G.R. No.

L-29972 January 26, 1976

ROSARIO CARBONELL
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE PONCIO, EMMA INFANTE and RAMON INFANTE

FACTS:

Respondent Poncio was the owner of a parcel of land situated at Rizal. The said land
subject to mortgage in favor of Republic Savings Bank. Both Petitioner Carbonell and Respondent
Infante offered to buy the said lot from Poncio. Poncio offered to sell the land to petitioner
Carbonell excluding the house wherein the former lived. Carbonell accepted the offer and
proposed the price of P9.50/sq.m to Poncio in which the latter had agreed on the condition that
the money to be paid in the bank would come from the purchase price.

On January 27, 1955, petitioner and Respondent Poncio had made and executed a
document (in Batanes Dialect) which reads: “CONTRACT FOR ONE HALF LOT WHICH I BOUGHT
FROM PONCIO”. Thereafter, petitioner asked a lawyer to prepare the formal deed of sale, which
she brought to respondent Poncio together with the balance of P400.00.

However when he arrived at Poncio’s house, the latter told her that he could no longer
proceed with the sale because he had already sold the lot to respondent Emma Infante. Petitioner
then sought to contact respondent Mrs. Infante but the latter refused to see her.

Poncio admitted that on January 30, 1955, Mrs. Infante improved her offer and he agreed
to sell the land and its improvements to her for P3,535.00. In a private memorandum agreement
dated January 31, 1955, respondent Poncio indeed bound himself to sell the same to his
corespondent Emma Infante.

On February 2, 1955, respondent Poncio executed the formal deed of sale in favor of
respondent Mrs. Infante .

Upon gaining knowledge that the sale to Infante was not yet registered, petitioner thru
counsel has filed an adverse claim on the said property on February 8, 1955. Hence, the deed of
sale in favor of respondent Mrs. Infante was registered only on February 12, 1955. The title issued
to the latter has an annotation of the adverse claim filed by petitioner. Thereafter, respondent
Infante immediately took possession of the lot and built a house thereof.

On June 1, 1955, petitioner Carbonell, thru counsel, filed a second amended complaint
against private respondents, praying that she be declared the lawful owner of the questioned
parcel of land; that the subsequent sale to respondents Infante be declared null and void, and
that respondent Poncio be ordered to execute the corresponding deed of conveyance of said
land in her favor.

The RTC has rendered a decision in favor of Petitioner declaring that the sale between
Respondents Poncio and Infante null and void. However, after a re-trial, the lower court reversed
its previous ruling. The Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the lower court and decided in favor
of the petitioner. Thus, a motion for reconsideration was filed by the Respondents. The CA reversed
its decision.

Hence, this appeal by certiorari.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT CARBONELL HAS A SUPERIOR RIGHT OVER EMMA INFANTE.

HELD:
Article 1544, New Civil Code, which is decisive of this case, recites:
 If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be
transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it
should movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring
it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith
was first in the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title,
provided there is good faith.

It is essential that the buyer of realty must act in good faith in registering his deed of sale to
merit the protection of the second paragraph of said Article 1544.

Unlike the first and third paragraphs of said Article 1544, which accord preference to the
one who first takes possession in good faith of personal or real property, the second paragraph
directs that ownership of immovable property should be recognized in favor of one "who in good
faith first recorded" his right. Under the first and third paragraph, good faith must characterize the
act of anterior registration (DBP vs. Mangawang, et al., 11 SCRA 405; Soriano, et al. vs. Magale, et
al., 8 SCRA 489).

If there is no inscription, what is decisive is prior possession in good faith. If there is inscription,
as in the case at bar, prior registration in good faith is a pre-condition to superior title.

When Carbonell bought the lot from Poncio on January 27, 1955, she was the only buyer
thereof and the title of Poncio was still in his name solely encumbered by bank mortgage duly
annotated thereon. Carbonell was not aware — and she could not have been aware — of any
sale of Infante as there was no such sale to Infante then. Hence, Carbonell's prior purchase of the
land was made in good faith. Her good faith subsisted and continued to exist when she recorded
her adverse claim four (4) days prior to the registration of Infantes's deed of sale. Carbonell's good
faith did not cease after Poncio told her on January 31, 1955 of his second sale of the same lot to
Infante. Because of that information, Carbonell wanted an audience with Infante, which desire
underscores Carbonell's good faith. With an aristocratic disdain unworthy of the good breeding
of a good Christian and good neighbor, Infante snubbed Carbonell like a leper and refused to
see her. So Carbonell did the next best thing to protect her right — she registered her adversed
claim on February 8, 1955. Under the circumstances, this recording of her adverse claim should
be deemed to have been done in good faith and should emphasize Infante's bad faith when she
registered her deed of sale four (4) days later on February 12, 1955.

