Angara vs. Electoral Commission, G.R. No. L-45081, July 15, 1936.

FACTS:

The case was an original action filed by Jose Angara for the issuance of writ of prohibition to restrain and
prohibit the Electoral Commission (EC) from taking further cognizance of the protest filed by Pedro Ynsua
against the election of the former.

Jose Angara and Pedro Ynsua, et.al., were candidates for the position of National Assembly member for 1st
district of Tayabas Province.

On October 7, 1935, Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed Angara as the winner. Angara then took his
oath of office. National Assembly passed Resolution No. 8 (Confirming the election of members of the National
Assembly against whom no protest had been filed)

Subsequently, Respondent Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a “Motion of Protest” against the
election of Angara. Electoral Commission adopted a resolution, paragraph 6 of which provides: “The
commission will not consider any protest that is not submitted on or before this day (Dec. 9)”

Angara filed before the Electoral Commission a “Motion to dismiss the protest” on the ground that it must
uphold Resolution No. 8 of National Assembly. Ynsua countered that there is no constitutional prohibition
barring the filing of protest.

The Electoral Commission promulgated a resolution denying the “Motion to dismiss the Protest” filed by
Angara.

ISSUES:
1. WoN the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission as well as the subject matter of the
controversy (Resolution of National Assembly or Resolution of EC) – YES.

2. WoN the Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction when: (1)it assumed cognizance
of the protest

despite the previous confirmation by the National Assembly; (2) it adopted its resolution in Dec. 9 – NO.
3. WoN Resolution No. 8 can “nullify” filing of protest or toll the time of filing protest effectively rendering the
resolution of the Electoral Commission moot – NO.

RATIO:

1. On judicial review

“In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to
determine the proper allocation of powers between several departments and among the integral or constituent
units thereof.”

Sec. 4 of Art VI provides EC the sole power of deciding such matters. Also, from the transcript of the Framers’
discussion, it is clearly the intention of the Framers to give EC “sole” jurisdiction over election protests.

1
Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of powers within its jurisdiction and is supreme
within its own sphere but it does not follow that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained
and independent of each other.

Constitution institutes the system of checks and balances. Moderating power of the court is granted by clear
implication from section 2 article VIII of the Constitution.

The judiciary does not intend to assert superiority over other departments or deliberately nullify of invalidate
acts of the legislature. It merely asserts the obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting
claims for authority under the Constitution and establish rights for the parties.

“Power of judicial review is limited only to actual cases and controversies…and limited further to the
constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented.”

2. On the legality of the Electoral Commission’s acts

National Assembly has no jurisdiction over election protests so it follows that they don’t have the authority to
prescribe the time or prevent the filing of protest. Separation within same branch of government.

Electoral Commission acted within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative. It acted within its
jurisdiction. The EC’s resolution will stand. National Assembly’s Resolution No. 8 should neither prevent the
filing of protest within the time prescribed in EC’s resolution nor “toll the time” in filing protests.

Francisco vs. House of Representatives, G.R. No 160261, November 10, 2003

SEPTEMBER 16, 2018

FACTS:

In late 2001 House of Representatives (HOR) of the 12th Congress adopted its Rules of Procedure in
Impeachment Proceedings. The new rules superseded impeachment Rules of the 11th Congress. Secs. 16
and 17 of these Rules state that impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if House Committee on
Justice deems the complaint sufficient in substance, or (2) if the House itself affirms or overturns the findings of
the House Committee on Justice on the substance of the complaint, or (3) by filing or endorsement before the
HOR Secretary General by one-thirds of the members of the House.

A few months later, HoR passed a resolution directing the Committee on Justice to conduct an investigation, in
aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by Chief Justice Davide of the Judiciary
Development Fund (JDF).”

In June 2003, former President Estrada files the first impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide and
7 Associate Justices of SC for “culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of public trust and other high
crimes.” The complaint was referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003 in accordance with
Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.

On October 13, 2003, the HOR Committee on Justice found the first impeachment complaint “sufficient in
form.” However, it also voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. Ten
days later, on October 23,2003, Teodoro and Fuentebella filed a second impeachment complaint against CJ
2
Davide, founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry on the JDF. The second impeachment
complaint was accompanied by a “resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by at least one-third of all
the Members of the House of Representatives.

Several petitions were filed with the SC by members of the bar, members of the House of Representatives, as
well as private individuals, all asserting their rights, among others, as taxpayers to stop the illegal spending of
public funds for the impeachment proceedings against the Chief Justice. The petitioners contend that Article
XI, Section 3 (5) of the 1987 Constitution bars the filing of the second impeachment complaint. The
constitutional provision states that “(n)o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official
more than once within a period of one year.”

Speaker Jose de Venecia submitted a manifestaiton to the SC stating that the High Court does not have
jurisdiction to hear the case as it would mean an encroachment on the power of HoR, a co-equal branch of
government.

ISSUES/HELD:

1.) Whether the filing of the second impeachment complaint violates Sec. 3(5), Article XI of the Constitution—
YES

2) Whether Sec. 16 & 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings approved by the
HoR are unconstitutional – YES

3.) Whether or not the certiorari jurisdiction of the court may be invoked – YES

RATIO:

1. The second impeachment complaint falls under the one-year bar under the Constitution.

2. Sec 16 and 17 of House Impeachment Rule V are unconstitutional.

The Supreme Court employed three principles in deciding the case:

1) Whenever possible, the words in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning (verbal egis);

2) If there is ambiguity, the Constitution must be interpreted according to the intent of the framers; and

3) The Constitution must be interpreted as a whole.

Applying these principles, to “initiate” in its ordinary acceptation means simply to begin. The records of the
debates by the framers affirm this textual interpretation. From the records of the Constitutional Convention and
the amicus curiae briefs of its two members (Maambong and Regalado), the term “to initiate” in Sec 3(5), Art.
XI of the Constitution refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with taking initial action by
Congress on the complaint.

By contrast, Secs. 16 and 17 state that impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if House Committee
on Justice deems the complaint sufficient in substance, or (2) if the House itself affirms or overturns the
3
findings of the House Committee on Justice on the substance of the complaint, or (3) by filing or endorsement
before the HOR Secretary General by one-thirds of the members of the House.

