MENDOZA

FACTS

This case stems from a complaint-affidavit filed by Juno Cars, Inc. through its representative, Raul C. Evangelista, on January 8,
2008 for qualified theft and estafa against Alfredo.3

In the complaint-affidavit, Juno Cars alleged that on June 2, 2007, it hired Alfredo as Trade-In/Used Car Supervisor. On November
19, 2007, its Dealer/Operator, Rolando Garcia, conducted a partial audit of the used cars and discovered that five (5) cars had been
sold and released by Alfredo without Rolando’s or the finance manager’s permission. 4

The partial audit showed that the buyers of the five cars made payments, but Alfredo failed to remit the payments
totalling P886,000.00. It was further alleged that while there were 20 cars under Alfredo’s custody, only 18 were accounted for.
Further investigation revealed that Alfredo failed to turn over the files of a 2001 Hyundai Starex and a Honda City 1.5 LXI. Juno Cars
alleged that taking into account the unremitted amounts and the acquisition cost of the Honda City, Alfredo pilfered a total amount
of P1,046,000.00 to its prejudice and damage. 5

In his counter-affidavit, Alfredo raised, among others, Juno Cars’ supposed failure to prove ownership over the five (5) cars or its
right to possess them with the purported unremitted payments. Hence, it could not have suffered damage. 6

On March 4, 2008, Provincial Prosecutor Rey F. Delgado issued a Resolution finding probable cause and recommending the filing of
7

an information against Alfredo for qualified theft and estafa.

Alfredo moved for reconsideration, but the motion was denied. He then filed a petition for review with the Department of Justice on
8

May 16, 2008. 9

While Alfredo’s motion for reconsideration was still pending before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong, two
informations for qualified theft and estafa were filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 212, Mandaluyong City. On March 31,
10 11

2008, Alfredo filed a motion for determination of probable cause before the trial court. On April 28, 2008, he also filed a motion to
12

defer arraignment.

Several clarificatory hearings were scheduled but were not conducted. On February 4, 2009, the parties agreed to submit all
13

pending incidents, including the clarificatory hearing, for resolution. 14

On March 3, 2009, the trial court, through Presiding Judge Rizalina Capco-Umali, issued an order dismissing the complaint, stating
15

that:

After conducting an independent assessment of the evidence on record which includes the assailed Resolution dated 04 March
2008, the court holds that the evidence adduced does not support a finding of probable cause for the offenses of qualified theft and
estafa. x x x.
16

Juno Cars filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial court denied on July 3, 2009. 17

Juno Cars then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the complaint. It argued that "the determination of probable cause
and the decision whether or not to file a criminal case in court, rightfully belongs to the public prosecutor." 18

On January 14, 2011, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision, reversed the trial court, and reinstated the case. In its decision, the
19

appellate court ruled that the trial court acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction "in supplanting the public prosecutor’s findings of
probable cause with her own findings of insufficiency of evidence and lack of probable cause." 20

Aggrieved, Alfredo filed a petition for review under Rule 45 before this court. In essence, he argued that the trial court was correct in
finding that there was no probable cause as shown by the evidence on record. He argued that "judicial determination of probable
cause is broader than [the] executive determination of probable cause" and that "[i]t is not correct to say that the determination of
21

probable cause is exclusively vested on the prosecutor x x x." 22

In its comment, Juno Cars argued that Alfredo presented questions, issues, and arguments that were a mere rehash of those
23

already considered and passed upon by the appellate court.

The Office of the Solicitor General, arguing for public respondent, stated in its comment that the appellate court correctly sustained
24

the public prosecutor in his findings of probable cause against Alfredo. Since there was no showing of grave abuse of discretion on
the part of Prosecutor Rey F. Delgado, the trial court should respect his determination of probable cause.

In his reply, Alfredo reiterated that "judicial determination of probable cause[,] while not a superior faculty[,] covers a broader
25

encompassing perspective in the disposition of the issue on the existence of probable cause." He argued that the findings of the
26

trial court should be accorded greater weight than the appellate court’s. It merely reviewed the findings of the trial court.

ISSUE
The primordial issue is whether the trial court may dismiss an information filed by the
prosecutor on the basis of its own independent finding of lack of probable cause.

UYBUCO
facts
Petitioner asserts that the Sandiganbayan erred in declaring the existence of a conspiracy
and in convicting him in the absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt of such conspiracy.
More importantly, petitioner finds fault in the Sandiganbayan’s denial of his Motion to
Reconsider the Decision of this Honorable Court (Promulgated on January 9, 2014) with a
Plea to Re-Open the Proceedings dated January 22, 2014. In his motion, petitioner prayed for
the reopening of the proceedings on the ground that his constitutional rights to due process
and to competent counsel were violated when his former counsel, due to blatant error, abuse
of discretion, and gross incompetence, did not present any evidence in his defense, causing
serious prejudice to him.

Chavez
facts
That on or about October 28, 2006, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent of gain
and means of force, violence and intimidation upon the person of ELMER DUQUE
 y OROS, by then and there, with intent to kill, stabbing the latter repeatedly with a
kitchen knife, thereby inflicting upon him mortal stab wounds which were the direct
and immediate cause of his death thereafter, and on the said occasion or by
reason thereof, accused took, robbed and carried away the following:

One (1) Unit Nokia Cellphone

One (1) Unit Motorola Cellphone
Six (6) pcs. Ladies Ring
Two (2) pcs. Necklace
One (1) pc. Bracelet

All of undetermined value and undetermined amount of money, all belonging to

said ELMER DUQUE y OROS @ BARBIE to the damage and prejudice of the said
owner/or his heirs, in the said undetermined amount in Philippines currency.

On October 28, 2006, Peñamante arrived home at around 2:45 a.m., coming from work as a
janitor in Eastwood City.[4] When he was about to go inside his house at 1326 Tuazon Street,
Sampaloc, Manila, he saw a person wearing a black, long-sleeved shirt and black pants and
holding something while leaving the house/parlor of Elmer Duque (Barbie) at 1325 Tuazon
Street, Sampaloc, Manila, just six meters across Peñamante’s house.[5]
There was a light at the left side of the house/parlor of Barbie, his favorite haircutter, so
Peñamante stated that he was able to see the face of Chavez and the clothes he was
wearing.[6]
Chavez could not close the door of Barbie’s house/parlor so he simply walked away.
However, he dropped something that he was holding and fell down when he stepped on it.[7]
He walked away after, and Peñamante was not able to determine what Chavez was holding.
[8] Peñamante then entered his house and went to bed.[9]
Sometime after 10:00 a.m., the Scene of the Crime Office (SOCO) team arrived, led by PCI
Cayrel. She was joined by PO3 Rex Maglansi (photographer), PO1 Joel Pelayo (sketcher),
and a fingerprint technician.[10] They conducted an initial survey of the crime scene after
coordinating with SPO3 Casimiro of the Manila Police District Homicide Section.[11]

