for the employees it will be CP =
330, for the people on the aircraft it will be CP = 1.
The overall risk is then obtained multiplying CP by the
respective accident probability.
V. CONCLUSION
Risk reduction is one of the key objectives pursued by
transport safety policies. Risk assessment is an essential
process in defining policy for risk management. By
identifying the nature and the potential impacts on consumers
or employees, risk assessment can assist regulatory authorities
and business organizations to determine what kind of actions
are needed
When building a large system (the airport) from a number
of smaller ones, we find that many of the hazards arise from
the intra-system interfaces.
most critical intra-system to deal with.
In this paper we proposed a probabilistic method to analyze
accident probability deduced by real data analysis which can
be coupled with any method to assess accident magnitude.
The model helps to determine the probability that an
airplane of the ith weight class, that touched the ground in a
point of a specific grid patch, which is represented by its
center (A), will be found in another grid patch, represented by
 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF SYSTEMS APPLICATIONS, ENGINEERING & DEVELOPMENT
Issue 2, Volume 2, 2008
its center (B). The same approach could be used for an
airplane taking-off from the runway.
In this way some isofrequency lines (Fig. 18) to identify
area with higher accident probabilities can be drawn.
This model represent a quantitative tool that can be used
both in airport designing (to acquire specific information
about safety distances between support/civil structures and the
runway, to analyze the impact of future airport re-layouts on
safety) and in airport operations management (to take
decisions about incoming and departing air traffic mix, to
support risk managers in the assessment phase).
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