In this light, Secs. 16 and 17 of the House Rules of Procedure for Impeachment are unconstitutional because
the rules clearly contravene Sec. 3 (5), Art. XI since the rules give the term “initiate” a different meaning from
filing and referral.

Hence, the second impeachment complaint by Teodoro and Fuentebella violates the constitutional one-year
ban.

3. The certiorari jurisdiction of the court may be invoked.

The Supreme Court, in exercising its expanded power of judicial review, only carried out its duty as stated in
Section 1, Article VIII, which mandates the judicial department to look into cases where there has been a grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the different branches of government. Here, it only reviewed the
constitutionality of the Rules of Impeachment against the one-year ban explicitly stated in the Constitution.
Consequently, the contention that judicial review over the case would result in a crisis is unwarranted.

The judiciary, with the Supreme Court at its helm as the final arbiter, effectively checks on the other
departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law. It must declare executive and legislative acts
void if they violate the Constitution. The violation of Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution is thus within the
competence of the Court to decide.

Aglipay v. Ruiz (Case Digest)

Aglipay v. Ruiz, GR No. L-45459, March 13, 1937

Facts:

Petitioner Aglipay, the head of Phil. Independent Church, filed a writ of prohibition against respondent Ruiz, the
Director of Post, enjoining the latter from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the 33rd Intl
Eucharistic Congress organized by the Roman Catholic. The petitioner invokes that such issuance and selling,
as authorized by Act 4052 by the Phil. Legislature, contemplates religious purpose – for the benefit of a
particular sect or church. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the issuing and selling of commemorative stamps is constitutional?

Held/Reason:

The Court said YES, the issuing and selling of commemorative stamps by the respondent does not
contemplate any favor upon a particular sect or church, but the purpose was only ‘to advertise the Philippines
and attract more tourist’ and the government just took advantage of an event considered of international
importance, thus, not violating the Constitution on its provision on the separation of the Church and State.
Moreover, the Court stressed that ‘Religious freedom, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound
reverence for religion and is not denial of its influence in human affairs’. Emphasizing that, ‘when the Filipino
people ‘implored the aid of Divine Providence’, they thereby manifested reliance upon Him who guides the
destinies of men and nations. The elevating influence of religion in human society is recognized here as
elsewhere. In fact, certain general concessions are indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and
denominations.’

4
Case Digest: GR No. 187167

2/2/2015

1 Comment

Prof. Magallona, Hontiveros, Prof. Roque and 38 UP College of Law Students

-vs-

Ermita Exec.Sec., Romulo Sec DFA, Andaya Sec DBM, Ventura Administrator National Mapping & Resource
Information Authority and Davide Jr.

-writ of certiorari and prohibition assailing the constitutionality of RA 9522

Facts:

RA 3046 was passed in 1961 which provides among others the demarcation lines of the baselines of the
Philippines as an archipelago. This is in consonance with UNCLOS I.

RA 5446 amended RA 3046 in terms of typographical errors and included Section 2 in which the government
reserved the drawing of baselines in Sabah in North Borneo.

RA 9522 took effect on March 2009 amending RA 5446. The amendments, which are in compliance with
UNCLOS III in which the Philippines is one of the signatory, shortening one baseline while optimizing the other
and classifying Kalayaan Group of Island and Scarborough Shoal as Regimes of Island.

Petitioners in their capacity as taxpayer, citizen and legislator assailed the constitutionality of RA 9522:- it
reduces the territory of the Philippines in violation to the Constitution and it opens the country to maritime
passage of vessels and aircrafts of other states to the detriment of the economy, sovereignty, national security
and of the Constitution as well. They added that the classification of Regime of Islands would be prejudicial to
the lives of the fishermen.

Issues:

1. WON the petitioners have locus standi to bring the suit; and
2. WON RA 9522 is unconstitutional

Ruling:

Petition is dismissed.

1st Issue:
The SC ruled the suit is not a taxpayer or legislator, but as a citizen suit, since it is the citizens who will be
directly injured and benefitted in affording relief over the remedy sought.
5
2nd Issue:
The SC upheld the constitutionality of RA 9522.

First, RA 9522 did not delineate the territory the Philippines but is merely a statutory tool to demarcate the
country’s maritime zone and continental shelf under UNCLOS III. SC emphasized that UNCLOS III is not a
mode of acquiring or losing a territory as provided under the laws of nations. UNCLOS III is a multi-lateral
treaty that is a result of a long-time negotiation to establish a uniform sea-use rights over maritime zones (i.e.,
the territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical miles from the
baselines], exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles from the baselines]), and continental shelves. In order
to measure said distances, it is a must for the state parties to have their archipelagic doctrines measured in
accordance to the treaty—the role played by RA 9522. The contention of the petitioner that RA 9522 resulted
to the loss of 15,000 square nautical miles is devoid of merit. The truth is, RA 9522, by optimizing the location
of base points, increased the Philippines total maritime space of 145,216 square nautical miles.

Second, the classification of KGI and Scarborough Shoal as Regime of Islands is consistent with the
Philippines’ sovereignty. Had RA 9522 enclosed the islands as part of the archipelago, the country will be
violating UNCLOS III since it categorically stated that the length of the baseline shall not exceed 125 nautical
miles. So what the legislators did is to carefully analyze the situation: the country, for decades, had been
claiming sovereignty over KGI and Scarborough Shoal on one hand and on the other hand they had to
consider that these are located at non-appreciable distance from the nearest shoreline of the Philippine
archipelago. So, the classification is in accordance with the Philippines sovereignty and State’s responsible
observance of its pacta sunt servanda obligation under UNCLOS III.

Third, the new base line introduced by RA 9522 is without prejudice with delineation of the baselines of the
territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the
Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty.

And lastly, the UNCLOS III and RA 9522 are not incompatible with the Constitution’s delineation of internal
waters. Petitioners contend that RA 9522 transformed the internal waters of the Philippines to archipelagic
waters hence subjecting these waters to the right of innocent and sea lanes passages, exposing the Philippine
internal waters to nuclear and maritime pollution hazards. The Court emphasized that the Philippines exercises
sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of the baselines, including the air space over it and the
submarine areas underneath, regardless whether internal or archipelagic waters. However, sovereignty will not
bar the Philippines to comply with its obligation in maintaining freedom of navigation and the generally
accepted principles of international law. It can be either passed by legislator as a municipal law or in the
absence thereof, it is deemed incorporated in the Philippines law since the right of innocent passage is a
customary international law, thus automatically incorporated thereto.