The team noted that the lobby and the parlor were in disarray, and they found Barbie’s dead
body inside.[12] They took photographs and collected fingerprints and other pieces of
evidence such as the 155 pieces of hair strands found clutched in Barbie’s left hand.[13]
They documented the evidence then turned them over to the Western Police District
Chemistry Division. Dr. Salen was called to conduct an autopsy on the body.[14]
At around 11:00 a.m., Peñamante’s landlady woke him up and told him that Barbie was found
dead at 9:00 a.m. He then informed his landlady that he saw Chavez leaving Barbie’s house
at 2:45 a.m.[15]
At around 1:00 p.m., Dr. Salen conducted an autopsy on the body and found that the time of
death was approximately 12 hours prior to examination.[16] There were 22 injuries on
Barbie’s body — 21 were stab wounds in various parts of the body caused by a sharp bladed
instrument, and one incised wound was caused by a sharp object.[17] Four (4) of the stab
wounds were considered fatal.[18]
The next day, the police invited Peñamante to the Manila Police Station to give a statement.
Peñamante described to SPO3 Casimiro the physical appearance of the person he saw
leaving Barbie’s parlor.[19]
Accompanied by his mother, Chavez voluntarily surrendered on November 5, 2006 to SPO3
Casimiro at the police station.[20] Chavez was then 22 years old.[21] His mother told the
police that she wanted to help her son who might be involved in Barbie’s death.[22]
SPO3 Casimiro informed them of the consequences in executing a written statement without
the assistance of a lawyer. However, Chavez’s mother still gave her statement, subscribed by
Administrative Officer Alex Francisco.[23] She also surrendered two cellular phones owned
by Barbie and a baseball cap owned by Chavez.[24]
The next day, Peñamante was again summoned by SPO3 Casimiro to identify from a line-up
the person he saw leaving Barbie’s house/parlor that early morning of October 28, 2006.[25]
Peñamante immediately pointed to and identified Chavez and thereafter executed his written
statement.[26] There were no issues raised in relation to the line-up.
On the other hand, Chavez explained that he was at home on October 27, 2006, exchanging
text messages with Barbie on whether they could talk regarding their misunderstanding.[27]
According to Chavez, Barbie suspected that he was having a relationship with Barbie’s
boyfriend, Maki.[28] When Barbie did not reply to his text message, Chavez decided to go to
Barbie’s house at around 1:00 a.m. of October 28, 2006.[29] Barbie allowed him to enter the
house, and he went home after.[30]

issue
whether Chavez is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide.

MORALES
FACTS

finding the accused Morales guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Sections 5 and
11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 entitled "An Act Instituting the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002."

In the Criminal Case No. 7534, Morales was charged with illegal sale of shabu as follows:

That on or about the 14th day of April 2004, in the Municipality or Rodriguez, Province of
Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly sell, deliver and give away to
another person one (1) heat scaled transparent plastic sachet containing 0.02 gram of white
crystalline substance, which gave positive result to the test for Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride, also known as shabu, a dangerous drug, in violation orthc above-cited law. 3

In the Criminal Case No. 7535, Morales was charged with illegal possession of shabu as
follows:

That on or about the 14th day of April 2004, in the Municipality of Rodriguez, Province of
Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession, direct
custody and control three (3) heat-scaled transparent sachets each containing 0.02 gram of
white crystalline substance, which gave positive results to the test for Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride, also known as shabu, a dangerous drug, in violation of the above-cited law. 4

When arraigned, the accused pleaded not guilty of the crimes charged. 5

The RTC held that the prosecution successfully discharged the burden of proof in the cases
of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs. The trial court relied on the
categorical statements of the prosecution witnesses as against the bare denials of the
accused. The presumption or regularity of performance of duties was upheld in the absence
of any improper motive on their part to testify falsely against the accused. The dispositive
portion reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, to wit:

(1) In Criminal Case No. 7534, finding the accused Alfredo Morales y Lam GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime or Sale or Dangerous Drug (Violation of Section
5, 1st par., Article II, R.A. 9165) and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of Life
Imprisonment and a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500, 000.00).

(2) In Criminal Case No. 7535, finding the accused Alfredo Morales y Lam GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of POSSESSION of DANGEROUS DRUG
(Violation of Section 11, 2nct par., No. 3, Article II, R.A. 9165) and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment of Twelve Years (12) years and one (1) day to
Twenty (20) years and a fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00).6

Upon appeal, the appellate court affirmed the findings of the trial court. It upheld the presence
of all the elements of the offenses of illegal sale and illegal possession of drugs, and
preservation of the corpus delicti of the crime from the time they were seized and presented in
court. The procedural steps required by Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 were liberally
construed in favor of the prosecution in view of the preservation of integrity and identity of the
corpus delicti. Conformably, the finding on the presumption of regularity of performance of
duties was affirmed in the absence of ill-motive on the part of the police officers.

On 29 August 2012, a Notice of Appeal 7 was filed by Morales through counsel before the
Supreme Court.

While this case is pending appeal, the Inmate Documents and Processing Division Officer-in-
Charge Emerenciana M. Divina 8 informed the Court that accused-appellant Morales died
while committed at the Bureau of Corrections on 2 November 2013 as evidenced by a copy of
Death Report9 signed by New Bilibid Prison Hospital's Medical Officer Ursicio D. Cenas. The
death of accused-appellant Morales pending appeal of his conviction, extinguishes his civil
and criminal liabilities.

[G.R. No. 192912 June 4, 2014]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
DEMOCRITO PARAS,Accused-Appellant.

[G.R. No. 192912 October 22, 2014]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
DEMOCRITO PARAS, Accused-Appellant.

[G.R. No. 187769 June 4, 2014]

ALVIN PATRIMONIO, Petitioner,
vs.
NAPOLEON GUTIERREZ and OCTAVIO MARASIGAN III, Respondents.

[G.R. No. 197293 April 21, 2014]

ALFREDO C. MENDOZA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND JUNO CARS, INC., Respondents.

[G.R. No. 193707 December 10, 2014]

NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of her minor child RODERIGO NORJO
VAN WILSEM, Petitioner,
vs.
ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM, Respondent.

[G.R. No. 205136 December 2, 2014]

OLIVIA DA SILVA CERAFICA, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

[G.R. No. 206004 February 24, 2015]

JOSEPH B. TIMBOL, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

[G.R. No. 205867 February 23, 2015]

MARIFLOR T. HORTIZUELA, represented by JOVIER TAGUFA, Petitioner,
vs.
GREGORIA TAGUFA, ROBERTO TAGUFA and ROGELIO LUMABAN, Respondents.
[G.R. No. 206832 January 21, 2015]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ALFREDO MORALES Y LAM, Accused-Appellant.
[ G.R. No. 202692, November 12, 2014 ]
EDMUND SYDECO Y SIONZON, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

[ G.R. No. 206379, November 19, 2014 ]

CECILIA PAGADUAN, Petitioner,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION* AND REMA MARTIN SALVADOR, Respondents.