(Yung nasa Nota Bene Pwede mo na ito hindi isulat, basahin mo na lang)

NOTA BENE:
Bad faith arising from previous knowledge by Infante of the prior sale to Carbonell is shown by the
following facts:

1. Mrs. Infante refused to see Carbonell, who wanted to see Infante after she was informed
by Poncio that he sold the lot to Infante but several days before Infante registered her
deed of sale. Ordinarily, one will not refuse to see a neighbor. Infante lives just behind the
house of Carbonell.
2. Carbonell was already in possession of the mortgage passbook and Poncio's copy of the
mortgage contract. Infante naturally must have demanded from Poncio the delivery to
her of his mortgage passbook as well as Poncio's mortgage contract so that the fact of full
payment of his bank mortgage will be entered therein; and Poncio, as well as the bank,
must have inevitably informed her that said mortgage passbook could not be given to her
because it was already delivered to Carbonell.
3. The fact that Poncio was no longer in possession of his mortgage passbook and that the
said mortgage passbook was already in possession of Carbonell, should have compelled
Infante to inquire from Poncio why he was no longer in possession of the mortgage
 passbook and from Carbonell why she was in possession of the same (Paglago, et. al vs.
Jara et al 22 SCRA 1247, 1252-1253). Infante snubbed Carbonell's request to talk to her
about the prior sale to her b Poncio of the lot. As aforestated, this is not the attitude
expected of a good neighbor imbued with Christian charity and good will as well as a
clear conscience.
4. Carbonell registered on February 8, 1955 her adverse claim, which was accordingly
annotated on Poncio's title, four [4] days before Infante registered on February 12, 1955
her deed of sale executed on February 2, 1955. Here she was again on notice of the prior
sale to Carbonell.
5. It is therefore logical to presume that Infante was told by Poncio and consequently knew
of the offer of Carbonell which fact likewise should have put her on her guard and should
have compelled her to inquire from Poncio whether or not he had already sold the
property to Carbonell.

x------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985

LORENZO M. TAÑADA VS HON. JUAN C. TUVERA
(EFFECTIVITY OF LAWS)

FACTS:

Petitioners Tanada et al., seek a writ of mandamus, invoking the right of the people to be
informed on matters of public concern as well as the principle that laws to be valid and
enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, to
compel the respondent public officials to publish and/or cause the publication in the Official
Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations,
executive orders, letters of implementations, and administrative order.

Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non
requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity
dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain special
provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not
indispensable for their effectivity.

ISSUE: WON ALL LAWS SHALL BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL GAZETTE BEFORE ITS EFFECTIVITY

HELD:

YES.
The point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code which provides:
“Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided.”

Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the

effectivity of laws with the fact of publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable
to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does not preclude the
requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its
effectivity.

** The clear object of SECTION 1 OF COMMONWEALTH ACT 638 is to give the general public
adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens.
Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim
"ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a
citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a
constructive one. Thus, without publication, the people have no means of knowing what
presidential decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing
themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees. (HUWAG MO NA ISULAT ITONG
PARAGRAPH NA ITO)

The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability"
is mandated by law. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class
of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption
that they have been circularized to all concerned.

It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or
"of general applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person
may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents.

The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which
have not been published, shall have no force and effect.

x-------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 46623 December 7, 1939

MARCIAL KASILAG
vs
RAFAELA RODRIGUEZ, URBANO ROQUE, SEVERO MAPILISAN and IGNACIO DEL ROSARIO
(IGNORANCE OF THE LAW)
FACTS:

On May 16, 1932 Emiliana Ambrosio and petitioner, Marcial Kasilag executed a contract
of mortgage (Exhibit 1) of improvements of land acquired as homestead to secure the payment
of the indebtedness of P1, 000 plus interest. The parties stipulated in the contract that Ambrosio
would pay the debt with interest within a four and one-half (4½) years after date of the execution
of this instrument then said mortgage shall be and become null and void; otherwise the same shall
be and shall remain in full force and effect. Moreover, they agreed that Ambrosio would pay all
the taxes thereof. Furthermore, they agreed that when the mortgagor Ambrosio should fail to
redeem this mortgage, she would execute a deed of absolute sale of the property after the
expiration of the agreed period.

One year after, that is, in 1933, it came to pass that Emiliana Ambrosio was unable to pay
the stipulated interests as well as the tax on the land and its improvements. For this reason, she
and the petitioner entered into another verbal contract whereby she conveyed to the latter the
possession of the land on condition that the latter would not collect the interest on the loan, would
attend to the payment of the land tax, would benefit by the fruits of the land, and would introduce
improvements thereon.