This does not mean that the states are placed in a lesser footing; it just signifies concession of archipelagic
states in exchange for their right to claim all waters inside the baseline. In fact, the demarcation of the
baselines enables the Philippines to delimit its exclusive economic zone, reserving solely to the Philippines the
exploitation of all living and non-living resources within such zone. Such a maritime delineation binds the
international community since the delineation is in strict observance of UNCLOS III. If the maritime delineation
is contrary to UNCLOS III, the international community will of course reject it and will refuse to be bound by it.

The Court expressed that it is within the Congress who has the prerogative to determine the passing of a law

6
and not the Court. Moreover, such enactment was necessary in order to comply with the UNCLOS III;
otherwise, it shall backfire on the Philippines for its territory shall be open to seafaring powers to freely enter
and exploit the resources in the waters and submarine areas around our archipelago and it will weaken the
country’s case in any international dispute over Philippine maritime space.

The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine archipelago and adjacent areas, as
embodied in RA 9522, allows an internationally-recognized delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines’
maritime zones and continental shelf. RA 9522 is therefore a most vital step on the part of the Philippines in
safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent with the Constitution and our national interest.

MELCHORA CABANAS v. FRANCISCO PILAPIL, GR NO. L-25843, 1974-07-25

Facts:

The insured, Florentino Pilapil had a child, Millian Pilapil, with a married woman, the plaintiff, Melchora
Cabanas. She was ten years old at the time the complaint was... filed on October 10, 1964. The defendant,
Francisco Pilapil, is the brother of the deceased. The deceased insured himself and instituted as beneficiary,
his child, with his brother to act as trustee during her minority. Upon his death, the proceeds were paid to...
him. Hence this complaint by the mother, with whom the child is living, seeking the delivery of such sum. She
filed the bond required by the Civil Code. Defendant would justify his claim to the retention of the amount in
question by invoking the terms of the... insurance policy.[2]

Issues:

The dispute centers as to who of them... should be entitled to act as trustee thereof

Ruling:

WHEREFORE, the decision of May 10, 1965 is affirmed

Principles:

It is buttressed by its adherence to the concept that the judiciary, as an agency of the State acting as parens
patriae, is called upon whenever a pending suit of litigation affects one who is a... minor to accord priority to his
best interest. It may happen, as it did occur here, that family relations may press their respective claims. It
would be more in consonance not only with the natural order of things but the tradition of the country for a
parent to be... preferred. It could have been different if the conflict were between father and mother. Such is
not the case at all. It is a mother asserting priority. Certainly, the judiciary as the instrumentality of the State in
its role of parens patriae... cannot remain insensible to the validity of her plea. In a recent case,[9] there is this
quotation from an opinion of the United States Supreme Court: "This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent
in the supreme power of every State, whether... that power is lodged in a royal person or in the legislature, and
has no affinity to those arbitrary powers which are sometimes exerted by irresponsible monarchs to the great
detriment of the people and the destruction of their liberties." What is more, there is this... constitutional
provision vitalizing this concept. It reads: "The State shall strengthen the family as a basic social
institution."[10] If, as the Constitution so wisely dictates, it is the family as a unit that has to be strengthened, it
does not... admit of doubt that even if a stronger case were presented for the uncle, still deference to a
constitutional mandate would have led the lower court to decide as it did.

CASE DIGEST : REPUBLIC vs VILLASOR

G.R. No. L-30671 November 28, 1973 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. GUILLERMO
P. VILLASOR, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch I, THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF
RIZAL, THE SHERIFF OF QUEZON CITY, and THE SHERIFF OF THE CITY OF MANILA, THE CLERK OF
COURT, Court of First Instance of Cebu, P. J. KIENER CO., LTD., GAVINO UNCHUAN, AND
INTERNATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, respondents.

7
Facts: On July 7, 1969, a decision was rendered in Special Proceedings No. 2156-R infavor of respondents
P.J. Kiener Co., Ltd., Gavino Unchuan, and InternationalConstruction Corporation and against petitioner
confirming the arbitration award in theamount of P1,712,396.40.The award is for the satisfactionof a judgment
against thePhlippine Government.On June 24, 1969, respondent Honorable Guillermo Villasor issued an
Orderdeclaring thedecision final and executory.Villasor directed the Sheriffs of RizalProvince, Quezon City as
well as Manilato execute said decision.The Provincial Sheriffof Rizal served Notices of Garnishment with
several Banks,specially on PhilippineVeterans Bank and PNB.The funds of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines on deposit with PhilippineVeterans Bank andPNB are public funds duly appropriated and allocated
for thepayment of pensions of retirees, pay andallowances of military and civilian personneland for
maintenance and operations of the AFP.Petitioner, on certiorari, filed prohibition proceedings against
respondent JudgeVillasor for acting in excess of jurisdiction with grave abuse of discretion amounting tolack of
jurisdiction in grantingthe issuance of a Writ of Execution against the propertiesof the AFP, hence the notices
and garnishment arenull and void.

Issue: Is the Writ of Execution issued by Judge Villasor valid?

Held: What was done by respondent Judge is not in conformity with the dictates of theConstitution.It isa
fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristicconcept of sovereignty that the stateas well
as its government is immune from suitunless it gives its consent.A sovereign is exempt from suit,not because
of any formalconception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that therecan beno legal
right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.The State may not be sued
without its consent. A corollary, both dictated by logicand soundsense from a basic concept is that public funds
cannot be the object of agarnishment proceeding even if theconsent to be sued had been previously granted
andthe state liability adjudged.The universal rule that wherethe State gives its consent tobe sued by private
parties either by general or special law, it may limitclaimant’s actiononly up to the completion of proceedings
anterior to the stage of execution and thatthepower of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since
the government fundsand properties maynot be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy
suchjudgments, is based on obviousconsiderations of public policy.Disbursements of publicfunds must be
covered by the correspondingappropriation as required by law.Thefunctions and public services rendered by
the State cannot be allowedto be paralyzedor disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate
and specific objects,asappropriated by law