[ G.R. No. 211703, December 10, 2014 ]

EDELBERT C. UYBOCO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

[ G.R. No. 207950, September 22, 2014 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARK JASON CHAVEZ Y BITANCOR ALIAS “NOY”, Accused-appellant.

[ G.R. No. 179080, November 26, 2014 ]

EDIGARDO GEROCHE, ROBERTO GARDE AND GENEROSO MARFIL ALIAS “TAPOL”,
Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

[ G.R. No. 166680, July 07, 2014 ]

ALOYSIUS DAIT LUMAUIG, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PROMULGATED: Respondent.

G.R. No. 200334 July 30, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent-Appellee,
vs.
VICTOR COGAED y ROMANA, Accused Appellant.
Alvin Patrimonio v. Napoleon Guttierez & OCTAVIO MARASIGAN III
FACTS:
Herein petitioner and respondent Guttierez entered into a business venture under the
name Slam Dunk Corporation. To start it up, petitioner pre-signed several check for the
expenses of the business. Although signed, however, there was no payee’s name, date or
amount indicated in the said checks. The blank checks were entrusted to Guttierez with the
instruction that he cannot fill them out without petitioner’s approval.
 In 1993, without petitioner’s knowledge and consent, Guttierez borrowed money from
co-respondent Marasigan in the amount of 200,000php. The latter aceded to Guttierez’
request and gave him the amount. Simultaneously, Guttierez deliverd to Marasigan one of the
blank checks pre-signed by petitioner. However, the same was dishonored by the bank on the
reason of closed account.
Marasigan sought recovery from Guttierez, but to no avail. Hence, he sent several
demand letters to petitioner, but to no avail as well. Thus, he filed a criminal case under BP 22
against petitioner. On the other hand, Petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a
Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Loan and Recovery of Damages against Respondents,
invoking that he never authorized the loan.
The trial court ruled in favor of Marasigan and found petitioner, in issuing the pre-signed blank
checks, had the intention of issuing the check even without his approval. On appeal to the
Court of Appeals (CA), the appellate court affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this
present case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is liable to the loan contracted by Guttierez to Marasigan?

HELD:
The court held no. That under Article 1878, paragraph 7 of the Civil Code, a written
authority is required when the loan is contracted through an agent.
In the present case, the petitioner is not bound by the contract of loan since the records
reveal that Guttierez did not have any authority to borrow money in behalf of petitioner.
Records do not show that the petitioner executed any special power of attorney in favor of
Guttierez to borrow in his behalf, hence, the act of Guttierez is in violation of the said
provision, and thus, he should be the only one liable for the loan he was not able to settle.

People of the Philippines v. Democrito Paras

G.R. No. 192912, October 22, 2014
Leonardo-De Castro, J.:

FACTS:
Accused-appellant Democrito Paras was charged with rape against a 17 year old
minor. The RTC and the CA convicted the accused. Hence, he appealed to the SC.

Police Superintendent Roberto Rabo sent a letter to the Court stating that the accused-
appellant had died at the New Bilibid Prison Hospital on January 24, 2013. The Court
received the letter only on August 27, 2014.

ISSUE:
Is the Court’s Decision date June 4, 2014 still valid in line with the accused-appellant’s death?

HELD:
NO, the Court’s Decision date June 4, 2014 had been rendered ineffectual and therefore set
aside. Under Article 89, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the death of an
accused pending his appeal extinguishes both his criminal and civil liability ex delicto. Thus,
upon the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is
extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil
 action instituted therein for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished,
grounded as it is on the criminal action.

In this case, when the accused-appellant died on January 24, 2013, his appeal to this Court
was still pending. The Decision dated June 4, 2014 was thereafter promulgated as the Court
was not immediately informed of the accused-appellant's death. The death of the accused-
appellant herein, thus, extinguished his criminal liability, as well as his civil liability directly
arising from and based solely on the crime committed.

Hence, the Court’s Decision is set aside.

JUNE 22, 2015 BY THE LAWYER'S POST

The Facts:
The Crime Of Falsification Of Public Document Is
Cecilia (Pagaduan) filed a complaint against Rema (Salvador), the Municipa Budget Officer of Tuguegarao City,
charging the latter for falsification and misrepresentation when she stated in her Personal Data Sheet (PDS) that

Contrary To Justice, Honesty And Good Morals

she possesses the necessary budgeting qualification and indicated therein that she performed bookkeeping and
accounting functions for Veteran’s Woodworks from 1990 to 1992 when she was never employed by the

And, Therefore, Involves Moral Turpitude…

company. In her defense, Rema averred that that she was employed by Alfonso Tuzon, who was granted full
management, direct supervision and control of Veterans Woodworks’ logging operations; her name does not
appear on the VVI payroll because Tuzon’s office was independent of the original staff. Cecilia also filed a case
for falsification of public documents before the MTCC of Tuguegarao City. On the administrative case, Rema
was found liable for Simple Misconduct only and the CSC approved her qualification as it was a “related field”.
Cecilia did not appeal this ruling. The MTCC subsequently convicted Rema for falsification of public documents;
she did not appeal this ruling, instead she applied for probation which was granted by the MTCC.

