People vs.

Pomar (case digest)

46 Phil 440 November 3, 1924

FACTS: Julio Pomar, the manager and person - in – charge of La Flor de la Isabela, a tobacco factory pertaining to
La Campania General de Tabacos de Filipinas, a corporation duly authorized to transact business in Manila,
employed Macaria Fajardo as cigar – maker. She was granted a vacation leave beginning July 16, 1923 by reason of
pregnancy. On October 26, 1923 a case was filed against defendant Pomar for failing to pay Fajardo her regular
wages corresponding to 30 days before and 30 days after her delivery and confinement, in accordance with the
provision of Act. 3071 which states that; “ Section 13 - Every person, firm or corporation owning or managing a
factory, shop or place of labor of any description shall be obliged to grant to any woman employed by it as laborer
who may be pregnant, thirty days vacation with pay before and another thirty days after confinement: Provided, That
the employer shall not discharge such laborer without just cause, under the penalty of being required to pay to her
wages equivalent to the total of two months counted from the day of her discharge.”. The judge found the defendant
guilty of the alleged offense. From that sentence, the defendant appealed contending that his act did not constitute
any offense because such provision of the Act No. 3071 is unconstitutional.

ISSUE: Whether or not Act No. 3071 is unconstitutional

HELD: Yes, Act No. 3071 is unconstitutional. Such Act violates the right to enter into a lawful contract.

The right to enter into lawful contracts constitutes one of the liberties provided by the constitution for the
people of the State. Being such a right, it should not therefore be arbitrarily interfered with. Even though it
has been contended that Act No. 3071 is within the police power of the State, such power cannot be
exercised in violation to the Constitution which is the fundamental and supreme law of the land.

(Labor Standards: Police Power, basis of social legislation)

FACTS: Julio Pomar is the manager and person in charge of La Flor de la Isabela, a tobacco factory pertaining to La
Campania General de Tabacos de Filipinas, a corporation duly authorized to transact business in the City of Manila.
under his employ is Macaria Fajardo, whom he granted vacation leave by reason of her pregnancy. However, Pomar
did not pay her the wages she is entitled to corresponding to 30 days before and 30 days after her delivery and
confinement. Despite demands made by her, Pomar still refused to pay Fajardo.

The CFI found Pomar guilty of violating section 13 in connection with section 15 of Act No. 3071. POmar appealed
questioning the constitutionality of the Act.

Said section 13 was enacted by the Legislature of the Philippine Islands in the exercise of its supposed police power,
with the praiseworthy purpose of safeguarding the health of pregnant women laborers in “factory, shop or place of
labor of any description,” and of insuring to them, to a certain extent, reasonable support for one month before and
one month after their delivery.

ISSUE: Whether or not Act 3071 has been adopted in the reasonable and lawful exercise of the police power of the
state.
RULING: The police power of the state is a growing and expanding power. As civilization develops and public
conscience becomes awakened, the police power may be extended, as has been demonstrated in the growth of
public sentiment with reference to the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors. But that power cannot grow faster
than the fundamental law of the state, nor transcend or violate the express inhibition of the people’s law – the
constitution. If the people desire to have the police power extended and applied to conditions and things prohibited by
the organic law, they must first amend that law.

It will also be noted from an examination of said section 13, that it takes no account of contracts for the employment
of women by the day nor by the piece. The law is equally applicable to each case. It will hardly be contended that the
person, firm or corporation owning or managing a factory, shop or place of labor, who employs women by the day or
by the piece, could be compelled under the law to pay for sixty days during which no services were rendered.

For all of the foregoing reasons, we are fully persuaded, under the facts and the law, that the provisions of section
13, of Act No. 3071 of the Philippine Legislature, are unconstitutional and void.

Therefore, the sentence of the lower court is hereby revoked, the complaint is hereby dismissed.

FACTS: Macaria Fajardo was an employee of La Flor de la Isabela, a Tobacco factory. She was granted a vacation
leave, by reason of her pregnancy, which commenced on the 16th of July 1923. According to Fajardo, during that
time, she was not given the salary due her in violation of the provisions of Act No. 3071. Fajardo filed a criminal
complaint based on Section 13 and 15 of said Act against the manager of the tobacco Factory, Julio Pomar, herein
defendant. The latter, on the other hand, claims that the facts in the complaint did not constitute an offense and
further alleges that the aforementioned provisions of Act No. 3071 was unconstitutional. Section 13, Act No. 3071
provides that, “Every person, firm or corporation owning or managing a factory, shop or place of labor of any
description shall be obliged to grant to any woman employed by it as laborer who may be pregnant, thirty days
vacation with pay before and another thirty days after confinement: Provided, That the employer shall not discharge
such laborer without just cause, under the penalty of being required to pay to her wages equivalent to the total of two
months counting from the day of her discharge.” Section 15 of the same Act provides for the penalty of any violation
of section 13. The latter was enacted by the legislature in the exercise of its supposed Police Power with the purpose
of safeguarding the health of pregnant women laborers in "factory, shop or place of labor of any description," and of
insuring to them, to a certain extent, reasonable support for one month before and one month after their delivery. The
trial court rendered a decision in favor of plaintiff, sentencing the defendant to pay the fine of fifty pesos and in case
of insolvency, to suffer subsidiary imprisonment. Hence, the case was raised to the Court of Appeals which affirmed
the former decision.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not Section 13 of Act No. 3071 is unconstitutional; (2) Whether or not the promulgation of
the questioned provision was a valid exercise of Police Power.

HELD: The Supreme Court declared Section 13 of Act No. 3071 to be unconstitutional for being violative or restrictive
of the right of the people to freely enter into contracts for their affairs. It has been decided several times, that the right
to contract about one's affairs is a part of the liberty of the individual, protected by the "due process of law" clause of
the constitution. The contracting parties may establish any agreements, terms, and conditions they may deem
advisable, provided they are not contrary to law, morals or public policy

The police power of the state is a very broad and expanding power. The police power may encompass every law for
the restraint and punishment of crimes, for the preservation of the public peace, health, and morals. But that power
cannot grow faster than the fundamental law of the state, nor transcend or violate the express inhibition of the
constitution. The Police Power is subject to and is controlled by the paramount authority of the constitution of the
state, and will not be permitted to violate rights secured or guaranteed by the latter.