Pedro Syquia et. al. vs. Natividad Almeda Lopez, Et. al. G.R. No. L-1648 August 17, 1949

Pedro Syquia et. al. vs. Natividad Almeda Lopez, Et. al. G.R. No. L-1648 August 17, 1949

Facts: Petitioners Pedro, Gonzalo and Leopoldo Syquia are joint owners of properties in Manila, namely, the
North Qyauia Apartments, South Syquia Apartments and Michel Apartments. In 1945, they executed contracts
for lease of the apartments to USA, with the term being until the war has ended and six months after, or unless
terminated sooner by USA, as the buildings were used for billeting and quartering officers of te US armed
forces stationed in the Manila Area. George Moore, a Commanding General of the US Army, and Erland
Tillman, Chief of the Real Estate Division to the US Army in Manila who was under the command of Moore,
was said to be in control of the apartment buildings and had authority in the name of USA to assign officers of
the army to the buildings or order them to vacuate the same. When Japan surrendered on September 2, 1945,
the lease would be terminated six months after. The petitioners approached the predecessors of Moore and
8
Tillman and requested the buildings to be returned to them, as per contract agreement. However, they were
advised that the US Army wanted to continue their occupancy of the buildings, and refused to execute new
leases but advised that they will vacate the premises before February 1, 1947, not the original terms of the
contract agreement. Petitioner-plaintiffs sued before the Municipal Court of Manila with the demand to get the
properties as their agreement supposedly expired, and furthermore asked for increased rentals until the
premises were vacated. Respondent-defendants were part of the armed forces of the US moved to dismiss the
suit for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the court. The MC of Manila granted the motion to dismiss the suit,
sustained by the CFI of Manila, hence the petition for certiorari.

Issue: Whether the Philippine Courts have a lack of jurisdiction, considering, under the doctrine of Sovereign
Immunity, that USA has not given their consent to be a respondent.

Ruling: The case was dismissed, the Supreme Court affirming in majority the decision of the Municipal Court of
Manila.

Reason: Considering the circumstances, the real defendant party is the United States of America, as it was the
U.S. Army who were occupying the buildings, with the rent being paid for by their government. USA has not
given their consent to be sued in this case, and any action against them without the consent would constitue a
lack of jurisdiction.

Case Digest: KHOSROW MINUCHER vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ARTHUR SCALZO (G.R. No.
142396 February 11, 2003)

Facts

Violation of the “Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,” was filed against Minucher following a “buy-bust operation”
conducted by Philippine police narcotic agents accompanied by Scalzo in the house of Minucher, an Iranian
national, where heroin was said to have been seized. Minucher was later acquitted by the court.

Minucher later on filed for damages due to trumped-up charges of drug trafficking made by Arthur Scalzo.

Scalzo on his counterclaims that he had acted in the discharge of his official duties as being merely an agent of
the Drug Enforcement Administration of the United States Department of Justice.

Scalzo subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that, being a special agent of the
United States Drug Enforcement Administration, he was entitled to diplomatic immunity. He attached to his
motion Diplomatic Note of the United States Embassy addressed to DOJ of the Philippines and a Certification
of Vice Consul Donna Woodward, certifying that the note is a true and faithful copy of its original. Trial court
denied the motion to dismiss.

ISSUE

Whether or not Arthur Scalzo is indeed entitled to diplomatic immunity.

RULLING

9
YES.

A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from suit as long as it can be
established that he is acting within the directives of the sending state.

The consent or imprimatur of the Philippine government to the activities of the United States Drug Enforcement
Agency, however, can be gleaned from the undisputed facts in the case.

The official exchanges of communication between agencies of the government of the two countries

Certifications from officials of both the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs and the United States Embassy

Participation of members of the Philippine Narcotics Command in the “buy-bust operation” conducted at the
residence of Minucher at the behest of Scalzo

These may be inadequate to support the “diplomatic status” of the latter but they give enough indication that
the Philippine government has given its imprimatur, if not consent, to the activities within Philippine territory of
agent Scalzo of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency.

The job description of Scalzo has tasked him to conduct surveillance on suspected drug suppliers and, after
having ascertained the target, to inform local law enforcers who would then be expected to make the arrest.

In conducting surveillance activities on Minucher, later acting as the poseur-buyer during the buy-bust
operation, and then becoming a principal witness in the criminal case against Minucher,

Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted beyond the scope of his official function or duties.

MOST REV. PEDRO ARIGO, et. al., Petitioners,

vs.

SCOTT H. SWIFT, et. al., Respondents.

G.R. No. 206510 September 16, 2014

PONENTE: Villarama

TOPIC: Writ of kalikasan, UNCLOS, Immunity from suit

FACTS:

The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US Navy. In December
2012, the US Embassy in the Philippines requested diplomatic clearance for the said vessel “to enter and exit
the territorial waters of the Philippines and to arrive at the port of Subic Bay for the purpose of routine ship
replenishment, maintenance, and crew liberty.” On January 6, 2013, the ship left Sasebo, Japan for Subic Bay,
arriving on January 13, 2013 after a brief stop for fuel in Okinawa, Japan.

10
 On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next port of call in Makassar,
Indonesia. On January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m. while transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground on the
northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles east-southeast of Palawan. No one was
injured in the incident, and there have been no reports of leaking fuel or oil.

Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the USS Guardian
cause and continue to cause environmental damage of such magnitude as to affect the provinces of
Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan,
Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, which events violate their constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful ecology.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not petitioners have legal standing.

2. Whether or not US respondents may be held liable for damages caused by USS Guardian.
3. Whether or not the waiver of immunity from suit under VFA applies in this case.

HELD:

First issue: YES.

Petitioners have legal standing

Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.” Specifically, it is “a

party’s personal and substantial interest in a case where he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a
result” of the act being challenged, and “calls for more than just a generalized grievance.” However, the rule on
standing is a procedural matter which this Court has relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens,
taxpayers and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the subject matter of the
controversy is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public
interest.

In the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., we recognized the “public right” of citizens to “a
balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in
the fundamental law.” We declared that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology need not be written in the
Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and polittcal rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from
the inception of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational implications.
Such right carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.

On the novel element in the class suit filed by the petitioners minors in Oposa, this Court ruled that
not only do ordinary citizens have legal standing to sue for the enforcement of environmental rights, they can
do so in representation of their own and future generations.