Cecilia then filed a second administrative complaint against Rema, this time for conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude. In her defense, she alleged res judicata, forum shopping and
double jeopardy, but the case proceeded, and she adopted her defenses in the criminal case.
After hearing, the CSC Regional Office found Rema liable for conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, and imposed on her the penalty of dismissal from the service. On appeal to
the Civil Service Commission, the latter reversed and set aside the CSC RO ruling. Thus
Cecilia elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which initially sided with her, and stated that
following precedents, a conviction for falsification of public documents constitute the offence
of conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. Rema moved to reconsider. This time
around, the CA reversed itself,ruled in favour of Rema and agreed with the findings of the
CSC that the act of falsification committed by Salvador did not involve moral turpitude as it
was a mere error of judgment on her part.
Thus Cecilia elevated the case to the Supreme Court via petition for review on certiorari.
The Issue:
Whether or not conviction for the crime of falsification of public documents merit Rema’s
dismissal from the service for conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude.
The Ruling:
As previously recited, this petition arose from the second administrative complaint filed by
Pagaduan against Salvador. The first administrative complaint was for the offenses of
falsification and misrepresentation, where the CSC-RO II found her to be liable for simple
misconduct only. The CSC decision affirming the said CSC-RO II decision became final and
executory, and Salvador served the penalty of one (1) month suspension.
Meanwhile, the October 22, 2008, MTCC decision1 in the criminal case filed by Pagaduan
against Salvador, finding the latter guilty of the crime of falsification of public document,
attained finality as Salvador did not appeal. By reason of the said conviction, Pagaduan filed
the second administrative complaint for the offense of conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude.
Before discussing the substantial aspect of the case, the issues on the procedural aspect
shall first be addressed.
In her Comment,2 Salvador invoked res judicata. and forum shopping in arguing that the
second administrative case was already barred by the prior administrative case against her. It
was her contention that both cases involved the same parties, the same facts and issues,
although with different causes of action.3
The principle of res judicata is applicable either by way of “bar by prior judgment” or by
“conclusiveness of judgment.” Here, Salvador’s defense was res judicata by conclusiveness
of judgment, in Borra v. Court of Appeals,4 the Court stated that:
Stated differently, conclusiveness of judgment finds application when a fact or question has
been squarely put in issue, judicially passed upon, and adjudged in a former suit by a court of
competent jurisdiction. The fact or question settled by final judgment or order binds the parties
to that action (and persons in privity with them or their successors-in-interest), and continues
to bind them while the judgment or order remains standing and unreversed by proper
authority on a timely motion or petition; the conclusively-settled fact or question cannot again
be litigated in any future or other action between the same parties or their privies and
successors-in-interest, in the same or in any other court of concurrent jurisdiction, either for
the same or for a different cause of action. Thus, only the identities of parties and issues are
required for the operation of the principle of conclusiveness of judgment. [Emphasis supplied]
Contrary to Salvador’s contention, however, there appears to be no identity of issues and
facts in the two administrative cases. The first case involved facts necessary to resolve the
issue of whether or not Salvador falsified her PDS. The second one involved facts necessary
to resolve the issue of whether or not Salvador was convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude. Falsification was the main issue in the first case, while it was no longer an issue in
the second case. The only fact to consider in the second administrative complaint is the fact
of conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, it must be borne in mind that both
administrative complaints were based on different grounds. The grounds were separate and
distinct from each other and entailed different sets of facts.

Corollarily, Pagaduan cannot be liable for forum shopping. The established rule is that for
forum shopping to exist, both actions must involve the same transactions, same essential
facts and circumstances, and must raise identical causes of actions, subject matter, and
issues.5 It exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present, namely: (a) there is
identity of parties, or at least such parties representing the same interests in both actions; (b)
there is identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same
set of facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment
rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res
judicata in the other.”6 Since no res judicata exists, no forum shopping either exists in this
case.
Now on the substantial issue, Pagaduan avers that Salvador was convicted of a crime
involving moral turpitude – a sufficient ground for dismissal from government service. On the
other hand, Salvador argues that the falsification she committed did not involve moral
turpitude. In resolving the issue of whether Salvador was convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude, the existence of only two elements is necessary: (1) the conviction of a crime, which
conviction has attained finality; and (2) the crime for which the accused was convicted
involves moral turpitude. There is no dispute as to the first element, leaving Us to determine
the presence of the other.
Moral turpitude has been defined as everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or
good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a
man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general,7 contrary to the accepted and customary
rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty,
modesty, or good morals.8 Not every criminal act, however, involves moral turpitude. It is for
this reason that the Court has to determine as to what crime involves moral turpitude.”9
Salvador was convicted of falsification of public document. The MTCC found that she made
an untruthful statement in a narration of facts and perverted the truth with a wrongful
intent.10 While Salvador invoked good faith as a defense, the MTCC was not convinced,
stating that good faith could not be made to depend solely on the self-serving statement of the
accused. It must be supported by other independent evidence.11 To the MTCC, Salvador
miserably failed to clearly show the presence of good faith. More specifically, the trial court
stated:
She alleged that she honestly believed she was employed with VWI because Alfonso Tuzon is
the operations manager of VWT. Second, she was responsible in the preparation of the
payroll sheets of VWI.
However, the following circumstances negate the existence of good faith:
1. Accused was not included in the list of employees of VWI as
shown in Exhibits “G”, “G-i”, “G-2”, “G-3”, and “G-4,” “J” and
its sub-markings and “K” and its sub-markings;
2. Accused was not in the payroll of VWI as shown in Exhibit
“L”;
3. Accused received her salary from Rodolfo Quiambao and
not from VWI;
4. Rodolfo Quiambao, who is not a VWI employee, issued
directives to the accused;
5. Accused never went to the VWI office at Magapit, Lallo,
Cagayan;
6. Accused never had any VWI identification card;
7. Accused had no contract of employment with VWI; and
finally,
8. Rodolfo Quiambao worked personally with Alfonso Tuzon
and not with VWI.
These circumstances were known to the accused. Despite knowledge of these facts, accused
stated in her PDS that she was employed with VWI, thus, she perverted the truth. Said act
constitutes malice on her part negating her claim of good faith.‘12
[Emphasis supplied]
Granting arguendo that Salvador had no criminal intent to injure a third person, the same is
immaterial as such intent is not an essential element of the crime of falsification of public
document. It is jurisprudentially settled that in the falsification of public or official documents,
whether by public officers or private persons, it is not necessary that there be present the idea
of gain or the intent to injure a third person for the reason that, in contradistinction to private
documents, the principal thing punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction
of truth as therein solemnly proclaimed. In falsification of public documents, therefore, the
controlling consideration is the public character of a document; and the existence of any
prejudice caused to third persons or, at least, the intent to cause such damage becomes
immaterial.13
Salvador did not appeal from the said judgment and, instead, filed an application for probation
which was granted. It has been held that an application for probation is an admission of
guilt.14 Logically then, when Salvador applied for probation, she admitted the making of an
untruthful statement in her PDS. In Lumancas v. Intas,15 the Court held that “the
accomplishment of the Personal Data Sheet being a requirement under the Civil Service
Rules and Regulations in connection with employment in the government, the making of an
untruthful statement therein was, therefore, intimately connected with such
employment.”16 The filing of a PDS is required in connection with the promotion to a higher
position and contenders for promotion have the legal obligation to disclose the truth.
Otherwise, enhancing their qualifications by means of false statements will prejudice other
qualified aspirants to the same position17
As early as 1961, in the case of De Jesus-Paras vs. Vailoces,18 the Court disbarred a lawyer
on the ground of conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, after having found that the
said lawyer was convicted of the crime of falsification of public documents. Similarly, in In Re
– Attorney Jose Avanceña,19 the said lawyer was disbarred from the practice of law due to a
conviction by final judgment of a crime involving moral turpitude after being convicted of the
crime of falsification of public documents. Lastly, in RE: SC Decision dated May 20, 2008 in
GR. No. 161455 under Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court v. Atty. Rodolfo D. Pactolin ,20 the
Court reiterated that the crime of falsification of public document is contrary to justice, honesty
and good morals and, therefore, involves moral turpitude.21
Following the Court’s disposition in the aforecited cases, the CSC and the CA therefore erred
in reaching a conclusion to the contrary, especially that Salvador’s conviction for such crime
already attained finality. Both tribunals were of the view that Salvador merely committed a
mere error of judgment and, thus, no moral turpitude was involved. Their position was based
on the finding previously made by the CSC-RO II in the first administrative complaint. That
could not a valid basis because, as earlier pointed out, the second case was separate and
distinct from the first one.
Although the CSC itself recognized that it was for the Court to determine what crime involved
moral turpitude, it ruled that Salvador’s commission of the crime of falsification of public
document did not involve moral turpitude. Both the CSC and the CA strayed away from the
settled jurisprudence on the matter. It will be absurd to insist that Salvador committed a mere
error of judgment when the very basis of the second administrative charge against her was a
final judgment of conviction where the trial court found otherwise.
Considering that the principal act punished in the crime of falsification of public document is
the violation of the public faith and the destruction of truth as therein solemnly proclaimed, the
elements of the administrative offense of conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude
clearly exist in this case. The Court does not have to look beyond what is simply apparent
from the surrounding circumstances.
Finally, Salvador argues that her conviction and eventual discharge from probation presents
another administrative case to be filed against her because to do so would defeat the purpose
of the Probation Law22 which was to erase the effect of conviction and to restore civil rights
that were lost or suspended. Suffice it to state that probation does not erase the effects and
fact of conviction, but merely suspends the penalty imposed. While indeed the purpose of the
Probation Law is to save valuable human material, it must not be forgotten that unlike pardon,
probation does not obliterate the crime for which the person under probation has been
convicted. The reform and rehabilitation of the probationer cannot justify his retention in the
government service.23 Furthermore, probation only affects the criminal liability of the
accused, and not his administrative liabilities, if any. The Court once ruled in the case
of Samalio vs. Court of Appeals24 that:
Finally, even if dismissal had been one of the accessory penalties of the principal penalty
imposed upon petitioner in the criminal case, and even if the administrative case had been
decided earlier than die criminal case, still the imposition of the penalty of dismissal could not
have been suspended by the grant of probation. As petitioner himself contends, the criminal
action is separate and distinct from the administrative case. And, if only for that reason, so is
administrative liability separate and distinct from penal liability. Hence, probation affects only
the criminal aspect of the case, not its administrative dimension.25 [Emphases supplied]
All told, if there is no compelling reason to deviate from what has already been established,
settled principles and jurisprudence should be respected. To do otherwise would only create
confusion and instability in our jurisprudence.
As a final note, it must be borne in mind that a PDS is a public document26 required of a
government employee and official by the CSC. It is the repository of all information about any
government employee or official regarding his personal background, qualification, and
eligibility. Government employees are tasked under the Civil Service rules to properly and
completely accomplish their PDS,27 in accordance with the constitutional principle that public
office is a public trust, thereby enjoining all public officers and employees to serve with the
highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.28 Only those who can live up
to such exacting standard deserve the honor of continuing in public service.29
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the August 31, 2012 Amended
Decision30 and the February 20, 2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
120208 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The February 28, 2012 Decision of the
Court of Appeals is UPHELD and REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