The respondents, children and heirs of the deceased Emiliana Ambrosio, commenced an
action for recovery of possession and improvements in the land against Petitioner Kasilag. The
Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of the respondents. Aggrieved, petitioner filed an appeal with
Court of Appeals in which it modified the decision of the lower court. The Court of Appeals came
to the conclusion and so held that the contract entered into by and between the parties was one
of absolute purchase and sale of the land and its improvements. And upon this ruling it held null
and void and without legal effect the entire Exhibit 1 as well as the subsequent verbal contract
entered into between the parties.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed an appeal.

ISSUE: WON THE PETITIONER SHOULD BE DEEMED A POSSESSOR IN GOOD FAITH BECAUSE HE
WAS UNAWARE OF ANY FLAW IN HIS TITLE OR IN THE MANNER OF ITS ACQUISITION
BY WHICH IT IS INVALIDATED.
WON PETITIONER’S GOOD FAITH MAY BE PREMISED UPON IGNORANCE OF THE LAWS.
RULING: YES.

From the facts found established by the Court of Appeals we can neither deduce nor
presume that the petitioner was aware of a flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition, aside
from the prohibition contained in Section 116 of Act No. 2874, as amended by Section 23 of Act
No. 3517.

(** WAG MO NA ITO ISULAT: SEC. 116. Except in favor of the Government or any of its
branches, units or institutions, or legally constituted banking corporations, lands acquired under
the free patent or homestead provisions shall not be subject to encumbrance or alienation from
the date of the approval of the application and for a term of five years from and after the date
of issuance of the patent or grant, nor shall they become liable to the satisfaction of any debt
contracted prior to the expiration of said period; but the improvements or crops on the land may
be mortgaged or pledged to qualified persons, associations, or corporations.)

According to this Manresa, gross and inexcusable ignorance of law may not be the basis
of good faith, but possible, excusable ignorance may be such basis. It is a fact that the petitioner
is not conversant with the laws because he is not a lawyer. In accepting the mortgage of the
improvements he proceeded on the well-grounded belief that he was not violating the prohibition
regarding the alienation of the land. In taking possession thereof and in consenting to receive its
fruits, he did not know, as clearly as a jurist does, that the possession and enjoyment of the fruits
are attributes of the contract of antichresis and that the latter, as a lien, was prohibited by section
116. These considerations again bring us to the conclusion that, as to the petitioner, his ignorance
of the provisions of section 116 is excusable and may, therefore, be the basis of his good faith. We,
therefore, hold that the petitioner acted in good faith in taking possession of the land and enjoying
its fruits.

x---------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. L-68385 May 12, 1989

ILDEFONSO O. ELEGADO vs. HON. COURT OF TAX APPEALS and COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE
(IGNORANCE OF THE LAW)

FACTS:

On March 1976, Warren Taylor Graham died in U.S.A. He left shares of stock in the
Philippines so his son, Ward Graham, filed an estate tax in U.S.A. On January 18, 1977, the
decedent's will had been admitted to probate in Oregon. Ward Graham, the designated
executor, then appointed Ildefonso Elegado, the herein petitioner, as his attorney-in-fact for the
allowance of the will in the Philippines. On the basis of the return, respondent Commissioner of
Internal Revenue assessed the decedent's estate an estate tax on February 9, 1978. The
assessment was protested but was denied by the CIR.

Petitioner commenced probate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. The will
was allowed on December 18, 1978, with the petitioner as ancillary administrator. As such, he filed
a second estate tax return with the Bureau of Internal Revenue on June 1980. The Commissioner
imposed an assessment on the estate. This was also protested. While the protest was pending, the
Commissioner filed in the probate proceedings a motion for the allowance of the basic estate tax
as assessed on February 9, 1978.
 Petitioner regarded this act as an implied denial by the Commissioner thus, he filed a
petition for review with the Court of Tax Appeals challenging the said assessment. The
Commissioner, instead of filing his answer, cancelled the protested assessment. And the latter filed
a motion to dismiss which was granted the CTA.

Aggrieved, Petitioner filed an appeal by certiorari.

ISSUE: WON PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT THAT THE FIRST ASSESSMENT IS NOT BINDING ON HIM
BECAUSE IT WAS BASED ON A RETURN FILED BY FOREIGN LAWYERS WHO HAD NO
KNOWLEDGE OF OUR TAX LAWS OR ACCESS TO THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS IS
MERITORIOUS

RULING:

The petitioner is clutching at straws.

Petitioner’s contention is no less flimsy. The petitioner cannot be serious when he argues
that the first assessment was invalid because the foreign lawyers who filed the return on which it
was based were not familiar with our tax laws and procedure. Is the petitioner suggesting that
they are excused from compliance therewith because of their ignorance?

If our own lawyers and taxpayers cannot claim a similar preference because they are not
allowed to claim a like ignorance, it stands to reason that foreigners cannot be any less bound by
our own laws in our own country. A more obvious and shallow discrimination than that suggested
by the petitioner is indeed difficult to find.