Second issue: YES.

The US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding officers of the US Navy who
had control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew. The alleged act or omission resulting in the
unfortunate grounding of the USS Guardian on the TRNP was committed while they were performing official
military duties. Considering that the satisfaction of a judgment against said officials will require remedial actions
11
and appropriation of funds by the US government, the suit is deemed to be one against the US itself. The
principle of State immunity therefore bars the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over the persons of
respondents Swift, Rice and Robling.

During the deliberations, Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio took the position that the
conduct of the US in this case, when its warship entered a restricted area in violation of R.A. No. 10067 and
caused damage to the TRNP reef system, brings the matter within the ambit of Article 31 of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). He explained that while historically, warships enjoy sovereign
immunity from suit as extensions of their flag State, Art. 31 of the UNCLOS creates an exception to this rule in
cases where they fail to comply with the rules and regulations of the coastal State regarding passage through
the latter’s internal waters and the territorial sea.

In the case of warships, as pointed out by Justice Carpio, they continue to enjoy sovereign immunity
subject to the following exceptions:

Article 30: Non-compliance by warships with the laws and regulations of the coastal State

If any warship does not comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning passage through
the territorial sea and disregards any request for compliance therewith which is made to it, the coastal State
may require it to leave the territorial sea immediately.

Article 31: Responsibility of the flag State for damage caused by a warship or other government ship operated
for non-commercial purposes

The flag State shall bear international responsibility for any loss or damage to the coastal State resulting from
the non-compliance by a warship or other government ship operated for non-commercial purposes with the
laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning passage through the territorial sea or with the provisions
of this Convention or other rules of international law.

Article 32: Immunities of warships and other government ships operated for non-commercial purposes

With such exceptions as are contained in subsection A and in articles 30 and 31, nothing in this
Convention affects the immunities of warships and other government ships operated for non-commercial
purposes. A foreign warship’s unauthorized entry into our internal waters with resulting damage to marine
resources is one situation in which the above provisions may apply.

But what if the offending warship is a non-party to the UNCLOS, as in this case, the US?

According to Justice Carpio, although the US to date has not ratified the UNCLOS, as a matter of long-
standing policy the US considers itself bound by customary international rules on the “traditional uses of the
oceans” as codified in UNCLOS.

Moreover, Justice Carpio emphasizes that “the US refusal to join the UNCLOS was centered on its
disagreement with UNCLOS” regime of deep seabed mining (Part XI) which considers the oceans and deep
seabed commonly owned by mankind,” pointing out that such “has nothing to do with its the US’ acceptance of
customary international rules on navigation.”

The Court also fully concurred with Justice Carpio’s view that non-membership in the UNCLOS does not mean
that the US will disregard the rights of the Philippines as a Coastal State over its internal waters and territorial
sea. We thus expect the US to bear “international responsibility” under Art. 31 in connection with the USS
Guardian grounding which adversely affected the Tubbataha reefs. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that our
12
long-time ally and trading partner, which has been actively supporting the country’s efforts to preserve our vital
marine resources, would shirk from its obligation to compensate the damage caused by its warship while
transiting our internal waters. Much less can we comprehend a Government exercising leadership in
international affairs, unwilling to comply with the UNCLOS directive for all nations to cooperate in the global
task to protect and preserve the marine environment as provided in Article 197 of UNCLOS

Article 197: Cooperation on a global or regional basis

States shall cooperate on a global basis and, as appropriate, on a regional basis, directly or through competent
international organizations, in formulating and elaborating international rules, standards and recommended
practices and procedures consistent with this Convention, for the protection and preservation of the marine
environment, taking into account characteristic regional features.

In fine, the relevance of UNCLOS provisions to the present controversy is beyond dispute. Although the said
treaty upholds the immunity of warships from the jurisdiction of Coastal States while navigating the latter’s
territorial sea, the flag States shall be required to leave the territorial sea immediately if they flout the laws and
regulations of the Coastal State, and they will be liable for damages caused by their warships or any other
government vessel operated for non-commercial purposes under Article 31.

Third issue: NO.

The waiver of State immunity under the VF A pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and not to special
civil actions such as the present petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan. In fact, it can be inferred from
Section 17, Rule 7 of the Rules that a criminal case against a person charged with a violation of an
environmental law is to be filed separately.

The Court considered a view that a ruling on the application or non-application of criminal jurisdiction
provisions of the VFA to US personnel who may be found responsible for the grounding of the USS Guardian,
would be premature and beyond the province of a petition for a writ of Kalikasan.

The Court also found unnecessary at this point to determine whether such waiver of State immunity
is indeed absolute. In the same vein, we cannot grant damages which have resulted from the violation of
environmental laws. The Rules allows the recovery of damages, including the collection of administrative fines
under R.A. No. 10067, in a separate civil suit or that deemed instituted with the criminal action charging the
same violation of an environmental law.

CASE DIGEST : Lasco Vs UNITED NATIONS REVOLVING FUND FOR NATURAL RESOURCES
EXPLORATION (UNRFNRE)
G.R. Nos. 109095-109107 February 23, 1995 ELDEPIO LASCO, RODOLFO ELISAN, URBANO BERADOR,
FLORENTINO ESTOBIO, MARCELINO MATURAN, FRAEN BALIBAG, CARMELITO GAJOL,
DEMOSTHENES MANTO, SATURNINO BACOL, SATURNINO LASCO, RAMON LOYOLA, JOSENIANO B.
ESPINA, all represented by MARIANO R. ESPINA, petitioner, vs. UNITED NATIONS REVOLVING FUND
FOR NATURAL RESOURCES EXPLORATION (UNRFNRE) represented by its operations manager, DR.
KYRIACOS LOUCA, OSCAR N. ABELLA, LEON G. GONZAGA, JR., MUSIB M. BUAT, Commissioners of
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Fifth Division, Cagayan de Oro City and IRVING PETILLA,
Labor Arbiter of Butuan City, respondents.

Facts: Petitioners were dismissed from their employment with privaterespondent, the United Nations Revolving
Fund for NaturalResourcesExploration (UNRFNRE), which is a special fund and subsidiary organ of theUnited

13
Nations.The UNRFNRE is involved in a joint project of thePhilippineGovernment and the United Nations for
exploration work in Dinagat Island.Petitioners are thecomplainants for illegal dismissal and damages.Private
respondent alleged that respondent Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over its personality since itenjoyed
diplomatic immunity.