An Action For Reconveyance Is A Legal And Equitable Remedy Granted To The Rightful
Landowner, Whose Land Was Wrongfully Or Erroneously Registered In The Name Of
Another, To Compel The Registered Owner To Transfer Or Reconvey The Land To Him...
The Facts:
Mariflor (Hortizuela), represented by Jovier Tagufa, filed an action for Reconveyance and
Recovery of Possession with damages against Gregoria and others (respondents) before the
MCTC of Tumauini, Isabela of a parcel of lot covered by OCT No. P-84609. According to her,
prior to the issuance of the title to the lot, her parents Epifanio and Godofreda originally
owned the lot. They then mortgaged the property to the Development Bank of the
Philippines, which foreclosed it upon failure of the spouses to redeem the property. DBP then
sold it to Atty. Romulo Marquez, who then sold it back to Runsted, Gregoria’s husband using
funds sent by Mariflor who was then working at the United States, with the agreement that
Runsted will reconvey the lot to his sister (Mariflor) when demanded. Mariflor soon
discovered that the same lot was titled in the name of Gregoria Tagufa under OCT No. P-
84609 by virtue of a free patent application before the DENR and execution of a Deed of
Extra-judicial Settlement of Estate of the spouses Leando and Remedios Tagufa, thus she
sought to recover possession of the property.
The MCTC dismissed the complaint, ruling that Mariflor resorted to a wrong remedy in filing
the case. The RTC however reversed the MCTC. It ordered Gregoria to reconvey the
property to Mariflor. On petition for review to the CA, the latter reversed the RTC. Although
an action for reconveyance, the same is clearly an attack on the validity of OCT No. P-84609,
which is not allowed by Sec. 48 of PD 1529, which proscribes collateral attacks on Torrens
titles. The issue of whether or not a title was fraudulently issued should be treshed out in a
direct proceeding. Aggrieved, Mariflor appealed to the Supreme Court. She maintains that
her action was not an action to nullify the title, but merely to reconvey the property covered by
that title, as Gregoria was clearly aware of the sale by Atty. Marquez to her husband,
Runsted. On the other hand, the respondents argue otherwise. The fact that Mariflor filed the
action for reconveyance was because she failed to file within one year the action for reversion
as a remedy provided under Act 496. Further, Mariflor being an American citizen, is not
allowed to own land in the Philippines.
The Issue:
Whether or not an action for reconveyance is an indirect or collateral attack on a title which is
prohibited by law.
The Court’s ruling:
The Court finds the petition meritorious.
The Court is not unmindful of the principle of indefeasibility of a Torrens title and Section 48 of
P.D. No. 1528 where it is provided that a certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral
attack.1 A Torrens title cannot be altered, modified or cancelled except in a direct proceeding
in accordance with law. When the Court says direct attack, it means that the object of an
action is to annul or set aside such judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand,
the attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on
the judgment or proceeding is nevertheless made as an incident thereof.2 In its decision, the
MCTC wrote:
Obviously, the bone of contention in this case are the deed of sale by and between Romulo
Marquez and Runsted Tagufa, the estranged husband of defendant Gregoria Tagufa, and
OCT No. P-84609 registered in the name of Gregoria Tagufa who, according to the plaintiff,
fraudulently caused the titling of the same.
In their lamentations, plaintiff pointed out the following indicia of fraud committed by Gregoria
Tagufa that would allegedly justify reconveyance:
First, Gregoria Tagufa made it appear in the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of spouses
Leandro Tagufa and Remedios Talosig that she is an heir when, in truth, she is only a grand
daughter-in-law,
Second, she already knew when she applied for free patent that plaintiff was already the
owner of the land she was applying for;
Third, she already knew that when she applied for free patent that plaintiff’s parents were not
anymore the owners of the land as the same was mortgaged with the DBP; and
Fourth, defendant has never been in actual possession of the property when she applied for
it.
All in all, plaintiff argued, Gregoria Tagufa never acquired any valid right or legal title over the
property.
Studying the merits of this case and removing all its superfluities, plaintiffs plainly question the
title generated in the name of defendant Gregoria Tagufa having been obtained by fraud and
misrepresentation. However, in the judicious analysis by this court, plaintiffs have resorted to
a wrong cause of action.3
From the foregoing, it can be deduced that the MCTC was convinced that fraud was attendant
in the registration of the land but was not convinced that reconveyance was an accepted
remedy.
Contrary to the pronouncements of the MCTC and the CA, however, the complaint of
Hortizuela was not a collateral attack on the title warranting dismissal. As a matter of fact, an
action for reconveyance is a recognized remedy, an action in personam, available to a person
whose property has been wrongfully registered under the Torrens system in another’s name.
In an action for reconveyance, the decree is not sought to be set aside. It does not seek to
set aside the decree but, respecting it as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, seeks
to transfer or reconvey the land from the registered owner to the rightful
owner. Reconveyance is always available as long as the property has not passed to an
innocent third person for value.4
There is no quibble that a certificate of title, like in the case at bench, can only be questioned
through a direct proceeding. The MCTC and the CA, however, failed to take into account that
in a complaint for reconveyance, the decree of registration is respected as incontrovertible
and is not being questioned. What is being sought is the transfer of the property wrongfully or
erroneously registered in another’s name to its rightful owner or to the one with a better right.
If the registration of the land is fraudulent, the person in whose name the land is registered
holds it as a mere trustee, and the real owner is entitled to file an action for reconveyance of
the property.5
The fact that Gregoria was able to secure a title in her name does not operate to vest
ownership upon her of the subject land. “Registration of a piece of land under the Torrens
System does not create or vest title, because it is not a mode of acquiring ownership. A
certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title over the particular property
described therein. It cannot be used to protect a usurper from the true owner; nor can it be
used as a shield for the commission of fraud; neither does it permit one to enrich himself at
the expense of others. Its issuance in favor of a particular person does not foreclose the
possibility that the real property may be co-owned with persons not named in the certificate,
or that it may be held in trust for another person by the registered owner.”6
Furthermore, respondents’ argument that the overriding reason why Hortizuela chose to file a
complaint for reconveyance and recovery of possession was that she failed to avail of the
remedy provided under Section 38 of Act 496 within the prescribed period of one (1) year,
counted from the issuance of the patent by the government, is weak. As was similarly held
in Cervantes v. CA,7 with the land obtained by respondent Gregoria through fraudulent
machinations by means of which a free patent and a title were issued in her name, she was
deemed to have held it in trust for the benefit of Hortizuela who was prejudiced by her actions.
Article 1456 provides:
ARTICLE 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by
force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom
the property comes.
The remedy of reconveyance, based on Section 53 of P.D. No. 1529 and Article 1456,
prescribes in ten (10) years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property.
The Court is not unaware of the rule that a fraudulently acquired free patent may only be
assailed by the government in an action for reversion pursuant to Section 101 of the Public
Land Act8. In Sherwill Development Corporation v. Sitio Sto. Niño Residents Association,
Inc.,9 this Court pointed out that:
x x x It is to the public interest that one who succeeds in fraudulently acquiring title to a public
land should not be allowed to benefit therefrom, and the State should, therefore, have an
even existing authority, thru its duly-authorized officers, to inquire into the circumstances
surrounding the issuance of any such title, to the end that the Republic, thru the Solicitor
General or any other officer who may be authorized by law, may file the corresponding action
for the reversion of the land involved to the public domain, subject thereafter to disposal to
other qualified persons in accordance with law. In other words, the indefeasibility of a title over
land previously public is not a bar to an investigation by the Director of Lands as to how such
title has been acquired, if the purpose of such investigation is to determine whether or not
fraud had been committed in securing such title in order that the appropriate action for
reversion may be filed by the Government.10
An action for reconveyance is proper
The foregoing rule is, however, not without exception. A recognized exception is that situation
where plaintiff-claimant seeks direct reconveyance from defendant of public land unlawfully
and in breach of trust titled by him, on the principle of enforcement of a constructive trust. This
was the ruling in Larzano v. Tabayag, Jr.11, where it was written:
A private individual may bring an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land even if the title
thereof was issued through a free patent since such action does not aim or purport to re-open
the registration proceeding and set aside the decree of registration, but only to show that the
person who secured the registration of the questioned property is not the real owner thereof.
In Roco, et al. v. Gimeda, we stated that if a patent had already been issued through fraud or
mistake and has been registered, the remedy of a party who has been injured by the
fraudulent registration is an action for reconveyance, thus:
It is to be noted that the petition does not seek for a reconsideration of the granting of the
patent or of the decree issued in the registration proceeding. The purpose is not to annul the
title but to have it conveyed to plaintiffs. Fraudulent statements were made in the application
for the patent and no notice thereof was given to plaintiffs, nor knowledge of the petition
known to the actual possessors and occupants of the property. The action is one based on
fraud and under the law, it can be instituted within four years from the discovery of the fraud.
(Art. 1146, Civil Code, as based on Section 3, paragraph 43 of Act No. 190.) It is to be noted
that as the patent here has already been issued, the land has the character of registered
property in accordance with the provisions of Section 122 of Act No. 496, as amended by Act
No. 2332, and the remedy of the party who has been injured by the fraudulent registration is
an action for reconveyance. (Director of Lands vs. Registered of Deeds, 92 Phil., 826; 49 Off.
Gaz. 935; Section 55 of Act No. 496.)
In the same vein, in Quiñiano, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., we stressed that:
The controlling legal norm was set forth in succinct language by Justice Tuason in a 1953
decision, Director of Lands v. Register of Deeds of Rizal. Thus: “The sole remedy of the land
owner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another’s name is,
after one year from the date of the decree, not to set aside the decree, as was done in the
instant case, but, respecting the decree as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, to
bring an ordinary action in the ordinary court of justice for reconveyance or, if the property has
passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, for damages.” Such a doctrine
goes back to the 1919 landmark decision of Cabanos v. Register of Deeds of Laguna. If it
were otherwise the institution of registration would, to quote from Justice Torres, serve “as a
protecting mantle to cover and shelter bad faith ….” In the language of the then Justice, later
Chief Justice, Bengzon: “A different view would encourage fraud and permit one person
unjustly to enrich himself at the expense of another.” It would indeed be a signal failing of any
legal system if under the circumstances disclosed, the aggrieved party is considered as
having lost his right to a property to which he is entitled. It is one thing to protect an innocent
third party; it is entirely a different matter, and one devoid of justification, if [deceit] would be
rewarded by allowing the perpetrator to enjoy the fruits of his nefarious deed. As clearly
revealed by the undeviating line of decisions coming from this Court, such an undesirable
eventuality is precisely sought to be guarded against. So it has been before; so it should
continue to be. (Citations omitted)
In this case, in filing the complaint for reconveyance and recovery of possession, Hortizuela
was not seeking a reconsideration of the granting of the patent or the decree issued in the
registration proceedings. What she was seeking was the reconveyance of the subject
property on account of the fraud committed by respondent Gregoria. An action for
reconveyance is a legal and equitable remedy granted to the rightful landowner, whose land
was wrongfully or erroneously registered in the name of another, to compel the registered
owner to transfer or reconvey the land to him.12 Thus, the RTC did not err in upholding the
right of Hortizuela to ask for the reconveyance of the subject property. To hold otherwise
would be to make the Torrens system a shield for the commission of fraud. To reiterate,
The fact that petitioner was able to secure a title in her name did not operate to vest
ownership upon her of the subject land. Registration of a piece of land under the Torrens
System does not create or vest title, because it is not a mode of acquiring ownership. A
certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title over the particular property
described therein. It cannot be used to protect a usurper from the true owner; nor can it be
used as a shield for the commission of fraud; neither does it permit one to enrich himself at
the expense of others. Its issuance in favor of a particular person does not foreclose the
possibility that the real property may be co-owned with persons not named in the certificate,
or that it may be held in trust for another person by the registered owner.13
Finally, respondents’ supposition that Hortizuela was ineligible to own the subject property
pursuant to B.P. Blg. 223 because she was no longer a Filipino citizen cannot be considered
for having been raised only for the first time on appeal. It must be noted that points of law,
theories, issues, and arguments not brought to the attention of the trial court ought not to be
considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal.14 The reason therefor is due process.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 13, 2012 Decision and the January
25, 2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA- G.R. SP No. 122648 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The July 1, 2011 Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 22, Cabagan, Isabela, is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