But the most compelling consideration in this case is the fact that the first assessment is
already final and executory and can no longer be questioned at this late hour. The assessment
was made on February 9, 1978. It was protested on March 7, 1978. The protest was denied on July
7, 1978. As no further action was taken thereon by the decedent's estate, there is no question that
the assessment has become final and executory. In view of the finality of the first assessment, the
petitioner cannot now raise the question of its validity before this Court any more than he could
have done so before the Court of Tax Appeals.

x-------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 120295 June 28, 1996

JUAN G. FRIVALDO
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and RAUL R. LEE
(RETROACTIVITY OF LAWS)

FACTS:

Petitioner Frivaldo and Respondent Lee filed their certificate of candidacy for the office of
Governor of Sorsogan in the May 1995 election. Respondent Lee filed a petition with the Comelec
praying that Frivaldo be disqualified from seeking or holding any public office or position by reason
of not yet being a citizen of the Philippines" and that his Certificate of Candidacy be canceled
which was granted by the COMELEC. The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Frivaldo remained
unacted upon until after the May elections. So, his candidacy continued and he was voted for
during the elections held on said date. On May 11, 1995, the Comelec en banc7 affirmed the
aforementioned Resolution of the Second Division. However, Frivaldo has garnered the highest
number of votes in the said election.
 On June 9, 1995, Respondent Lee filed a petition praying for his proclamation as duly-
elected Governor. The COMELEC En Banc decided in his favor and Lee was proclaimed as
Governor on June 30, 1995.

On July 6, 1995, Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a petition praying for the annulment of the
June 30, 1995 proclamation of Lee and for his own proclamation. He alleged that on June 30,
1995, at 2:00 in the afternoon, he took his oath of allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after
"his petition for repatriation under P.D. 725 which he filed with the Special Committee on
Naturalization in September 1994 had been granted". As such, when "the said order (dated June
21, 1995) (of the Comelec) . . . was released and received by Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 at 5:30
o'clock in the evening, there was no more legal impediment to the proclamation (of Frivaldo) as
governor . . ."

COMELEC granted petitioner Frivaldo’s petition hence Lee filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied by the COMELEC.

Hence, this present petition.

ISSUE: WON FRIVALDO’S REPATRIATION UNDER PD 725 IS VALID AND MAY BE GIVEN A
RETROACTIVE EFFECT

HELD:

On the basis of the parties' submissions, we are convinced that the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty and the presumption of legality in the repatriation of
Frivaldo have not been successfully rebutted by Lee.

But to remove all doubts on this important issue, we also hold that the repatriation of
Frivaldo RETROACTED to the date of the filing of his application on August 17, 1994.

It is true that under the Civil Code of the Philippines, "laws shall have no retroactive effect,
unless the contrary is provided." But there are settled exceptions to this general rule, such as when
the statute is CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in nature or when it CREATES NEW RIGHTS.

A reading of P.D. 725 immediately shows that it creates a new right, and also provides for
a new remedy, thereby filling certain voids in our laws. In this case, P.D. No. 725 was enacted to
cure the defect in the existing naturalization law, specifically C.A. No. 63 wherein married Filipino
women are allowed to repatriate only upon the death of their husbands, and natural-born Filipinos
who lost their citizenship by naturalization and other causes faced the difficulty of undergoing the
rigid procedures of C.A. 63 for reacquisition of Filipino citizenship by naturalization. Presidential
Decree No. 725 provided a remedy for the aforementioned legal aberrations and thus its
provisions are considered essentially remedial and curative.

While it is true that the law was already in effect at the time that Frivaldo became an
American citizen, nevertheless, it is not only the law itself (P.D. 725) which is to be given retroactive
effect, but even the repatriation granted under said law to Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 is to be
deemed to have retroacted to the date of his application therefor, August 17, 1994. The reason
for this is simply that if, as in this case, it was the intent of the legislative authority that the law should
apply to past events in order to benefit the greatest number of former Filipinos possible thereby
enabling them to enjoy and exercise the constitutionally guaranteed right of citizenship, and such
legislative intention is to be given the fullest effect and expression, then there is all the more reason
to have the law apply in a retroactive or retrospective manner to situations, events and
transactions subsequent to the passage of such law. That is, the repatriation granted to Frivaldo
on June 30, 1995 can and should be made to take effect as of date of his application. As earlier
mentioned, there is nothing in the law that would bar this or would show a contrary intention on
the part of the legislative authority; and there is no showing that damage or prejudice to anyone,
or anything unjust or injurious would result from giving retroactivity to his repatriation. Neither has
Lee shown that there will result the impairment of any contractual obligation, disturbance of any
vested right or breach of some constitutional guaranty.
 Being a former Filipino who has served the people repeatedly, Frivaldo deserves a liberal
interpretation of Philippine laws and whatever defects there were in his nationality should now be
deemed mooted by his repatriation.