Issue:WON specialized agencies enjoy diplomatic immunity

Held:Petition is dismissed. This is not to say that petitioner have no recourse.Section 31 of the Convention on
the Privileges and Immunitiesof the SpecializedAgencies of the United Nations states that ³each specialized
agency shall makea provision for appropriate modes of settlement of (a) disputes arising out of contracts or
other disputes of private character to which thespecialized agencyisa party.´ Private respondent is not engaged
in a commercial venture in thePhilippines.Its presence is by virtue of a joint project entered into by
thePhilippine Government and theUnited Nations for mineral exploration in DinagatIsland

ERNESTO CALLADO vs. INTERNATIONAL RICE RESEARCH INSTITUTE (IRRI)

G.R. No. 106483 May 22, 1995/ ROMERO, J.:

Facts: Ernesto Callado, petitioner, was employed as a driver at the IRRI. One day while driving an IRRI vehicle
on an official trip to the NAIA and back to the IRRI, petitioner figured in an accident.

Petitioner was informed of the findings of a preliminary investigation conducted by the IRRI's Human Resource
Development Department Manager. In view of the findings, he was charged with:

(1) Driving an institute vehicle while on official duty under the influence of liquor;

(2) Serious misconduct consisting of failure to report to supervisors the failure of the vehicle to start because of
a problem with the car battery, and

(3) Gross and habitual neglect of duties.

Petitioner submitted his answer and defenses to the charges against him. However, IRRI issued a Notice of
Termination to petitioner.

Thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal, illegal suspension and
indemnity pay with moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.

14
IRRI wrote the Labor Arbiter to inform him that the Institute enjoys immunity from legal process by virtue of
Article 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1620, 5 and that it invokes such diplomatic immunity and privileges as an
international organization in the instant case filed by petitioner, not having waived the same.

While admitting IRRI's defense of immunity, the Labor Arbiter, nonetheless, cited an Order issued by the
Institute to the effect that "in all cases of termination, respondent IRRI waives its immunity," and, accordingly,
considered the defense of immunity no longer a legal obstacle in resolving the case.

The NLRC found merit in private respondent's appeal and, finding that IRRI did not waive its immunity, ordered
the aforesaid decision of the Labor Arbiter set aside and the complaint dismissed.

In this petition petitioner contends that the immunity of the IRRI as an international organization granted by
Article 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1620 may not be invoked in the case at bench inasmuch as it waived the
same by virtue of its Memorandum on "Guidelines on the handling of dismissed employees in relation to P.D.
1620."

Issue: Did the (IRRI) waive its immunity from suit in this dispute which arose from an employer-employee
relationship?

Held: No.

P.D. No. 1620, Article 3 provides:

Art. 3. Immunity from Legal Process. The Institute shall enjoy immunity from any penal, civil and administrative
proceedings, except insofar as that immunity has been expressly waived by the Director-General of the
Institute or his authorized representatives.

The SC upholds the constitutionality of the aforequoted law. There is in this case "a categorical recognition by
the Executive Branch of the Government that IRRI enjoys immunities accorded to international organizations,
which determination has been held to be a political question conclusive upon the Courts in order not to
embarass a political department of Government.

It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers that diplomatic
immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a determination by the
executive branch of the government, and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by
the executive branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept the
claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the government or other officer
acting under his direction.

15
The raison d'etre for these immunities is the assurance of unimpeded performance of their functions by the
agencies concerned.

The grant of immunity to IRRI is clear and unequivocal and an express waiver by its Director-General is the
only way by which it may relinquish or abandon this immunity.

In cases involving dismissed employees, the Institute may waive its immunity, signifying that such waiver is
discretionary on its part.

Calub and Valencia vs. CA G.R. No. 115634, April 27, 2000
Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: The Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Team of the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office of the DENR apprehended 2 motor vehicles loaded with illegally sourced lumber.
Thedrivers of the vehicles failed to present proper documents. Thus, the apprehending team impounded the
vehicles and its load of lumber. The impounded vehicles were forcibly taken by the drivers from the custody of
DENR. Thereafter, one of the 2 vehicles was again apprehended by acomposite team of DENR-CENRO and
Phil. Army elements. The vehicle was again loaded with forest products.

Private respondents Manuela Babalcon, the vehicle owner, and Constancio Abuganda, the driver, filed a
complaint for the recovery of possession of the vehicle with an application for replevin against petitioners
DENR and DENR Officer Calub.

Issue: Whether or not the complaint for the recovery of possession of impounded vehicles, with
an application for replevin, is a suit against the State

Held: Well established is the doctrine that the State may not be sued without its consent. And a suit against a
public officer for his official acts is, in effect, a suit against the State if its purpose is to hold the State ultimately
liable. However, the protection afforded to public officers by thisdoctrine generally applies only to activities
within the scope of their authority in good faith and without willfulness, malice or corruption.

In the present case, the acts for which the petitioners are being called to account were performed by them in
16
the discharge of their official duties. The acts in question are clearly official in nature. In implementing and
enforcing Secs. 78-A and 89 of the Forestry Code through the seizurecarried out, petitioners were performing
their duties and functions as officers of the DENR, and did so within the limits of their authority. There was no
malice or bad faith on their part. Hence, a suit against the petitioners who represent the DENR is a suit against
the State. It cannot prosper without the State’s consent.

BUREAU OF PRINTING v. BUREAU OF PRINTING EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, GR No. L-15751, 1961-01-

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Facts:

he action in question was upon complaint of the respondent Bureau of Printing Employees Association (NLU)...
against herein petitioners Bureau of

Printing,... The complaint alleged that Serafin Salvador and Mariano Ledesma have been engaging in unfair
labor practice by interfering with,... or coercing the employees of the Bureau of Printing, particularly the
members of the complaining association, in the exercise of their right to self-organization and discriminating in
regard to hire and tenure of their employment in order to discourage them from pursuing their... union activities.

the petitioners... denied the charges of unfair labor practices attributed to them and, by way of affirmative
defenses, alleged, among other things, that respondents... were suspended pending result of an administrative
investigation against them for breach of Civil Service rules and regulations; that the Bureau of Printing has no
juridical personality to sue and be sued;... that said Bureau of

Printing is not an industrial concern engaged for the purpose of gain but is an agency of the Republic
performing governmental functions.