OBLIGATION OF A FOREIGN NATIONAL TO SUPPORT HIS MINOR CHILD UNDER

PHILIPPINE LAW
Petitioner Norma and respondent Ernst Johan contracted marriage in Holland. They were
blessed with a son named Roderigo, who at the time of the filing of the instant petition was
sixteen (16) years of age.
Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the
appropriate Court of Holland. At that time, their son was only eighteen(18) months old.
Thereafter, petitioner and her son came home to the Philippines.
According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide monthly support to their son
in the amount of Two Hundred Fifty (250) Guildene (which is equivalent to Php17,500.00
more or less). However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines,
respondent never gave support to the son, Roderigo.
Not long thereafter, respondent came to the Philippines and remarried in Cebu City, and since
then, have been residing thereat. Petitioner, through hercounsel, sent a letter demanding for
support from respondent. However, respondent refused to receive the letter.
Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed a complaint affidavit with the
Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City against respondent for violation of Section 5, paragraph
E(2) of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to support his minor child with petitioner.
Thereafter, the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City issued a Resolution recommending the
filing of an information for the crime charged against herein respondent with the RTC-Cebu.
The RTC-Cebu issued the herein assailed Order, dismissing the instant criminal case against
respondent on the ground that the facts charged in the information do not constitute an
offense with respect to the respondent who is an alien,
Thereafter, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration thereto reiterating respondent’s
obligation to support their child under Article 195 of the Family Code, thus, failure to do so
makes him liable under R.A. No. 9262 which "equally applies to all persons in the Philippines
who are obliged to support their minor children regardless of the obligor’s nationality."
The RTC-Cebu issued an Order denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, the
present Petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUE:
Does a foreign national have an obligation to support his minor child under our Philippine
Law?

RULING:
A foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child. Petitioner cannot rely on Article
195 of the New Civil Code in demanding support from respondent, who is a foreign citizen,
since Article 15 of the New Civil Code stresses the principle of nationality. In other words,
insofar as Philippine laws are concerned, specifically the provisions of the Family Code on
support, the same only applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies to
foreigners such that they are governed by their national law with respect to family rights
and duties.
The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and duties.
Since the respondent is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands he is subject to the laws of his
country, not to Philippine law, as to whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as well
as the consequencesof his failure to do so.
It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son
under Article 195 of the Family Code as a consequence of the Divorce Covenant obtained in
Holland. This does not, however, mean that respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s
son altogether.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case
has the burden of proving the foreign law. In the present case, respondent hastily concludes
that being a national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of
provision of and capacity to support. While respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in
advancing his position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same.
It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands
does not impose upon the parents the obligation to support their child (either before, during or
after the issuance of a divorce decree). In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national
law of the Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine of processual presumption shall govern.
Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts
will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal law. Thus,
since the law of the Netherlands as regards the obligation to support has not been properly
pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is presumed to be the same with Philippine law,
 which enforces the obligation of parents to support their children and penalizing the non-
compliance therewith. Such obligation is still duly enforceable in the Philippines because it
would be of great injustice to the child to be denied of financial support when the latter is
entitled thereto.
G.R. No. 193707, December 10, 2014
NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of her minor child RODERIGO NORJO VAN
WILSEM,Petitioner, vs. ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM, Respondent.

MAY 27, 2015 BY THE LAWYER'S POST The Facts:

The Comelec Should Also Balance Its Duty “To

Joseph (Timbol) filed his Certificate of Candidacy for member of the Sangguniang Panglunsod on October 5,
2012. On January 17, 2013, he received a notice from the election officer (Dinah Valencia) for him to appear

Ensure That The Electoral Process Is Clean,

before her office for a clarificatory hearing on his certificate of candidacy. During the hearing, Joseph, assisted
by counsel, argued that he was not a nuisance candidate, alleging that in the 2010 elections, he ranked

Honest, Orderly, And Peaceful” With The Right Of

8th among all the candidates for the sangguniang panglunsod, and he had sufficient resources to sustain his
campaign. While his name already appeared in the list of nuisance candidates in the Comelec website, the panel
assured him that his certificate of candidacy would be given due course and his name deleted in the list of
A Candidate To Explain His Or Her Bona Fide
nuisance candidates. Indeed, the election officer thru a Memorandum dated January 17, 2013 recommended
that Joseph’s COC be given due course. Despite the recommendation, his name was not deleted from the list,
Intention To Run For Public Office Before He Or
and since the printing of ballots for the automated election will be held on February 4, 2013, he filed before the
COMELEC on February 2, 2013 a petition praying that his name be included in the certified list of candidtaes. By
She Is Declared A Nuisance Candidate…
a Minute Resolution issued on February 5, 2013, , the COMELEC denied his petition, averring that it became moot
and academic with the beginning of the printing of ballots. Aggrieved, Josph field a petition for certiorari before
the Supreme Court, arguing that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it declared him a
nuisance candidate, even before the hearing officer conducted the clarificatory hearing on his certificate of
candidacy. In its comment, the Comelec argued that the petition had become moot and academic with the
conduct of the 2013 elections. Even assuming it is not yet moot and academic, the Comelec did not deprive him
of due process as he was given the opportunity to be heard during the clarificatory hearing. The Supreme Court
ordered Joseph to file his Reply, and subsequently his counsel but both failed, hence the court submitted the
case for decision even without the Reply.
The Issue:
1. Whether the case is moot and academic.
2. Whether the Comelec gravely abused its discretion in denying due course to the certificate
of candidacy of Joseph.
The Court’s ruling:
We deny the Petition.
I
This case is moot and academic.
A case is moot and academic if it “ceases to present a justiciable controversy because of
supervening events so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or
value.”1 When a case is moot and academic, this court generally declines jurisdiction over
it.2
There are recognized exceptions to this rule. This court has taken cognizance of moot and
academic cases when:
(1) there was a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) the case involved a situation of
exceptional character and was of paramount public interest; (3) the issues raised required the
formulation of controlling principles to guide the Bench, the Bar and the public; and (4) the
case was capable of repetition yet evading review. (Citation omitted)
We may no longer act on petitioner’s prayer that his name be included in the certified list of
candidates and be printed on the ballots as a candidate for Member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod. Petitioner filed with this court his Petition for Certiorari on March 15, 2013, 39
days after respondent began printing the ballots on February 4, 2013. Also, the May 13, 2013
elections had been concluded, with the winners already proclaimed.