Issues:

that the Bureau of Printing has no juridical personality to sue and be sued

Ruling:

Clearly, while the Bureau of Printing is allowed to undertake private printing jobs, it cannot be pretended that it
is thereby an industrial... or business concern. The additional work it executes for private parties is merely
incidental to its function, and although such work may be deemed proprietary in character, there is no showing
that the employees performing said proprietary function are separate and distinct... from those employed in its
general governmental functions.

ndeed, as an office of the Government, without any corporate or juridical personality, the Bureau of Printing
cannot be sued

Any suit, action or proceeding against it, if it were to produce any effect, would actually be a suit, action or...
proceeding against the Government itself, and the rule is settled that the Government cannot be sued without
its consent, much less over its objection.

Said administrative charges are for insubordination,... grave misconduct and acts prejudicial to public service
committed by inciting the employees of the Bureau of Printing to walk out of their jobs against the order of the
duly constituted officials.

Under the law, the Heads of Departments and Bureaus are authorized to institute... and investigate
administrative charges against erring subordinates.

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MOBIL PHIL INC VS CUSTOM ARRASTRE SERVICE

G.R. No. L-23139 18 SCRA 1120 December 17, 1966

MOBIL PHILIPPINES EXPLORATION, INC., plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
CUSTOMS ARRASTRE SERVICE and BUREAU of CUSTOMS, defendants-appellees

Facts:

This case was filed by Mobil Phil Exploration Inc. against the Customs Arrastre Service and the Bureau of
Customs to recover the value of the undelivered case of rotary drill parts.

Four cases of rotary drill parts were shipped from abroad, consigned to Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc. The
shipment was discharged to the custody of the Customs Arrastre Service, the unit of the Bureau of Customs
then handling arrastre operations therein. The Customs Arrastre Service later delivered to the broker of the
consignee three cases only of the shipment. Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc filed suit in the Court of First
Instance of Manila against the Customs Arrastre Service and the Bureau of Customs to recover the value of
the undelivered case plus other damages.

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that not being persons under the law,
defendants cannot be sued. Appellant contends that not all government entities are immune from suit; that
defendant Bureau of Customs as operator of the arrastre service at the Port of Manila, is discharging
proprietary functions and as such, can be sued by private individuals.

Issues:

Whether or not both Customs Arrastre Service and the Bureau of Customs can invoke state immunity.

Discussions:

The Bureau of Custom, is a part of Department of Finance. It does not have a separate juridical personality of
its own apart from that of the national government. Its primary function is governmental, that of assessing and
collecting lawful revenues from imported articles and all other tariff and customs duties, fees, charges, fines
and penalties (Sec. 602, R.A. 1937). To this function, arrastre service is a necessary incident. As stated in the
law, agencies of the government is not suable if it is performing governmental functions and if it an
unincorporated government entity without a separate juridical personality.

18
Rulings:

Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the Bureau of Customs cannot be sued for recovery of money and
damages involving arrastre services, considering that said arrastre function may be deemed proprietary,
because it is a necessary incident of the primary and governmental function of the Bureau of Customs. The
Court ruled that the fact that a non-corporate government entity performs a function proprietary in nature does
not necessarily result in its being suable. If said non-governmental function is undertaken as an incident to its
governmental function, there is no waiver thereby of the sovereign immunity from suit extended to such
government entity. The Supreme Court ruled that the plaintiff should have filed its present claim to the General
Auditing Office, it being for money under the provisions of Commonwealth Act 327, which state the conditions
under which money claims against the Government may be filed.

Sayson v. Singson,G.R. No. L-30044, 19 December 1973

09JAN

Second Division

[FERNANDO, J.]

FACTS: Petitioner Sayson was the Highway Auditor of the Bureau of Public Highways who found overpricing in
the procurement of spare parts for the repair of a D-8 bulldozer. Singson as sole proprietor of Singkier Motor
Service, filed a complaint in the lower court against the Auditor claiming for the payment of the balance,
amounting to P8,706, which was withheld due to alleged overpricing. The lower court adjudged Singson as
entitled to collect the balance. Hence this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: Is the lower court correct in taking cognizance of the case filed by Singson for contractual money
claims against the government?

HELD: NO.

Actually, the suit disguised as one for mandamus to compel the Auditors to approve the vouchers for payment,
is a suit against the State, which cannot prosper or be entertained by the Court except with the consent of the
State. In other words, the respondent should have filed his claim with the General Auditing Office, under the
provisions of Commonwealth Act 327 which prescribe the conditions under which money claim against the
government may be filed.

It is true that once consent is secured, an action may be filed. There is nothing to prevent the State, however,
in such statutory grant, to require that certain administrative proceedings be had and be exhausted. Also, the
proper forum in the judicial hierarchy can be specified if thereafter an appeal would be taken by the party
aggrieved. Here, there was no ruling of the Auditor General. Even had there been such, the court to which the
matter should have been elevated is this Tribunal; the lower court could not legally act on the matter. What
transpired was anything but that. It is quite obvious then that it does not have the imprint of validity.

VICTORIA AMIGABLE vs. NICOLAS CUENCA G.R. No. L-26400 February 29, 1972
FACTS: Victoria Amigable is the is the registered owner of a lot which, without prior expropriation proceedings
or negotiated sale, was used by the government. Amigable's counsel wrote the President of the Philippines
requesting payment of the portion of her lot which had been expropriated by the government.

19
Amigable later filed a case against Cuenca, the Commissioner of Public Highways, for recovery of ownership
and possession of the said lot. She also sought payment for comlensatory damages, moral damages and
attorney's fees.

The defendant said that the case was premature, barred by prescription, and the government did not give its
consent to be sued.

ISSUE: W/N the appellant may properly sue the government.

HELD: Where the government takes away property from a private landowner for public use without going
through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit
against the government without violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit.

The doctrine of immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice to a citizen. The
only relief available is for the government to make due compensation which it could and should have done
years ago. To determine just compensation of the land, the basis should be the price or value at the time of the
taking.

USA VS RUIZ

G.R. No. L-35645 136 scra 487 May 22, 1985

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CAPT. JAMES E. GALLOWAY, WILLIAM I. COLLINS and ROBERT
GOHIER, petitioners,
vs.
HON. V. M. RUIZ, Presiding Judge of Branch XV, Court of First Instance of Rizal and ELIGIO DE GUZMAN &
CO., INC., respondents.

Facts:

This is a petition to review, set aside certain orders and restrain perpetually the proceedings done by Hon. Ruiz
for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court.

The United States of America had a naval base in Subic, Zambales. The base was one of those provided in
the Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the United States. Sometime in May, 1972, the
United States invited the submission of bids for a couple of repair projects. Eligio de Guzman land Co., Inc.
responded to the invitation and submitted bids. Subsequent thereto, the company received from the US two
telegrams requesting it to confirm its price proposals and for the name of its bonding company. The company
construed this as an acceptance of its offer so they complied with the requests. The company received a letter
which was signed by William I. Collins of Department of the Navy of the United States, also one of the
petitioners herein informing that the company did not qualify to receive an award for the projects because of its
previous unsatisfactory performance rating in repairs, and that the projects were awarded to third parties. For
this reason, a suit for specific performance was filed by him against the US.

20
Issues:

Whether or not the US naval base in bidding for said contracts exercise governmental functions to be able to
invoke state immunity.

Discussions:

The traditional role of the state immunity exempts a state from being sued in the courts of another state without
its consent or waiver. This rule is necessary consequence of the principle of independence and equality of
states. However, the rules of international law are not petrified; they are continually and evolving and because
the activities of states have multiplied. It has been necessary to distinguish them between sovereign and
governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that
State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperil. The restrictive application of State immunity is now the
rule in the United States, the United Kingdom and other states in western Europe.

Rulings:

Yes. The Supreme Court held that the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case
the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the United States
and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest order, they are not utilized for nor
dedicated to commercial or business purposes.

The restrictive application of state immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial
transactions of the foreign sovereign. Its commercial activities of economic affairs. A state may be descended
to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued. Only when it
enters into business contracts.

G.R. No. 76607 182 SCRA 644 February 26, 1990

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, FREDERICK M. SMOUSE AND YVONNE REEVES, petitioners,

vs.
HON. ELIODORO B. GUINTO, Presiding Judge, Branch LVII, Regional Trial Court, Angeles City, ROBERTO
T. VALENCIA, EMERENCIANA C. TANGLAO, AND PABLO C. DEL PILAR, respondents.

Facts:

The case involves the doctrine of state immunity. The United States of America was not impleaded in the case
at bar but has moved to dismiss on the ground that they are in effect suits against it to which it has not
consented.

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The private respondents are suing several officers of the US Air Force in Clark Air Base in connection with the
bidding conducted by them for contracts for barber services in the said base. Among those who submitted their
bids were private respondents Roberto T. Valencia, Emerenciana C. Tanglao, and Pablo C. del Pilar.

The Bidding was won by Ramon Dizon over the objection of the private respondents who claimed that he had
made a bid for 4 facilities, including the Civil Engineering Area which was not included in the invitation to bid.

The private respondents filed a complaint in the court below to compel Philippine Area Exchange (PHAX) and
the individual petitioners to cancel the award to Dizon, to conduct a rebidding for the barbershop concessions
and to allow the private respondents by a writ of preliminary injunction to continue operating the concessions
pending litigation.

The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss and opposition to the petition for preliminary injunction on the ground
that the action was in effect a suit against USA which had not waived its non-suability, but trial court denied the
application for a writ of preliminary injunction.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the action was in effect a suit against United States of America.

2. Whether or not the petitioners were immune from suit under the RP-US Bases Treaty for acts done by

them in the performance of their official duties.

Discussions:

The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent, is one of the generally accepted principles of
international law that we have adopted as part of the law of our land.

Even without such affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally accepted principles of international law
under the doctrine of incorporation. Under this doctrine, as accepted by the majority of states, such principles
are deemed incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a condition and consequence of its membership
in the society of nations. Upon its admission to such society, the state is automatically obligated to comply with
these principles in its relations with other states.

While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to
complaints filed against officials of the states for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their
duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative
act to satisfy the same, the suit must be regarded as against the state although it has not been formally

22
impleaded. When the government enters into a contract, it is deemed to have descended to the level of the
other contracting party and divested of its sovereign immunity from suit with its implied consent.

Rulings:

1. The court finds the barbershops subject to the concessions granted by the US government to be

commercial enterprises operated by private persons. They are not agencies of the United States Armed

Forces nor are their facilities demandable as a matter of right by the American servicemen. These

establishments provide for the grooming needs of their customers. This being the case, the petitioners

cannot plead any immunity from the complaint filed by the private respondents in the court below.

2. Petitioners states they have acted in the discharge of their official functions as officers or agents of the

United States. They are sought to be held answerable for personal torts in which the United States itself

is not involved. If found liable, they and they alone must satisfy the judgment.

The Court would have directly resolved the claims against the defendants, except for the paucity of the record
in the case at hand. The evidence of the alleged irregularity in the grant of the barbershop concessions is not
before the Court. The respondent court will have to receive that evidence first, so it can later determine on the
basis thereof if the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief they seek. Accordingly, this case must also be remanded
to the court below for further proceedings.

E. Meritt v. Government of the Philippine Islands, G.R. No. L-11154, 21 March 1916

09JAN

En Banc

[TRENT, J.]

FACTS: Section 1 Act No. 2457, authorized to E. Meritt to file a “suit in the Court of First Instance of the City of
Manila against the Government of the Philippine Islands in order to fix the responsibility for the collision
between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital, and to determine the amount of the
damages, if any, to which Mr. E. Merritt is entitled on account of said collision, and the Attorney-General of the
Philippine Islands is hereby authorized and directed to appear at the trial on the behalf of the Government of
said Islands, to defendant said Government at the same.”

ISSUE: Did the Government of the Philippine Islands, in enacting the above quoted Act, simply waive its
immunity from suit or did it also concede its liability to the plaintiff?

HELD: The Act only waived state immunity from suit.

By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby concede its liability
to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or extend its liability to any cause not previously

23
recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the
court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense.

It being quite clear that Act No. 2457 does not operate to extend the Government’s liability to any cause not
previously recognized.

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