That this case is moot and academic, however, does not preclude us from setting forth
“controlling and authoritative doctrines”3 to be observed by respondent in motu
proprio denying due course to or cancelling certificates of candidacy of alleged nuisance
candidates. This motu proprio authority is always subject to the alleged nuisance candidate’s
opportunity to be heard4 — an essential element of procedural due process.5
II
Respondent’s power to motu proprio deny due course to a certificate of candidacy is subject
to the candidate’s opportunity to be heard.
Under Article II, Section 26 of the Constitution, “[t]he State shall guarantee equal access to
opportunities for public service[.]” This, however, does not guarantee “a constitutional right to
run for or hold public office[.]”6 To run for public office is a mere “privilege subject to limitations
imposed by law.”7 Among these limitations is the prohibition on nuisance candidates.
Nuisance candidates are persons who file their certificates of candidacy “to put the election
process in mockery or disrepute or to cause confusion among the voters by the similarity of
the names of the registered candidates or by other circumstances or acts which clearly
demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide intention to run for the office for which the
certificate of candidacy has been filed and thus prevent a faithful determination of the true will
of the electorate.8 In Pamatong v. Commission on Elections,9 this court explained why
nuisance candidates are prohibited from running for public office:
. . . The State has a compelling interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational,
objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into account the practical
considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates, the
greater the opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of
time and resources in preparation for the election. These practical difficulties should, of
course, never exempt the State from the conduct of a mandated electoral exercise. At the
same time, remedial actions should be available to alleviate these logistical hardships,
whenever necessary and proper. Ultimately, a disorderly election is not merely a textbook
example of inefficiency, but a rot that erodes faith in our democratic institutions. . . .
. . . The organization of an election with bona fide candidates standing is onerous enough. To
add into the mix candidates with no serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable campaign
would actually impair the electoral process. This is not to mention the candidacies which are
palpably ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note joke. The poll body would be bogged by
irrelevant minutiae covering every step of the electoral process, most probably posed at the
instance of these nuisance candidates. It would be a senseless sacrifice on the part of the
State.10
To minimize the logistical confusion caused by nuisance candidates, their certificates of
candidacy may be denied due course or cancelled by respondent. This denial or cancellation
may be “motu proprio or upon a verified petition of an interested party,”11 “subject to an
opportunity to be heard.”12

The opportunity to be heard is a chance “to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.”13 In election cases, due process
requirements are satisfied “when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain their side of the controversy at hand.”14
In Cipriano v. Commission on Elections,15 this court explained:
[T]he determination whether a candidate is eligible for the position he is seeking involves a
determination of fact where both parties must be allowed to adduce evidence in support of
their contentions. Because the resolution of such fact may result to a deprivation of one’s right
to run for public office, or, as in this case, one’s right to hold public office, it is only proper and
fair that the candidate concerned be notified of the proceedings against him and that he be
given the opportunity to refute the allegations against him. It should be stressed that it is not
sufficient, as the COMELEC claims, that the candidate be notified of the Commission’s inquiry
into the veracity of the contents of his certificate of candidacy, but he must also be allowed to
present his own evidence to prove that he possesses the qualifications for the office he
seeks.16
Respondent commits grave abuse of discretion if it denies due course to or cancels a
certificate of candidacy without affording the candidate an opportunity to be heard17.
Respondent declared petitioner a nuisance candidate without giving him a chance to explain
his bona fide intention to run for office. Respondent had already issued Resolution No. 9610
on January 11, 2013 when petitioner appeared before Election Officer Valencia in a
clarificatory hearing on January 17, 2013. This was an ineffective opportunity to be heard.
That petitioner was able to file a Petition for inclusion in the certified list of candidates did not
cure the defect in the issuance of Resolution No. 9610. First, he would not have to file the
Petition had been given an opportunity to be heard in the first place. Second, in the Minute
Resolution dated February 5, 2013, respondent denied petitioner’s Petition on the sole
ground that the printing of ballots had already begun on February 4, 2013.
We understand the “insurmountable and tremendous operational constraints and costs
implications”18 of reprinting ballots had respondent ordered the inclusion of petitioner’s name
in the certified list if candidates. The ballots already printed would have to be recalled,
leading to the waste of the ballots previously printed. It should be noted that these ballots are
special as the have the capability of being optically scanned by Precinct Count Optical Scan
machines. Reprinting another batch of ballots would, indeed, be costly.
Still, “automation is not the end-all and be-all of an electoral process.”19 Respondent should
also balance its duty “to ensure that the electoral process is clean, honest, orderly, and
peaceful”20 with the right of a candidate to explain his or her bona fide intention to run for
public office before he or she is declared a nuisance candidate.
III
Counsel for petitioner must be fined for failure to comply with the Show Cause Resolution
dated September 2, 2014.
Atty. Aspiras, counsel for petitioner, failed to obtain the injunctive reliefs prayed for in time for
the May 13, 2013 elections. However, this was no reason for him to defy our orders to file a
reply on behalf of his client. for such contumacious acts, he should be ordered to show cause
why he should not be proceeded with administratively.
WHEREFORE, this Petition for Certiorari is DENIED for being moot and academic.
Moreover, Atty. Jose Ventura Aspiras is ORDERED to show cause within a non-extendible
period of ten (10) days from receipt of this Resolution why he should not be the subject of
administrative actions for his contumacious attitude towards repeated orders of this court,
specifically, for his failure to comply with the Resolutions dated August 6, 2013 and
September 2, 2013. The action against Atty. Jose Ventura Aspiras will be docketed as a new
and separate administrative case.
Let a copy of this decision be given to the Office of the Bar Confidant for the initiation of the
proper disciplinary action against Atty. Jose Ventura Aspiras.
SO ORDERED.